成唯識論 義疏通講 · 冊3

Having finished discussing the substance of the first six evolving consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), this section turns to the caitta, the "mental factors" — that crowd of mental functions which constantly move in step with the mind-king. It first gives a general statement: the mental factors fall into six great classes (six positions), fifty-one in all; then it explains how these six consciousnesses correspond to the three feelings of pain, pleasure, and the neutral feeling; and then, following the verses, it expounds in detail the first two of the six classes — the "universal five" and the "object-specific five." The places where the debate is most densely argued are two: first, the long dispute over whether what is felt in the hells is bodily pain or mental distress, and second, the several variant readings on whether the object-specific five must arise together and how they correspond to the five feelings. We open it up section by section below.

What this section establishes has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. As for the names and definitions of the mental factors, although the scriptures speak of them only sparingly, there is still a scriptural root to anchor them to. The Saṃyukta-āgama says "faculty, object, and consciousness, these three, come together and there is contact; arising together with contact are feeling, perception, and volition" — and this "the coming-together of three gives rise to contact, and arising together with contact are feeling, perception, and volition" is precisely the scriptural basis on which the treatise proves the "universal," showing that contact, together with feeling, perception, and volition, constantly co-arise and pervade every state of mind. As for "attention," a scripture likewise says "only if the faculty is unimpaired, the object is present, and attention rightly arises can consciousness arise," making clear that attention too pervades every state of mind. The scriptures point to the universal ones only in brief; the complete inventory of the substance and function of the six classes of mental associate, and the definitions of each one, fall to the treatises. The Yogācārabhūmi, in its chapter on the auxiliaries, lists the full inventory of the corresponding mental factors, ranking the universal five (attention, contact, feeling, perception, volition) and the object-specific five (aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) at the head; the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā go further and fix the "substance and function" of the universal five and the object-specific five one by one — for instance, saying that "aspiration" has "drawing forth longing upon a longed-for matter as its substance, and serving as the basis of right diligence as its function," and that "wisdom" has "discerning dharmas upon an observed matter as its substance, and severing doubt as its function." The kind of definition in Dharmapāla's compiled commentary in this treatise — "What is aspiration? Upon a longed-for object, it has wishing as its nature and serving as the basis of diligence as its function" — all derives from these. So the scriptural root of this section lies in the Āgama's "coming-together of three giving rise to contact," and the treatise-basis lies in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā — and with that we follow the verses and open the exposition.

A. The Six Consciousnesses Generally, and Their Correspondence with the Six Classes of Mental Factors

1. What "Mental Associate" Means — Its Relationship to the Mind-King

How many kinds of mental associate do the six consciousnesses correspond with? The verse answers: these mental factors fall, in all, into six classes — the universal, the object-specific, the wholesome, the afflictions, the secondary afflictions, and the indeterminate — and all of them correspond with the three feelings of pain, pleasure, and neutrality. The treatise then says: these six evolving consciousnesses, generally speaking, correspond with the "six classes of mental associate," that is, with the class of universal ones and so on, six classes in all.

Why are they called "mental factors"? Because they constantly arise in dependence on the mind-king, correspond with the mind-king, and belong to the mind-king — just as we set up the term "what is mine" for things that belong to me, so these functions that belong to the mind and accompany it are named "mental factors" (literally, "what belongs to the mind"). Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) marks out what each of these three meanings answers to: the meaning "constantly arising in dependence on the mind" displays the universal ones (they invariably arise along with the mind); the meaning "corresponding with the mind" displays the remaining mental factors (corresponding by way of same-object, same-time, same-support); and only the meaning "belonging to the mind, taking the mind as sovereign" is the proper sense of the name "mental associate" (the mental associate accompanies the mind and cannot stand on its own) — only when all three meanings are present is the name "mental associate" established.

What, then, is the division of labor between mind-king and mental associate? The mind-king, facing its object, grasps only its "general aspect" (its overall outline); the mental associate, facing the very same object, grasps not only the general aspect but also the "particular aspect" (each separate facet), and it helps bring about the mind-king's work — and that is precisely why it earns the name "mental associate." It is like a master painter working with apprentices: the master draws the outline (sets the form), the apprentices fill in the color (apply the pigment); each has its task, and together they complete a single painting — the mind-king grasps the general, the mental factors grasp the particular, and only the two together complete one full act of cognition.

This principle has scriptural and treatise authority. The Yogācārabhūmi says: "consciousness" can discern the general aspect of a thing; "attention" can discern the facet that consciousness has not yet discerned — and this is the particular aspect that the mental factors grasp: "contact" discerns the facet of "agreeable or disagreeable," "feeling" discerns the facet of "appropriating and receiving," "perception" discerns the facet of "the basis for verbal designation," and "volition" discerns the facet of "right cause and so on" — therefore attention and the rest are all called "mental-associate dharmas." This passage also shows that the mental factors in fact also take the general aspect as their object (they do not grasp only the particular aspect). Elsewhere it again says: "aspiration" too can discern the facet of "what is delightful," "resolve" too discerns the facet of "the settled," "mindfulness" too discerns the facet of "what was formerly practiced," and "concentration and wisdom" too discern the facet of "merit and fault" — and by this the mind comes to arise as wholesome or defiled upon its object. So it is clear that the mental factors, facing their object, all grasp the particular aspect in addition to the general aspect.

2. Fifty-One in All Across the Six Classes, and Why Each Class Is Named as It Is

Although these functions are all alike called "mental factors" (with no difference in name or in meaning), by difference of kind they are divided into six classes: the universal, five; the object-specific, five; the wholesome, eleven; the (root) afflictions, six; the secondary afflictions, twenty; and the indeterminate, four — which comes to exactly fifty-one. Each class is named for a reason. "Universal" — because it is invariably found in every state of mind. "Object-specific" — because it arises only when it takes a particular object. "Wholesome" — because it arises only within a wholesome mind. "(Root) affliction" — because its very nature is subsumed under the root afflictions. "Secondary affliction" — because it is merely an outflow, a derivative-equivalent, of the root afflictions. "Indeterminate" — because it is not fixed with respect to wholesome, defiled, and the rest (it may be good or bad).

Here a variant reading must be added: the Yogācārabhūmi combines these six classes into five — because the "afflictions" and the "secondary afflictions" are alike defiled, it merges these two into a single "defiled class" for counting. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) also reconciles this number of "fifty-one in all": the way this treatise opens out the "fifty-one" differs from the fifty-three of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and from the fifty-three and fifty-five of the Yogācārabhūmi, the difference being that this treatise opens out, within the object-specific, several additional ones such as "wrong aspiration" and "wrong resolve" (a different opening and folding), so the numbers do not match; and this number "fifty-one" agrees precisely with the Prakaraṇa-āryavācā-śāstra, the Pañcaskandhaka, and the Hundred Dharmas treatise.

3. Clarifying the Distinctions Among the Five Classes by the "Four Universalities"

The treatise then takes a further angle, distinguishing them by the "four universalities" (here reckoned according to the five classes after the merger). The "four universalities" are four measures of "pervasive or not": whether it extends to "all moral natures" (the three natures of wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), whether it extends to "all stages," whether it extends to "all times" (present at any moment), and whether it extends to "all co-arisings" (able to co-arise with every state of mind). Apply these four measures to the five classes: the "universal" possesses all four universalities; the "object-specific" holds only the first two (all natures, all stages); the "wholesome" holds only one (all stages); the "defiled" class (afflictions and secondary afflictions merged) holds none of the four; and the "indeterminate" holds only one (all natures). By these four measures the differences of kind among the five classes are clarified.

B. The Six Consciousnesses and Their Correspondence with the Three Feelings

1. What the Three Feelings — Pleasure, Pain, and Neither-Painful-Nor-Pleasant — Are

These six evolving consciousnesses are "shifting and unsettled" (they change with their object), and so all of them admit correspondence with the "three feelings." Why? Because they all receive the three kinds of object-appearance: the agreeable, the disagreeable, and the one that is neither. Receiving an agreeable object-appearance, one that gladdens body and mind, is "pleasant feeling." Receiving a disagreeable object-appearance, one that oppresses body and mind, is "painful feeling." Receiving the moderate object-appearance that is neither agreeable nor disagreeable, that neither oppresses nor gladdens body or mind, is "neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling" (that is, neutral feeling).

2. These Three Feelings Can Also Be Opened Out into Two, Three, Four, and Five

These same three feelings can be opened out further from different angles.

Opened into "two": those that correspond with the first five consciousnesses are called "bodily feeling" (because each depends severally on a bodily faculty); those that correspond with mental consciousness are called "mental feeling" (because it depends only on the mind). Moreover, all three feelings extend to the contaminated and the uncontaminated — even painful feeling can arise from the uncontaminated (for instance, the compassionate sorrow a bodhisattva feels out of pity for sentient beings).

Opened into "three": one way of dividing is "to-be-abandoned-by-seeing, to-be-abandoned-by-cultivation, and not-to-be-abandoned"; another way is "of the trainee, of the adept, and of neither (neither trainee nor adept)."

Opened into "four": that is, wholesome, unwholesome, obscured-neutral, and unobscured-neutral — the last two being two kinds of neutral feeling.

On this "opening into four" there is a variant reading. One view: each of the three feelings in fact admits being opened into four. The reasoning: the "spontaneously arising (naturally occurring) greed and delusion" that come when the five consciousnesses are active together, and the spontaneous afflictions in the purely painful destinies (the hells), so long as they "do not set deeds in motion," belong to the neutral nature — and all these admit correspondence with the faculty of pain. The Yogācārabhūmi says: "all afflictions that arise spontaneously become active across the three feelings; those that extend to all bodies-of-consciousness correspond with all faculties, and those that do not extend to all bodies-of-consciousness correspond with all faculties at the mental stage." The Abhidharma-samuccaya (in its expanded compendium) also says: "of the spontaneous afflictions bound to the desire realm, those that set evil conduct in motion count as unwholesome, and the rest are all obscured-neutral." So it is known that each of the three feelings admits four kinds (wholesome, unwholesome, obscured, unobscured).

Opened into "five": that is, pain, pleasure, distress, joy, and equanimity. Why must "pain and pleasure" within the three feelings each be split into two (pleasure split into pleasure and joy, pain split into pain and distress), while "neither-painful-nor-pleasant" is not split? There are three reasons. Pain and pleasure are split because: the aspect of oppression or gladdening differs in the "body" and in the "mind"; bodily feeling is non-discursive while mental feeling is discursive; and bodily feeling is especially heavy while mental feeling is comparatively slight — so pleasure splits into bodily pleasure and mental joy, and pain splits into bodily pain and mental distress. Neither-painful-nor-pleasant is not split, again for three reasons: its aspect of "neither oppressing nor gladdening" is the same in body and in mind; it is non-discursive; and it proceeds evenly — so there is no place where it could be split.

3. How Pleasant Feeling and Joyful Feeling Are Assigned According to the Stages

How are the "gladdening feelings" named according to the stages of meditative cultivation? Those corresponding with the five consciousnesses are uniformly called "pleasure." Those corresponding with mental consciousness depend on the stage: in the desire realm and in the "access concentrations" of the first and second meditative absorptions, it is called "joy" (because it gladdens only the mind, not the body); on reaching the "fundamental concentrations" of the first and second absorptions, it is called both "pleasure" and "joy" (gladdening both body and mind); and on reaching the access and fundamental concentrations of the third absorption, it is called "pleasure" (because here the tranquillity is especially heavy and is also non-discursive).

4. How Painful Feeling and Distressful Feeling Are Assigned to the Consciousnesses — In the Hells, Is It Distress or Pain?

And the "oppressing feelings"? Those corresponding with the five consciousnesses are uniformly called "pain." But as for the oppressing feeling that arises together with mental consciousness, whether it is called distress or pain — here a long dispute breaks out.

One view (called only "distress"): the oppressing feeling that arises together with mental consciousness is called only "distress," because what it oppresses is the mind. All the sacred teachings say "the aversive feeling at the mental stage is called the faculty of distress"; the Yogācārabhūmi says "the beings born in the hells, with the maturation-fruit followed without interval by maturation-born states, have painful feeling and distressful feeling in unbroken succession," and again "the applied and sustained thought in the hells arise together with distress, and so too for a portion of the hungry-ghost and animal destinies." So even the heaviest aversive feeling at the mental stage is still called "distress" — how much more, then, the lighter ones, which of course are also called distress.

Another view (it extends to both distress and pain): the oppressing feeling that arises together with mental consciousness in fact extends to both "distress" and "pain." Among humans and gods it is uniformly called "distress" (because it does not count as especially heavy); among animals and ghosts it is called both "distress" and "pain" (because there the painful feeling is sometimes mixed and sometimes pure, varying in weight); and in naraka (the hells) it is called only "pain" (because it is purely received, especially heavy, and non-discursive). This view too cites the Yogācārabhūmi's "all afflictions that arise spontaneously become active across the three feelings" (expounded at length as before), and cites "the innate view of self-identity is merely of the neutral nature" — then the extreme-grasping view of the same kind should be likewise — and so this co-arising painful feeling is not subsumed under the faculty of distress, because the treatise says the faculty of distress is not neutral, whereas this innate view is merely neutral; therefore the painful feeling accompanying it cannot be the faculty of distress, but must be the faculty of pain.

This "extends-to-both" view then cites a string of Yogācārabhūmi passages to establish firmly that "the hells are the faculty of pain, not the faculty of distress." The Yogācārabhūmi says "among the faculties of the hells, the remaining three faculties are definitely not active" (and the purely painful ghost and animal destinies are likewise). These "remaining three faculties" must be the three faculties of pleasure, joy, and distress — because the hells definitely accomplish the activity of "equanimity" (and since the faculty of equanimity is accomplished, it does not stand among "the remaining ones not accomplished"). Someone objects: "Then would not the momentarily arising 'adventitious equanimity' also definitely not be accomplished in the hells?" The reply turns it back: how do you know that passage speaks only of "adventitious feeling (the momentarily arising feeling)"? If that passage spoke only of adventitious feeling, it ought not to say that the hells "definitely accomplish the faculty of mind (constantly accomplished)," because those momentarily arising six adventitious consciousnesses are sometimes absent (not constant); therefore one should not force-read that treatise as speaking only of adventitious feeling — it speaks comprehensively of the "constantly accomplished faculty of mind," and there is no other reason to cut it in two halves of adventitious and constant feeling.

Going further: if that treatise truly spoke by way of "adventitious feeling," how could it also say that the hells "definitely accomplish eight faculties (constantly accomplished)"? Someone shifts the wording to rescue it: "because the five consciousnesses are not continuous in the hells, one must definitely take the 'faculty of distress' as the eighth faculty." Refute him: in the states of death, of birth, and of swooning, where would there be any faculty of distress (distress is a discursive feeling of the mental stage, and these three states have none of it at all)? Again, someone grasps the "faculty of pain" as the eighth faculty, and is refuted with the same words (death, birth, and swooning have no constant accomplishment of the faculty of pain either). Again, someone grasps "a single gender (the male or female faculty)" as the eighth faculty, and this too does not hold — the gender faculty is not fixed, and the hells, summoned by evil karma, admit beings without gender. In truth, the beings of the hells, pressed by evil karma, constantly receive pain at the five faculty-doors, so they definitely accomplish the eye and the rest (the five material faculties, the faculty of pain, the life faculty, and the faculty of mind — already seven faculties gathered); but turn it back and ask: what use is "there must definitely be a gender faculty" to the beings of the hells? In the great unremitting hell there can be no matter of lustful craving at all (so the gender faculty cannot be that constantly accomplished eighth). By this whole line of reasoning, the eighth constantly accomplished faculty must be the "faculty of equanimity" — because the seventh and the eighth consciousnesses constantly correspond with neutral feeling, and these two consciousnesses operate constantly in the hells, so the faculty of equanimity is constantly accomplished, and that is precisely the eighth faculty.

Then why do the hells not accomplish the three faculties of "joy, distress, and pleasure"? The principle is just like the "stage of supreme bliss" (the third absorption), where the mental gladdening is called only "pleasure" and there is no faculty of joy (pure pleasure without joy) — so, conversely, at the "place of supreme pain" (the hells), the mental oppression is called only "pain" and there is no faculty of distress (pure pain without distress). Therefore those "remaining three faculties" must refer to the three faculties of distress, joy, and pleasure (the hells do not accomplish these three and definitely accomplish the faculty of equanimity). As for the passages elsewhere that speak of the hells "having an outflow-pleasure," one must understand that this is spoken by way of the "principle-gate of according-with-others" (a provisional statement that accommodates another school's tenet); or else it speaks comprehensively, meaning that "apart from the hells, the other places of mixed feeling have no maturation-pleasure, and so it is called purely painful" — not that the hells truly have pleasure.

How, then, do we explain the sacred teachings' plain statement that "the aversive feeling at the mental stage is called the faculty of distress"? One must understand that this is spoken by way of "the majority of cases," or by way of the "gate of according-with-others," and so it does not conflict with "the hells are the faculty of pain." The earlier-cited Yogācārabhūmi passages — "in the hells pain and distress follow in succession," "the applied and sustained thought in the hells co-arise with distress, and a portion of the ghost and animal destinies likewise" — are all likewise spoken by way of the gate of according-with-others (not the definitive meaning).

Then why do the sacred teachings call that painful feeling in the hells co-arising with mental consciousness "distress"? Two explanations. First, it is "of the kind of distress," and so the word "distress" is borrowed and provisionally applied to it (it is in reality the faculty of pain). Second, that faculty of pain harms both body and mind, and so, although in substance it belongs to the faculty of pain, it is also called "distress" by extension — just as the earlier-mentioned "joy of the access concentration" benefits both body and mind, so although it is the faculty of joy, it is by extension also called "pleasure." The Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra and treatises like it make this principle very clear. Furthermore, in the "preliminary stage" concentration there is no faculty of pleasure (the treatise says there are only eleven faculties there). From all this it is known: "the aversive feeling at the mental stage," and "the place of purely received pain" (the hells), are both subsumed under the "faculty of pain" (not the faculty of distress).

These distinctions in the sacred teachings have many avenues; fearing the text would grow too tangled, we will not expound them one by one.

5. Can the Three Feelings of the Six Consciousnesses Arise Simultaneously?

The last dispute: can the three feelings of the six consciousnesses arise together at the same time?

One view (they cannot co-arise): the three feelings of the six consciousnesses cannot co-arise, because they are all "outward-door-operating" and mutually contradictory. The reasoning: the "five-accompanying mental consciousness" that arises together with the five consciousnesses takes the very same object as the five consciousnesses; if the five consciousnesses could have the three feelings together, then mental consciousness should likewise — but this contradicts right principle, so they definitely do not co-arise. As for what the Yogācārabhūmi and the like say, that "the store-consciousness corresponds with the evolving consciousnesses at one time, the three feelings arising together," that is spoken by way of "many moments (different instants)," just as the expression "one mind" does not refer to the arising-and-perishing of a single instant — so it does not count as a contradiction.

Another view (it admits co-arising, and this is the settled correct reading): the three feelings of the six consciousnesses do admit arising together at the same time. Because the agreeable object, the disagreeable object, and the moderate object can in their own right be received simultaneously; and because the feeling of mental consciousness need not be the same as the feeling of the five consciousnesses; and because the mind, when it "particularly attends to" a given object, arouses that one feeling, and when there is no particular attending it arouses neutral feeling — therefore the three feelings of the six consciousnesses do admit co-arising. But upon reaching the "stage of attained mastery" (buddhahood), only the three feelings of pleasure, joy, and equanimity remain — because the buddhas have already cut off the whole matter of "distress and pain." The six classes of mental factors have already been set out in brief above; now their distinguishing characteristics ought to be displayed in detail. So one first asks: what exactly are the characteristics of the first two classes (the universal and the object-specific)? The verse answers next.

C. The First Class — the Universal Five

1. The Names and Definitions of the Universal Ones, and the Twofold Proof from "Teaching" and "Reasoning"

The treatise says: first among the six classes is the "universal mental factors," that is, the five — contact, attention, feeling, perception, and volition (already expounded in detail before). How, then, is this characteristic of "universality" to be known? It is established by the two "criteria of certainty": "teaching" (the explicit text of the sacred teachings) and "reasoning" (investigation by right principle).

First, the side of "teaching." As a scripture says, "with eye and form as condition there arises eye-consciousness; the coming-together of the three — faculty, object, and consciousness — gives rise to contact; and arising together with contact are also feeling, perception, and volition" (expounded at length below) — by this passage we know that "contact," together with feeling, perception, and volition, these four, are universal. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) marks out, at this point on the "universal," the dispute that stood at the time: the Sarvāstivādins and the like asked only "whether these five pervade every state of mind," while the Sautrāntika masters and the like asked "whether these five, taken as really existent, can count as universal"; the fifty-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi cites this same Āgama passage to refute the Sautrāntikas — and since this passage is a root scripture admitted in common by the Great and the Small Vehicle (namely the Āgama), taking it as the scriptural proof of the "universal" is something none of the schools can rebut. And a scripture says, "if the faculty is unimpaired, the object is present, and attention rightly arises, only then can consciousness arise"; another scripture says, "wherever one attends, there one discerns; wherever one discerns, there one attends, so attention and consciousness, these two, constantly come together in mutual harmony" (expounded at length below) — by this passage we know that "attention" too is universal. Explicit texts of the sacred teachings of this kind are not in just one place.

Then the side of "reasoning," investigated for the five one by one. On "contact" being universal: the arising of consciousness always has the "coming-together of three" (the harmonizing of faculty, object, and consciousness), and the coming-together of three always gives rise to "contact," while the coming-together of three also definitely depends on "contact" to be accomplished (contact causes the three to come together); if there were no contact, then mind and mental factors could not come together to touch the same single object (contact is precisely the function that makes mind and mental factors touch one object together), so contact pervades every state of mind. On "attention" being universal: attention can guide the mind, making the mind incline toward its own object; if there were no attention, the mind could not arise at all, so attention pervades every state of mind. On "feeling" being universal: feeling can receive the three objects — agreeable, disagreeable, and moderate — making the mind and the rest arise with the aspect of gladness, aversion, or equanimity; there is no state of mind that arises lacking one of the feelings, so feeling pervades every state of mind. On "perception" being universal: perception can fix the "delimitation" (the bounding form) of its own object; if when the mind arose there were no perception, it could not grasp the delimiting aspect of the object, so perception pervades every state of mind. On "volition" being universal: volition can make the mind grasp the "right cause and so on" aspects and thereupon perform wholesome and other deeds; there is no state of mind that arises lacking volition, so there is definitely volition. From this it is proven: contact and the rest, these five dharmas, are all definitely present the moment the mind arises, and so are "universal"; the others (the object-specific and so on) are not universal, and this principle will be expounded below.

D. The Second Class — the Object-Specific Five

The treatise says: next is the class of "object-specific," that is, the five from "aspiration" to "wisdom" (aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom). The object-events they take are for the most part each different, and within the six classes they are ranked after the "first class (the universal)," so they are the second class. Each is discussed one by one below.

1. Aspiration — Wishing

What is "aspiration"? Upon a "longed-for object," it has "wishing" as its nature, and "serving as the basis of energetic diligence" as its function (only with wishing is one willing to be diligent).

What object, then, does "the longed-for" refer to? Here there are three views. One view (the delight-worthy object): "the longed-for" is the "delight-worthy object" — toward delight-worthy things one wishes to see, to hear, and so on, and has wishing. Someone objects: toward repugnant things, wishing that one will not meet them, wishing to be free of them — is this not also aspiration? Answer: this is merely seeking the "delight-worthy self-substance" attained upon "being freed from the repugnant," and is not aspiration toward the repugnant thing itself. So toward "repugnant" and "moderate" objects there is uniformly no aspiration; and even when one takes a delight-worthy thing as object, if no wishing arises, there is no aspiration either. Another view (the sought object): "the longed-for" is the "sought object" — toward both the delight-worthy and the repugnant, one seeks "union" and seeks "separation" and has wishing. In that case, only toward the "moderate" object is there uniformly no aspiration; and even taking a delight-worthy or repugnant thing as object, if no seeking arises, there is no aspiration. Another view (the object one wishes to observe): "the longed-for" is the "object one wishes to observe" — toward any thing whatever, if one wishes to observe it, there is wishing. If one does not wish to observe, but merely takes the object spontaneously under the force of cause and object, there is no aspiration at all. From this principle it can be known: "aspiration is not universal" (it does not pervade every state of mind).

In passing, a claim that "aspiration ought to be universal" is refuted. Someone says: it is precisely by the force of "wishing for the object" that mind and mental factors manage to take their object, so a scripture says "aspiration is the root of all dharmas" (and if so, aspiration ought to be universal). Refutation: that statement is wrong — the mind and the rest take their object "by relying on attention" (all the sacred teachings say that only with attention present can consciousness arise), and nowhere has it ever been said that "it is by relying on aspiration that mind and mental factors arise." Just as a scripture says "all dharmas have craving as their root" — are mind and mental factors then born by relying on craving (plainly not)? The scripture's saying "aspiration is the root of all dharmas" means "all the undertakings that aspiration sets in motion" (not that aspiration can give birth to all states of mind); or it means "wholesome aspiration can set right diligence in motion" — because wholesome aspiration helps bring about all wholesome deeds, the treatise therefore says aspiration is "the basis of energetic diligence."

2. Resolve — Imprinting and Holding

What is "resolve"? Upon a "settled object," it has "imprinting and holding" (settling and grasping firmly) as its nature, and "not being able to be drawn away" as its function. That is to say: by the force of teaching, the force of reasoning, and the force of witness — whether wrong or right — one examines and settles upon the object grasped, imprinting it and dwelling on it firmly, so that no other condition can ever stir it or alter it. So toward a "doubtful object" there is no resolve at all; and a mind that is not examining-and-settling has no resolve either. From this it is known: resolve is not subsumed under the universal.

