俱舍論 白話全本 · 冊3Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Complete Vernacular · Vol. 3
三界五趣·四生·中有The Three Realms and Five Destinies · Four Modes of Birth · Intermediate Existence
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔正1–3〕三界是什麼——欲界二十處·色界十七處·無色界無處
論(承前起問):前面已經依著三界,把心與心所等法一一分別過了。現在接著應當說:三界究竟是哪三界?在每一界之中,處所的分別又各有多少?頌說:
頌:地獄、傍生、餓鬼,人,以及六欲天——這叫作欲界,共有二十個處所,因為地獄有八、洲有四而各不相同。在欲界之上,有十七個處所,叫作色界;其中前三個靜慮地各有三處,第四靜慮地獨有八處。無色界沒有處所,只因『生』的不同而有四種;那裡的心與心所,是靠著眾同分與命根,才能相續下去。
論:地獄、傍生、餓鬼、人這四類,加上六欲天,再加上他們所依住的器世間(山河大地那一分),合起來就叫作欲界。
所謂六欲天,一是四大王眾天,二是三十三天,三是夜摩天,四是覩史多天,五是樂變化天,六是他化自在天。
那麼欲界的處所分別共有幾個呢?由於地獄有八、洲有四,各各不同,所以合成二十。八大地獄,就是地獄這一邊的不同:一是等活地獄,二是黑繩地獄,三是眾合地獄,四是號叫地獄,五是大叫地獄,六是炎熱地獄,七是大熱地獄,八是無間地獄。所謂洲的不同,就是四大洲:一是南贍部洲,二是東勝身洲,三是西牛貨洲,四是北俱盧洲。這樣八加四共十二,再加上六欲天,再加上傍生、餓鬼二處,恰好成二十。
論主又給欲界劃出上下的邊界:若就有情這一邊說,從他化自在天往下一直到無間地獄;若就器世間這一邊說,一直下到風輪為止——這整個範圍都屬欲界所攝。
這欲界之上有十七個處所,就是三個靜慮地各有三處,第四靜慮地獨有八處;器世間與其中的有情合起來,總名色界。
第一靜慮地有三處的,一是梵眾天,二是梵輔天,三是大梵天。第二靜慮地有三處的,一是少光天,二是無量光天,三是極光淨天。第三靜慮地有三處的,一是少淨天,二是無量淨天,三是遍淨天。第四靜慮地有八處的,一是無雲天,二是福生天,三是廣果天,四是無煩天,五是無熱天,六是善現天,七是善見天,八是色究竟天。
此處論本另錄一說:迦濕彌羅國的諸位大論師都說,色界的處所只有十六。他們的理由是:就在梵輔天那一處之上有一座高臺樓閣,名叫大梵天,那只是一位主者所居之地,並不是另外一個獨立的地;就好像一位尊長高踞座上,四眾圍繞在旁——座並不因此別成一處。(頌文自身立十七,長行並錄此十六之說。二說並列,此處不作取捨。)
無色界之中,完全沒有處所可言,因為無色之法本來就沒有方所可占。連過去、未來的無表(不顯現於外的那一分色法)與無色之法,都不安住於方所,這道理是決定如此的。無色界只是就『異熟所生』這一邊而有差別,共分四種:一是空無邊處,二是識無邊處,三是無所有處,四是非想非非想處——這四種總名無色界。
要留意:這四種並不是因為處所有上下高低才分四;只是由於『生』的不同,勝劣才有分別。
又怎麼知道那裡確實沒有方所呢?答:因為在什麼地方得到那一層定,命終時就在那個地方受生(並不必移到別處去);而且從無色界沒後、要生到欲界或色界時,也就在那個地方中有現前(可見它本身不占一塊地方)。
論(設難與答):像有色界的一切有情,心與心所要依著色身才能相續。那麼在無色界受生的有情,是拿什麼作依止而使心等相續的呢?
對法諸師答:那裡的心等,是依著眾同分(同一類生命的相續體)與命根而得相續的。
問:若是這樣,有色有情的心等,為什麼不也只依這二法相續就好?答:因為生在有色界的,這二法勢力較弱。
問:無色界的這二法為什麼反而強?答:因為那一界的這二法是從殊勝的定所生的,由於那種等至(定的境界)能夠伏住色想。
問:若是這樣,那裡的心等相續但依殊勝的定就行了,何必另立所依?
論主又換一個方向再問一次:如有色界受生的有情,眾同分與命根是依著色身而轉的;無色界的這二法又以什麼為依?答:這二法互相為依而轉。問:有色界的這二法為什麼不互相為依?答:因為生在有色界的,這二法勢力較弱。問:無色界的這二法為什麼強?答:因為那一界的這二法是從殊勝的定所生的。(然而)前面已說那定能伏色想,這樣一來,還是回到心相續那一問上去了。
論主於是以理再難一句:或者心與心所只是互相為依而已(那就不必另立同分、命根為所依)。所以經部師說:無色界的心等相續,並沒有另外一個所依。他們的說法是:如果那個能引起心等的因,還沒有離開對色的貪愛,那麼所引起的心等就與色一同生起、依著色而轉;如果那個因對色已經離愛、厭背了色,那麼所引起的心等就不與色俱生,也就不依色而轉了。
論(釋三界之名):為什麼叫作欲界等三界呢?因為能夠任持自己的體相,所以叫作『界』;或者『界』是種族的意思,這在前面界品已經解釋過了。
屬於欲的那個界,就叫欲界;屬於色的那個界,就叫色界。中間那個『的』字省去了,才這樣簡稱——就像說『胡椒飲』(其實是加了胡椒的飲品)、說『金剛環』(其實是金剛所成的環)一樣。
在那一界之中色法非有,所以叫作『無色』。所謂色,是變礙的意思(可壞可礙),或者是示現的意思(可顯現)。那一界的體不是色,所以立『無色』之名;並不是說它拿『色的沒有』當作自己的體。屬於無色的那個界,就叫無色界,中間的字也省去了,比喻同前。
還有第二種讀法:又『欲之界』就叫欲界——這個界有力量能任持欲。色界、無色界也應當照這樣理解。
論(欲的體是什麼·外道往復):這裡所說的『欲』,究竟是指什麼法?簡略地說,就是由段食(一口一口吃下去的飲食)與婬事所引起的貪。像經中的頌說:
引頌:世間種種美妙的境界,並不是真正的欲;真正的欲,是人對境所起的分別貪。美妙的境界仍舊安住在世間如故,智者在其中已經除去了欲。
論:(有一位)邪命外道就拿頌去詰難尊者舍利子說:
引頌:如果世間的妙境不是真正的欲,而說欲是人所起的分別貪,那麼比丘也該叫作『受欲的人』了——因為他也會生起惡的分別尋思啊。
論:那時舍利子反過來質問他說:
引頌:如果世間的妙境就是真正的欲,而說欲不是人的分別貪,那麼你的老師也該叫作『受欲的人』了——因為他總是在看那些可意的美色啊。
論(三界繫屬之判):(接著論主自設一問。)凡是在那一界中現行的法,是不是就說它屬於那一界所繫?答:不是。問:那怎麼說呢?答:在其中隨增(隨著增長)三界之貪的,才是三界所繫。
問:這裡所說的『三界貪』又是哪個法?答:就是在三界之中各各隨增的那個貪。
(難者責曰:)現在這樣回答,好像跟『縛馬答』一樣。就好比有人問:綁馬的是誰?答:馬主。他又問:馬主是誰?答:綁馬的人。這樣兩答互相推來推去,都不能讓人明白。
但現在這裡所說的並不同於那種回答。意思是:對前面所說欲界的種種處所還沒有離貪的,那個貪就叫欲貪,被這個貪所隨增的,就叫欲界繫。對前面所說的色界、無色界,也隨其所應照這樣去理解。
或者換一個判法:不定地(不屬於定地)的貪叫欲貪,被它隨增的叫欲界繫;諸靜慮地的貪叫色貪,被它隨增的叫色界繫;諸無色地的貪叫無色貪,被它隨增的就叫無色界繫。
論(附問三則):問:對欲界所變化出來的心,怎麼會生起欲貪呢?答:或是從別人那裡聽說而生貪,或是自己退失了那種能力而生起愛味;或是看到能變化者的自在勢力,於是對他的那個化心生起貪愛。
又:如果一個心能變化出香、味這二法,那麼這個能化之心一定是欲界所繫——因為色界的心不能變化出香味來。
問:像這樣的三界,只有這麼一組嗎?答:三界無邊無際,如同虛空之量。所以雖然沒有一個『開始才有』的有情,卻有無量無邊的佛出現於世,一一化度無數有情,令他們證入無餘涅槃界,而三界仍舊不會窮盡,就像虛空一樣。
問:世界應當說是怎樣安住的?答:應當說是『橫著並排』而住。所以契經說:譬如天上下雨,雨滴粗如車軸,無間無斷地從空中傾注下來;就像這樣,東方也是無間無斷有無量世界或壞或成。東方如此,南方、西方、北方也都如此——經中不說上下二方。
又有一說:上下二方也有世界,因為別部所傳的經中說到十方。(若如此,)色究竟天之上還有欲界,欲界之下也還有色究竟天。
又:如果對某一個欲界之貪得離,那麼一切欲界之貪都一併滅離;離色界、無色界的貪也應照這樣理解。
又:依初靜慮而起神通的時候,所發的神通只能到達自己所生那一界的梵世,不能到別處去;其餘各地的神通也應照這樣理解。
〔正4〕五趣——為什麼中有不算一趣
論(承轉):三界已經說完了。五趣又是怎麼回事?頌說:
頌:在三界之中,地獄等五類就用它們自己的名字叫作五趣;五趣的體性只是無覆無記,而且只限於有情,不包括中有。
論:在三界之中說有五趣,就是地獄等等,照它們自己的名字說——也就是前面所說的地獄、傍生、餓鬼,以及人、天,這就叫五趣。
只有欲界具足四趣(地獄、傍生、餓鬼、人)的全部,而三界各有天趣的一分。
問:是不是有些東西屬於三界所攝,卻不被五趣收進去,而還說界中有五趣呢?答:有——就是善法、染污法、外器世間與中有。它們雖然是界的體性,卻不被趣所攝。
五趣的體性只是無覆無記(既非善染,亦非有覆)。如果不是這樣,各趣就會互相夾雜了——因為在同一趣中,具有通往五趣的業與煩惱。
五趣只就有情這一數而攝,體性不包括中有。《施設足論》這樣說:四生能攝五趣,五趣不能攝四生。不被攝的是什麼?就是中有。《法蘊足論》也這樣說:什麼叫眼界?就是四大種所造的清淨色,這是眼、是眼根、是眼處、是眼界;地獄、傍生、餓鬼、人、天這五趣之眼、修所成的天眼,以及中有之眼(都是此眼界所攝)。
契經也把中有與諸趣分別開來。是哪一部契經?就是《七有經》。那部經說有七種『有』:地獄有、傍生有、餓鬼有、天有、人有、業有、中有。那部經是把五趣、以及趣的因、以及趣的方便一併說出來的——所以趣只是無覆無記,這道理極為成立;把『業有』另外列出來作為因,正是為了與諸趣區分開。
迦濕彌羅國所誦的契經是這樣的:尊者舍利子這樣說:具壽!如果有人因為地獄的諸漏現前,於是造作並增長了順地獄受的業,他的身、語、意都彎曲、污穢、混濁,於是在那落迦(地獄)之中領受五蘊的異熟;異熟一起,才叫作那落迦——除去五蘊之法,那個『那落迦』根本了不可得。所以趣只是無覆無記。
問:若是這樣,《品類足論》又該怎麼會通?它說五趣是一切隨眠所隨增的(若五趣純是無記,隨眠怎能隨增)。答:那是說五趣的續生心中容許有五部的一切煩惱、趣及入心(續生之時能起諸惑之心叫作『趣入心』;趣與那入心合起來總名為趣);總的說為趣,並不相違背。譬如村落與村落的周邊,總名為村落。
又有一說:趣的體性也通於善與染污。至於《七有經》為什麼把『業有』另外列出,並不是說一經別立而說,就定然不被它所攝——好比五濁之中,煩惱與見別立為二濁,卻不能因為別說,就斷定那個『見』一定不被煩惱所攝。同樣地,業有雖然也是趣,但為了顯示趣的因,所以才別立出來。
問:若是這樣,中有也應當是趣了。答:不是。因為『趣』的意義與中有不相應。所謂趣,是『所往之處』;不能說中有是所往之處,因為它就在死處生起。
問:若是這樣,無色界也應當不是趣了——它也是就在死處受生的。答:既然如此(照你的說法),中有就叫中有,所以不該叫趣。(其理由是:)因為它在二趣中間,所以叫中有;這若被趣所攝,就不是『中間』了,那就不該叫作中有。
論(前說趣通善染者回頭會通二句經文):至於那位尊者舍利子所說『異熟起已名地獄』,是說異熟生起了才叫地獄,並不是說地獄只是異熟。又說『除五蘊法彼那落迦不可得』,那是為了遮止『實有一個能往諸趣的補特伽羅』(一個實在的『我』在輪迴),才這樣說;並不是要遮除其餘的蘊才這樣講。
毘婆沙師說:趣只是無覆無記。又有一說:一向是異熟所生。還有別的師說:也通於長養(由飲食睡眠等滋長的那一分)。
〔正5·正6前半〕七識住——識樂於安住的七個地方
論(承轉):就在三界與五趣之中,依著次第,識住有七。這七個是什麼?頌說:
頌:身相不同而想也不同,身相不同而想同一,跟這翻過來的(身同一而想不同、身想都同一),再加上無色界下三處——所以識住有七;其餘各處不算,因為那裡有損壞識的法。
論:契經中說:有色的有情,身相不同、想也不同,像人以及一分天,這是第一識住。
所謂『一分天』,指欲界天以及初靜慮天(除掉劫初才起的那一批)。所謂『身異』,是說他們的色身在種種顯色、形色、狀貌上各各不同;由於身相不同,或者說有不同的身,所以那些有情叫作身異。所謂『想異』,是說他們的苦想、樂想、不苦不樂想有差別;由於想不同,或者說有不同的想,所以那些有情叫作想異。
有色的有情,身相不同而想同一,像梵眾天——就是劫初才起的那一批——這是第二識住。
為什麼呢?因為在劫初生起時,那些梵眾都起這樣的想:我們都是大梵所生。大梵那時也起這樣的想:這些梵眾都是我所生。由於所想的『同一個因』,所以叫作想一。而大梵王的身量高大廣闊,容貌、威德、言語、光明、衣冠等等,一一都與梵眾不同,所以叫作身異。
論(附一段經與三家之解):經上說:梵眾這樣念言:我們曾經見過這樣一位有情長壽久住,乃至起了願心:怎樣才能讓其餘的有情生到我的同分中來?當他正起這個心願的時候,我們就生到他的同分裡面了。
問:梵眾是在什麼地方曾經見過梵王的呢?
有的師說:住在極光淨天時見過,因為他們是從那一層天沒了以後才生到這裡的。(難:)那麼為什麼現在得不到第二靜慮,卻還能憶念那一地的宿住之事?(又難:)如果他已經得了第二靜慮,那怎麼還會緣著大梵而生起戒禁取(把非因當因的執取)呢?
又有的師說:是住在中有之中見的。(難:)住在中有之中並沒有長時安住的道理,因為對受生沒有障礙(一有緣就去投生了);那麼梵眾怎麼可以說『我們曾見這樣一位有情長壽久住』呢?
所以(第三解,也就是論本所取的):梵眾就在自己這一層天上,憶念此生之前所經歷過的事——先前見過他長壽久住,後來重新見到的時候,才起這樣的念頭。
論(第三識住):有色的有情,身相同一而想不同,像極光淨天,這是第三識住。
這裡是舉最後一層而連帶收攝前面的,應知它其實把整個第二靜慮都包括在內了;若不這樣說,那少光天、無量光天要算在哪一個識住裡呢?
那些天的顯色、形色、狀貌並無差別,所以叫作身一。至於想,則是樂受之想與非苦非樂之想二者交參,所以叫作想異。傳說那些天厭離根本地的喜根之後,就起近分地的捨根現前;厭離近分地的捨根之後,又起根本地的喜根現前——就像富貴人厭了世俗之樂就去受法樂,厭了法樂又回頭受世俗之樂。
問:(若照這個說法,)遍淨天不也該是這樣嗎?答:遍淨天不曾厭過樂——因為那樂寂靜,從來沒有可厭的時候;喜就不然,喜是擾動人心的。
論(另錄經部一解):經部師說:另有契經解釋那一層天的『想異』之義。那部經說:極光淨天有新生的天人,還不能善巧了知世間的成與壞;他們看見下地火焰洞然,看了就生驚怖厭離,心想:可別讓那火焰燒盡梵宮、使它們都空了,再往上侵到我們這一處來。而極光淨天有舊生的天人,早已善知世間成壞,就安慰那些驚怖的天人說:淨仙啊淨仙,別怕別怕!從前那火焰燒盡梵宮,使其皆空,就在那裡自己滅了。他們對火焰有『會來』與『不會來』的想、有『怖』與『不怖』的想,所以叫作想異——並不是因為有樂想與非苦非樂想交參才得『想異』之名。
論(第四識住與識住之體):有色的有情,身相同一而想也同一,像遍淨天,這是第四識住。因為只有樂想,所以叫作想一。
(順帶把上下四地的『想』理一遍:)初靜慮之中由於是染污想,所以說想一;第二靜慮由於是二種善想,所以說想異;第三靜慮由於是異熟想,所以說想一。下三無色的名目,如經中所說,那三個識住加起來,總共就是七。
問:這裡什麼法叫作『識住』?答:就是那一處所繫屬的五蘊或四蘊——隨其所應,這就叫識住。
問:其餘各處為什麼不算識住呢?答:因為在其餘之處都有『損壞識』的法。
問:其餘之處是哪些?答:就是諸惡處(三惡道)、第四靜慮,以及有頂天。
問:為什麼?答:因為那些地方有損壞識的法,所以不是識住。
問:什麼叫作損壞識的法?答:諸惡處有沉重的苦受,能損害於識;第四靜慮有無想定與無想事;有頂天中有滅盡定,能壞於識,令識的相續中斷——所以都不是識住。
又有一種說法:如果一個地方,別處的有情心裡樂意來安住,來到這裡就不再求出去,這才叫識住。對於諸惡處,這兩層意思都沒有。第四靜慮的心則恆常求出:異生求進入無想,聖者則樂於進入淨居天或無色處,而淨居天又樂於證取寂滅。至於有頂,那裡的心昧劣(暗鈍羸弱),所以不是識住。
〔正6後半·正7前半〕九有情居——多出來的那兩處
論(承轉):像這樣分別七識住已經說完了。因為這個緣故,接著要說九有情居。這九個是什麼?頌說:
頌:應當知道,把有頂與無想有情這兩處也一併算進來,就是九有情居;其餘各處不算,因為有情不樂於住在那裡。
論:前面的七識住,加上第一有(有頂天)與無想有情,這就叫作九。諸類有情只在這九處欣樂而住,所以立為『有情居』。
其餘各處都不是,因為有情不樂住在那裡。所謂其餘之處,就是諸惡處——有情並非自己樂意住在其中,而是被惡業羅剎逼迫著才住在那裡的;那裡就像牢獄,所以不立為有情居。
第四靜慮除去無想天以外,其餘也不是有情居,理由如識住那一段中所解釋的。
〔正7後半·正8前半〕四識住——識自己為什麼不算識住
論(承轉):前面所引的經說七識住,另外還有經說四識住。這四個是什麼?頌說:
頌:四識住應當知道,就是四蘊,而且只限於自己那一地;經中說『識』單獨不算識住;它們都是有漏,可以用四句來收攝(七與四的寬窄關係)。
論:如契經所說:識隨著色而住,識隨著受而住,識隨著想而住,識隨著行而住——這叫作四種。
問:這四種的體是什麼?答:就是依次第而說的有漏四蘊。而且這只在自己那一地,不通別地——因為識是依著、貪著於它們才叫識住的;並不是在別地的色等蘊之中,識能隨著愛的力量而依著在那裡。
問:為什麼不把識也說成識住?答:因為要離開『能住』才能立『所住』。能住的識不可以叫作所住,就好像『王』本身不能叫作『王座』。或者這樣說:如果有一種法是識所乘御的,就像人乘船那樣,才叫作識住;識並不能乘御自己的體,所以不把識說成識住。毘婆沙師所說的就是這樣。
問:若是這樣,為什麼另外的契經說:在識食之中有喜、有染,因為有喜染,所以識住在其中、被識所乘御(那不就是識住於識了嗎)?又:怎麼前面說七識住是以五蘊為體(那也把識算進去了)?
答:雖然有這樣的說法,但那是在受生之處所攝的諸蘊之中不加分析,總說能生喜染而已;識轉起的時候也叫識住,並不是單說識自己。然而色等蘊是一一都能生種種喜染、令識依著的;單獨的識卻不能如此,所以說它非住。因此在這四識住之中,識不算識住;在其餘場合則可以那樣說。
又:佛的意思是說,這四識住猶如良田,而總說一切有取之識猶如種子——不可以把種子立為良田。這是仰測世尊的教意如此。
又:法與識可以同時而生,作為識的良田,所以立為識住;識蘊自己不是這樣,所以不是識住。
論(七與四之相攝):像這樣所說的七種與四種,識住雖然不同,卻都是有漏。問:是七攝四,還是四攝七?答:不是全面互攝,可以作成四句。就是說仔細觀察就知道,這二門的體有寬有窄,於是成四句——有的是七所攝而非四所攝,等等。
第一句(七攝非四攝):七識住之中的『識』。第二句(四攝非七攝):諸惡處、第四靜慮以及有頂之中,除識以外的其餘諸蘊。第三句(二俱攝):七識住之中的四蘊。第四句(二俱非):除去前面三句所說的其餘一切。
〔正8後半·正9〕四生——卵胎濕化,哪一趣有哪一種
論(承轉):在前面所說的諸界、諸趣之中,應知有情的『生』大略有四種。是哪四種?哪一處有哪一種?頌說:
頌:在其中有四生,有情就是卵生等等四類;人與傍生具足四種;地獄與諸天,還有中有,只有化生;餓鬼則通於胎生、化生二種。
論:有情這一類有卵生、胎生、濕生、化生,這就叫作四。所謂『生』,是生的種類。諸有情之中雖然其餘的類別互相夾雜,但就『生的種類』說是齊等的。
什麼叫卵生?就是有情從卵殼中生出來,這叫卵生,如鵝、孔雀、鸚鵡、雁等。什麼叫胎生?就是有情從胎藏中生出來,這叫胎生,如象、馬、牛、豬、羊、驢等。什麼叫濕生?就是有情從濕氣中生出來,這叫濕生,如蟲、飛蛾、蚊、蚰蜒等。什麼叫化生?就是有情生起時沒有任何憑託,這叫化生,如那落迦、諸天、中有等——諸根具足無缺、支分一時頓生,本來沒有而忽然就有了,所以叫作『化』。
人趣與傍生趣各具四種。
人而卵生的,就像世羅與鄔波世羅這兩位是從鶴卵生的,又如鹿母所生的三十二子、般遮羅王的五百子等。人而胎生的,就像今天的人。人而濕生的,如曼馱多、遮盧、鄔波遮盧、鴿鬘、菴羅衛等。人而化生的,只有劫初的人。
傍生的三種是大家都看得見的;傍生而化生的,如龍、揭路荼(金翅鳥)等。
一切地獄、諸天、中有,都只是化生。餓鬼趣則只通胎生與化生二種。餓鬼而胎生的,就像那位餓鬼女對目連所說的:
引頌:我在夜裡生下五個孩子,隨生下來就都自己吃掉;白天生五個也是一樣——雖然都吃盡了,卻仍然不飽。
〔正9 之續〕哪一種生最殊勝——菩薩為什麼還受胎生
論:問:一切生之中哪一種最殊勝?答:應當說最殊勝的只有化生。
問:若是這樣,為什麼最後身的菩薩已經得了生的自在,卻還受胎生?
答:現受胎生有很大的利益。就是說:為了引導諸位大釋種,藉著親屬相因的關係令他們進入正法。又為了引導其餘的人,讓他們知道菩薩是轉輪王的種姓,生起敬慕之心,因而捨去邪道、趣向正法。又為了令所化度的人生起增上之心:他既然也是人,能成就這樣的大義;我輩也一樣是人,為什麼不能因此發起正勤、專修正法?又:如果不這樣,他的族姓就無從知曉,人們恐怕會懷疑他是幻化出來的,不知是天還是鬼。像外道的論中就矯情地設下謗言,說:過了一百劫之後,將有大幻出現於世,吞食世間——所以受胎生正可以止息這些疑謗。
論(另錄一師之說與往復):又有的師說:是為了留下身界(遺體舍利)才受胎生的,好讓無量的人與其餘各類眾生,一興供養就能千返生天並且證得解脫。如果受化生就沒有外種(父母遺體之緣),身體一斷氣就沒有遺形留下,像燈滅了光就什麼也看不見了。
(論主難:)如果有人信佛有『持願通』能長久留住其身(那麼化生身也一樣可以留下遺形,何必為留身界而受胎生),這個解釋就不能成立。
(因論生論·又難:)如果化生身像燈滅光盡、死後無遺,那麼為什麼契經說化生的揭路荼捉化生的龍來充作食物呢?答:那是因為不知道(龍死後無遺形)才捉龍來當食物,經中並沒說牠真吃飽了——這有什麼過失呢?或者那龍還沒死,暫時得以充飢,死了以後又餓了;暫時吃一下有什麼過咎!
論(四生之多少):問:在四生之內哪一種最多?答:只有化生最多。為什麼?因為三趣的少分、二趣的全部,以及一切中有,都是化生的緣故。
〔正10〕中有是什麼——為什麼它不叫『生』
論(承轉):這裡什麼法叫作中有?又為什麼中有不就叫作『生』?頌說:
頌:在死有之後、生有之前,那中間的五蘊叫作中有;因為還沒有到達所應到的地方,所以中有不叫作生。
論:在死有之後、生有之前,就在那中間有一個自體生起;為了到達受生之處才生起這個身,因為它在二趣中間,所以叫作中有。
問:這個身既然已經起了,為什麼不叫作『生』?答:所謂生,是指將來所應到達的地方;依著『已到』的意義才建立『生』這個名字。這個中有之身,體雖然已經起了,卻還沒有到達那裡,所以不叫作生。
問:什麼叫作『將來所應到達的地方』?答:所引的異熟究竟分明顯現之處,這就叫將來所應到達的地方。
論(設無中有之說):有別的部派說:從死到生,其間容許有間隔斷絕,所以沒有中有。(論主答:)這是不可承許的。
問:為什麼?答:依著道理與聖教的緣故。
問:所依的理與教是什麼?頌說:
〔正11·正12〕理教二證——穀相續之理與五經七經之教
頌:如同穀等的相續,處所無間而後後續生(此其一);『像』實有這件事不能成立(此其二);就算成立也不相等,所以不能作譬喻(此其三)——因為一處不能有二色並存,因為質與像不是一相續,因為像是由二緣所生。至於教證:經說有健達縛,以及《五不還經》、《七善士趣經》等的緣故。
論(理證):姑且依著正理來說:中有不是沒有的。
現前可以看見,世間凡是相續流轉之法,必定是處所無間、剎那剎那地接著生。就像世間的穀等相續(種在這裡,芽也在這裡出),有情的相續在道理上也應當如此——剎那接續而生,處所必定無間。
論(外難·鏡像之喻):(無中有家救云:)豈不是現前可以看見有法續生,而其中處所卻有間隔嗎?就像依著鏡子等,從本質生出鏡像來(本質在此,像在彼,中間有間)。同樣地,有情的死有與生有,處所雖有間隔,又何妨續生呢?
論(破一·像非實有):答:因為『諸像實有』這件事在道理上不能成立;又因為即使成立也不相等,所以作譬喻不能成立。
(先解第一路:)所謂另有一種色法生起而叫作『像』,它的體實有,這在道理上是不成立的;設使成立,也與所比之法不相等,所以譬喻不成。
說『像不成立』,理由在於:一處所不能有二色並存。就是說:在同一個地方,鏡的色與像的色一併現前被看見;但兩種色不應當在同一處所並存,因為它們所依的大種不同。
又:在狹窄的水面上,兩岸的色形同時同處一併現出二像;站在兩岸的人各自看得分明,卻不曾有一處同時見到二色並存——不應說這二色是一同生起的。
又:影與光不曾同處;然而曾見鏡子懸掛在陰影之中,而光的像卻分明現在鏡面上——不應在這裡說二者一併生起。
或者說『一處無二並』是這樣的:鏡面與月像被說成二物,遠近分別可見(照井水時就是如此);如果它們真是一併生起的,怎麼會有遠近之別可見?
所以知道諸像在道理上其實是沒有的。只是種種因緣和合的勢力,令人看起來如此罷了——因為諸法體性的功能差別實在難可思議。
論(破二·不相等故非喻):已經辯明『不成立』的道理,說它不能作譬喻。再說『不相等所以也不能作譬喻』:因為本質與像不是一個相續。就是說:本質與像不是同一相續,只是依著鏡等才有像現起;而且像與本質是同時而有的。至於死有與生有,是同一相續,前後無間而在別處續生;本質與像相對而望,並沒有這種相續關係——因為不相似,所以譬喻不成。
論(破三·由二緣生):又:所現的像是由二緣而生的。就是說,由二種緣諸像才能生:一是本質,二是鏡等。這二者之中較殊勝的那個,像就依它而生。至於生有,不可能由二緣而起——只有死有,並沒有另外一個更殊勝的所依。所以所引的譬喻與所比之法不相等。
也不可以說:拿外在的非情之物如精血等作為殊勝所依。因為化生的有情是在空中忽然生起的,那裡面又要算哪一個作殊勝所依呢?
論(教證五經):已經依著正理破除了他宗『從死到生容許間隔斷絕』之說,所以中有決定不是沒有的。接著依著聖教來證明有中有。
其一,契經說:『有』有七種,就是五趣有、業有、中有。
其二,如果這部契經他們那一部不誦,難道連《健達縛經》也不誦嗎?如契經所說:入母胎的,必須由三件事同時現前——一是母身當時調適,二是父母交愛和合,三是健達縛正現在前。除了中有之身,還有什麼健達縛?前蘊已經壞了,是什麼在現前呢?
其三,如果這部契經他們也不誦,那麼《掌馬族經》又要怎麼解釋?如那部經所說:你現在知道嗎?這個正現前的健達縛,是婆羅門、是剎帝利、是吠舍、還是戍達羅?是從東方來、還是從南西北方來?前蘊已經壞了,不可以說它來;那麼這裡所說的『來』,本來就只能是中有。
其四,如果再不誦這些契經,那《五不還經》又該怎麼解釋?如契經所說:有五種不還——一是中般,二是生般,三是無行般,四是有行般,五是上流。中有如果沒有,『中般』這名字從何而來?
論(破二種異釋『中般』):有的師執定說:有一層天叫作『中』,在那裡般涅槃,所以叫中般。(破:)那就應當承許還有『生天』等等的天了;既然不許有,可見這種執取不是善說。
又:經中說有七善士趣,就是在前面五種之中把『中般』分為三,依著處所與時間的近、中、遠而分。譬如札火(木片之火)的小星迸出時,才起就近處滅了,第一種善士也是這樣;譬如鐵火的小星迸出時,起到中途才滅,第二種善士也是這樣;譬如鐵火的大星迸出時,飛得遠而還沒落地就滅了,第三種善士也是這樣。(若照他所執的,)並不是他所執的那個『別有一層中天』能有這種時、處三品的差別——所以他所執的一定不合道理。
又有的師說:或者是在壽量的中間、或者是在接近天的中間,斷除其餘煩惱而成阿羅漢,這叫中般;並且由於到達界位、想位或尋位而般涅槃,所以分成三品:或者才取得色界的眾同分就般涅槃,這叫第一;從此以後受了天樂才般涅槃,這叫第二;再從此以後進入天的法會才般涅槃,這叫第三。進入法會之後又經過許多時候才般涅槃的,就叫生般;或者減損許多壽量才般涅槃、不是剛生就般的,所以叫生般。
(破:)像這樣所說,與火星之喻全都不相應。為什麼?因為那樣一來,處所與行程就沒有差別了(三品只成時間之別)。又:無色界也應當說有中般涅槃,因為那裡也有在壽量中間般涅槃的。然而經中並不說那裡有中般,如嗢拕南伽他中所說:
引頌:總集諸位聖賢的數目——四靜慮各有十位,三無色各有七位,只有非想非非想處是六位。
〔正12 之續〕教量既立·諸經之會通
論:所以他們所執的都是虛妄的。
如果連這些經也不誦,那就無話可說了:無上法王久已滅度,諸位大法將也都般涅槃了,聖教支離而已分成許多部,他們對於文與義各執己見、交相馳騁,取捨全憑私意,到今天愈演愈盛。可歎啊,你們固執守著愚迷,違背道理、拒絕聖教,實在太可傷了。
凡是依憑前面所說的理與教作為量的人,中有在他們那裡實有這件事已經極為成立。
論(會通第一經):問:若是這樣,為什麼契經中說:造了極惡之業的度使魔羅,現身就顛墜到無間地獄去了(可見中間沒有中有)?
答:這部經的意思是說:他的命還沒有捨,地獄的猛焰就已經燒著他的身;因此命終之後受了那個中有,乘著這中有才墮入無間地獄。由於他惡業的勢力太強,不等到命終而苦相已經現前——先受了『現受』的果,後受『生受』的果。
論(會通第二經):問:為什麼經中說:有一類有情在五無間業造作並增長之後,無間必定生到那落迦?
答:這部經的意思是要遮止他往別的趣去,以及顯示那個業一定是順生受的。如果只執著文面,那就得要五種無間業具足才生地獄了——不是這樣,隨缺一種、或者由其餘的業因也能生,否則便成大過。
又:既說『無間生那落迦』,那就應當作了業立刻就生,不必等身壞了。(可見不能只看文面。)
或者說:誰說中有不算是『生』呢?『那落迦』這個名字也通於中有——死有無間、中有起時也可以叫作生,因為它是生的方便(通往生的那一段)。經上說『無間生那落迦』,並沒有說那時就是生有。
論(會通第三·經頌):問:若是這樣,那經中的頌又該怎麼會通?如經頌所說:
引頌:再生啊,你如今已過了盛年之位,衰老將近,離琰魔王不遠了;想要前往前路卻沒有資糧,想求在中間停住卻無處可止。
論:問:如果有中有,為什麼世尊說『他在中間沒有可停之處』?
答:這一頌的意思是顯示他在人中迅速歸於磨滅,沒有暫停的餘地;或者是說那個中有為了到達所生之處,也沒有暫停,因為它行動無所障礙。
(難者反問:)你怎麼知道經意是這樣而不是別的?(論主反質:)你又怎麼知道是別的而不是這樣?兩邊的責問既然相等,為什麼偏偏只徵問我一方?這兩種解釋對於經文都沒有違害,怎麼可以偏偏拿它來證明中有是沒有的。
凡是引來作證的話,道理上不能有別的走向;這一句既然還有別的走向,作為證據就不能成立。
〔Roots 1–3〕What the Three Realms Are — Twenty Places in the Desire Realm · Seventeen in the Form Realm · No Place in the Formless Realm
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Above, in dependence upon the three realms, mind and mental factors and the rest have been analyzed one by one. Now it should next be said: what, after all, are the three realms? And within each of them, how many separate places are there? The stanza says:
Stanza: The hells, animals, hungry ghosts, human beings, and the six heavens of desire — these are called the desire realm, twenty places in all, because the hells are eight and the continents four, each of them distinct. Above the desire realm there are seventeen places, called the form realm; within it the first three levels of meditative absorption have three places each, and the fourth level of meditative absorption alone has eight. The formless realm has no places, and has four kinds only by the difference of “birth”; and mind and mental factors there continue on in dependence upon the commonality of sentient beings and the life faculty.
Treatise: The four classes — the hells, animals, hungry ghosts, and human beings — together with the six heavens of desire, and together further with the receptacle world in which they dwell (that portion which is mountains, rivers, and the great earth), are called in sum the desire realm.
The six heavens of desire are: first, the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings; second, the Heaven of the Thirty-Three; third, the Yāma Heaven; fourth, the Tuṣita Heaven; fifth, the Heaven of Delight in Working Transformations; sixth, the Heaven of Sovereignty over Others’ Transformations.
How many, then, are the separate places of the desire realm? Since the hells are eight and the continents four, each of them distinct, together they come to twenty. The eight great hells are the distinctions on the side of the hells: first the Hell of Equal Reviving, second the Hell of the Black Rope, third the Hell of Massed Crushing, fourth the Hell of Howling, fifth the Hell of Great Howling, sixth the Hell of Burning Heat, seventh the Hell of Great Heat, eighth the Unremitting Hell. The distinctions of continent are the four great continents: first Jambudvīpa in the south, second Videha in the east, third Godānīya in the west, fourth Uttarakuru in the north. Thus eight and four make twelve; add the six heavens of desire, and add the two places of animals and hungry ghosts, and they come to exactly twenty.
The author further marks out the upper and lower boundaries of the desire realm: speaking on the side of sentient beings, it runs down from the Heaven of Sovereignty over Others’ Transformations as far as the Unremitting Hell; speaking on the side of the receptacle world, it runs down as far as the wind circle — and this whole range is gathered into the desire realm.
Above this desire realm there are seventeen places, that is, three places on each of three levels of meditative absorption and eight on the fourth level alone; the receptacle world together with the sentient beings within it is named in sum the form realm.
The three places on the first level of meditative absorption are: first the Brahmakāyika Heaven, second the Brahmapurohita Heaven, third the Mahābrahmā Heaven. The three places on the second level of meditative absorption are: first the Parīttābha Heaven, second the Apramāṇābha Heaven, third the Ābhāsvara Heaven. The three places on the third level of meditative absorption are: first the Parīttaśubha Heaven, second the Apramāṇaśubha Heaven, third the Śubhakṛtsna Heaven. The eight places on the fourth level of meditative absorption are: first the Anabhraka Heaven, second the Puṇyaprasava Heaven, third the Bṛhatphala Heaven, fourth the Avṛha Heaven, fifth the Atapa Heaven, sixth the Sudṛśa Heaven, seventh the Sudarśana Heaven, eighth the Akaniṣṭha Heaven.
Here the treatise records a further account alongside: the great masters of the treatises of the land of Kaśmīra all say that the places of the form realm are only sixteen. Their reason is this: just above that one place which is the Brahmapurohita Heaven there stands a high terraced pavilion named the Mahābrahmā Heaven, and that is merely the dwelling of a single lord and not a separate level of its own; it is as when an honored elder sits high upon his seat with the fourfold assembly gathered about him — the seat does not thereby become a separate place. (The stanza itself establishes seventeen, and the prose commentary records alongside it this account of sixteen. The two accounts stand side by side, and no choice between them is made here.)
Within the formless realm there are no places to speak of at all, since dharmas without form have from the first no location to occupy. Even the nonmanifest (that portion of form which is not displayed outwardly) and the formless dharmas, past and future alike, do not abide in a location; this principle is settled. The formless realm has distinctions only on the side of what is born of maturation, and divides into four: first the sphere of the infinity of space, second the sphere of the infinity of consciousness, third the sphere of nothingness, fourth the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception — these four are named in sum the formless realm.
Note that these four are not divided into four because their places have any above and below, high and low; it is only by the difference of “birth” that superiority and inferiority are distinguished.
And how is it known that there is indeed no location there? Answer: because wherever one obtains that level of absorption, there at the end of life one takes birth (without having to move elsewhere); and further, when one passes away from the formless realm and is to be born into the desire realm or the form realm, it is in that very place that the intermediate existence becomes present (from which it is evident that the formless realm occupies no piece of ground of its own).
Treatise (an objection set and answered): All sentient beings in the realms possessed of form have their mind and mental factors continue on only in dependence upon a body of form. On what, then, do sentient beings born in the formless realm depend, so that mind and the rest continue on?
The Abhidharma masters answer: mind and the rest there continue on in dependence upon the commonality of sentient beings (the continuum of one and the same class of life) and the life faculty.
Question: if so, why do the mind and the rest of sentient beings possessed of form not likewise continue on in dependence upon these two dharmas alone? Answer: because in those born in the realms possessed of form the force of these two dharmas is the weaker.
Question: why, on the contrary, are these two dharmas of the formless realm strong? Answer: because these two dharmas of that realm are born of a superior absorption, since that meditative attainment (the state reached in absorption) is able to suppress the perception of form.
Question: if so, the continuity of mind and the rest there would need only to depend upon that superior absorption; why establish a further support at all?
The author then turns about and asks once more from another direction: in sentient beings born in the realms possessed of form, the commonality of sentient beings and the life faculty proceed in dependence upon a body of form; upon what, then, do these two dharmas of the formless realm depend? Answer: these two dharmas proceed in dependence upon each other. Question: why do these two dharmas of the realms possessed of form not depend upon each other? Answer: because in those born in the realms possessed of form the force of these two dharmas is the weaker. Question: why are these two dharmas of the formless realm strong? Answer: because these two dharmas of that realm are born of a superior absorption. (Yet) it was already said above that this absorption is able to suppress the perception of form — and so one comes back round again to that same question about the continuity of mind.
The author then presses once more by reasoning: or else mind and mental factors merely depend upon each other (and then there is no need to establish commonality and the life faculty as a further support). Hence the Sautrāntika masters say: the continuity of mind and the rest in the formless realm has no separate support at all. Their account is this: if the cause that draws forth mind and the rest has not yet left behind greed and craving for form, then the mind and the rest it draws forth arise together with form and proceed in dependence upon form; but if that cause has left craving for form behind and turned away from form in aversion, then the mind and the rest it draws forth do not arise together with form, and so do not proceed in dependence upon form.
Treatise (explaining the names of the three realms): Why are they called the desire realm and the rest, the three realms? Because they are able to uphold their own intrinsic mark, they are called “realm”; or else “realm” has the sense of lineage, as was already explained above in the Chapter on the Elements.
The realm that belongs to desire is called the desire realm; the realm that belongs to form is called the form realm. The connecting word between them is dropped, and hence the abbreviated name — just as one says “a pepper drink” (which is in fact a drink with pepper in it) or “a vajra ring” (which is in fact a ring made of vajra).
Within that realm dharmas of form are not present, and so it is called “formless.” Form means resistant deformation (what can be broken and can obstruct), or else it means display (what can appear). The entity of that realm is not form, and so the name “formless” is established; it is not that it takes “the absence of form” for its own entity. The realm that belongs to the formless is called the formless realm, the connecting word being dropped here too, on the same analogy as before.
There is also a second reading: again, “the realm of desire” is called the desire realm — this realm has the power to uphold desire. The form realm and the formless realm are to be understood in the same way.
Treatise (what the entity of desire is · the exchange with a non-Buddhist): What dharma does the word “desire” spoken of here refer to? Briefly, it is the greed drawn forth by morsel food (nourishment eaten mouthful by mouthful) and by sexual union. As a stanza in a sūtra says:
Quoted stanza: The many fine objects of the world are not true desire; true desire is the discriminative greed a person arouses toward them. Fine objects abide in the world as they were before; among them the wise have already removed desire.
Treatise: A non-Buddhist of wrong livelihood then took a stanza and challenged the Venerable Śāriputra with it, saying:
Quoted stanza: If the fine objects of the world are not true desire, and desire is said to be the discriminative greed a person arouses, then a monk too should be named one who enjoys desire — for he too arouses evil discriminative applied thinking.
Treatise: Then Śāriputra questioned him back, saying:
Quoted stanza: If the fine objects of the world just are true desire, and desire is said not to be a person’s discriminative greed, then your own teacher should be named one who enjoys desire — for he gazes constantly upon agreeable and beautiful forms.
Treatise (adjudicating affiliation to the three realms): (The author next sets himself a question.) Is every dharma that is active within a given realm therefore said to belong to that realm? Answer: it is not. Question: how then is it put? Answer: only that upon which the greed of the three realms increases by attachment (that is, grows along with it) belongs to the three realms.
Question: and which dharma is this “greed of the three realms”? Answer: just that greed which increases by attachment within each of the three realms respectively.
(The objector reproaches him:) an answer given in this way is like the answer about tying a horse. It is as if someone asked, “Who is the one tying the horse?” — Answer: “The horse’s owner.” And he asked again, “Who is the horse’s owner?” — Answer: “The one tying it.” The two answers push each other back and forth in this way, and neither lets one understand.
But what is said here is not like that answer. The sense is: with respect to the various places of the desire realm spoken of above, the greed of one not yet free from greed is called greed for desire, and what has this greed increasing upon it by attachment is said to belong to the desire realm. As for the form realm and the formless realm spoken of above, they are to be understood in the same way, each as applicable.
Or, adjudicating it another way: the greed of the level that is not a level of absorption is called greed for desire, and what has it increasing upon it by attachment belongs to the desire realm; the greed of the levels of meditative absorption is called greed for form, and what has it increasing upon it by attachment belongs to the form realm; the greed of the formless levels is called greed for the formless, and what has it increasing upon it by attachment belongs to the formless realm.
Treatise (three appended questions): Question: how is greed for desire aroused toward a transformation mind of the desire realm? Answer: either greed arises from hearing of it from another; or, having oneself fallen back from that capacity, one arouses a relishing of it; or, seeing the sovereign power of one who can work transformations, one arouses greed and craving toward that transformation mind of his.
Again: if a mind can produce by transformation the two dharmas of odor and taste, that mind able to transform definitely belongs to the desire realm — for a mind of the form realm cannot bring odor and taste into being by transformation.
Question: of three realms such as these, is there only this one set? Answer: the three realms are boundless, as measureless as space. Hence, although there is no sentient being that first begins to be, measureless and boundless Buddhas appear in the world, and each converts and delivers countless sentient beings and causes them to enter the realm of nirvāṇa without remainder, and yet the three realms are still not exhausted, being like space.
Question: how should the worlds be said to abide? Answer: they should be said to abide side by side crosswise. Hence a sūtra says: it is as when rain falls from the sky, the drops as thick as a cart axle, pouring down without interval and without break; just so, in the eastern quarter too there are measureless worlds without interval and without break, now dissolving, now forming. As with the east, so with the south, the west, and the north — the sūtra does not speak of the two directions above and below.
There is also another account: worlds exist in the two directions above and below as well, since a sūtra transmitted by another school speaks of the ten directions. (If so,) above the Akaniṣṭha Heaven there is a further desire realm, and below the desire realm there is a further Akaniṣṭha Heaven.
Again: if one becomes free from the greed of any one desire realm, all greed of the desire realms is extinguished and left behind together; becoming free from the greed of the form realm and the formless realm is to be understood in the same way.
Again: when a supernormal power is aroused in dependence upon the first meditative absorption, the power so produced can reach only as far as the Brahmā world of the realm in which one has oneself been born, and cannot go elsewhere; the supernormal powers of the remaining levels are to be understood in the same way.
〔Root 4〕The Five Destinies — Why Intermediate Existence Does Not Count as a Destiny
Treatise (transition): The three realms have been stated. What, then, of the five destinies? The stanza says:
Stanza: Within the three realms, the five classes beginning with the hells are called the five destinies by their own names; the entity of the five destinies is unobscured-indeterminate alone, and it is confined to sentient beings and does not include intermediate existence.
Treatise: Within the three realms five destinies are said to exist, namely the hells and the rest, stated by their own names — that is, the hells, animals, and hungry ghosts spoken of above, together with human beings and gods; these are called the five destinies.
The desire realm alone has all four destinies complete (the hells, animals, hungry ghosts, and human beings), while each of the three realms has a portion of the destiny of gods.
Question: are there things gathered into the three realms and yet not taken up into the five destinies, while the five destinies are still said to be within the realms? Answer: there are — wholesome dharmas, defiled dharmas, the outer receptacle world, and intermediate existence. Although these are of the nature of a realm, they are not gathered into a destiny.
The entity of the five destinies is unobscured-indeterminate alone (neither wholesome nor defiled, and not obscured either). Were it otherwise, the destinies would be mixed together with one another — for within one and the same destiny there are the actions and afflictions that lead to all five destinies.
The five destinies are gathered only under the count of sentient beings, and their entity does not include intermediate existence. The Treatise of Designations says: the four modes of birth can gather in the five destinies, but the five destinies cannot gather in the four modes of birth. What is it that is not gathered in? Intermediate existence. The Dharmaskandha likewise says: what is the eye element? It is the subtle form derived from the four great elements; this is the eye, the eye faculty, the eye sense field, the eye element; and the eyes of the five destinies — the hells, animals, hungry ghosts, human beings, and gods — the divine eye formed through cultivation, and the eye of intermediate existence (all are gathered into this eye element).
A sūtra too sets intermediate existence apart from the destinies. Which sūtra? The Sūtra of the Seven Existences. That sūtra says there are seven kinds of “existence”: the existence of the hells, the existence of animals, the existence of hungry ghosts, the existence of gods, the existence of human beings, the existence of action, and intermediate existence. That sūtra states together the five destinies, the cause of a destiny, and the means to a destiny — so that a destiny being unobscured-indeterminate alone is thoroughly established; and “the existence of action” is set out separately as the cause precisely in order to mark it off from the destinies.
The sūtra recited in the land of Kaśmīra runs thus: the Venerable Śāriputra spoke thus: Venerable sir! If, because the outflows of the hells become present in someone, he thereupon performs and increases action to be experienced in the hells, so that his body, speech, and mind are all bent, defiled, and turbid, he then undergoes in the naraka the maturation of the five aggregates; and only when the maturation has arisen is he called a naraka-being — apart from the dharmas that are the five aggregates, that “naraka-being” is simply not to be found. Hence a destiny is unobscured-indeterminate alone.
Question: if so, how is the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas to be reconciled? It says that the five destinies have all the latent tendencies increasing upon them by attachment (and if the five destinies were purely indeterminate, how could latent tendencies increase upon them by attachment?). Answer: that says that within the rebirth-linking mind of the five destinies all the afflictions of the five categories may be present, together with the destiny and the mind that enters it (the mind able to arouse the afflictions at the moment of rebirth-linking is called “the mind entering a destiny”; the destiny and that entering mind together are named in sum a destiny); to state them in sum as a destiny is not contradictory. It is as a village and the outskirts of a village are together named a village.
There is also another account: the entity of a destiny extends to the wholesome and the defiled as well. As for why the Sūtra of the Seven Existences sets out “the existence of action” separately, it does not follow that whatever is set out separately in a sūtra is definitely not gathered in by it — just as among the five turbidities affliction and view are set out separately as two turbidities, and yet one cannot decide from their separate statement that “view” is definitely not gathered in by affliction. In the same way the existence of action, though it too is a destiny, is set out separately in order to display the cause of a destiny.
Question: if so, intermediate existence too should be a destiny. Answer: it is not. For the sense of “destiny” does not fit intermediate existence. A destiny is the place gone to; and one cannot say that intermediate existence is the place gone to, since it arises in the very place of death.
Question: if so, the formless realm too should not be a destiny — there also one takes birth in the very place of death. Answer: that being so, on your own account, intermediate existence is named intermediate existence and therefore should not be named a destiny. (The reason is:) because it lies between two destinies it is named intermediate existence; and if this were gathered into a destiny it would not be “between,” and then it should not be named intermediate existence.
Treatise (the party holding that a destiny extends to the wholesome and the defiled turns back to reconcile two sentences of scripture): As for what the Venerable Śāriputra said, “once the maturation has arisen he is called a hell-being,” this says that only when the maturation has arisen is he called a hell-being; it does not say that a hell-being is maturation only. And as for “apart from the dharmas that are the five aggregates that naraka-being is not to be found,” that was said in order to block “a really existing person who goes to the several destinies” (a real “self” that transmigrates); it was not said in order to block the remaining aggregates.
The Vaibhāṣikas say: a destiny is unobscured-indeterminate alone. There is another account: it is invariably born of maturation. And other masters say: it extends to the nourished as well (that portion which is fostered by food, sleep, and the like).
〔Root 5 · First Half of Root 6〕The Seven Stations of Consciousness — the Seven Places Where Consciousness Delights to Abide
Treatise (transition): Within these very three realms and five destinies, in due order, the stations of consciousness are seven. What are the seven? The stanza says:
Stanza: Different in body and different in perception; different in body and one in perception; the reverse of these (one in body and different in perception, and one in both body and perception); and with the lower three places of the formless realm added — hence the stations of consciousness are seven; the remaining places do not count, since there are dharmas there that injure consciousness.
Treatise: A sūtra says: sentient beings possessed of form, different in body and different in perception, such as human beings and a portion of the gods — this is the first station of consciousness.
“A portion of the gods” means the gods of the desire realm together with the gods of the first meditative absorption (excluding that batch which arises at the beginning of an aeon). “Different in body” means that their bodies of form differ from one another in the several colors, shapes, and appearances; because their bodies differ, or because it is said that they have different bodies, those sentient beings are called different in body. “Different in perception” means that their perceptions of suffering, of pleasure, and of what is neither suffering nor pleasure are distinguished; because their perceptions differ, or because it is said that they have different perceptions, those sentient beings are called different in perception.
Sentient beings possessed of form, different in body and one in perception, such as the Brahmakāyika gods — that is, the batch which arises at the beginning of an aeon — this is the second station of consciousness.
Why? Because when they arise at the beginning of an aeon those Brahmā multitudes all arouse this perception: we were all produced by the great Brahmā. And the great Brahmā then arouses this perception: these Brahmā multitudes were all produced by me. Because what they perceive is one and the same cause, they are called one in perception. Yet the great Brahmā king’s bodily measure is lofty and vast, and his appearance, majesty, speech, radiance, and dress are each of them unlike those of the Brahmā multitudes, and so they are called different in body.
Treatise (a passage of scripture appended, with the explanations of three masters): A sūtra says: the Brahmā multitudes think thus: we once saw such a sentient being, long-lived and long abiding, and he even aroused the wish, how may I bring it about that other sentient beings are born into my commonality? — and just when he was arousing that wish, we were born into his commonality.
Question: where was it that the Brahmā multitudes once saw the Brahmā king?
Some masters say: they saw him while dwelling in the Ābhāsvara Heaven, since it was after passing away from that heaven that they were born here. (Objection:) then why, not obtaining the second meditative absorption now, can they still recall the former abodes of that level? (A further objection:) and if such a one had already obtained the second meditative absorption, how could he still, taking the great Brahmā as his object, arouse the grasping of rules and observances (the grasping that takes what is not a cause for a cause)?
Other masters say: they saw him while dwelling in intermediate existence. (Objection:) there is no principle by which one abides for a long time in intermediate existence, since nothing obstructs its taking birth (as soon as the conditions are there it goes to be born); how then can the Brahmā multitudes say, “we once saw such a sentient being, long-lived and long abiding”?
Therefore (the third explanation, which is the one the treatise adopts): the Brahmā multitudes, dwelling in their own heaven, recall what they had passed through before this life — having seen him long-lived and long abiding earlier, they arouse this thought when they see him again later.
Treatise (the third station of consciousness): Sentient beings possessed of form, one in body and different in perception, such as the Ābhāsvara gods — this is the third station of consciousness.
Here the last of the heavens is raised and the earlier ones gathered in with it; it should be known that the whole of the second meditative absorption is in fact included therein. Were it not put so, in which station of consciousness would the Parīttābha and the Apramāṇābha Heavens be reckoned?
Those gods have no difference in color, shape, or appearance, and so are called one in body. As for perception, the perception of pleasant feeling and the perception of what is neither suffering nor pleasure interweave, and so they are called different in perception. It is transmitted that those gods, having grown weary of the faculty of joy of the fundamental level, then bring the faculty of equanimity of the access level to presence; and having grown weary of the faculty of equanimity of the access level, they again bring the faculty of joy of the fundamental level to presence — just as a rich and noble man, wearied of worldly pleasure, goes to enjoy the pleasure of the Dharma, and, wearied of the pleasure of the Dharma, turns back to enjoy worldly pleasure.
Question: (on this account) should the Śubhakṛtsna gods not be the same? Answer: the Śubhakṛtsna gods have never grown weary of pleasure — for that pleasure is quiescent, and there is never a time when it can be wearied of; with joy it is not so, for joy stirs and disturbs the mind.
Treatise (a further explanation of the Sautrāntikas recorded alongside): The Sautrāntika masters say: there is another sūtra that explains the sense of “different in perception” for that heaven. That sūtra says: among the Ābhāsvara gods there are newly born gods who cannot yet skillfully know the forming and the dissolving of the world; when they see the flames of the level below blazing out, the sight arouses terror and aversion in them, and they think: may those flames not burn out the Brahmā palaces and empty them, and then rise further to encroach upon this place of ours. And among the Ābhāsvara gods there are gods born long before who have long known well the forming and the dissolving of the world, and they console those terrified gods, saying: pure seers, pure seers, do not be afraid, do not be afraid! In former times those flames burned out the Brahmā palaces and emptied them, and there they went out of themselves. They have the perception that the flames will come and the perception that they will not come, the perception of terror and the perception of no terror, and so they are called different in perception — and it is not through the interweaving of the perception of pleasure and the perception of what is neither suffering nor pleasure that they obtain the name “different in perception.”
Treatise (the fourth station of consciousness, and the entity of a station of consciousness): Sentient beings possessed of form, one in body and one in perception, such as the Śubhakṛtsna gods — this is the fourth station of consciousness. Because there is only the perception of pleasure, they are called one in perception.
(Incidentally the perception of the four levels above and below is set in order:) within the first meditative absorption, because the perception is defiled, they are said to be one in perception; in the second meditative absorption, because there are two kinds of wholesome perception, they are said to be different in perception; in the third meditative absorption, because the perception is maturation-born, they are said to be one in perception. The names of the lower three formless spheres are as stated in the sūtra; adding those three stations of consciousness, they come in all to seven.
Question: what dharma here is called a “station of consciousness”? Answer: just the five aggregates or the four aggregates affiliated to that place — each as applicable; this is called a station of consciousness.
Question: why do the remaining places not count as stations of consciousness? Answer: because in the remaining places there are dharmas that injure consciousness.
Question: which are the remaining places? Answer: the evil destinations (the three evil destinies), the fourth meditative absorption, and the heaven of the summit of existence.
Question: why? Answer: because in those places there are dharmas that injure consciousness, and so they are not stations of consciousness.
Question: what are the dharmas that injure consciousness? Answer: in the evil destinations there is heavy painful feeling, which can injure consciousness; in the fourth meditative absorption there are the absorption without perception and the entity of non-perception; and in the heaven of the summit of existence there is the absorption of cessation, which can injure consciousness and cause the continuity of consciousness to be broken off — and so none of them is a station of consciousness.
There is also another account: if a place is one to which sentient beings elsewhere are glad in mind to come and abide, and, having come here, seek to go out no more, only that is called a station of consciousness. In the evil destinations neither of these two senses obtains. The mind in the fourth meditative absorption, for its part, constantly seeks to go out: ordinary beings seek to enter non-perception, while noble ones delight in entering the Pure Abodes or the formless spheres, and those in the Pure Abodes in turn delight in realizing quiescence. As for the summit of existence, the mind there is dull and feeble (dim, blunt, and weak), and so it is not a station of consciousness.
〔Second Half of Root 6 · First Half of Root 7〕The Nine Abodes of Sentient Beings — the Two Places That Are Added
Treatise (transition): The analysis of the seven stations of consciousness in this way has been stated. For this reason the nine abodes of sentient beings are to be stated next. What are the nine? The stanza says:
Stanza: It should be known that when the two places of the summit of existence and of the non-percipient sentient beings are reckoned in as well, they are the nine abodes of sentient beings; the remaining places do not count, since sentient beings do not delight to dwell there.
Treatise: The seven stations of consciousness above, together with the foremost existence (the heaven of the summit of existence) and the non-percipient sentient beings, are what is called the nine. The classes of sentient beings delight to dwell in these nine places alone, and so they are established as “abodes of sentient beings.”
The remaining places are not, since sentient beings do not delight to dwell there. The remaining places are the evil destinations — sentient beings do not dwell within them of their own delight, but are forced to dwell there by the rākṣasa of evil action; that place is like a prison, and so it is not established as an abode of sentient beings.
In the fourth meditative absorption, apart from the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, the rest are likewise not abodes of sentient beings, for the reason explained in the passage on the stations of consciousness.
〔Second Half of Root 7 · First Half of Root 8〕The Four Stations of Consciousness — Why Consciousness Itself Does Not Count as a Station
Treatise (transition): The sūtra cited above states seven stations of consciousness; there is a further sūtra that states four stations of consciousness. What are the four? The stanza says:
Stanza: The four stations of consciousness should be known to be the four aggregates, and to be confined to one’s own level alone; the sūtra says that consciousness by itself does not count as a station; they are all with outflows, and they may be gathered in by a fourfold analysis (the relative breadth of the seven and the four).
Treatise: As a sūtra says: consciousness abides following form, consciousness abides following feeling, consciousness abides following perception, consciousness abides following formations — these are called the four kinds.
Question: what is the entity of these four? Answer: the four aggregates with outflows, stated in due order. And this holds on one’s own level only and does not extend to another level — for it is because consciousness adheres to them with attachment that they are called stations of consciousness; it is not that among the aggregates of form and the rest of another level consciousness could adhere there by the force of craving.
Question: why is consciousness itself not also stated as a station of consciousness? Answer: because what abides must be set aside before that in which it abides can be established. The consciousness that abides may not be called that in which it abides, just as the king himself cannot be called the king’s seat. Or it may be put thus: if there is a dharma that consciousness mounts and drives, as a man rides a boat, that is called a station of consciousness; and consciousness cannot mount and drive its own entity, and so consciousness is not stated as a station of consciousness. This is what the Vaibhāṣikas say.
Question: if so, why does another sūtra say that within the nutriment of consciousness there is joy and there is defilement, and that because there is joy and defilement consciousness abides therein and is mounted and driven by consciousness (does that not make consciousness abide in consciousness)? And again: why was it said above that the seven stations of consciousness have the five aggregates for their entity (which reckons consciousness in as well)?
Answer: although it is stated so, that is said without analysis among the aggregates gathered into the place of taking birth, stating in sum only that they can produce joy and defilement; and when consciousness turns on it too is called a station of consciousness, which is not to state consciousness alone. Yet the aggregates of form and the rest can each of them produce the several joys and defilements and make consciousness adhere; consciousness by itself cannot do so, and so it is said not to be a station. Hence among these four stations of consciousness consciousness does not count as a station of consciousness; in other contexts it may be so stated.
Again: the Buddha’s intent is to say that these four stations of consciousness are like a good field, and to state in sum that all consciousness possessed of appropriation is like a seed — and a seed may not be established as a good field. This is a reverent surmise that such is the World-Honored One’s intent in teaching.
Again: a dharma and consciousness can arise at the same time and serve as the good field of consciousness, and so are established as a station of consciousness; the aggregate of consciousness itself is not so, and so is not a station of consciousness.
Treatise (how the seven and the four gather each other in): The seven kinds and the four kinds stated in this way, though the stations of consciousness differ, are alike with outflows. Question: do the seven gather in the four, or the four the seven? Answer: they do not gather each other in throughout, and a fourfold analysis may be made. That is, on careful observation it will be seen that the entities of these two gates are the wider and the narrower, and hence the four alternatives — some are gathered in by the seven and not by the four, and so on.
The first alternative (gathered in by the seven and not by the four): the consciousness within the seven stations of consciousness. The second alternative (gathered in by the four and not by the seven): the remaining aggregates other than consciousness within the evil destinations, the fourth meditative absorption, and the summit of existence. The third alternative (gathered in by both): the four aggregates within the seven stations of consciousness. The fourth alternative (gathered in by neither): all the rest, excepting what the three preceding alternatives state.
〔Second Half of Root 8 · Root 9〕The Four Modes of Birth — Egg, Womb, Moisture, Transformation, and Which Destiny Has Which
Treatise (transition): Among the realms and destinies stated above, it should be known that the “birth” of sentient beings is broadly of four kinds. Which four? And which place has which? The stanza says:
Stanza: Within them there are four modes of birth, and sentient beings are the four classes beginning with birth from an egg; human beings and animals have all four complete; the hells and the gods, and intermediate existence too, have birth by transformation alone; while hungry ghosts extend to the two, birth from a womb and birth by transformation.
Treatise: The class of sentient beings has birth from an egg, birth from a womb, birth from moisture, and birth by transformation, and these are called the four. “Birth” means a class of birth. Among sentient beings, although the other classifications are mixed together with one another, with respect to the class of birth they are equal.
What is birth from an egg? Sentient beings born from within an eggshell — this is called birth from an egg, as with geese, peacocks, parrots, and wild geese. What is birth from a womb? Sentient beings born from within a womb — this is called birth from a womb, as with elephants, horses, cattle, pigs, sheep, and donkeys. What is birth from moisture? Sentient beings born from moisture — this is called birth from moisture, as with worms, moths, mosquitoes, and centipedes. What is birth by transformation? Sentient beings that arise with nothing to depend upon — this is called birth by transformation, as with naraka-beings, gods, intermediate existence, and the like; their faculties are complete and unimpaired and their limbs arise all at once, and because what was not there suddenly is, it is called “transformation.”
The destiny of human beings and the destiny of animals each have all four.
Human beings born from an egg are such as Śaila and Upaśaila, the two who were born from a crane’s egg, and again the thirty-two sons borne by the Deer Mother, and the five hundred sons of the king of Pañcāla. Human beings born from a womb are such as the people of today. Human beings born from moisture are such as Māndhātṛ, Cāru, Upacāru, Dove-Garland, and Āmrapālī. Human beings born by transformation are only the people at the beginning of an aeon.
Three of the modes among animals are seen by all; animals born by transformation are such as nāgas and garuḍas (the golden-winged birds).
All the hells, the gods, and intermediate existence are birth by transformation alone. The destiny of hungry ghosts, for its part, extends to two only, birth from a womb and birth by transformation. A hungry ghost born from a womb is such as the one of whom the female hungry ghost spoke to Maudgalyāyana:
Quoted stanza: At night I bear five children, and as each is born I devour it myself; by day I bear five, and it is the same — and though I eat them all up, I am never filled.
〔Root 9, continued〕Which Mode of Birth Is Most Excellent — Why the Bodhisattva Undergoes Birth from a Womb
Treatise: Question: which of all the modes of birth is the most excellent? Answer: it should be said that the most excellent is birth by transformation alone.
Question: if so, why does the bodhisattva in his last body, having already obtained sovereignty over birth, still undergo birth from a womb?
Answer: because undergoing birth from a womb in the present has great benefit. That is: in order to draw in the great men of the Śākya clan, causing them by the connection of kinship to enter the true Dharma. And in order to draw in others, letting them know that the bodhisattva is of the lineage of a wheel-turning monarch, so that they arouse reverence and longing and thereby abandon wrong paths and turn toward the true Dharma. And in order to make those he converts arouse a superior mind: since he too is a man and can accomplish so great a matter, we too are such — why should we not thereby arouse right diligence and cultivate the true Dharma single-mindedly? And again: were it not so, his clan and lineage could not be known, and people might suspect him to be a conjured apparition, not knowing whether god or ghost. Thus in the treatises of the non-Buddhists there is a feigned slander set down, saying that when a hundred aeons have passed there will appear in the world a great conjuration that devours the world — so that undergoing birth from a womb serves precisely to lay these doubts and slanders to rest.
Treatise (a further master’s account recorded alongside, with the exchange upon it): Other masters say: it is in order to leave behind the bodily element (the relics of the body) that he undergoes birth from a womb, so that measureless human beings and beings of the other classes, once they make offerings, may be born in heaven a thousand times over and realize liberation. If he underwent birth by transformation there would be no outer seed (the condition of a body received from father and mother), and the moment the body ceased to breathe no remaining form would be left behind, as when a lamp goes out and its light is seen no more.
(The author objects:) if someone believes that the Buddha has the supernormal power of upholding a vow by which he can long preserve his body (then a body born by transformation could equally leave a remaining form behind, and there would be no need to undergo birth from a womb in order to leave the bodily element), this explanation does not hold.
(A discussion arising from the discussion · a further objection:) if a body born by transformation is like a lamp gone out and its light spent, leaving nothing behind after death, then why does a sūtra say that a garuḍa born by transformation seizes a nāga born by transformation to serve as its food? Answer: it seizes the nāga for food because it does not know (that a nāga leaves no remaining form after death), and the sūtra does not say that it was really filled — what fault is there in this? Or else the nāga had not yet died and served for the moment to stay its hunger, and when it had died it was hungry again; what blame is there in eating for a moment!
Treatise (how many there are of each of the four modes of birth): Question: within the four modes of birth, which is the most numerous? Answer: birth by transformation alone is the most numerous. Why? Because a portion of three destinies, the whole of two destinies, and all intermediate existence are birth by transformation.
〔Root 10〕What Intermediate Existence Is — Why It Is Not Called “Birth”
Treatise (transition): What dharma here is called intermediate existence? And why is intermediate existence not simply called “birth”? The stanza says:
Stanza: After the existence of death and before the existence of birth, the five aggregates in between are called intermediate existence; because it has not yet reached the place it should reach, intermediate existence is not called birth.
Treatise: After the existence of death and before the existence of birth, in that very interval an entity of its own arises; this body arises in order to reach the place of taking birth, and because it lies between two destinies it is called intermediate existence.
Question: since this body has already arisen, why is it not called “birth”? Answer: birth means the place that is to be reached in time to come; the name “birth” is established upon the sense of having reached. This body of intermediate existence, though its entity has already arisen, has not yet reached that place, and so is not called birth.
Question: what is “the place that is to be reached in time to come”? Answer: the place where the maturation that has been drawn forth is finally and clearly displayed; this is called the place that is to be reached in time to come.
Treatise (the account that sets down no intermediate existence): Another school says: between death and birth an interval and a break may be allowed, and so there is no intermediate existence. (The author answers:) this cannot be granted.
Question: why? Answer: by reason of principle and of the sacred teaching.
Question: what are the principle and the teaching relied upon? The stanza says:
〔Root 11 · Root 12〕The Two Proofs from Principle and Teaching — the Principle of the Continuity of Grain and the Teaching of the Sūtras of Five and of Seven
Stanza: As with the continuity of grain and the like, the places are uninterrupted and each moment arises in succession after the one before (this is the first); that an image really exists cannot be established (this is the second); and even granting that it were established it is not alike, and so cannot serve as an analogy (this is the third) — because two forms cannot stand together in one place, because the substance and the image are not one continuum, because an image arises from two conditions. As for the proof from teaching: because the sūtra speaks of a gandharva, and because of the Sūtra of the Five Non-Returners, the Sūtra of the Seven Destinations of Good Men, and the rest.
Treatise (the proof from principle): To speak for the moment in accordance with correct principle: intermediate existence is not nonexistent.
It is plainly to be seen that whatever dharma in the world turns on in continuity must arise in succession moment after moment with its places uninterrupted. Just as with the continuity of grain and the like in the world (the seed is here and the sprout comes up here too), the continuity of sentient beings ought in principle to be the same — arising moment after moment in succession, with the places necessarily uninterrupted.
Treatise (the outside objection · the analogy of the reflected image): (Those who hold that there is no intermediate existence defend themselves:) is it not plainly to be seen that there are dharmas that arise in succession while the places within them have an interval? As when, in dependence upon a mirror and the like, an image is produced from a substance (the substance being here and the image there, with an interval between). In the same way, though the existence of death and the existence of birth of a sentient being have an interval of place, what is there to prevent their arising in succession?
Treatise (the first refutation · an image is not really existent): Answer: because “images really exist” cannot be established in principle; and because, even were it established, it is not alike, so that it does not hold as an analogy.
(First to explain the first route:) that a further kind of form arises and is called an “image,” its entity really existing, does not hold in principle; and even granting that it were established, it would not be alike to the dharma compared with it, so that the analogy does not hold.
The reason for saying that “an image does not hold” is this: two forms cannot stand together in one place. That is: in one and the same place the form of the mirror and the form of the image are seen present together; but two forms ought not to stand together in the same place, since the great elements they depend upon differ.
Again: on a narrow surface of water the forms and shapes of the two banks display two images together at the same time and in the same place; those standing on the two banks each see clearly, and yet nowhere has anyone seen two forms standing together in one place — it should not be said that these two forms arise together.
Again: shadow and light are never in the same place; and yet a mirror has been seen hanging in the shadow while the image of the light appears distinctly upon the mirror’s face — it should not be said here that the two arise together.
Or “no two stand together in one place” may be put thus: the face of the mirror and the image of the moon are stated as two things, and are seen separately as near and far (as is the case when one looks into well water); if they truly arose together, how could a difference of near and far be seen?
Hence it is known that images are in principle really nonexistent. It is only the force of the coming together of the several causes and conditions that makes one see them so — for the differentiations of capability in the intrinsic nature of dharmas are truly hard to conceive.
Treatise (the second refutation · not being alike, it is no analogy): The principle of “not being established” having been made out, it was said that an image cannot serve as an analogy. Now for “not being alike, and so likewise unable to serve as an analogy”: because the substance and the image are not one continuum. That is: the substance and the image are not the same continuum, and an image arises only in dependence upon a mirror and the like; moreover the image and the substance are present at the same time. The existence of death and the existence of birth, by contrast, are one continuum, uninterrupted before and after, and arise in succession in another place; and the substance and the image, set over against each other, have no such relation of continuity — since they are not alike, the analogy does not hold.
Treatise (the third refutation · it arises from two conditions): Again: the image that appears arises from two conditions. That is, images can arise only from two kinds of condition: first the substance, second the mirror and the like. Of these two the image arises in dependence upon the more excellent. The existence of birth, however, cannot arise from two conditions — there is only the existence of death, and no further and more excellent support. Hence the analogy adduced is not alike to the dharma compared with it.
Nor may it be said that outer insentient things such as semen and blood are taken as the more excellent support. For sentient beings born by transformation arise suddenly in mid-air, and among those what would be reckoned the more excellent support?
Treatise (the proof from teaching, in five sūtras): The other school’s account that between death and birth an interval and a break may be allowed having been refuted by correct principle, intermediate existence is definitely not nonexistent. Next, the existence of intermediate existence is proved by the sacred teaching.
First, a sūtra says: “existence” is of seven kinds, namely the existences of the five destinies, the existence of action, and intermediate existence.
Second, if that school does not recite this sūtra, do they not recite even the Gandharva Sūtra? As a sūtra says: for entry into the mother’s womb three things must be present together — first, that the mother’s body is at that time in fit condition; second, that father and mother join in mutual love; third, that a gandharva is just present. Apart from the body of intermediate existence, what gandharva is there? The former aggregates have already perished — what then is it that is present?
Third, if they do not recite this sūtra either, then how is the Sūtra of the Horse-Keeping Clan to be explained? As that sūtra says: do you now know? This gandharva that is just present — is he a brahmin, a kṣatriya, a vaiśya, or a śūdra? Does he come from the east, or from the south, the west, or the north? The former aggregates have already perished and cannot be said to come; and so the “coming” spoken of here can from the first be nothing but intermediate existence.
Fourth, if they still do not recite these sūtras, how is the Sūtra of the Five Non-Returners to be explained? As a sūtra says: there are five kinds of non-returner — first, one who attains parinirvāṇa in the interval; second, one who attains parinirvāṇa upon birth; third, one who attains parinirvāṇa without exertion; fourth, one who attains parinirvāṇa with exertion; fifth, one who goes upstream. If there were no intermediate existence, whence would the name “attaining parinirvāṇa in the interval” come?
Treatise (refuting two divergent explanations of “attaining parinirvāṇa in the interval”): Certain masters hold fixedly that there is a heaven named “Interval,” and that one attains parinirvāṇa there, whence the name “attaining parinirvāṇa in the interval.” (Refutation:) then one should also grant heavens named “Birth” and the rest; and since these are not granted, it is clear that such a grasping is not well said.
Again: a sūtra states seven destinations of good men, that is, within the five above it divides “attaining parinirvāṇa in the interval” into three, dividing them by the nearness, the middle distance, and the farness of place and of time. As when a small spark of a splinter fire (a fire of wood chips) flies off and is extinguished near at hand as soon as it rises, so it is with the first good man; as when a small spark of an iron fire flies off and is extinguished only at the middle of its course, so it is with the second good man; as when a great spark of an iron fire flies off and travels far and is extinguished before it falls, so it is with the third good man. (On what those masters hold,) it is not that the separate heaven called “Interval” which they hold could have such a threefold difference of time and of place — and so what they hold is definitely contrary to principle.
Other masters say: whether in the middle of the lifespan or in the middle of the approach to a heaven, one cuts off the remaining afflictions and becomes an arhat, and this is called attaining parinirvāṇa in the interval; and because one attains parinirvāṇa upon reaching the stage of the element, the stage of perception, or the stage of applied thought, it is divided into three grades: either one attains parinirvāṇa as soon as one has taken up the commonality of sentient beings of the form realm, and this is called the first; or one attains parinirvāṇa only after having enjoyed the pleasures of the gods thereafter, and this is called the second; or one attains parinirvāṇa only after entering the Dharma assembly of the gods thereafter, and this is called the third. One who attains parinirvāṇa only after much time has passed since entering the assembly is called one who attains parinirvāṇa upon birth; or one who attains parinirvāṇa only after much of the lifespan has been diminished and not immediately upon being born is for that reason called one who attains parinirvāṇa upon birth.
(Refutation:) what is stated in this way does not fit the analogy of the sparks at all. Why? Because on that account there would be no difference of place or of course traversed (the three grades becoming a difference of time alone). Again: the formless realm too would have to be said to have parinirvāṇa attained in the interval, for there also there are those who attain parinirvāṇa in the middle of the lifespan. Yet the sūtra does not say that there is attaining parinirvāṇa in the interval there, as is stated in the Udāna verses:
Quoted stanza: Gathering in sum the number of the noble and the worthy — in each of the four meditative absorptions there are ten, in each of the three formless spheres seven, and in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception six alone.
〔Root 12, continued〕The Measure of Teaching Established · Reconciling the Several Sūtras
Treatise: Hence what they hold is all false.
If they do not recite even these sūtras, there is nothing more to be said: the unsurpassed King of the Dharma passed into extinction long ago, and the great generals of the Dharma have all attained parinirvāṇa; the sacred teaching is scattered and has already divided into many schools, and over its letter and its sense they each hold to their own view and gallop against one another, taking up and setting aside entirely as they please, and to this day the thing grows ever stronger. Alas! You cling stubbornly to folly and confusion, going against principle and refusing the sacred teaching; it is greatly to be lamented.
For all who take the principle and the teaching stated above as their measure, the real existence of intermediate existence is thoroughly established.
Treatise (reconciling the first sūtra): Question: if so, why does a sūtra say that Dūṣin the Māra, who performed extremely evil action, fell headlong in his present body into the Unremitting Hell (which shows that there is no intermediate existence in between)?
Answer: the sense of that sūtra is this: his life had not yet been given up when the fierce flames of the hell were already burning his body; hence when his life ended he took up that intermediate existence, and it was riding upon this intermediate existence that he fell into the Unremitting Hell. Because the force of his evil action was so strong, the marks of suffering became present without waiting for his life to end — he first underwent the result to be experienced in the present life and afterwards the result to be experienced in the next life.
Treatise (reconciling the second sūtra): Question: why does a sūtra say that there is a class of sentient beings who, once the five actions without interval have been performed and increased, are without interval definitely born in the naraka?
Answer: the sense of that sūtra is to block his going to another destiny and to display that that action is definitely to be experienced in the next life. If one clings to the surface of the text alone, then all five actions without interval would have to be complete before one were born in hell — it is not so; one may be born there lacking any one of them, or through the cause of some other action; otherwise a great fault follows.
Again: if it says “without interval one is born in the naraka,” then one ought to be born the instant the action is done, without waiting for the body to break up. (Which shows that the surface of the text alone will not do.)
Or it may be said: who says that intermediate existence does not count as “birth”? The name “naraka” extends to intermediate existence as well — when intermediate existence arises without interval upon the existence of death, that too may be called birth, since it is the means to birth (the stretch that leads to birth). The sūtra says “without interval one is born in the naraka,” and does not say that at that moment it is the existence of birth.
Treatise (reconciling the third · a stanza of scripture): Question: if so, how is the stanza in the sūtra to be reconciled? As a stanza of a sūtra says:
Quoted stanza: Twice-born, you have now passed the stage of your prime; decline draws near, and King Yama is not far off; you would go forward upon the road ahead and have no provisions, and you would seek to halt in between and there is no place to stay.
Treatise: Question: if there is intermediate existence, why did the World-Honored One say that “in between there is no place for him to stay”?
Answer: the sense of this stanza is to display that among human beings he swiftly comes to wearing away, with no room for a moment’s halt; or else that that intermediate existence, in order to reach the place where it is to be born, likewise makes no halt, since its going is unobstructed.
(The objector asks in return:) how do you know that the sense of the sūtra is this and not something else? (The author questions him back:) and how do you know that it is something else and not this? Since the reproaches on the two sides are equal, why single out my side alone for questioning? Neither of these two explanations does violence to the text of the sūtra; how then may it be singled out to prove that there is no intermediate existence?
Whenever words are adduced as proof, their principle may have no other tendency; and since this sentence does have another tendency, it does not hold as proof.
中有·入胎·緣起總說Intermediate Existence · Entry into the Womb · Dependent Origination in General
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔正13〕中有的形狀——與將要投生的那一身同一個模樣
論(承前起問):上文已辨明中有(死後、投生前那一段過渡的身)確實存在。接下來問:這個中有將要往哪一趣去?它所現起的形狀又是怎樣的?頌說:
頌:中有與當來那一身是同一個業所牽引的緣故,所以中有的樣子就像將來那個『本有』的形狀。所謂『本有』,是指死之前、投生那一剎那之後的一段。
論:如果有一個業能牽引一個有情將要往生的那一趣,這同一個業就同時招感那個『能往彼趣』的中有。所以這個中有若是要往某一趣去,它的樣子就像那一趣將來的本有之形。
有人難問:這樣的話,在同一隻狗的肚子裡,豈不是可能有五趣(天、人、鬼、畜生、地獄)的中有一齊現起(腹中若有五子同時命終、各生一趣,五趣中有便一時在腹中頓起)?既然其中有地獄的中有現前,為什麼它不會把母親的肚子燒掉呢?
答:地獄有情就是住在地獄的本有之中,尚且也不是隨時都在燃燒(何況只是中有)。就好像暫時到園林裡遊玩一趟(有時也有不受苦的間隙),何況只是中有的階段。
再退一步說,就算承認它能燒,中有也是看不見、摸不著的——因為中有之身極其微細的緣故——所以剛才那個責難不合道理。
各趣的中有雖然同住在一個肚子裡,彼此並不互相接觸、互相燒害,這是被業力所遮隔的緣故。
欲界的中有,身量雖然像五六歲的小孩,但諸根卻很明利;菩薩的中有,則像壯年時那樣,身量周圓、具足種種相好,所以菩薩住在中有將要入胎的時候,能照亮百俱胝(百億)個四大洲那麼廣。
有人問:既然如此,為什麼菩薩的母親會夢見一頭白象子來進入自己的右脅呢?
答:那是吉祥的瑞相,與中有無關。菩薩早已捨離畜生趣(不可能再現象身)了。這就好比訖栗枳王夢見的十件事一樣:
引頌:夢見大象、水井、麨、栴檀樹、美妙的園林、小象、獼猴二事(一是獼猴身塗糞穢、一是獼猴受灌頂立為王)、又寬又結實的衣、以及鬪諍。
論:像這樣所夢見的,只是表示將來另有一些事情的先兆,並不是真如所見的那樣(夢中之象不等於實有象來)。
再者,各種中有都是從產門進入的,並不是破開母親的肚子才得以入胎——所以雙胞胎才會先出生的小、後出生的大(先入者反在內,後入者反先出)。
有人問:那麼法善現(善現尊者)所說的一首頌又該怎麼會通呢?
引頌:白象的相貌端嚴,具足六牙四足,正知而入母腹,安寢猶如仙人隱居林中。
論:答:這一頌不必非得會通,因為它不屬於三藏(經、律、論)所收。而且諸種諷誦的頌辭,說法有時會超過實情。
如果一定要會通,那就當作是就菩薩母親所見的夢相而造這首頌,也沒有過失。
色界的中有,身量圓滿得像本有一樣。而且是與衣服一同生起的,因為色界有情慚愧心增盛的緣故。菩薩的中有也是與衣同生。鮮白苾芻尼(一位比丘尼)由於本願的力量,她世世都有自然而有的衣服,常不離身、隨時改變樣式,一直到最後入涅槃時,就用這件衣纏裹遺體焚葬。其餘欲界的中有都沒有衣服,因為他們都增長了無慚無愧的緣故。
有人問:中有所像的那個『本有』,它的體是什麼?
答:是指死有之前、生有之後的那一段五蘊,總說起來體就是五取蘊(有漏的色、受、想、行、識)。在這中間依位次分成四段:一是中有,意義如前面所說;二是生有,指在各趣中結生的那一剎那;三是本有,指除去結生那一剎那、死之前的其餘各位;四是死有,指最後那一念。
依次序說,中有排在生有之前,所以有色的有情具足這四有;若在無色界,則缺中有而只具三有(無色界沒有色身,不須中有往來)。
以上已說中有的形量,其餘的義理接下來要辨。頌說:
〔正14·正15〕中有的種種門——誰看得見它、它跑得多快、吃什麼、住多久
頌:中有能被同類以及修得的清淨天眼所見;它具有最快的業通;諸根具足;沒有任何東西能對礙它;已經定向就不可轉變;以香為食;不會久住。它以顛倒之心奔向所貪的境;濕生染著香氣、化生染著處所而受生。天的中有頭朝上,人、鬼、傍生三者橫行,地獄的中有則頭朝下。
論:這中有之身,同一類的中有彼此看得見。若有人修得極清淨的天眼,也能看得見它;而一切生來就有的眼(包括天生的天眼)都看不到,因為中有太細微了。
另有一些論師說:天的中有之眼具足能力,五趣的中有——人、鬼、傍生、地獄——分別能見到四、三、二、一種,就是各自能見自類以下、除去在上者(天中有能見五趣,人中有能見人以下四趣,餘類推)。
在一切神通當中,業通最快。『凌越虛空、來去自在』就叫作通;由業所得的通就叫作業通;這種通的勢用極為迅速,所以叫作『疾』。中有具有最快的業通,上至世尊也無法遮止攔阻它,因為業的勢力最為強盛。
一切中有都具足五根(眼耳鼻舌身)。所謂『對』就是對礙(互相阻擋),中有連金剛等物都遮不住它,所以叫作『無對』。曾經聽說有人剖開燒得赤紅的鐵塊,看見裡面竟有蟲生(可見連鐵中也可入而受生)。
已經確定要往某一趣的中有一旦生起,任何一種力量都不能使它轉變——就是說,不可能讓人的中有消失而改起其他趣的中有;其餘各類也是一樣。既然為了往某一趣的中有已經生起,就只應往那一趣,決定不往別處。
有人問:欲界的中有之身要靠段食(一口一口吃的飲食)滋養嗎?