In passing, a claim that "resolve ought to be universal" is refuted. Someone says: when mind and the rest take their own object, there is no obstruction, so they all have resolve (and if so, resolve ought to be universal). Refutation: that statement has no ground. Why? What "can be unobstructing" is the dharmas (the object-dharmas are by nature unobstructing), what "is unobstructed" is the mind and the rest (the mind is by nature unobstructed), and what truly "powerfully sets things in motion (forcefully arouses the mind to incline toward the object)" is the faculty and attention — if one insisted it is by relying on resolve that things are powerfully set in motion, then resolve itself would have to rely on something else, and that on something else again, committing the fault of "infinite regress."

3. Mindfulness — Clear Remembrance, Not Forgetting

What is "mindfulness"? Upon a "formerly-practiced object" (an object one has previously experienced), it has "making the mind remember clearly and not forget" as its nature, and "serving as the basis of concentration" as its function. That is to say: repeatedly holding in memory an object formerly received, making it not be lost, and thereby it can induce concentration. Toward a "formerly-unreceived" substance or kind of object, mindfulness cannot arise at all; and even toward what was formerly received, if it cannot be clearly remembered, mindfulness cannot arise either. So mindfulness is definitely not subsumed under the universal.

In passing, a claim that "mindfulness ought to be universal" is refuted. Someone says: the moment the mind arises there is definitely mindfulness accompanying it, because it can serve as the cause of "later remembrance" (and if so, mindfulness ought to be universal). Refutation: that statement has no ground. Take a counterexample: one cannot, because there is delusion, faith, and so on later on, infer back that the earlier mind too definitely had delusion or faith (what is present later cannot prove that it was present earlier). Besides, the force of the earlier mind, mental factors, or "perception" is already enough to serve as the cause of later remembrance (the earlier mindfulness is not necessarily required).

4. Concentration — Focused Attention, Not Scattered

What is "concentration"? Upon an "observed object," it has "making the mind focus and not scatter" as its nature, and "serving as the basis of knowledge" as its function. That is to say: when observing the object of "merit, fault, or neither," concentration makes the mind focus and not scatter, and in dependence on this there arises the "knowledge of discrimination."

One must note that the phrase "the mind focuses" means "it can dwell wherever one wishes to make it dwell," and does not mean that it can only be confined to a single object — were it otherwise, then at the path of seeing, where one observes the four truths in succession with each successive object different, would there then be no "even-holding (concentration)"? Conversely, if one does not bind the mind, and is not in the stage of a focused object, no concentration arises, so concentration is not universal.

In passing, several shifted reckonings that "concentration ought to be universal" are refuted. Someone says: even in a scattered state concentration arises, only its aspect is faint and hidden (and if so, concentration ought to be universal). Answer: one should speak honestly (one cannot force-assert that it is present). The first shifted reckoning: if one says "concentration can make the mind and the rest harmonize and incline toward one object together, so it is universal" — the principle does not hold; that is in fact the function of "contact" (not concentration). The second shifted reckoning: if one says "concentration can make the mind, within a single instant, not shift its object, so it is subsumed under the universal" — this too is unreasonable; the mind of a single instant, with respect to its own object, has no question of "shifting" in the first place. The third shifted reckoning: if one says "it is by relying on concentration that the mind takes its object, so it is subsumed under the universal" — this too has no ground; it is "attention" that makes the mind take its object (not concentration). Yet another says: "the substance of concentration is just the mind" — because a scripture says "concentration is the training in the mind" and "the one-pointedness of mind." Refutation: that is no firm proof — it is said in this way "by relying on concentration to gather the mind and make the mind one-pointed" (not that concentration just is the mind). Moreover, concentration is also subsumed under "the faculty of concentration, the power of concentration, the awakening-factor of concentration, right concentration," and so on, just like mindfulness, wisdom, and the rest (all of which are mental factors), and so it is not the mind itself.

5. Wisdom — Discernment

What is "wisdom"? Upon an "observed object," it has "discernment (distinguishing and deciding)" as its nature, and "severing doubt" as its function. That is to say: when observing the object of merit, fault, or neither, by wisdom one investigates and arrives at a settled conclusion. In the deluded mind that is "not an object of observation" there is no discernment, so wisdom is not subsumed under the universal.

In passing, a claim that "wisdom ought to be universal" is refuted. Someone says: even in delusion wisdom arises, only its aspect is faint and hidden (and if so, wisdom ought to be universal). Refutation: "you heaven-beloved (you people)" — how do you know this? You say it is because the Abhidharma lists wisdom among the "great-ground dharmas (the universal)" — but the Abhidharma texts of the various schools contradict one another, so how can you take them as a criterion? The scripture says only "contact and the other five" are universal; "speaking of ten (the great-ground dharmas)" is not derived from the scripture, and should not be rigidly clung to. Furthermore, since "aspiration and the other five (the object-specific)" are not "contact and the other five," they are definitely not universal — just like faith, greed, and the rest (which are likewise not universal).

6. Whether the Object-Specific Five Must Arise Together — the Reckoning of the "Thirty-One Phrasings"

Do these five object-specific ones definitely draw one another up and appear together? Here there are two views.

One view (they definitely aid one another): these five definitely aid one another — whichever one arises, the other four are definitely present.

Another view (not necessarily, and this is the settled correct reading): not necessarily (they need not arise together). The Yogācārabhūmi says the object-specific lack the latter two of the "four universalities" (no all-times, no all-co-arisings); and it says these five arise by taking "four kinds of object" (the longed-for, the settled, the formerly-practiced, the observed) as condition, and the object grasped and the grasping consciousness do not necessarily arise together. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) assigns the earlier "they definitely aid one another" view to "the position of one master" — meaning that whenever any one of aspiration and the rest arises, the other four are definitely present; whereas this treatise takes "they need not arise together" as the settled correct reading.

Following the correct reading, the treatise reckons through all the various combinations.

It should be said that these five sometimes "arise singly": upon a longed-for object only wishing (aspiration) arises; or upon a settled object only imprinting-understanding (resolve); or upon a formerly-practiced object only remembrance (mindfulness); or upon an observed object only focus (concentration). The line "upon an observed object only concentration arises" needs special explanation here: those deluded folk, in order to still the scattered mind, focus on the object yet cannot discern it — everyone in the world knows them as "having concentration without wisdom." In the stage of preparatory practice they have little hearing and reflection, and so it is said "even-holding takes the observed object as condition"; or it is said this way by way of "the majority of cases." And like the "gods who play and forget," who focus on a single object yet arouse greed, hatred, and so on, they too have concentration without wisdom — and of this kind there are in fact a great many. Conversely there are also those who, "upon an observed object, only discernment (wisdom) arises" — that is, not focusing but galloping and scattering while investigating (having wisdom without concentration).

The case of "arising in twos": for instance, upon the two objects of the longed-for and the settled, wishing and resolve arise; or upon the two objects of the longed-for and the formerly-practiced, wishing and mindfulness arise... and so on down the line, up to, upon the observed object, concentration and wisdom arising — twelve phrasings in all.

The case of "arising in threes": for instance, upon the three objects of the longed-for, the settled, and the formerly-practiced, wishing, resolve, and mindfulness arise; and so on, up to, upon the formerly-practiced and the observed, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom arising — thirteen phrasings in all.

The case of "arising in fours": for instance, upon the four objects of the longed-for, the settled, the formerly-practiced, and the observed, the first four (wishing, resolve, mindfulness, concentration) arise; and so on, up to (lacking wishing) upon the settled, formerly-practiced, observed, and other objects, the latter four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) arising — "five fours" in all (five phrasings each arising in four).

The case of "arising in fives": upon the four objects of the longed-for, the settled, the formerly-practiced, and the observed, all five (wishing, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) arise. Thus, arousing the five — aspiration and the rest — within the "four objects," reckoning the general and the particular together, there are "thirty-one phrasings" in all.

There is, in addition, a state of mind where "none of the five arises": for instance, the "abrupt-falling mind" (a mind that flashes up suddenly, not yet discriminating) that is not upon those "four objects" (not the longed-for, settled, formerly-practiced, or observed), and the state arising together with the store-consciousness — and of this kind too there is more than one sort.

7. The Presence or Absence of the Object-Specific Five in the Several Consciousnesses

In the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, these object-specific five are present in some states and absent in others (already discussed above). The sixth, mental consciousness, in every state admits arising together with these five — whether "transformed at the basis" or "not yet transformed at the basis," neither case excludes them.

As for whether the first five consciousnesses have the object-specific five, here there are two views. One view (they have none): the first five consciousnesses have none of these five — because the five consciousnesses take "already-attained objects," they have no wishing (no aspiration); because they cannot examine-and-settle, they have no imprinting-and-holding (no resolve); because they constantly take "new objects," they have no recollection (no mindfulness); because they are by nature scattered and moving, they have no focus (no concentration); and because they cannot deliberate, they have no discernment (no wisdom).

Another view (they admit having them all, and this is the settled correct reading): the first five consciousnesses admit having these five. Although toward the object they have no "augmented wishing," they do have the faint, weak sense of "delighting in the object" (so they have aspiration); although toward the object they have no "augmented examining-and-settling," they do have the faint, weak sense of "imprinting the object" (so they have resolve); although they cannot clearly remember the substance of a formerly-practiced object, they do have a faint, weak kind of "mindfulness-object" (so they have mindfulness); although they do not deliberately bind their mindfulness to one object, they do have a faint, weak sense of "focus" (so they have concentration) — the "scattered and moving by nature" mentioned earlier negates "even-induction" (the kind induced by the concentration-stage), not "even-holding," so the five consciousnesses admit having concentration; and although they cannot deliberate upon the object, they do have a faint, weak sense of "discernment" (so they have wisdom). It is precisely for this reason that the sacred teachings say "the eye-superknowledge and the ear-superknowledge are the knowledge-nature corresponding with eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness" (and this is plain proof that the five consciousnesses have wisdom); and inferring the remaining three — nose, tongue, and body consciousness — by this, there is no fault in saying they too have wisdom.

One must also distinguish the two stages of the ordinary and the holy: in the "stage not yet at mastery" (the ordinary stage) these five may perhaps be absent; "at the time of attained mastery" (buddhahood) these five are definitely all present — the buddha delights in observing every object, so wishing is undiminished; the resolve that imprints the object is constantly undiminished; he remembers what was formerly practiced and received, so mindfulness is undiminished; moreover, the buddha's five consciousnesses can take as object the three times — past, present, and future (so they have mindfulness); the Tathāgata has no unconcentrated mind (so there is concentration); and the five consciousnesses all have the "knowledge that accomplishes tasks" (the perfecting-of-action knowledge, so they have wisdom).

8. Which Feelings the Object-Specific Five Correspond With

Which feelings do these object-specific five correspond with? Here there are two views.

One view: "aspiration" corresponds with three feelings (excluding distress and pain, because the objects of distress and pain are not "longed-for"); the other four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) extend to four feelings, excluding only painful feeling — because examining-and-settling and the rest are not present in the five consciousnesses, whereas painful feeling is present in the five consciousnesses, and since the five consciousnesses have none of these four (per the earlier "one view" that the five consciousnesses lack the object-specific), these four do not correspond with painful feeling.

Another view (all of them correspond with the five feelings, and this is the settled correct reading): the object-specific five all uniformly correspond with all five feelings. The grounds: the treatise says "the faculty of distress yearns aversively toward the unsurpassed dharma, and grieves while seeking and clinging to its attainment" (so it is clear that aspiration can co-arise with distress); in the "place of purely received pain" (the hells) one seeks for liberation, and the mental stage has the faculty of pain (already discussed above, so it is clear that aspiration can co-arise with pain); the treatise also says "greedy craving corresponds with distress and pain," and when this greedy craving co-arises there is definitely aspiration (so it is clear that aspiration can co-arise with distress and pain). Since the faculty of pain can correspond with mental consciousness, what obstruction is there to examining-and-settling and the other three (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) co-arising with painful feeling? Moreover, when the five consciousnesses co-arise there are also the faint and subtle four of imprinting-the-object and the rest (the principle as stated before, this being per the correct reading that "the five consciousnesses admit having the object-specific"). From this, the object-specific aspiration and the other five all correspond with all five feelings.

Finally the treatise adds a closing line: these object-specific five can be further distinguished by the various gates of "the three natures, the three realms, the trainee and the adept," and so on — this is left for the learner to ponder duly for oneself.

Onward Transmission

The framework this section establishes — "the six classes of mental associate, fifty-one in all," together with the substance and function of each of the universal five and the object-specific five — is the governing outline by which the whole consciousness-only system accounts for "mental functions," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists "the dharmas that are mental factors" as the second of the five positions of the hundred dharmas, with the universal five (contact, attention, feeling, perception, volition) and the object-specific five (aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) as precisely its first two classes, dharma answering to dharma. The Thirty Verses — verse nine (the six classes of mental associate, all corresponding with the three feelings) and verse ten (the universal five and the object-specific five) — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on characteristics, when clarifying "unreal imagination," regards the mental factors as the other-dependent mental functions that serve as the basis of defilement and purity — a sense that touches on this section's "general subsumption of the mental factors." The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its section on the characteristic of the knowable, distinguishes how the other-dependent nature, the three natures, and mind-and-mental-associates are mutually subsumed; this section's body of mental factors falls within that general subsumption too, only it has no point-for-point counterpart there that argues each class separately. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the division of the six classes of mental associate; here it is left aside.

Having finished the universal factors (the ones present in every act of cognition) and the object-specific factors, this section takes up the third of the "six classes of mental factors" — the wholesome (good) factors. The verse lists eleven of them in a single breath: trust, the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, then the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-aversion, and non-delusion, then diligence (energy), tranquillity (mental and bodily ease), conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, and finally non-harming. They share one identity: they arise only together with a wholesome mind, which is why they are called wholesome mental factors — in other words, this class of factors steps onto the stage only when a wholesome mind is present.

The method of this section is as follows. First it takes each factor one by one and sets out what each one is in itself (its intrinsic nature) and what each one does (its function), and wherever the treatise's author has set up one or another "alternative view," each is laid open and tested for soundness in turn (when the views are laid out, the particular master is never named — they are introduced only as "one view / another view / the settled (correct) reading"). After all eleven have been treated, it turns back to handle several large closing questions: which further wholesome factors that little word "and" in the verse silently gathers in; which three of the eleven are "merely nominal" (without a self-standing reality); whether every wholesome mind carries the full set of eleven; and where each of them falls across the topical headings of feeling, the object-specific factors, the three moral qualities, the realms, the stages of training, and what is abandoned on the path of seeing versus the path of cultivation. Not a single passage is skipped; everything is taken in turn.

The establishing of these eleven wholesome factors is the Abhidharma analysis — the unfolding and gathering — of the mental factors that go with a wholesome mind; there is no scriptural passage that positively sets up these eleven as a separate enumeration, and so this section's grounding draws directly from the treatises rather than from a sūtra. The source of their names, their number, and their associations is the Yogācārabhūmi, in its Basic Section: there it lists "the eleven wholesome by intrinsic nature" (trust, the sense of shame, the sense of moral dread, non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion, energy, tranquillity, conscientiousness, equanimity, and non-harming), which are precisely the names and number of this treatise's eleven wholesome factors; and it apportions their associations across six positions — when the mind is "decided" there is trust; when it "stills the defiled" there are the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread (one regarding self, one regarding others); when "wholesome-quality activity proceeds" there are non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion, and energy; when there is "freedom from desire by the worldly path" there is tranquillity; and when there is "freedom from desire by the supramundane path" there are conscientiousness and equanimity — and this treatise's phrase "the eleven arise across six positions" rests on just this. The defining of each wholesome factor's substance and function then rests on the Abhidharma-samuccaya: there trust is defined as "having, toward what has reality, what has virtue, and what has capacity, acceptance, pure aspiration as its substance," the sense of shame as "being ashamed before oneself" and the sense of moral dread as "being ashamed before others" (the treatise-basis for the sense of shame and moral dread relying on the force of one's own self and the Dharma, and partly on the force of the world); non-delusion as "having as its substance discernment by the knowledge of retribution, of instruction, and of realization" (the treatise text cited in the dispute over "non-delusion just is wisdom"); and non-harming as "having as its substance a portion of the wholesome root of non-aversion, the compassionate pity of beings" (the treatise-basis for "non-harming is provisionally posited on a portion of non-aversion"); and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā adds the line "the discerner is wisdom, energy, and diligence together," which is exactly the textual ground for distinguishing the cause-and-effect relation of non-delusion and wisdom. The treatises on which Dharmapāla's synthetic commentary rests for this section are these three — the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and its commentary. With that we follow the verse and open the exposition.

A. General statement — what "wholesome mental factor" means

The author begins with the general heading: only what arises in association with a wholesome mind is called a wholesome mental factor; and their number is fixed — there are eleven exactly: trust, the sense of shame, the sense of moral dread, non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion, diligence, tranquillity (that is, mental and bodily ease), conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, and non-harming. What follows takes them up one by one in this order. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) points out that, in setting out the substances of these wholesome factors below, although eleven names are listed, the exposition in fact "divides into eight segments" — combining the sense of shame and moral dread into one segment, and combining the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-aversion, and non-delusion into one segment — so that the actual segments are trust, the shame-and-moral-dread pair, the three roots, diligence, tranquillity, conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, and non-harming: eight segments gathering up the eleven factors in full. The exposition below follows this eight-segment unfolding-and-gathering.

B. Trust

What trust is

The first is trust. What is trust? It has an object, an intrinsic nature, and a function. Its object is three kinds of thing — the real, the virtuous, and the capable; facing these three, the mind generates three attitudes — deep acceptance, deep delight, and deep aspiration; its intrinsic nature is the purifying of the mind (making the mind limpid); and its function is to counteract distrust and to delight in cultivating the good.

The three varieties of trust

Trust, facing those three kinds of object, divides into three. The first is trust that the real exists — toward the concrete facts and principles of all phenomena, one deeply accepts and assents to them (one acknowledges that they truly are so). The second is trust that virtue exists — toward the truly pure qualities of the Three Jewels, one deeply accepts them with delight. The third is trust that capacity exists — toward all the wholesome things of the world and beyond it, one deeply trusts that they have power, that they can be realized and brought to completion, and so one generates aspiration and longing for them.

By these three kinds of trust one is able to counteract the mind of distrust, so that a person comes to delight in realizing and cultivating the good of both the worldly and the supramundane. Here a distinction of cause and effect must be kept clear: the "acceptance" mentioned above is in fact resolute conviction, and that is the cause of trust (one must first be resolutely convinced before trust can take hold); the "delight-aspiration" is in fact desire, and that is the effect of trust (only after trusting does one generate aspiration).

What the defining mark of trust really is — refuting the phrase "purifying of the mind" point by point

Next the defining mark of trust (the mark most properly its own) must be pinned down further. Someone raises an objection: did we not just say that trust "has the purifying of the mind as its nature"? The reply: that phrase has not yet been made clear. For the expression "purifying of the mind," pressed closely, runs into three difficulties. First, if "the pure" simply equals the mind itself (the principal consciousness), then trust ought not to count as a mental factor at all (a mental factor is something distinct from the principal mind). Second, if "being able to make the mind pure" is enough to qualify, then the sense of shame and the other wholesome factors can equally make the mind pure — so what would distinguish trust from the sense of shame and the rest? Third, if "the pure" means "some pure factor that arises together with the mind," the difficulty is just the same (it still cannot be told apart from the sense of shame and the rest).

To these three difficulties the author replies: the very substance of trust is a kind of clarifying function, one that purifies both the principal mind and the remaining mental factors; and because the principal mind is the master, one simply takes "purifying of the mind" as the name for it (this does not mean it purifies the mind only and not the other factors). It is like a water-clearing gem dropped into muddy water — the water clears of itself; the gem's own nature is "clarity," but what it clarifies is the water. The sense of shame and the rest, though they too are wholesome factors, do not take "purity" as their own defining mark; only trust has "purity" as its mark, and so it is not confused with the sense of shame and the rest, and the three difficulties above do not stand.

The author then adds a supporting reason from the opposite side: each defiled factor has its own particular mark, but distrust alone is one whose own mark is precisely muddiness, and which can moreover muddy the remaining mind and mental factors along with it — like something filthy that is dirty itself and dirties others as well. Trust is exactly the reverse of distrust, and so trust takes "purity" as its mark (the one muddy, the other limpid, the two answering each other exactly as opposites). Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) gathers these items of trust into one clear sorting: the three kinds of object, "the real, the virtuous, and the capable," are the "basis" on which trust rests; "deep acceptance, delight, and aspiration" are the "cause and effect" of trust (acceptance the cause, delight-aspiration the effect); and only "purifying of the mind" is what properly displays the "very substance" of trust — the three having each its own role, not to be run together into one.

Alternative view 1 · "delight" as the mark

Here is the first alternative view. One view holds: trust has delight as its mark. The author refutes it: delight is something common to all three moral qualities — wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral (one can delight in bad things too); if trust took delight as its mark, then the substance of trust would amount to desire (it is desire that is common to all three qualities and delights). Further, the truth of suffering and the truth of its origin are not objects one delights in, so suffering and origin would then not be objects that trust takes — yet trust in fact takes all four noble truths as its objects (one trusts suffering and origin as well). So "delight as the mark" will not hold.

Alternative view 2 · "conformity" as the mark

The second alternative view. Another holds: trust has conformity as its mark. The author refutes it: conformity is likewise common to all three moral qualities; and pressed finely, if the "conformity" you mean is assenting conformity (conformity that fixes and ratifies), then that is in fact resolute conviction; and if it is delighting conformity (conformity that delights), then that is in fact desire — apart from these two substances, resolute conviction and desire, no independent "conformity" mark can be found at all.

From this whole line of argument it should be known that the settled (correct) reading is: trust has the "purifying of the mind" as its mark.

C. The sense of shame and the sense of moral dread

What the sense of shame is · what the sense of moral dread is

Next come the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, a pair. What is the sense of shame? It relies on two forces — one's own self and the true Dharma — and takes as its intrinsic nature the honoring of the worthy and the good (revering and prizing worthy persons and wholesome things), and takes as its function the counteracting of shamelessness and the stopping of evil conduct — that is, drawing on the eminence of one's own self and of the true Dharma, one honors the worthy and the good and is ashamed of faults and evils, and this counteracts shamelessness and stops the various kinds of evil conduct.

What is the sense of moral dread? It relies on the force of the world (public opinion), and takes as its intrinsic nature the spurning of the cruel and evil (disdaining and rejecting what is violent and wicked), and takes as its function the counteracting of the absence of moral dread and the stopping of evil conduct — that is, drawing on the censure and revulsion of the world as its impetus, one spurns the cruel and evil and is ashamed of offenses and crimes, and this counteracts the absence of moral dread and stops the various kinds of evil deeds.

"Being ashamed of fault and evil" is a shared mark, not a distinguishing mark

The author points out: "being ashamed of fault and evil" is the shared mark common to both the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, and so scripture sometimes provisionally takes it as the substance of the pair. The problem is just this: can "being ashamed" be taken as the distinguishing mark (the particular mark proper to each) by which the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread are told apart? The author shows below, by three difficulties, that it cannot.

The first difficulty: if one forcibly takes "being ashamed" as the distinguishing mark of the two, then the substances of the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread would have no difference; and if their substances have no difference, then the two factors ought to be "definitely non-co-arising" (unable to arise at the same time) — like feeling and perception, which do not arise together — but this contradicts scripture (scripture clearly says the sense of shame and moral dread arise together).

The second difficulty: if instead one establishes their difference by "with reference to oneself / with reference to others" (one toward oneself, one toward others), then the two would become factors "provisionally posited by relational reference" and ought not to be really existent — which again contradicts scripture (scripture says the sense of shame and moral dread are really existent); and if you then grant that the two are really existent yet arise separately (not co-arising), that contradicts the treatise's statement that "the eleven wholesome factors pervade the wholesome mind" (if they must both pervade, they cannot arise each apart from the other).

The third difficulty: if one takes "honoring the good / spurning the evil" as the distinguishing mark of the two, then the objects the two take would differ (one takes the good as object, one the evil) and they ought not to be able to arise at the same time. Here the author turns the question back on the objector: the "two faults" that this third difficulty commits are of the very same kind as the ones already named — why do you single out only one side for censure?

The author then states the matter positively: who said the objects taken by these two factors differ? — Someone presses: if they are not different, then how are things? — The author answers: when a wholesome mind arises, whatever its object may be, in that moment the mind simultaneously carries both meanings, "honoring the good" and "spurning the evil"; so the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread in fact "both pervade the wholesome mind and take the same object," and it is not that each takes a separate object.

The author again turns back and questions the holder of the distinguishing-mark view: must you not also concede this "both pervade" sense? Yet since you insist that the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread have the same defining mark, what reason can you give to fend off the three difficulties above? (So only the "shared-mark view" stands.)

Then how is scripture's phrase "regarding oneself, regarding others" to be settled? The author says: that calls "one's own self and the true Dharma" the "self," and calls "the world" the "other"; or it provisionally fixes a name of "self" and "other" with reference to whether this "honoring the good and spurning the evil" is beneficial or harmful to oneself — it does not mean that the objects taken by the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread are really different.

D. Non-greed · non-aversion · non-delusion (the three wholesome roots)

Why they are called "wholesome roots"

In the verse's phrase "the three roots, non-greed and so forth," that word "and so forth" gathers in non-aversion and non-delusion as well. There are two reasons these three earn the name wholesome roots: first, their power to generate the wholesome is especially strong; second, they are precisely the nearest counteragents to the three unwholesome roots of greed, aversion, and delusion (each answering one, opposite for opposite).

What non-greed and non-aversion are

What is non-greed? Non-attachment toward "existence" (the fruit-results of the three forms of becoming) and toward "the equipment of existence" (the causes that summon the three forms of becoming) — this is its intrinsic nature; its function is to counteract greedy attachment and to do wholesome deeds. What is non-aversion? Non-hatred toward "suffering" and toward "the equipment of suffering" (the causes that summon suffering) — this is its intrinsic nature; its function is to counteract hatred and to do wholesome deeds.