答:雖然也靠段食,但那是極細的、不是粗的。
問:所謂細的是什麼?
答:只是香氣而已。因為這個緣故,中有才得到『健達縛』(食香者)這個名字。諸多字界(語根)的意義不只一種,而讀成短音的『健達縛』,就像『設建途』與『羯建途』(同一語根而長短音不同的例子)一樣,是為了省略,所以沒有過失。
福薄的中有只能吃到臭惡的香,福多的則以好香為食。
問:像這樣的中有要住多久?
大德說:這沒有一定的期限。只要投生的因緣還沒有和合,中有就一直存在;因為中有的命根並不是另外一個業所牽引的,它與所要投生的那一趣(人等)同屬一個『眾同分』(同一類生命的共同分限)的緣故。若不是這樣,那麼中有的命根最後滅的時候,就應該另立一個死有了(可見中有與當生同屬一期,不能另算生死)。
有人設難:假設有一堆肉聚積得像妙高山那麼大,到了夏天下雨的時候,就變成一大堆蟲。那麼應該說這些中有是漸漸地等著這個時節(一個一個排隊等待)呢?還是說牠們是從什麼地方一下子同時來到這裡的呢?
答:雖然沒有經論的明文可作判釋,然而依正理應當這樣說:有各式各樣雜類的眾生,數目無邊無際,牠們貪著香味而壽量短促。那些有情因為嗅到這股氣味,貪著香味,於是同時命終;由貪愛之力喚醒了先前所感得蟲身之業(如同從睡眠中被喚起而起作用),就同時在此受得細小的蟲身。或者說,本來就有許多有情應當在此受生,只因為許多助緣還沒有齊備而住在中有之中,如今遇到眾緣齊備,才一下子同時生在這裡。
應當同時生的,決定不會前後不同時。就好像有一種能招感轉輪王果報的業,一定要等到人壽八萬歲的時候,或者更後的時候,才一下子給出果報,不會在其他時位給果。這裡的道理也是一樣。所以世尊說:各類有情的業果差別,是不可思議的。
尊者世友說:中有最多住七天;如果投生的因緣還沒有和合,就一次次地死、一次次地生(每七日一輪)。
另有論師說:最多住七七四十九天。
毘婆沙師說:中有只住很短的時間,因為中有心中樂於求得生有,所以不會久住,很快就去結生。
至於那些投生的因緣一時未能和合的中有:如果決定應當在此處、生為此類,業力就會使這些因緣和合起來;如果並非決定要託生於此處而因緣不合,就轉而寄生到別處、別類去。
也有論師說:中有會轉而受生為相似的類別。譬如家牛、狗、熊、馬,牠們的欲心增盛的時節依次屬於夏、秋、冬、春;而野牛、野干(豺)、羆、驢則沒有一定的時節。前面四種的中有若碰不上時節,就依次轉生為後面四種同類(家牛轉野牛之類)。
(論主破此說:)中有豈不是決定不會與所生之處的眾同分有別(因為中有與生有是同一個業所牽引的)嗎?怎麼可以說轉而受生為相似之類呢?
論(續):像這樣的中有,為了到達所生之處,先起顛倒之心而奔向所貪的境。它憑業力所起的眼根,雖然身在遠處,卻能看見受生之處父母交會,因而生起顛倒之心:若是男身,就緣著母親生起男性的欲愛;若是女身,就緣著父親生起女性的欲愛;反過來緣另一方,則對二人都生起瞋心。
所以《施設論》有這樣的說法:那時健達縛(中有)在愛與恚兩種心當中,隨其一種現行——就是愛或者恚。
它由於生起這兩種顛倒之心,便以為自己的身體與所愛的人結合了。等到所憎者的不淨(精血)流泄到胎中的時候,中有以為那是自己所有,便生起歡喜安慰之心;從此蘊聚增厚,中有便沒去,生有生起,這就叫作『已結生』。
若是男胎,就依著母親的右脅、面向背部蹲坐;若是女胎,就依著母親的左脅、面向腹部而住。若既非男又非女(無形之類)住母胎時,就隨其所起的貪愛,如其所應而住。
決定沒有既非女又非男的中有,因為中有之身必定諸根具足的緣故。由於在中有的階段或是女或是男,所以入母胎時才能隨其所應而住;後來胎兒增長時,也可能變作不男(如扇搋之類)。
在這個義理當中還應該思擇一件事:究竟是由業力使得精血這些大種(地水火風四大)直接成為諸根所依的身體呢?還是業另外生起一組作為根依的大種,而這組大種只是依附著精血而住呢?
有論師說:精血就直接成為根的所依。就是說,先前沒有根的中有一同滅去,後面有根的身無間相續而生起,就像種子滅、芽生的道理一樣。因為這樣,最初的階段才叫作『羯剌藍』(初凝的胎質)。這樣說也正好順成這一段經文:『父母的不淨生起羯剌藍。』又如經中告訴苾芻們說:『你們長夜以來所執受的血滴,增長成了羯吒私(胎中積聚之物)。』
另有論師說:是另外生起一組大種。就像依著樹葉、糞土而另外有蟲生出來一樣,是在不淨的聚積之中生出羯剌藍。所以說『父母的不淨生起羯剌藍』,這樣說也與那段經文並不相違。
以上且就胎生、卵生二種而說,其餘二生(濕生、化生)如其所應,現在接著要說。
若是濕生的有情,是因為染著香氣而受生——就是遠遠地嗅知受生之處的香氣,便生起愛染而往那裡受生;隨其業的差別,所染之香也有淨、有穢。
若是化生的有情,是因為染著處所而受生——就是遠遠地觀見將要受生之處,便生起愛染而往那裡受生;隨其業的差別,所染之處也有淨、有穢。
有人難問:難道對地獄也會生起愛染嗎?
答:由於心顛倒的緣故,起染並沒有過失。就是說,那個中有或者見到自己的身體被冷雨寒風所逼迫,卻見到熱地獄火焰熾然,心中欣喜那份暖觸,就投身進去;或者見到自己的身體被熱風盛火所逼害,卻見到寒地獄,心裡想要清涼,就投身進去。
先前古老的諸位論師則這樣說:是因為見到先前造下感得那個地獄之業時、與自己同伴的那一夥人,便奔馳前往投奔他們。
再說行相:天的中有,頭正朝上升起,就像從座位上站起來一樣;人、鬼、傍生的中有,行進的樣子還像人等平常行走一樣;地獄的中有則頭下腳上,顛倒墜落其中。所以有一首伽他(偈頌)說:
引頌:顛倒墜落於地獄,腳在上而頭朝下;由於毀謗諸位仙人——那些樂於寂靜、修習苦行的人。
〔正16·正17〕入胎四種——誰能在入胎時仍然清醒
論(承前起問):前面說中有以顛倒之心進入母胎,那麼一切中有都決定是這樣嗎?
答:不是。經中說入胎有四種。是哪四種呢?頌說:
頌:第一種只在『入』的時候正知;第二、第三種則兼及『住』與『出』;第四種在一切位都不正知,卵生的則永遠無知。前三種入胎的,是轉輪王與二佛(獨覺、佛),因為他們的業與智依次殊勝的緣故;第四種則是其餘的眾生。
論:有些有情多集福業、勤修正念與智慧,所以在死與生的時候被念力所任持,正知而無錯亂。這當中,有的是入胎時正知,有的是住胎時正知並兼及入胎時,有的是出胎時正知並兼知入胎、住胎。頌文說『兼』,是為了顯示後面的一定連帶前面的(能正知出胎者,必定也正知入與住)。
有些有情福與智都少,入、住、出三位都不能正知。入胎既然不正知,住與出必定也是如此。頌文之所以倒過來說這四種(先說第一,後說第四),是為了順著結頌的體例(音節與句法之便)。
至於各種卵生的有情,入胎等各位都恆常無知。
有人問:卵生怎麼算入胎呢?牠們是從卵殼裡出來的呀。
答:說『入胎藏』,是因為卵生的必定先入母胎(先在母體中結為卵)。或者是就將來說的——因為將來要生為卵,所以叫作卵生(在入胎時尚未成卵)。就像契經說『造作有為』(尚未造成而先如此稱),世間也說『煮飯』『磨麨』(正煮的是米、正磨的是麥,卻先用將成的飯、麨來稱它)一樣。所以說卵生也入胎,並沒有過失。
問:怎樣叫作三位(入、住、出)的正知與不正知?
答:假如有情的福很微薄,入母胎的時候會生起顛倒的想解:見到大風大雨、酷熱嚴寒,或者大軍的聲勢威逼混亂,於是見到自己進入密草稠林、樹葉搭的窟、茅草蓋的屋,或投奔到樹下牆邊;住胎的時候,就見到自己已經住在這裡面;出胎的時候,就見到身體從這裡出去。
如果福增多一些,入母胎的時候生起的顛倒想解是:自己見到身體進入美妙的園林、登上花臺宮殿、居於上好的床座等等;住與出的情形也如前面所說(只是所見的境相較好)。
以上這些都叫作三時不正知的人。
如果在入、住、出三位都能正知,在入等時沒有顛倒的想解——就是入胎時知道自己入胎,住胎、出胎時自己知道在住、在出(如實而知,不作別解)。
再另外顯示這四種入胎的人:前三種依次是轉輪王、獨覺、大覺(佛)。第一種入胎的是轉輪王,入胎時正知,住與出時則不正知。第二種入胎的是獨勝覺(獨覺),入與住時正知,出胎時則不。第三種入胎的是無上覺(佛),入、住、出三位都能正知。這前三種人是就將來所成之名而稱說的(尚在胎中,未成輪王與佛,先以當來之名顯之)。
問:什麼緣故有這樣三品的不同?
答:由於業與智依次殊勝的緣故。第一種是業勝——轉輪王在過去世曾經廣修大福。第二種是智勝——獨勝覺長久修習多聞、勝妙的思擇。第三種是業智俱勝——無上覺經歷曠劫修行殊勝的福與智。
除去前三種人,其餘的胎生、卵生有情福與智都劣,合起來成為第四種。
〔正18·正19〕無我而唯有蘊——是誰在投胎
論(承前起問):這裡有執著實我的外道說:如果承認有情能夠轉往別的世間(從此生到彼生),那麼我所主張的『有我』之義就成立了(因為必須有一個常住的我在往來)。現在為了遮遣這種主張,頌說:
頌:並沒有一個我,只有諸蘊而已;由煩惱與業所造作,藉著中有相續而入胎,就像燈焰(相續而轉至他方)。像這樣由業所牽引而次第增長,諸蘊相續,又由惑與業更趣向其他世間,所以生死之輪沒有開端。
論(徵問):你們所執的『我』是什麼相狀?
(執我者答:)就是那個能捨掉此生之蘊、能接續來生之蘊,在身內起作用的『士夫』(作者)。
(論主破:)這樣的我決定沒有,因為它不像色、不像眼等那樣可以被得知的緣故(色是現量可見,眼根是由作用比知,而我二者皆非)。
世尊也說:『有業、有異熟(果報),而作者不可得。』所謂『作者』就是那個能捨此蘊、能接續餘蘊的東西——除了法的假名施設之外,沒有真實的作者。
問:所謂『法假』是什麼?
答:就是『依此而有彼,此生故彼生』,乃至廣說十二緣起(因果前後相續,就在這相續上假立作者之名)。
問:既然如此,那麼什麼樣的『我』不在遮遣之列?
答:只有諸蘊而已——就是說,只在五蘊之上假立『我』這個名字,這是不加遮遣的。
問:這樣的話,就應當承認諸蘊自身能夠從此世間轉到別的世間了?
答:蘊是剎那生滅的,對於輪轉往來並無能力。但因為屢屢串習的煩惱與業所造作的緣故,使得中有之蘊相續而入胎。譬如燈焰雖然剎那剎那生滅,卻能相續而轉移到別的地方去。諸蘊也是這樣,說它『轉往』並沒有過失。所以雖然沒有我,而由於惑與業,諸蘊相續入胎的意義是成立的。
如同被業所牽引而次第轉增的諸蘊相續一樣,又由於煩惱與業力的造作而轉趣其他世間。這是說:並非一切被牽引的諸蘊,其增長相續的長短都一樣齊等,因為牽引壽命的業因有差別的緣故。隨著能引之業的勢力增強或減弱,就在那麼長的時間中次第增長。
問:怎樣次第增長呢?
答:如同聖者所說:
引頌:最初是羯剌藍(凝滑),其次生頞部曇(皰狀),從此生閉尸(軟肉/血肉),閉尸生鍵南(堅肉),其次是鉢羅奢佉(支節分明);此後髮、毛、爪等以及有色諸根與形相,漸漸地轉增。
論:就是說母親腹中的分位有五:一是羯剌藍位,二是頞部曇位,三是閉尸位,四是鍵南位,五是鉢羅奢佉位。這胎中之『箭』漸漸轉增,一直到有色諸根與形相圓滿之位。
接著由業所起的異熟風力,轉動胎中之體使它趣向產門。就像堅硬的糞團過度地閉塞艱澀一樣,從此轉而墮入劇烈的痛苦,難以承受。
那位母親有時因為威儀(動作)、飲食、勞作過度,或者由於胎兒宿世的罪業之力,胎兒就死在胎內。
這時有些婦女或者醫者,善巧精通接生之法、善於養育嬰兒,用酥油與睒末梨(一種樹)的汁液溫熱之後塗抹手上,手執小小的利刀(伸入取出死胎)。胎內就像糞坑一樣,極其污穢下劣、雜穢充塞,是黑暗所居之處,無量千數的蟲類依止在那裡;常常流出惡濁的汁液,須要不斷地對治;精血污垢油膩、潰爛臭滑;不淨之物流溢,鄙陋污穢不堪一看;上面只覆蓋著一層穿孔的薄皮。由於宿業所引,就在身上的瘡孔之中,把胎兒的肢節分解而牽出體外。
然而這個胎兒是乘著宿世所造之業而來,屬於順後受業(隔生受報之業)所趣,其中的道理難以了知(不是今生所能盡見)。
或者也有沒有這些災難、安穩出生的,身體就像新生的瘡口一樣,細嫩柔軟而難以碰觸。這時或是母親愛子,或是其他婦女,用如同刀灰般粗澀的兩手,把嬰兒抱起洗拭而安置妥當;接著含餵清澄的酥、給他喝母乳,漸漸讓他習慣受用細的、粗的飲食;如此次第轉增,到了諸根成熟之位,又生起煩惱、積集諸業。由於這樣,身壞命終之後,又有如前所說的中有相續,再趣向另一個世間。
像這樣,惑與業作為因而有生,生了以後又作為因而起惑與業,從這惑業又更有生——所以知道生死之輪迴旋往復,沒有開端。
如果有人主張生死有開端,那麼這個開端就應該沒有原因;開端既然沒有原因,其餘的一切也都該自己無因而起了。可是現見芽等是從種子等生的,而且處所與時節都是決定的(此處此時之種,生此處此時之芽)。又由火等而有成熟變化等等的生起。由此可知,決定沒有無因而起之法。
至於主張有一個常住之因(如自在天)的說法,前面已經破除了。
所以生死決定沒有最初的開端,然而卻有最後的邊際,因為因可以窮盡的緣故。生既然依於因,因滅壞的時候,所生的果必定消亡,道理決定應當如此。就像種子滅壞,芽必定不生。
〔正20〕十二支與三際——一張生死的分段表
論(承前起問):像這樣的蘊相續,是就三生(過去、現在、未來)而立為分位的。頌說:
頌:像這樣的種種緣起,共有十二支、分為三際;前際與後際各有二支,中際的八支是就圓滿者而說的。
論:十二支是:一無明、二行、三識、四名色、五六處、六觸、七受、八愛、九取、十有、十一生、十二老死。
所謂三際:一是前際、二是後際、三是中際,也就是過去、未來與現在三生。
問:這十二支怎樣在三際上建立?
答:前際與後際各立二支,中際立八支,所以合成十二。無明與行在前際,生與老死在後際,其餘八支在中際。
問:這中際的八支,是否一切有情在這一生當中都完全具有?
答:並非都具有。
問:既然如此,為什麼說有八支呢?
答:是依據『圓滿者』而說的。這裡的意思是說:一個補特伽羅(有情)經歷了一切位次,才叫作圓滿者;並不是指那些中途夭折的、以及色界無色界的有情,而只是就欲界的補特伽羅而說。因為《大緣起經》說(欲界胎生者)具有這八支的緣故。
那部經說,佛告訴阿難陀說:『識若不入胎,名色能不能增廣長大?』『不能,世尊!』乃至廣說。
又有時只說二分緣起:一是前際所攝,二是後際所攝。前面七支屬前際所攝,就是無明乃至受;後面五支屬後際所攝,就是從愛到老死——因為前後兩段各以因、果二分而攝的緣故(前七是前一重因果,後五是後一重因果)。
〔正21–24〕十二支各以什麼為體——一支一位,位位是五蘊
論(承前起問):無明等各支,以什麼法為體呢?頌說:
頌:過去生中煩惱之位叫作無明;過去生中的諸業叫作行;正結生時的那一剎那五蘊叫作識;六處生起之前的階段叫作名色;從六處生起眼等諸根(根境識三者和合之前)叫作六處;已至三和合而還不能了知三受之因的差別,這叫作觸;在淫愛之前的階段叫作受;貪求資具而淫愛現行叫作愛;為了獲得種種境界而普遍馳求叫作取;『有』就是正能造作牽引當來果報之業;結成當來之身叫作生;一直到當來領受老死的階段叫作老死。
論:在過去生中的種種煩惱之位,到今生果報成熟,總名為『無明』——因為那些煩惱是與無明同時而行的,並且由於無明的力量它們才得以現行。就像說『國王出行』,並不是沒有前導與隨從,只因為國王與眾人同行而國王最尊勝,所以總說是『王行』(一位五蘊而獨標無明,義同此喻)。
在過去生中福業、非福業等業之位,到今生果報成熟,總得『行』這個名字。頌文第一句的『位』字,一直貫通到最後的老死支(每一支都是就位而立)。
在母胎等處正結生的時候,那一剎那之位的五蘊叫作『識』。
結生之識以後、六處生起以前,中間的各位總稱為『名色』。
(有人問:)這裡應該說是『四處生前』才對(因為結生時身、意二處已有,只餘眼耳鼻舌四處未生),為什麼說『六處前』呢?答:是依據六處圓滿而立名的緣故。
眼等諸根已經生起,到根、境、識三者尚未和合的階段,就得『六處』之名。
已經達到三者和合,而還未能了知三種受(樂、苦、不苦不樂)之因的差別,這一位總名為『觸』。
已經了知三受之因的差別相,而還沒有生起淫貪,這一位叫作『受』。
貪求美妙的資具、淫愛現行,而還沒有廣泛地追求,這一位叫作『愛』。
為了獲得種種上妙的境界而周遍馳求,這一位叫作『取』。
因為馳求的緣故,積集了能夠牽引當來果報之業,這一位叫作『有』。
由於這個業力,從此捨去性命、正結當來之身,這一位叫作『生』。
當來的生支,就像今生的識支一樣,在生起的剎那之後漸漸增長,一直到當來的受位,總名為『老死』。像這樣的老死,就等於今世的名色、六處、觸、受這四支(同一段內容,在後際合稱老死)。
辨十二支各自的體別,就是這樣。
論(續):再者,緣起依差別可說有四種:一是剎那緣起,二是連縛緣起,三是分位緣起,四是遠續緣起。
問:怎樣叫作剎那緣起?
答:就是在一剎那頃,由於貪而行殺,就具足十二支:癡就是無明,思就是行,對種種境事的了別就是識,識所俱起的三蘊(受想行)總稱名色,安住在名色之上的諸根叫作六處,六處對著其餘(境與識)和合就有觸,領納觸就是受,貪就是愛,與貪相應的種種纏縛就是取,所起的身業語業就是有,這些法起來就叫作生,成熟變異叫作老,滅壞叫作死。
又有論師說:剎那緣起與連縛緣起,如同《品類足論》所說,二者都遍於一切有為法。
十二支各位所有的五蘊,都是分位緣起所攝。
就這樣懸遠地相續而無始以來不斷,就叫作遠續緣起。
〔正25前半〕世尊究竟依哪一種說——「傳許」二字的分量
論(承前起問):世尊在這裡(說十二緣起時)意在說哪一種呢?頌說:
頌:相傳如此、且許其說:是就分位而說的;並且是從最勝者來立這一支之名。
論:相傳如此、且許其說:世尊只是就分位而說諸緣起有十二支。
問:如果每一支當中都具足五蘊,為什麼只立『無明』等名字?
答:因為在各位當中無明等最為殊勝的緣故。就著最勝者立無明等名——就是說,如果某一位當中無明最勝,這一位的五蘊就總名為無明;乃至某一位當中老死最勝,這一位的五蘊就總名為老死。所以體雖然是總(皆五蘊),名字有別也沒有過失。
問:什麼緣故經中所說的這十二支,與《品類足論》所說有差異呢?
答:如那部論所說:『什麼叫作緣起?就是一切有為法』乃至廣說(範圍比十二支寬得多)。素怛纜(契經)是就個別的意趣而說,阿毘達磨則是依法相而說,所以宣說的方式不同。
像這樣,分位、剎那、遠續、連縛四種緣起,都只在有情數中(唯有情有此四種)。有情與非有情的差別就在這裡(阿毘達磨所說之緣起則通非情)。
〔正25後半〕經為什麼只說有情——為了除去三際的疑惑
論(承前起問):契經為什麼只說有情的緣起呢?頌說:
頌:是就前際、後際、中際,為了遣除他人的愚惑。
論:是為了遣除他人在三際上的愚惑。三際的差別只在有情身上才有(非情無此三世輪轉之疑)。
問:怎樣是有情對前際的愚惑?
答:就是對前際生起這樣的懷疑:『我在過去世究竟是有還是沒有?曾經是什麼樣的我?我是怎樣存在的?』
問:怎樣是有情對後際的愚惑?
答:就是對後際生起這樣的懷疑:『我在未來世究竟會有還是沒有?將會是什麼樣的我?我將怎樣存在?』
問:怎樣是有情對中際的愚惑?
答:就是對中際生起這樣的懷疑:『什麼是我?這個我是怎麼回事?我為誰所有?我將擁有誰?』
為了除去這樣三際的愚惑,所以經中只說有情的緣起,依照次序說無明、行以及生、老死,並說識乃至有(前際二支答前際之疑,後際二支答後際之疑,中際八支答中際之疑)。
問:為什麼這樣說?
答:因為契經說:『苾芻們諦聽!若有苾芻對於種種緣起與緣已生法,能夠以如實的正慧觀見,他必定不會對三際愚惑,也就是不會再起〔我在過去世究竟是有還是沒有〕這一類的疑。』
另有一些論師說:愛、取、有這三支也是為了除去他人對後際的愚惑,因為這三支都是後際之因的緣故。
〔正26〕三惑、二業、七事——十二支的另一種切法
論(承前起問):又應當知道:這裡所說的緣起法門雖然有十二支,而其性質只有三類與二類——三類是惑、業、事,二類是果與因。這是什麼意思呢?頌說:
頌:三支是煩惱,二支是業,七支是事而也叫作果;後際略說果、前際略說因,由中際便可比知前後二際。
論:無明、愛、取三支以煩惱為性;行與有二支以業為性;其餘識等七支以事為性——因為它們是煩惱與業所依託之事的緣故。
像這樣七事同時也叫作『果』;依此類推,其餘五支(三惑二業)同時也叫作『因』,因為它們以煩惱與業為自性的緣故。
問:什麼緣故中際廣說果與因(中際列了八支)?
答:因為中際把『事』開為五支(識、名色、六處、觸、受)、把『惑』開為二支(愛、取)的緣故。後際略說果,因為那裡的事只有二支(生、老死);前際略說因,因為那裡的惑只有一支(無明)。由於中際說得廣,就可以據以比度前後二際;廣的意義既然已經成立,所以不必另外再說,說了也沒有用處。
論(續問):如果緣起支只有十二,那麼不說老死之果,生死就應該有終結;不說無明之因,生死就應該有開端。或者應該再立其他的緣起支,而其餘的又還有其餘,就成了無窮的過失,所以不應該再立。
答:然而並沒有前面所說的過失,因為這裡世尊已經由義理顯示出來了。
問:怎樣算是已經顯示?頌說:
〔正27〕從惑生惑——十二支之間的五種相生
頌:從惑生惑、從惑生業;從業生事;從事生事、從事生惑。有支的道理只有這些。
論:從惑生惑,就是愛生取;從惑生業,就是取生有、無明生行;從業生事,就是行生識、以及有生生;從事生事,就是從識支生名色,乃至從觸生受支,以及從生支生老死;從事生惑,就是受生愛。由立『有』這一支,其中的道理就只有這些(五種相生已盡)。
這樣就已經顯示老死是事與惑之因(老死可生惑業,故生死無終),也顯示無明是事與惑之果(無明從老死來,故生死無始)——因為無明與老死本身就是事與惑的體性。既然如此,何必再另立其餘的緣起支呢?所以經中說:『像這樣就是純大苦蘊的集起。』如果不是這個意思,這句話還有什麼用處呢?
論(他家之釋一):另有一種解釋說:其餘的契經說『非理作意』是無明之因,無明又生起非理作意(所以無明有因,不必另立支)。而非理作意也是取支所攝,所以也算是說在這部契經中了。
(論主難之:)這個非理作意怎麼會是取支所攝呢?如果說是因為它與取相應,那麼愛與無明也應該算取支所攝(同樣相應)。就算承認它是取支所攝,又怎麼能證明非理作意是無明之因呢?如果只憑『被取支所攝』就證成因果關係,那麼愛與無明也同樣被取支所攝,就不應該另立為緣起支了。
論(他家之釋二):另有人又解釋說:其餘的契經說非理作意是無明之因,無明又生起非理作意;而非理作意是說在『觸』的時位,所以其餘經中說『眼與色為緣而生癡(無明),所生的染濁作意』——這個作意在受位必定引生無明的緣故。其餘經中又說:『由無明觸所生的諸受為緣而生愛。』所以在觸的時位,非理作意與受一同轉起,並以無明為緣。由於這樣,無明就沒有『無因』的過失,也不須另立其餘的緣起支。而且緣起支也沒有無窮的過失,因為非理作意是從癡(無明)生的緣故。就像契經說:『眼與色為緣而生癡,所生的染濁作意。』
(論主難之:)其餘經中雖然有這樣的誠實之言,然而在這部經中還是應該另外再說(既然此經要遣三際愚,就該把因果說盡)。
(他家答:)不須再說。
(論主問:)怎麼知道不須再說?
(他家答:)由道理可以知道。
(論主問:)是什麼道理?
(他家答:)離開無明,受不能作為愛的緣,因為阿羅漢的受不生愛的緣故;又,不顛倒的觸不能作為染污之受的緣,也不可能離開無明而有顛倒之觸,因為阿羅漢的觸不是顛倒的緣故。由這樣的道理作證,所以知道(不須再說)。
(論主難之:)若是這樣,就應當有太過的失誤——凡是由正理可以證知的事,一切都應該不須再說了(那經還說什麼)。所以他們所說的並不能成立為對前難的解釋。
論(正解):然而上面所說的『經中不另說老死有果、無明有因,生死便成有終有始』這個責難,並不合道理,因為經的意趣另有所在。也並不是所說的道理不圓滿。
為什麼呢?因為這部經只是為了除去所化者對三際的愚惑而已。由於所化者只生起這樣的疑問:『有情如何三世相續?就是從前世而今世得生,今世又能生於後世。』如來只是為了除他這個疑情,所以說十二支,如前面已經辨明的——就是『在前際、後際、中際,為了遣除他人的愚惑』。
論(附辨二名):如世尊告訴諸位苾芻說:『我將為你們說緣起法與緣已生法。』
問:這二者有什麼差別?
答:且依本論(《品類足論》)的文,這二者沒有差別,因為二者都說是攝一切法的緣故。
問:未來還沒有生起之法,怎麼能同過去、現在一樣說是『緣已生』呢?
(反難彼云:)未來還沒有造作之法,那又怎麼能同過去、現在一樣叫作『有為』呢(『有為』一名你們是許用在未來法上的)?
答:因為能作的思之力已經造下的緣故。
問:若是這樣,無漏法怎麼算是有為呢(無漏非思業所造)?
答:那也是由善思之力已經造下的緣故。
問:若是這樣,就得涅槃而言也應該如此了(涅槃亦應成有為)?
答:依實而論應當說是『依種類而說』——就像還沒有變壞的(未來色)也得到『色』這個名字一樣,由於種類相同,所以這樣說並沒有過失。
〔正28前半〕緣起與緣已生——同一支的兩面
論(承前起問):然而現在要正式解釋契經的意思,頌說:
頌:這裡經意所正說的是:因的一面叫緣起,果的一面叫緣已生。
論:諸支的『因分』說名為緣起,因為以它為緣能夠生起果的緣故;諸支的『果分』說名為緣已生,因為它們都是從緣所生的緣故。
像這樣一切支上兩種意義都成立,因為諸支都具有因、果二性的緣故。
問:如果這樣安立,二者就不該同時成立(一法不應既是因又是果)?
答:不是這樣,因為所觀待的角度有差別的緣故。就是說,若觀待這一邊而名為緣已生,就不是同時觀待那一邊而又名為緣起——好像因與果、父與子等名稱一樣(同一人望父為子、望子為父)。
論(他家之說):尊者望滿的意思是說:諸法之中,有的是緣起而非緣已生,應當作四句分別。第一句(是緣起非緣已生)是指未來法;第二句(是緣已生非緣起)是指阿羅漢最後心位的過去現在諸法(此後無果可起);第三句(二者都是)是指其餘的過去現在法;第四句(二者都不是)是指諸無為法。
論(經部之難):經部諸師這樣陳說:這裡所說的(分位緣起),是敘述你們自己的意思,還是經的意思?如果說是經的意思,那麼經意並非如此。
為什麼呢?前面所說的分位緣起,把十二個五蘊當作十二支,這違背契經,因為經另有說法的緣故。就像契經說:『什麼叫作無明?就是對前際的無智』乃至廣說(只說無智,不說五蘊)。這是了義之說,不可以壓抑它使成不了義。所以前面所說的分位緣起,與經意相違。
(有部答:)並不是一切經都是了義說,也有隨著最勝而說的。就像《象跡喻經》說:『什麼是內地界?就是髮、毛、爪等。』雖然那裡並非沒有其餘的色等諸法,卻只就最勝的而說。這裡也應當是這樣。
(經部難:)所引的並不能作證。因為那部經並不是要用『地界』來辨明髮毛等而成為不具足之說;那部經是以髮毛等來分別地界,並沒有離開髮毛等而另有地界,所以那部契經是具足之說。這部經所說的無明等支,也應該像那樣算是具足之說——除了所說的以外,沒有其餘的了(所以無明就只是無智,不含五蘊)。
(有部難:)難道地界越出髮毛等之外,在鼻涕眼淚等當中它的體不是也有嗎(若然,則髮毛等攝地界不盡,那部經仍舊只是就勝而說)?
(經部通難:)鼻涕等也都說在那部經中——就像經中說『另外還有身中其餘之物』一樣(『餘物』即攝洟淚等,可見彼經仍是具足之說)。就算退一步同你所說,離髮毛等而別有地界罷;那麼離開無明之外還有其餘的無明,現在就應該顯示出來(然而離無明之外並沒有另一個無明)。
(經部又責:)如果把不同類的東西放進『無明』裡面,這又有什麼好處呢?
(經部立理結成己義:)雖然在諸位當中都有五蘊,然而要隨著『這個有無、那個決定有無』的關係,才可以立此法為彼法之支。或者有五蘊而沒有行的(隨福行、非福行、不動行三者皆無,如阿羅漢)、沒有識乃至愛等的,所以經的意思就如所說(無明等即以無智等為體,不由五蘊之力而立支)。
(經部續破望滿四句:)所說的四句分別,道理上也不對。如果未來諸法不是緣已生,就違背契經了。經中說:『什麼是緣已生法?就是無明、行乃至生、老死。』或者就應該不許有二支在未來(生、老死在後際),這樣一來就破壞了前面所立的三際。
論(有說緣起是無為):有人說:緣起是無為法。因為契經說:『如來出世或者不出世,這樣的緣起法性常住。』
答:若依前一種意思來理解,道理還可以說得通;若依另一種意思來理解,道理就不通了。
問:怎樣是『這樣的意思』?怎樣是『另一種意思』?以致說可通與不可通。
答:如果所說的意思是:如來出世或者不出世,行等都恆常以無明等為緣而起,並非以其餘之法為緣,或者根本無緣可得——因為這樣才說『常住』;若是這樣的意思,道理就可以說得通。
如果所說的意思是:另有一個法體名為『緣起』,湛然常住不變;這樣的另一種說法,道理就不通了。為什麼呢?因為『生』與『起』都是有為之相的緣故(緣起之名本身即含起義)。並不是另有一個常住之法可以作為無常之相,這不合正理。而且『起』必定應當依著『能起者』而立,這個常住之法與那些無明等有什麼相關牽涉,卻要說這個法是依著它們而立、作為它們的緣起呢?再者,名為『緣起』卻說它指的是常法,這樣的句義沒有相應的道理。
論(聲明學釋名):這裡『緣起』是什麼句義(就語言結構而言)?
答:『鉢剌底』是『至(到達)』的意思,『醫底界』是『行』的意思;由於前面那個字的助力,使得字界的意義轉變,所以『行』就由『至』而轉變成『緣』。『參』是和合的意思,『嗢』是上升的意思,『鉢地界』是『有』的意思;『有』藉著和合與上升而轉變成『起』。由於這樣,有法到達於緣之後,和合而升起,這就是『緣起』的意思。
論(設難):這樣的句義,道理上不應如此。為什麼呢?因為這樣就變成依著一個作者而有兩重作用(先到達,後生起),那麼前一個作用就應該有一個『已』字,就像有一個人『洗浴已』才吃飯(二事有先後)。可是並沒有一絲一毫的行法能夠在生起之前就先存在,先到達於緣、後來才生起;沒有作者的時候,是不可能有作用的。所以有一首頌說:
引頌:說『到達於緣』如果在『起』之先,那麼(那時行法還)不存在,這不合道理;如果二者是同時的,那麼『已』字就落空了——因為『已』字表示前者應當先說。
論(答此難):並沒有這樣的過失。姑且反過來詰問聲論諸師:法是在什麼時候生起的?是在現在,還是在未來?
(聲論反問:)這樣問又有什麼過失?
答:生起如果在現在——生起就不是『已生』(正在起怎麼算已生),那怎麼能成為現在呢?現在就是『已生』,那又怎麼還在『起』呢?已生了還要再起,就成了無窮。生起如果在未來——那時法還沒有,怎麼能成為作者?作者既然沒有,哪來的作用?
所以就在『起』的那一位,同時也就是『至緣』。
問:『起位』是什麼?
答:就是未來世的諸行正在生起之時;就在這一位上,也說它『到達於緣』(不是先後二時)。
再者,聲論師所妄自安立的『作者』與『作用』,依實理來說是不成立的:『有』是作者,『起』是作用,然而在這當中並沒有見到有一個實在的作者,異於『起』這個作用而真實可得。所以這個說法只在世俗的說法上沒有謬誤而已(勝義中無作者)。
論(引經證):這個『緣起』的意思,就是所說的『依此而有彼,此生故彼生』,所以應當引那句經來解釋緣起的意義。所以有一首頌說:
引頌:如同(你說行法)不存在而能生起,那麼『到達於緣』也應當同樣(不存在而能到達);若說生起之後才叫起,就成無窮;或者說先有、或者說先無,二者也都有『已』字的問題。就像說『暗至而燈已滅』、『開口已而眠』一樣(二事同時而仍用『已』字);如果說眠在後面,那麼口就應該閉上了(可見二事實同時)。
論(他家更釋):有人執著另外的意義來解釋這個責難:『鉢剌底』是『種種』的意思,『醫底界』是『不住』的意思;『不住』由於『種種』的助力,就變成『緣』。『參』是聚集的意思,『嗢』是上升的意思,『鉢地界』是『行』的意思;由於『嗢』在先,『行』就變成『起』。這是說種種的緣和合之後,使得諸行法聚集升起,這就是『緣起』的意思。
(論主難之:)像這樣的解釋,在這裡(十二支)或許還說得通;可是『眼與色各自為緣,生起眼識』等等場合,這當中所謂的『種種聚集』又怎麼成立呢(眼色二緣而已,何來種種)?
論(釋經之二句):問:什麼緣故世尊要說前面那兩句——就是『依此而有彼』以及『此生故彼生』?
答:一、為了讓人對緣起知道決定不移。就像別的地方所說:依著無明而有諸行,並不是離開無明可以有諸行。二、又為了顯示諸支輾轉相生——就是依著這一支有,那一支才得有;由那一支生,其餘的支才得生。三、又為了顯示三際輾轉相生——就是依著前際有,中際才得有;由中際生,後際才得生。四、又為了顯示親、傳二種緣——就是有無明無間即生起行(親緣),或者由輾轉之力諸行才生(傳緣)。
論(他家之釋):另有論師解釋說:這兩句是為了破斥『無因』與『常因』二種主張——就是說並非無因而諸行可有,也不是由常住的自性、我等作為無生之因而諸行得生。
(論主難之:)若是這樣,前一句就成了沒有用處,因為單憑後一句『此生故彼生』就能同時破斥『無因』與『常因』了。
(論主自解:)然而或許有人執著『有一個我作為所依,行等才得有;由無明等因分而生,行等才得生』。所以世尊為了除去這種執著,決斷判定:果之有,就是由於生因(並無別的所依)。若是『此生故彼生』,就是『依此有彼有』,並不是說果的有另外依託其他的因。就是說無明緣行,乃至像這樣就是純大苦蘊的集起。
論(軌範師之釋):軌範諸師解釋這兩句,是為了顯示因果的『不斷』與『生』——就是說依著無明不斷,諸行才不斷;就由無明生,諸行才得生。像這樣輾轉都應當廣說。
論(又一釋):有人解釋說:是為了顯示因果的『住』與『生』——就是說乃至因相續存在,果相續也存在;以及就由因分生,諸果分才生。
(論主難之:)這裡既然要辨明『生』,什麼緣故卻說『住』呢?又,佛為什麼要打破次第來說——先說『住』完了,然後才說『生』(依常理應先生後住)?
論(復有釋言):又有人解釋說:『依此有彼有』是說依著果有,因才有滅(果既生起,因才謝滅);『此生故彼生』是恐怕有人懷疑果是無因而生的,所以又說由於因生的緣故果才得起,並不是無因。
(論主難之:)經義如果是這樣,就應當這樣說:『依此有彼滅無。』又應當先說『因生故果生』,然後才可以說『依果有因滅無』,這樣的次第才叫作善說。如果不是這樣,既然要辨明緣起,依什麼次第會先說『因滅』呢?所以他們所解釋的並不是這部經的意思。
論(經部出十二支體):再者,怎樣是無明緣行,乃至廣說到生緣老死呢?我現在簡略地顯示,以符順經的意思。
就是說:種種愚夫對於緣生之法,不知道其中只有『行』(有為法的流轉)而已,妄自生起我見與我慢的執著。為了自己領受樂受、或者領受不苦不樂受的緣故,造作身、語、意各三種業——就是為了自身領受當來的樂,而造作種種福業;為了領受當來的不苦不樂受,而造作不動業(色無色界之定業);為了領受現前的樂,而造作非福業。像這樣就叫作『無明緣行』。
由於牽引之業的力量,識的相續之流就像火焰的行進一樣,往到那一趣、那一趣,憑附著中有,奔赴所生之處而結生成身,這就叫作『行緣識』。若照這樣解釋,就很順合契經中把識支通於六識來分別的說法,因為識是在先的緣故。
在這一趣當中有名色生起,具足五蘊、輾轉相續、遍於一期生命——在《大因緣經》《辯緣起經》等各部經中都有這樣的說法。
像這樣名色漸漸成熟的時候,具足眼等諸根,就說為『六處』。
接著六處與境相合,便有識生起;三者和合,所以有順於樂等的觸。
依著這個觸,便生起樂等三種受。
從這三種受引生三種愛——就是由於苦所逼迫的人,對樂受發起欲愛;或者有人對樂受、不苦不樂受發起色愛;或者有人只對不苦不樂受生起無色愛。
從欣求受的愛,生起欲取等四種取。這當中『欲』是指五妙欲(色聲香味觸);『見』是指六十二見,如《梵網經》廣說;『戒』是指遠離惡戒;『禁』是指狗禁、牛禁等(學狗學牛之邪行)。譬如各種離繫外道(裸形之類)以及婆羅門、播輸鉢多、般利伐羅勺迦等不同類的外道,受持種種裸露身形、拔除頭髮、披著黑鹿皮、結髮塗灰、手執三杖、剪除鬚髮等等沒有意義的苦行。『我語』是指內身,因為依著內身而說『我』的緣故。
另有一些論師說:我見與我慢叫作『我語』。
問:什麼緣故這兩種獨獨叫作『我語』?
答:由於這兩種才說有『我』;而我實際上並不存在,所以叫作『我語』(只是言說而已)。就像契經說:『苾芻們應當知道!愚昧而沒有聽聞的種種異生之類,隨著假立的言說而生起我執,其中實在沒有我與我所。』
在前面四種取當中,『取』就是指欲貪。所以薄伽梵在諸經中解釋說:『什麼叫作取?就是所謂的欲貪。』
由於取為緣,積集種種招感後有的業,這就說名為『有』。如世尊告訴阿難陀說:『招感後有的業就說名為有。』
由於有為緣,識的相續之流趣向未來之生;如前面的道理,具足五蘊就說名為『生』。
以生為緣,便有老死;其中相狀的差別如經中廣說。
『純』這個字,是顯示只有行(有為法)而沒有我與我所;『大苦蘊』這幾個字,是顯示苦的積集沒有開始也沒有終結;『集』這個字,是為了顯示諸苦蘊的生起。
至於毘婆沙宗之說,如前面已經說過了。
〔Root 13〕The Appearance of Intermediate Existence — the Very Likeness of the Body It Is About to Be Born Into
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Above it has been established that intermediate existence (that transitional body after death and before birth) really exists. Next it is asked: to which destiny will this intermediate existence go? And what is the appearance in which it manifests? The stanza says:
Stanza: Because intermediate existence and that coming body are drawn forth by one and the same action, the appearance of intermediate existence is like the shape of that coming ‘basic existence.’ What is called ‘basic existence’ means the stretch before death and after the moment of taking birth.
Treatise: If there is an action that can draw forth the destiny to which a sentient being is to go, this same action at the same time calls forth that intermediate existence ‘able to go to that destiny.’ Hence if this intermediate existence is to go to a certain destiny, its appearance is like the shape of the coming basic existence of that destiny.