Here the author adds an important point: when a wholesome mind arises, whatever object it takes, that mind already maintains non-attachment toward "existence" and the like and non-hatred toward "suffering" and the like — this is a non-attachment and non-hatred "posited with reference to the principles of 'existence' and 'suffering,'" and it does not mean the mind must actually take "existence" and "suffering" as its objects (even when those objects are not present, it is still non-attached and non-hating all the same). This is the same principle as "posited with reference to the good and the evil" in the discussion of the sense of shame and moral dread above. So non-greed and non-aversion, these two, pervade every wholesome mind.

What non-delusion is

What is non-delusion? Clearly comprehending the various principles and concrete facts — this is its intrinsic nature; its function is to counteract delusion and to do wholesome deeds. This factor of non-delusion draws out below a debate over "whether it is simply identical with wisdom."

Alternative view 1 · non-delusion just is "wisdom"

One view: non-delusion has wisdom as its intrinsic nature (non-delusion has no separate substance; it is wisdom itself). Its basis is the Abhidharma-samuccaya: non-delusion has as its substance the several "discernments" of "the wisdom of innate endowment, the wisdom of instruction, and realizing knowledge" — that is, the four wisdoms of innate wisdom (born with one), the wisdom of hearing, the wisdom of reflecting, and the wisdom of cultivating; since all four are of the nature of "discernment," it is clear that non-delusion just is wisdom. As for why non-delusion is still set up separately, that is only to highlight that, on the side of the wholesome, this wisdom has an especially excellent function, and so it is given a separate name — just as, on the side of the afflictions, "wisdom" is also set up separately as "wrong view."

The settled (correct) reading · non-delusion has its own separate substance

Another view (and this is the correct one): non-delusion is not simply wisdom; it "has its own separate intrinsic nature, precisely counteracting ignorance." There are three reasons. First, non-greed and non-aversion each have their own separate substance and yet enter together among the wholesome roots, so non-delusion, by the same rule, ought to have its own separate substance (the three wholesome roots must be uniform). Second, the treatise says "great compassion is gathered up by non-aversion and non-delusion," and not "gathered up by the wholesome roots"; if non-delusion were just wisdom, then great compassion ought to be gathered up by "wisdom (and the like roots)" the way "power" and so forth are — which contradicts the treatise text. Third, if non-delusion had no separate substance (like non-harming and such, which are merely nominal, posited in dependence on something else), then it ought not to be a real thing — but this again contradicts the treatise's statement that "among the eleven wholesome factors, three are conventionally existent (nominal) and the remaining eight are all real" (non-delusion is right among those eight real ones).

Then how is the Abhidharma-samuccaya's phrase "having wisdom as its substance" to be understood? The author says: that "cites the cause and the effect of non-delusion in order to display its intrinsic nature" — the mark of non-delusion mostly shows itself only by way of wisdom (discernment is wisdom, and non-delusion regularly appears following discernment), so wisdom is borrowed to express it; this is just like expressing the substance of trust above by "acceptance and delight" (acceptance is the cause of trust, delight is the effect of trust, and one borrows cause and effect to express the substance). The principle is necessarily this way, and it does not mean non-delusion just equals wisdom.

The author then adds a most forceful reason: greed, aversion, and delusion are associated with the first six consciousnesses, belong properly to the afflictions, and have an especially strong power to give rise to evil, so they are set up as the "unwholesome roots"; to cut off these three, one must rely on two routes — the "general counteragent" and the "specific counteragent." The "general counteragent" is solely wholesome wisdom (a single wisdom that counteracts the three poisons together), while the "specific counteragents" are precisely the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-aversion, and non-delusion (each one counteracting one poison). Since cutting off greed, aversion, and delusion still requires the route of "specific counteragents," it is clear that non-delusion must have its own separate substance and is not simply that wisdom which serves as the "general counteragent." Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) sets this "having its own separate nature" out formally as an inference: non-delusion must have its own separate substance (this is the thesis); because "what it properly counteracts is an unwholesome root (ignorance)" (this is the reason); just as in the case of non-greed and non-aversion (this is the example) — non-greed and non-aversion each have their own separate substance and properly counteract greed and aversion, and non-delusion is the same case, properly counteracting delusion (ignorance), and so it too ought to have its own separate substance.

E. Diligence (energy)

What diligence is

Diligence is energy. Its arena is the two matters of "the wholesome is to be cultivated, the unwholesome is to be cut off"; within this cultivating and cutting, it takes "bravery and toughness" as its intrinsic nature and takes "counteracting indolence and bringing wholesome matters to completion" as its function. Here the two words "bravery" and "toughness" each make a distinction: "bravery" expresses forging upward (striving ahead), used to set diligence apart from the defiled factors — among the defiled there is also bold and energetic effort (one can be very industrious at doing evil), but that does not count as wholesome; "toughness" expresses purity, used to set it apart from "pure neutral" states. By this distinction it becomes clear that energy belongs solely to the wholesome quality.

The five varieties of energy

The mark of energy, finely divided, has roughly five varieties: donning the armor, the preparatory application, no inferiority, no backsliding, and no contentment. These five answer exactly to what the scripture calls "having force, having effort, having bravery, being firm and fierce, and not casting off the wholesome yoke," matched in order (donning the armor is "having force"; actually putting in the work is "having effort"; not feeling timid and inferior is "having bravery"; not regressing is "being firm and fierce"; not being satisfied, not willing to set down the wholesome burden on one's shoulders, is "not casting off the wholesome yoke").

The dividing of these five has had several explanations among the earlier masters. Some explain it by "initial resolve / one's own measure / forging upward," which divides the conduct "within one's own measure" into three grades; some explain it by "initial resolve, the long term, the uninterrupted, the earnest, and the without-remainder," which divides by the varieties of "cultivation"; some explain it by the varieties of the "five paths" such as the path of equipment (among which, the final path of the two vehicles is so because of their longing for the great awakening, and the final path of the buddhas is so because of their delight in benefiting and gladdening others); some explain it by the varieties of the four paths of "preparatory application, the uninterrupted, liberation, and forging upward."

F. Tranquillity (mental and bodily ease)

Tranquillity is "mental and bodily ease." Its intrinsic nature is "departing from heaviness, attuning and easing body and mind, fitness for work (body and mind made supple and capable of tasks)"; its function is "counteracting torpor and the transformation of the basis" — meaning that tranquillity can subdue and remove the factors that obstruct meditative concentration, so that the body and mind one depends on are transformed into a state of comfort and suppleness. (This factor will be brought up again later, in the discussion of "pervading or not pervading the wholesome mind," because tranquillity is the only one of the eleven that "does not pervade.")

G. Conscientiousness

What conscientiousness is · it has no separate substance

Conscientiousness is in fact the combined function of four factors — "energy plus non-greed, non-aversion, and non-delusion": in the matters of "the evil that should be cut off, the good that should be cultivated," it takes "guarding (guarding against evil) and cultivating (cultivating the good)" as its intrinsic nature, and takes "counteracting negligence and bringing to completion all wholesome matters worldly and supramundane" as its function — that is, these four factors can guard and can cultivate in cutting off evil and cultivating good, and this combined capacity is called conscientiousness. The crucial point is this: conscientiousness has no separate substance of its own; its mark is nothing beyond the marks of those four factors; in this business of guarding against evil and cultivating good, once you take away the function of those four factors, you cannot find any function that belongs to conscientiousness alone.

Then why are exactly those four taken, and not trust, the sense of shame, and so on? The author says: trust, the sense of shame, and the rest do have a slight capacity for guarding and cultivating, but compared to those four factors their power is far weaker; moreover trust, the sense of shame, and the rest are not "wholesome roots" and cannot "universally urge on" (universally drive all the wholesome), so they are not taken as the basis of conscientiousness — only energy plus the three wholesome roots, these four, are taken.

Refuting "guarding and cultivating are the distinguishing mark of conscientiousness" point by point

Someone objects: are not guarding and cultivating precisely the very mark and function of conscientiousness itself (how can you say it has no separate substance)? The author answers: guarding and cultivating are not different from energy and the three roots themselves; if you forcibly say "guarding and cultivating depend on conscientiousness in order to have their function," then conscientiousness too ought to depend on something else in order to have its function, and pushing this back step by step leads to the fault of "infinite regress."

The objector presses again: energy only handles "universally urging on" and the three wholesome roots only handle "serving as basis" — how can you say they have the function of guarding and cultivating (guarding and cultivating still require setting up a separate conscientiousness)? The author answers: then you tell us, what exactly is the mark of this "guarding-and-cultivating function" you speak of? We will press it through one by one: if what you mean is "universal supporting and holding," that is non-greed and the other two roots; if it is "universally urging on and overseeing," that is no different from energy; if it is "stopping evil and advancing good," that is the sum of these four factors; if it is "keeping the mind undistracted," that should be "concentration"; if it is "making the mind take a single object together," what difference is there from "contact"; if it is "keeping the mind from forgetting," that should be "mindfulness" — and following this whole line of search, the function of "conscientiousness," once you take away the four factors of non-greed and so forth, cannot be found at all. Therefore conscientiousness definitely has no separate substance (it is a nominal factor).

H. Equanimity-in-action

What equanimity-in-action is · it too has no separate substance

What is equanimity-in-action? It too is the function of those four factors, "energy plus non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion": making the mind "even, upright, and abiding without effort" is its intrinsic nature; counteracting restlessness and making the mind abide in quiet is its function — that is, these four factors make the mind depart from restlessness and the like obstacles and abide quietly, and this is called equanimity. As for those three terms, "even / upright / abiding without effort," they distinguish the varieties of "equanimity" with reference to the "initial, middle, and final" stages of practice (at first it makes the mind even, in the middle it makes the mind upright, at the end it makes the mind abide naturally without effort).

The author explains the division of labor between equanimity-in-action and conscientiousness: first conscientiousness removes the defilements, then equanimity-in-action makes the mind quiet and abiding. Equanimity-in-action, like conscientiousness, also has no separate substance: take away those four factors and it has neither mark nor function — what makes the mind quiet is precisely those four factors, and what is made quiet is the mind and the rest (both the agent side and the object side fall within the four factors and the mind, and no substance belonging to equanimity-in-action itself can be found).

I. Non-harming

What non-harming is · it is the provisional positing of a portion of non-aversion

What is non-harming? Not injuring or vexing any sentient being, with "non-aversion" as its intrinsic nature, and with "counteracting harming and compassion (the drawing out of suffering)" as its function — that is, on the one portion of "non-aversion" that concerns "not injuring or vexing sentient beings," a name "non-harming" is provisionally posited.

The author explains in detail the division of labor between non-aversion and non-harming: non-aversion is what reverses the aversion of "cutting off a being's life (taking life)," while non-harming is what directly opposes the harming of "injuring and vexing beings"; non-aversion inclines toward "bestowing happiness (giving beings ease)," and that is loving-kindness, while non-harming inclines toward "drawing out suffering (removing suffering for beings)," and that is compassion — this is the rough distinction between the two on the level of marks. But on the level of principle, non-aversion really has its own substance, whereas non-harming is merely posited provisionally in dependence on "one portion" of non-aversion; the reason non-harming is still set up separately is to display the difference between the two marks of "loving-kindness and compassion," since in this matter of "benefiting and gladdening sentient beings," these two sides, loving-kindness and compassion, are the most excellent (worth giving each its own name). Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) here resolves a doubt that easily arises: earlier, "great compassion" was said to take the two factors of non-aversion and non-delusion as its substance, so why, in treating non-harming here, is "non-aversion" alone spoken of? He answers that the two passages are framed differently — "great compassion" is stated "with reference to real substance" (with respect to its really-existent two factors, non-aversion and non-delusion), whereas non-harming is stated "with reference to nominal positing" (since on one portion of non-aversion the sense of drawing out suffering is foremost, a name is provisionally posited there); moreover the former is "great compassion," while this is merely "compassion" (one of the four immeasurables), so that although the names are close, the positions and the unfolding-and-gathering they point to are not the same, and the two passages do not conflict.

Alternative view · non-harming has its own separate substance

Here is an alternative view. One view: non-harming is not just non-aversion; it has its own separate substance, namely "goodly-good nature." The author refutes it: what then is the mark of that "goodly-good nature"? You say it is "not injuring and vexing" — but non-aversion is exactly that too (non-aversion toward sentient beings is precisely not injuring and vexing them, is precisely the kindly-compassionate goodly-good), so why set up yet another intrinsic nature? Therefore non-harming is still "nominal," posited in dependence on one portion of non-aversion.

J. The "meaning-distinct mental factors" gathered in by the word "and" in the verse

What the word "and" gathers in

That word "and" in the verse (equanimity-in-action and non-harming), besides connecting, also displays this: beyond these eleven there is a class of wholesome mental factors "distinct in meaning but not different in substance" (like gladness, weariness-of-the-world, and so forth); though each has its own meaning and its own name, their substance is not different from the eleven before, so they are not set up separately as individual wholesome mental factors but are merely swept in with the one word "and."

Gladness · weariness · a whole string of "non-X" wholesome factors, each assigned to a portion of the three wholesome roots

The author assigns one by one where these "meaning-distinct, substance-same" wholesome factors belong. "Gladness (glad delight)" goes together with "desire" and belongs to a portion of "non-aversion" (because it does not hate the object it is glad about); "non-resentment, non-grudging, non-vexing, non-envy" and the like are the same, each as is fitting all directly reversing a portion of "aversion." "Weariness (weariness-of-the-world)" goes together with "wisdom" and belongs to a portion of "non-greed" (because it is not attached to the object it is weary of); "non-stinginess, non-arrogance" and the like are the same, each as is fitting directly reversing a portion of "greed." "Non-concealment, non-deceit, non-flattery" are a portion of "non-greed and non-delusion," each as is fitting directly reversing a portion of "greed and delusion."

The dispute over non-concealment

Concerning "non-concealment" there is a small alternative view. One view: non-concealment is only a portion of "non-delusion" — because nowhere in scripture or treatise is it said that "concealment" is also a portion of "greed" (since concealment does not extend to greed, non-concealment singly reverses non-delusion and need not also involve non-greed).

The dispute over non-conceit (three views)

Where "non-conceit" should be assigned has three views: one view assigns it to a portion of "trust" (having trusted and submitted to another, one will not be conceited toward him); one view assigns it to a portion of "equanimity" (the mind being even, one will not exalt oneself and be conceited toward others); one view assigns it to a portion of "the sense of shame" (having honored another, one will not be conceited toward him).

The dispute over non-doubt (three views)

Where "non-doubt" should be assigned also has three views: one view, it is gathered up by "trust" (having trusted and submitted to another, one has no wavering); one view, it just is "right resolute conviction" (having decided, one has no wavering); one view, it is gathered up by "right wisdom" (being right view, one has no wavering).

The assignment of the remaining few

As for "non-distraction," it is gathered up by "right concentration"; "right view, right knowing" are both gathered up by "wholesome wisdom"; "non-forgetting" just is "right mindfulness."

Why regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought are not set up separately as wholesome

"Regret, sleep, applied thought, sustained thought," these four (that is, the mental factors of the "indeterminate" class), are common to both the defiled and the undefiled (they can be defiled or undefiled, and are not invariably wholesome), just as "contact, desire," and the like among the universal and object-specific factors are both ways; and so there is no "wholesome factor specifically reversing them" that can be set up — since there is no separate reversal, they are not separately set up among the wholesome.

Why some wholesome factors reversing the defiled are set up separately and some are not

Someone objects generally: among the wholesome factors that the defiled factors reverse into, why are some set up as separate wholesome mental factors and some not? The author answers: whatever has a special difference in mark and function is set up separately; the rest are not, and this should not be faulted. Going further: those defiled factors that "pervade the six consciousnesses," because their power is strong and abundant, are specially reversed and set up separately as wholesome factors. As for "conceit" and the like, "resentment" and the like, they are associated only with the "mental consciousness" (they do not pervade the six consciousnesses), and so they are not separately reversed into wholesome factors. "Harming," though it too is associated only with the mental consciousness, because it arises again and again, injures and vexes others, and obstructs the excellent cause of the unsurpassed vehicle — "compassion" — is, in order to let people know its especially grave fault, specially reversed and set up as "non-harming." And the three of "loss of mindfulness, distraction, and wrong knowing" — what they reverse into is the mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom among the object-specific factors, and so among the wholesome they are not again separately spoken of.

Why the pure factors (the wholesome) are fewer than the defiled

Someone else objects: since the defiled and the pure are mutual reverses, why are the pure factors (the eleven wholesome) so much fewer than the defiled factors (the six root afflictions plus the twenty derivative afflictions)? The author answers: because the pure are superior and the defiled inferior, it is a case of "the few standing against the many" (a single wholesome factor can stand against several defiled factors, so there is no need for a one-to-one match); furthermore, the pure factors "comprehend principle (penetrate the principles)," and so they can run together (many wholesome factors that the defiled reverse into are in fact a single substance — for instance, that whole string of "non-X" are all gathered under portions of the three wholesome roots), whereas the defiled factors "are deluded about concrete facts," and so they are fragmented and confined (parsed out into many names as the facts dictate). So the numbers on the defiled and the pure sides ought not to be faulted by lining them up head to head in the first place.

K. The nominal and the real among the eleven wholesome factors

Having gone through all eleven, the author reckons up which are nominal and which are real: among these eleven, three are nominally existent — namely conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, and non-harming (for the reasons given under each entry above, none of them has a separate substance, but is posited provisionally in dependence on energy and the three roots, or on a portion of non-aversion); the remaining eight are all really existent (because each has its own separate mark and function).

L. Whether every wholesome mind carries the full eleven · whether tranquillity pervades

Alternative view 1 · only four pervade the wholesome mind, the other seven are indeterminate

This is an important debate. One view: of the eleven, only the "four that pervade the wholesome mind" — energy, non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion — pervade, while the other seven are all "indeterminate (not present in every wholesome mind)." Its reasons are: when a person is searching out a matter or principle and has not yet decided, trust cannot arise (so trust does not pervade); the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, though of the same kind, have separate bases, so when one of them arises, in that moment the second is absent (so the two cannot both pervade); tranquillity comes only when "the worldly path cuts off the afflictions"; conscientiousness and equanimity-in-action arise only at the "uncontaminated path"; non-harming comes only when there is "compassion for sentient beings." It further cites the treatise's "the eleven arise across six positions" as proof: only at the position of decision is trust associated; only when stilling the defiled do the sense of shame and moral dread arise (regarding self, regarding others); only at the wholesome-quality position do energy and the three roots arise; only at the worldly path is there tranquillity; only at the supramundane path are there equanimity-in-action and conscientiousness; only at the gathering-in of sentient beings is there non-harming.

Refuting the foregoing view

Another view comes forward to refute it: the foregoing view is unsound. Refuting point by point: First, a mind searching and not yet decided — if trust does not arise in it, then this mind ought not to count as wholesome (just as defiled minds and the like, precisely because they lack pure trust, do not count as wholesome) — but a mind searching and not yet decided can plainly still be wholesome, so it is clear that trust is still present. Second, the sense of shame and the sense of moral dread, though of different kinds, have one and the same "object-specific" basis, and it was already established above that the two both pervade the wholesome mind. Third, if there were no tranquillity at the supramundane path, then the "tranquillity factor of awakening" ought not to be uncontaminated (yet it is plainly an uncontaminated factor of awakening). Fourth, if there were no equanimity-in-action and conscientiousness at the worldly path, then the worldly wholesome mind ought not to count as "quiet, guarding against evil and cultivating good," and ought to be unable to subdue restlessness and negligence — but since the contaminated wholesome mind too possesses those four factors (energy and the three roots), it ought to have equanimity-in-action and conscientiousness just as the supramundane path does. Fifth, when a wholesome mind arises it never injures sentient beings and always opposes the factors that can injure, so in that moment there is non-harming. As for the treatise's saying "the eleven arise across six positions," that is said "with reference to a particular factor being especially strong at a particular position" (emphasizing that at that position a certain factor is most prominent — it does not mean the factor is lacking at the other positions). Therefore the foregoing view is unsound.

The settled (correct) reading · ten pervade the wholesome mind, only tranquillity does not pervade

So the settled conclusion (the correct reading): one should say that of the eleven, ten pervade the wholesome mind, and tranquillity alone does not pervade — because tranquillity can attune and ease body and mind only at the "concentrative position," and is absent at the unconcentrated position, and so does not pervade. The author cites the "Section on Ascertainment" as proof: those ten wholesome factors pervade the wholesome mind in both the concentrative ground and the non-concentrative ground; only in a mind of the concentrative ground is there the addition of one further factor, "tranquillity."

The dispute over which grounds tranquillity is found in

Concerning which "grounds" tranquillity falls in, there is again a small alternative view. One view: the "preparatory application" of meditative concentration (the preliminary work) also earns the name "concentrative ground" (because the preparatory work too has a faint sense of attuning and easing), so even the desire realm has tranquillity — otherwise it would contradict the "Basic Section's" statement that "trust and the rest of the eleven extend to all grounds." Another view (leaning toward the correct): tranquillity is found only within "concentration" (it can arise only when nourished by concentration); the treatise says "the various minds and mental factors of the desire realm, because they lack tranquillity, are called the 'non-concentrative ground'"; as for the phrase "all grounds have the eleven," that is said with reference to all three grounds of "with applied thought and sustained thought, without applied thought but with sustained thought, and without applied thought or sustained thought" having them — it does not mean that even the scattered-mind desire realm has tranquillity.

Whether the eleven are present in each of the eight consciousnesses

The author next sets out the presence or absence of these eleven in each consciousness: the seventh and eighth consciousnesses have or lack them according to their position; the sixth consciousness, at the "concentrative position," has all eleven, and at the "non-concentrative position" lacks only tranquillity (the other ten are all present).

Whether the five sense consciousnesses have tranquillity

The last small dispute asks whether the first five sense consciousnesses have tranquillity. One view: the five sense consciousnesses have only ten (they lack tranquillity) — because the intrinsic nature of the five consciousnesses is "scattered and stirring," with no tranquillity. Another view: the five sense consciousnesses too have tranquillity — because "the wholesome drawn forth by concentration" also has attuning and easing, and moreover when the "wisdom of accomplishing what is to be done" (the wisdom into which the first five consciousnesses are transformed) is present there is necessarily tranquillity attending it (since the transformed wisdom has tranquillity, the original consciousness-position too should be allowed to have it).

M. The topical distinctions of the eleven wholesome factors

Finally the eleven are placed within several topical headings.

Association with feeling: the eleven wholesome factors are associated with the "fifteen feelings" — that is, out of all the feelings, one removes the two oppressive feelings of "grief and pain," because the oppressive feelings have no attuning ease and are at odds with the attuning ease of the wholesome factors.

The object-specific factors: the eleven wholesome factors can be associated with all "five object-specific factors (desire, resolute conviction, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom)," because trust and the rest are not at odds with desire and the rest.

The three moral qualities: these eleven are solely of the "wholesome" quality.

Realm-binding: only "tranquillity" does not extend to the desire realm (as said before, the unconcentrated position has no tranquillity); the remaining ten extend to all three realms.

The stages of training: all eleven extend to the three positions of "the trainee, the one beyond training, and neither trainee nor beyond training."

Abandoned on seeing or on cultivation: they are not "abandoned on the path of seeing" — the Yogācārabhūmi says "the six faculties of trust and the rest (trust, energy, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, plus wholesome factors such as conscientiousness) are abandoned only on the path of cultivation, not on the path of seeing" (wholesome factors are not among the defiled delusions abandoned on the path of seeing).

There are still other topical distinctions besides these, which one may work out for oneself by following this same principle.

Onward Transmission

What this section establishes — the names and number of the eleven wholesome mental factors, the substance and function of each, the reckoning that three are nominal and eight real, and that ten pervade the wholesome mind while tranquillity alone does not — is the ground on which the consciousness-only system founds its account of "the framework of the pure, the equipment of the path of cultivation," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise gathers these eleven, one by one, under the "wholesome" position of the mental factors (trust, the sense of shame, the sense of moral dread, non-greed, non-aversion, non-delusion, diligence, tranquillity, conscientiousness, equanimity-in-action, non-harming), matching this section factor for factor. The Thirty Verses — its verse eleven — is the very root-verse this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on the cultivation of counteragents, unfolds the thirty-seven factors of awakening, among which such wholesome factors as trust, energy, tranquillity, and equanimity are precisely several of the eleven wholesome factors unfolded within the sequence of the factors of the path — bearing on and carrying forward the doctrine of the wholesome factors this section establishes. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the cause and effect of entering, expounds the six perfections, and the enhancing sense of such wholesome factors as tranquillity and conscientiousness, gathered up under energy and meditative concentration, is likewise this section's wholesome mental factors taken up within the practice of the perfections. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only without external objects and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the substance and function of the wholesome mental factors; here it is left aside.

Having finished the earlier mental factors, we come now to the heaviest class within the "six categories of mental factors": the root afflictions. These six are called "root" because they are the root of every affliction; the remaining secondary afflictions are all derived from them. This section first explains the six one by one (with "wrong view" further opened into five kinds), and then works through a long sequence of "gates" — whether they can associate with one another, which consciousnesses they associate with, which feelings they associate with, whether they are wholesome or unwholesome, in which realm they are bound, whether they are cut at the path of seeing or the path of cultivation, which of the truths they are deluded about — testing them one gate at a time.

These six root afflictions have their roots in scripture and treatise alike. Every affliction turns in dependence on consciousness and arises by taking an object as condition. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on mind, mentation, and consciousness, says that the "profound and subtle" appropriating consciousness has "all its seeds like a rushing torrent," and that the World-Honored One "did not expound it to the foolish" — for fear, precisely, that someone would "discriminate and grasp it as a self." That very line is the scriptural basis for the first of the six roots, "the view of a real self in the perishing aggregates (self-grasping)"; and the other afflictions, too, all arise in dependence on this grasping at self. But the substance and function of each mental associate is treated only sparingly in the scriptures, the full analysis lying in the treatises — so this section stands chiefly on the treatise-basis. There are three treatise-sources. The Yogācārabhūmi, in its Maulī-bhūmi, sets up the root afflictions "either as six kinds or as ten kinds," fixes the five wrong views as "having defiled wisdom for their substance," and fixes greed, anger, and the rest as "having defiled clinging, hatred-and-rage, self-elevation, defiled ignorance, and divergent cognition for their substance" — this is the ground for what the present treatise calls the substances "defiled wisdom," "murky blindness," "wavering," and the rest. The Abhidharma-samuccaya takes up each one under the two heads "substance (nature)" and "function (karmic work)" together — this is the ground for the present treatise's "nature · function" format. And the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā makes the sense plainer still, building on substance and function: in explaining why greed produces suffering, for instance, it says it is "because the five appropriated aggregates are born by the force of craving" — this is what the present treatise's line "because by the force of craving the appropriated aggregates are born" carries on. What follows, then, expounds the six one by one, following the framework these three treatises set up.

B. The Six Root Afflictions

These six — greed and the rest — are all, in their very nature, gathered under the class "root affliction," and so they earn the name "affliction." We take them up one at a time.

1. Greed — the defiled clinging that sticks to the three forms of existence

What is greed? Its nature is defiled clinging — toward "existence" (the living existence found in the three realms) and toward the "supports of existence" (the various provisions that summon and sustain that existence), it raises a clinging, reluctant-to-let-go, defiled mind. Its function (its karmic work) is this: it obstructs the wholesome associate "non-greed," and it produces suffering. Why say it produces suffering? Because it is precisely by the force of this loving defilement that the five appropriated aggregates — this body-and-mind complex that draws in all suffering — are again and again appropriated and brought into being. Craving is the cause of future existence, so the moment greed stirs, the painful fruit of saṃsāra follows along behind it.

2. Anger — the hatred and rage toward what goes against us

What is anger? Its nature is hatred and rage — toward "suffering" (the various adverse, unwelcome objects) and toward the "supports of suffering" (the persons and things that bring those sufferings), it raises a hating, repelling mind. Its function is this: it obstructs "non-anger," it leaves a person "ill at ease," and it becomes the basis on which every evil deed rests. Why? Because once anger arises, body and mind necessarily grow hot and burn with agitated distress, and from this all sorts of evil karma are set off; its nature is unwholesome. Greed sticks fast, anger pushes away — they are two defiled minds running in opposite directions.

3. Delusion — the murky blindness toward principle and toward fact (this is ignorance)

What is delusion? It is also called "ignorance." Its nature is murky blindness — toward all "principles" (such as the four truths and dependent arising) and toward all "facts" (such as karma and its fruit), it cannot see clearly, it is muddled and dark. Its function is this: it obstructs "non-delusion," and it becomes the basis on which "every defilement" rests. Why say it is the basis of every defilement? Because it is precisely from this ignorance that there next arise doubt, false views, and the activity of the remaining afflictions such as greed, along with all the secondary afflictions; and these in turn are able to summon the defiled phenomena of future lives. So delusion is the bottommost of them all — for any other affliction to arise, it cannot do without delusion.

4. Conceit — leaning on oneself to raise oneself up

What is conceit? Its nature is self-elevation — leaning on oneself, one raises oneself up relative to others. Its function is this: it obstructs "non-conceit" (humility), and it produces suffering. Why does it produce suffering? Because if a person harbors conceit, then in the presence of "virtue" (genuine merit) and "those who have virtue," the mind cannot bow down; and out of this failure to bow down, birth-and-death turns round without end and one undergoes all manner of suffering. Conceit has finer subdivisions as well — there is talk of "seven conceits" and of "nine conceits," but on the whole they arise around the "three grades" (the three comparisons: better than another, equal to another, worse than another) and around the loci of "self" and "virtue." All these conceits are cut by both the path of seeing and the path of cultivation. One thing should be added: a noble one who has reached certain stages still has his associated "conceit of self" arise and operate (it is not yet finally and fully cut), so when it is said that "conceit too arises from this," there is no contradiction — it is precisely because even the noble stages still have the self-conceit operating that the claim "conceit belongs to both seeing and cultivation as what is cut" holds together.

5. Doubt — wavering toward the truth

What is doubt? Its nature is wavering — toward the various "truth-principles" (such as the real principles of the four truths), it cannot make up its mind and swings back and forth. Its function is this: it obstructs "non-doubt" and it hinders the arising of wholesome qualities. Why? Because a person who wavers indecisively cannot bring wholesome dharmas to birth — the mind will not settle, and the wholesome roots cannot take hold.

On the very substance of "doubt," there are two readings here.

One view: doubt has wisdom for its substance. This view holds that what we call doubt is really "wavering while at the same time discriminating and selecting" — this kind of selection-with-wavering is what is named doubt; and selecting is precisely the work of wisdom, so the substance of doubt just is wisdom. It further argues from word-formation in Sanskrit: the word that expresses "doubt" is formed by adding a prefix onto the very verbal root that expresses "wisdom / pondering," which shows that doubt is nothing but a variant form of wisdom; and that "pondering" root is, in meaning, no different from prajñā (wisdom).

Another view (the settled, correct reading): doubt has its own substance and is not wisdom. This view holds that doubt has its own independent substance, and its function is "keeping wisdom from settling" — since its work is to stir up wisdom and leave it undecided, this shows that it is not itself wisdom (for if it were, how could it obstruct wisdom?). The Yogācārabhūmi says: among the six root afflictions, only "view" is an existent established by convention (because view is in fact a portion of wisdom); the remaining five (doubt included) are all truly existent, each with its own substance. As for the earlier view's appeal to Sanskrit word-formation — "add a prefix to the root of wisdom and you get doubt, therefore doubt is wisdom" — this argument does not stand: because when that very same prefix is added to the root for "cognition / understanding," "cognition" turns into "consciousness" — yet would one dare to say that consciousness is cognition? This shows that once a "root" takes on an auxiliary condition (a prefix), the meaning shifts entirely, and the before and after are not the same thing at all. So doubt does not have wisdom for its substance. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) reads it exactly this way: doubt "has its own separate substance," and the reason it is called "wavering" is that a simultaneous doubt (or a doubt at another moment) keeps wisdom from settling — so it is not wisdom. As for the opponent's argument from the Sanskrit gloss — adding a prefix to the root that expresses "wisdom / pondering" and so judging the substance of doubt to be wisdom itself — Kuiji turns the question back: then when that same prefix is applied to the root that expresses "cognition," must one likewise say that the substance of cognition is consciousness itself? Add the prefix and the meaning shifts; so this glossing argument does not hold.

6. Wrong view — the defiled wisdom that judges things upside-down

What is wrong view? Its nature is defiled wisdom — toward the various truth-principles it judges and assesses upside-down; it is a defiled selecting. Its function is this: it obstructs "right view," and it summons painful fruit. Why? Because those who hold wrong views, for the most part, are bound to suffer.

The mode of operation of this "wrong view," subdivided more finely, has five kinds:

(i) The view of a real self in the perishing aggregates (satkāya-dṛṣṭi, the self-view). It is the deluded grasping, upon the five appropriated aggregates, that there is a "self" and there are "things belonging to the self" (what is mine). It is the basis on which every mistaken view rests — nearly all the other views are born from it. It too has finer distinctions, such as the "twenty-clause" and "sixty-five-clause" schemes of expansion and contraction; and this self-view belongs solely to the "discrimination-arisen" type (the type acquired later, stirred up by way of discrimination and by perverse teaching). For the name "satkāya," Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) cites three schools' differing glosses: the Sarvāstivāda glosses "sat" as "existent," so they call it the "view of an existent self"; the Sautrāntika glosses "sat" as "false," so they call it the "view of a false self"; the Mahāyāna takes the sense of "shifting transformation" — meaning that the "self"-like image that appears upon this mind is not really existent (it is a provisional dharma), yet is not utterly nothing either (it arises dependently and so becomes an objective-support condition), and the name is established precisely upon this "neither-real-nor-utterly-nothing" transformation. The three schools' glosses differ, which exactly reflects how each one judges the "self-image" to be existent or non-existent.

(ii) The view that grasps an extreme (the edge-clinging view). It is, upon that "self" grasped by the self-view, the further biased grasping — either grasping it as "cut off into nothing" (annihilation) or grasping it as "permanently abiding" (eternalism). Its function is to obstruct "the middle course" (the middle way) and to obstruct release. Its distinctions are scattered throughout the various mistaken views: those who argue with a bias toward the "past extreme" hold the "four eternalisms," the "partial eternalism," and the like; those who calculate with a bias toward the "future extreme" hold "the sixteen with perception," "the eight without perception / the eight neither-nor," "the seven annihilationisms," and the like — these all belong to the discrimination-arisen type.

(iii) Perverse view (denial-view). It is the slandering of cause, the slandering of effect, the slandering of activity, and the slandering of real facts, together with all the other mistaken graspings outside the preceding four kinds of view (the reason the miscellaneous leftover graspings are all gathered under perverse view is that perverse view is "the most pervasive in name and meaning" — like the "predominant condition," it covers the widest range). Its distinctions too are scattered throughout the various views: biased toward the past extreme are the "two causelessness doctrines," the "four finitude-and-the-rest," and the "deathless equivocation"; calculating toward the future extreme is the "five present-life nirvāṇas"; or it reckons Maheśvara, the world-lord, Indra, Brahmā, and so on, and the other categories of things, to be permanent and unchanging; or it reckons that Maheśvara and the rest are the cause of all things; or it recklessly calculates various counterfeit liberations; or it falsely grasps "what is not the path" as being "the path" — all such things are gathered under perverse view.

(iv) View-attachment (the grasping of views as supreme). It is, upon the various "views" and upon the five aggregates that carry those views, the grasping of them as "most excellent, able to win purity." Its function is to become the basis on which all disputation rests — each clinging to his own view and refusing to yield, and so quarrels arise from it.

(v) Attachment to precepts and observances (rule-and-ritual grasping). It is, upon the "precepts and observances" (the codes and taboo-practices) set up in accordance with various mistaken views, and upon the five aggregates that carry them, the grasping of them as "most excellent, able to win purity." Its function is to become the basis on which "profitless toil and hardship" rests — the futile, fruitless ascetic suffering comes from it.

Here a variant reading should be sorted out. Some passages say "grasping as most excellent is called view-attachment; grasping as able to win purity is called rule-and-ritual grasping" (as though "most excellent" and "purity" were divided between the two graspings). One should understand that this is "abbreviation by mutual implication" or "the gate of accommodation" — each is mentioned for one side so that they mutually illumine each other; it is not that the two graspings each lean to one meaning. Otherwise, "what is not cessation reckoned as cessation, what is not the path reckoned as the path" (which also carries the sense of "grasping as able to win purity") — why is it said to be perverse view and not gathered into the two graspings? This shows that the two senses, "most excellent" and "able to purify," are interchangeable within the two graspings; that passage merely mentions one side of each.

7. Among the ten afflictions, which are innate and which are discrimination-arisen

Counting the six roots together (with wrong view opened into five), there are ten afflictions in all. Among these ten:

Six — greed, anger, delusion, conceit, plus the self-view and the edge-clinging view — run through both the innate and the discrimination-arisen. That is, they can arise both "spontaneously" (innately, without reflection) and through "deliberate examination" (later discrimination, stirred up by teaching) — both roads are open to them.

Doubt, together with the latter three views (perverse view, view-attachment, rule-and-ritual grasping), are solely discrimination-arisen. Because these necessarily depend on the enticement of bad friends or the force of perverse teaching, plus a stretch of one's own scrutinizing and pondering, before they can arise — they do not simply spring up spontaneously. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) sorts out the innate and the discrimination-arisen of these ten still more clearly: among the six roots, the "four dull ones" (greed, anger, delusion, conceit) and the "two sharp ones" (self-view, edge-clinging view) run through both the innate and the discrimination-arisen — leaving out doubt, perverse view, view-attachment, and rule-and-ritual grasping (what arises spontaneously is innate, what arises only through deliberate examination is discrimination-arisen); and he points out that both the first scroll of the Prakaraṇāryavāca and the eighth scroll of the Yogācārabhūmi say "these six run through both the innate and the discrimination-arisen," which serves as the treatise-basis for this judgment.

Here the "runs through the innate" of the edge-clinging view needs a passage of analysis, and there are two readings.

One view: within the edge-clinging view, only the "annihilation view" runs through the innate. The mode of the eternalism view is rather coarse, and it must be drawn out by external forces such as bad friends, so eternalism does not run through the innate. The Yogācārabhūmi and others say: "Which kind of edge-grasping view is innate? The kind gathered under the annihilation view." Moreover, one who cultivates direct contemplation will give rise to this kind of fear: "This very self I now have — where exactly is it?" And even animals and the like, when they meet adverse conditions, instinctively fear that "my self is cut off" and rouse alarm — this instinctive fear of being "cut off" precisely shows that the annihilation view is spontaneous and innate.

Another view: the innate edge-clinging view in fact runs through eternalism as well. This view holds that the earlier line in the Yogācārabhūmi was spoken "with respect to the coarse mode"; argued by its true principle, the innate edge-clinging view runs through eternalism too — observe that animals and the like instinctively grasp "my self permanently endures," which is exactly why they urgently gather and over long stretches strive to lay up provisions (for if they did not grasp the self as permanently present, why plan for the long term?). So the Prakaraṇāryavāca and other treatises say: upon the five appropriated aggregates, grasping annihilation and reckoning permanence can both be innate and can both be discrimination-arisen.

[The Gate-by-Gate Analysis of the Root Afflictions]

Now, with respect to these ten afflictions, we analyze them from each angle, one gate at a time.

[The Gate of Mutual Association] — whether they can associate with one another

First ask: can these ten afflictions associate (arise simultaneously) with one another?

Greed and anger, greed and doubt, certainly never arise together. Because what greed faces is a "lovable object" and what anger faces is a "hateful object," and the two objects, love and hate, cannot be simultaneous; and doubt is undecided toward its object, so since the mind does not settle, no defiled clinging toward a given object can arise — therefore greed and doubt also do not co-occur.

Greed and conceit, greed and view, may associate. With respect to "what is loved" and "what is to be overtopped" not being the same object, they do not co-occur; but with respect to "what is defiled-with" and "what is relied-upon" being able to be the same object, they do associate; and one can still raise craving while facing the objects of all five wrong views, so it is said that greed associates with the five views, without fault.

Anger and conceit, anger and doubt, may arise together. With respect to "what is angered-at" and "what is relied-upon" not being one object, they do not associate; with respect to "what is despised" and "what is hated" being able to be the same object, they do arise together. As for doubt: at the very first wavering, hatred toward that object has not yet arisen, so they do not co-occur; but when, after long pondering without resolution, one at last flares up in resentment, then they associate — doubt that accords with one's own affairs or that goes against one's own affairs associates or fails to associate as the case may be. Anger and the two graspings (view-attachment, rule-and-ritual grasping) certainly do not associate, because the two graspings grasp views and the path as excellent and prizeworthy, and since one treasures it, one will not hate it. Anger and the three views (self-view, edge-clinging view, perverse view) may associate: when one raises self-view or eternalism upon "delightful aggregates," no hatred is born, so they do not associate; when one raises self-view or eternalism upon "painful aggregates," hatred and rage are born, so they arise together; the annihilation view reverses this (raising annihilation upon delightful aggregates brings hatred, raising it upon painful aggregates brings no hatred), so it is said that anger and the annihilation view may or may not co-occur; perverse view sometimes denies bad facts, sometimes denies good facts, so accordingly anger is said to be absent (denying bad facts brings no hatred) or present (denying good facts brings hatred).

Conceit is decided toward its object while doubt is undecided, so there is no principle by which conceit and doubt associate. Conceit may arise together with all five views, because their modes of operation interpenetrate one another in succession and are not mutually opposed; however, conceit certainly does not co-arise with the annihilation view (at the very moment of grasping that the self is to be cut off, there is no self to be overtopped or relied upon), and the same holds with a certain portion of self-view and perverse view (no co-occurrence). Because doubt does not examine-and-decide, it is precisely opposed to "view" (which decides and judges), so doubt certainly does not co-arise with the five views. The five views also certainly do not associate with one another, because within a single mind there cannot be several instances of wisdom at once (view is defiled wisdom, and one mind has one wisdom). Delusion certainly associates with all the other nine, because for any affliction to arise, it must rest on the foundation of delusion (ignorance).

[The Gate of Which Consciousnesses] — which consciousnesses they associate with

Next ask: which consciousnesses do these ten afflictions associate with?

The eighth, the storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), associates with none of them (the storehouse consciousness is unobstructed-indeterminate, and does not associate with afflictions). The seventh, manas, associates with only four (self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love). The sixth, the mental consciousness, possesses all ten in full. The first five consciousnesses associate with only three — greed, anger, delusion. Why do the first five consciousnesses have only these three? Because the first five consciousnesses have no discriminative function; whereas conceit, doubt, and the views need such discrimination as "weighing and calculating" before they can arise, and since the first five lack discrimination, they naturally cannot pair with them.

[The Gate of Which Feelings] — which feelings they associate with

Next ask: how do these ten associate with "feeling" (the five feelings: pleasure, pain, joy, sorrow, equanimity)?

The three — greed, anger, delusion — whether innate or discrimination-arisen, may all associate with all five feelings. For example, when greed meets adverse conditions (seeking but not getting), it arises together with sorrow and pain; when anger meets an object favorable to itself (its hatred running its course), it arises together with joy and pleasure.

The association of conceit with feeling has two readings. One view: innate and discrimination-arisen conceit may associate with the four feelings "other than pain"; when what it leans on is "painful, inferior aggregates," it associates with sorrow. Another view: innate conceit can also arise together with painful feeling, because the mental ground does have painful feeling, as was already stated earlier. One should add a line: discrimination-arisen conceit and the like are absent in the "wholly painful destinies" (such as the hells), because there are no perverse teachers or perverse teachings there to stir them up (the discrimination-arisen requires external conditions); nevertheless, the hell-beings are not thereby unable to commit the karma leading to evil destinies — such karma is set off by discrimination-arisen afflictions (committed in other places, at other times).

Doubt, together with the latter three views, may associate with four feelings. For example, doubt in the desire realm has no pain and the like (but has joy and the like), and can also arise together with joy; if the two graspings take as object "a view associated with sorrow" and the like, then at that time they can associate with sorrow.

The association of the self-view and edge-clinging view with feeling also has two readings. One view: the innate self-view and edge-clinging view associate only with the three feelings of joy, pleasure, and equanimity, and do not arise together with the first five consciousnesses, because they are solely indeterminate (they do not set off strong pain or sorrow); the discrimination-arisen pair, however, may associate with four feelings — for example, when one grasps "aggregates carrying suffering" as self and as mine, eternalism and annihilation, reversely, will associate with sorrow. Another view: if the two views are innate, they too can arise together with painful feeling, because in "a place of wholly undergoing suffering" they take as object "extremely painful aggregates" and so naturally associate with pain. The treatise also says that "all innate afflictions are found operating within the three feelings," in detail as stated before.

The above is spoken according to "the strict sense" (analyzed rigorously); if instead we speak according to "the coarse mode" (the general aspect), then it is thus: greed, conceit, and the four views associate with pleasure, joy, and equanimity; anger associates only with pain, sorrow, and equanimity; delusion associates with all five feelings; perverse view and doubt associate with four feelings (except pain). Speaking further by the boundaries of "ground": the "association with pleasure" of greed and delusion runs through the lower four grounds (the desire realm together with the first, second, and third meditative absorptions); the "association with pleasure" of the remaining seven excludes the desire realm and runs through the three grounds of the form realm; as for doubt, and delusion that arises by itself (independent delusion), within the desire realm it associates only with sorrow and equanimity, while in other grounds it arises together with the other feelings — all this should be understood in accord with principle.

[The Gate of Association with the Object-Specific Associates] — how they associate with the five "object-specific" mental factors

Next ask: how do these ten associate with the "object-specific" associates (aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom), these five mental factors?

Greed, anger, delusion, conceit may all arise together with all five object-specific associates, because they can fix upon a single object, and so they can also have "concentration." Doubt and the five views, however, may each arise together with only four. Doubt must exclude "resolve" — because doubt is undecided, precisely opposed to "resolve" (the decided holding-fast). The five views must exclude "wisdom" — because view itself is "defiled wisdom," not separate from wisdom, so it does not additionally arise alongside the "wisdom" associate.

[The Gate of the Three Natures] — whether they are wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate

Next ask: under which of the three natures do these ten fall?

Anger is solely "unwholesome," because it harms both oneself and others. The remaining nine run through both classes, "unwholesome" and "indeterminate," as the case decides:

Any affliction belonging to "the upper two realms" (the form realm and the formless realm) is solely indeterminate, because they are subdued by the power of concentration (they do not set off coarse evil). Those bound to the desire realm that are "discrimination-arisen" are solely unwholesome (they trigger evil deeds). Those that are "innate" and able to trigger evil deeds also count as unwholesome (they harm self and others); the remaining innate afflictions are indeterminate, because they are subtle, do not obstruct the wholesome, and do not coarsely harm and distress self and others. One should also know: the innate self-view and edge-clinging view are solely indeterminate — they do not set off evil karma, and although they operate again and again, they do not obstruct wholesome dharmas.

[The Gate of Realm-Binding] — which realm they are bound to

Next ask: to which of the three realms are these ten bound?

Anger is found only in the desire realm; the remaining nine run through the three realms.

Here there is an analysis of afflictions arising across upper and lower grounds. For one born in a lower ground who has not yet left the defilement of the lower ground, the afflictions of an upper ground will not appear before him — only when he has cultivated the root absorption of that upper ground will the afflictions of that ground be permitted to appear (the contaminated path, though it cannot subdue the discrimination-arisen afflictions or the subtle innate ones, can subdue the coarse innate ones, and by this gradually realizes entry into the root absorption of the upper ground). Conversely, for one born in an upper ground, the various discrimination-arisen and innate afflictions of the lower grounds can still arise (for instance, the intermediate-existence being born in the fourth absorption, about to descend and be reborn into a lower ground, will raise the innate craving of the lower ground that moistens rebirth).

The afflictions can also "take an object across realms." Lower-ground afflictions can take an upper ground as object: as the Yogācārabhūmi says, "the greed bound to the desire realm craves rebirth in an upper ground and savors the absorption of an upper ground"; and there are those who hate and envy cessation and the path, those who take all formations together as object and grasp self, mine, annihilation, and permanence, and the conceited who can take an upper ground as object — that the remaining few can take an upper ground as object is also easily established as principle. (Where some passages say that greed, anger, conceit and the like do not take an upper ground as object, that is spoken with respect to the general case or with respect to a particular condition.) Upper-ground afflictions can also take a lower ground as object: one born in an upper ground will, leaning on his own superior virtue, overtop and despise the beings of a lower ground; the craving that takes all formations together as object and grasps self, mine, annihilation, and permanence can also take a lower ground as object; and as for whether doubt and the latter three views take a lower ground as object, ponder it in accord with principle (where it is said that an upper ground does not take a lower ground as object, that is spoken with respect to the general case or a particular condition).

[The Gate of the Trainee and the Rest] — whether they belong to "trainee" and "beyond-training"

Next ask: do these ten belong to "trainee" and "beyond-training"? They do not. Because "trainee" and "beyond-training" are solely of wholesome nature, while these ten are afflictions (defiled), and so they are not among them.

[The Gate of What Is Cut by Seeing or by Cultivation] — whether they are cut at the path of seeing or the path of cultivation

Next ask: how are these ten cut? First, they are not "what is not to be cut" — "what is not to be cut" refers to the uncontaminated, undefiled dharmas, while these ten are defiled, and so of course they must be cut. Further dividing:

The discrimination-arisen are solely cut by "the path of seeing," because they are coarse and easily cut. The innate are solely cut by "the path of cultivation," because they are subtle and hard to cut. And these ten that are cut at the path of seeing are, at the position of "the true path of seeing," cut all at once in a single stroke — because the true path of seeing takes all four truths together as object and realizes the principle (cut all at once, not slowly one by one).

Next we sort out the modes of "being deluded about the truths," which have a "general" and a "particular" account. In the general account: all ten are deluded about the four truths — the truth of suffering and the truth of origin are their "loci of cause-and-basis" (the afflictions arise in dependence on suffering and origin), and the truth of cessation and the truth of the path are their "loci of dread" (the afflictions dread cessation and the path and repel them). In the particular account: they arise each being deluded about the mode of one particular truth —

The self-view and edge-clinging view are deluded solely about "the truth of suffering" (they arise only upon the "locus of fruit," specifically violating the principle of "emptiness and non-self," and emptiness-and-non-self belongs to the truth of suffering); the remaining eight run through delusion about all four truths. Among them: doubt and the three views (perverse view, view-attachment, rule-and-ritual grasping) are intimately deluded about the principle of suffering; the two graspings grasp those three views, the precepts-and-observances, and the aggregates carrying them as excellent and as able to purify, and toward one's own view, another's view, and their retinues, raise greed, raise rage, and raise conceit in turn; the ignorance associated with these is, along with these nine, deluded together; while the "exclusive ignorance" (independent ignorance) is intimately deluded about the principle of suffering. Doubt and perverse view are also intimately deluded about the truth of origin and the rest; that the two graspings, greed, and so on are deluded about origin should be understood by analogy with their delusion about suffering. Furthermore, anger too can be intimately deluded about the two truths of cessation and the path — because it dreads cessation and the path, and out of dread gives rise to hatred and envy.

The "intimate and distant" of being deluded about the truths is, in the coarse mode, as above; if stated more finely: the innate forms of greed, anger, conceit, the three views, and doubt are, as the case dictates, understood by analogy with what was said before (in the coarse mode). But one point must be singled out — the innate self-view and edge-clinging view, together with the craving, conceit, and ignorance associated with them, although they are deluded about the truth of suffering, are nonetheless, because they are subtle and hard to cut, cut only at the path of cultivation (not at the path of seeing). Anger and the remaining craving and the like arise being deluded about "particular facts" and do not violate the contemplation of the truths (they do not directly obstruct the seeing of the truths), and so they too are cut at the path of cultivation.