Someone raises an objection: in that case, within the belly of a single dog there might arise at one time the intermediate existences of five destinies (gods, human beings, ghosts, animals, and the hells) — if within the belly five offspring were to die at the same time and each be born into a different destiny, the intermediate existences of the five destinies would arise there all at once. And since among them the hell intermediate existence would be present, why does it not burn up the mother’s belly?
Answer: hell beings dwell in the very basic existence of the hells, and even so they are not constantly burning (how much less what is merely an intermediate existence). It is like going out for a while to roam in a garden (where there are sometimes intervals free of suffering) — how much more at the stage of intermediate existence alone.
To yield a further step: even granting that it can burn, intermediate existence is such that it cannot be seen and cannot be touched — because the body of intermediate existence is exceedingly subtle — and so the objection just raised does not stand to reason.
The intermediate existences of the several destinies, though they dwell together in one belly, do not touch one another nor burn and harm one another, and this is because they are shut off by the force of action.
The intermediate existence of the desire realm is in bodily measure like a child of five or six years, and yet its faculties are keen and bright. The intermediate existence of a bodhisattva is like a man in his prime, full and round in bodily measure and possessed of all the marks and signs, and so when a bodhisattva dwelling in intermediate existence is about to enter the womb, he can illumine as far as a hundred koṭis (a hundred hundred-millions) of sets of four great continents.
Someone asks: if that is so, why did the bodhisattva’s mother dream that a white elephant calf came and entered her right side?
Answer: that was an auspicious sign of good fortune and has nothing to do with intermediate existence. The bodhisattva had long since abandoned the destiny of animals (and could no longer manifest the body of an elephant). This is just like the ten things dreamed by King Kṛkin:
Quoted stanza: He dreamed of a great elephant, a well, parched flour, a sandalwood tree, a fine and beautiful grove, a small elephant, and two matters of monkeys (one a monkey with its body smeared with filth, one a monkey consecrated and set up as king), and a garment both broad and sturdy, and strife.
Treatise: What is dreamed in this way merely betokens that there are other events to come as their prior omen; it is not really as it was seen (an elephant in a dream is not the same as a real elephant coming).
Further, all intermediate existences enter by the birth-gate, and it is not by breaking open the mother’s belly that entry into the womb is had — and this is why with twins the one born first is the smaller and the one born after the larger (the one that entered first is the further in, and the one that entered after comes out first).
Someone asks: then how is the stanza spoken by Dharmasubhūti (the Venerable Subhūti of the Dharma) to be harmonized?
Quoted stanza: The white elephant was upright and fair in its marks, complete with six tusks and four feet; with full awareness it entered the mother’s womb, and lay at rest as a seer secluded in a grove.
Treatise: Answer: this stanza need not be harmonized at all costs, because it is not among the works gathered in the Three Baskets (the sūtras, the discipline, and the treatises). Moreover, the words of stanzas chanted and recited will sometimes overstate the fact.
If it must be harmonized, then take it that the stanza was composed with reference to the dream-image seen by the bodhisattva’s mother, and there is no fault in that either.
The intermediate existence of the form realm is full and round in bodily measure as the basic existence is. Moreover it arises together with clothing, because in sentient beings of the form realm conscience and shame are abundant. The bodhisattva’s intermediate existence too arises together with clothing. The nun Śuklā (a bhikṣuṇī), by the force of her original vow, had in life after life a garment that came of itself, never leaving her body and changing its style as occasion required, down to the time when she at last entered nirvāṇa, when this very garment was used to wrap the remains for cremation. All the other intermediate existences of the desire realm have no clothing, because they have all increased in the lack of conscience and shame.
Someone asks: that ‘basic existence’ which intermediate existence resembles — what is its entity?
Answer: it means that stretch of the five aggregates before death-existence and after birth-existence; stated in sum, the entity is the five aggregates of appropriation (form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, with outflows). Within this, by stages, it is divided into four segments: first, intermediate existence, whose sense is as stated above; second, birth-existence, that is, the very moment of rebirth-linking in any of the destinies; third, basic existence, that is, all the stages except that moment of rebirth-linking and before death; fourth, death-existence, that is, the last thought-moment.
Stated in order, intermediate existence stands before birth-existence, and so sentient beings possessed of form have all four of these existences complete; but in the formless realm, intermediate existence is wanting and only three are had (the formless realm has no material body and needs no going and coming by intermediate existence).
The above has stated the shape and measure of intermediate existence; the remaining points of doctrine are to be analyzed next. The stanza says:
〔Root 14 · Root 15〕The Several Gates of Intermediate Existence — Who Can See It, How Fast It Goes, What It Eats, How Long It Abides
Stanza: Intermediate existence can be seen by its own kind and by the pure divine eye obtained through cultivation; it has the swiftest supernormal power of action; its faculties are complete; there is nothing that can resist it; once directed it cannot be turned; it takes fragrance for its food; it does not abide long. With an inverted mind it hastens toward the object it craves; those of moisture-birth are defiled by fragrance and those of transformation-birth by the place, and so take birth. The intermediate existence of gods has the head upward; humans, ghosts, and animals, these three, go horizontally; the intermediate existence of the hells has the head downward.
Treatise: This body of intermediate existence is seen by intermediate existences of its own kind. If a person has obtained through cultivation an exceedingly pure divine eye, he too can see it; but no eye acquired by birth (including a divine eye had by birth) can see it, because intermediate existence is too subtle.
Other masters say: the eye of the intermediate existence of gods is complete in its power, and the intermediate existences of the five destinies — human beings, ghosts, animals, hell beings — can respectively see four, three, two, and one kind, that is, each can see its own kind and below, excluding those above (the intermediate existence of gods can see all five destinies, that of human beings the four destinies from human beings down, and so on by extension).
Among all supernormal powers, the supernormal power of action is the swiftest. ‘To soar over space and come and go at will’ is what is called a supernormal power; a supernormal power obtained through action is called the supernormal power of action; and because the operation of this power is exceedingly fast it is called ‘swift.’ Intermediate existence has the swiftest supernormal power of action, and up to the World-Honored One there is none who can hold it back or block it, because the force of action is the strongest of all.
All intermediate existences are complete in the five faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body). What is called ‘resistance’ is obstruction; and since not even adamant and the like can block intermediate existence, it is called ‘nonresistant.’ It was once heard that someone split open a lump of iron heated red, and saw that within it worms had been born (from which it may be seen that even into iron it can enter and take birth).
Once the intermediate existence that has been fixed for going to a certain destiny has arisen, no power of any kind whatever can make it change — that is, it is impossible for a human intermediate existence to disappear and an intermediate existence of some other destiny to arise instead; and so it is with all the other kinds. Since the intermediate existence for going to a certain destiny has already arisen, it should go only to that destiny and definitely does not go elsewhere.
Someone asks: does the body of intermediate existence in the desire realm draw its support from morsel food (food taken mouthful by mouthful)?
Answer: it does draw support from morsel food, but that food is exceedingly subtle and not coarse.
Question: what is the subtle food?
Answer: fragrance alone. It is for this reason that intermediate existence gets the name ‘gandharva’ (one who feeds on fragrance). The senses of the several verbal roots are not of one kind only, and to read “gandharva” with the short vowel is like the instances “sekantu” and “kekantu” (one and the same root with a difference of long and short vowel) — it is for the sake of abbreviation, and so there is no fault.
An intermediate existence of scant merit can obtain only foul and evil fragrance, while one of much merit takes good fragrance for its food.
Question: for how long does such an intermediate existence abide?
The Venerable says: for this there is no fixed limit. So long as the conditions for taking birth have not yet met, the intermediate existence continues to exist; for the life faculty of intermediate existence is not drawn forth by some other action, and it belongs to one and the same ‘commonality of sentient beings’ (the shared limit of one class of life) with the destiny into which it is to be born, human or other. Were it not so, then when the life faculty of intermediate existence finally ceased, a death-existence would have to be established separately for it (from which it may be seen that intermediate existence and the coming life belong to one and the same term, and that they cannot be reckoned as separate lives and deaths).
Someone sets an objection: suppose there were a mass of flesh heaped as great as Mount Sumeru, and when the rains of summer came it turned into a great mass of worms. Should it then be said that these intermediate existences waited for this season gradually (queuing one after another)? Or should it be said that they came here all at once from somewhere?
Answer: although there is no plain text of sūtra or treatise that adjudicates it, yet according to correct principle it should be said thus: there are all manner of mixed classes of beings, boundless in number, who are greedy for the taste of fragrance and short in lifespan. Those sentient beings, because they smell this odor and are greedy for the taste of fragrance, die at the same time; and by the force of craving the action formerly called forth for a worm’s body is roused (as one is roused from sleep and begins to operate), and so they receive at the same time the bodies of tiny worms here. Or else it may be said that there were from the first many sentient beings who ought to take birth here, and who abide within intermediate existence only because many assisting conditions were not yet complete, and now, meeting with the conditions complete, are born here all at once.
What ought to be born at one time definitely will not be born at different times, earlier and later. It is like the action that can call forth the result of a wheel-turning monarch: it must wait until human lifespan is eighty thousand years, or until a still later time, before it gives its result all at once, and it does not give the result at any other stage of time. The principle here is the same. Hence the World-Honored One said: the differences among the results of the actions of the several classes of sentient beings are inconceivable.
The Venerable Vasumitra says: intermediate existence abides at the most seven days; and if the conditions for taking birth have not yet met, it dies again and again and is born again and again (one round every seven days).
Other masters say: it abides at the most seven times seven, forty-nine days.
The Vaibhāṣika masters say: intermediate existence abides only a short time, because within intermediate existence there is delight in seeking a birth-existence, and so it does not abide long but goes quickly to link rebirth.
As for those intermediate existences whose conditions for taking birth have for the time not met: if it is fixed that they should be born in this place and as this class, the force of action will make these conditions meet; and if it is not fixed that they are to be lodged in this place and the conditions do not meet, then they turn and are lodged in another place and another class.
There are also masters who say: intermediate existence turns and takes birth in a class resembling its own. For instance, the domestic ox, the dog, the bear, and the horse have their seasons of increased desire belonging in order to summer, autumn, winter, and spring; while the wild ox, the jackal, the brown bear, and the ass have no fixed season. The intermediate existences of the former four, if they do not meet with their season, are born in order into the same class as the latter four (the domestic ox turning into the class of the wild ox, and so on).
(The author refutes this account:) Is it not that intermediate existence definitely does not differ in commonality of sentient beings from the place into which it is born (since intermediate existence and birth-existence are drawn forth by one and the same action)? How then can it be said to turn and take birth in a resembling class?
Treatise (continued): Such an intermediate existence as this, in order to reach the place where it is to be born, first arouses an inverted mind and hastens toward the object it craves. By the eye faculty aroused through the force of action, although its body is at a distance, it can see the parents joining at the place where it is to take birth, and thereupon an inverted mind arises: if it is of male body, it arouses a male desire with the mother for its object; if of female body, it arouses a female desire with the father for its object; and reversing the object toward the other party, it arouses a mind of hatred toward them both.
Hence the Treatise of Designations has this statement: at that time the gandharva (intermediate existence) has one or other of the two minds, love and hatred, in operation — that is, either love or hatred.
Because it arouses these two inverted minds, it supposes that its own body has joined with the one it loves. And when the impurity (semen and blood) of the one it hates flows into the womb, the intermediate existence supposes this to be its own possession and gives rise to a mind of joy and comfort; from this the aggregates gather and thicken, intermediate existence disappears, and birth-existence arises — and this is what is called ‘having linked rebirth.’
If it is a male embryo, it squats against the mother’s right side facing her back; if a female embryo, it dwells against the mother’s left side facing her belly. If it is neither male nor female (of the classes without shape), then in dwelling in the mother’s womb it dwells as is fitting, according to the craving it arouses.
There is definitely no intermediate existence that is neither female nor male, because the body of intermediate existence must be complete in its faculties. Since at the stage of intermediate existence it is either female or male, on entering the mother’s womb it can dwell as is fitting; and later, when the embryo grows, it may also become a non-male (of the ṣaṇḍha class and the like).
Within this point of doctrine one further matter should be considered: is it by the force of action that the semen and blood, these great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind), directly become the body on which the faculties depend? Or does action separately produce another set of great elements to serve as the support of the faculties, this set merely resting in dependence upon the semen and blood?
Some masters say: the semen and blood directly become the support of the faculties. That is, the intermediate existence which had no faculties before ceases together, and afterwards the body possessed of faculties arises in immediate continuity — as with the principle of the seed ceasing and the sprout arising. It is for this reason that the first stage is called ‘kalala’ (the first congealing of the embryonic substance). Stated thus, it also accords well with this passage of scripture: ‘The impurity of the parents produces the kalala.’ And as scripture tells the monks: ‘You have through the long night appropriated drops of blood, which have grown into the kaṭasi (the accumulation within the womb).’
Other masters say: another set of great elements is separately produced. Just as worms are separately produced in dependence upon leaves and dung, so within the accumulation of impurity the kalala is produced. Hence to say ‘the impurity of the parents produces the kalala’ is, stated thus, also not in conflict with that passage of scripture.
The above has been stated with reference to the two births from a womb and from an egg; the remaining two births (from moisture and by transformation) are to be stated next, as is fitting for each.
If a sentient being is of moisture-birth, it takes birth through being defiled by fragrance — that is, from afar it smells and knows the fragrance of the place where it is to be born, and thereupon arouses craving and defilement and goes there to take birth; and according to the difference of its action, the fragrance it is defiled by is also pure or foul.
If a sentient being is of transformation-birth, it takes birth through being defiled by the place — that is, from afar it observes the place where it is about to be born, and thereupon arouses craving and defilement and goes there to take birth; and according to the difference of its action, the place it is defiled by is also pure or foul.
Someone raises an objection: is craving and defilement really aroused even toward the hells?
Answer: because the mind is inverted, the arising of defilement is no fault. That is, that intermediate existence either sees its own body oppressed by cold rain and freezing wind while it sees the flames of a hot hell blazing, and delights in mind at that warmth of touch and casts itself in; or else it sees its own body harmed and oppressed by hot wind and raging fire while it sees a cold hell, and wishing for coolness casts itself in.
The masters of former times, however, say thus: it is because it sees that band of its own companions of the time when it formerly did the action that calls forth that hell, and so runs and hastens to join them.
Further, as to the manner of movement: the intermediate existence of gods rises with the head straight upward, as one rises from a seat; the intermediate existence of human beings, ghosts, and animals goes in its manner of movement as human beings and the rest ordinarily walk; and the intermediate existence of the hells goes head down and feet up, falling headlong into them. Hence a gāthā (stanza) says:
Quoted stanza: Falling headlong into the hells, with the feet upward and the head turned down; through slandering the several seers — those who delight in quiet and cultivate austerities.
〔Root 16 · Root 17〕The Four Modes of Entry into the Womb — Who Can Still Be Awake While Entering the Womb
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): It was said above that intermediate existence enters the mother’s womb with an inverted mind; is it then definitely so for all intermediate existences?
Answer: it is not. Scripture says that entry into the womb is of four kinds. What are the four? The stanza says:
Stanza: The first kind has full awareness only at the time of ‘entering’; the second and third extend also to ‘dwelling’ and to ‘coming out’; the fourth has no full awareness at any stage, and those of egg-birth are always without awareness. The first three who enter the womb are the wheel-turning monarch and the two Buddhas (the pratyekabuddha and the Buddha), because their action and their cognition are excellent in that order; the fourth is all the remaining beings.
Treatise: Some sentient beings gather much meritorious action and diligently cultivate correct mindfulness and cognition, and so at the times of death and of birth they are upheld by the power of mindfulness, having full awareness and free of confusion. Among these, some have full awareness at the time of entering the womb; some have full awareness at the time of dwelling in the womb and this extends also to the time of entering; some have full awareness at the time of coming out of the womb and know as well the entering and the dwelling. The stanza says ‘also’ in order to show that what comes after necessarily carries what comes before (one who has full awareness of coming out of the womb must have full awareness of entering and of dwelling too).
Some sentient beings have little of both merit and cognition, and at all three stages of entering, dwelling, and coming out are without full awareness. Since entering the womb is without full awareness, dwelling and coming out are necessarily so too. The reason the stanza states these four in reverse (the first stated first and the fourth last) is to follow the rule for composing stanzas (the convenience of metre and phrasing).
As for the several sentient beings of egg-birth, they are constantly without awareness at every stage, entering the womb and the rest.
Someone asks: how are those of egg-birth reckoned as entering the womb? For they come out of an eggshell.
Answer: it is said that they ‘enter the womb-store’ because those of egg-birth must first enter the mother’s womb (forming into an egg within the mother’s body). Or else it is stated with reference to what is to come — because they are to be born as eggs in the future, they are called of egg-birth (though at the time of entering the womb the egg is not yet formed). It is just as scripture says ‘to make the conditioned’ (naming it so beforehand, before the making is done), and as the world says ‘boiling rice’ and ‘grinding parched flour’ (what is being boiled is rice and what is being ground is wheat, and yet they are named beforehand by the rice-dish and the flour that are to be). Hence to say that those of egg-birth also enter the womb is no fault.
Question: what is it to have and to lack full awareness at the three stages of entering, dwelling, and coming out?
Answer: suppose a sentient being whose merit is very scant: on entering the mother’s womb he arouses inverted notions and construals, seeing great wind and great rain, fierce heat and bitter cold, or the might and clamor of great armies pressing in confusion upon him; and thereupon he sees himself entering dense grass and thick woods, a cave of leaves, a hut of thatch, or taking refuge beneath a tree or beside a wall. At the time of dwelling in the womb, he sees himself already dwelling within it; at the time of coming out of the womb, he sees his body going out from it.
If merit is somewhat greater, the inverted notions and construals aroused on entering the mother’s womb are these: he sees his body entering fine gardens and groves, mounting flowered terraces and palaces, dwelling on excellent couches and the like; and the dwelling and the coming out are as stated above (only what he sees is of a better sort).
All these are called persons without full awareness at the three times.
If a being can have full awareness at all three stages of entering, dwelling, and coming out, then at the times of entering and the rest he has no inverted notions and construals — that is, on entering the womb he knows he is entering the womb, and while dwelling in and coming out of the womb he knows of himself that he is dwelling and coming out (knowing as it really is, and forming no other construal).
To show further these four kinds who enter the womb: the first three are in order the wheel-turning monarch, the pratyekabuddha, and the great awakened one (the Buddha). The first kind who enters the womb is the wheel-turning monarch, who has full awareness on entering the womb but not while dwelling and coming out. The second kind who enters the womb is the solitary victorious awakened one (the pratyekabuddha), who has full awareness while entering and dwelling but not on coming out of the womb. The third kind who enters the womb is the unsurpassed awakened one (the Buddha), who has full awareness at all three stages of entering, dwelling, and coming out. These first three persons are spoken of by the name of what they are to become in the future (being still within the womb, they are not yet a wheel-turning monarch or a Buddha, and are shown beforehand by the name of what is to come).
Question: on what ground is there such a difference of three grades?
Answer: because action and cognition are excellent in that order. The first is excellent in action — the wheel-turning monarch in past lives cultivated great merit widely. The second is excellent in cognition — the solitary victorious awakened one long practiced much learning and excellent discrimination. The third is excellent in both action and cognition — the unsurpassed awakened one through vast aeons cultivated excellent merit and cognition.
Apart from these first three persons, the remaining sentient beings of womb-birth and egg-birth are inferior in both merit and cognition, and together make the fourth kind.
〔Root 18 · Root 19〕No Self and Only Aggregates — Who Is It That Takes a Womb
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Here a non-Buddhist who holds to a real self says: if it is granted that a sentient being can pass over to another world (from this life to that life), then the sense of ‘there is a self’ that I maintain is established (since there must be a constantly abiding self that comes and goes). Now, in order to dispel this position, the stanza says:
Stanza: There is no self; there are only the aggregates. Made by the afflictions and by action, they enter the womb by the continuity of intermediate existence, as a lamp-flame does (continuing and shifting to another place). Growing in order thus, drawn forth by action, the aggregates continue and, by afflictions and action, go on to other worlds — and so the wheel of birth and death has no beginning.
Treatise (counter-questioning): What is the mark of that ‘self’ you hold to?
(The holder of self answers:) It is that ‘person’ (agent) which can cast off the aggregates of this life and can continue the aggregates of the coming life, functioning within the body.
(The author refutes:) Such a self definitely does not exist, because it cannot be got at as form and as the eye and the rest can (form is visible by direct perception, and the eye faculty is known by inference from its function, whereas the self is neither).
The World-Honored One too said: ‘There is action and there is maturation, but an agent cannot be got at.’ What is called an ‘agent’ is that which can cast off these aggregates and continue other aggregates — and apart from the provisional designation of dharmas there is no real agent.
Question: what is meant by ‘the provisional designation of dharmas’?
Answer: it is ‘this being, that is; this arising, that arises,’ and so at length the twelve links of dependent origination (upon the continuity of cause and result, earlier and later, the name of an agent is provisionally established).
Question: if that is so, what sort of ‘self’ is not within the range of what is dispelled?
Answer: the aggregates alone — that is, it is only upon the five aggregates that the name ‘self’ is provisionally established, and this is not dispelled.
Question: in that case, it should be granted that the aggregates themselves can pass from this world to another world?
Answer: the aggregates arise and cease moment by moment and have no power over the turning round and coming and going. But because of what is made by afflictions and action habituated again and again, the aggregates of intermediate existence continue and enter the womb. It is as a lamp-flame, though it arises and ceases moment by moment, can yet continue and shift to another place. So it is with the aggregates too, and to say that they ‘pass over’ is no fault. Hence, although there is no self, the sense of the aggregates continuing and entering the womb by reason of afflictions and action is established.
Just as the aggregates continue and grow in order by turns, drawn forth by action, so again, by what is made by the force of afflictions and action, they turn and go on to other worlds. That is to say: not all the aggregates that are drawn forth are equal in the length or brevity of their growth and continuity, because the causes of the actions that draw forth the lifespan differ. According as the force of the drawing action is strengthened or weakened, they grow in order for just so long a time.
Question: how do they grow in order?
Answer: as the noble one has said:
Quoted stanza: First there is the kalala (congealed and slippery); next is produced the arbuda (in the form of a blister); from this is produced the peśī (soft flesh, or flesh and blood); the peśī produces the ghana (firm flesh); next is the praśākhā (with limbs and joints distinct); thereafter hair, down, nails, and the rest, together with the material faculties and the shape, gradually grow by turns.
Treatise: That is, within the mother’s belly the stages are five: first the stage of the kalala, second the stage of the arbuda, third the stage of the peśī, fourth the stage of the ghana, fifth the stage of the praśākhā. This ‘arrow’ within the womb gradually grows by turns, up to the stage where the material faculties and the shape are complete.
Next, by the force of the wind of maturation aroused by action, the body within the womb is turned so as to move toward the birth-gate. It is like a hard lump of dung stopped and straitened beyond measure; and from this it falls by turns into fierce suffering, hard to bear.
Sometimes, because that mother is excessive in deportment (movement), in food, or in labor, or else by the force of the child’s own sinful action of former lives, the child dies within the womb.
At such a time there are women, or physicians, skilled and thoroughly versed in the art of delivery and good at rearing infants, who warm butter and the juice of the śāmalī (a kind of tree) and smear them on their hands, taking in hand a small sharp knife (to reach in and draw out the dead embryo). Within the womb it is like a cesspit, utterly foul and base, packed with mixed filth; it is a dwelling of darkness where numberless thousands of worms take their support; foul and turbid fluids run there constantly and must be dealt with without cease; semen, blood, grime, and grease are festering and slippery; impurities overflow, mean and filthy past looking at; and above it is covered only by a thin and perforated skin. Drawn on by former action, it is within the sores and openings of the body that the limbs and joints of the embryo are severed and drawn out.
Yet this embryo has come riding upon the action done in former lives and belongs to the course of action to be experienced in a later life (action whose result is received in a later birth), and the principle within it is hard to know (it is not something that can be wholly seen in this life).
Or else there are those who suffer none of these disasters and are born in safety, whose bodies are like a fresh sore, fine and soft and hard to touch. At this time it is either the mother who loves the child or some other woman who, with two hands rough as a knife or as ashes, takes the infant up, washes and wipes it, and settles it comfortably; then puts clear butter in its mouth and gives it the mother’s milk, and gradually accustoms it to take fine and coarse food; and so, growing in order by turns, it reaches the stage where the faculties are mature and again arouses the afflictions and accumulates the several actions. Because of this, when the body is destroyed and life ends, there is again the continuity of intermediate existence as stated above, going on to yet another world.
Thus afflictions and action being the cause there is birth; and birth having taken place, it is again the cause from which afflictions and action arise; and from these afflictions and action there is again birth — and so it is known that the wheel of birth and death revolves round and round without a beginning.
If someone should maintain that birth and death have a beginning, then that beginning would have to be without a cause; and the beginning being without a cause, everything else too should arise of itself without a cause. Yet we plainly see that sprouts and the rest arise from seeds and the rest, and that place and season are determined (a seed of this place and this season produces a sprout of this place and this season). And again, through fire and the rest, there arise ripening and alteration and so forth. From this it is known that there is definitely no dharma that arises without a cause.
As for the position that maintains a constantly abiding cause (such as Īśvara), it has already been refuted above.
Therefore birth and death definitely have no first beginning, and yet they have a last edge, because the cause can be exhausted. Since birth depends upon a cause, when the cause is destroyed the result produced must perish; the principle definitely must be so. It is as when a seed is destroyed the sprout certainly does not grow.
〔Root 20〕The Twelve Links and the Three Periods — a Table of the Segments of Birth and Death
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Such a continuity of the aggregates as this is established as stages with reference to three lives (past, present, and future). The stanza says:
Stanza: Such several dependent originations are twelve links in all, divided into three periods; the earlier and the later period have two links each, and the eight links of the middle period are stated on the basis of one who is complete.
Treatise: The twelve links are: first, ignorance; second, the formations; third, consciousness; fourth, name-and-form; fifth, the six sense fields; sixth, contact; seventh, feeling; eighth, craving; ninth, grasping; tenth, existence; eleventh, birth; twelfth, aging-and-death.
As for the three periods: first the earlier period, second the later period, third the middle period — that is, the three lives past, future, and present.
Question: how are these twelve links established upon the three periods?
Answer: the earlier and the later period have two links established for each and the middle period eight, and so together they make twelve. Ignorance and the formations are in the earlier period, birth and aging-and-death in the later period, and the remaining eight in the middle period.
Question: are these eight links of the middle period present in full in all sentient beings within this one life?
Answer: they are not all present.
Question: if that is so, why is it said that there are eight links?
Answer: it is stated on the basis of ‘one who is complete.’ The sense here is this: a person (a sentient being) who has passed through all the stages is called one who is complete; it does not mean those who die untimely along the way, nor sentient beings of the form and formless realms, but is stated only with reference to persons of the desire realm. For the Great Sūtra of Dependent Origination says that they (those of womb-birth in the desire realm) have these eight links.
That sūtra says that the Buddha told Ānanda: ‘If consciousness did not enter the womb, would name-and-form be able to grow and increase?’ ‘It would not, World-Honored One!’ and so at length.
Again, sometimes only a twofold dependent origination is stated: first what is gathered into the earlier period, second what is gathered into the later period. The first seven links belong to what is gathered into the earlier period, that is, ignorance through feeling; the latter five links belong to what is gathered into the later period, that is, from craving to aging-and-death — because the two segments, earlier and later, are gathered each by the two divisions of cause and result (the first seven being one round of cause and result, the latter five a second round).
〔Roots 21–24〕What Each of the Twelve Links Has for Its Entity — One Link, One Stage, and Every Stage the Five Aggregates
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Ignorance and the rest, what dharma has each of the links for its entity? The stanza says:
Stanza: The stage of the afflictions in a past life is called ignorance; the several actions in a past life are called the formations; the five aggregates of that single moment at the very rebirth-linking are called consciousness; the stretch before the six sense fields arise is called name-and-form; from the six sense fields there arise the eye and the other faculties (before faculty, object, and consciousness have met), and this is called the six sense fields; having reached the meeting of three and not yet knowing the differences among the causes of the three feelings is called contact; the stretch before sexual craving is called feeling; craving for goods and the operation of sexual craving is called craving; ranging in pursuit everywhere for the getting of all manner of objects is called grasping; ‘existence’ is the actually making of the action that draws forth the result of a coming life; the linking of a coming body is called birth; and up to the stage of undergoing aging and death in the coming life is called aging-and-death.
Treatise: The several stages of the afflictions in a past life, whose result has matured in this present life, are named in sum ‘ignorance’ — because those afflictions operated at the same time as ignorance, and it was by the force of ignorance that they were able to operate. It is like saying ‘the king goes forth’: it is not that there are no outriders and no retinue, but only that the king goes together with them and the king is the most honored, and so it is stated in sum as ‘the king’s going forth’ (one stage of five aggregates with ignorance alone singled out — the sense is as in this simile).
The stages of meritorious action, demeritorious action, and the rest in a past life, whose result has matured in this present life, get in sum the name ‘the formations.’ The word ‘stage’ in the first line of the stanza runs on all the way to the last link, aging-and-death (every link being established with reference to a stage).
At the very rebirth-linking in the mother’s womb and the like, the five aggregates at that stage of a single moment are called ‘consciousness.’
After the consciousness of rebirth-linking and before the six sense fields arise, all the intervening stages together are called ‘name-and-form.’
(Someone asks:) Here it ought to say ‘before four sense fields arise’ (since at rebirth-linking the body and mind sense fields already exist, and only the four, eye, ear, nose, and tongue, have not yet arisen); why does it say ‘before the six sense fields’? Answer: because it is established as a name on the basis of the completeness of the six sense fields.
From when the eye and the other faculties have already arisen up to the stage where faculty, object, and consciousness have not yet met, it gets the name ‘the six sense fields.’
Having reached the meeting of the three, and not yet being able to know the differences among the causes of the three feelings (pleasant, painful, and neither painful nor pleasant), this stage is named in sum ‘contact.’
Having already known the marks of difference among the causes of the three feelings, and sexual greed not yet having arisen, this stage is called ‘feeling.’
Craving for fine goods, with sexual craving in operation, and yet not pursuing them widely, this stage is called ‘craving.’
Ranging in pursuit everywhere for the getting of all manner of fine and excellent objects, this stage is called ‘grasping.’
Because of that ranging pursuit, accumulating the action that can draw forth the result of a coming life, this stage is called ‘existence.’
By the force of that action, casting off life here and linking the coming body, this stage is called ‘birth.’
The link of birth in the coming life, just as the link of consciousness does in this present life, grows gradually after the moment of arising, up to the stage of feeling in the coming life, and this in sum is named ‘aging-and-death.’ Such aging-and-death is equivalent to the four links name-and-form, the six sense fields, contact, and feeling of this present life (the same content, gathered under the single name aging-and-death in the later period).
The analysis of the separate entities of the twelve links is just this.
Treatise (continued): Further, dependent origination may be stated as four by difference: first, momentary dependent origination; second, dependent origination of unbroken linkage; third, dependent origination by stages; fourth, dependent origination of remote continuance.
Question: what is momentary dependent origination?
Answer: in the space of a single instant, in doing a killing out of greed, the twelve links are complete: delusion is ignorance; volition is the formations; the discerning of the several objects and matters is consciousness; the three aggregates arising together with consciousness (feeling, perception, and the formations) are named in sum name-and-form; the faculties resting upon name-and-form are the six sense fields; the six sense fields meeting with the rest (object and consciousness) give contact; the receiving of contact is feeling; greed is craving; the several bonds associated with greed are grasping; the actions of body and speech that are aroused are existence; the arising of these dharmas is named birth; their ripening and altering are named aging; and their destruction is named death.
Other masters say further: momentary dependent origination and dependent origination of unbroken linkage, as the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas states them, both run through all conditioned dharmas.
All the five aggregates at the several stages of the twelve links are gathered under dependent origination by stages.
This same remote continuity, unbroken from beginningless time, is called dependent origination of remote continuance.
〔First Half of Root 25〕Which of Them the World-Honored One Spoke With Reference To — the Weight of the Words “Transmitted and Allowed”
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): What did the World-Honored One here (in stating the twelve links of dependent origination) mean to speak of? The stanza says:
Stanza: So it is transmitted, and it is allowed: it was stated with reference to stages; and the name of the link is established from what is most eminent.
Treatise: So it is transmitted, and it is allowed: the World-Honored One spoke of the several dependent originations as having twelve links solely with reference to stages.
Question: if within each and every link the five aggregates are complete, why are only the names ‘ignorance’ and the rest established?
Answer: because at each of the stages ignorance and the rest are the most eminent. The names ignorance and the rest are established from what is most eminent — that is, if at a certain stage ignorance is the most eminent, the five aggregates of that stage are named in sum ignorance; and so on, until at a certain stage aging-and-death is the most eminent, and the five aggregates of that stage are named in sum aging-and-death. Hence though the entity is one in sum (all being the five aggregates), that the names are separate is no fault.
Question: on what ground do these twelve links stated in scripture differ from what the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas states?
Answer: as that treatise says, ‘What is dependent origination? It is all conditioned dharmas,’ and so at length (a range far wider than the twelve links). The sūtrānta (the sūtras) speak with reference to a particular intent, while the Abhidharma states things according to the marks of dharmas, and so the manner of their statement differs.
Thus the four kinds of dependent origination — by stages, momentary, of remote continuance, and of unbroken linkage — are all only within the class of sentient beings (only sentient beings have these four). The difference of sentient and insentient lies just here (whereas the dependent origination stated by the Abhidharma runs through the insentient as well).
〔Second Half of Root 25〕Why Scripture Speaks Only of Sentient Beings — In Order to Remove the Doubt over the Three Periods
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Why do the sūtras speak only of the dependent origination of sentient beings? The stanza says:
Stanza: It is with reference to the earlier, the later, and the middle period, in order to dispel another’s bewilderment.
Treatise: It is in order to dispel another’s bewilderment over the three periods. The difference of the three periods exists only in sentient beings (the insentient have no such doubt about turning through the three times).
Question: what is a sentient being’s bewilderment over the earlier period?
Answer: it is to arouse such a doubt as this about the earlier period: ‘Was I in the past world existent or not existent? What sort of I was I? How was it that I was?’
Question: what is a sentient being’s bewilderment over the later period?
Answer: it is to arouse such a doubt as this about the later period: ‘Shall I in the future world be existent or not existent? What sort of I shall I be? How shall it be that I am?’
Question: what is a sentient being’s bewilderment over the middle period?
Answer: it is to arouse such a doubt as this about the middle period: ‘What is I? How is this I? Whose is this I? Whom shall I have?’
It is in order to remove such bewilderment over the three periods that scripture speaks only of the dependent origination of sentient beings, stating in their order ignorance and the formations, and birth and aging-and-death, and stating consciousness through existence (the two links of the earlier period answering the doubt about the earlier period, the two of the later answering the doubt about the later, and the eight of the middle answering the doubt about the middle).
Question: why is it said so?
Answer: because the sūtras say: ‘Listen well, monks! If a monk can see, with true and correct discernment as they really are, the several dependent originations and the dharmas that have already arisen from conditions, he will certainly not be bewildered over the three periods — that is, he will no longer arouse doubts of the kind 〔Was I in the past world existent or not existent?〕.’
Other masters say: the three links craving, grasping, and existence are also for the removing of another’s bewilderment over the later period, because these three are all causes of the later period.
〔Root 26〕Three Afflictions, Two Actions, Seven Entities — Another Way of Cutting the Twelve Links
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): It should be known further that although the doctrinal gate of dependent origination stated here has twelve links, its natures are only three classes and two — the three classes being affliction, action, and entity, and the two being result and cause. What does this mean? The stanza says:
Stanza: Three links are afflictions, two links are action, and seven links are entities and are also named results; the later period states the result in brief and the earlier period states the cause in brief, for from the middle period the two other periods may be inferred.
Treatise: The three links ignorance, craving, and grasping have affliction for their nature; the two links the formations and existence have action for their nature; and the remaining seven links, consciousness and the rest, have entity for their nature — because they are the entities on which afflictions and action rest.
Thus these seven entities are at the same time also named ‘results’; and it follows by implication that the remaining five links (the three afflictions and the two actions) are at the same time also named ‘causes,’ because they have afflictions and action for their own nature.
Question: on what ground does the middle period state result and cause at length (eight links being listed in the middle period)?
Answer: because the middle period opens ‘entity’ into five links (consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense fields, contact, and feeling) and ‘affliction’ into two links (craving and grasping). The later period states the result in brief, because there the entities are only two links (birth and aging-and-death); the earlier period states the cause in brief, because there the affliction is only one link (ignorance). Since the middle period is stated at length, the earlier and later periods may be inferred from it; and the sense at length being already established, they need not be stated separately, for to state them would be of no use.
Treatise (a further question): If the links of dependent origination are twelve only, then, a result of aging-and-death not being stated, birth and death should have an end; and a cause of ignorance not being stated, birth and death should have a beginning. Or else other links of dependent origination should be established; and those others would have yet others, and so it would become the fault of infinity, and therefore they should not be established.
Answer: yet there is not the fault stated above, because here the World-Honored One has already shown it by way of the sense.
Question: how is it already shown? The stanza says:
〔Root 27〕From an Affliction an Affliction Is Produced — the Five Modes of Mutual Production among the Twelve Links
Stanza: From an affliction an affliction is produced, and from an affliction an action; from action an entity is produced; from an entity an entity is produced, and from an entity an affliction. The principle of the links of existence is only this.
Treatise: From an affliction an affliction is produced, that is, craving produces grasping. From an affliction an action is produced, that is, grasping produces existence, and ignorance produces the formations. From action an entity is produced, that is, the formations produce consciousness, and existence produces birth. From an entity an entity is produced, that is, from the link of consciousness name-and-form is produced, and so on to contact producing the link of feeling, and the link of birth producing aging-and-death. From an entity an affliction is produced, that is, feeling produces craving. By establishing the link ‘existence,’ the principle within it is only this (the five modes of mutual production being exhaustive).
Thus it has already been shown that aging-and-death is a cause of entity and of affliction (aging-and-death can produce affliction and action, and so birth and death have no end), and shown too that ignorance is a result of entity and of affliction (ignorance comes from aging-and-death, and so birth and death have no beginning) — because ignorance and aging-and-death are themselves of the natures of entity and of affliction. This being so, what need is there to establish yet other links of dependent origination? Hence scripture says: ‘Thus is the origination of the sheer great mass of suffering.’ Were this not the meaning, what use would this sentence be?
Treatise (a further party’s explanation, one): There is another explanation which says: another sūtra states that ‘improper attention’ is the cause of ignorance, and that ignorance in turn produces improper attention (so that ignorance has a cause and no further link need be established). And improper attention is also gathered under the link of grasping, and so it too is reckoned as stated within this sūtra.
(The author objects to this:) How can this improper attention be gathered under the link of grasping? If it is said to be so because it is associated with grasping, then craving and ignorance too should be reckoned as gathered under the link of grasping (being likewise associated). And granting even that it is gathered under the link of grasping, how does that prove that improper attention is the cause of ignorance? If a relation of cause and result is established merely by being ‘gathered under the link of grasping,’ then craving and ignorance are likewise gathered under the link of grasping, and they should not have been established as separate links of dependent origination.
Treatise (a further party’s explanation, two): Someone explains further: another sūtra states that improper attention is the cause of ignorance and that ignorance in turn produces improper attention; and improper attention is stated at the stage of ‘contact,’ and so another sūtra says, ‘from eye and form as condition delusion (ignorance) arises, and the defiled attention thus produced’ — because this attention at the stage of feeling must draw forth ignorance. And another sūtra says: ‘Conditioned by the feelings produced by contact accompanied by ignorance, craving arises.’ Hence at the stage of contact, improper attention operates together with feeling and has ignorance for its condition. In this way ignorance has not the fault of being ‘without a cause,’ nor is it necessary to establish other links of dependent origination. And the links of dependent origination have not the fault of infinity either, because improper attention is produced from delusion (ignorance). As a sūtra says: ‘From eye and form as condition delusion arises, and the defiled attention thus produced.’
(The author objects to this:) Though another sūtra has such trustworthy words, yet within this sūtra it should still be stated further (since this sūtra means to dispel bewilderment over the three periods, it should have stated cause and result to the end).
(The other party answers:) It need not be stated further.
(The author asks:) How is it known that it need not be stated further?
(The other party answers:) It may be known by reasoning.
(The author asks:) By what reasoning?
(The other party answers:) Apart from ignorance, feeling cannot serve as the condition of craving, because the feeling of an arhat does not produce craving; and again, an uninverted contact cannot serve as the condition of a defiled feeling, nor can there be an inverted contact apart from ignorance, because an arhat’s contact is not inverted. By such reasoning as evidence, it is therefore known (that it need not be stated further).
(The author objects to this:) If it were so, then there would be the fault of proving too much — whatever can be known as evidence by correct reasoning would all not need to be stated further (and then what would scripture be stating?). Hence what they say cannot be established as an explanation of the previous objection.
Treatise (the correct explanation): Yet the objection stated above — that ‘scripture does not separately state that aging-and-death has a result and that ignorance has a cause, and so birth and death come to have an end and a beginning’ — is not reasonable, because the intent of the sūtra lies elsewhere. Nor is it that the principle stated is incomplete.
Why so? Because this sūtra is only for the removing of the bewilderment of those it converts over the three periods. Since those it converts arouse only such a doubt as this: ‘How do sentient beings continue through the three times? That is, from a former life this present life is born, and this present life can again be born in a later life’ — the Tathāgata, only in order to remove this doubt of theirs, states the twelve links, as has already been analyzed above; that is, ‘in the earlier, the later, and the middle period, in order to dispel another’s bewilderment.’
Treatise (appended: analyzing two names): As the World-Honored One told the monks: ‘I shall state for you the dharma of dependent origination and the dharmas that have already arisen from conditions.’
Question: what is the difference between these two?
Answer: according to the text of this treatise (the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas), there is no difference between these two, because both are said to gather all dharmas.
Question: future dharmas that have not yet arisen — how can they be said, along with the past and present, to be ‘what has already arisen from conditions’?
(He is counter-objected to thus:) A future dharma that has not yet been made — how then can it be called ‘conditioned’ along with the past and present (the name ‘conditioned’ being one you do allow to be used of future dharmas)?
Answer: because it has already been made by the force of an effective volition.
Question: if that is so, how is an undefiled dharma reckoned as conditioned (the undefiled not being made by the action of volition)?
Answer: that too has already been made by the force of a wholesome volition.
Question: if that is so, then as regards the attaining of nirvāṇa it should be so as well (nirvāṇa too becoming conditioned)?
Answer: in strict principle it should be said that it is ‘stated with reference to class’ — just as what has not yet deteriorated (future form) also gets the name ‘form,’ so, the class being the same, there is no fault in speaking thus.
〔First Half of Root 28〕Dependent Origination and What Has Already Arisen from Conditions — Two Faces of One Link
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Now, however, the meaning of the sūtra is to be explained properly. The stanza says:
Stanza: What the sense of the sūtra here properly states is: the face of cause is called dependent origination, and the face of result is called what has already arisen from conditions.
Treatise: The ‘cause-portion’ of the links is called dependent origination, because with it for condition a result can be originated; the ‘result-portion’ of the links is called what has already arisen from conditions, because they are all produced from conditions.
Thus upon all the links both senses hold, because the links all have the two natures of cause and of result.
Question: if it is set up thus, then the two should not hold at the same time (one dharma should not be both cause and result)?