[The Gate of Taking an Object With or Without a Real Substrate] — the presence or absence and the contamination-status of the substrate they take as object

Finally we sort out the "substrate" that the afflictions take as object. One should know: every affliction has its "image-portion" (the reflected image manifested within the mind), but the "substrate" that this image leans upon is sometimes present and sometimes absent — and so they are distinguished as "afflictions taking an object with a real substrate" and "afflictions taking an object without a real substrate." Although the object they intimately take is in every case contaminated, the substrate they lean upon may also run through the uncontaminated (for example, when taking the two truths of cessation and the path as object) — and so they are further distinguished as "contaminated-object afflictions" and "uncontaminated-object afflictions." Furthermore: those taking "their own ground" as object have an image-portion resembling the substrate, and are called "taking as object the fact-domain arisen by discrimination"; those taking the two truths of cessation and the path as object, and those taking "another ground" as object, have an image-portion not resembling the substrate, and are called "taking as object the name-domain arisen by discrimination." The analysis of the remaining gates should be pondered in accord with principle.

Onward Transmission

The "substance (own-nature) · function (karmic work)" established for each of these six root afflictions (with wrong view opened into five, making ten), together with the long gate-by-gate analysis, is the pivot on which the whole consciousness-only system founds "the root of defiled dharmas," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists these six roots as a class within the mental factors, the root afflictions — greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and wrong view each set up as a single entry (wrong view further opened into the five: self-view, edge-clinging view, perverse view, view-attachment, rule-and-ritual grasping), each dharma carried on in turn, while the present section explains them together, their substance and function and how they mutually include one another. The Thirty Verses — verse twelve ("the afflictions are greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and wrong view") — is the very root-verse this section expounds, verse answering to verse; and the "four afflictions" spoken of in verse six of the manas chapter (self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love) are in fact the delusion, view, conceit, and greed among these six roots, taking only the portion that associates with the manas. The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on the obstructions, sets up "the afflictive obstruction," taking these root afflictions as the root of defilement and the foremost obstruction to liberation — which carries on precisely the present section's sense of "obstructing such-and-such wholesome quality · summoning suffering" as their function. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the cause-and-fruit of entry and its account of the characteristics to be known, sets up "afflictive defilement" (one of the three defilements), saying it arises in dependence on the ālaya holding the seeds — which carries on precisely the principle that these six roots are defiled in dependence on consciousness. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and the absence of external objects and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects, and it has no direct counterpart to the substance, function, or association of the root afflictions; here it is left aside.

〔Verses commented〕Verses 13–14 · the secondary afflictions

The previous section finished treating the six root afflictions. This section takes up two further groups. The first is the "secondary afflictions" (upakleśa) — twenty of them, all defiled mental factors that flow out in the train of the root afflictions. The second is the "indeterminate" factors — four of them, so called because they are not fixed as good, bad, or morally neutral. Finally, a closing passage, the "summary of the six classes of mental factors," answers a more fundamental question: are these factors entities that exist apart from the mind itself, each with its own self-nature, or are they merely modal differentiations of the mind?

First, let us lay out the twenty-plus-four named in the verse. The secondary afflictions are: wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harmfulness, conceit, lack of shame, lack of embarrassment, restlessness, torpor, lack of faith, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and wrong knowing. The indeterminate are: regret, sleep, applied thought (vitarka), and sustained thought (vicāra) — followed in the verse by the three words "two, each twofold."

The defiled and pure characteristics of the mental factors treated in this section have their roots in scripture and treatise alike. In the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the analysis of yoga, the World-Honored One answers the Bodhisattva Maitreya: the image apprehended within concentration is "not different" from the apprehending mind — why so? "Because that image is consciousness alone" — "I declare that what consciousness takes as object is nothing but the manifestation of consciousness." Whether defiled or pure, the various characteristics that the mental factors display are manifested not apart from consciousness; and this is exactly the scriptural basis on which this section's closing "summary of the six classes of mental factors" returns everything to "consciousness-only" and says that the mental factors "appear in the likeness of it (the mind)." As for the names, substances, and functions of these twenty secondary afflictions and four indeterminate, the treatise-basis lies in the Yogācārabhūmi, in its Foundational Section — there, in the section on "auxiliaries" within the ground of mentation, it lists out collectively the names of the conjoined mental factors, wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, and on down to wrongdoing (regret), sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought; this is the treatise-basis on which the twenty secondary afflictions and four indeterminate are founded. The Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā then define one by one their substance and function — for instance, wrath is "a portion of hatred, with the angering of the mind as substance, and the seizing of a cudgel and bursting into fury as function"; wrongdoing is "a portion of delusion, with the mind's pursuing remorse as substance, and the obstructing of the mind's settling as function"; applied thought is "the seeking-out of the verbal-mental object in dependence on volition and on wisdom, making the mind coarse"; sustained thought is "the scrutinizing of the verbal-mental object in dependence on volition and on wisdom, making the mind fine." The substance and function of the mental factors that Dharmapāla synthesizes and expounds below have their scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana and their treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā — and with that we follow the verse and open the exposition.

A. The Twenty Secondary Afflictions

[General Heading] — why they are called "secondary" afflictions, and how they divide into minor, middling, and major classes

Having finished the six root afflictions, what are the characteristics of the "secondary afflictions"? The answer is the twenty just listed. Why are they called "secondary" (literally, "following") afflictions? Because all twenty are "modal differentiations" of the root afflictions — the distinct aspects that the afflictions display in various situations — and their "outflow of the same kind" — factors of the same family that stream out from the afflictions. They arise in the wake of the root afflictions, and so are called secondary afflictions.

These twenty divide into three classes according to the breadth or narrowness of their pervasion. The first class — wrath and the rest, ten of them — each arises singly and never accompanies the others; these are the "minor secondary afflictions." The second class — lack of shame and lack of embarrassment, two of them — pervades every unwholesome mind; these are the "middling secondary afflictions." The third class — restlessness and the rest, eight of them — pervades every defiled mind; these are the "major secondary afflictions." We will take each in turn.

1. Wrath

What is "wrath"? When faced with a present object that does no good and that contradicts, injures, or vexes me, the mind flares up in anger — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-wrath, and its function shows itself as "taking up a weapon": one possessed by wrath will mostly issue coarse and violent bodily acts (overt behavior). Note that wrath is not an independent thing — it is simply "a portion of hatred" (pratigha); apart from hatred no separate characteristic or function of wrath can be found at all.

2. Enmity

What is "enmity"? Led on by prior wrath, one nurses ill-will that will not let go and binds it into a grudge — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-enmity, and its function is "fevered distress": one who harbors a grudge cannot bear it patiently and is forever scorched by that fever. Enmity, too, is a portion of hatred; apart from hatred there is no independent characteristic or function of enmity.

3. Concealment

What is "concealment"? For an offense one has committed, fearing the loss of gain and reputation, one hides it away — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-concealment, and its function is "remorseful distress": one who conceals an offense is bound to suffer remorse afterward, with no peace of mind.

Now, what exactly constitutes concealment? Here there are two views. One view holds that concealment is merely "a portion of delusion," since the treatise speaks of it only as a portion of delusion; moreover, the one who conceals an offense dares to hide it precisely because he does not fear the suffering that will ripen in the future, and this fearlessness is itself the mark of delusion (ignorance). Another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that concealment is "a portion of both craving and delusion," because the one who conceals also conceals out of "fear of losing gain and reputation," and fear of such loss belongs to craving. When the treatise speaks "only of a portion of delusion," it is speaking from the comparatively coarse and obvious aspect. By way of parallel: the treatise also calls restlessness "a portion of craving," yet it likewise says that restlessness "pervades every defiled mind" — which shows that one must not rigidly insist that restlessness is craving alone. Concealment follows the same logic, and must not be rigidly held to be delusion alone.

4. Vexation

What is "vexation"? Led on by wrath and enmity, dwelling on past wrongs and meeting present adverse conditions, one breeds a surge of violent heat — savage, cruel, and perverse — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-vexation, and its function is "stinging": like a wasp or scorpion stinging a person, one wounds others. The vexed person, dwelling on past wrongs and running up against present contrary conditions, hardens into cruelty, and mostly issues arrogant, fierce, vile, and coarse speech to sting and harm others. Vexation, too, is a portion of hatred; apart from hatred there is no independent characteristic or function of vexation.

5. Envy

What is "envy"? Out of a craving for one's own fame and gain, one cannot bear another's flourishing, and jealousy arises — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-envy, and its function is "grief": the envious person, the moment he hears or sees another flourishing, sinks into deep grief, with no peace of mind. Envy, too, is a portion of hatred; apart from hatred there is no independent characteristic or function of envy.

6. Stinginess

What is "stinginess"? Cleaving to wealth and to teaching, one refuses to use one's wisdom to give, but hoards and grudges — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-stinginess, and its function is "mean accumulation": hoarding meanly. The stingy person is mostly mean and tight of mind, knowing only how to pile up wealth and teaching, unwilling to give to others. Stinginess differs from the preceding few: it is "a portion of craving," and apart from craving there is no independent characteristic or function of stinginess.

7. Deceit

What is "deceit"? In order to swindle gain and reputation, one feigns and counterfeits a show of virtue, contriving a fraud — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-deceit, and its function is "wrong livelihood": making a living by improper means. The deceitful person, harboring a scheming heart, mostly displays all sorts of false and crooked livelihoods. Deceit is "a portion of both craving and delusion"; apart from these two there is no independent characteristic or function of deceit.

8. Flattery

What is "flattery"? In order to win over and ensnare others, one feigns all manner of contrived and aberrant deportment — both sly and crooked — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-flattery, and its function is "obstructing instruction." The flatterer, in order to net others, bends his intent to suit the times and contrives all sorts of expedients — whether to curry favor or to cover his own faults. As a result he can no longer bear the proper instruction of teachers and friends. Flattery, too, is a portion of both craving and delusion; apart from these two there is no independent characteristic or function of flattery.

9. Harmfulness

What is "harmfulness"? Toward living beings, the mind has no compassion whatsoever and only sets out to injure and vex — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-harming, and its function is "tormenting": the harmful person specializes in tormenting others. Harmfulness, too, is a portion of hatred; apart from hatred there is no independent characteristic or function of harmfulness. As for how hatred and harmfulness are to be distinguished, one may proceed by analogy with the earlier chapter on the wholesome mental factors. There it was settled that "non-hatred is the giving of happiness, while non-harming is the removal of suffering"; viewing the distinct characteristics of hatred and harmfulness in the same way makes their difference plain.

10. Conceit

What is "conceit"? Toward one's own prosperous affairs — vigor of youth, wealth and rank, intelligence, and the like — one cleaves deeply and grows arrogant, as if intoxicated — this is its essential nature. It obstructs non-conceit, and its function is "the basis of defilement": being the support for every kind of defiled factor. The conceited and intoxicated person breeds every kind of defiled factor. Conceit is a portion of craving; apart from craving there is no independent characteristic or function of conceit.

With this the "ten minor secondary afflictions" are complete — wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harmfulness, and conceit. We now take up the "two middling secondary afflictions."

11. Lack of Shame

What is "lack of shame"? Holding neither oneself nor the true Teaching in regard, one slights and rejects the worthy and good — this is its essential nature. It obstructs shame, and its function is "the breeding of evil conduct": one who holds neither self nor the Teaching in regard slights and rejects the worthy and good, feels no disgrace at faults and wrongs, and so obstructs shame and breeds every kind of evil conduct.

12. Lack of Embarrassment

What is "lack of embarrassment"? Holding the world (the censure of others) in no regard at all, one instead esteems and reveres what is brutal and evil — this is its essential nature. It obstructs embarrassment, and its function, likewise, is "the breeding of evil conduct": one who holds the world in no regard at all esteems brutality and evil, feels no disgrace at faults and crimes, and so obstructs embarrassment and breeds every kind of evil conduct.

Next we must distinguish the substance of these two — lack of shame and lack of embarrassment — and how they are told apart. First, their "common characteristic": "feeling no disgrace at faults and wrongs" is shared by both, and so some scriptural teachings provisionally take this common characteristic as their substance. But this raises an objection.

Someone objects: if "feeling no disgrace" is taken to be the "distinct characteristic" of each, then there is no difference in the substance of the two; and if there is no difference in substance, the two ought not to be able to arise simultaneously — just as feeling and conception, which each have a distinct substance, cannot arise together as one substance. Furthermore, if one wishes to establish two distinct characteristics by relating them respectively to "oneself" and "others," then the two become provisional factors established by mutual reference and ought not to be substantially real — which contradicts the scriptural teaching (which says lack of shame and lack of embarrassment are substantially real). Yet if one grants that they are substantially real and arise separately, that contradicts the treatise's statement that "lack of shame and lack of embarrassment both pervade every unwholesome mind" — for if both pervade, neither ought to arise separately on its own.

To this objection the answer is: the moment an unwholesome mind arises, whatever its object may be, it simultaneously carries both senses — "slighting and rejecting the good" and "esteeming and revering evil." Hence these two "both pervade the unwholesome mind and do not differ in object," and they suffer no fault of "arising separately on their own": they need not arise apart from one another, for they already pervade the unwholesome mind together.

As for how the scriptural phrase "disregarding oneself, disregarding others" is to be understood, it may be reconciled thus: take "one's own person and the true Teaching" as "self," and "the world" as "others"; or else, with reference to the benefit or harm to oneself in "rejecting the good" and "esteeming evil," provisionally name these "self" and "others." And when the treatise says "lack of shame and lack of embarrassment are a portion of craving and the rest," it means that these two are an "outflow of the same kind" from craving and the rest — not that they take craving and the rest as their essential nature.

With this the "two middling secondary afflictions" are complete. Next come the "eight major secondary afflictions."

13. Restlessness

What is "restlessness"? Keeping the mind from settling upon its object — this is its essential nature. It obstructs equanimity (the wholesome factor of even-mindedness) and calm abiding (śamatha) — this is its function.

What constitutes restlessness? Here there are three views. One view: restlessness is merely "a portion of craving," since the treatise speaks of it only as a portion of craving, and since restlessness arises from recalling past pleasures (recalling pleasure belongs to craving). Another view: restlessness is not subsumed under craving alone — the treatise says restlessness pervades every defiled mind (if it were craving alone, it ought not so to pervade), and the characteristic of restlessness is "non-tranquility," which the treatise says belongs to the "common characteristic of the afflictions"; apart from this non-tranquility no further self-characteristic of restlessness can be found. Restlessness is therefore provisionally established in dependence on all the afflictions; only because it is especially intense within the "station of craving" is it preferentially called a portion of craving — which does not mean it is craving alone. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that restlessness "has its own distinct self-nature and pervades every defiled mind," just as lack of faith and the rest also pervade the defiled mind and yet have their own distinct substance. One must not, on the grounds that the treatise calls it "a portion of craving and the rest," conclude that its substance is unreal — otherwise lack of faith and the rest would also turn out to be merely provisional (whereas lack of faith and the rest are substantially real). When the treatise says restlessness is "conventionally existent (provisional)," that is like the case of sleep and the like: it is "stated by way of the other's characteristic" (provisionally so described from the coarse characteristic of what it depends on), not a statement that its substance is truly provisional. The "distinct characteristic" of restlessness is precisely "clamorous agitation" (noisy commotion): it keeps the factors arising together with it from settling. Were one to say there is no characteristic of restlessness apart from the afflictions, then the treatise ought not to have separately said "restlessness obstructs calm abiding" — since it obstructs calm abiding singly, it must have its own characteristic. Therefore "non-tranquility" is only the common characteristic of restlessness, not its distinct characteristic; its distinct characteristic is "clamorous agitation."

14. Torpor

What is "torpor"? Rendering the mind "unfit" toward its object — dull, heavy, and unable to function — this is its essential nature. It obstructs pliancy and insight (vipaśyanā) — this is its function.

What constitutes torpor? Here too there are three views. One view: torpor is merely "a portion of delusion," since the treatise speaks of it only as a portion of delusion, and since "dim dullness and heaviness" is precisely the mark of delusion (murky obscurity). Another view: torpor is not subsumed under delusion alone — "unfitness" is the characteristic of torpor, yet every affliction renders the mind unfit, and apart from this unfitness no further self-characteristic of torpor can be found. Torpor is therefore provisionally established in dependence on all the afflictions; only because the characteristic of torpor is especially intense within delusion is it said to be merely a portion of delusion — which does not mean it is delusion alone. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that torpor "has its own distinct self-nature": though named "a portion of delusion," it is in fact an outflow of the same kind from delusion (like lack of faith and the rest), and is not actually subsumed under delusion. When the treatise says it is "stated by way of the other's characteristic and so called conventionally existent" (provisionally so described from the coarse characteristic of what it depends on), this is like the case of sleep and the like — yet its substance "is substantially real." The "distinct characteristic" of torpor is precisely "dim heaviness" (murky dullness and weight), which renders the factors arising together with it unfit. Were one to say there is no characteristic of torpor apart from the afflictions, then the treatise ought not to have separately said "torpor obstructs insight"; therefore "unfitness" is only its common characteristic, not its distinct one, and its distinct characteristic is "dim heaviness." One must also clearly distinguish torpor from the characteristic of delusion: delusion takes "murky obscurity" toward its object as its characteristic and properly obstructs non-delusion, not dim heaviness; torpor takes "dim heaviness" toward its object as its characteristic and properly obstructs pliancy, not murky obscurity.

15. Lack of Faith

What is "lack of faith"? Toward the three objects of "the real, the virtuous, and the capable," one refuses to assent, refuses to delight, and refuses to aspire, and the mind is turbid and impure — this is its essential nature. It obstructs pure faith, and its function is "serving as the basis for indolence": the faithless person mostly breeds indolence.

The "three characteristics" of lack of faith — not assenting to what is real, not delighting in what is virtuous, not aspiring to what is capable — are understood simply by reversing the three characteristics of faith. But while the various defiled factors each have their own distinct characteristics, lack of faith alone is "turbid in its own characteristic" and is moreover able to make turbid the remaining mind and mental factors; like a thoroughly filthy thing that is itself dirty and dirties other things, it is therefore said to take "defilement of the mind" as its essential nature. To put it more precisely: through lack of faith one does not assent to, delight in, or aspire toward the real, the virtuous, and the capable — yet this "not assenting, delighting, or aspiring" is not a self-nature lack of faith possesses over and above its defilement of the mind; it is merely the function of that defilement. Again, if toward other matters one gives rise to "wrong" assent, delight, or aspiration, that is the cause-and-effect that lack of faith induces, and is likewise not the self-nature of lack of faith.

16. Indolence

What is "indolence"? Toward the wholesome that ought to be "cultivated" and the unwholesome that ought to be "cut off," one is lazy — this is its essential nature. It obstructs vigor, and its function is "increasing defilement": the indolent person feeds defilement.

Here a few easily confused cases must be distinguished. One who, on the contrary, strives and exerts himself diligently toward various defiled matters is also called "indolent," because he has fallen away from the wholesome. As for one who strives and exerts himself toward morally neutral matters, neither increasing nor falling away from the wholesome — that is merely the function of "desire" and "resolve," not a self-nature that indolence possesses in addition; just as the "assent, delight, and aspiration" toward a morally neutral matter is neither pure nor defiled, so within it there is no question of "faith" or "lack of faith" either.

17. Heedlessness

What is "heedlessness"? Toward the defiled one cannot "guard against," and toward the pure one cannot "cultivate"; one is loose and dissolute — this is its essential nature. It obstructs heedfulness, and its function is "serving as the basis for increasing evil and diminishing good." The key point is this: heedlessness arises when the four factors of indolence, craving, hatred, and delusion together make one unable to guard against the defiled and cultivate the pure; combined, they are called "heedlessness," and it "has no separate substance of its own." Although conceit, doubt, and the like also have some slight capacity for "failing to guard and cultivate," their force is far weaker than those four; moreover, those four directly obstruct the "three wholesome roots" and are factors that can "pervasively spur on" (indolence pervasively spurs all; craving, hatred, and delusion are the roots), and so only these four are taken as the substance of heedlessness. How is its characteristic to be investigated? By analogy with the earlier chapter on "heedfulness," one knows: since "guarding and cultivating" cannot be found apart from those four, it is clear that heedlessness has no separate substance.

18. Forgetfulness

What is "forgetfulness"? Being unable to clearly retain the various objects — this is its essential nature. It obstructs right mindfulness, and its function is "serving as the basis for distraction": the forgetful person's mind follows distraction.

What constitutes forgetfulness? Three views. One view: forgetfulness is merely "a portion of mindfulness," since the treatise calls it "mindfulness that is associated with afflictions." Another view: forgetfulness is merely "a portion of delusion," since the Yogācārabhūmi calls it a portion of delusion — delusion causes mindfulness to be lost, and so it is called forgetfulness. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that forgetfulness is "a portion of both mindfulness and delusion": the previous two views speak "by partial allusion" (each citing one side, the two mutually illuminating each other); moreover the treatise also says forgetfulness pervades the defiled mind — if it were a portion of mindfulness alone it would not so pervade, and only by including a portion of delusion can it pervade.

19. Distraction

What is "distraction"? Causing the mind to scatter and gallop among the various objects — this is its essential nature. It obstructs right concentration, and its function is "serving as the basis for evil wisdom": the distracted person gives rise to evil wisdom.

What constitutes distraction? Again three views. One view: distraction is merely "a portion of delusion," since the Yogācārabhūmi calls it a portion of delusion. Another view: distraction is subsumed under all three of craving, hatred, and delusion, since the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the like call it "a portion of three"; the previous view, which speaks only of "a portion of delusion," speaks with respect to "pervading the defiled mind" (delusion pervades the defiled) — in fact the power of craving, hatred, and delusion to make the mind scatter exceeds that of the other factors, and so these three are called distraction. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that distraction "has its own distinct substance"; when the treatise calls it "a portion of three," it means that it is an outflow of the same kind from craving, hatred, and delusion (like lack of shame and the rest), and is not actually subsumed under these three — "stated by way of the other's characteristic and so called conventionally existent" is the same kind of case. The "distinct characteristic" of distraction is precisely "agitated disturbance" (restless turbulence), which makes the factors arising together with it scatter. Were one to say there is no substance of distraction apart from those three factors, then the treatise ought not to have separately said "distraction obstructs concentration" — since it obstructs concentration singly, it must have its own distinct substance.

Here, in passing, one question may be settled: what is the difference in function between restlessness and distraction? The answer: restlessness causes the mind to "change its understanding" — to alter its view, its interpretive grasp; distraction causes the mind to "change its object" — to alter the object it apprehends. Although within a single instant neither understanding nor object actually changes, across the successive flow of moments there is the sense of changing, and so the two have different functions. The moment a defiled mind arises, by the force of restlessness and distraction it ought, moment by moment, to change its understanding and change its object — unless temporarily subdued by the force of "mindfulness" and the like, just as a rope tying a monkey lets it have a temporary halt. Thus restlessness and distraction "both pervade the defiled mind" and arise together; only the direction of their function differs.

20. Wrong Knowing

What is "wrong knowing"? Forming an erroneous understanding of the object contemplated — this is its essential nature. It obstructs right knowing, and its function is "transgression": transgression of the disciplinary code — the person of wrong knowing commits many transgressions.

What constitutes wrong knowing? Three views, paired up very neatly with forgetfulness. One view: wrong knowing is merely "a portion of wisdom," since the treatise calls it "wisdom that is associated with afflictions." Another view: wrong knowing is merely "a portion of delusion," since the Yogācārabhūmi calls it a portion of delusion — delusion causes what is known to be wrong, and so it is called wrong knowing. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that wrong knowing is "a portion of both wisdom and delusion": the previous two views speak by partial allusion, each illuminating the other; moreover the treatise also says wrong knowing pervades the defiled mind — only by including both the portion of wisdom and the portion of delusion can it pervade.

With this the "eight major secondary afflictions" are complete — restlessness, torpor, lack of faith, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and wrong knowing.

[Beyond the Twenty] — the secondary afflictions are not only twenty; how the name "secondary affliction" is to be defined

The verse uses the three connectives "with," "together with," and "as well as" — this is meant to show that the secondary afflictions are "not only twenty." The Kṣudraka-vastu and the like say that craving and the rest have many more kinds of secondary affliction. Note the scope of the name "secondary affliction": it also encompasses the "root afflictions" within itself, since the root afflictions, too, have the sense of outflow of the same kind; whereas the remaining defiled factors of the same family as the afflictions are called "secondary afflictions" only, and are not counted as subsumed under the "root afflictions."

Then why are just these twenty established here as the secondary afflictions? Because they are "not root afflictions" (they are not set up as the six roots) and are purely defiled, coarse, and manifest factors; the remaining defiled factors are either modal differentiations of these twenty or outflows of the same kind from these twenty, and so are all gathered within these twenty. Following their classes — minor, middling, and major, the three — one is to understand them rightly.

[The Gates on the Secondary Afflictions] — laying these twenty out from twelve angles

Having treated the characteristics of the twenty, we now lay out their doctrinal content from twelve gates (angles).

[Gate of Provisional and Real] — which are provisionally existent and which are substantially real

Among these twenty: the ten minor (wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harmfulness, conceit) and three of the major (heedlessness, forgetfulness, wrong knowing) are definitely "provisionally existent." Lack of shame, lack of embarrassment, lack of faith, and indolence are definitely "substantially real" — this holds on both scriptural and rational grounds. As for restlessness, torpor, and distraction, these three — one view says provisional, another says real; the reasoning and the scripture cited are precisely the debate over "having a distinct self-nature" found in the three chapters above on restlessness, torpor, and distraction.

[Gate of Innate and Discriminated] — whether they are innate or arise from acquired discrimination

All twenty pervade both the "innate" (arising spontaneously from birth) and the "discriminated" (arising through acquired reckoning), because they all arise following the force of both the "innate afflictions" and the "discriminated afflictions."

[Gate of Mutual Co-arising] — whether they can arise simultaneously with one another

Can these twenty arise simultaneously with one another? This is treated in several layers. The ten minor "are definitely fixed not to co-arise" — they mutually contradict one another, their mode is coarse and fierce, and each demands to be master, and a single mind cannot hold two masters. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) makes the ground of this "not co-arising" perfectly plain: it is precisely "because each is its own master" — when any of the minor arises it demands to be the master of that very thought-moment, and since a master will not admit a second, the minor are definitely fixed not to arise together with one another. The two middling (lack of shame, lack of embarrassment) arise together with every unwholesome mind, and accordingly can co-arise with both the minor and the major. The treatise says the "eight major pervade every defiled mind," so the major also permit co-arising with the minor and the middling.