Answer: it is not so, because what is regarded differs. That is to say, if this side is regarded and it is named what has already arisen from conditions, then it is not that at the same time that side is regarded and it is also named dependent origination — just like the names cause and result, father and son, and the like (one and the same person is a son regarded toward the father and a father regarded toward the son).
Treatise (a further party’s account): The sense intended by the Venerable Wangman is this: among dharmas some are dependent origination and not what has already arisen from conditions, and a fourfold analysis should be made. The first alternative (dependent origination and not what has already arisen from conditions) refers to future dharmas; the second alternative (what has already arisen from conditions and not dependent origination) refers to the past and present dharmas at the stage of an arhat’s last thought (after which no result can be originated); the third alternative (both) refers to the remaining past and present dharmas; the fourth alternative (neither) refers to the unconditioned dharmas.
Treatise (the Sautrāntikas’ objection): The Sautrāntika masters state it thus: is what is stated here (dependent origination by stages) a report of your own opinion, or is it the sense of the sūtra? If it is said to be the sense of the sūtra, then the sense of the sūtra is not such.
Why so? What was stated above as dependent origination by stages, taking twelve sets of five aggregates for the twelve links, contradicts the sūtras, because the sūtras state it otherwise. As a sūtra says: ‘What is ignorance? It is the absence of knowledge regarding the earlier period,’ and so at length (stating only the absence of knowledge, not the five aggregates). This is a statement of definitive meaning, and it may not be forced down into an interpretable one. Hence the dependent origination by stages stated above contradicts the sense of the sūtra.
(The Sarvāstivādins answer:) It is not that all sūtras are of definitive meaning; some are stated in accordance with what is most eminent. It is as the Sūtra of the Simile of the Elephant’s Footprint says: ‘What is the inner earth element? It is hair, down, nails, and the rest.’ Although there are not lacking other dharmas of form and the rest there, it states only what is most eminent. Here too it should be so.
(The Sautrāntikas object:) What is adduced cannot serve as evidence. For that sūtra is not making the ‘earth element’ analyze hair, down, and the rest so as to be an incomplete statement; that sūtra analyzes the earth element by hair, down, and the rest, and there is no earth element apart from hair, down, and the rest, and so that sūtra is a complete statement. The links ignorance and the rest stated in this sūtra should likewise be reckoned a complete statement — apart from what is stated there is nothing further (so that ignorance is just the absence of knowledge and does not include the five aggregates).
(The Sarvāstivādins object:) Does not the earth element go beyond hair, down, and the rest, its entity being present also in mucus and tears and so forth (in which case hair, down, and the rest do not exhaust the earth element, and that sūtra is still stating only what is most eminent)?
(The Sautrāntikas resolve the objection:) Mucus and the rest are also stated within that sūtra — as the sūtra says, ‘there are yet other things in the body’ (the words ‘other things’ gathering in mucus, tears, and the rest, which shows that that sūtra is still a complete statement). And granting even that we allow what you say, that apart from hair, down, and the rest there is a separate earth element, then apart from ignorance there should be some further ignorance, and it should now be exhibited (whereas apart from ignorance there is no other ignorance).
(The Sautrāntikas demand further:) If a thing of a different class is put inside ‘ignorance,’ what good does this do?
(The Sautrāntikas establish the principle and conclude their own sense:) Although at all the stages there are the five aggregates, yet only where the relation holds of ‘this being or not being, that definitely is or is not’ may this dharma be established as a link of that dharma. Or else there are cases where the five aggregates are present and the formations are not (the three, meritorious, demeritorious, and imperturbable formations, being all absent, as with an arhat), or where consciousness and so on to craving and the rest are absent; and so the sense of the sūtra is just as it is stated (ignorance and the rest having the absence of knowledge and the rest for their entities, and the links not being established by the force of the five aggregates).
(The Sautrāntikas go on to refute Wangman’s four alternatives:) The fourfold analysis so stated is likewise unreasonable in principle. If future dharmas are not what has already arisen from conditions, then it contradicts a sūtra. For a sūtra says: ‘What are the dharmas that have already arisen from conditions? They are ignorance, the formations, and so on to birth and aging-and-death.’ Or else it would have to be disallowed that two links are in the future (birth and aging-and-death being in the later period), and thus the three periods established above would be wrecked.
Treatise (some say dependent origination is unconditioned): Some say: dependent origination is an unconditioned dharma. For the sūtras say: ‘Whether a Tathāgata appears in the world or does not appear, such is the abiding constancy of the dharma-nature of dependent origination.’
Answer: understood with the former intent, the principle may still be granted; understood with the other intent, the principle may not be granted.
Question: what is ‘such an intent’? And what is ‘the other intent’? — that it should be said to be grantable and not grantable.
Answer: if the intent stated is that, whether a Tathāgata appears in the world or does not appear, the formations and the rest constantly arise with ignorance and the rest for condition, and not with other dharmas for condition, nor with no condition at all to be got — and that it is for this that ‘abiding constancy’ is said; if the intent is such, the principle may be granted.
If the intent stated is that there is besides an entity of a dharma named ‘dependent origination,’ limpidly abiding and constant and unchanging — with such another intent as this the principle may not be granted. Why so? Because ‘arising’ and ‘origination’ are both marks of the conditioned (the very name dependent origination containing the sense of origination). It is not that there is besides a constantly abiding dharma that can serve as the mark of what is impermanent; this does not accord with correct principle. And further, ‘origination’ must be established in dependence upon ‘what originates’ — what relation or connection has this constantly abiding dharma with ignorance and the rest, that it should be said to be established in dependence on them and to be their dependent origination? And again, to name it ‘dependent origination’ and yet say that it points at a constant dharma — such a sense of the phrase has no reasonable correspondence.
Treatise (the science of sounds explains the name): Here, what is the sense of the phrase ‘dependent origination’ (as regards the structure of the language)?
Answer: ‘prati’ has the sense of ‘reaching (arriving at),’ and the verbal root ‘i’ has the sense of ‘going’; by the helping force of the former word the sense of the root is altered, and so ‘going’ is altered through ‘reaching’ into ‘dependent.’ ‘sam’ has the sense of conjoining, ‘ud’ the sense of rising, and the verbal root ‘pad’ the sense of ‘being’; and ‘being,’ by borrowing conjoining and rising, is altered into ‘origination.’ Because of this, a dharma having reached its condition conjoins and rises — and this is the sense of ‘dependent origination.’
Treatise (an objection set): Such a sense of the phrase does not stand to reason. Why so? Because in this way there would be two operations upon one and the same agent (first reaching, afterwards arising), and then the former operation should have the word ‘already,’ as when a man ‘having bathed’ then eats (two matters with a before and an after). Yet there is not the least dharma of the formations that can exist before arising, first reaching its condition and only afterwards arising; and where there is no agent, there cannot possibly be an operation. Hence a stanza says:
Quoted stanza: If ‘reaching the condition’ is prior to ‘origination,’ then (at that time the dharma of the formations) does not exist, and this is unreasonable; and if the two are simultaneous, then the word ‘already’ falls to nothing — for the word ‘already’ indicates that the former should be stated first.
Treatise (answering this objection): There is not such a fault. Let the masters of the science of sounds be counter-questioned: at what time does a dharma arise? In the present, or in the future?
(The masters of the science of sounds ask back:) And what fault is there in asking so?
Answer: if arising is in the present — arising is then not ‘already arisen’ (what is in the act of arising, how is it already arisen?), and how can it be present? The present is what has already arisen, and how then is it still ‘arising’? And if what has already arisen arises again, this leads to infinity. If arising is in the future — at that time the dharma does not yet exist, and how can it be an agent? And the agent being absent, whence any operation?
Therefore at the very stage of ‘arising’ it also ‘reaches the condition.’
Question: what is the ‘stage of arising’?
Answer: it is the time when the formations of the future world are in the act of arising; and at just this stage it is also said to ‘reach the condition’ (not two times, before and after).
Further, the ‘agent’ and the ‘operation’ that the masters of the science of sounds falsely set up are, in strict principle, not established: ‘being’ is the agent and ‘origination’ the operation, yet within this there is seen no real agent, other than the operation of ‘arising,’ that can truly be got at. Hence this way of speaking is merely without error in worldly speech (there being no agent in the ultimate sense).
Treatise (adducing scripture as proof): The sense of this ‘dependent origination’ is just what is stated as ‘this being, that is; this arising, that arises,’ and so that sentence of the sūtra should be adduced to explain the sense of dependent origination. Hence a stanza says:
Quoted stanza: Just as (you say that a dharma of the formations) does not exist and yet can arise, so ‘reaching the condition’ too should be so (not existing and yet able to reach); if it is said that only after arising is it called origination, this becomes infinity; and whether prior existence or prior nonexistence be said, both alike have the problem of the word ‘already.’ It is like saying ‘darkness arriving, the lamp has already gone out’ and ‘the mouth having been opened, one sleeps’ (two matters simultaneous, and yet the word ‘already’ is used); and if sleep be said to come after, then the mouth would have to be shut (from which it is seen that the two matters are in fact simultaneous).
Treatise (a further explanation by another party): Someone holds to a further sense in explaining this objection: ‘prati’ has the sense of ‘variety,’ and the verbal root ‘i’ has the sense of ‘not abiding’; and ‘not abiding,’ by the helping force of ‘variety,’ becomes ‘dependent.’ ‘sam’ has the sense of gathering, ‘ud’ the sense of rising, and the verbal root ‘pad’ the sense of ‘going’; and because ‘ud’ comes first, ‘going’ becomes ‘origination.’ This is to say that a variety of conditions conjoin and make the dharmas of the formations gather and rise, and this is the sense of ‘dependent origination.’
(The author objects to this:) An explanation such as this may perhaps still be granted here (with the twelve links); but where ‘eye and form each being a condition, an eye-consciousness arises’ and the like, how is what is called a ‘gathering of variety’ to be established within it (there being only the two conditions eye and form — whence any variety)?
Treatise (explaining the two sentences of the sūtra): Question: on what ground did the World-Honored One state those two sentences above, namely ‘this being, that is’ and ‘this arising, that arises’?
Answer: first, in order that people should know dependent origination to be fixed and unshifting. As is stated elsewhere: in dependence upon ignorance there are the formations, and it is not that apart from ignorance there can be formations. Second, further, in order to show the successive production of the links — that is, in dependence upon this link being, that link comes to be; and by that link arising, the remaining links come to arise. Third, further, in order to show the successive production of the three periods — that is, in dependence upon the earlier period being, the middle period comes to be; and by the middle period arising, the later period comes to arise. Fourth, further, in order to show the two conditions, the immediate and the mediate — that is, ignorance being, the formations arise without interval (the immediate condition); or else it is by a force passing through intermediaries that the formations arise (the mediate condition).
Treatise (another party’s explanation): Other masters explain: these two sentences are for refuting the two positions of ‘no cause’ and ‘a constant cause’ — that is, it is not that the formations can be without a cause, nor is it that by a constantly abiding intrinsic nature, a self, and the like as an unproduced cause the formations come to arise.
(The author objects to this:) If it were so, the first sentence would become useless, since by the second sentence alone, ‘this arising, that arises,’ both ‘no cause’ and ‘a constant cause’ could be refuted at once.
(The author explains for himself:) Yet perhaps someone holds that ‘with a self as support the formations and the rest come to be, and by ignorance and the rest as the cause-portion producing them the formations and the rest come to arise.’ Therefore the World-Honored One, in order to remove such a holding, decisively adjudicates: the being of a result is by its cause of arising (and there is no other support). And ‘this arising, that arises’ is ‘this being, that is’ — it is not that the being of a result depends besides upon some other cause. That is, ignorance conditions the formations, and so on until such is the origination of the sheer great mass of suffering.
Treatise (the preceptor masters’ explanation): The preceptor masters explain these two sentences as being for the showing of the ‘unbrokenness’ and the ‘arising’ of cause and result — that is, in dependence upon ignorance being unbroken the formations are unbroken; and it is just by ignorance arising that the formations come to arise. And so by turns it should all be stated at length.
Treatise (yet another explanation): Someone explains: it is for showing the ‘abiding’ and the ‘arising’ of cause and result — that is, so long as the cause continues to exist, the result continues to exist; and it is just by the cause-portion arising that the several result-portions arise.
(The author objects to this:) Since it is ‘arising’ that is here to be analyzed, on what ground is ‘abiding’ stated? And why should the Buddha break the order in stating it — stating ‘abiding’ first and only afterwards ‘arising’ (whereas by ordinary reason arising should come first and abiding after)?
Treatise (there is a further explanation): Someone explains further: ‘this being, that is’ means that in dependence upon the result being, the cause has its ceasing (the result having arisen, the cause then passes away); and ‘this arising, that arises’ is lest someone should doubt that the result arises without a cause, and so it is further said that by the cause arising the result comes to be aroused, and not without a cause.
(The author objects to this:) If the sense of the sūtra were so, then it should be stated thus: ‘this being, that ceases and is not.’ And it should first say ‘the cause arising, the result arises,’ and only then may it say ‘in dependence upon the result being, the cause ceases and is not’ — in such an order it would be called well stated. If it were not so, then, since dependent origination is what is to be analyzed, on what order would ‘the ceasing of the cause’ be stated first? Hence what they explain is not the sense of this sūtra.
Treatise (the Sautrāntikas set out the entities of the twelve links): Further, what is it for ignorance to condition the formations, and so at length to birth conditioning aging-and-death? I shall now briefly show what conforms to the sense of the sūtra.
That is to say: the several fools, regarding the dharmas arisen from conditions, do not know that within them there is only ‘the formations’ (the flowing on of conditioned dharmas), and falsely arouse the holding of the view of self and the conceit of self. For the sake of their own undergoing pleasant feeling, or of undergoing feeling neither painful nor pleasant, they make the three kinds of action, of body, of speech, and of mind — that is, for the sake of their own undergoing pleasure in the coming life they make the several meritorious actions; for the sake of undergoing feeling neither painful nor pleasant in the coming life they make imperturbable action (the action of the absorptions of the form and formless realms); and for the sake of undergoing present pleasure they make demeritorious action. Such is what is called ‘ignorance conditioning the formations.’
By the force of the projecting action, the continuous stream of consciousness goes on as the going of a flame, to this destiny and to that; and relying upon intermediate existence it hastens to the place where it is to be born and links a birth-existence into a body — and this is called ‘the formations conditioning consciousness.’ Explained in this way, it accords well with the statement of the sūtras that analyze the link of consciousness as running through the six consciousnesses, because consciousness comes first.
Within that destiny name-and-form arises, complete in the five aggregates, continuing by turns, and running through the whole of one term of life — and there are statements to this effect in the Great Sūtra of Causes and Conditions, the Sūtra Analyzing Dependent Origination, and other sūtras.
When name-and-form has thus gradually matured and is complete in the eye and the other faculties, it is called ‘the six sense fields.’
Next, the six sense fields meet with their objects and consciousness arises; and by the meeting of the three there is contact conducive to pleasure and the rest.
In dependence upon this contact there arise the three feelings, pleasant and the rest.
From these three feelings the three cravings are drawn forth — that is, one oppressed by suffering arouses craving for desire toward pleasant feeling; or one arouses craving for form toward pleasant feeling and toward feeling neither painful nor pleasant; or one arouses craving for the formless toward feeling neither painful nor pleasant alone.
From the craving that delights in and seeks feeling there arise the four kinds of grasping beginning with the grasping of desire. Among these, ‘desire’ means the five fine desires (form, sound, smell, taste, and touch); ‘views’ means the sixty-two views, as stated at length in the Brahmajāla Sūtra; ‘rules’ means keeping away from bad discipline; and ‘observances’ means the observances of dogs and of oxen and the like (the wrong practices of imitating a dog or an ox). For instance, the several Nirgrantha non-Buddhists (those who go naked) and the brahmins, the Pāśupatas, the Parivrājakas, and non-Buddhists of other classes undertake all manner of meaningless austerities — going with the body bare, plucking out the hair, wearing the skin of a black deer, binding up the hair and smearing on ashes, holding a triple staff, cutting off beard and hair, and the like. ‘Talk of a self’ means the inner body, because in dependence upon it a self is spoken of.
Other masters say: the view of self and the conceit of self are called ‘talk of a self.’
Question: on what ground are these two alone called ‘talk of a self’?
Answer: because it is by these two that a self is said to be; and the self does not really exist, and so it is called ‘talk of a self’ (mere speech and no more). As a sūtra says: ‘Monks, you should know! The several classes of ordinary beings, foolish and unlearned, arouse the grasping of self in accordance with provisional speech, and within it there is truly no self nor what belongs to a self.’
Among the four kinds of grasping above, ‘grasping’ means desire-greed. Hence the Bhagavat explains in the sūtras: ‘What is grasping? It is what is called desire-greed.’
Because grasping is the condition, the several actions that call forth a coming existence are accumulated, and this is called ‘existence.’ As the World-Honored One told Ānanda: ‘The action that calls forth a coming existence is called existence.’
Because existence is the condition, the continuous stream of consciousness goes toward a future birth; and as in the principle stated above, being complete in the five aggregates it is called ‘birth.’
With birth as condition there is aging-and-death; and the differences of its marks are as stated at length in the sūtras.
The word ‘sheer’ shows that there is only the formations and no self nor what belongs to a self; the words ‘great mass of suffering’ show that the accumulation of suffering has neither beginning nor end; and the word ‘origination’ is to show the arising of the masses of suffering.
As for the account of the Vaibhāṣika school, it has already been stated above.
緣起別釋·四有·四食Dependent Origination in Detail · The Four Existences · The Four Nutriments
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔正28後半〕無明是什麼——它不是『明的缺席』
論(起問):十二緣起的頭一支叫「無明」。無明是什麼意思呢?答:它的體性不是明(『明』就是照見四諦的智慧)。
有人立刻反問:如果凡是『不是明』的東西都叫無明,那麼眼睛耳朵這些根也不是明,它們豈不都成了無明?
那麼換一種說法:既然如此,「無明」這個詞的意思應該是『明的沒有』(明不在,就叫無明)。
又有人反問:若是這樣,無明就成了『沒有』,它自己的體豈不成了不存在的東西?(『沒有』不能作緣去生起行支。)
為了顯示無明確實有它自己的體,而這個體的意義又不會與別的東西混淆,論主說了下面這首頌:
頌:無明,就是被「明」所對治的那個東西——好比說「非親」「非實」等等詞語的用法一樣。
論:像各人的親友所面對的怨敵,因為與親友正相違背,所以叫作「非親友」。這個「非親友」既不是『親友以外隨便哪一個人』(那樣的話陌生人也算),也不是『沒有親友』(那樣的話它就不是一個實有的對象)。
同樣,說真話叫作「實」,與它正相對治的那種虛妄誆騙的言論就叫作「非實」。這個「非實」既不是『實以外隨便什麼話』,也不是『沒有實』。
頌中的「等」字,是要把「非法」「非義」「非事等性」這一類詞也一併包括進來——它們的用法都一樣:既不是『那個東西以外的隨便什麼』,也不是『那個東西的不存在』。
這樣就知道:無明是另外有它的實體的,這個實體正是被「明」所對治的那一個;它不是『明以外的任何東西』,也不是『明的不存在』。
怎麼知道確實如此呢?因為經中說『無明作緣,才生起行支』——能作緣的必須是有體之法。此外還有可靠的證明。頌說:
〔正29〕四條理由,證明無明另有其體
頌:因為經中把它說成結、縛這一類東西的緣故;因為它不就是壞的智慧、也不就是見的緣故;因為它與見能夠相應的緣故;因為經中說它能夠染污智慧的緣故。
論:
第一證·經說它是結縛。經中把無明列為「結」「縛」「隨眠」以及「漏」「軛」「瀑流」等等(這些都是煩惱的別名)。眼睛這些根不是煩惱,不能列進去;而一個體性完全沒有的東西更不可能被說成結縛之類的事。所以確實另外有一個法叫作無明。
第二證·它不是壞智慧。有人主張:無明就是壞的智慧,並舉一喻立說——好比一個壞妻子、壞兒子,因為沒有妻子兒子該有的德,人們就管他叫『沒有妻子』;照這個道理,壞智慧沒有明的德,也就該叫作「無明」。論主不從此讀,逕破:那壞智慧並不是無明,因為它裡面含有「見」(『見』是一種推度決斷的染污慧,例如身見、邊見),而見並不是無明。凡是染污的智慧都叫作惡慧,惡慧當中既然含有見,可知惡慧不等於無明。
有人再退一步問:那麼把『不是見的那一部分染污慧』承許為無明,可以嗎?答:不可以,因為無明與見是能夠相應同起的。
第三證·它與見相應。如果無明就是慧,它就不該與見相應——因為兩個慧的體性不能同時互相相應(一念之中不會有兩個慧並起)。既然經中承許無明與見相應,可見無明不是慧。
第四證·它能染污慧。經中說:「貪欲染心令不解脫,無明染慧令不清淨。」慧自己不可能染污慧自己。就像貪是與心不同類的東西,才能染污心;無明也應當是與慧不同類的東西,才能染污慧。
有人救說:為什麼不許這樣講——各種染污的慧夾雜在善慧中間,使它不清淨,這就叫作「能染」;正如貪染污心而令心不解脫一樣。難道一定要當下現起、與心相應,才能叫「能染」嗎?其實是由於貪的勢力損害繫縛了心,使心不得解脫;後來把那個貪的熏習轉滅了,心便解脫。無明也是這樣,它染污了慧使慧不清淨,並不需要與慧相應,只是由無明損害混濁了慧罷了。這樣分別,有什麼道理上的違背呢?何況誰又能遮止別人自己的一套分別。
論主接著判定:然而,另有一個與慧不同類的法叫作無明,就像貪與心不同類一樣——這一種說法比較妥善。
破『一切煩惱都是無明』。有人主張:所有煩惱都是無明。這也可以用前面同樣的道理遮遣。如果所有煩惱都是無明,那麼在「結」等等的分類中就不該另外單說一個無明;也不該說無明與見等相應——因為見等不會自己與自己相應。或者也應該說「無明染心」(既然一切煩惱都是無明,那貪染心也就是無明染心了)。如果說這裡是就差別而說(只取其中一分),那麼在講「染慧」的時候也就不該用「無明」這個總名了。
無明之相。既然承許無明是另外一個法為體,就該說它的體相是什麼。答:就是「不了知諦實業果」(不明白四諦、真實、業與果報)。
有人追問:還沒弄清楚什麼叫「不了知」——它是『了知以外的另一個東西』呢,還是『了知的不存在』呢?答:這兩種說法都有過失,正如前面講無明時所辨的一樣。這裡說的「不了知」,是指被了知所對治的那個別法。
又追問:這仍難捉摸,它的相究竟是什麼?答:這一類法本來就只能這樣說。就像別處問『什麼是眼』,回答是『清淨色,是眼識所依止的』——只能就它的作用來辨識。無明也是如此,只能辨其作用。
大德法救之說。大德法救說:這個無明就是有情們「恃我」的那一種類性(『類性』指一種與我慢有別的內在習性),與我慢不同。
問:這個「類」的體是什麼?答:經中說『我如今這樣知道了、這樣看見了,所有的愛、所有的見、所有的類性、種種我與我所的執著、我慢的執著、隨眠,都因得斷遍知〔斷盡諸惑所成的遍知〕而無影寂滅』——由此可知「類性」與我慢是兩回事。
問:怎麼知道類性就是無明呢?答:因為它不能被說成其餘任何一種煩惱。
問:難道不能說它是其餘的慢等等嗎?答:這件事若再細細研究下去,言論就繁雜了,所以到此為止。
(承轉):緣起十二支中的「名色」是什麼意思呢?色在前面界品已經辨過了,這裡只辨「名」。頌說:
〔正30·一句〕名——為什麼四個無色蘊叫作「名」
頌:名,就是無色的四蘊(受、想、行、識)。
論:受想行識這四個無色蘊,為什麼稱作「名」?因為它們隨著所安立的名稱、隨著根與境的勢力,而在義(所指的內容)上輾轉變異,所以叫作「名」。
怎麼叫『隨著名的勢力而轉變』呢?就是說:隨著世間共同安立的種種名稱,在各個各個的意義上輾轉變異、加以詮表——好比「牛」「馬」「色」「味」這些名稱一樣(叫出這個名,心就轉到那個內容上去)。
又問:這四蘊究竟憑什麼理由,要用「名」這個字來標舉它?答:因為它們在各個各個的境上輾轉變異地攀緣(『緣』就是心去攀取對象);而且它們與名同一類——一切法不出色類與非色類,四蘊與名同屬非色,類似於名;又四蘊微細難知,要隨著名稱才顯明。
另有一些論師說:這四個無色蘊,捨了此身之後便輾轉趣向別的生處,那種轉變的樣子就像「名」一樣(名可以從一物移用到另一物),所以標作「名」。
(承轉):「觸」是什麼意思呢?頌說:
〔正30·二句〕觸——三樣東西碰在一起
頌:觸有六種,是由三者和合而生的。
論:觸有六種,就是眼觸乃至意觸(眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意各有一觸)。這觸又是什麼呢?是三者和合所生的——根、境、識三者和合在一起,因而另有一個「觸」生起。
前五種觸的生起,說『三者和合』是可以的,因為前五根、境、識三者是同時而起的。可是意觸怎麼辦呢?意根屬於過去(前一念滅去的心作為意根),法境或許屬於未來,意識屬於現在——三者不在同一時,怎麼能叫「和合」?
答:這正是所謂的和合,因為『因果的關係』在此成立了(意根是因,意識是果)。或者說:因為它們同生一個果,所以叫和合——根、境、識三者同樣順成觸的生起,所以叫和合。
兩派的爭論。諸位論師在這件事上見解不同:
一派說:三者和合本身就叫作觸(沒有另一個叫觸的心所)。他們引經為證,經中說:『這樣三法聚集和合,就叫作觸。』
另一派說:觸是另外一個與心相應的法,由三和所生,才叫作觸。他們也引經為證,經中說:『什麼是六六法門?一是六內處、二是六外處、三是六識身、四是六觸身、五是六受身、六是六愛身。』在這部經裡,根、境、識之外另外說了六觸,可見觸另有其體。
主張『三和即是觸』的一派回答那個六六經:那只是另外分開來說罷了,不因為分說就一定另有一個體——否則,經中說了法處之後又另說六受、六愛,難道受與愛就不屬於法處所攝了嗎?
主張『別有觸體』的一派答:沒有這樣的過失,因為離開愛、受、觸之外,法處中另有其餘諸法之體。並反過來責難:照你們的宗義,離開觸之外並沒有另外的三(三和就是觸),那你可以把「觸」與「三」當作有差別的兩件事來分說;可是雖然有根與境卻不一定發起識,而從來沒有識能離開根境而生。既然已經說了「三」,再另外說一個「觸」就成了多餘。
又有人出來救:並不是所有的眼與色都是眼識的因,也不是所有的眼識都是眼色的果。不成因果的那些,就分開說作「三」;成了因果的那些,總立為「觸」。
主張『離三和另有觸』的一派則回答前面所引的『三法聚集和合名觸』:我們部派所誦的經文與這個不同;或者說,這是在「因」上假借了「果」的名字,好比說『諸佛出現就是樂』一樣(佛出現是因,樂是果,卻直接叫作樂)。
論主收筆:像這樣輾轉往復地互相詰難解釋,言論就太繁多了,所以到此為止。然而對法論者(毘婆沙師)主張另有一個觸體。
(承轉):前面的六觸,再合併為兩類。頌說:
〔正30後半〕有對觸與增語觸
頌:前五種觸相應的叫「有對」,第六種與它俱起的叫「增語」。
論:眼等五種觸叫作「有對觸」,因為它們是以有質礙的根(眼耳鼻舌身五色根)作所依的。
第六意觸叫作「增語觸」。為什麼呢?「增語」就是「名」(名言);名是意觸所緣的一種特別廣長的境界,所以偏就這一點把它叫作增語觸。
好比說:眼識只能了別『青』這個顏色,卻不能了別『這是青』(不能安立名言);意識既了別青,又能了別『這是青』——所以說意識的境比較「長」(廣)。
因此,有對觸的名字是從「所依」而立,增語觸的名字是就「所緣」而立。
另有一種說法:意識是憑著語言(名言)的增上力,才能在境上轉起;五識則不然。所以獨獨把意識叫作「增語」,與它相應的觸就叫增語觸。照這一說,有對觸之名從所依立,增語觸之名則是就「相應」而立。
(承轉):前面這六種觸,再隨著各別的相應法,又成為八種。頌說:
〔正31〕八種觸——依明無明分三、依愛恚分二、依順受分三
頌:明觸、無明觸,以及非此二者的觸;依次是無漏的、染污的、其餘的。又有與愛、恚相應的兩種。還有隨順樂等三受的三種。
論:
依明與無明分作三種:一是明觸、二是無明觸、三是非明非無明觸。這三種依次應知就是:與無漏法相應的觸、與染污法相應的觸、與其餘法相應的觸。所謂「其餘」,是指無漏與染污以外的部分,也就是有漏的善與無覆無記。
依愛恚再立兩種:無明觸當中有一分是屢屢現起的,依著那一分再立「愛觸」與「恚觸」兩種,因為愛與恚的隨眠與它共相應的緣故。
依順受總攝為三種:一是順樂受觸、二是順苦受觸、三是順不苦不樂受觸。這三種之所以叫「順受」,或者因為它們能引生樂等受;或者因為它們被樂等受所領納;或者因為它們能作受的行相所依。
有人問:觸怎麼會被受所領納呢?答:因為受的行相極其類似觸,而且受是依觸而生的。
(總計):這樣合起來共成十六種觸(六觸、三觸、二觸、三觸、二觸相加)。
(承轉):「受」是什麼意思呢?頌說:
〔正32前半〕六受——以及一場關於『觸與受是否同時』的長辯
頌:從這六觸生出六受,前五種屬於身,其餘的屬於心。
論:從前面的六觸,生出六種受,就是眼觸所生受乃至意觸所生受。六者當中,前五種叫作「身受」,因為它們依止色根;意觸所生的那一種叫作「心受」,因為它只依止心。
〔經部問〕:受的生起,與觸是先後呢,還是同時呢?
〔毘婆沙師答〕:同時生起,因為觸與受輾轉互為「俱有因」(同時互相作因的一種因)。
〔難〕:兩個法同時而生,怎麼能說得上一個能生、一個所生?
〔答〕:能生所生的關係是可以成立的。
〔難〕:怎麼不能成立?因為沒有那個功能——對於已經生起的法,別的法對它已無能為力了。
〔答〕:你這話與剛才立的宗旨沒有分別。你說『兩法同時而生,能生所生不成立』,又說『對已生之法別的法無能』,意思和先前一樣,重複說有什麼用?
〔難〕:若照你這樣說,就會有「互相生」的過失(甲生乙、乙也生甲)。
〔答〕:我們本來就承許,所以不算過失。我們的宗義承許這二者互為俱有因,也互相為果。
〔難〕:你雖然這樣承許,可是契經中並不許這二者互為因果。經中只說『眼觸為緣,生眼觸所生受』,從來沒有一部經說『眼受為緣,生眼受所生觸』。
而且這個道理也不合理,因為它違越了『能生之法』的通則。凡是確實能生某法的,這個能生之法與所生之法在時間上必定有先後——例如先有種子後有芽、先有乳後有酪、先有敲擊後有聲音、先有意根後有識。
〔答〕:先因後果固然不是不成立;然而也有大家都承認的「同時因果」。例如眼識與眼、色是同時的;四大種與所造色也是同時俱有的。
〔難〕:你這個例子裡一樣可以許前後——前一念的根、境作緣,能發起後一念的識;前一念的大種聚,能生後一念的所造色。有什麼道理可以遮住這樣讀?
〔答〕:那麼影子與身體,難道不是同時俱有的嗎?
〔經部上座之說〕:有人說:觸之後才有受生。次第是這樣的——先有根與境,接著有識起,這三者合起來就叫作觸,到第三剎那時才緣著觸而生受。
〔難〕:若是這樣,就應當有些識沒有受相應了;而且那些識也不都是觸了。
〔答〕:沒有這樣的過失。因為由前一位的觸,所以後一位的受生起;因此每一個有觸的時候都有受,而所有識的體沒有不是觸的。
〔難〕:這不合理。
〔答〕:哪裡不合理呢?
〔難〕:就是說:有時候前後兩個觸所緣的境不同,而你說由前一位的受所依之觸生後一位的受——那麼一個緣此境的受,怎麼會從緣彼境的觸生出來?否則你就得承許:受雖與這個心相應,卻不與這個心緣同一個境。
〔答〕:既然如此,如果承許有這樣的情形——有識成觸而無受;在這一位之前,另有識、有受而體不是觸,因為缺了助緣的緣故——這又有什麼過失?
〔難〕:若是這樣,就破壞了「十大地法」(受、想、思等十種遍一切心的心所),因為它們必定在一切心品中恒常俱起。
〔答〕:『它們必定恒常俱起』這一條,是依據什麼教典建立的?
〔難〕:依據本論(阿毘達磨論)建立。
〔答〕:我們只以契經為量,本論不是量,破了它有什麼過錯?所以世尊說過:『應當依經為量。』
或者說:大地法的意義未必是「遍於一切心」。
〔難〕:若是這樣,「大地法」的意義又是什麼?
〔答〕:所謂「地」有三組。第一組三地:一是有尋有伺地、二是無尋唯伺地、三是無尋無伺地。第二組三地:一是善地、二是不善地、三是無記地。第三組三地:一是學地、二是無學地、三是非學非無學地。凡是在前面這些地當中都有的法,叫作「大地法」;凡是只在諸善地中有的,叫作「大善地法」;凡是只在諸染地中有的,叫作「大煩惱地法」。這些法各隨所應更替而生,並不是全都一起現起。至於別處所說的「大不善地法」,那是因誦讀而牽引來的,是後來增益的,不是本來所誦的。
〔難〕:如果觸之後才有受生,那麼經文怎麼解釋?契經說:『眼與色為緣生於眼識,三和合觸,俱起受、想、思。』
〔答〕:經中只說「俱起」,並沒有說「與觸俱起」,這對我們的宗義有什麼違背需要解釋?何況「俱」這個字用在無間相續的情形也可以,例如契經說『與慈俱行,修念覺支』(慈與念覺支並非嚴格同剎那)。所以那不能作為證據。
〔難〕:若是這樣,經中為何說:『這是受、這是想、這是思、這是識,這些法相雜不離,所以沒有離開受等的識』?
〔答〕:現在應當仔細想一想:「相雜」是什麼意思?這部經接著又說:『所受的就是所思的,所思的就是所想的,所想的就是所識的。』我們還不明白這裡是就「所緣」而說,還是就「剎那」而說。
〔難〕:在『壽與煖同時俱起』那一段裡也有同樣的「相雜」之語,比照可知:這裡的說法一定是就剎那而說的。
〔難·續〕:又契經說『三和合觸』,那麼怎麼會有識而不是三和?或者是三和而不叫作觸?所以應當確定承許:一切識現起時全都有觸,而所有的觸沒有不與受等同時俱生的。
(收筆):旁論到此結束,應當回頭辨正題。頌說:
〔正32後半〕十八意近行
頌:這受又成為十八種,因為「意近行」有種種差別。
論:在前面略說的『一種心受』當中,由於意近行的差別,又分成十八種。應知頌中「復」這個字,是顯示承接前文而生起後文。
這十八種意近行是哪些呢?就是喜、憂、捨三者各配六境,成六種近行(『近行』就是心在境上一再往來遊行)。
為何恰是十八:如果只依自性算,應該只有三種,因為喜、憂、捨三者的自性不同;如果只依相應算,應該只有一種,因為它們全都與意相應;如果只依所緣算,應該只有六種,因為色等六境是它們的所緣。此十八之成,是三個條件具足才有的(自性三、相應唯意、所緣六,三者相乘相攝)。
其中十五種(色、聲、香、味、觸五境各配喜憂捨)叫作「不雜緣」,因為所緣的境各各分別;三種「法近行」則通於雜緣與不雜緣兩種(法境可以單緣一法,也可以總緣多法)。
「意近行」這個名字取的是什麼義:傳說是——喜等以「意」作為親近之緣,因而在種種境中屢屢遊行,所以叫意近行。另有一說——喜等能作親近之緣,使「意」在境上屢屢遊行,所以叫意近行。
問答五則:
一問:身受為什麼不算意近行?答:因為它不是只依止意,所以不叫「近」;又因為它沒有分別,所以也不叫「行」。
二問:第三靜慮中意地的樂根,為什麼不攝在意近行裡?答:傳說在最初的意界(欲界)中,意識相應沒有樂根;而且也沒有與之相對的苦根所攝的意近行(喜與憂相對成雙,樂沒有相對者,故不立)。
三問:如果意近行只在意地,經中為何說『眼見色已,於順喜的色上起喜近行』等等?答:那是依著五識身所引起的意地喜等近行而說的,所以這樣講。好比依著眼識而引起不淨觀,這不淨觀其實只屬意地。而且那部經說的是「眼見色已」乃至廣說(『已』字表示見過之後才起,仍在意地),所以不應以此為難。
四問:如果雖然不是親眼見,乃至身體觸到之後才起喜憂捨,那也算意近行嗎?答:也算。如果不是這樣,那麼在欲界中就不該有緣色界色等的意近行了;在色界中也不該有緣欲界香味觸境的種種意近行了。經中說「見色」等等,是隨著明顯易了的情形而說。見了色等之後,在聲等境上起喜憂捨,也是意近行——是隨著沒有雜亂的情形這樣說,好在其中把根與境的配屬定下來。
五問:會不會有某些色等境,對於喜等三者只能順生其中一種近行?答:有的,那是就一個相續(一個有情自身的情況)而說,不是就所緣本身而說。
(承轉):那麼在種種意近行當中,有幾種是欲界所繫?欲界的意近行又各緣什麼境?色界、無色界照樣這麼問。頌說:
〔正33·正34·正35前半〕三界之中各有幾種、各緣何境
頌:欲界的十八種緣欲界境也是十八;緣色界境有十二,緣上面的無色界只有三。初二靜慮的十二種緣欲界境有十二;其中八種緣自地,二種緣無色。後二靜慮的六種緣欲界境有六;四種緣自地,一種緣上界。最初的無色近分(空無邊處近分)緣色界有四,緣自地有一。四個無色根本地以及上三個近分,都只有一種,且只緣自己的境。
論:
欲界所繫:具有十八種,緣欲界境也是十八種。緣色界境只有十二種——除去香、味兩境所配的六種,因為色界沒有香味二境。緣無色界境只得三種——因為無色界沒有色、聲、香、味、觸這五種所緣。
色界所繫:初靜慮與第二靜慮只有十二種,就是除去六種憂近行(此二地無憂根)。它們緣欲界境也有十二種(欲界六境具足,故十二皆得下緣);至於緣自地,則須除去香、味所配的四種(色界無香味二境),其餘八種才緣自地;另二種緣無色界,就是法近行。
第三、第四靜慮只有六種,就是捨所配的六種(此二地喜憂皆無,唯捨);緣欲界境也得有六種(欲界六境具足);至於緣自地,則須除去香、味所配的二種,其餘四種才緣自地;另一種緣無色界,就是法近行。
無色界所繫:空無邊處的近分定只有四種,就是捨所配的、但緣色、聲、觸、法四境。它緣第四靜慮,也具有這四種——這是就承許『可以別別緣下地』的說法而言;如果主張那一地只能總緣下地,那就只有雜緣的法意近行一種。
緣無色界只有一種,就是法近行;至於四種根本地以及上面三個近分,也只有一種法近行,而且只緣自己的境——因為無色的根本地不緣下地,那上面的三個近分不緣色法。
「不緣下地」的道理,後面(定品)會再辨。
(承轉):這意近行,通於無漏嗎?頌說:
〔正35·三句〕十八唯是有漏——以及誰成就幾種
頌:這十八種都只是有漏。
論:沒有一種意近行是通於無漏的,所以說十八種都只是有漏。
(誰成就幾種):
生在欲界的人,若還沒有獲得色界善心,就成就欲界的一切十八種;初禪二禪的八種、三禪四禪的四種、無色界的一種也成就。他所成就的上界那些,都不緣下地,因為那些是染污的緣故。
若已經獲得色界善心而還沒有離欲界貪,就成就欲界一切十八種;初靜慮的十種;其餘照前面所說。(在初靜慮中只成就四種喜近行,因為染污心不緣下地的香、味二境;捨則具足成就六種,因為未至定中的善心能緣香味境。)其餘的照這個道理,隨其所應可以推知。
若生在色界,就只成就欲界的一種捨法近行,就是與通果心(神通變化之心)俱起的那一種。
(世親自陳異見):有人說:像這樣種種意近行,是毘婆沙師隨著義理方便而建立的。然而我所看到的經義卻有所不同。為什麼呢?因為對於某一地已經離染的人,是不可能再緣此地之境而起意近行的;所以並不是有漏的喜、憂、捨三者全都攝在近行之中。只有雜染的那些,與意互相牽引、屢屢遊行於所緣,才是意近行。
怎樣叫『與意互相牽引、屢屢遊行』?就是或起愛、或起憎、或不加簡擇而捨置。
為了對治那三種,經中說「六恒住」——見了色之後不生喜、不生憂,心恒常安住於捨,具足正念與正知,乃至於知法也是這樣。
並不是說阿羅漢就沒有世間緣善法而起的喜;只是為了遮止雜染的近行,才這樣說的。
又就喜等而立「三十六師句」,就是依「耽嗜」與「出離」的分別而立(喜憂捨各配六境成十八,再分耽嗜依與出離依兩類,成三十六)。這一句差別,是大師(佛)所說的。所謂耽嗜依,就是種種染污的受;所謂出離依,就是種種善的受。
像這樣所說的「受」,應知就在十二有支的受支之中。
(承轉):受支的義門差別無量,那麼為什麼不說其餘的有支呢?頌說:
〔正35·四句〕其餘的支——已經說過的、將要說的
頌:其餘的支,或已經說過,或將要說。
論:其餘的有支,有的已經說過,有的將要說,所以這裡不論。
其中「識支」如前面已說——『識就是各各了別』,這就叫作意處等等。
「六處支」如前面已說——『那識所依止的清淨色』,就叫作眼等五根等等。
「行支」與「有支」這二支,在業品中將要說。「愛支」與「取支」這二支,在隨眠品中將要說。
(承轉):這十二緣起,簡略地立為三類,就是煩惱、業、異熟果事。應當寄託外界的譬喻,來顯示它們各別的功能。頌說:
〔正36·正37〕煩惱、業、果事——外喻八象九用
頌:這裡說煩惱好比種子,又好比龍,好比草根與樹莖,以及好比包著米的糠;業好比帶糠的米,好比草藥,好比花;種種異熟果事,則好比煮熟的飲食。
論:
煩惱五喻:
一、怎麼說這三類與種子等相似呢?就像從種子生出芽、葉等等一樣,從煩惱生出煩惱、業、果事三者。
二、好比龍鎮守著池子,池水就恒常不會枯竭;煩惱鎮守著業,生死的相續就永無窮盡。
三、好比草根沒有拔掉,苗剪了又長;煩惱的根沒有拔掉,趣(生趣)滅了又起。
四、好比從樹莖上屢屢生出枝、花、果;從種種煩惱屢屢生起惑、業、果事。
五、好比包著糠的米能生芽等,單是米不能生;煩惱好比糠——是惑、以及惑之得,裹住了業,業才能招感其餘的生,單是業不能招感。煩惱如種子等等,應當這樣理解。
業三喻:
一、好比帶糠的米能生芽等,業有煩惱作助伴,才能招感異熟。
二、好比種種草藥,果實成熟就是最後一步(結了果,藥草的事就完了);業的果報成熟以後,就不再招感異熟。
三、好比花對於果實是生果的近因;業作為近因,能生異熟。業如米等等,應當這樣理解。
果事一喻:好比煮熟的飲食只應受用,不能再轉成別的飲食;異熟的果事既已成熟,就不能再招感其餘的生與異熟。如果異熟又能感生別的生,別的又再感別的,那就永無解脫了。果事如飲食,應當這樣理解。
(承轉):這樣,緣起的煩惱、業、果事三類生生相續,不出「四有」——中有、生有、本有、死有,這在前面已經解釋過了。它們的染與不染、三界之中有無,現在應當略辨。頌說:
〔正38〕四有之中,唯生有一向染污
頌:在四種有當中,生有唯是染污的;由自地的煩惱染污;其餘三有各通三性,無色界中只有三有。
論:
在四有當中,「生有」(受生的最初一剎那)唯是染污。
由什麼煩惱染污呢?由自地的種種惑。就是說:在這一地受生,這一地的一切煩惱都能染污這一地的生有。所以對法論者都這樣說:『種種煩惱當中,沒有哪一個煩惱在結生的時位上不具備滋潤的功能。』
然而結生只靠根本煩惱的力量,不是由自力現起的纏與垢(『纏』『垢』是隨煩惱)。雖然在這個時位上心與身都昏昧羸劣,但由於屢屢生起、或者近來現行的引發力,煩惱仍然現起。
應知中有最初相續的那一剎那也必定是染污的,就像生有一樣。
至於其餘三有,一一都通於三性——就是本有、死有、中有這三者,各各通於善、染污、無記。
在無色界中,除去中有,只有三有——因為那一界並沒有處所的隔別,可以說是『往別處去』而立中有。
頌中沒有說欲界與色界,所以知道在那二界中承許具足四有。
(承轉):有情的緣起已經廣為分別了,這些有情又是依什麼而住的呢?頌說:
〔正39–41〕有情由食而住——四食
頌:有情依食而住。段食的體只在欲界,只有三種(香味觸);色不是段食,因為它不能利益自己所對的根,也因為已解脫食貪者見之而無所資益的緣故。觸食、思食、識食這三種,都是有漏的,通於三界。意成、求生、食香、中有、名起——這五個都是中有的名稱。前二食利益此世的所依身與能依心;後二食則對於當來的有,一個能引、一個能起,依次如此。
論:
四食之立:經中說,世尊自己覺悟一法而正覺正說,就是——一切有情沒有不是依食而住的。
什麼是食呢?食有四種:一是段食(一段一段吃下去的飲食)、二是觸食、三是思食、四是識食。
段食之細麁:段食有兩種,就是細與麁。「細」指中有的食,因為中有以香為食;以及劫初時人的食,因為那時的食沒有變成穢物,好像油澆在沙上一般,逕自散入肢體,不留殘穢。或者說,細小的污虫與嬰兒等等的食也叫作細;與此相反的就是麁。
段食唯在欲界:像這樣的段食只在欲界有,因為離了段食之貪才生上界的緣故,所以段食唯是欲界所繫。
段食之體:香、味、觸這三者,全都是段食的自體,因為它們可以一段一段地飲下、吃下——就是用口與鼻一分一分地承受它們。
問:光、影、炎、涼這些怎麼也能成為食?答:傳說這句話是就多數的情形而論的。而且雖然不是飲下吃下,卻能任持身體,也算細食所攝,好比塗身與洗浴一樣。
色為什麼不是段食:問:色也可以一段一段地飲噉(例如看得見的飲食),為什麼不算食?答:因為色不能利益自己所對的那個根(眼根),也因為已解脫食貪的人雖見種種上妙飲食而不因此得益。凡叫作「食」的,一定先要滋益自身的根與大種,然後才及於其餘。人在飲噉的時候看見色,對自己的眼根與大種尚且沒有利益,何況及於其餘——因為那些根與境各各分別。
有時候看見色而生喜樂,那是緣著色而生的「觸」,是觸食,不是色。
再說,不還果與阿羅漢已經解脫了對食的貪,即使見到種種上妙飲食也沒有利益。
其餘三食之體:「觸」是指三和所生的種種觸;「思」是指意業;「識」是指識蘊。這三者都只是有漏的,三界之中都有。
問:食的體為什麼不通於無漏?毘婆沙師這樣解釋:能夠資助諸有(三有的生死),這就是「食」的意義;無漏是為了修習而生、為了滅除諸有的,所以不是食。又契經說:食有四種,能令部多有情安住,並能資益種種求生者。無漏不是這樣,所以不是食體。
部多與求生:所謂「部多」,是顯示「已生」的意思——凡是諸趣已經受生的,都叫已生。
又說「求生」是指什麼呢?這是指中有。因為佛世尊用五種名字來說中有:一叫「意成」,因為它是從意而生的,不是精血等外緣和合所成;二叫「求生」,因為它常喜歡尋找伺察將要受生之處;三叫「食香」,因為它的身體以香為食而前往生處;四叫「中有」,因為它是死有與生有二趣中間的諸蘊;五叫「名起」,因為它對向著當來所生而暫時生起。
如契經說:『有壞自體起,有壞世間生』——這裡的「起」就是中有。
又經中說:『有補特伽羅(有情)已斷起結、未斷生結。』這部經裡廣說四句:離二界貪的種種上流者是第一句(已斷起結、未斷生結);中般涅槃者是第二句;種種阿羅漢是第三句;除去前面這些情形的是第四句。
又有一種說法:「部多」是指阿羅漢,其餘還有愛的就叫「求生」。
幾食安住部多、幾食資益求生:問:有幾種食能令部多安住?有幾種食能資益求生的有情?毘婆沙師說:都具足四種。種種有愛的人也由段食作緣而得資益,使他招感後有——因為世尊說四食都是病、癰、箭、根、老死的緣。也可以看到思食能使現前的身安住。
思食三事:
世間相傳有這樣的話:從前有一個父親,遇上饑荒,想要遠走他方。自己已經飢餓瘦弱,兩個孩子還小,想帶著走卻沒有力氣,於是用袋子裝了灰掛在牆上,安慰兩個孩子說那是麨粉的袋子(麨是炒熟的米麥粉)。兩個孩子懷著希望,多活了一段時日;後來有人來把袋子打開,孩子看見是灰,希望斷絕就死了。
又在大海上有一群商人,遭難船破,飲食全失。遠遠望見海面上堆積的泡沫,疑心是海岸,心中盼望快點到達,性命因此得以延續一時;到了跟前,摸到才知道不是,希望斷絕就死了。
《集異門足論》說:大海中有一種大眾生,登上岸生卵,把卵埋在沙裡就回到海中;母親若常常掛念,卵就不會壞;如果失了念,卵就敗亡。
論主辨正:這樣說不對,因為違背了食的意義。難道別人的思食能夠任持自己的身體嗎?依理應當說:是卵常常思念母親,才得以不爛壞;忘了就命終。而所謂『起念母之思』,正發生在『觸』的時位。
為何唯說四食:種種有漏法都能滋長諸有,那麼世尊為何說食只有四種?答:雖然如此,就其殊勝者而說四種並無過失。
前二食能利益此身的「所依」與「能依」;後二食能引起當來的有。
所謂「所依」,是指有根身;段食對它能作資益。所謂「能依」,是指心與心所;觸食對它們能作資益。這二食對於已生之有的資益功能最為殊勝。
所謂「當有」,是指未來的生;對於那將要生的,思食能引發。思食引發之後,從業所熏成的識種子之力,後有才得以生起。這二食對於未生之有的引與起功能最為殊勝。
所以雖然一切有漏法都滋長諸有,但就其殊勝的功能,只說這四種食。前二食好比養母,因為養育已生的;後二食好比生母,因為生起未生的。
段與食之四句:問:凡是「段」都是食嗎?答:有的段不是食,應當作四句分別。第一句(是段非食):所飲所吃的東西反而作緣,損壞了諸根與大種。第二句(是食非段):其餘的三種食。第三句(亦段亦食):所飲所吃的東西作緣,資益了諸根與大種。第四句(非段非食):除去前面這些情形。
觸等三食也隨其所應,一一都可以這樣作四句。
問:有沒有觸等作緣,資益了諸根大種而仍然不是食的?答:有,就是異地的無漏觸等。
捐食者身亦名為食:種種吃下之後反而損害食者之身的,仍然叫作食,因為它起初曾有資益。毘婆沙師說:食在兩個時位都能起食的作用,都叫作食——一是最初吃的時候能除去飢渴;二是消化之後能資益根與大種。
五趣四生皆具四食:問:哪一趣、哪一生各具足幾種食?答:五趣四生都具足四食。
問:地獄怎麼會有段食?那些鐵丸、熔銅難道是段食嗎?如果能作損害的也算食,那就與前面的四句相違了。而且《品類足論》說:『什麼是段食?就是能資益諸根大種的』,乃至識食也是這樣說。
答:那部論是且依「能資益」的一面說它叫食,所以並不相違。然而地獄中的熱鐵丸等等,雖然吃了以後能作損害,卻也能暫時解除飢渴,得到食的相狀,所以也叫作食。又孤地獄(散在人間的小地獄)的段食就跟人一樣。所以五趣中都有四食。
贍部林異生之挍量:世尊說過:如果有人能布施一百位外道離欲仙人飲食,另一人若能布施一位「贍部林中異生」飲食,後者的果報勝過前者。
什麼叫「贍部林中異生」呢?
有人這樣解釋:就是所有住在贍部洲、凡有肚腹的人。這個解釋不合理,因為經中說的是「一」個人。而且照這個解釋,在此中布施無量異生飲食,道理上總該勝過布施少數外道離欲仙人,那有什麼稀奇值得挍量讚歎的?
有人說:那是接近成佛的菩薩。這也不對,因為布施他所獲的福,勝過布施俱胝(千萬)阿羅漢。
毘婆沙者說:這位異生是已經獲得順決擇分(見道前的加行位)的人。這個說法名與義也不相應,因為從來沒有一部契經或本論說『得順決擇分的人住在贍部林中』——應知那只是他們自己的分別罷了。
(正解):最後身的菩薩住在贍部林,就叫作『那位異生』。這個說法才合理。因為那時菩薩與離欲仙人同列(尚是異生),所以才拿他與那些仙人挍量而讚歎其勝;雖然布施菩薩的福勝過無邊,但承接前文的挍量,姑且說勝過一百。道理必定如此。因為後來世尊除開那位異生,改拿外道與預流向來挍量勝劣;如果不是這樣,世尊就該拿那位異生與預流向來對比了。
(承轉):有情的緣起與住已經說了。像先前所說的壽盡而死等等,現在應當正辨——是哪一個識現前、與哪一種受相應而有死生等事?頌說:
〔正42·正43·正44前半〕死與生,用的是哪一個識、哪一種受
頌:斷善根與續善根、離染與退、死與生,承許都只在意識之中;死與生只與捨受相應,不在定中、不在無心位;入涅槃的心只有二種無記。漸漸命終的人,識依次在足、臍、心處最後滅;往下趣者、往人趣者、往天趣者與不生者各不相同,另有「斷末摩」由水等而起。
論:
六位唯意識:斷善根、續善根、離界地之染、從離染而退、命終、受生——在這六個時位上,法爾只承許意識,不是其餘五識。頌中所說的「生」字,應知也包括最初結生的中有。
死生唯捨受:死與生只承許與捨受相應,因為與捨相應的心不明利;其餘的受明利,不順於死生。
唯散非定、必非無心:又這死生二時只在散心,不在定中;一定要在有心的時位,不會是無心。
不在定心而有死生,理由有三:一是界地各別(定心屬上界地,死生屬自界地);二是定心由加行而生(死生之心任運而起);三是定心能作攝益(死生之心微劣,不能攝益)。
也不會在無心位而有死生,因為在無心的時位,命根必定不會損壞。如果所依的身將要壞了,必定還會生起屬於所依身的心,然後才命終,再沒有別的道理。而且無心的人不能受生,因為沒有受生之因——離開煩惱的現起,是不會受生的。
入涅槃唯二無記:雖然說死有通於三性心,然而入涅槃時只有二種無記心。若主張欲界有『捨受的異熟心』的一派,就說欲界入涅槃的心兼具威儀路與異熟兩種無記;若主張欲界沒有捨受異熟的一派,就說欲界入涅槃的心只有威儀路而沒有異熟。
問:為什麼只有無記心能入涅槃?答:因為無記的勢力微弱,順於心的斷絕。
命終時識在何處滅:頓時命終的人,意識與身根忽然一齊滅盡。
若是漸漸死去的,則往下、往人、往天各不相同——依次在足、臍、心三處識滅。所謂「往下」是說墮惡趣的,他的識最後在足處滅;若往人趣,識在臍處滅;若往生天,識在心處滅。種種阿羅漢叫作「不生」,他們最後的心也在心處滅。另有一些論師說:阿羅漢的識滅在頭頂。
正命終的時候,因為足等處的身根滅了,意識也隨之而滅。臨命終時身根漸漸滅去,到足等處便忽然全部滅盡——好像把少量的水倒在燒紅的石頭上,漸漸減少、漸漸消失,到一處便全盡了。
斷末摩:又漸漸命終的人,臨終時多半被「斷末摩」的苦受所逼。
並沒有另一個東西叫作末摩;只是身中有一些特別的支節,一觸到就會致死,這就叫末摩。
如果水、火、風隨便哪一大增盛起來,就像鋒利的刀刃觸到那末摩,因此便生起極重的苦受,從此不久就命終了。
這裡說的「斷」,不像砍柴那樣叫斷;是因為斷了之後便無知覺,所以得個「斷」的名字。
問:地界為什麼沒有這種斷的作用?答:因為沒有第四種內在的災患。內在的三種災患,就是風、熱、痰;水、火、風隨其所應而增盛,就起這三種災患。有人說:這正像外器世間的三災(水災、火災、風災)。
天子五衰:這種斷末摩在天中是沒有的。然而諸天子將要命終的時候,先有五種小衰相現起:一是衣服與莊嚴器具發出不可愛的聲音;二是自身的光明忽然昏昧微弱;三是在沐浴的時候水滴會沾附在身上(平時不沾);四是本性原本喧騰奔馳,如今卻滯留在一個境上;五是眼睛本來凝定安寂,如今卻屢屢眨動。這五相現起,還不一定當死。
又有五種大衰相現起:一是衣服沾染塵埃;二是花鬘枯萎憔悴;三是兩腋出汗;四是臭氣沾身;五是不樂本座。這五相現起,就必定當死。
(承轉):世尊在這有情世間的生、住、沒當中建立了「三聚」。什麼是三聚?頌說:
〔正44後半〕三聚——正性、邪性、不定性
頌:正性定聚、邪性定聚、不定性聚。聖者屬正、造無間業者屬邪,其餘的是不定。
論:一是正性定聚、二是邪性定聚、三是不定性聚。
什麼叫正性:契經說:『貪無餘斷、瞋無餘斷、癡無餘斷,一切煩惱都無餘斷』,這就叫作正性。所謂「定」,是指聖者;「聖」是指已經有無漏道生起的人——遠離種種惡法所以叫聖,因為獲得了畢竟離繫之得(斷惑所證的無漏得)。他們必定能盡除煩惱,所以叫「正定」。
問:那些已經獲得順解脫分的人,也必定能得涅槃,為什麼不算正定?答:因為他們後來或許會墮入邪定聚;而且得涅槃的時間還沒有定,不像預流者最多七返生死那樣有定限;又因為他們還不能捨離邪性,所以不叫正定。
什麼叫邪性:就是種種地獄、傍生、餓鬼,這叫作邪性。所謂「定」,是指五無間業;造了無間業的人必定墮地獄,所以叫「邪定」。
什麼叫不定:正定、邪定以外的,叫作不定性——因為他們有待於兩種緣,可以成為正定或邪定其中之一。
〔Second Half of Root 28〕What Ignorance Is — It Is Not “the Absence of Clear Knowing”
Treatise (opening the question): The first link of the twelvefold dependent origination is called “ignorance.” What does ignorance mean? Answer: its entity is not clear knowing (“clear knowing” is the discernment that illumines the four truths).
Someone at once objects: if whatever is “not clear knowing” is called ignorance, then the eye, the ear, and the other faculties are also not clear knowing — would they not all become ignorance?
Then let it be put another way: this being so, the word “ignorance” ought to mean “the absence of clear knowing” (clear knowing not being there, that is called ignorance).
And again someone objects: if that is so, ignorance becomes a mere “absence,” and would not its own entity then be something that does not exist? (An “absence” cannot act as a condition to give rise to the link of formations.)
In order to show that ignorance does indeed have an entity of its own, and that the sense of that entity is not to be confused with anything else, the author speaks the stanza below:
Stanza: Ignorance is that which is counteracted by “clear knowing” — just as with the usage of such words as “not a kinsman” and “not true.”
Treatise: Just as the enemy whom each man’s friends and kinsmen face is called “not a friend and kinsman” because he stands directly opposed to friends and kinsmen. This “not a friend and kinsman” is neither “any person whatever other than friends and kinsmen” (in which case a stranger would count as one) nor “the absence of friends and kinsmen” (in which case it would not be a really existent object).
In the same way, speaking the truth is called “true,” and that kind of false and deceitful speech which stands directly counteracted by it is called “not true.” This “not true” is neither “any speech whatever other than true speech” nor “the absence of truth.”
The word “and the rest” in the stanza is meant to take in such words as “not a dharma,” “not the sense,” and “the nature of not being a real thing,” together with the rest of that kind — their usage is all the same: neither “anything whatever other than that thing” nor “the nonexistence of that thing.”
Thus it is known: ignorance has a real entity of its own besides, and that real entity is precisely the one counteracted by “clear knowing”; it is not “anything whatever other than clear knowing,” nor is it “the nonexistence of clear knowing.”
How is it known that it is indeed so? Because the sūtra says that “with ignorance as condition the link of formations then arises” — whatever can act as a condition must be a dharma possessed of an entity. There are, besides this, further reliable proofs. The stanza says:
〔Root 29〕Four Reasons Proving That Ignorance Has an Entity of Its Own
Stanza: Because the sūtra states it as being a fetter, a bond, and things of that kind; because it is neither bad discernment itself nor view itself; because it can be associated with view; because the sūtra says that it can defile discernment.
Treatise:
First proof · the sūtra states it as fetter and bond. The sūtra lists ignorance among the “fetters,” the “bonds,” the “latent tendencies,” and the “outflows,” “yokes,” and “floods,” and the rest (all these being alternative names for the afflictions). The eye and the other faculties are not afflictions and cannot be entered in the list; and something whose entity is wholly absent could still less be spoken of as a fetter, a bond, or anything of that kind. Therefore there is indeed a further dharma called ignorance.
Second proof · it is not bad discernment. Some hold that ignorance is just bad discernment, and set up their account with a simile: just as a bad wife or a bad child, lacking the virtues a wife or a child should have, is called by people “having no wife or child,” so on this reasoning bad discernment, lacking the virtue of clear knowing, ought likewise to be named “ignorance.” The author does not follow this reading and refutes it straight off: that bad discernment is not ignorance, since there is “view” within it (“view” is a defiled discernment that investigates and decides, such as the view of self and the extreme view), and view is not ignorance. Every defiled discernment is called bad discernment, and since view is contained within bad discernment, it is evident that bad discernment is not the same as ignorance.
Someone then retreats a step and asks: may one then grant that ignorance is “that portion of defiled discernment which is not view”? Answer: one may not, because ignorance and view are able to be associated and arise together.
Third proof · it is associated with view. If ignorance were discernment, it ought not to be associated with view — because two entities of discernment cannot be mutually associated at one time (within a single moment of thought two discernments do not arise together). Since the sūtra grants that ignorance is associated with view, it is evident that ignorance is not discernment.
Fourth proof · it can defile discernment. The sūtra says: “Greedy desire defiles the mind so that it is not liberated; ignorance defiles discernment so that it is not pure.” Discernment cannot itself defile discernment. Just as greed, being of a kind unlike mind, can therefore defile mind, so ignorance too ought to be of a kind unlike discernment, and can therefore defile discernment.
Someone comes to the defense: why should it not be put this way — the several defiled discernments, interspersed among wholesome discernment, make it impure, and this is called “being able to defile,” just as greed defiles the mind and makes the mind not liberated. Must a thing needs arise at that very moment and be associated with mind before it can be called “able to defile”? In truth it is by the force of greed injuring and binding the mind that the mind fails to be liberated; and afterwards, when that perfuming of greed has been turned back and extinguished, the mind is liberated. So it is with ignorance too: it defiles discernment and makes it impure without needing to be associated with discernment, being merely a matter of ignorance injuring and muddying discernment. What contradiction in reasoning is there in analyzing the matter so? And besides, who can shut off another man from analyzing it after his own fashion?
The author then adjudicates: yet there is a further dharma of a kind unlike discernment called ignorance, just as greed is of a kind unlike mind — this account is the better one.
Refuting the view that all afflictions are ignorance. Some hold that all the afflictions are ignorance. This too may be dismissed by the same reasoning as above. If all the afflictions were ignorance, then in the classifications of “fetters” and the rest ignorance ought not to be stated separately in addition; nor ought it to be said that ignorance is associated with view and the rest — since view and the rest are not associated with themselves. Or else one ought also to say “ignorance defiles the mind” (since if every affliction is ignorance, then greed defiling the mind is ignorance defiling the mind as well). And if it be said that here the statement is made with respect to a distinction (taking only one portion of it), then in speaking of “defiling discernment” the general name “ignorance” ought likewise not to have been used.
The mark of ignorance. Since it is granted that ignorance has a further dharma for its entity, its entity-mark ought to be stated. Answer: it is “not comprehending the truths, the real, action, and result” (not being clear about the four truths, the real, and action and its maturation).
Someone presses on: it is still not settled what “not comprehending” means — is it “a further thing other than comprehending,” or is it “the nonexistence of comprehending”? Answer: both accounts are faulty, exactly as was discriminated above in the case of ignorance. The “not comprehending” spoken of here refers to that separate dharma which comprehending counteracts.
He presses further: this is still hard to lay hold of; what after all is its mark? Answer: dharmas of this kind can from the first only be stated so. Just as when elsewhere it is asked “what is the eye?” and the answer is “subtle form, that on which visual consciousness depends” — it can be identified only by way of its function. So it is with ignorance too: only its function can be distinguished.
The account of the Venerable Dharmatrāta. The Venerable Dharmatrāta says: this ignorance is that class-nature of relying on a self which sentient beings have (“class-nature” meaning an inward disposition distinct from the conceit “I am”), and it differs from the conceit “I am.”
Question: what is the entity of this “class”? Answer: the sūtra says, “I now know thus and see thus, and every craving, every view, every class-nature, every clinging to I and mine, every clinging of the conceit ‘I am,’ and every latent tendency have, by attaining the full understanding that is abandonment 〔the full understanding formed by the exhaustive abandoning of the several delusions〕, been extinguished without a shadow left” — and from this it is known that class-nature and the conceit “I am” are two different things.
Question: how is it known that class-nature is ignorance? Answer: because it cannot be stated to be any other one of the afflictions.
Question: may it not then be said to be one of the remaining conceits and the rest? Answer: were this matter to be investigated still more minutely, the discussion would become tangled, and so it stops here.
(Transition): What does “name-and-form,” among the twelve links of dependent origination, mean? Form has already been distinguished above in the Chapter on the Elements, and here only “name” is distinguished. The stanza says:
〔Root 30, First Line〕Name — Why the Four Formless Aggregates Are Called “Name”
Stanza: Name is the four formless aggregates (feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness).
Treatise: Why are the four formless aggregates of feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness called “name”? Because, following the names established for them and following the force of faculty and object, they turn and change with respect to the sense (the content referred to), and so they are called “name.”
What is meant by “turning and changing following the force of a name”? It means this: following the several names commonly established in the world, they turn and change with respect to each several sense and set it forth in words — as with such names as “ox,” “horse,” “form,” and “taste” (the name being uttered, the mind turns to that content).
He asks again: on what ground exactly are these four aggregates to be signalized by the word “name”? Answer: because upon each several object they turn and change in taking it as their object (“taking as object” being the mind’s reaching out to lay hold of an object); and because they are of a kind like name — for no dharma falls outside the class of form and the class of non-form, and the four aggregates, belonging with name to non-form, resemble name; and further because the four aggregates are subtle and hard to know, and are made manifest only by following names.
Certain other masters say: these four formless aggregates, when this body has been cast off, turn and proceed to another birth, and that manner of turning and changing is like a “name” (a name being transferable from one thing to another), and so they are signalized as “name.”
(Transition): What does “contact” mean? The stanza says:
〔Root 30, Second Line〕Contact — Three Things Meeting Together
Stanza: Contact is of six kinds, and is produced by the meeting of three.
Treatise: Contact is of six kinds, namely eye-contact through to mind-contact (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind each having one contact). And what is this contact? It is what is produced by the meeting of three — faculty, object, and consciousness meeting together, whereupon a further “contact” arises.
Of the arising of the first five contacts it may be said that “three meet,” since the first five faculties, objects, and consciousnesses arise at the same time. But what of mind-contact? The mind-faculty belongs to the past (the mind of the preceding moment, having ceased, serving as mind-faculty), the object of dharmas may belong to the future, and mental consciousness belongs to the present — the three not being at one time, how can this be called “meeting”?
Answer: this is precisely what is called meeting, because “the relation of cause and result” is established in it (the mind-faculty being cause and mental consciousness result). Or else: because they produce one and the same result, they are called meeting — faculty, object, and consciousness alike conducing to the arising of contact, and so being called meeting.
The dispute between two parties. The several masters differ in their views on this matter:
One party says: the meeting of three is itself called contact (there being no further mental factor called contact). They cite scripture in proof, the sūtra saying: “These three dharmas gathered and met together are called contact.”
The other party says: contact is a further dharma associated with mind, produced by the meeting of three, and only so is it called contact. They too cite scripture in proof, the sūtra saying: “What is the gate of the six sixes? First, the six internal sense fields; second, the six external sense fields; third, the six bodies of consciousness; fourth, the six bodies of contact; fifth, the six bodies of feeling; sixth, the six bodies of craving.” In this sūtra, six contacts are stated in addition to faculty, object, and consciousness, from which it is evident that contact has an entity of its own.
The party holding that “the meeting of three is itself contact” answers that sūtra of the six sixes: that is merely stating them apart in addition, and being stated apart does not necessarily mean that there is a further entity — otherwise, when the sūtra, having stated the sense field of dharmas, goes on to state the six feelings and six cravings in addition, would feeling and craving then not be gathered under the sense field of dharmas?
The party holding that “contact has an entity of its own” answers: there is no such fault, because apart from craving, feeling, and contact there are the entities of the remaining dharmas within the sense field of dharmas. And they press back in turn: on your tenet there is no further “three” apart from contact (the meeting of three being contact itself), so you may state “contact” and “three” apart as two things that differ; yet though faculty and object be present, consciousness is not necessarily aroused, whereas there has never been a consciousness that could arise apart from faculty and object. “Three” having already been stated, to state a further “contact” becomes superfluous.
Again someone comes forward to the defense: not every eye and every visible form is a cause of visual consciousness, nor is every visual consciousness a result of eye and visible form. Those that do not constitute cause and result are stated apart as “three”; those that do constitute cause and result are established together as “contact.”
The party holding that “apart from the meeting of three there is a further contact” then answers the passage cited above, “three dharmas gathered and met together are named contact”: the text of the sūtra as our school recites it differs from this; or else, this is borrowing the name of the “result” for the “cause,” as when it is said that “the appearance of the Buddhas is happiness” (the Buddhas’ appearance being cause and happiness result, yet it is called happiness outright).
The author lays down his pen: since to object and explain back and forth in this fashion would make the discussion far too long, it stops here. The Abhidharma masters (the Vaibhāṣikas), however, hold that there is a further entity of contact.
(Transition): The six contacts above are further combined into two classes. The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 30〕Resistant Contact and Contact of Designation
Stanza: Those associated with the first five are called “resistant”; the sixth, arising together with it, is called “of designation.”
Treatise: The five contacts of eye and the rest are called “resistant contact,” because they take resistant faculties (the five material faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) as their support.
The sixth, mind-contact, is called “contact of designation.” Why so? “Designation” is “name” (verbal designation); and name is a peculiarly long and wide object of mind-contact, and so, with respect to just this, it is called contact of designation.
For example: visual consciousness can cognize only the color “blue” and cannot cognize “this is blue” (it cannot establish verbal designation); mental consciousness both cognizes blue and can cognize “this is blue” — and so the object of mental consciousness is said to be the “longer” (the wider).
Therefore the name of resistant contact is established from the “support,” and the name of contact of designation is established with respect to the “object.”
There is another account: it is by the dominance of speech (verbal designation) that mental consciousness is able to turn upon its object, whereas the five consciousnesses are not so. Hence mental consciousness alone is called “of designation,” and the contact associated with it is called contact of designation. On this account, the name of resistant contact is established from the support while the name of contact of designation is established with respect to “association.”
(Transition): These six contacts, further following their several associated dharmas, become eight kinds. The stanza says:
〔Root 31〕Eight Kinds of Contact — Three by Clear Knowing and Ignorance, Two by Craving and Hostility, Three by the Feeling They Conduce To
Stanza: Contact with clear knowing, contact with ignorance, and the contact that is neither of these two; these are, in order, the one without outflows, the defiled, and the rest. There are also two associated with craving and with hostility. And there are three conducing to the three feelings, of pleasure and the rest.
Treatise:
Three kinds divided by clear knowing and ignorance: first, contact with clear knowing; second, contact with ignorance; third, contact neither with clear knowing nor with ignorance. These three should be known to be, in order, the contact associated with dharmas without outflows, the contact associated with defiled dharmas, and the contact associated with the remaining dharmas. What is called “the rest” means the portion outside the without-outflows and the defiled, that is, the wholesome with outflows and the unobscured-indeterminate.
Two further established by craving and hostility: within contact with ignorance there is one portion that arises repeatedly, and in dependence on that portion the two further contacts of “craving” and “hostility” are established, since the latent tendencies of craving and of hostility are associated with it.
Three gathered in all by the feeling conduced to: first, contact conducing to pleasant feeling; second, contact conducing to painful feeling; third, contact conducing to feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant. These three are called “conducing to feeling” either because they can draw forth pleasant and the other feelings; or because they are received by pleasant and the other feelings; or because they can serve as the support of the mode of apprehension of feeling.
Someone asks: how can contact be received by feeling? Answer: because the mode of apprehension of feeling is exceedingly like contact, and because feeling arises in dependence upon contact.
(Total): Thus there are, taken together, sixteen kinds of contact in all (the six contacts, three contacts, two contacts, three contacts, and two contacts added together).
(Transition): What does “feeling” mean? The stanza says:
〔First Half of Root 32〕The Six Feelings — and a Long Debate on Whether Contact and Feeling Are Simultaneous
Stanza: From these six contacts six feelings are produced; the first five belong to the body, the remaining one to the mind.
Treatise: From the six contacts above, six feelings are produced, namely the feeling produced by eye-contact through to the feeling produced by mind-contact. Of the six, the first five are called “bodily feelings,” because they depend upon material faculties; the one produced by mind-contact is called “mental feeling,” because it depends upon mind alone.
〔The Sautrāntikas ask〕: In its arising, is feeling before or after contact, or simultaneous with it?
〔The Vaibhāṣikas answer〕: They arise simultaneously, because contact and feeling are reciprocally “coexistent causes” for one another (a kind of cause in which two things are causes for each other at the same time).
〔Objection〕: When two dharmas arise at the same time, how can one be spoken of as producer and the other as produced?
〔Answer〕: The relation of producer and produced can be established.
〔Objection〕: How can it not be established? Because there is no such capacity — toward a dharma that has already arisen, another dharma can do nothing further.
〔Answer〕: What you say is no different from the thesis just laid down. You said, “two dharmas arising at the same time, producer and produced are not established,” and you say again, “toward a dharma already arisen another dharma can do nothing” — the meaning is the same as before, and what use is there in repeating it?
〔Objection〕: If it is as you say, then there follows the fault of “producing each other” (this producing that and that producing this as well).
〔Answer〕: We grant this from the first, and so it is no fault. Our tenet grants that these two are coexistent causes for one another, and results for one another as well.
〔Objection〕: You may grant it so, yet the sūtras do not grant that these two are cause and result for each other. The sūtra says only, “with eye-contact as condition the feeling produced by eye-contact arises”; there has never been a sūtra that says, “with eye-feeling as condition the contact produced by eye-feeling arises.”
Moreover this reasoning is unsound, since it transgresses the general rule concerning “a dharma that can produce.” Whatever really can produce a given dharma must, in time, stand before or after the dharma it produces — as the seed is before and the sprout after, milk before and curds after, the striking before and the sound after, the mind-faculty before and consciousness after.
〔Answer〕: That cause is before and result after is indeed not unestablished; yet there is also a “simultaneous cause and result” which everyone acknowledges. For instance, visual consciousness is simultaneous with the eye and with visible form; and the four great elements are coexistent with derived form as well.
〔Objection〕: In your very example the before and after may equally be granted — the faculty and object of the preceding moment acting as conditions can arouse the consciousness of the following moment; the aggregate of great elements of the preceding moment can produce the derived form of the following moment. What reasoning can block such a reading?
〔Answer〕: Then are a shadow and a body not coexistent?
〔The account of the Sautrāntika Elder〕: Someone says: only after contact does feeling arise. The sequence is this — first there are faculty and object, next consciousness arises, and these three together are called contact; and only at the third moment does feeling arise with contact as its object.
〔Objection〕: If so, there ought to be consciousnesses with no feeling associated with them; and moreover those consciousnesses would not all be contact.
〔Answer〕: There is no such fault. Because it is by the contact of the preceding position that the feeling of the following position arises; hence wherever there is contact there is feeling, and no entity of any consciousness fails to be contact.
〔Objection〕: This is unsound.
〔Answer〕: Where is it unsound?
〔Objection〕: Just here: sometimes two successive contacts have different objects, and you say that from the contact upon which the feeling of the preceding position depends the feeling of the following position arises — then how does a feeling taking this object arise from a contact taking that object? Otherwise you must grant that feeling, though associated with this mind, does not take the same object as this mind.
〔Answer〕: That being so, if it is granted that such a case obtains — that there is a consciousness constituting contact but without feeling, and that before this position there is another consciousness having feeling whose entity is not contact, because a contributory condition was lacking — what fault is there in this?
〔Objection〕: If it is so, the “ten factors of the great ground” are destroyed (feeling, perception, volition, and the other ten mental factors that pervade every mind), since they must arise together constantly in every class of mind.
〔Answer〕: On the strength of what scriptural authority is the rule “they must arise together constantly” established?
〔Objection〕: On the strength of the root treatise (the Abhidharma treatise).
〔Answer〕: We take the sūtras alone as our measure; the root treatise is not a measure, and what fault is there in destroying it? Therefore the World-Honored One said: “One should take the sūtras as measure.”
Or else: the sense of the factors of the great ground is not necessarily “pervading every mind.”
〔Objection〕: If so, what then is the sense of “factors of the great ground”?
〔Answer〕: What is called “ground” comes in three sets. The first set of three grounds: first, the ground with applied and sustained thought; second, the ground without applied thought and with sustained thought only; third, the ground without applied and without sustained thought. The second set of three grounds: first, the wholesome ground; second, the unwholesome ground; third, the indeterminate ground. The third set of three grounds: first, the ground of one in training; second, the ground of one beyond training; third, the ground of one neither in training nor beyond training. Whatever dharmas are present in all these foregoing grounds are called “factors of the great ground”; whatever are present only in the wholesome grounds are called “factors of the great wholesome ground”; whatever are present only in the defiled grounds are called “factors of the great defiled ground.” These dharmas arise by turns each as it is applicable, and they do not all arise together. As for the “factors of the great unwholesome ground” stated elsewhere, that was drawn in by the way of recitation and is a later addition, not part of the original recitation.
〔Objection〕: If only after contact does feeling arise, how is the text of the sūtra to be explained? The sūtra says: “With eye and visible form as condition visual consciousness arises; the meeting of three is contact; arising together with it are feeling, perception, and volition.”
〔Answer〕: The sūtra says only “arising together” and does not say “arising together with contact,” and what contradiction is there here to our tenet that needs explaining? Besides, the word “together” may also be used of what is continuous without interval, as when the sūtra says, “proceeding together with loving-kindness, one cultivates the awakening-factor of mindfulness” (loving-kindness and the awakening-factor of mindfulness not being strictly of one and the same moment). Therefore that cannot serve as proof.
〔Objection〕: If so, why does the sūtra say: “This is feeling, this is perception, this is volition, this is consciousness; these dharmas are intermixed and not separate, and so there is no consciousness apart from feeling and the rest”?
〔Answer〕: Now one ought to consider carefully: what does “intermixed” mean? This sūtra goes on to say: “What is felt is what is thought; what is thought is what is perceived; what is perceived is what is cognized.” We are still not clear whether the statement here is made with respect to “object” or with respect to “moment.”
〔Objection〕: In the passage “vitality and warmth arise together” there is the same word “intermixed,” and by comparison it is known: the statement here must be made with respect to the moment.
〔Objection, continued〕: Further, the sūtra says “the meeting of three is contact,” so how could there be a consciousness that is not the meeting of three? Or a meeting of three not called contact? Therefore it should be firmly granted that whenever any consciousness arises there is contact throughout, and that no contact whatever fails to arise together with feeling and the rest.
(The author lays down his pen): The incidental discussion ends here, and the proper topic should be taken up again. The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 32〕The Eighteen Mental Proximate-Activities
Stanza: This feeling becomes eighteen kinds besides, by the differences of the “mental proximate-activities.”
Treatise: Within the “one mental feeling” stated in brief above, by the differences of mental proximate-activity it divides further into eighteen kinds. The word “besides” in the stanza should be known to display the carrying forward of what precedes and the raising of what follows.
Which are these eighteen mental proximate-activities? They are joy, sorrow, and equanimity, each matched with the six objects, making six proximate activities apiece (“proximate activity” being the mind roaming to and fro again and again upon an object).
Why they are exactly eighteen: if reckoned by intrinsic nature alone there ought to be only three, since joy, sorrow, and equanimity differ in intrinsic nature; if reckoned by association alone there ought to be only one, since all of them are associated with mind; if reckoned by object alone there ought to be only six, since visible form and the other six objects are their objects. That these eighteen come about is a matter of three conditions being complete (three by intrinsic nature, associated with mind alone, six by object — the three multiplying and gathering one another in).
Of these, fifteen (the five objects of visible form, sound, odor, taste, and the tangible each matched with joy, sorrow, and equanimity) are called “not taking a mixed object,” since the objects they take are severally distinct; while the three “proximate activities upon dharmas” extend to both taking a mixed object and not taking a mixed object (the object of dharmas admitting of taking one dharma singly and of taking many together).
What sense the name “mental proximate-activity” takes: it is transmitted that joy and the rest take “mind” as their proximate condition and therefore roam again and again among the several objects, and so they are called mental proximate-activities. There is another account — that joy and the rest can act as the proximate condition, causing “mind” to roam again and again upon an object, and so they are called mental proximate-activities.
Five questions and answers:
First question: why is bodily feeling not counted a mental proximate-activity? Answer: because it does not depend upon mind alone, it is not called “proximate”; and because it is without discrimination, neither is it called “activity.”
Second question: why is the pleasure faculty on the ground of mind in the third meditative absorption not gathered under the mental proximate-activities? Answer: it is transmitted that in the first mental element (the desire realm) there is no pleasure faculty associated with mental consciousness; and moreover there is no mental proximate-activity gathered under a pain faculty to stand opposite to it (joy and sorrow standing opposite each other in a pair, while pleasure has nothing to stand opposite it and so is not established).
Third question: if the mental proximate-activities are only on the ground of mind, why does the sūtra say, “having seen a visible form with the eye, one arouses a proximate activity of joy upon a visible form conducive to joy,” and so on? Answer: that is said with reference to the proximate activities of joy and the rest on the ground of mind which are drawn forth by the five bodies of consciousness, and so it is put in that way. It is like the contemplation of impurity drawn forth in dependence upon visual consciousness, which contemplation of impurity in fact belongs to the ground of mind alone. Moreover that sūtra says “having seen a visible form with the eye” and so on at length (the word “having” showing that it arises only after seeing, and so still on the ground of mind), and therefore it should not be raised as an objection.
Fourth question: if joy, sorrow, and equanimity arise after something has been reached by the body and so on, without being seen with one’s own eyes, do these too count as mental proximate-activities? Answer: they do. Were it not so, then within the desire realm there ought to be no mental proximate-activity taking the visible form and the rest of the form realm as object; and within the form realm there ought to be none of the several mental proximate-activities taking as object the odor, taste, and tangible objects of the desire realm. The sūtra’s “seeing a visible form” and the rest is said as the case is most plain and easy to understand. Joy, sorrow, and equanimity arising upon sound and the other objects after visible form and the rest have been seen are mental proximate-activities also — this being said as the case is unmixed, so as to fix therein the matching of faculty with object.
Fifth question: can there be visible forms and other objects which, with respect to joy and the other two, can conduce to the arising of one proximate activity only? Answer: there can, and that is said with respect to one continuum (the case of a single sentient being himself), not with respect to the object as such.
(Transition): Among the several mental proximate-activities, then, how many belong to the desire realm, and what objects do the mental proximate-activities of the desire realm take? The same is asked of the form realm and the formless realm. The stanza says:
〔Root 33 · Root 34 · First Half of Root 35〕How Many There Are within Each of the Three Realms, and What Objects Each Takes
Stanza: The eighteen of the desire realm taking objects of the desire realm are eighteen as well; taking objects of the form realm there are twelve; taking those of the formless realm above, only three. The twelve of the first two meditative absorptions taking objects of the desire realm are twelve; of these, eight take objects of their own level, and two take those of the formless realm. The six of the latter two meditative absorptions taking objects of the desire realm are six; four take those of their own level, and one takes those of the realm above. The first formless preliminary stage (the preliminary stage of the sphere of the infinity of space) has four taking objects of the form realm and one taking objects of its own level. The four fundamental formless levels and the upper three preliminary stages all have one only, and take only their own objects.
Treatise:
Bound to the desire realm: it has all eighteen kinds, and taking objects of the desire realm they are eighteen kinds as well. Taking objects of the form realm there are only twelve kinds — the six matched with the two objects of odor and taste being excluded, since the form realm has no objects of odor and taste. Taking objects of the formless realm there are only three — since the formless realm has none of the five objects of visible form, sound, odor, taste, and the tangible.
Bound to the form realm: the first meditative absorption and the second have only twelve kinds, namely with the six proximate activities of sorrow excluded (these two levels having no faculty of sorrow). Taking objects of the desire realm they too have twelve kinds (the six objects of the desire realm being complete, so that all twelve may take a lower object); as for taking objects of their own level, the four matched with odor and taste must be excluded (the form realm having no objects of odor and taste), and the remaining eight take objects of their own level; two further take objects of the formless realm, namely the proximate activities upon dharmas.