Here there are differing enumerations. One place says "only six of the major pervade the defiled mind," because torpor and restlessness, when intense, cannot co-arise (one sinking, one stirring — mutually contradictory), and so, subtracting these two, only six are said to pervade. Another place says "only five pervade the defiled," because torpor, restlessness, and the like contradict pliancy and the rest, which are "exclusively wholesome" (so one more is subtracted). All these major factors are exclusively of defiled nature, and so do not co-arise with the eighth, the ālaya-vijñāna (which is unobstructed-neutral).

Now consider their distribution among the various consciousnesses. In the seventh, the manas, there are "only the eight major"; its distinctions of inclusion and exclusion are known from what was said above (the innate, exclusively defiled set). The sixth, mental consciousness, permits co-arising with "all twenty." The ten minor are coarse and fierce (depending on acquired discriminative reckoning), and so are absent from the first five consciousnesses; the middling and major, however, are shared with the five consciousnesses and are permitted there. Because of this, the middling and major can be associated with the "five feelings" (the first five consciousnesses have access to suffering, pleasure, and the rest).

[Gate of Association with Feeling] — which feelings they are associated with

How are they associated with feeling? Here there are two views. One view: among the ten minor, excluding the three of flattery, deceit, and conceit, the remaining ones — wrath and the rest (wrath, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, harmfulness) — are associated only with the three feelings of joy, sorrow, and equanimity; flattery, deceit, and conceit co-arise with four feelings (excluding suffering). Another view: wrath and the rest co-arise with four feelings (excluding pleasure); flattery, deceit, and conceit can co-arise with all five feelings. The mental ground does have suffering-feeling, as was already said in the chapter on root afflictions. The manner of their association with feeling follows what was said there.

The above is the "real meaning" (the ultimate sense); if one speaks instead from the "coarse characteristic": wrath, enmity, vexation, envy, and harmfulness co-arise with sorrow and equanimity; concealment and stinginess co-arise with joy and equanimity; the remaining three (flattery, deceit, conceit) add pleasure on top. The middling and major, taken from the coarse characteristic, are the same as their real meaning, with no further separate account.

[Gate of Association with the Object-specific Five] — whether they can be associated with the five object-specific factors

These twenty all permit co-arising with the object-specific five (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom), because they are not in contradiction with them. Here someone may doubt: do not defiled mindfulness (forgetfulness) and defiled wisdom (wrong knowing) contradict "mindfulness" and "wisdom"? The answer is: although forgetfulness and wrong knowing do not arise by taking "mindfulness" and "wisdom" as their substance, yet with respect to their "portion of delusion" they too must be associated with mindfulness and wisdom. Again, "mindfulness" can also apprehend the present and objects of the same kind that have been previously habituated, while "wrath" too can apprehend a momentary past object, and so wrath, too, must be associated with mindfulness. Again, when defiled concentration (concentration in the state of distraction) arises, the mind is also agitated, and so there is no problem in "distraction" being associated with "concentration" either.

[Gate of Association with the Afflictions] — how they pair with the root afflictions

The two middling and the eight major can all co-arise with the ten root afflictions. The ten minor, however, "are definitely fixed not to co-arise with 'views' and 'doubt'" — because the characteristic of the minor is coarse and stirring, while the characteristic of views and doubt is deliberative and fine; coarse and fine cannot be paired.

Now examine in detail which root afflictions each of the minor pairs with. The five factors of wrath and the rest (wrath, enmity, vexation, envy, harmfulness) permit co-arising with conceit and delusion, but not with craving and hatred — because they are a portion of hatred (and hatred does not pair with craving, so neither, of course, does it pair with itself). Stinginess permits co-arising with delusion and conceit, but not with craving and hatred — because it is a portion of craving. Conceit co-arises only with delusion; it differs in meaning from "pride" (conceit relies on one's own prosperity; pride lords over others), and conceit is a portion of craving (so it does not pair with craving). Concealment, deceit, and flattery — these three permit co-arising with craving, delusion, and conceit, since their modes are not in contradiction, and they are portions of craving and delusion.

[Gate of the Three Moral Qualities] — to which they belong: wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral

Seven of the minor (wrath, enmity, vexation, envy, harmfulness, concealment, stinginess) and the two middling belong only to the "unwholesome." Three of the minor (flattery, deceit, conceit) and the eight major also extend to the "neutral" (not only the unwholesome).

[Gate of Realm-binding] — to which of the three realms they are bound, and whether higher and lower stages can take each other as object

The seven minor and two middling belong only to the desire realm. Deceit and flattery extend to both the desire realm and the form realm; the remaining ones (conceit plus the eight major, nine in all) extend to all three realms. One born in a lower stage may give rise to the eleven of the higher stage (conceit, deceit, flattery, plus the eight major) — because, cleaving to the state of meditative absorption, one gives rise to conceit, deceit, flattery, and the like toward others. And one born in a higher stage may give rise to the latter ten of the lower stage — because, when wrong view and craving arise together, they permit the dragging up of those.

As for the ten minor: a person born in a higher stage has no way to give rise to the minor of a lower stage — because the minor are neither afflictions that "properly moisten rebirth" nor afflictions that "slander cessation," and so do not arise with reference to a lower stage. The two middling and the eight major: even one in a lower stage can apprehend a higher stage — arising correspondingly in the train of "craving directed upward" and the like.

Here, whether the minor can apprehend the upper, there are again two views. One view: the ten minor in a lower stage do not apprehend a higher stage — their mode is coarse and near at hand, with no way to apprehend a distant higher object. Another view: envy and the like can also apprehend the upper — because one gives rise to envy and the like toward the factors of a higher, superior stage.

Now the case of the upper apprehending the lower: the eight major plus flattery and deceit, even in a higher stage, can apprehend a lower stage — arising correspondingly in the train of "pride directed downward" and the like; for instance, the great Brahmā gives rise to flattery and deceit toward Śākyamuni's disciples (this is arising with reference to the lower). Only "conceit" does not apprehend the lower — because the lower stage is not the prosperity on which one prides oneself.

[Gate of the Trainee and the Adept] — whether they are subsumed under the noble trainee's stage or the adept's stage

These twenty "are not subsumed under either the 'trainee' or the 'adept'" — the secondary afflictions are purely defiled factors, whereas the stages of the trainee and the adept are exclusively pure factors.

[Gate of What Is Cut Off in the Path of Seeing and of Cultivation] — whether cut off in the path of seeing or the path of cultivation

The latter ten (restlessness, torpor, lack of faith, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, wrong knowing, plus lack of shame and lack of embarrassment) extend only to "cut off in the path of seeing" and "cut off in the path of cultivation" — because they arise in association with both the discriminated and the innate afflictions. Among these, those cut off in the path of seeing, following the characteristic of the truth they are deluded about, arise together with the afflictions whether in general delusion or particular delusion, and so accordingly extend to delusion about all four noble truths. The intimacy or remoteness of their delusion about the truths, and the rest, follow what was said in the chapter on root afflictions.

For the former ten (the ten minor) there are here two views. One view: they are only "cut off in the path of cultivation" — because the minor take coarse and manifest objective matters as their object and arise spontaneously (belonging to the innate, and so cut off in cultivation). Another view: the minor also extend to both "cut off in seeing and in cultivation" — because they arise following the force of both the discriminated and the innate afflictions; for instance, giving rise to wrath and the like with reference to another's wrong view (this is arising in dependence on the discriminated affliction, and belongs to what is cut off in seeing). Among these, those cut off in seeing, accordingly associated with their object, by the force of general or particular delusion, all extend to delusion about the four noble truths.

There is here a further layer: do the minor "directly delude about the truths"? Again two views. One view: wrath and the rest merely arise as "afflictions that accompany delusion about the truths" and do not "directly delude about the truths" — their mode is coarse and shallow, not deeply grasping the principle of the truths. Another view: envy and the like do directly delude about the truths — for instance, giving rise to envy and the like toward the truths of cessation, the path, and so on. Still, all ten of wrath and the rest apprehend only "objects with substance" (objects with a real underlying basis) and can arise only by relying on a "substratum." Their gates of "apprehending the defiled and the undefiled" and the like are known by analogy with the chapter on root afflictions.

(This was originally the point of division between fascicles, at the close of fascicle seven.)

Onward Transmission

The establishing of the twenty secondary afflictions is taken up by the later treatises group by group. The Hundred Dharmas lists the twenty under the mental factors with exactly the names and number settled here, and its threefold division into the lesser ten, middling two and greater eight rests on this. Verse 13 and the first half of verse 14 of the Thirty Verses are the root verses this chapter expounds. The Madhyāntavibhāga, in its chapter on obstructions, treats shamelessness, non-embarrassment, restlessness and torpor as particular obstructions to the limbs of awakening — the very middling two and greater eight named here. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, in its chapter on the stages of cultivation, sets out what is severed ground by ground, and what is severed is this class of modal affliction: there the stages of severance, here the substance and character — the two accounts requiring each other.

〔Verses commented〕Verse 14 · the four indeterminate

What this chapter settles — the four indeterminate, and the summary of the classes — has its treatise ground. The Yogācārabhūmi, in its Basic Section, fixes the character of applied and sustained thought: "applied thought is what makes the mind discriminate coarsely," "sustained thought is what makes the mind discriminate finely" — and that coarseness and fineness is the ground on which this chapter judges them to run through all three natures while not pervading every stage. The same text establishes the three stages — with both applied and sustained thought, with sustained thought only, with neither — which shows exactly that they do not pervade every stage, and is the warrant for the name "indeterminate." As to whether the mental factors stand apart from mind, the Yogācārabhūmi both sets them out as a separate collection and says they are "concomitant with mind"; the dispute over apart-or-identical arises from just that.

A. The Four Indeterminate

[General Heading] — why these four are called "indeterminate"

The characteristics of the twenty secondary afflictions have been treated. The "indeterminate" are four; what are their characteristics? The verse answers: the indeterminate are regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought, followed by "two, each twofold." Why establish the name "indeterminate"? Because these four — regret, sleep, applied thought, sustained thought — are "indeterminate" within the three moral qualities of wholesome, defiled, and the rest (not fixed as to which quality they belong to); and they are unlike the ever-present factors such as "contact," which "definitely pervade every mind," nor like the object-specific factors such as "desire," which "definitely pervade every stage"; and so the name "indeterminate" is established. We take each in turn.

1. Regret (Wrongdoing)

"Regret" is "wrongdoing" (literally, "the deed regretted"); it means to loathe the deed one has done and to give rise to remorse — this is its essential nature; its function is "obstructing calm abiding (śamatha)." Here a technical term must be clarified: "wrongdoing" properly refers to "the deed that is loathed" (this is the cause). First there is the loathed deed (the cause), and only afterward does remorse arise (the effect); yet now the cause-name "wrongdoing" is used to name that effect, namely remorse — this is called "provisionally applying the cause-name to the effect." Furthermore, "regretting what one previously did not do" also counts as "wrongdoing"; for instance, someone may regret, saying, "My not having done such a thing before — this is my wrongdoing." Clearly regret is not limited to regretting what was done; it also includes regretting what was not done.

2. Sleep

"Sleep" is "sleeping"; it renders the body not free, and takes "dimness and feebleness" — the mind dim, its mode feeble and inferior — as its essential nature; its function is "obstructing insight (vipaśyanā)." During sleep, the body is not free, the mind is utterly dark and inferior, and it operates relying on "a single gate" (the mental gate, without recourse to the five sense gates). Here the word "dim" serves to distinguish it from "being in concentration" (entering concentration is also the mind one-pointed, but that is not dimness); the word "feeble" serves to distinguish it from "waking" (in waking the mode is not feeble and inferior) — marking it out in this way is meant to show that sleep is not without substance and function. Again, even in the "mindless states" (such as fainting) the name "sleep" is provisionally applied, because, like the other hindrances, entanglements, and so on that are associated with the mind, it is stated as a provisional expedient by way of the other's characteristic.

What do regret and sleep take as their substance? This debate has four views. One view: regret and sleep take "delusion" alone as their substance, since the treatise calls these two "secondary afflictions" and "portions of delusion." Another view: not so — regret and sleep also extend to the wholesome (not only the defiled); one should say their "defiled portion" takes delusion as its substance, while their "pure portion" takes non-delusion as its substance; the treatise speaks of them as secondary afflictions and subsumed under a portion of delusion only with respect to the "defiled portion," not as saying that the whole of them is delusion alone. Yet another view: the previous account is also untenable — because regret and sleep also extend to the "neutral," and the neutral is neither the nature of delusion nor of non-delusion (so defiled-delusion and pure-non-delusion cannot encompass it); one should say "wrongdoing" takes "volition and wisdom" as its substance (in remorse one clearly investigates the deed done), and "sleep" jointly takes "volition and conception" as its substance (in sleep one conceives and forms the various characteristics of dreams); the treatise likewise calls both of these "conventionally existent (provisional)"; their defiled portion is an outflow of the same kind from delusion (like lack of faith and the rest), and so they are called a portion of delusion. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that the reasoning of the previous account is also wrong: regret and sleep are not actually the "entanglement" (the entanglement being a secondary affliction; volition, wisdom, and conception are not entanglements) nature of "volition, wisdom, and conception"; one should say regret and sleep "each have their own distinct substance," differing in mode from the other mental factors; their being "stated, by way of the characteristic of delusion, to be conventionally existent" is again a provisional expedient by way of the other's characteristic, not a statement that their substance is provisional.

3. Applied Thought · Sustained Thought

"Applied thought" (vitarka) is searching, causing the mind to "operate coarsely" upon the "verbal-mental object" (the object grasped through names and words within the mind) in a hurried manner — coarsely deliberating — this is its essential nature. "Sustained thought" (vicāra) is examining, causing the mind to "operate finely" upon the verbal-mental object in a hurried manner — finely deliberating — this is its essential nature. Both take as their function "serving as the basis for the stage in which body and mind are at ease or not at ease" (when applied and sustained thought are calm, body and mind are at ease; when they are agitated, body and mind are not at ease). Both take "a portion of volition and wisdom" as their substance: upon the verbal-mental object, "not deeply deliberating" (applied thought) and "deeply deliberating" (sustained thought) differ in their categories; and were one to set aside volition and wisdom, the difference in category between these two, applied thought and sustained thought, could not be found at all.

Then what does the verse's "two, each twofold" mean? Here, again, there are three views. One view: it refers to applied thought and sustained thought, these two, each having two classes of difference, defiled and pure, and so it is called "two, each twofold." Another view: this interpretation does not accord with right principle — regret and sleep also have the two classes of defiled and pure, so why speak only of applied and sustained thought? One should say: just as the various defiled mental factors above have the distinction of "being of the nature of an affliction" and "being of the nature of a secondary affliction," so applied thought and sustained thought each have the two classes of "unwholesome and neutral," or each have the two classes of "entanglement" (the active manifestation) and "latent tendency" (the seed) — this is what "two, each twofold" means. Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that that interpretation, too, does not accord with right principle: the phrase "two, each twofold" is placed at the end of the "four indeterminate" (summing up these four), not spoken with respect to applied and sustained thought alone. One should explain: the first "two" shows that there are "two pairs of two": the first "two" refers to regret and sleep; the second "two" refers to applied and sustained thought. The categories of these two groups are each distinct, and so a single "two" is used to indicate jointly this "two of the two groups." And each of these factors "is itself twofold," namely "defiled and undefiled" (unlike the wholesome mental factors and the defiled mental factors, which each have only one quality). Or else "each twofold" is specifically to distinguish the "defiled" (to show that they are not only defiled but also indeterminate), and so this phrase is spoken — because regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought have at times also been called secondary afflictions (lest one rigidly hold them to be exclusively defiled, this phrase is placed to show their indeterminacy). In sum, in order to show the sense of "indeterminate," "two, each twofold" is spoken; and so the placing of this phrase is greatly to the purpose. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) parses the verse-line clearly, dividing its ten words "the indeterminate, namely regret and sleep, applied thought and sustained thought, two, each twofold" into segments: the opening two words ("the indeterminate") mark out the general name of this class; the next five words ("namely regret, sleep, applied thought, sustained thought") list out one by one their particular names; and only the final three words ("two, each twofold") display the sense of "indeterminate" — which agrees exactly with the treatise's own settled reading of "two, each twofold" (two pairs of two, each extending to both the defiled and the undefiled).

[The Gates on the Four Indeterminate] — laying these four out from the same twelve angles

The characteristics of regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought, and the phrase "two, each twofold," have been treated; next we distinguish their doctrinal content from the various gates.

[Gate of Provisional and Real] — which are provisional, which are real

Among these four: applied thought and sustained thought are definitely "provisionally existent" — they are composed of volition and wisdom, as the scriptural teaching states. Regret and sleep have two views. One view: they are also provisionally existent, since the Yogācārabhūmi calls these two "conventionally existent." Another view: regret and sleep are "substantially existent things" — the Yogācārabhūmi says only that "the latter two (applied and sustained thought)" are provisionally existent, and does not say that the former two (regret, sleep) are definitely provisional; the phrase "conventionally existent" is stated by way of the other's characteristic and is not meant to show that the former two are definitely provisional; just as the "inner seed," whose substance is real, is yet called "conventionally existent" in the treatise — which shows that "conventionally existent" does not necessarily mean the substance is provisional.

[Gate of Mutual Non-association] — whether they can arise together

Among these four, applied thought and sustained thought are definitely not associated (do not arise together) — though they are of the same category (both volition and wisdom), they differ as coarse and fine, and a single mind cannot hold coarse and fine operating together. In dependence on the "presence" and "absence" of applied and sustained thought (with both applied and sustained thought, without applied thought but with sustained thought, without either), the distinction of the "three stages" is established; this rests only on the coarseness or fineness of the active operation of applied and sustained thought, not on whether their seeds are present or arising, and so the division of the three stages is not confused. Applied and sustained thought permit mutual association (co-arising) with the former two (regret, sleep), and the former two (regret, sleep) also have the sense of mutual association with each other.

[Gate of Which Consciousness They Are Associated With] — which consciousnesses they are associated with

These four do not co-arise with the seventh or the eighth consciousness, on the same principle as in the previous chapter; regret and sleep co-arise only with the sixth, mental consciousness — because they are not "factors of the five (consciousnesses)" (the five consciousnesses have no mode such as remorse or sleep).

With which consciousnesses are applied and sustained thought associated? Two views. One view: applied and sustained thought also co-arise with the five consciousnesses — the treatise says "the five consciousnesses have applied and sustained thought"; it also says "applied and sustained thought are the seven kinds of discrimination" (such as discrimination-with-characteristic and the rest); the Abhidharma-samuccaya further says "spontaneous discrimination is the five consciousnesses" (the spontaneous discrimination of the five consciousnesses is applied and sustained thought). Yet another view — and this is the settled, correct reading — holds that applied and sustained thought co-arise only with mental consciousness — the treatise says "factors such as searching and examining are all the exclusive factors of mental consciousness"; it also says "applied and sustained thought are associated with sorrow and joy," and never says they co-arise with suffering and pleasure (equanimity-feeling is pervasive, so it need not be specially mentioned). Here someone asks: why is it not said that applied and sustained thought co-arise with suffering and pleasure? The answer: although the first meditative absorption has "pleasure of the mental ground," it is inseparable from "joy," and so it is collectively subsumed under the name "joy"; although a place of pure suffering has "suffering of the mental ground," its mode resembles "sorrow," and so it is collectively spoken of as "sorrow" (hence suffering and pleasure are not separately established). Again, the treatise says: applied and sustained thought take the meaning of "name-bodies" and the like as their object, while the five-consciousness body does not take name-bodies and the like as its object (the five consciousnesses apprehend the particular characteristic, not names and words), and so applied and sustained thought co-arise only with mental consciousness.

Then how is the earlier statement that "the five consciousnesses have applied and sustained thought" to be understood? That shows that applied and sustained thought are "mostly aroused by the five consciousnesses," not that applied and sustained thought are associated and co-arise with the five consciousnesses. As for the Abhidharma-samuccaya's statement that "spontaneous discrimination is the five consciousnesses," its sense of "discrimination" differs from that of the Yogācārabhūmi: the Abhidharma-samuccaya says "spontaneous discrimination is the five consciousnesses," whereas the Yogācārabhūmi says this "discrimination" is "the applied and sustained thought associated with that discriminating mental consciousness which co-arises with the five consciousnesses" (that is, the applied and sustained thought of the sixth, mental consciousness, not something the five consciousnesses possess of themselves). Therefore the earlier view's citing of the Abhidharma-samuccaya in evidence does not stand; and from this one knows that "the five consciousnesses definitely have no applied and sustained thought."

[Gate of Association with Feeling] — which feelings they are associated with

How are they associated with feeling? Two views. One view: wrongdoing (regret) is associated with "sorrow and equanimity" — it operates only in accord with the "mode of grief" (the mode of sorrowful distress), and also extends to the neutral (so also with equanimity). Sleep co-arises with the three feelings of "joy, sorrow, and equanimity" — its mode operates through "the joyful, the grieving, and the middling." Applied and sustained thought are associated with four feelings, "sorrow, joy, equanimity, and pleasure" — because in the first meditative absorption they co-arise with "pleasure of the mental ground." Another view: these four also co-arise with "suffering-feeling" — in a destiny of pure suffering (the hells), they co-arise with "suffering of the mental ground" (so these four extend to all five feelings).

[Gate of Association with the Object-specific Five] — whether they can be associated with the object-specific five

These four all permit co-arising with the object-specific five (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) — their mode and object are not in contradiction.

[Gate of Association with the Wholesome] — how they are associated with the wholesome mental factors

Regret and sleep permit co-arising only with "ten wholesome mental factors" — because these two exist only in the desire realm, and the desire realm has no "pliancy" (so, subtracting pliancy, only ten wholesome). Applied and sustained thought permit co-arising with "eleven wholesome" — because in the first meditative absorption pliancy co-arises (the full eleven wholesome).

[Gate of Association with the Afflictions and Secondary Afflictions] — how they are associated with the root afflictions and the secondary afflictions

Regret permits association only with the single root affliction of "ignorance (delusion)" — because the mode of regret is coarse, while the mode of craving and the rest is fine (they cannot be paired). Sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought co-arise with all ten root afflictions — they are mutually non-contradictory. Regret permits co-arising with the middling and major secondary afflictions, but not with the ten minor such as wrath — because wrath and the rest each demand to be master, which contradicts regret's "demanding to be master." Sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought permit co-arising with all twenty secondary afflictions — within the state of sleep and the rest, all those secondary afflictions can arise.

[Gate of the Three Moral Qualities] — to which they belong: wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral

These four all extend to all three moral qualities, wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral — for instance, one can give rise to remorse even toward a "neutral deed" (regret extends to the neutral); the rest follow by analogy.

Then, within the "wholesome," which kind of wholesome do they belong to? Two views. One view: the former two (regret, sleep) are only "innately acquired wholesome" (the wholesome present from birth) — because the mode of regret is coarse and crude, and the mode of sleep is dim and feeble (incapable of supporting applied effort); the latter two (applied and sustained thought) also extend to "applied-effort wholesome" — because within the wisdom of "what is attained through hearing" and the like there are applied and sustained thought. Another view: the former two also extend to "applied-effort wholesome" — within the stages of hearing and reflection there are also regret and sleep; and further, the latter three (sleep, applied thought, sustained thought) all extend to both "defiled-neutral" and "pure-neutral"; only "wrongdoing (regret)" is not defiled-neutral — because its mode of understanding is coarse and fierce (the defiled-neutral must be fine, and regret being coarse, it is subtracted).

[Gate of the Four Kinds of Neutral] — their distribution among the four kinds of neutral

Among the "four kinds of neutral" (the neutral of karmic maturation, the neutral of deportment, the neutral of craftsmanship, the neutral of transformation / mastery): regret extends only to the "middle two" (deportment and craftsmanship) — its mode is coarse and fierce, and it is not a "fruit of concentration" (so the neutral of transformation is subtracted). Sleep "excludes the fourth" (the neutral of transformation) — it is not induced by concentration, and even the mind born of karmic maturation can have sleep (so it extends to the first three). Applied and sustained thought "exclude the first" (the neutral of karmic maturation) — their mode of understanding is feeble and inferior, and cannot search out and examine the meaning of names, words, and the like (so karmic maturation is subtracted, and they extend to the latter three).

[Gate of Realm-binding] — to which realm they are bound, and whether higher and lower can take each other as object

Wrongdoing and sleep exist only in the desire realm; applied and sustained thought exist in the desire realm and the first meditative absorption; the factors of the remaining realm-stages (the second absorption and above) are all subtle and all calm (there are none of these four coarse and stirring factors). Therefore, if a person of regret and sleep is born in a higher stage, these two definitely do not arise; applied and sustained thought, however, can "in the upper and the lower give rise to the lower and the upper" (those above giving rise to the lower, those below giving rise to the upper, mutually interchanging). The applied and sustained thought of those below and above can also apprehend objects above and below.

Whether regret and sleep can apprehend the upper, again two views. One view: regret and sleep cannot apprehend a higher stage — their mode is coarse and near at hand, utterly dim and feeble, with no way to apprehend a distant higher object. Another view: these two also apprehend higher objects — for instance, a person with wrong view may regret the matter of his own "cultivation of concentration" (this is apprehending the higher concentration), and in dreams one can apprehend universally all the matters one has experienced (including higher objects).

[Gate of the Trainee and the Adept] — whether they are subsumed under the trainee or the adept

Regret is not subsumed under the "adept" — because, once free of desire (attaining the adept stage), one casts off regret. Sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought all extend to all three of "trainee, adept, and neither-trainee-nor-adept." For the conditioned wholesome factors of "those seeking liberation" are all called "trainee," and the conditioned wholesome factors of "those who have brought training to completion" are all called "adept" (sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought extend to both these stages).