The third and fourth meditative absorptions have only six kinds, namely the six matched with equanimity (these two levels having neither joy nor sorrow, but equanimity alone); taking objects of the desire realm there are likewise six kinds (the six objects of the desire realm being complete); as for taking objects of their own level, the two matched with odor and taste must be excluded, and the remaining four take objects of their own level; one further takes objects of the formless realm, namely the proximate activity upon dharmas.
Bound to the formless realm: the preliminary concentration of the sphere of the infinity of space has only four kinds, namely those matched with equanimity but taking only the four objects of visible form, sound, the tangible, and dharmas. Taking the fourth meditative absorption as its object it likewise has these four kinds — this being said with respect to the account that grants that “lower levels may be taken as object severally”; and if one holds that that level can take a lower level only as a whole, then there is only the one mental proximate-activity upon dharmas that takes a mixed object.
Taking objects of the formless realm there is only one kind, namely the proximate activity upon dharmas; and as for the four fundamental levels together with the upper three preliminary stages, they too have only the one proximate activity upon dharmas, and take only their own objects — because the fundamental formless levels do not take lower levels as object, and the three preliminary stages above them do not take dharmas of form as object.
The reasoning of “not taking lower levels as object” will be distinguished further below (in the chapter on absorption).
(Transition): Do these mental proximate-activities extend to what is without outflows? The stanza says:
〔Root 35, Third Line〕The Eighteen Are with Outflows Alone — and Who Accomplishes How Many
Stanza: These eighteen are all with outflows alone.
Treatise: There is no mental proximate-activity that extends to what is without outflows, and therefore it is said that the eighteen kinds are with outflows alone.
(Who accomplishes how many):
One born in the desire realm who has not yet obtained the wholesome mind of the form realm accomplishes all eighteen kinds of the desire realm; he accomplishes also the eight kinds of the first and second meditative absorptions, the four of the third and fourth, and the one of the formless realm. Those of the upper realms which he accomplishes do not take lower levels as object, because they are defiled.
If he has already obtained the wholesome mind of the form realm but is not yet free from craving for the desire realm, he accomplishes all eighteen kinds of the desire realm and ten of the first meditative absorption; the rest are as stated above. (Within the first meditative absorption he accomplishes only four proximate activities of joy, because a defiled mind does not take as object the two objects of odor and taste of the lower level; while of equanimity he accomplishes the full six, because the wholesome mind in access concentration can take odor and taste as objects.) The rest may be inferred on this same reasoning, each as it is applicable.
If he is born in the form realm, he accomplishes only the one kind of the desire realm, the proximate activity of equanimity upon dharmas, namely the one arising together with the supernormal-result mind (the mind of supernormal power and transformation).
(Vasubandhu declares a divergent view of his own): Some say: mental proximate-activities of this kind are established by the Vaibhāṣikas as suits their sense of the doctrine. Yet the sense of the sūtras as I see it is otherwise. Why so? Because for one who has already become free from defilement with respect to a given level, it is impossible for a mental proximate-activity to arise again taking an object of that level; and so it is not the case that all three of joy, sorrow, and equanimity with outflows are gathered under the proximate activities. Only those that are defiled, drawing one another on with mind and roaming again and again upon their objects, are mental proximate-activities.
What is it to “draw one another on with mind and roam again and again”? It is to arouse craving, or to arouse hatred, or to set the thing aside without discriminating it.
In order to counteract those three, the sūtra speaks of the “six constant abidings” — having seen a visible form, one gives rise neither to joy nor to sorrow, the mind abiding constantly in equanimity, complete in mindfulness and right knowing, and so on down to knowing dharmas as well.
It is not said that an arhat has no worldly joy arising with a wholesome dharma as object; it is only in order to block the defiled proximate activities that this is said.
Further, with respect to joy and the rest, the “thirty-six teacher’s sentences” are established, that is, established by the distinction of “relish” and “renunciation” (joy, sorrow, and equanimity each matched with the six objects making eighteen, and these divided further into the two classes of those based on relish and those based on renunciation, making thirty-six). This distinction among the sentences was spoken by the Great Teacher (the Buddha). What is based on relish means the several defiled feelings; what is based on renunciation means the several wholesome feelings.
The “feeling” thus spoken of should be known to be just what falls within the link of feeling among the twelve links of existence.
(Transition): The differences among the gates of sense of the link of feeling are measureless; why then are the remaining links of existence not stated? The stanza says:
〔Root 35, Fourth Line〕The Remaining Links — Those Already Stated and Those Yet to Be Stated
Stanza: The remaining links have either been stated already or are yet to be stated.
Treatise: Of the remaining links of existence, some have been stated already and some are yet to be stated, and therefore they are not discussed here.
Among them the “link of consciousness” is as stated above — “consciousness is the cognizing of each severally,” and this is what is called the mental sense field and the rest.
The “link of the six sense fields” is as stated above — “the subtle form upon which that consciousness depends” is what is called the five faculties of eye and the rest.
The two links of “formations” and “existence” will be stated in the chapter on action. The two links of “craving” and “appropriation” will be stated in the chapter on the latent tendencies.
(Transition): These twelve links of dependent origination are established in brief as three classes, namely affliction, action, and the matter of maturation results. External similes should be resorted to in order to display their several capacities. The stanza says:
〔Root 36 · Root 37〕Affliction, Action, and the Matter of Results — Eight External Images in Nine Uses
Stanza: Here affliction is said to be like a seed, and like a dragon, like the root and the stem of a plant, and like the husk that wraps the rice; action is like husked rice, like a medicinal herb, like a flower; and the several matters of maturation results are like cooked food and drink.
Treatise:
The five similes for affliction:
First, how are these three classes said to resemble a seed and the rest? Just as from a seed there arise sprout, leaves, and the rest, so from affliction there arise the three of affliction, action, and the matter of results.
Second, just as a dragon guards a pool and the water of the pool is never exhausted, so affliction guards action and the continuity of birth and death is without end.
Third, just as when the root of a grass is not pulled up the shoot grows again after cutting, so when the root of affliction is not pulled up a destiny arises again after ceasing.
Fourth, just as from the stem of a tree branches, flowers, and fruit arise again and again, so from the several afflictions delusion, action, and the matter of results arise again and again.
Fifth, just as rice wrapped in its husk can produce a sprout and the rest while bare rice cannot, so affliction is like the husk — delusion, and the acquisition of delusion, wrapping action, so that action can then call forth a further birth, while bare action cannot call it forth. Affliction being like a seed and the rest should be understood in this way.
The three similes for action:
First, just as rice that still has its husk can produce a sprout and the rest, so action having affliction for its helper can call forth maturation.
Second, just as with the several medicinal herbs the ripening of the fruit is the last stage (the fruit once set, the herb’s business is finished), so once the result of an action has ripened it calls forth no further maturation.
Third, just as a flower is the proximate cause producing the fruit, so action as proximate cause can produce maturation. Action being like rice and the rest should be understood in this way.
The one simile for the matter of results: just as cooked food and drink are only to be consumed and cannot be turned into further food and drink, so once the matter of maturation results has ripened it can call forth no further birth and maturation. If maturation could call forth a further birth, and that another, and so on, there would be no liberation ever. The matter of results being like food and drink should be understood in this way.
(Transition): Thus the three classes of affliction, action, and the matter of results in dependent origination, arising in continual succession, do not go beyond the “four existences” — intermediate existence, the existence of birth, existence proper, and the existence of death — which have been explained above. Whether they are defiled or undefiled, and whether they are present within the three realms, should now be briefly distinguished. The stanza says:
〔Root 38〕Among the Four Existences, the Existence of Birth Alone Is Invariably Defiled
Stanza: Among the four existences, the existence of birth alone is defiled; it is defiled by the afflictions of its own level; the remaining three each extend to the three ethical qualities, and within the formless realm there are three existences only.
Treatise:
Among the four existences, the “existence of birth” (the first moment of taking birth) is defiled alone.
By what afflictions is it defiled? By the several delusions of its own level. That is to say: taking birth on this level, all the afflictions of this level can defile the existence of birth of this level. Hence the Abhidharma masters all say: “Among the several afflictions there is not one affliction that lacks the capacity to moisten at the position of joining rebirth.”
Nevertheless the joining of rebirth depends only on the force of the root afflictions and not on the entanglements and stains that arise by their own strength (“entanglement” and “stain” being secondary afflictions). Although at this position both mind and body are dulled and feeble, yet by the drawing force of what has arisen again and again, or of what has been active recently, the afflictions arise all the same.
It should be known that the first moment of the continuity of intermediate existence is also necessarily defiled, just as the existence of birth is.
As for the remaining three existences, each one of them extends to the three ethical qualities — that is, existence proper, the existence of death, and intermediate existence each extend to the wholesome, the defiled, and the indeterminate.
Within the formless realm, intermediate existence being excluded, there are three existences only — for within that realm there is no separation of places such that one might speak of “going to another place” and so establish intermediate existence.
The stanza does not speak of the desire realm and the form realm, and from this it is known that within those two realms all four existences are granted.
(Transition): The dependent origination of sentient beings has now been distinguished at length; upon what, then, do these sentient beings depend to abide? The stanza says:
〔Roots 39–41〕Sentient Beings Abide by Nutriment — The Four Nutriments
Stanza: Sentient beings abide by nutriment. The entity of morsel nutriment is in the desire realm alone, and is of three only (odor, taste, and the tangible). Form is not morsel nutriment, because it cannot benefit the faculty it faces, and because one who is liberated from craving for nutriment sees it and takes no benefit from it. The three nutriments of contact, volition, and consciousness are all with outflows and extend to the three realms. Formed by mind, seeker of birth, eater of odors, intermediate existence, named arising — these five are all names for intermediate existence. The first two nutriments benefit the supporting body and the supported mind of this present life; the latter two, with respect to the existence that is to come, the one draws it forth and the other raises it up, in that order.
Treatise:
The establishing of the four nutriments: the sūtra says that the World-Honored One awakened of himself to one dharma and rightly awakened to it and rightly stated it, namely this — that there is no sentient being whatever that does not abide by nutriment.
What is nutriment? Nutriment is of four kinds: first, morsel nutriment (food and drink taken in morsel by morsel); second, contact nutriment; third, volition nutriment; fourth, consciousness nutriment.
The subtle and the coarse in morsel nutriment: morsel nutriment is of two kinds, the subtle and the coarse. The “subtle” refers to the nutriment of intermediate existence, since intermediate existence takes odor for its nutriment; and to the nutriment of human beings at the beginning of an aeon, since the nutriment of that time did not turn into filth but, like oil poured upon sand, passed straight into the limbs and left no residue behind. Or else, the nutriment of tiny vermin, infants, and the like is also called subtle; and what is contrary to this is coarse.
Morsel nutriment is in the desire realm alone: morsel nutriment such as this is present in the desire realm alone, since it is by becoming free from craving for morsel nutriment that one is born in the upper realms; and therefore morsel nutriment is bound to the desire realm alone.
The entity of morsel nutriment: odor, taste, and the tangible, these three, are all of them the very entity of morsel nutriment, since they can be drunk and eaten as separate morsels — that is, they are received portion by portion by the mouth and the nose.
Question: how can light, shade, flame, and coolness also become nutriment? Answer: it is transmitted that this sentence is put with respect to the majority of cases. Moreover, though they are not drunk and eaten, they can sustain the body, and so are gathered under subtle nutriment, just as anointing the body and bathing are.
Why form is not morsel nutriment: Question: form too may be drunk and eaten by morsels (as with visible food and drink); why is it not counted nutriment? Answer: because form cannot benefit the very faculty it faces (the eye faculty), and because one who is already liberated from craving for nutriment takes no benefit from it though he see all manner of fine food and drink. Whatever is called “nutriment” must first nourish one’s own faculties and great elements, and only then reach the rest. When a man sees a visible form while drinking and eating, it does not so much as benefit his own eye faculty and great elements, still less reach the rest — because those faculties and objects are severally distinct.
Sometimes joy and pleasure arise upon seeing a visible form; but that is the “contact” which arises with form as its object, and it is contact nutriment, not form.
Furthermore, the non-returner and the arhat are already liberated from craving for nutriment, and take no benefit even upon seeing all manner of fine food and drink.
The entities of the remaining three nutriments: “contact” refers to the several contacts produced by the meeting of three; “volition” refers to mental action; “consciousness” refers to the aggregate of consciousness. These three are all of them with outflows alone, and are present within all three realms.
Question: why does the entity of nutriment not extend to what is without outflows? The Vaibhāṣikas explain it thus: to be able to assist the several existences (birth and death in the three existences) is what the sense of “nutriment” is; and what is without outflows arises for the sake of cultivation and for the extinguishing of the several existences, and so is not nutriment. Moreover the sūtra says: nutriment is of four kinds, and can cause beings that have come to be to abide, and can assist the several seekers of birth. What is without outflows is not so, and so is not an entity of nutriment.
Beings that have come to be, and seekers of birth: what is called “a being that has come to be” displays the sense of “already born” — whoever has already taken birth in any of the destinies is called already born.
And what does “seeker of birth” refer to? It refers to intermediate existence. For the Buddha, the World-Honored One, spoke of intermediate existence under five names: the first is “formed by mind,” since it arises from mind and is not formed by the meeting of outward conditions such as semen and blood; the second is “seeker of birth,” since it constantly delights to seek out and examine the place where it is to take birth; the third is “eater of odors,” since its body takes odor for its nutriment as it goes to the place of birth; the fourth is “intermediate existence,” since it is the aggregates in the interval between the two destinies of death and birth; the fifth is “named arising,” since it arises for a time facing the birth that is to come.
As the sūtra says: “There is the arising of a broken body of one’s own, there is the birth of a broken world” — the “arising” here is intermediate existence.
The sūtra says further: “There is a person who has cut off the fetter of arising and has not cut off the fetter of birth.” This sūtra states four alternatives at length: the several who go upstream, being free from craving for two realms, are the first alternative (having cut off the fetter of arising and not cut off the fetter of birth); those who attain parinirvāṇa in the interval are the second alternative; the several arhats are the third alternative; and what is left when the foregoing cases are excluded is the fourth alternative.
There is also another account: “a being that has come to be” refers to the arhat, and the rest, who still have craving, are called “seekers of birth.”
How many nutriments make beings that have come to be abide, and how many assist seekers of birth: Question: how many nutriments can make beings that have come to be abide? How many nutriments can assist sentient beings that seek birth? The Vaibhāṣikas say: all four in each case. The several who have craving are assisted by morsel nutriment as condition as well, so that it makes them call forth a later existence — because the World-Honored One said that all four nutriments are conditions of sickness, of the boil, of the arrow, of the root, and of old age and death. It may also be seen that volition nutriment can make the body now present abide.
The three matters of volition nutriment:
There is a saying handed down in the world thus: once upon a time a father, meeting with famine, wished to travel to a distant land. He was already starved and gaunt, and his two children were still small; he wished to take them with him but had not the strength, and so he filled a bag with ashes and hung it upon the wall, comforting the two children by telling them it was a bag of parched meal (parched meal being roasted rice or wheat flour). The two children cherished hope and prolonged their lives for a time; afterwards someone came and opened the bag, and the children saw that it was ashes, and their hope being cut off they died.
Again, upon the great sea there was a company of merchants who met with disaster and whose ship broke up, and all their food and drink was lost. Far off they saw the foam heaped upon the surface of the sea and suspected it was the shore, and in their hearts they hoped to reach it quickly, and by this their lives were prolonged for a time; but when they came up to it and touched it and knew that it was not the shore, their hope being cut off they died.
The Treatise on the Collected Various Gates says: in the great sea there is a great kind of living being that climbs upon the shore and lays eggs, buries the eggs in the sand, and returns into the sea; and if the mother constantly keeps them in mind the eggs do not spoil, but if she loses mindfulness of them the eggs perish.
The author corrects this: to say so is unsound, since it contradicts the sense of nutriment. Can another’s volition nutriment sustain one’s own body? By right reasoning it should be said that it is the eggs that constantly think of the mother and thereby escape rotting and spoiling, and that when they forget, their life ends. And the “arousing of the thought that thinks of the mother” occurs precisely at the position of “contact.”
Why only four nutriments are stated: since the several dharmas with outflows are all able to make the several existences grow, why did the World-Honored One state nutriment as being of four kinds only? Answer: even so, to state four with respect to what is excellent is no fault.
The first two nutriments can benefit the “support” and the “supported” of this present body; the latter two can draw forth the existence that is to come.
What is called the “support” refers to the body endowed with faculties, and morsel nutriment can assist it. What is called the “supported” refers to mind and mental factors, and contact nutriment can assist them. The capacity of these two nutriments to assist an existence already arisen is the most excellent.
What is called “the existence to come” refers to a future birth; and with respect to what is to be born, volition nutriment can draw it forth. Volition nutriment having drawn it forth, it is by the force of the seeds of consciousness perfumed by action that the later existence can then arise. The capacity of these two nutriments to draw forth and to raise up an existence not yet arisen is the most excellent.
Therefore, although all dharmas with outflows make the several existences grow, yet with respect to the most excellent capacity these four nutriments alone are stated. The first two nutriments are like the mother who rears, since they rear what has been born; the latter two are like the mother who bears, since they bring to birth what has not been born.
The four alternatives of morsel and nutriment: Question: is everything that is a “morsel” a nutriment? Answer: there are morsels that are not nutriment, and a fourfold analysis should be made. The first alternative (a morsel and not a nutriment): what is drunk and eaten acting on the contrary as a condition that injures the several faculties and great elements. The second alternative (a nutriment and not a morsel): the remaining three nutriments. The third alternative (both a morsel and a nutriment): what is drunk and eaten acting as a condition that assists the several faculties and great elements. The fourth alternative (neither a morsel nor a nutriment): what is left when the foregoing cases are excluded.
Contact and the other two nutriments, each as is applicable, may likewise each be made into four alternatives in this way.
Question: are there cases where contact and the rest act as condition and assist the several faculties and great elements and yet are not nutriment? Answer: there are, namely contact and the rest without outflows and of another level.
The body of one whom nutriment has harmed is called nutriment as well: the several things which, once eaten, injure on the contrary the body of the eater are called nutriment all the same, because at the outset they had a capacity to assist. The Vaibhāṣikas say: nutriment can perform the function of nutriment at two positions, and at both is called nutriment — first, at the time of first eating, when it can remove hunger and thirst; second, after digestion, when it can assist the faculties and the great elements.
All five destinies and four modes of birth have all four nutriments: Question: which destiny and which mode of birth has how many nutriments? Answer: the five destinies and the four modes of birth all have the four nutriments complete.
Question: how can there be morsel nutriment in the hells? Are those iron balls and molten copper morsel nutriment? And if what can injure is also counted nutriment, then this contradicts the four alternatives above. Moreover the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas says: “What is morsel nutriment? It is what can assist the several faculties and great elements,” and so on down to consciousness nutriment stated in the same way.
Answer: that treatise states it as called nutriment merely with respect to the side of “being able to assist,” and so there is no contradiction. Yet the hot iron balls and the rest in the hells, though after being eaten they act to injure, can nevertheless remove hunger and thirst for a time and so obtain the character of nutriment, and therefore they too are called nutriment. Moreover the morsel nutriment of the solitary hells (the small hells scattered among human beings) is just like that of human beings. Hence within the five destinies there are the four nutriments.
The weighing of the ordinary being in the Jambu grove: The World-Honored One said: if a man were able to give food and drink to a hundred non-Buddhist seers free from craving, and another were able to give food and drink to one single “ordinary being in the Jambu grove,” the result obtained by the latter would surpass that of the former.
What is meant by “an ordinary being in the Jambu grove”?
Some explain it thus: it is all who dwell in Jambudvīpa and have a belly. This explanation is unsound, because the sūtra speaks of “one” man. Moreover, on this explanation, giving food and drink here to measureless ordinary beings ought in reason to surpass giving to a few non-Buddhist seers free from craving; and what would then be remarkable in it, worth weighing and praising?
Some say: it is a bodhisattva close to buddhahood. This too is unsound, because the merit obtained by giving to him surpasses giving to a koṭi (ten million) of arhats.
The Vaibhāṣika masters say: this ordinary being is one who has already obtained the factors conducive to penetration (the stage of preparation before the path of seeing). In this account name and sense do not answer to each other either, since there has never been a sūtra or root treatise that says “one who has obtained the factors conducive to penetration dwells in the Jambu grove” — it should be known that this is merely a discrimination of their own.
(The correct interpretation): the bodhisattva in his last body dwelling in the Jambu grove is what is called “that ordinary being.” This account alone is sound. For at that time the bodhisattva stood in the same rank as the seers free from craving (being still an ordinary being), and therefore he is weighed against those seers and his superiority is praised; and although the merit of giving to the bodhisattva surpasses without bound, yet carrying forward the weighing above, it is said for the present to surpass a hundred. In reasoning it must be so. For afterwards the World-Honored One set that ordinary being aside and weighed the superiority and inferiority of a non-Buddhist against one on the way to the fruit of stream-entry; were it not so, the World-Honored One ought to have set that ordinary being over against one on the way to the fruit of stream-entry.
(Transition): The dependent origination of sentient beings and their abiding have now been stated. As to dying at the exhaustion of the lifespan and the rest, spoken of above, they should now be properly distinguished — which consciousness is present, and with which feeling is it associated, when death and birth and the rest occur? The stanza says:
〔Root 42 · Root 43 · First Half of Root 44〕Death and Birth: Which Consciousness and Which Feeling
Stanza: Cutting off wholesome roots and restoring them, becoming free from defilement and falling back, dying and taking birth — all these are granted to be in mental consciousness alone; death and birth are associated with equanimous feeling alone, are not in absorption, and are not at a position without mind; the mind that enters nirvāṇa is of two indeterminate kinds only. In one whose life ends gradually, consciousness ceases last at the feet, the navel, and the heart in order; those who go downward, those who go to the human destiny, those who go to the heavens, and those who are not born again all differ; and there is besides the “severing of the vital points,” arisen from water and the rest.
Treatise:
Six positions in mental consciousness alone: cutting off wholesome roots, restoring wholesome roots, becoming free from defilement with respect to a realm or level, falling back from freedom from defilement, dying, and taking birth — at these six positions it is by the very nature of things granted that there is mental consciousness alone, and not the other five consciousnesses. The word “birth” spoken of in the stanza should be known to include also the first joining of rebirth in intermediate existence.
Death and birth with equanimous feeling alone: death and birth are granted to be associated with equanimous feeling alone, because the mind associated with equanimity is not sharp and clear; the remaining feelings are sharp and clear and do not conduce to death and birth.
In a distracted mind alone and not in absorption; necessarily not without mind: further, these two times of death and birth are in a distracted mind alone and not in absorption; they must be at a position where there is mind, and will not be without mind.
That there is no death and birth in a mind in absorption has three reasons: first, the realms and levels are severally distinct (a mind in absorption belonging to an upper realm and level, death and birth to one’s own realm); second, a mind in absorption arises by preparation (whereas the mind of death and birth arises spontaneously); third, a mind in absorption can render assistance (whereas the mind of death and birth is feeble and cannot render assistance).
Neither will death and birth occur at a position without mind, because at a position without mind the life faculty is certainly not injured. If the supporting body is about to be destroyed, a mind belonging to that supporting body must still arise, and only then does life end; there is no other reasoning. Moreover one without mind cannot take birth, because the cause of taking birth is lacking — apart from the arising of the afflictions there is no taking birth.
Entering nirvāṇa with two indeterminate minds alone: although it is said that the existence of death extends to minds of all three ethical qualities, yet at entering nirvāṇa there are only two indeterminate minds. The party that holds that the desire realm has a “maturation mind of equanimous feeling” says that the mind entering nirvāṇa in the desire realm has both the indeterminate of the mode of deportment and the indeterminate of maturation; the party that holds that the desire realm has no maturation of equanimous feeling says that the mind entering nirvāṇa in the desire realm has the mode of deportment only and no maturation.
Question: why can only an indeterminate mind enter nirvāṇa? Answer: because the force of the indeterminate is feeble, and conduces to the cutting off of mind.
Where consciousness ceases at the end of life: in one whose life ends all at once, mental consciousness and the body faculty cease abruptly and together.
If he dies gradually, then those who go downward, those who go to human beings, and those who go to the heavens differ — consciousness ceasing at the three places of the feet, the navel, and the heart in that order. “Going downward” means falling into an evil destiny, and his consciousness ceases last at the place of the feet; if he goes to the destiny of human beings, consciousness ceases at the navel; if he goes to be born among the gods, consciousness ceases at the place of the heart. The several arhats are called “not born again,” and their last mind too ceases at the place of the heart. Certain other masters say: the consciousness of the arhat ceases at the crown of the head.
At the very time of the ending of life, because the body faculty at the feet and the other places has ceased, mental consciousness ceases along with it. As the end of life draws near the body faculty gradually ceases, and reaching the feet and the other places it abruptly ceases altogether — like a little water poured upon a red-hot stone, which gradually lessens and gradually vanishes, and at one place is wholly exhausted.
The severing of the vital points: further, one whose life ends gradually is at the end for the most part pressed by the painful feeling of the “severing of the vital points.”
There is no separate thing called a vital point; there are only certain particular joints within the body which, once touched, bring death, and these are called the vital points.
If any one among water, fire, and wind grows dominant, then, as a sharp blade’s edge touching those vital points, an exceedingly heavy painful feeling arises thereby, and from this life ends before long.
The “severing” spoken of here is not called severing as chopping firewood is; it is because after the severing there is no awareness that it gets the name “severing.”
Question: why does the element of earth have no such severing function? Answer: because there is no fourth inward calamity. The three inward calamities are wind, heat, and phlegm; and as water, fire, and wind grow dominant each as is applicable, these three calamities arise. Some say: this is just like the three catastrophes of the outer receptacle world (the catastrophes of water, of fire, and of wind).
The five signs of decay in the sons of the gods: this severing of the vital points is not found among the gods. Yet when the several sons of the gods are about to end their lives, five small signs of decay appear first: first, their garments and ornamental gear give out a sound not to be desired; second, the light of their own bodies suddenly becomes dim and feeble; third, at the time of bathing, drops of water cling to their bodies (which ordinarily they do not); fourth, whereas by nature they were restless and swift-moving, they now stagnate upon a single object; fifth, whereas their eyes were fixed and still, they now blink again and again. When these five signs appear, it is not yet certain that they will die.
Further, five great signs of decay appear: first, their garments are stained with dust; second, their flower garlands wither and fade; third, sweat comes forth from both armpits; fourth, a foul odor clings to their bodies; fifth, they take no delight in their own seats. When these five signs appear, they will certainly die.
(Transition): Within the birth, abiding, and passing away of this world of sentient beings the World-Honored One established the “three classes.” What are the three classes? The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 44〕The Three Classes — Fixed in Rightness, Fixed in Wrongness, and Indeterminate
Stanza: The class fixed in rightness, the class fixed in wrongness, and the class of indeterminate nature. The noble belong to the right, those who commit the deeds of immediate retribution to the wrong, and the rest are indeterminate.
Treatise: First, the class fixed in rightness; second, the class fixed in wrongness; third, the class of indeterminate nature.
What “rightness” means: the sūtra says, “Greed cut off without remainder, hatred cut off without remainder, delusion cut off without remainder, all the afflictions cut off without remainder,” and this is called rightness. What is called “fixed” refers to the noble; and “noble” refers to those in whom the path without outflows has already arisen — being far from the several evil dharmas they are called noble, since they have obtained the acquisition of final release from bondage (the acquisition without outflows realized by the cutting off of delusion). They will certainly be able to exhaust the afflictions, and so are called “fixed in rightness.”
Question: those who have already obtained the factors conducive to liberation will also certainly obtain nirvāṇa; why are they not counted as fixed in rightness? Answer: because they may afterwards fall into the class fixed in wrongness; and because the time of their obtaining nirvāṇa is not yet fixed, unlike the stream-enterer with his fixed limit of at most seven further existences; and because they are not yet able to cast off wrongness, and so are not called fixed in rightness.
What “wrongness” means: it is the several hells, animals, and hungry ghosts, and this is called wrongness. And “fixed” refers to the five deeds of immediate retribution; one who has committed a deed of immediate retribution will certainly fall into the hells, and so it is called fixed in wrongness.
What “indeterminate” means: what is other than fixed in rightness and fixed in wrongness is called of indeterminate nature — because these await two conditions and may become either one of the two.
器世間·身量·壽量The Receptacle World · Bodily Measure · Lifespan
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔正45–47〕器世間怎麼安立——風輪、水輪、金輪三層底座
論(承前起問):前面已經把「有情世間」(住在世界裡的一切生命)說完了,接著要說「器世間」(承載這些生命的外在世界,好比盛物的器皿)。頌說:
頌:要安立器世間,最下面是風輪,它的廣度大到無法計數,厚度是十六洛叉(『洛叉』是印度的數目單位,古德說相當於漢地的『億』)。風輪之上是水輪,深十一億二萬;水輪的下面八洛叉仍是水,其餘的部分凝結成了金。這水輪與金輪的廣度,直徑十二洛叉三千四百半,周長是直徑的三倍。
論:要承認這三千大千世界就是這樣安立起來的,其中形狀與大小各各不同。是這樣的:由於一切有情『業』的增上力量(『增上力』就是有壓倒性、作得了主的推動力),最下面依著虛空生出了風輪,廣度無法計數,厚十六億踰繕那(『踰繕那』是印度的長度單位,舊譯作『由旬』)。
這個風輪的體性極為堅密。假設有一位大諾健那(一種力氣極大的神),拿金剛輪奮力懸空擊下去,金剛輪會碎,風輪卻毫髮無損。
又由於一切有情業的增上力,興起大雲降雨,澆注在風輪之上,雨滴粗得像車軸一樣,積水就成了水輪。這水輪在還沒有凝結的階段,深十一億二萬踰繕那。
有人問:水輪為什麼不會向四邊流散呢?有一派論師說:是一切有情的業力所執持,使它不流散——就像人所吃喝的東西,還沒有消化變熟的時候,終究不會流走掉進熟藏(腸道)裡去。另有一派論師說:是靠風力執持才不流散,就像『篅』(用竹編的圓形穀倉)能把穀子圍住一樣。
由有情業力感召出另一種風生起,搏擊這水,把水面上層結成了金——就像煮熟的乳汁靜置之後,上面凝出一層乳膜。所以水輪就減少到只剩八洛叉厚,其餘的轉成了金,金的厚度是三億二萬。水輪與金輪這兩層的廣度數目相同,就是直徑十二億三千四百半。周長的數是直徑的三倍,也就是周長合計三十六億一萬三百五十踰繕那。頌說:
〔正48–51〕金輪上的九座大山
頌:正中央是蘇迷盧山,其次是踰健達羅、伊沙馱羅山、朅地洛迦山、蘇達梨舍那、頞濕縛羯拏、毘那怛迦山、尼民達羅山;在四大洲等等的外面,還有鐵輪圍山。前面七座山是金子造成的,蘇迷盧則是四種寶物造成的。這些山沒入水中的部分都是八萬,妙高山(就是蘇迷盧)露出水面的高度也是八萬,其餘八座則一座比一座低一半。每座山的寬度都與它露出水面的高度相等。
論:在金輪之上有九座大山,妙高山王處在正中央,其餘八座周匝環繞著妙高山。八座山當中前七座叫作『內山』,第七座山之外才有四大洲等等;再往外,還有鐵輪圍山,像車輪的外框一樣把一個世界圍起來。
持雙山等七座山只由金子構成。妙高山王則以四種寶為體,依次是北面、東面、南面、西面,分別為金、銀、吠琉璃、頗胝迦寶(吠琉璃即青色寶石,頗胝迦即水晶)。由於寶物本身的威德,顏色會映現到空中,所以我們贍部洲上空看起來像吠琉璃的青色。
有人問:這些寶物又是從哪裡生出來的呢?答:一樣是一切有情業的增上力。又有大雲興起,降雨在金輪上,雨滴粗如車軸,積水奔騰如濤,這水就成了眾寶的『種』與『藏』。由於種種威德猛風的鑽擊,變化生出了眾寶之類。
這樣由水變生出寶物的時候,是『因滅而果生』,因與果的體並不同時存在——不像數論外道所主張的『轉變』那樣。
問:數論是怎麼主張轉變的意思呢?
〔數論答〕:他們主張有一個『有法』(作為承載者的實體)自性恆常存在,只是其中有的法生起、有的法滅去——這樣講轉變,有什麼道理上的違背嗎?
〔論主難〕:必定不可能有一個常住的法,卻又在它上面主張另外有法滅、有法生。
〔數論救〕:誰說在法之外另有一個『有法』呢?就是這個法本身在轉變的時候,作為不同相狀的所依,才叫作『有法』。
〔論主破〕:這樣講也不合理。
〔數論徵〕:哪裡不合理?
〔論主答〕:就是這個東西,卻又不像這個東西——這樣的說法,我從來沒聽過。
這樣變生出金寶等等之後,又由業力引起另一種風,把寶物等等分揀開來,聚攏成山、成洲;並且把水分成甘水與鹹水,各別成立內海與外海。
於是這九座山住在金輪之上,沒入水中的量都是八萬踰繕那,蘇迷盧山露出水面的高度也是如此。其餘八座露出水面的高度一半一半地遞減:最初的持雙山露出水面四萬,一直到最後的鐵輪圍山,露出水面三百一十二半。這九座山各自的寬度,都與自己露出水面的高度相同。頌說:
〔正52·正53〕山與山之間的八重海
頌:山與山之間有八重海,前七重叫作『內海』。最裡面那一重寬八萬,四邊各是它的三倍;其餘六重一重比一重窄一半。第八重叫作『外海』,寬三洛叉二萬二千踰繕那。
論:以妙高山為最初、鐵輪圍山為最後,中間有八重海,前七重叫作內海。這七重海裡都具備八種功德的水:一是甘、二是冷、三是軟、四是輕、五是清淨、六是不臭、七是喝的時候不損傷咽喉、八是喝下去不傷腸胃。
這七重海,最裡面那一重寬八萬——這是就持雙山內側的一圈來計量的;在它的四面,各是三倍,也就是各成二億四萬踰繕那。其餘六重海的寬度一重比一重窄一半:第二重海寬四萬,一直到第七重寬一千二百五十。這裡不說周長,是因為數字太繁瑣了。
第八重叫作外海,裡面盈滿鹹水,寬三億二萬二千。頌說:
〔正54–57〕外海中的四大洲與八中洲
頌:外海當中四大洲的形狀是這樣的——南贍部洲像車子,三邊各二千,南邊只有三踰繕那半。東毘提訶洲,形狀像半月,三邊與贍部洲相同,東邊三百五十。西瞿陀尼洲,形狀圓滿沒有缺口,直徑二千五百,周長是它的三倍。北俱盧洲是正方形,每邊各二千,四邊相等。另外還有八個中洲,四大洲的兩側各有兩個。
論:在外海之中有四個大洲,就在妙高山的四面。
南贍部洲北邊寬、南邊窄,另外三邊長度相等,形狀像一輛車。南邊只寬三踰繕那半,其餘三邊各有二千踰繕那。只有這個洲當中有『金剛座』,上面窮盡地面、下面抵住金輪。一切菩薩將要登上正覺的時候,都坐在這個座上生起『金剛喻定』(像金剛一樣能斷盡一切煩惱的最後一念定)——因為除此以外,再沒有其餘的所依與處所,具有足夠堅固的力量能承載這件事。
東勝身洲東邊窄、西邊寬,另外三邊長度相等,形狀像半月。東邊三百五十,其餘三邊各二千。
西牛貨洲圓得像滿月,直徑二千五百,周長七千半。
北俱盧洲形狀像方形的座,四邊長度相等,每邊各二千。頌裡說『等』字,是要表明四邊沒有一點增減。
隨著各洲的形狀,那裡的人的臉形也是這樣(洲圓則人面圓,洲方則人面方)。
另外還有八個中洲,是大洲的眷屬——四大洲的兩側各有兩個中洲。贍部洲旁邊的兩個中洲,一是遮末羅洲、二是筏羅遮末羅洲。勝身洲旁邊的兩個,一是提訶洲、二是毘提訶洲。牛貨洲旁邊的兩個,一是舍搋洲、二是嗢怛羅漫怛里拏洲。俱盧洲旁邊的兩個,一是矩拉婆洲、二是憍拉婆洲。這一切中洲都有人居住。另有一種說法:其中只有一個是邏剎娑(羅剎,一類非人)所居。頌說:
〔正58〕黑山、雪山、香醉山與無熱池
頌:贍部洲往北有九座黑山,雪山與香醉山之內,有無熱池,縱橫各五十踰繕那。
論:這個贍部洲從中部往北,有三處地方各有三重黑山(三處各三重,合為九座)。黑山的北面有大雪山,大雪山的北面有香醉山。雪山之北、香山之南,有一座大池,名叫『無熱惱』,流出四條大河:一是殑伽河、二是信度河、三是徙多河、四是縛芻河。
無熱惱池縱橫正好相等,每邊各五十踰繕那,八功德水盈滿其中,不是得了神通的人就沒有辦法到達。在這池邊有『贍部林』,樹形高大,果實甘美——依這片林子而得名叫贍部洲,或者依這果子來立洲的名號。
那麼又在什麼地方安置㮈落迦(地獄)與大㮈落迦(大地獄)呢?它們有多大、有幾個呢?頌說:
〔正59·正60〕八大地獄、十六增與八寒地獄
頌:從這裡往下超過二萬,就是無間地獄,深度與寬度相同。它上面有七個㮈落迦。八個地獄的『增』都是十六個,就是煻煨、屍糞、鋒刃、烈河這四種增,各自安住在那八個地獄的四方。其餘還有八個寒地獄。
論:這個贍部洲往下超過二萬,有阿鼻旨大㮈落迦(阿鼻旨即無間),深度與寬度同前面所說,都是二萬,所以它的底距離這裡有四萬踰繕那。因為在那裡受苦沒有間斷——不像其餘七個大㮈落迦受苦不是恆常的——所以叫作「無間」。
譬如在等活地獄當中,那些有情的身體雖然被種種砍刺磨搗,可是他們一遇到涼風吹來,就又活轉如初;由於這個道理,才立『等活』(重新一樣活過來)的名字。阿鼻旨當中沒有這種事。
另有一派論師說:阿鼻旨當中沒有『樂』來間隔『苦』,所以叫無間;其餘的地獄中還有樂夾雜生起——雖然那不是異熟果,卻是等流果(『異熟』是業直接感得的果報,『等流』是同類相續而來的餘勢)。
七個㮈落迦在無間地獄之上,一層層疊著住。那七個是什麼呢?一是極熱、二是炎熱、三是大叫、四是號叫、五是眾合、六是黑繩、七是等活。另有一種說法:這七個在無間地獄的旁邊。
八個㮈落迦的『增』各有十六個,所以薄伽梵(世尊)說了這樣一首頌:
〔引頌〕世尊所說的地獄頌,與十六增的內容
引頌:這八個㮈落迦,我說是極難超越的。地是熱鐵鑄成,四周圍著鐵牆,四面開四道門,用鐵扇關閉起來。巧妙地安排布置,各有十六個增,多達百踰繕那,裡面滿是造惡的人,周遍的火焰交相貫徹,猛火恆常熾燃。
論:所謂十六增,是說八個㮈落迦的四面門外,各有四處——
一是『煻煨增』(煻煨即熱灰)。這個增裡面熱灰深及膝蓋,有情走進去,才一落腳,皮肉連血一起燒焦爛落;一抬腳,又重新長出來、恢復如初。
二是『屍糞增』。這個增裡面滿是屍體與糞便的泥漿,其中有很多『娘矩吒』蟲,嘴尖利得像針,身白頭黑;有情走進去,都被這種蟲鑽破皮、咬破骨頭,吸食他們的骨髓。
三是『鋒刃增』。這個增裡面又有三種:第一是『刀刃路』,就是在這裡面刀刃朝上鋪成大道,有情走上去,才一落腳,皮肉連血一起被割碎掉落;一抬腳,又重新長出來、恢復如初。第二是『劍葉林』,這片林子上面純粹以銛利的劍刃作為樹葉,有情走進去,風一吹葉子落下來,把他的肢體斬刺得骨肉零落,還有毛色斑駁的烏狗抓扯著吃他。第三是『鐵刺林』,這片林子上長著鋒利的鐵刺,有十六指長;有情被逼著上樹下樹的時候,那些刺尖銳地上下穿刺,還有鐵嘴的鳥來啄食有情的眼睛與心肝,爭著搶食。刀刃路等這三種雖然不同,但同樣是鐵造的刑具,所以合起來算作一個增。
四是『烈河增』。這個增的範圍寬廣,裡面滿是滾熱的鹹水;有情進到裡面,或者浮起、或者沉下,或者逆流、或者順流,或者橫著、或者打轉,被蒸被煮,骨肉糜爛。就像大鍋裡盛滿灰汁,放進麻子米粒等等,底下猛火燒著,麻米在裡面上下翻轉,整個爛掉;有情也是這樣。假設想要逃走,兩岸上有許多獄卒,手裡拿著刀槍攔阻趕回,沒有辦法出去。
這條烈河像護城的壕溝,前面三種則像園林。四面各有四個增,所以說總共十六。
這是『增上被刑害的地方』,所以叫作「增」——因為在本地獄裡剛被刑害過,又再一次遭受傷害。另有一種說法:有情從地獄出來以後又遭受這種苦,所以說是增。
現在在這裡由一個論題引出另一個論題:那些地獄卒是有情嗎?