[Gate of What Is Cut Off in Seeing and in Cultivation] — cut off in seeing, in cultivation, or not subject to cutting off

Regret and sleep extend only to "cut off in seeing and cut off in cultivation" — they too arise by the force of wrong view and the like (so cut off in seeing), are not directly induced by the undefiled path (so not entering "not subject to cutting off"), and unlike "sorrow," cannot deeply seek liberation (sorrow can enter the not-subject-to-cutting-off, but regret and sleep cannot). If one takes the sense of "what has already been cut off is called not-subject-to-cutting-off," then the sleep of the adept stage can also be subsumed under "not subject to cutting off" (it has been completely cut off).

Applied and sustained thought, although not the truly undefiled path, can arouse the undefiled (and also arise from the undefiled), and so extend to all three: "cut off in seeing, cut off in cultivation, and not subject to cutting off."

For the "not-subject-to-cutting-off" of applied and sustained thought, again two views. One view: the "not-subject-to-cutting-off" of applied and sustained thought, among the five categories of "characteristic, name, discrimination, right wisdom, and suchness," is subsumed only under "discrimination" — the Yogācārabhūmi says applied and sustained thought are "discrimination." Another view: these two are also subsumed under "right wisdom" — because the treatise says "right thought is undefiled," and right thought is precisely what causes the mind to search and the like (that is, applied and sustained thought); it also says applied and sustained thought are "the cause of verbal expression," and in the "stage not yet completed" (the bodhisattva stage) one cannot yet fully know remedies, ailments, and the like, so in subsequently-attained wisdom one must, in order to teach the Dharma to others, rely on applied and sustained thought, unlike the buddha-ground with its "effortless teaching" (teaching spontaneously, without recourse to applied and sustained thought) — therefore these two, applied and sustained thought, also extend to the undefiled. One more remark: although it is said that applied and sustained thought are definitely "discrimination," one cannot conclude that they belong only to the third of the five categories (discrimination) — because within "subsequently-attained right wisdom" there is also discrimination (that is, applied and sustained thought also extend to right wisdom). The remaining gates are to be reflected on rightly by analogy with the above (the gates on the secondary afflictions).

B. Summary of the Six Classes of Mental Factors — are the mental factors something existing apart from the mind, or simply modal differentiations of the mind?

Finally, a closing passage gathers all together. Having now treated the mental factors of all "six classes" (the ever-present, the object-specific, the wholesome, the afflictions, the secondary afflictions, and the indeterminate), we must here answer a fundamental question: are these mental factors "something with a self-nature existing apart from the substance of the mind itself," or are they "modal differentiations of the mind itself" (not apart from the mind)? Someone counters: whichever side one takes, what fault is there? The answer is: there is fault on both sides. Let us first lay out the faults of each.

First, the faults of "the mental factors existing apart from the mind." If the mental factors had a self-nature apart from the mind, then there would be three things that cannot be made to cohere. First, how could one speak, as the scriptural teaching does, of "consciousness-only" — for if the mental factors existed apart, it would not be "consciousness-only." Second, how could one speak of "the mind travels far, the mind moves alone," "defilement and purity are by the mind," "the six elements of the person" (which include the consciousness-element, taking the mind to subsume the mental factors). Third, how would that passage of the Ornament Treatise be reconciled — its verse says: it is granted that the mind appears as "two" (the apprehending subject and the apprehended object), and appears also as craving and the rest (the defiled), or as faith and the rest (the wholesome), and there are no defiled factors or wholesome factors existing apart from the mind. All these go to prove that the mental factors are not apart from the mind.

Next, the faults of "the mental factors being modal differentiations of the mind." If the mental factors were just modal differentiations of the mind, non-dual with the mind, then there too would be three things that cannot be made to cohere. First, how could one speak, as the scriptural teaching does, of "the mind and the mental factors being associated" — for association is "association of distinct natures" (only two factors of different nature can be associated), not the association of a self-nature with itself. Second, how could one speak of "the mind and the mental factors arising simultaneously, like the sun and sunlight" — for if they just were the mind, there would not be two factors that could be together. Third, how would that passage of the Yogācārabhūmi be reconciled — it says "the mental factors are not just the mind"; its verse says: if the mental factors were just the mind, then the five senses (self-nature, basis, object, mode, and association) would all fail to be established, and there would further be the fault of "modal differentiation," and the causes and conditions ought to have no differences — which contradicts the scriptural teaching. All these go to prove that the mental factors are not just the mind.

Having refuted both sides, we now state the correct view. It should be said: the mental factors "have their own self-nature, existing apart from the mind." Yet because "the mind itself is dominant," the scriptural teaching speaks of "consciousness-only" and the like — this is citing the dominant to subsume the subordinate, not saying that there are no mental factors; the mental factors arise in dependence on the force of the mind itself, and so it is said that they "appear in its likeness (the mind's)," not that the mental factors just are the mind. Again, the term "consciousness, mind" originally subsumes the mental factors within itself (the mental factors being ever-associated with the mind). In this way, the statements "consciousness-only" and the rest, and the expression "appearing in its likeness," are all without fault — this is stated "in accord with the conventional" (at the conventional level, "apart" and "identical" can be distinguished). If one speaks "in accord with the ultimate," then the mental factors and the mind are "neither apart nor identical" (not one and not different); and the various consciousnesses, regarded relative to one another, should be seen in the same way (neither apart nor identical). This is the marvelous principle of the Great Vehicle's "two truths," the ultimate and the conventional.

Onward Transmission

The twenty secondary afflictions and four indeterminate established in this section are the fifth and sixth of the six classes of mental factors, and the later consciousness-only treatises take them up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise, within its six classes of mental factors, lists out the full twenty secondary afflictions and four indeterminate and matches each to its place — the twenty-plus-four of this section are precisely the fifth and sixth cells of the hundred-dharmas table of mental factors. The Thirty Verses — verse thirteen (the names of the twenty secondary afflictions) and verse fourteen (the four indeterminate together with "two, each twofold") — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse, the two being sisters. In the Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on the obstructions, the secondary afflictions are treated as "the characteristic of defilement" (the secondary afflictions displaying the marks of the defiled), which bears directly on the doctrine of this section's twenty defiled mental factors. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the cause and fruit of entering, speaks of the defiled factors that the six perfections counteract, and that counteracted defilement bears, in one sense, on this section's "defilement to be cut off" of the secondary afflictions. As for the Twenty Verses, its concern is to establish consciousness-only and the absence of external objects, and to refute the outsiders' clinging to real objects; it has no direct counterpart to the substance and function of the mental factors, and here it is left aside.

We have already settled the substance and function of the three transformers — the eighth (the ripening consciousness), the seventh (the deliberating consciousness), and the first six (the consciousnesses that cognize their fields). Following the verses, this section does three things. First, it explains the conditions under which the first five consciousnesses arise at all (Part A). Then it treats the one consciousness that can in fact "switch off" — the mind-consciousness — in its five states, and from that draws out the questions of how the eight consciousnesses turn at the same time and whether the eight are one or many (Parts B and C). Finally it answers head-on what "the transformation of consciousness" means, and on that basis establishes the thesis of the whole treatise: that everything is consciousness-only (Part D). The three verses expounded here are these. Of the five: "Resting upon the root consciousness, the five consciousnesses manifest according to conditions — sometimes together, sometimes not — like waves resting upon water." Of the mind-consciousness: "It is always arising, except for those born in the heaven of no-perception, the two mindless absorptions, deep sleep, and fainting." And the summation: "These consciousnesses, in their transformation, are the discriminator and the discriminated; because of this, both [self and dharmas] are absent — therefore everything is consciousness-only."

The thesis of this section — "the correct reading of transformation, everything consciousness-only" — has its roots in scripture and treatise alike. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, in its chapter on the discernment of yoga, sets up just this meaning: the World-Honored One says that "the object cognized by the consciousness I speak of is only what consciousness manifests"; and again that "in this there is no slight dharma able to perceive a slight dharma, yet at the very moment this mind so arises there is just such a reflected image appearing" — "what consciousness cognizes is only what consciousness manifests, and at the mind's arising a reflected image appears" is precisely the scriptural root of verse seventeen of this chapter, "the discriminated and the discriminator, everything consciousness-only"; the treatise's citation, "a scripture says what is cognized is only what consciousness manifests," points to this very sūtra. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra shows the arising of the first five consciousnesses by an image: "as a bright mirror manifests the images of the many colors; and as a fierce wind stirs the waters of the great ocean, the wind of outer fields buffets the ocean of mind, and the waves of consciousness continue unbroken... and so the body of the five consciousnesses is able to turn forth" — "the bright mirror manifesting images, the wind of outer fields buffeting the ocean of mind, the waves of consciousness unbroken, the five consciousnesses turning forth" is precisely the scriptural root of verse fifteen, "the five consciousnesses manifest according to conditions, like waves resting upon water," showing the waves of the eight consciousnesses turning in dependence on the store consciousness. The treatise-basis lies in the Yogācārabhūmi: its Section on Ascertainment records, in the same words as the Saṃdhinirmocana, "what consciousness cognizes is only what consciousness manifests, and at the mind's arising a reflected image appears," the treatise-basis for "what consciousness-only manifests"; and its Section on the Fundamental Grounds settles that "consciousness is the present discerning of the cognized field" and "consciousness discerns the general aspect of things" — and this sense, that "the discerning nature of consciousness is just its transforming-to-resemble and thereby grasping," is precisely the treatise-basis for verse seventeen, "the transformation of the consciousnesses, the perceiving-aspect named the discriminator, the grasper of aspects." Dharmapāla's blended commentary establishes the thesis of consciousness-only with its scriptural root in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Laṅkāvatāra, and its treatise-basis in the Yogācārabhūmi — and with that we follow the verse and open the exposition.

A. When the First Five Consciousnesses Arise — Resting on the Root Consciousness, Manifesting According to Conditions, Like Waves Upon Water

The verse says "resting upon the root consciousness." This "root consciousness" is the eighth, the ādāna (appropriating) consciousness. It is called "root" because it is the root from which all the defiled and pure dharmas, and all the consciousnesses, arise. "Resting upon" means that the six evolving consciousnesses all take this eighth consciousness as their shared, intimate support. Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) draws this out further: the phrase "resting upon the root consciousness" runs through all six evolving consciousnesses, for they all rest upon the eighth, and so it is called a "shared support"; and this resting is of two kinds — resting upon the eighth as seeds, which is the "intimate causal support," and resting upon the eighth as an active consciousness, which is the "dominant-condition support." The "five consciousnesses" are the first five evolving consciousnesses — eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. Because they are alike in kind, they are spoken of together as a group.

The verse says "manifest according to conditions," and this is meant to show that the five consciousnesses do not arise at every moment. The "conditions" here are such factors as attention, the sense-faculties, and the sense-objects. The point is this: inwardly the five consciousnesses lean on the eighth root consciousness, but outwardly they still require the coming-together of many conditions — attention, the five sense-faculties, and the objects cognized — before they can manifest. Precisely because they must wait for the conditions to assemble, their arising is "sometimes together, sometimes not" — at times several arise at once, at times not all at once; where the outer conditions assemble fully, the manifestation comes, but with some quick and some slow. It is like waves upon water, which rise more or fewer according to how much wind and other conditions there are. This kind of usage, taken as a simile, the scriptures have already set out in detail.

Why are the first five consciousnesses more often at rest and seldom active? Because their mode of operation is coarse, evident, and restless, the many conditions they must borrow often fail to assemble; so the times of their manifestation are few and the times of their non-arising are many. The sixth, the mind-consciousness, though also coarse and active, never lacks the conditions it relies on for a single moment; it fails to arise only when it meets an "adverse condition" — that is, the five mindless states to be explained below. As for the seventh and the eighth, their mode of operation is subtle, and the conditions they require are present at all times; so there is essentially no obstacle of conditions that could make them entirely cease to operate.

To put it from another angle: the first five consciousnesses cannot themselves give rise to deliberation; they can only turn toward the "outer gate" and cognize the five outer fields, and they need many conditions, so their interruptions are many and their activity is slight. The sixth mind-consciousness, by contrast, can itself give rise to deliberation and turns at both the "inner gate" and the "outer gate" — inwardly it can cognize the field of mental objects, outwardly it can cognize all manner of fields — and it need not borrow so many conditions. Apart from the five states to be discussed below, the mind-consciousness is constantly able to manifest, so its interruptions are few and its activity is frequent. It is for just this reason that the verse does not attach the words "manifest according to conditions" to the mind-consciousness — "manifest according to conditions" is said of the five consciousnesses alone.

B. The Five States in Which the Mind-Consciousness Alone Comes to a Stop

The verse says the mind-consciousness is constantly arising "except for the five states." Which five? The five beginning with "born in the heaven of no-perception": the heaven of no-perception, the absorption of no-perception, the absorption of cessation, deep sleep, and fainting. Each is treated in turn below.

One. Born in the Heaven of No-Perception

The "heaven of no-perception" is so called because one who has cultivated the absorption of no-perception, by the force of his revulsion at coarse perception, is born into that heaven, where he suppresses the "non-constant" mind and mental factors — that is, the first six consciousnesses and their mental factors. Because this suppression is headed by the cessation of perception, it is called the "heaven of no-perception." Hence the first six evolving consciousnesses are cut off in that heaven and do not manifest.

As to whether there are any of the six consciousnesses in that heaven at all, the treatise lays out several positions.

One view: in that heaven there is constantly no operation of the six consciousnesses. The grounds are that the sacred teaching says that heaven has "no evolving consciousness," that it has "only the corporeal supports" (no mental support), and that it is a "mindless ground."

Another view: the beings of that heaven, when they are "about to die," must first give rise to evolving consciousness and only then pass away — because at death they necessarily give rise to the craving that "moistens" rebirth in a lower realm. The Yogācārabhūmi, which says "after a later perception arises, these beings then fall from that heaven," can be cited in proof. As for the earlier statement that the heaven has "no evolving consciousness," that is said with respect to the long stretch of time (the greater part), not that there is none from beginning to end.

Another view still: even at the very "first taking of birth" in that heaven there is evolving consciousness — because in the intermediate state one necessarily gives rise to the afflictions that moisten rebirth, and because, as in the "present life" phase of the other destinies, at the very start there must be evolving consciousness. The Yogācārabhūmi says, "if one is born into that heaven, one merely 'enters' and does not 'arise'; when perception is once again born, one falls from that heaven." Since it says "enters," then if there were no evolving consciousness at the start of his present life, how could it be called "entering"? There must first be evolving consciousness and only later its absence — this is what "entering no-perception" means.

And one further view fills this in more finely. The sacred teaching, in the Section on Ascertainment, says, "It is only when the mind and mental factors that are 'born of acquired ripening' cease that it is called no-perception." The intent of this sentence is to show that at the start of one's present life in that heaven there is a kind of evolving consciousness of the "ripening-born" sort, which arises briefly by the force of the causes and conditions of former lives and thereafter is born no more. By this "arising briefly and then being born no more," a phase-difference in the indeterminate ripening is brought about, and so it is called "no-perception" — just as one speaks of the absorption of no-perception and the absorption of cessation being induced by wholesome dharmas, and so those two absorptions are themselves called "wholesome." If it were otherwise (if the evolving consciousness of that heaven did not operate at all times), then the treatise's sentence, "only the mind and mental factors that are 'born of acquired ripening' cease," would make no sense — for if they all failed to operate, why single out the "born of acquired" ones to speak of? So the evolving consciousness at the initial phase in that heaven still arises briefly.

The heaven of no-perception exists only within the fourth meditative absorption (the fourth dhyāna). For in the lower grounds (the first, second, and third dhyānas) perception is too coarse and active to be cut off, and in the higher ground (the formless realm) there is simply no such ripening-place as "no-perception." It is precisely within this fourth absorption that the one thought of intention which can draw forth the "absorption of no-perception" is able to call forth the ripened fruit of that heaven.

Two. The Absorption of No-Perception (One of the Two Mindless Absorptions)

The verse says "and the two mindless absorptions," referring to the "absorption of no-perception" and the "absorption of cessation." In both of these the six consciousnesses do not operate, and so they are called "mindless."

The "absorption of no-perception" is so called because an ordinary person who has already subdued the craving of the "heaven of universal purity" (the third dhyāna) but has not yet subdued the defilement of what lies above it (the fourth dhyāna), led by the attention of the "perception of departure" (the thought that revolts at perception), brings the "non-constant" mind and mental factors — that is, the first six consciousnesses and their mental factors — to cease. Because this cessation is headed by the cessation of perception, the name "no-perception" is set up; and because it can render the body at ease and harmonious, it is also called an "absorption."

In cultivating this absorption there are three grades. One who cultivates the lower grade necessarily loses it in this very life and cannot quickly draw the absorption to manifest again; later, born into that heaven, he is not very luminous and pure, his form is broad and large, and he necessarily dies an untimely death partway through. One who cultivates the middling grade does not necessarily lose it in this life, and even if he does, he can quickly draw it to manifest again; later, born into that heaven, his form, though very luminous and pure and broad and large, has not reached the utmost, and though untimely death is possible it is not certain. One who cultivates the higher grade necessarily does not lose it in this life; later, born into that heaven, he is most luminous and pure, his form broad and large, with no untimely death whatsoever, perishing only after exhausting the full span of life.

This absorption of no-perception belongs only to the fourth meditative absorption. It is also only "wholesome" in nature, because it is induced by wholesome dharmas (the perception of departure and the like). Neither the lower grounds nor the higher ones possess this absorption, for the reasons stated before. Among the "four kinds of karma" it pertains to three — excepting "karma to be experienced in the present" (it does not call forth a ripening to be experienced in this very life), it pertains to the other three: karma to be experienced in the next life, karma to be experienced in a life thereafter, and karma of indeterminate time.

As to the place where this absorption is first cultivated, the treatise gives two positions. One view: this absorption is cultivated only in the desire realm (among humans) — because it must be drawn forth by relying on the instruction set out in the teachings of the various non-Buddhists, and because among humans the keenness of understanding is extremely sharp. Another view: having first practiced it in the desire realm, one can also, later born into the form realm, draw this absorption to manifest — excepting only one already born in the heaven of no-perception (who has already attained the final fruit). This absorption is entered through "revulsion at perception and longing for the fruit of that heaven," and so it is merely "contaminated," not something a noble one gives rise to.

Three. The Absorption of Cessation (The Second of the Two Mindless Absorptions)

The "absorption of cessation" is so called because a noble one of the "beyond-training" stage, or one of the "still-training" stage, who has already subdued or permanently left behind the craving of the "sphere of nothingness" (the third sphere of the formless realm) — the craving of the sphere above it, "neither-perception-nor-non-perception," being indeterminate (either subdued or not) — led by the "perception of quieting" (the attention that stills perception), brings to cease the "non-constant" first six consciousnesses, together with the "constantly operating defiled" seventh, the manas — bringing all these mind and mental factors to cease. Hence the name "cessation" is set up; and because it can render the body at ease and harmonious, it too is called an "absorption." Since it lays special weight on the revulsion at the two — feeling and perception — it is also called the "absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception."

In cultivating this absorption there are likewise three grades. One who cultivates the lower grade necessarily loses it in this life and cannot quickly draw it to manifest again; one who cultivates the middling grade does not necessarily lose it in this life, and even if he does, he can quickly draw it to manifest again; one who cultivates the higher grade does not, in the end, lose it.

This absorption, when first cultivated, must rely on the "summit of existence" (the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception) — one enters it taking "roaming contemplation in the uncontaminated" as the preparatory practice, because in the "nine successive absorptions" it stands last. Though the ground it relies on is the summit of existence, its own substance pertains to the "uncontaminated." Once one has gained mastery in cultivating this absorption, one can also bring it to manifest after the mind on any of the other grounds. Though this absorption pertains to the "truth of the path," it is held to be "neither of training nor beyond training" (not tied to the stage of training or the stage beyond training), because it resembles nirvāṇa.

This absorption, when it first arises, occurs only among humans — because it must be drawn forth by the power of the words of the Buddha and his disciples, and because among humans the keenness of understanding is extremely sharp; thereafter, in the upper two realms (the form realm and the formless realm), one can also bring it to manifest. The Udāyin Sūtra is the firm proof of this, and the formless realm is also called the "heaven of mind-made bodies" (where there is still a mind-made body that can give rise to this absorption).

Here a key point is drawn out. One who cannot yet accept the teaching of the "store consciousness" (the ālaya-vijñāna), if born into the formless realm, will not dare to give rise to this absorption of cessation — because he fears that in the formless realm, where there is no physical body and the mind too is brought to cessation, would not this amount to annihilation? But one who has already accepted the teaching of the store consciousness can, even when born into the formless realm, bring this absorption to manifest — because he understands that there is a store consciousness which continues moment after moment and is never cut off.

One must also understand this: one must have exhausted the afflictions "to be cut off by the path of seeing" of all three realms (that is, one must first have entered the path of seeing and become a noble one) before one can give rise to this absorption of cessation — an ordinary person cannot subdue the mind and mental factors of the "summit of existence." Moreover, this absorption is subtle and wondrous; one must realize the twofold emptiness — the emptiness of self and the emptiness of dharmas — and draw it forth, as the case may be, by means of the "subsequently attained wisdom."

As to "what degree of cutting-off is required before this absorption first arises," the treatise again gives two positions. One view: among the afflictions "to be cut off by the path of cultivation" on the lower eight grounds (excepting the summit of existence), one must cut off the afflictions of the desire realm entirely and subdue or cut off the afflictions of the other grounds, before one can first give rise to this absorption — because the seeds of the desire-realm afflictions are wholesome and unwholesome, mixed and tangled, and their power to obstruct absorption is strong. Hence it is said that only those of the "non-returner" fruit, the "beyond-training" of the three vehicles, and the bodhisattvas can attain this absorption, and they, as the case may be, can give rise to it afterward when born on any of the upper eight grounds. Another view: one must exhaust the afflictions "to be cut off by the path of cultivation" of the lower four grounds (the desire realm and the first, second, and third dhyānas), and subdue or cut off those of the other grounds, before one can first give rise to this absorption — because the seeds of the afflictions that accompany "variable feeling" (pain, pleasure, and the like) have a strong power to obstruct absorption. They, as the case may be, can give rise to it afterward when born on any of the upper five grounds (the fourth dhyāna and the four formless grounds).

Here there is a challenge. If merely "subduing" the afflictions of a lower ground suffices to give rise to this absorption, and one then, without cutting off those afflictions, loses the absorption and yet is born into an upper ground — would this not mean that, after being born in the upper ground, one must turn back to cut off the afflictions of the lower ground (the order reversed)? The reply: even if, after being born in the upper ground, one then cuts off the lower, there is no fault — because one born on an upper ground is, by nature, able to cut off the innate afflictions of the manas of his lower ground, and there is precedent for this. That said, the "non-returner" noble one has strong power of countering, and at the time of properly moistening rebirth he does not give rise to active afflictions at all; it is only by the "seeds" of the afflictions that rebirth is moistened into the upper ground. Of the afflictions he has subdued, some are lost and some are not, yet there is no such case as "being born into an upper ground while merely having subdued the afflictions of the lower" (the non-returner necessarily cuts off the lower afflictions entirely before being born above), and so he does not commit the reversed fault of "being born above and then turning back to cut off the lower."

There is, further, the distinction proper to the bodhisattva's path. If a bodhisattva first attained the absorption of cessation while in the stage of the two vehicles and later turned from the lesser toward the great, then he can give rise to this absorption in all stages. If he is not such a bodhisattva (not one who has turned his mind from the two vehicles), then some must reach the consummate mind of the seventh ground before they can permanently subdue all afflictions — and though they have not yet permanently cut off the desire-realm afflictions of cultivation, it is "as if already cut off," and they can give rise to this absorption; the treatise's saying, "Having entered the Far-Reaching Ground (the seventh ground), the bodhisattva can then bring forth the absorption of cessation," can be cited in proof. There are also bodhisattvas who, from the first ground, can permanently subdue all afflictions (as an arhat does), and these can give rise to this absorption throughout the ten grounds — the scripture's saying, "In the first six grounds the bodhisattva can also bring forth the absorption of cessation," can be cited in proof.

Four. Extremely Heavy Sleep · Five. Extremely Heavy Fainting

The verse speaks of the mindless states of "deep sleep and fainting," referring to "extremely heavy sleep" and "extremely heavy fainting," which can cause the first six consciousnesses all to not operate (which is why they are gathered into the five mindless states; it is not that all sleep and all fainting are mindless).

That bodily condition brought on by such conditions as utter exhaustion harms the first six consciousnesses and renders them inoperative, and so it is called "extremely heavy sleep." Note this carefully: at the time of such sleep, even the very substance of the mental factor "sleep" is gone (since the six consciousnesses have here ceased, there is no "sleep" mental factor to speak of); it is only because this bodily condition "resembles sleep" that the name "sleep" is borrowed to speak of it. That bodily condition brought on by such conditions as wind and heat likewise harms the six consciousnesses, and so it is called "extremely heavy fainting." Or one may say that these two — sleep and fainting — are both a small portion of the "field of touch" (what the body-faculty meets), pertaining to alterations in the bodily condition.

Apart from these five states (the heaven of no-perception, the absorption of no-perception, the absorption of cessation, sleep, and fainting), the mind-consciousness arises at all times.

Six. Sorting Out the Five States — The Moment of Dying and the Moment of Being Born, the Six Times, the Three Classes of Beings

Someone raises a challenge: at the very moment of dying and the very moment of being born, the mind-consciousness too is inoperative — why does the verse speak only of "five states" in which the mind-consciousness is inoperative, and not count dying and being born among them?

One view: the states of dying and being born have, in fact, already been shown in the verse by the two particles "and" and "with" (they are implicit within the five states). The treatise refutes this view: that is wrong. Why? Because the sacred teaching speaks of only "six times" as mindless — namely, the first five states (the heaven of no-perception, the absorption of no-perception, the absorption of cessation, sleep, and fainting) plus the nirvāṇa "without remainder" — and does not separately set up dying and being born as times that are mindless.

Then how does the settled (correct) reading put it? One should say: the states of dying and being born are subsumed under "fainting," because each is itself the utmost state of fainting; the verse's two particles "and" and "with" merely show that the five states do not mingle with one another (they set the five states apart). And there is a further sense: these five states only show that "after the six consciousnesses are cut off, they will still arise again according to their respective seeds within the eighth consciousness" (the six consciousnesses can revive). It is precisely in order to show "they can arise again" that the verse does not count "entering nirvāṇa without remainder" among them — for that is a never-again-arising, which is not what is meant to be spoken of here.

Finally, the five states are allotted to the three classes of beings. The ordinary person has four of them — excepting the "absorption of cessation" (cessation is attained only by noble ones). The noble one has only the latter three (the absorption of cessation, sleep, and fainting, lacking the earlier two of the heaven of no-perception and the absorption of no-perception). Among these, the Tathāgata and the "sovereign bodhisattvas" have only one of them (namely the absorption of cessation), because they have neither "sleep" nor "fainting."

A. The Eight Consciousnesses Turning at the Same Time, and Whether They Are One or Many

One. How the Eight Consciousnesses Turn at the Same Time

Since the substance and function of the eight consciousnesses have now been settled, one may say this: in every sentient being the "mind" (the eighth, the ālaya) and the "manas" (the seventh) are these two consciousnesses that turn together at all times; if the sixth mind-consciousness also arises, that makes three consciousnesses turning together; and the remaining first five consciousnesses, arising as conditions assemble, may arise as one or as five, so that there may be four turning together, or up to eight turning together. This is, in outline, the meaning of "the consciousnesses turning at the same time."

Two. The Chain of Questions and Answers This Draws Out

Since there are so many consciousnesses turning at the same time in a single sentient being, a question arises at once: how, then, can he be said to be a single sentient being? The treatise answers: if one holds that the number of "sentient beings" is to be fixed by the number of consciousnesses, then in a "mindless state" (when the consciousnesses do not operate) would you not have to become "not a sentient being" (which is plainly untenable)? Moreover, when "another's mind" (someone else's mind, or a mind of a different kind) is present, can one then say it is one's "own" sentient being (even if the number of consciousnesses is the same, they cannot be merged into one)? So one should know: to fix the number of "sentient beings," one should rely on the number of the "life-faculty," or on the "ripening consciousness" (the eighth) — only thus is there no conflict with reason, for of these two, the life-faculty and the ripening consciousness, there is at all times only one (one body, one ripening consciousness, hence one sentient being).

Next it is asked: a single body has only one "immediately antecedent condition" (the prior moment yielding its place to open the way for the next moment) — how, then, can many consciousnesses turn together at one and the same time (do all these consciousnesses share a single condition that opens the way)? The answer: since one grants that this single immediately antecedent condition can give rise to many mental factors, on what grounds would one not grant that it can also give rise to many mind-kings? Besides, who insists that this condition "is only one"? Those who hold that many consciousnesses arise together are precisely the ones who grant that the "immediately antecedent condition" too is many.

It is asked again: for one who wishes to grasp many objects at the same time, when those many objects are present, why can he not grasp them all at once (why must it be one after another)? Because the power of the coming-together of the various faculties and objects is equal (present at the same time); to say that consciousness must arise in succession (and not simultaneously) is what makes no sense.

Again: although the "nature" of the mental factors (the nature of cognizing) has no difference, their "kind" is differentiated (feeling, perception, and volition are each a kind); even so, one grants that many mental factors arise together — on what grounds would one not grant that the differing kinds of mind-kings (the eight consciousnesses) too arise together? And to give an analogy: the waves upon the water and the images within the mirror both arise as "many" in dependence on "one" (a single body of water, a single mirror) — which shows that in dependence on "one mind" (one assembly of faculties and objects) many consciousnesses too can turn at the same time.

Again: if one does not grant that the sixth mind-consciousness and the first five consciousnesses arise together, then the objects grasped by the five consciousnesses ought to be "not clear" — they would be as hazy as the "scattered solitary mind-consciousness" cognizing an object that has already perished (because it would not cognize, together with the five consciousnesses, the object present before them).

Then someone raises a challenge: why is it that, among those arising together with the five consciousnesses, there is only "one" mind-consciousness, and yet it can grasp one object or many objects among the fields of form, sound, and so on (how can one mind-consciousness cope with so many)? The answer: just as the eye and the other consciousnesses can each, in their own fields, grasp one or grasp many (not limited to one), what is wrong with this mind-consciousness doing so? Because the "object-aspect and the perceiving-aspect" of a consciousness have, by their very nature, all manner of modes (one consciousness can manifest many object-aspects and many perceiving-aspects).

It is asked again: why do consciousnesses of the same kind (for instance, two eye-consciousnesses) not arise together? The answer: with respect to its own cognized object, if a consciousness is one that cognizes, a single consciousness already cognizes it, and the others of the same kind would be useless (and so they do not arise together).

Following this, it is asked further: if it is so (that one consciousness can already cognize, and the rest are useless), then since the five consciousnesses already cognize their own objects, why must the mind-consciousness arise again to cognize them? The answer: the mind-consciousness that arises together with the five consciousnesses is there to "assist the five consciousnesses so that they arise clearly and sharply," and is not present solely to cognize what the five consciousnesses cognize; moreover, upon those objects it can grasp "more clearly" (discriminating and examining them), differing from the eye and the other five consciousnesses, and so it is not useless. It is for just this reason that the sacred teaching calls this mind-consciousness "having discrimination," whereas the five consciousnesses are not so (they are without discrimination).

It is challenged again: since many consciousnesses turn together, why are they "not associated" with one another (not mutually associated dharmas)? The answer: because they do not cognize one and the same object; and even if they cognize one object, the substance and number of the "supports" — the faculties — on which each leans are also different from one another (as the five faculties and five consciousnesses each lean on their own). So the various consciousnesses are not mutually associated, just as the consciousnesses of the five faculties are not mutually associated.

Three. Whether the Eight Consciousnesses Are One or Many

The self-nature of the eight consciousnesses "cannot be flatly asserted to be one" — because their mode of operation, their support, their cognized object, and the mental factors associated with them are each different; and when one consciousness ceases, the others do not cease; and the aspects of the perfuming and the perfumed are also distinct (the eighth is the perfumed, the rest are the perfumers). Yet it also "cannot be flatly asserted to be many" — because the scripture says the eight consciousnesses are "like water and waves" and so on, without difference; and if they really were fixed as many, then the nature of cause-and-effect would be lost (cause and effect must continue as one stream); just as illusory things and the like have no "fixedly many" self-nature.

As stated before, the "differentiated aspect of consciousness" is established with respect to the "conventional truth of principle," not the "ultimate truth in its true sense"; in the true ultimate, both "mind" and "speech" are cut off (apart from the aspect that mind cognizes, apart from the aspect of verbal expression). As a verse says: of these eight — mind, manas, and consciousness — with respect to the conventional, their aspects are differentiated; with respect to the truth, their aspects are without difference, because both the characterizing and the characterized are unobtainable.

B. The Direct Reading of "the Transformation of Consciousness," Establishing "Everything Is Consciousness-Only"

One. The Bridging Question

We have already differentiated in detail the aspects of the "three transformers" (the ripening, the deliberating, and the cognizing of fields), and we know they are the support of the "perceiving-aspect and object-aspect" — the two parts — that each of them manifests. So the next question is: how do we know that "self and dharmas are merely conventionally spoken of in dependence on what consciousness transforms, and are not real entities existing apart from consciousness," so that "everything is consciousness-only"? The verse is now cited in answer.

Two. The Verse Given in Answer

The verse says: the "transformation" of these "consciousnesses" is just the "discriminator" (the perceiving-aspect that discriminates) and the "discriminated" (the object-aspect that is discriminated); for this reason (apart from consciousness there is no real self or dharmas), the real self and real dharmas that are grasped are absent; therefore everything is consciousness-only.

Three. The Prose Exposition Properly Explaining This Verse

The treatise first explains it thus: by "these consciousnesses" the verse means the "three transformer consciousnesses" spoken of before, together with the mental factors associated with them; all these can manifest the two parts that resemble the "perceiving-aspect and object-aspect," and so the name "transformation" is set up. The perceiving-aspect that is transformed is called the "discriminator," because it grasps aspects; the object-aspect that is transformed is called the "discriminated," because it is grasped by the perceiving-aspect.

By this correct principle: the "real self and real dharmas" that are grasped are, apart from the perceiving-aspect and object-aspect that consciousness transforms, definitively absent — because apart from "what grasps (the perceiving-aspect) and what is grasped (the object-aspect)" there is nothing else, and there is no real thing that could exist apart from these two aspects of perceiving and object. So all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, whether real or conventional, do not stand apart from consciousness. The word "only" in the verse is meant to exclude "real things apart from consciousness," and is not meant to exclude "the mental-factor dharmas that are not apart from consciousness" and the like (these mental factors still exist).

As to how the term "transformation" is to be read, Kuiji's Notes (the Shuji) lays out two lines of reading among the ancient masters. Sthiramati's explanation is this: "transformation" means that the self-substance of each of the three transformer consciousnesses transforms and manifests as resembling the two parts, perceiving-aspect and object-aspect — the self-substance-portion of consciousness is itself what is called "transformation"; this "transformation" takes the sense of "manifesting-as" and also the sense of "altering" (the self-substance manifests as resembling the two aspects, though there are not really two aspects). The bodhisattva Dharmapāla's explanation, by contrast, takes "transformation" in the sense of "shifting-and-turning" — it means that the substance of one consciousness shifts and turns so as to give rise to the two aspects, perceiving and object, differing from its own substance, and so it is spoken of as "the self-substance being able to transform." The first explanation given here in the treatise takes as its basis precisely Dharmapāla's "shifting-and-turning" reading. As for the "second explanation" of Nanda and the others below, the Notes points out that it is framed with respect to "the perceiving-aspect consciousness, among the first three transformers, being able to transform the other-dependent object-aspect and manifest the aspect of an outer field — there being only the inner consciousness of the two parts, perceiving and object, and no transformed outer field at all"; this is set up on the basis of the "only two parts" doctrine of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha and the like, which does not posit the self-witnessing-portion, and differs from Dharmapāla's "four parts" doctrine — Sthiramati positing only one part, Nanda only two parts, Dharmapāla four parts, the differences among the masters in positing parts being detailed point by point in the Notes.

"Transformation" admits of a further reading. It means that the inner consciousnesses turn and manifest the aspect of an outer field that resembles "self and dharmas." This "that which transforms" is called the "discriminator," because it has "false discrimination" as its self-nature — that is, it refers to the mind and mental factors of the three realms. This grasped field is called the "discriminated," that is, the nature of the falsely grasped "real self and real dharmas." By this discrimination, an aspect of "conventional self and conventional dharmas" resembling an outer field is manifested; while the "real self and real dharmas" that are discriminated are definitively absent — the teaching and reasoning cited before have already refuted them at length. So everything is consciousness-only, because the point that "false discrimination exists" is held in common by both parties (already thoroughly established).

Since the word "only" in the verse does not exclude the dharmas that are "not apart from consciousness," therefore "true emptiness" (suchness) and the like are also of "an existent nature" (not annihilation-nothingness). By this (that the grasped real self, real dharmas, and outer field are definitively absent, while suchness and the other dharmas not apart from consciousness definitively exist), one departs from the two extremes of "superimposition (grasping it as really existent) and denial (writing it off as nothing)," and the principle of consciousness-only is thereby established, in accord with the middle way.

Four. The Broad Settling of Teaching and Reasoning, Firmly Establishing Consciousness-Only

Someone asks again: by exactly which "teachings" and "reasonings" is the meaning of consciousness-only established? The answer: was this not already said before? It is asked again: though it was said, it has not yet been driven home; and besides, "refuting another's position" does not amount to "one's own position being established"; so it should be set out more precisely, firmly establishing this teaching and reasoning of consciousness-only.

First, "teaching" proofs are cited. As a scripture says, "the three realms are mind-only"; and again, "what is cognized is only the appearance of consciousness"; and again, "all dharmas are not apart from mind"; and again, "sentient beings become defiled or pure according to the defilement or purity of mind." And it says, "the bodhisattva who accomplishes the four wisdoms can accordingly awaken into 'consciousness-only, without object.'" These four wisdoms are as follows.

First, the wisdom of the mutually conflicting aspects of consciousness — in one and the same place, hungry ghosts, humans, gods, and so on see differently according to the difference of their respective karma (for example, of one and the same river, a ghost sees a river of pus, a human sees clear water, a god sees lapis lazuli). If the object were really existent, how could this "one object yet differing views" be established? It shows that the object transforms according to consciousness.

Second, the wisdom of consciousness having no object cognized — when cognizing such non-existent objects as the past, the future, and dream-images, consciousness still arises and is obtainable; since those (past, future, dream) objects are not really existent and yet consciousness can still arise, then the other (the present, seemingly real) objects should be like this too — the object itself is absent, and consciousness manifests it of itself.

Third, the wisdom that there would otherwise be no error — if what the deluded person's cognition obtains were a "real object," then he ought naturally to become "free of error," and ought to attain liberation without exerting any effort; but the deluded person is, in plain fact, in error and does not attain liberation, which shows that what he cognizes is not a real object.

Fourth, the wisdom of the threefold turning according to wisdom — the object turns according to three kinds of wisdom, and by this one knows there is no real object. (i) The wisdom of turning according to the wisdom of the sovereign one — one who has realized "mastery of mind" (such as those of the eighth ground and above) can, according to his thought, transform earth, water, and the like, and accomplish them; if the object were really existent, how could it change at will? (ii) The wisdom of turning according to the wisdom of the contemplator — one who has gained excellent absorption and cultivates contemplation of dharmas can, according to his contemplation of a single object, have a multitude of aspects appear (as one who cultivates the contemplation of impurity sees skeletons everywhere); if the object were real, how could it turn according to mind? (iii) The wisdom of turning according to non-discriminating wisdom — when one gives rise to the "non-discriminating wisdom that realizes the real," all object-aspects do not appear; if the object were real, how could it be made not to appear? It shows there is no real object.

The bodhisattva who has accomplished these four wisdoms will definitively awaken into the principle of consciousness-only. And a verse says: the objects cognized by mind, manas, and consciousness are none of them apart from their own (consciousness's) nature; therefore I say everything is consciousness-only, and there is nothing else (no object apart from consciousness). Firm proofs of this kind of sacred teaching are found in more than one place.

Next, "reasoning" proofs are cited (inferring by valid inference). "The eye and the other five consciousnesses, held in common by both parties," because they are "any one of the five consciousnesses," like the other consciousnesses already granted not to intimately cognize an outer object, do not intimately cognize the form and other objects that stand apart from their own (consciousness's) nature. "The remaining consciousnesses (the sixth, seventh, and eighth)," because they "are consciousness," like the eye-consciousness and the rest, also do not intimately cognize the dharmas that stand apart from their own. And the "intimate cognized object" of these consciousnesses definitively does not stand apart from these consciousnesses themselves — because it is "any one of the cognizer and the cognized," like the perceiving-aspect that cognizes, which is not apart from consciousness, and like the cognized object of the associated mental factors, which is not apart from mind, it definitively does not stand apart from mind and mental factors. Firm proofs of this kind of correct reasoning are likewise found in more than one place, and so one should deeply accept consciousness-only.

Then there is the middle way. The grasped "self and dharmas" are not existent; the "emptiness (suchness) and consciousness" upon the other-dependent nature are not non-existent. Departing from the extreme of "existence" and departing from the extreme of "non-existence," one accords with the middle way. The Venerable One (Maitreya), in dependence on this principle, spoke two verses, the gist of which is: "false discrimination" exists; within this discrimination both "the grasper and the grasped" are absent; within this discrimination there is only "the nature of emptiness (suchness)," and within that emptiness there is again this "false discrimination"; therefore all dharmas are "neither empty nor not empty" — because there is (false discrimination), there is not (the two graspings of grasper and grasped), and there is again (within emptiness there is discrimination, within discrimination there is emptiness) — and this accords with the middle way. It should be added, by way of explanation, that this verse speaks for the time being with respect to the "defiled portion of the other-dependent"; in its full principle, there is also the "pure portion of the other-dependent" (the pure other-dependent nature is subsumed within it as well).

What follows is a chain of resolutions of doubts.

Someone doubts: if it is merely the inner consciousness transforming so as to resemble an outer field that arises, how is it that one sees, throughout the world, sentient and insentient things turning forth with "determination (limitation)" in place and time, and with "indeterminacy (non-limitation)" in bodily form and function (seeming as if there were an outer field with its determination and indeterminacy)? The answer: dream-objects and the like likewise have determination and indeterminacy of place, time, body, and function (in a dream one can also see a determinate place, a determinate time, indeterminate things); take this to resolve the doubt — a dream has no outer field and yet seems to have determination and indeterminacy.

Again one doubts: if it is consciousness-only, then why did the World-Honored One speak of the "twelve sense-bases" (the six faculties and six objects, seemingly an outer field)? The answer: the twelve sense-bases are spoken of in dependence on what consciousness transforms, not as real entities existing apart from consciousness. In order to make people awaken to the "emptiness of self," he spoke of the two sets of six dharmas, "the six faculties and six objects" (showing that "self" is merely a conventional assemblage of dharmas) — just as, in order to block the "view of annihilation," he provisionally spoke of "the continuous sentient being." And in order to make people awaken to the "emptiness of dharmas," he further spoke of "consciousness-only," so that people would know that outer dharmas too are not really existent.

Again one doubts: is not this "nature of consciousness-only" itself also empty (should it too not be written off as nothing)? The answer: it is not so. It is asked: why? The answer: because it is "not a thing that is grasped." That is to say, the real dharmas "falsely grasped" in dependence on what consciousness transforms are, when investigated by reason, unobtainable, and so one speaks of the "emptiness of dharmas"; but it is not that "the nature of consciousness-only, beyond words and realized by right wisdom," is also absent — so this "emptiness of dharmas" empties what is grasped, not the nature of consciousness-only.

Again one doubts (following on the above): if this consciousness were absent, there would be no "conventional truth"; and the conventional truth being absent, the "ultimate truth" too would be absent — because the two truths, the true and the conventional, are established in mutual dependence. To write off both truths as nothing is "evil-grasped emptiness," and the buddhas say that such a person is "beyond cure." So one should know: dharmas have "emptiness" (the grasped two graspings are empty) and also "non-emptiness" (the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished are not empty); it was for precisely this that the Venerable One spoke the two verses given above.

Again one doubts: if the "fields of form" too have consciousness as their substance, why is it that they manifest resembling "form-aspects," and turn forth as one kind that abides firmly and continuously (seeming as if there were real substance)? The answer: it arises by the force of the "perfuming of names and words"; and because this form-aspect must serve as the support for the "defiled and pure" dharmas — meaning that if this form-aspect were absent, there should be no error, and so no defilement and no pure dharmas (defilement and purity both rest upon the form-aspect and turn forth) — and so the consciousnesses too transform so as to resemble form and manifest it. As a verse says: "the disordered aspect" (the object-aspect resembling form) and the "disordered substance" (the perceiving-aspect that disorders) should be granted as "form-consciousness (consciousness resembling form)" and "non-form-consciousness (the remaining consciousnesses)"; if these (the disordered aspect and disordered substance) were absent, then the rest (defilement and purity) would be absent too.

Again one doubts: form and the other outer fields can plainly be intimately realized right now and are obtained by "direct perception" — how can they be written off as nothing? The answer: at the time of intimate realization by direct perception, one does not grasp them as "outer"; it is the mind-consciousness of the next moment that gives rise to discrimination and then falsely produces the notion of "outer." So one must distinguish clearly: the object cognized by direct perception is the "object-aspect of one's own (consciousness)," is what consciousness transforms, and so it too is said to "exist"; but the kind of form-and-the-like that the mind-consciousness grasps as "outer and real" comes from false reckoning, and so it (the outer real form) is said to be absent. Again: form and the other objects are in fact "not form yet resembling form, not outer yet resembling outer," like what is cognized in a dream (resembling form, resembling outer, yet in truth not so), and must not be grasped as a really existent outer form.

Again one doubts: if the form of the waking state too is, like a dream-object, not apart from consciousness, then just as, upon waking from a dream, one knows the dream was "mind-only," why is it that, while awake, one does not know one's own form-objects to be "consciousness-only" (one does not know it of oneself while awake)? The answer: just as, while the dream has not yet ended, one cannot know of oneself (that it is mind-only), but only upon waking can one recall and become aware of it — the objects and forms of the waking state are likewise: while one has not yet attained "true awakening" (the realization of the real), one cannot know of oneself that it is consciousness-only, but when "true awakening" comes, one can then recall and become aware of it. One who has not yet attained true awakening dwells constantly within the (ignorance) dream, and so the Buddha says this is the "long night of birth-and-death," and it is for just this reason that one has failed to comprehend that form-objects are consciousness-only.

Again one doubts: outer form is indeed absent, granted, and so may be said not to be an object cognized by the inner consciousness; but "another's mind" is really existent — is it not, then, an object cognized by one's own consciousness (does consciousness not, then, cognize a real object outside consciousness)? The answer: who says that another's mind is "not" an object of one's own consciousness? It is only that one does not say another's mind is the "intimate cognized object" of one's own consciousness. The point is: when one's own consciousness arises, it has no real action by which it intimately grasps another's mind — not like a hand and the like that intimately grasps an outer thing, not like the sun and the like that sends forth light and intimately illuminates an outer object — but is only like a mirror and the like that transforms so as to resemble an outer object and manifests it, and so it is called "cognizing another's mind," not "intimately able to cognize another's mind." What it intimately cognizes is only what it itself (consciousness) transforms (the object-aspect). So a scripture says: "There is no slight dharma that can grasp another dharma"; it is only that, when consciousness arises, it transforms so as to resemble that (cognized) aspect and manifests it, and this is called "grasping that thing." Cognizing another's mind is thus, and cognizing form and the like is thus too (both are resembling-that-aspect-manifested, not a real grasping of an outer field).

Again one doubts: since there is a "differing object" (another's mind and the like, which differ from one's own object), how can it still be called "consciousness-only"? The answer: how strange — to hold on so stubbornly, raising doubts at every turn! Does the teaching of "consciousness-only" say there is "only a single consciousness"? It is asked: it is not so; then how is it? The answer: listen well — if there were only a single consciousness, how could there be the distinctions of ordinary and noble, honored and lowly, cause and effect, throughout the ten directions? Who would expound (the dharma) for whom? What dharma would there be to expound, what dharma to seek? So the phrase "consciousness-only" has its own deep intent (it does not say there is only a single consciousness).

What, then, does the word "consciousness" subsume in full? The single word "consciousness" sets forth in full: every sentient being has its own eight consciousnesses, six classes of mental factors, the object-aspect and perceiving-aspect they transform, and the various phase-distinctions, together with the suchness disclosed by that principle of emptiness. The way it subsumes dharmas has five layers: it is the "self-aspect of consciousness" (the eight consciousnesses, the mind-kings); it is the "association of consciousness" (the mental factors); it is "what the two (mind-kings and mental factors) transform" (the object-aspect and perceiving-aspect); it is "the phases of the above three" (the non-associated factors); and it is "the real nature of the above four" (suchness) — in this way all dharmas are not apart from consciousness, and so the name "consciousness" is set up to cover them all. The word "only" merely excludes the kind of form and the like that the deluded grasp as "definitely existing apart from the consciousnesses as real" (it does not exclude the dharmas not apart from consciousness).

Finally, by way of conclusion: if one can understand the intent of the teaching of consciousness-only in this way, then one can, without error, well prepare the provisions, swiftly awaken into the "emptiness of dharmas," realize unsurpassed awakening, and rescue conscious beings (sentient beings) out of the cycle of birth-and-death. This is by no means what the evil-grasped emptiness-holder, who "writes everything off as nothing," can accomplish — he contradicts both teaching and reasoning, and so cannot accomplish this. Therefore one should definitively believe that "everything is consciousness-only."

Onward Transmission

What this section establishes — "the eight consciousnesses turning together, their sameness-and-difference, the correct reading of transformation, the establishing of consciousness-only" — is the pivot on which the whole consciousness-only system makes good its thesis that "everything is consciousness-only," and the later treatises take it up one by one. The Hundred Dharmas treatise lists the eight consciousnesses sorted out in this chapter (the first five, the sixth, the seventh, the eighth) as the eight consciousness-dharmas under the mind-dharmas, and places the five omnipresent factors associated with the five consciousnesses, together with the six classes of mental factors that "the word 'consciousness' sets forth in full," under the mental-factor dharmas — the eight that this chapter's "eight consciousnesses turning together, one or many" enumerates being precisely these eight mind-dharmas of the Hundred Dharmas. The Thirty Verses — verse fifteen (the five consciousnesses manifesting according to conditions), verse sixteen (the mind-consciousness except for the five states), and verse seventeen (the transformation of the consciousnesses, everything consciousness-only) — is the very root-text this section expounds, verse answering to verse. The Twenty Verses bears directly on this section, being the treatise devoted to establishing "consciousness-only, without object": it says, "establishing that the three realms of the Great Vehicle are consciousness-only... at the arising of the inner consciousness it manifests as resembling an outer field," which is the very groundwork for this chapter's "the transformation of the consciousnesses, manifesting as resembling the aspect of an outer field"; and with its four points — "place and time are determinate as in a dream, the body is indeterminate as with the hungry ghosts, all alike seeing a river of pus and the rest, and as in a dream there is loss of function" — it answers this chapter's resolution that "the determination and indeterminacy of place, time, body, and function are all as in a dream," answering as well to the "wisdom of the mutually conflicting aspects of consciousness" among the four wisdoms (ghosts, humans, and gods each seeing differently). The Madhyānta-vibhāga, in its chapter on aspects, sets up "false discrimination exists; in this the two are both absent; in this there is only emptiness; in that too there is this," which is precisely the root-text of the two verses of the Venerable Maitreya that this treatise cites in establishing consciousness-only, declaring the one sense of "the defiled portion of the other-dependent, in accord with the middle way." The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in its chapter on the characteristic of the knowable, clarifies consciousness-only by means of the other-dependent nature, the nature of consciousness-only, and the three natures; this treatise's second explanation of "transformation," which speaks of "establishing only the two parts on the basis of the Saṃgraha," is rooted just here.