有一種說法:不是有情。問:那怎麼會動作呢?答:由有情的業力所推動,就像世界成立時的那種風(也不必是誰在吹)。問:如果是這樣,那麼大德法善現所說的又該怎麼會通呢?他的頌是這樣說的:
〔引頌〕大德法善現之頌,與八寒地獄、餘處諸趣
引頌:心裡常懷著忿恨毒害,喜歡積集種種惡業,看見別人受苦反而欣喜,死後就作琰魔卒。
論:琰魔王派遣那些邏剎娑,把有情丟進地獄裡去,這些才叫作『琰魔卒』——他們是真實的有情,但不是地獄當中直接殘害有情的那些;所以(直接行刑的)地獄卒並不是真實有情。
另有一種說法:(地獄卒)是有情。問:如果是這樣,他們這種惡業要在什麼地方受異熟果呢?答:就在地獄當中。因為地獄當中尚且容得下無間業所感的異熟果,這一點又有什麼道理可以遮止呢?問:如果是這樣,為什麼火燒不到他們?答:這一定是被業力隔開的緣故,或者是感得了不同的大種(構成身體的四大不同),所以不被燒。
熱㮈落迦已經說了有八個。此外還有另外八個寒㮈落迦。那八個是什麼呢?一是頞部陀、二是尼剌部陀、三是頞唽吒、四是臛臛婆、五是虎虎婆、六是嗢鉢羅、七是鉢特摩、八是摩訶鉢特摩。這裡面的有情被嚴寒逼迫,隨著身體與聲音的變化來立它們的名字。
這八個寒地獄一併位於贍部洲之下,就在前面所說的大地獄旁邊。
問:這個贍部洲的面積沒有多少,底下怎麼容得下無間地獄那麼大的東西呢?答:洲的形狀像堆起來的穀子,上面尖、下面闊,所以大海是越往下越窄、越往下越深(洲則越往下越闊)。
像上面所論的十六地獄,是一切有情共同的增上業所感。其餘的『孤地獄』則各由別業所招,或者許多人共住、或者兩人、或者一人所止,差別有很多種,處所也不固定——或者靠近江河山邊曠野,或者在地底、在空中以及其餘的地方。
諸地獄的安布就是這樣:本處在下面,支流分派則不固定。
傍生(畜生)的住處是水、陸、空三處,本處在大海,後來才流布到其餘地方。
諸鬼的本處是琰魔王國。在這個贍部洲底下超過五百踰繕那,有琰魔王國,縱橫的量也是五百,從這裡輾轉散布到其餘地方。(鬼趣之中)或者有端正莊嚴、具大威德的,享受種種富樂自在如同天人;或者有飢餓羸弱、面貌醜陋的。像這一類,經中有詳細的說法。
至於日月所居的處所與大小等等問題,頌說:
〔正61–63〕日月的高度、大小,與晝夜的增減
頌:日月在迷盧山的一半高處,直徑分別是五十一與五十。北洲夜半的時候,東洲日落、南洲日中、西洲日出,四洲相等。雨際的第二個月,後半的第九日起夜漸漸增長;寒際的第四個月也是這樣。夜減的時候晝就相反。晝夜每次增減一個臘縛。日在南路北路運行的緣故,月靠近日的時候被自己的影子遮住,所以看見月輪有缺。
論:問:日月眾星依著什麼而住?答:依著風而住。就是一切有情業的增上力共同引起風生起,繞著妙高山在空中旋轉環行,運載執持日月等等,使它們不停下、不墜落。
問:它們所住的地方距離這裡有幾踰繕那?答:與持雙山頂齊平,也就是妙高山的一半高。
問:日月的直徑有幾踰繕那?答:日五十一,月只有五十。星最小的只有一俱盧舍(一種較小的長度單位),最大的十六踰繕那。
日輪的下面是頗胝迦寶中的火珠所成,能發熱、能照明;月輪的下面是頗胝迦寶中的水珠所成,能生冷、能照明。這是隨著有情的業增上力所生的,能對眼、身、果、花、莊稼、藥草等等事物,隨其所應地或者利益、或者損害。
問:只有一個日月普遍在四洲作它所該作的事,那麼一天所作的事,是四洲同時的嗎?答:不是。問:那是怎樣?答:北洲夜半的時候,東洲日落、南洲日中、西洲日出。這四個時刻是彼此相等(同時)的,其餘依此類推就可以知道。
日在這個洲上運行的路線有差別,所以使得晝夜有減有增。從雨際第二個月的後半第九日起,夜漸漸增長;從寒際第四個月的後半第九日起,夜漸漸減短。晝的增減與此相反:夜漸增的時候晝就漸減,夜若漸減晝就漸增。
問:晝夜增長的時候,一晝夜增多少?答:增一臘縛(一種很短的時間單位)。晝夜減少也是這樣。
日在這個洲上向南運行、向北運行,依次就使得夜增、晝增。
問:為什麼月輪在黑半的末尾、白半的開頭(陰曆月末月初)看起來有缺呢?答:《世施設》當中是這樣解釋的——因為月宮殿運行時靠近日輪,月被日輪的光所侵照,另一邊便發出影子遮住自己的月輪,使得那時候看起來不圓滿。先前的舊論師則解釋為:由於日月二輪運行的度數不同,才顯現出圓與缺。
問:日等宮殿是哪些有情居住?答:四大天王所統屬的天眾。問:這些天眾只住在這裡嗎?答:如果是空居天,就只住在日等宮殿裡;如果是地居天,就住在妙高山的各層級等處。
問:有幾個層級?它們的量是多少?哪些天住在哪一層級?頌說:
〔正64·正65〕妙高山的四層級與四大王眾天
頌:妙高山有四個層級,彼此相距各一萬。向旁邊伸出的寬度依次是一萬六千、八千、四千、二千。堅手、持鬘、恒憍與大王眾,依次住在四個層級,也住在其餘七座金山上。
論:蘇迷盧山有四個層級:從水面起算到第一層,相距一萬踰繕那;這樣一直到從第三層到第四層,也是一萬。
這四個層級從妙高山向旁邊伸出、圍繞著山,占盡它的下半部。最初一層向旁伸出一萬六千,第二、第三、第四層依次是八千、四千、二千。
有一位藥叉神名叫堅手,住在最初一層;有一位名叫持鬘,住在第二層;有一位名叫恒憍,住在第三層。這三位都是四大天王所統屬的天眾。第四層是四大天王與各自的眷屬共同居住的地方,所以經中依此說『四大王眾天』。
就像妙高山四面的層級是四大王眾與眷屬所居,同樣地,持雙、持軸山等七座金山上也有天人居住,那是四大天王所統屬的封邑——這叫作『依地而住的四大王眾天』。在欲界諸天當中,這一重天的範圍最廣。
問:三十三天住在什麼地方?頌說:
〔正66–69〕三十三天與善見城
頌:妙高山頂每邊八萬,三十三天住在那裡。四個角各有一座山峰,是金剛手所住。中央的宮城名叫善見,周長一萬踰繕那,高一踰繕那半的金城,種種雜寶裝飾,地面柔軟。城中有一座殊勝殿,周長一千踰繕那。城外有四座苑莊嚴著,就是眾車、麁惡、雜林、喜林。四座妙池分居四方,各距苑二十。東北是圓生樹,西南是善法堂。
論:三十三天住在迷盧山頂。山頂四面各八十千(八萬),與山下四邊的量沒有分別。另有一派論師說:(山頂)周長是八十千,並且分開說四邊各只有二萬。
山頂四個角各有一座山峰,高與寬各有五百。有一位藥叉神名叫金剛手,住在裡面守護諸天。
山頂中央有一座宮城名叫善見,每邊二千半,周長一萬踰繕那。金城的高度是一踰繕那半,地面平坦,也是真金所成,並用一百零一種雜寶嚴飾。地面觸感柔軟得像妬羅綿(一種樹果中所出的綿絮),踩上去時隨著腳而高低起伏。這是天帝釋所都的大城。
城中有一座殊勝殿,用種種妙寶具足莊嚴,因為勝過其餘天宮而叫作『殊勝』,每邊二百五十,周長一千踰繕那。以上是城中種種可愛的事物。
城外四面有四座苑莊嚴著,是那些天人共同遊戲的地方:一是眾車苑、二是麁惡苑、三是雜林苑、四是喜林苑,這是大城外部的裝飾莊嚴。四苑的四邊有四座妙池,中間各距離苑二十踰繕那,是那些天人殊勝的遊戲處,諸天在那裡比賽競勝、歡樂娛戲。
城外東北方有一株圓生樹,是三十三天享受欲樂最殊勝的地方。它盤結的樹根深廣五十踰繕那,聳直的樹幹向上生長,枝條向四旁鋪展,高與廣各有一百踰繕那。挺秀的葉子開出花來,妙香芬芳馥郁,順風可以熏滿一百踰繕那;若是逆風的時候,還能遍布五十。
問:順風可以這樣,怎麼還能逆風熏呢?有一派論師說:香並沒有逆著風熏的道理,只是依著『不超出樹的範圍』這一點,才說是逆風熏。按道理說,圓生樹確實有這樣的功德,它所流出的香氣能夠逆風而熏;雖然被天上調和之風的力量所壅遏,然而能夠相續不斷地流向其餘方位,只是漸漸變弱、漸漸微細,到不遠的地方就歇止了,不能像順風熏那樣遠達。
問:像這樣的花香,是依著自己的地方隨風相續轉到其餘方位去呢,還是只是熏了風、另外生起香氣呢?答:這件事沒有定論,諸位軌範師對這兩種說法都容許,沒有過失。
問:如果是這樣,那麼為什麼薄伽梵說:
〔引頌〕世尊的花香之頌,與善法堂
引頌:花的香氣不能逆風熏,根莖等等的香氣也是這樣;善士功德的香氣才芬芳馥郁,能逆著風流布美名遍於諸方。
論:那是依據人間的香氣才這樣說的,因為世人共同了知的香確實沒有這種能耐。化地部所傳的經中說:這(圓生樹的)香氣順風熏滿一百踰繕那,如果沒有風的時候只遍布五十。
城外西南角有善法堂,三十三天時常聚集在那裡,詳細討論如法與不如法的事。
前面已經辨明三十三天所居的外器;其餘有色諸天所住的器又是怎樣呢?頌說:
〔正70前半〕三十三天以上,宮殿住在空中
頌:這以上的有色諸天,居住依託於空中的宮殿。
論:前面所說的三十三天以上還有有色諸天,居住依託於空中的宮殿。
問:什麼叫作『上有色諸天』?答:就是夜摩天、覩史多天、樂變化天、他化自在天,以及前面所說的梵眾天等等共有十六處。連同前面(四大王眾天與三十三天),合起來有二十二重天,都依託外器而住。
在這樣所說的諸天眾當中,頌說:
〔正70後半〕六欲天行婬之相各不相同
頌:六欲天承受欲境,依次以交、抱、執手、笑、視為婬。
論:只有六欲天承受微妙的欲境。其中最初二重是依地而住的天(四大王眾天與三十三天),形體交合而成婬,與人間沒有分別;不過風氣一泄,熱惱就消除了,不像人間還有其餘的不淨。夜摩天眾只要一相抱就成婬,覩史多天只要執手,樂變化天只要相對而笑,他化自在天只要互相注視就成婬。
毘婆沙師是這樣解釋的:六天都是以形體交合而成婬;《世施設》中說相抱等等,只是為了顯示他們(成婬所需)時間長短的差別。因為越往上的天,欲境越微妙、貪心越迅捷,所以才會這樣。
隨著那些天人的男女膝上,會忽然化生出童男童女,這就說是那位天所生的男女。
問:初生的天眾身量是怎樣?頌說:
〔正71前半〕初生天眾的身量
頌:(欲天)初生時像五歲到十歲的孩子,色界天初生時身量已經圓滿且具有天衣。
論:六欲天初生的時候,依次像五歲、六歲、七歲、八歲、九歲、十歲的人,生下來身形很快就長成圓滿。色界天眾在初生的時候,身量就周遍圓滿,並具備微妙的衣服。
一切天眾都說『聖言』,也就是他們的言語與中印度相同。
問:欲生與樂生的分別應該怎麼理解?頌說:
〔正71後半〕欲生三種、樂生三種
頌:欲生有三種,通於人與天;樂生有三種,在九個處所。
論:所謂欲生三種——
有一類有情,樂於承受現前的種種妙欲境,他們在這樣現成的欲境當中自在而轉,這就是全部人趣以及下面四重天(四大王眾天到覩史多天)。
有一類有情,樂於承受自己所變化出來的種種妙欲境,他們在自化的妙欲境中自在而轉,這只有第五重樂變化天。
有一類有情,樂於承受他人所變化出來的種種妙欲境,他們在他化的妙欲境中自在而轉,這是第六重他化自在天。
依據『承受如所生起的現前欲境』、依據『樂於承受自化欲境』、依據『樂於承受他化欲境』,所以在欲界當中分別出「欲生」的三種差別。
所謂樂生三種——在三個靜慮當中,於九個處所受生而領受三種樂:就是那些天人安住在『離生喜樂』(初靜慮)、『定生喜樂』(第二靜慮),以及由於離了喜而唯有樂(第三靜慮),長時安住、長時遠離苦、長時領受樂,所以叫作「樂生」。
(附一問):生在靜慮中間(大梵天所居)根本沒有喜樂,應當思量:為什麼也稱作樂生天呢?
問:前面所說的諸天二十二處,上下彼此相距的量是多少?頌說:
〔正72前半〕從某一天往上的距離,等於它往下的距離
頌:像那一重天距離下面的量有多少,它距離上面的數目也是這樣。
論:每一重天中間相隔的踰繕那量,不容易一一數出來,只能總括地舉一個原則:那一重天距離下面的量有多少,距離上面也依此類推。
隨著從哪一重天算起,它距離下面大海的量有多少,它往上所能到達的距離就與往下相同。也就是說:妙高山從第四層級往下到大海是四萬踰繕那,那裡是四大天王本來的住處;那麼從那裡往上到三十三天,也就等於那一重天距離下面大海的量。像三十三天距離下面大海的量,往上到夜摩天的量也是如此。這樣一直到善見天距離下面大海的踰繕那量,從那裡往上到色究竟天,也與那一重天距離下面大海的量相等。
從此再往上就沒有居住之處了,這個地方最高,名叫『色究竟』。另有一派論師說:它名叫『礙究竟天』——他們所謂『礙』,是指積集起來的色;到了這裡質礙窮盡,所以得『究竟』之名。
問:生在下處的天人,能不能上昇、能不能看見上面?頌說:
〔正72後半〕除非有神通或依他力,下面的天不能上昇、不能見上
頌:除了神通力與依靠他力之外,下面的天不能上昇、不能看見上面。
論:三十三天由自己的神通力,能從本處上昇到夜摩天;或者依靠他力,就是得神通的人以及上界天眾把他接引到夜摩天去。其餘諸天上昇的情形也依此類推。
若上天來下、或下天至上,則下方得見上天;至於下界下地之眼,則不能見上界上地之色。然而下面的眼不能看見上界、上地,因為那不是它的境界——就像感覺不到那上界的觸一樣。所以(上界天人)從上地來到下地的時候,不是自身親自來,一定要變作下地的化身。
另有一派論師說:那下地的天,隨自己意樂也能看見上地的色,就像生在這欲界能從下面看見上天一樣。
問:夜摩等天的宮殿依處,量有多大?有一派論師說:這上面四重天的依處,量與妙高山頂相同。另一派論師說:往上一重一重加倍遞增。另有論師說:初靜慮地的宮殿依處等於一個四大洲,第二靜慮等於一個小千世界,第三靜慮等於一個中千世界,第四靜慮等於一個大千世界。又有論師說:下面三個靜慮依次等於小千、中千、大千,第四靜慮的量沒有邊際。
問:要到什麼樣的量才說是小千、中千、大千呢?頌說:
〔正73·正74〕小千、中千、大千
頌:四大洲、日月、蘇迷盧、欲界諸天、梵世,各各一千個,叫作一個小千世界。這個小千再乘一千倍,叫作一個中千。這個中千再乘一千倍就是大千,都是同時成、同時壞。
論:一千個四大洲乃至一千個梵世,這樣總說為一個小千。一千倍的小千叫作一個中千界。一千個中千界總名為一個大千。這樣的大千是同時成、同時壞的。同成同壞的相狀,後面(劫量章)會詳細辨明。
問:像外器的量各有差別那樣,身量也各有差別嗎?答:也有差別。問:是怎樣?頌說:
〔正75·正76·正77前半〕四洲人與諸天的身量
頌:贍部洲人的身量三肘半或四肘。東、西、北三洲的人依次一倍一倍地增加。欲界諸天以俱盧舍為單位,每一重加四分之一。色界諸天以踰繕那為單位,最初四重每次加半,這以上一重一重加倍,只有無雲天減去三。
論:贍部洲人的身高多半是三肘半,其中少部分有長到四肘的。東勝身洲人身高八肘,西牛貨洲人十六肘,北俱盧洲人三十二肘。
欲界六天最下一重的身量是一俱盧舍的四分之一,這樣以後每一重各加四分之一,到第六重天身量是一俱盧舍半。
色界天的身量:最初梵眾天半踰繕那,梵輔天整一踰繕那,大梵天一踰繕那半,少光天整二踰繕那。這以上其餘諸天都一倍一倍地增加,只有無雲天要減去三踰繕那——也就是無量光天由二倍增到四,這樣一直到色究竟天增滿一萬六千。
問:身量既然各不相同,壽量有沒有分別呢?答:也有分別。問:是怎樣?頌說:
〔正77後半·正78–80〕人、欲天、色天、無色天的壽量
頌:北洲定壽一千年,西洲、東洲各減一半;這個贍部洲壽量不定,最後只有十歲,最初則無法計量。人間五十年是最下一重天的一晝夜,乘這個算下來壽五百年,上面五重一倍一倍地增加。色界沒有晝夜的分別,劫的數目與身量相等。無色界最初二萬劫,往後各加二萬。少光天以上與以下的天,分別以大劫的全數與半數為劫。
論:北俱盧洲人定壽一千歲,西牛貨洲人壽五百歲,東勝身洲人壽二百五十歲,南贍部洲人壽沒有定限——劫減到最後,最長的壽命只有十歲;在劫初的時候,人壽無量,用百千等等數目都不能計量。
以上已經說了人間壽量的長短。
要先建立天上的晝夜,才可以計算天的壽命長短。問:天上怎麼建立晝夜?答:人間五十歲是六欲天中最下一重天的一晝一夜,乘這個晝夜三十天為一個月、十二個月為一年,那一重天壽命五百年。
上面五重欲天則逐漸加倍:人間一百歲是第二重天的一晝一夜,乘這個晝夜算成月與年,那一重天壽命一千歲。夜摩天等四重天,依次以人間二百、四百、八百、一千六百歲為一晝一夜,乘這個晝夜算成月與年,依次壽命是二千、四千、八千、一萬六千歲。
問:持雙山以上並沒有日月,那些天怎麼建立晝夜與光明的事呢?依靠什麼而成立?答:依花的開合建立晝夜,像拘物陀花、鉢特摩花等等;又依諸鳥鳴叫與安靜的差別,或者依天眾睡醒的不同;並依自身的光明來成就外在的光明。
以上已經說了欲界天壽命的長短。
色界天當中沒有晝夜的分別,只用劫的數目來知道壽命長短。他們的壽劫長短與身量的數目相等:如果身量半踰繕那,壽量就是半劫;如果身量一踰繕那,壽量就是一劫;乃至身量長一萬六千,壽量也同樣是一萬六千劫。
以上已經說了色界天壽命的長短。
無色界四天從下往上依次壽量二萬、四萬、六萬、八萬劫。
問:上面所說的『劫』,它的量是多少?是壞劫、成劫,是中劫、還是大劫呢?答:少光天以上用『大劫的全數』為劫,以下諸天用『大劫的一半』為劫。正因為這樣,才說大梵王超過梵輔天壽一劫半——也就是以成、住、壞各二十中劫,六十中劫為一劫半;所以用大劫之半的四十中劫,作為下面三重天所計壽劫的量。
以上已經說了善趣壽量的長短。惡趣又是怎樣?頌說:
〔正81–83〕地獄、傍生、鬼的壽量
頌:等活等上面六個地獄,依次以欲界諸天的壽命為一晝夜,壽量也與那些天相同。極熱地獄半中劫,無間地獄整一中劫。傍生最長一中劫。鬼以人間一月為一日,壽五百年。頞部陀的壽量,像一婆訶的麻,百年取出一粒直到取盡;往後各以二十倍遞增。
論:四大王眾天等六重欲天的壽命,依次作為等活等六個㮈落迦的一晝一夜;而這六個地獄的壽量,依次也與那些天相同。也就是說:四大王眾天壽量五百年,這在等活地獄是一晝一夜,用這樣的晝夜算成月與年,以這樣的年計算,他們壽命五百年。乃至他化自在天壽一萬六千年,這在炎熱地獄是一晝一夜,用這樣的晝夜算成月與年,他們的壽命就是這樣的一萬六千歲。
極熱地獄壽半個中劫,無間地獄壽一個中劫。
傍生的壽量多半沒有定限;如果壽命極長的,也是一個中劫,就是難陀等等諸大龍王。所以世尊說:大龍有八位,都能住一劫、能執持大地。
鬼以人間一個月為一日,這樣乘算成月與年,壽五百年。
問:寒那落迦的壽量是怎樣?答:世尊寄託一個譬喻來顯示他們的壽命——就像人間二十佉梨成為摩揭陀國的一麻婆訶的量(『佉梨』與『婆訶』都是容量單位,一婆訶合二十佉梨),有人把巨勝(胡麻)平平地裝滿其中,假設又有人能夠一百年取走一粒;這樣胡麻容易有取盡的時候,生在頞部陀地獄的壽量卻難以窮盡。這個數目的二十倍就是第二重寒地獄的壽量,這樣往後各以二十倍遞增——這就是八個寒地獄的壽量。
問:這些壽量有中途夭折的嗎?頌說:
〔正84前半〕中夭,以及不會中夭的人
頌:各處都有中夭,只除去北俱盧洲。
論:各處的壽量都有中途夭折的,只有北俱盧洲定壽一千歲。
不過這是就『處所』來說的,不是就個別有情說的——因為另有一些有情是不會中夭的。就是說:住在覩史多天的一生所繫菩薩(只剩一生就要成佛的菩薩),以及最後有身的、佛所授記的、佛所差使的、隨信行者、隨法行者,還有懷著菩薩胎與輪王胎的母親——這些人依其所應,都沒有中夭。
〔Roots 45–47〕How the Receptacle World Is Established — the Three-Tiered Base of Wind Circle, Water Circle, and Golden Circle
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Above, the “world of sentient beings” (all the lives that dwell within the world) has been stated in full; next the “receptacle world” is to be stated (the outer world that bears those lives, like a vessel that holds what is put into it). The stanza says:
Stanza: To establish the receptacle world: lowest of all is the wind circle, whose breadth is so great that it cannot be numbered and whose thickness is sixteen lakṣa (“lakṣa” is an Indian unit of number, which the ancient masters say answers to the Chinese term for a hundred thousand). Above the wind circle is the water circle, eleven hundred thousand and twenty thousand deep; the lower eight lakṣa of it remain water, and the rest has congealed into gold. As for the breadth of this water circle and golden circle, the diameter is twelve hundred thousand three thousand four hundred and a half, and the circumference is three times the diameter.
Treatise: One should grant that this three-thousandfold great-thousand world-sphere is established in just this way, and that within it the shapes and sizes differ one from another. It is thus: by the dominant force of the “action” of all sentient beings (“dominant force” means a driving power that overrides all else and can determine the outcome), lowest of all and resting upon space a wind circle arises, of breadth beyond numbering and sixteen hundred thousand yojanas thick (“yojana” is an Indian unit of length, called youxun in the older translation).
The nature of this wind circle is exceedingly firm and dense. Suppose a great Mahānagna (a god of enormous strength) were to take a vajra wheel and, hurling it down through the air with all his might, strike the wind circle: the vajra wheel would shatter and the wind circle would not be harmed by so much as a hair.
Again, by the dominant force of the actions of all sentient beings, great clouds arise and rain falls, pouring down upon the wind circle in drops as thick as a chariot axle, and the water that gathers becomes the water circle. At the stage when this water circle has not yet congealed, it is eleven hundred thousand and twenty thousand yojanas deep.
Someone asks: why does the water circle not flow away on every side? One party of masters says: it is held by the force of the actions of all sentient beings so that it does not flow away — just as what a person eats and drinks, so long as it has not yet been digested and ripened, never in the end flows away and falls into the receptacle of the digested (the intestines). Another party of masters says: it is held by the force of wind so that it does not flow away, just as a chuan (a round granary woven of bamboo) can pen the grain in.
Called forth by the force of the actions of sentient beings, another wind arises and beats upon this water, congealing its upper surface into gold — just as, when boiled milk is left standing, a film of cream congeals upon the top. So the water circle is reduced until only eight lakṣa remain, the rest having turned to gold, the thickness of the gold being three hundred thousand and twenty thousand. The breadths of these two circles, of water and of gold, are equal in number, namely a diameter of twelve hundred thousand three thousand four hundred and a half. The number of the circumference is three times the diameter, that is, the circumference comes in all to thirty-six hundred thousand ten thousand three hundred and fifty yojanas. The stanza says:
〔Roots 48–51〕The Nine Great Mountains upon the Golden Circle
Stanza: At the very center is Mount Sumeru; next Yugandhara, Mount Īṣādhara, Mount Khadiraka, Sudarśana, Aśvakarṇa, Mount Vinataka, Mount Nimindhara; and outside the four great continents and the rest there is further the Iron Circle Mountain. The first seven mountains are made of gold, while Sumeru is made of four kinds of jewel. The portion of these mountains sunk in the water is in every case eighty thousand, and the height by which the Sublime and Lofty Mountain (that is, Sumeru) stands out of the water is likewise eighty thousand, while of the remaining eight each is lower than the one before it by half. The breadth of each mountain is equal to the height by which it stands out of the water.
Treatise: Upon the golden circle there are nine great mountains. The Sublime and Lofty Mountain King stands at the very center, and the remaining eight encircle the Sublime and Lofty round about. Among these eight the first seven are called “the inner mountains”; only outside the seventh mountain are there the four great continents and the rest; and further out again there is the Iron Circle Mountain, which encircles one world-sphere as the rim encircles a wheel.
The seven mountains beginning with Upholding the Pair are constituted of gold alone. The Sublime and Lofty Mountain King has four kinds of jewel for its entity, namely, on the north, east, south, and west sides in order, gold, silver, vaiḍūrya, and sphaṭika jewel (vaiḍūrya is the blue gemstone, sphaṭika is crystal). Through the majestic power of the jewels themselves their color is reflected into the sky, and so the sky above our Jambudvīpa looks like the blue of vaiḍūrya.
Someone asks: and from what are these jewels produced? Answer: from the very same dominant force of the actions of all sentient beings. Great clouds arise again and rain upon the golden circle in drops thick as a chariot axle, and the water that gathers surges like billows; and this water becomes the “seed” and the “store” of the several jewels. Then, through the drilling and beating of manifold winds of majestic violence, the several kinds of jewel are produced by transformation.
When jewels are thus produced by transformation out of water, this is a case of “the cause ceasing and the result arising,” the entities of cause and result not existing at one and the same time — unlike the “transmutation” maintained by the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists.
Question: how do the Sāṃkhya maintain the sense of transmutation?
〔Sāṃkhya answer〕: They maintain that there is a “possessor of dharmas” (a real substance serving as the bearer) whose own nature exists permanently, and that within it some dharmas arise and some dharmas cease — what, on such an account of transmutation, is contrary to principle?
〔The author objects〕: There can never be a permanently abiding dharma of which it is at the same time maintained that other dharmas cease and arise upon it.
〔Sāṃkhya defends〕: Who says that there is a “possessor of dharmas” apart from the dharma? It is just this dharma itself that, at the time of transmutation, serves as the support of differing characteristics, and is on that account called the possessor of dharmas.
〔The author refutes〕: Put in that way it is still contrary to principle.
〔Sāṃkhya challenges〕: In what way contrary to principle?
〔The author answers〕: That it should be this very thing and yet not be thus — such a statement I have never heard.
After gold and the jewels have been produced by transformation in this way, the force of action gives rise to yet another wind, which sorts the jewels and the rest apart and gathers them into mountains and into continents; and it divides the water into sweet and salt, establishing the inner seas and the outer sea separately.
So these nine mountains stand upon the golden circle, the measure of each sunk in the water being eighty thousand yojanas, and the height by which Mount Sumeru stands out of the water being the same. The heights by which the remaining eight stand out of the water decrease by half and half: the first, Upholding the Pair, stands out of the water forty thousand, and so on down to the last, the Iron Circle Mountain, which stands out of the water three hundred and twelve and a half. The breadth of each of these nine mountains is the same as the height by which it itself stands out of the water. The stanza says:
〔Root 52 · Root 53〕The Eight Seas between Mountain and Mountain
Stanza: Between mountain and mountain there are eight seas, of which the first seven are called “the inner seas.” The innermost of them is eighty thousand broad, and on each of its four sides three times as much; the remaining six are each narrower than the one before by half. The eighth is called “the outer sea,” three lakṣa twenty-two thousand yojanas broad.
Treatise: With the Sublime and Lofty first and the Iron Circle Mountain last, there are eight seas in between, of which the first seven are called the inner seas. In all seven of these seas there is water possessed of eight qualities: first sweet, second cool, third soft, fourth light, fifth pure, sixth free of foul odor, seventh not hurting the throat when it is drunk, and eighth not harming the belly once it has been drunk.
Of these seven seas the innermost is eighty thousand broad — this being measured along the ring on the inner side of Upholding the Pair; and on each of its four sides it is three times as much, that is, two hundred thousand and forty thousand yojanas on each. The breadths of the remaining six seas are each narrower than the one before by half: the second sea is forty thousand broad, and so on down to the seventh, which is one thousand two hundred and fifty. The circumferences are not stated here, because the figures would be too cumbersome.
The eighth is called the outer sea, filled to the brim with salt water, three hundred thousand and twenty-two thousand broad. The stanza says:
〔Roots 54–57〕The Four Great Continents and the Eight Intermediate Continents in the Outer Sea
Stanza: Within the outer sea the shapes of the four great continents are these — Jambudvīpa in the south is like a chariot, its three sides two thousand each, its south side only three and a half yojanas. The continent of Videha in the east is shaped like a half-moon, its three sides the same as Jambudvīpa’s, its east side three hundred and fifty. The continent of Godānīya in the west is perfectly round and without a gap, its diameter two thousand five hundred and its circumference three times as much. Uttarakuru in the north is exactly square, each side two thousand, the four sides equal. Besides these there are eight intermediate continents, two on either flank of each of the four great continents.
Treatise: Within the outer sea there are four great continents, situated at the four sides of the Sublime and Lofty Mountain.
Jambudvīpa in the south is broad on the north and narrow on the south, its other three sides equal in length, and it is shaped like a chariot. Its south side is only three and a half yojanas broad, while its other three sides are two thousand yojanas each. In this continent alone is there the “vajra seat,” which reaches up to the surface of the ground and down to the golden circle. All bodhisattvas, when they are about to ascend to perfect awakening, sit upon this seat and arouse the “vajra-like concentration” (the final moment of concentration which, like a vajra, can cut off every affliction) — for apart from this there is no other support and no other place possessed of firmness enough to bear such a thing.
The continent of Videha in the east is narrow on the east and broad on the west, its other three sides equal in length, and it is shaped like a half-moon. Its east side is three hundred and fifty, and its other three sides two thousand each.
The continent of Godānīya in the west is round like a full moon, its diameter two thousand five hundred and its circumference seven thousand five hundred.
Uttarakuru in the north is shaped like a square seat, its four sides equal in length, each side two thousand. The word “equal” in the stanza is meant to make plain that among the four sides there is not the least increase or decrease.
According as each continent has its shape, so likewise are the faces of the people there (where the continent is round the faces are round, where the continent is square the faces are square).
Besides these there are eight intermediate continents, which are the retinue of the great continents — two intermediate continents on either flank of each of the four great continents. The two intermediate continents at the flank of Jambudvīpa are, first, the continent of Cāmara and, second, the continent of Varacāmara. The two at the flank of the continent of Videha are, first, the continent of Deha and, second, the continent of Videha. The two at the flank of the continent of Godānīya are, first, the continent of Śāṭha and, second, the continent of Uttaramantriṇa. The two at the flank of Uttarakuru are, first, the continent of Kurava and, second, the continent of Kaurava. All these intermediate continents are inhabited by human beings. There is another account: that one of them alone is inhabited by rākṣasas (a class of non-human beings). The stanza says:
〔Root 58〕The Black Mountains, the Snow Mountain, the Mountain of Intoxicating Fragrance, and the Lake Without Heat
Stanza: North of Jambudvīpa there are nine black mountains, and within the Snow Mountain and the Mountain of Intoxicating Fragrance there is the Lake Without Heat, fifty yojanas each way.
Treatise: In this Jambudvīpa, going north from the middle, there are three places each of which has three ranges of black mountains (three places with three ranges each, making nine in all). North of the black mountains is the Great Snow Mountain, and north of the Great Snow Mountain is the Mountain of Intoxicating Fragrance. North of the Snow Mountain and south of the Fragrance Mountain there is a great lake named Without Heat and Torment, from which four great rivers flow out: first the river Gaṅgā, second the river Sindhu, third the river Sītā, fourth the river Vakṣu.
The Lake Without Heat and Torment is exactly equal in length and breadth, each side being fifty yojanas, and is filled to the brim with water possessed of the eight qualities; none but a person who has attained the supernormal powers has any way of reaching it. At the edge of this lake there is a “Jambu grove,” the trees tall of form and the fruit sweet to the taste — the continent is named Jambudvīpa from this grove, or else its name is established from this fruit.
In what place, then, are the narakas (the hells) and the great narakas (the great hells) situated? How large are they, and how many? The stanza says:
〔Root 59 · Root 60〕The Eight Great Hells, the Sixteen Increases, and the Eight Cold Hells
Stanza: Going down from here past twenty thousand is the Unremitting hell, its depth and its breadth the same. Above it there are seven narakas. The “Increases” of the eight hells are sixteen in all, that is, the four Increases of hot ashes, of corpses and dung, of blades, and of the fierce river, each set standing at the four sides of those eight hells. Besides these there are eight cold hells.
Treatise: Going down from this Jambudvīpa past twenty thousand there is the great naraka Avīci (Avīci means the Unremitting), whose depth and breadth are as stated above, both twenty thousand, so that its floor is forty thousand yojanas from here. Because suffering is undergone there without remission — unlike the remaining seven great narakas, where the undergoing of suffering is not constant — it is called “the Unremitting.”
For instance, in the hell of Equal Reviving, although the bodies of those sentient beings are hacked, pierced, ground, and pounded in every way, yet as soon as they meet a cool wind blowing upon them they revive again as they were at first; and it is on this ground that the name “Equal Reviving” (living again just as before) is established. In Avīci there is no such thing.
Another party of masters says: in Avīci there is no “pleasure” to come between the sufferings, and it is for that reason called the Unremitting; whereas in the remaining hells there is pleasure arising mixed in — and although that is not a maturation result, it is a homogeneous result (“maturation” is the retribution called forth directly by action, “homogeneous” is the residual momentum that follows on within the same kind).
The seven narakas are above the Unremitting hell, dwelling one piled upon another. What are those seven? First Extreme Heat, second Burning Heat, third Great Howling, fourth Howling, fifth Massed Crushing, sixth the Black Rope, seventh Equal Reviving. There is another account: that these seven are at the flank of the Unremitting hell.
The “Increases” of the eight narakas are sixteen in all, and so the Bhagavat (the World-Honored One) spoke a stanza in these words:
〔Quoted Stanza〕The Stanza on the Hells Spoken by the World-Honored One, and the Content of the Sixteen Increases
Quoted stanza: These eight narakas, I say, are exceedingly hard to pass beyond. The ground is cast of hot iron, iron walls encircle it round about, on the four sides four gates open, and they are shut fast with leaves of iron. Skillfully laid out and disposed, they have sixteen Increases each, as many as a hundred yojanas, filled within with those who have done evil, pierced through and through by flames on every side, and fierce fire burns there without ceasing.
Treatise: The sixteen Increases means that outside the gates on the four sides of the eight narakas there are four places each —
The first is the “Increase of Hot Ashes” (hot ashes being embers). Within this Increase the hot ashes are knee-deep; when a sentient being walks into it, at the very first setting down of a foot the skin and flesh together with the blood are scorched, festered, and fall away; and at the lifting of the foot they grow again and are restored as before.
The second is the “Increase of Corpses and Dung.” This Increase is filled with a mire of corpses and dung, in which there are many nyaṅkuṭa worms, their mouths as sharp as needles, their bodies white and their heads black; and sentient beings who walk into it are all bored through the skin and gnawed through the bone by these worms, which suck out their marrow.
The third is the “Increase of Blades.” Within this Increase there are three further kinds. The first is the “Road of Sword Blades,” where sword blades are laid edge upward to form a great road, and when a sentient being walks upon it, at the very first setting down of a foot the skin and flesh together with the blood are cut to pieces and fall away, and at the lifting of the foot they grow again and are restored as before. The second is the “Forest of Sword Leaves,” a forest upon which sharp sword blades serve as the leaves and nothing else; when a sentient being walks into it and the wind blows and the leaves fall, his limbs and body are hacked and pierced until bone and flesh are strewn about, and there are besides piebald crows and dogs that seize and tear at him and eat him. The third is the “Forest of Iron Thorns,” a forest that grows sharp iron thorns sixteen finger-breadths long; and when a sentient being is driven up the tree and down again, those thorns pierce keenly upward and downward, and there are besides iron-beaked birds that come to peck out the sentient being’s eyes, heart, and liver, contending for the food. Although these three, the Road of Sword Blades and the rest, differ one from another, they are alike instruments of punishment made of iron, and so together they are reckoned as one Increase.
The fourth is the “Increase of the Fierce River.” The extent of this Increase is broad and wide, and it is filled with boiling salt water; sentient beings who enter it float or sink, go against the current or with it, drift crosswise or spin about, and are steamed and boiled until bone and flesh are pulped away. It is as when a great cauldron is filled with lye and sesame and grains of rice and the like are put in, with a fierce fire burning beneath, and the sesame and rice turn over and over within it, up and down, and are wholly pulped away; sentient beings are just so. Should they wish to escape, upon the two banks there are many hell warders holding knives and spears in their hands who bar them and drive them back, so that there is no way out.
This fierce river is like a moat guarding a city wall, while the first three are like a garden park. On each of the four sides there are four Increases, and so they are said to be sixteen in all.
This is “a place of being punished over and above,” and hence it is called an “Increase” — because, having just been punished in the hell proper, one suffers injury there once again. There is another account: that sentient beings undergo this suffering after they have come out of the hell, and it is therefore called an Increase.
Now here a discussion arises from the discussion: are those hell warders sentient beings?
There is one account: they are not sentient beings. Question: how then do they move and act? Answer: they are driven by the force of the actions of sentient beings, like the wind at the time when a world is being formed (there need be no one blowing it). Question: if so, how is what the Venerable Dharmasubhūti said to be reconciled with this? His stanza runs thus:
〔Quoted Stanza〕The Stanza of the Venerable Dharmasubhūti, and the Eight Cold Hells and the Destinies of the Other Places
Quoted stanza: Whose heart harbors always rage and venom, who delights to heap up every kind of evil action, who sees the suffering of others and rejoices at it — he becomes at death a warder of Yama.
Treatise: King Yama sends those rākṣasas to cast sentient beings into the hells, and these alone are what are called “the warders of Yama” — they are real sentient beings, but they are not those who inflict the injuries directly upon sentient beings within the hells; and so the hell warders (those who carry out the punishments directly) are not real sentient beings.
There is another account: they are sentient beings. Question: if so, in what place do they undergo the maturation result of such evil actions? Answer: within the hells themselves. Since the hells can hold even the maturation result called forth by actions without interval, what principle is there to block this? Question: if so, why does the fire not burn them? Answer: this is certainly because they are shut off by the force of action, or else because they have called forth different great elements (the four great elements that constitute their bodies being different), and so are not burned.
Of hot narakas it has been said that there are eight. Besides these there are eight further cold narakas. What are those eight? First Arbuda, second Nirarbuda, third Aṭaṭa, fourth Hahava, fifth Huhuva, sixth Utpala, seventh Padma, eighth Mahāpadma. The sentient beings within them are oppressed by bitter cold, and their names are established according to the changes of body and of voice.
These eight cold hells all lie beneath Jambudvīpa together, just at the flank of the great hells spoken of above.
Question: the area of this Jambudvīpa is not great; how can what is beneath it hold anything so large as the Unremitting hell? Answer: the continent is shaped like a heap of piled grain, pointed above and wide below, and so the great sea grows narrower and deeper the further down one goes (while the continent grows wider the further down one goes).
The sixteen hells discussed above are called forth by the dominant action shared by all sentient beings. The remaining “solitary hells” are summoned each by a separate action, and are dwelt in by many together, or by two, or by one, with differences of many kinds and no fixed place — whether near a river or a mountainside or in the wilderness, or underground, or in the sky, or in yet other places.
Such is the disposition of the hells: the base place is below, while the branches and offshoots are not fixed.
The dwelling places of animals (beasts) are the three of water, land, and air; their base place is the great sea, and only later did they spread abroad to other places.
The base place of the ghosts is the realm of King Yama. Five hundred yojanas down beneath this Jambudvīpa there is the realm of King Yama, its measure likewise five hundred each way, and from there they have spread by degrees and settled in other places. (Among the destiny of ghosts) there are some upright and majestic and possessed of great dignity, who enjoy every kind of wealth and pleasure in sovereign freedom like the gods; and there are some who are hungry and gaunt and ugly of countenance. Of this class the sūtras have a detailed account.
As for the questions of the places where the sun and moon are situated and of their sizes and the like, the stanza says:
〔Roots 61–63〕The Height and Size of the Sun and Moon, and the Increase and Decrease of Day and Night
Stanza: The sun and moon are at half the height of Meru, their diameters fifty-one and fifty respectively. When it is midnight in the northern continent, the sun is setting in the eastern continent, at midday in the southern, and rising in the western, and the four continents are equal. In the second month of the rainy season, from the ninth day of the latter half, the night gradually lengthens; and so it is in the fourth month of the cold season. When the night decreases the day does the opposite. Each time day and night increase or decrease, it is by one lava. Because the sun travels a southern course and a northern course; and because the moon, when it draws near the sun, is covered by its own shadow, the disc of the moon is seen to have a gap.
Treatise: Question: upon what do the sun, the moon, and the host of stars rest? Answer: they rest upon wind. That is, the dominant force of the actions of all sentient beings together gives rise to a wind, which turns and circles through the sky around the Sublime and Lofty Mountain, carrying and upholding the sun and moon and the rest so that they neither stop nor fall.
Question: how many yojanas is the place where they rest distant from here? Answer: level with the summit of Upholding the Pair, which is half the height of the Sublime and Lofty Mountain.
Question: how many yojanas are the diameters of the sun and moon? Answer: the sun fifty-one, the moon only fifty. The smallest of the stars is only one krośa (a smaller unit of length), the largest sixteen yojanas.
The underside of the sun’s disc is constituted of the fire-pearl among sphaṭika jewels, and can give heat and give light; the underside of the moon’s disc is constituted of the water-pearl among sphaṭika jewels, and can give cold and give light. These are produced according to the dominant force of the actions of sentient beings, and upon eyes, bodies, fruits, flowers, crops, medicinal herbs, and the like they work benefit or harm, each as is fitting.
Question: since one sun and moon alone do what they have to do throughout the four continents, is what they do in one day done in the four continents at the same time? Answer: no. Question: how then? Answer: when it is midnight in the northern continent, the sun is setting in the eastern continent, at midday in the southern, and rising in the western. These four moments are equal to one another (simultaneous), and the rest may be known on this pattern.
The sun’s course over this continent has its differences, and this is what makes day and night decrease and increase. From the ninth day of the latter half of the second month of the rainy season, the night gradually lengthens; from the ninth day of the latter half of the fourth month of the cold season, the night gradually shortens. The increase and decrease of the day are the opposite of this: when the night gradually increases the day gradually decreases, and if the night gradually decreases the day gradually increases.
Question: when day and night lengthen, by how much does one day and night increase? Answer: it increases by one lava (a very short unit of time). Their decrease is likewise.
The sun travels southward and travels northward over this continent, and thereby makes the night increase and the day increase in turn.
Question: why is the moon’s disc seen to have a gap at the end of the dark half and the beginning of the bright half (the end and the beginning of a lunar month)? Answer: the Designations of the World explains it thus — because as the palace of the moon travels it draws near the disc of the sun, and the moon is encroached upon and lit by the light of the sun’s disc, while on its other side it puts forth a shadow that covers its own disc, so that at that time it is seen not to be full. The masters of old, however, explained it thus: it is because the two discs of sun and moon differ in the degrees of their courses that fullness and gap appear.
Question: what sentient beings inhabit the palaces of the sun and the rest? Answer: the host of gods belonging to the four great heavenly kings. Question: do these gods dwell only here? Answer: if they are gods dwelling in space, they dwell only in the palaces of the sun and the rest; if they are gods dwelling on the ground, they dwell on the several terraces of the Sublime and Lofty Mountain and the like.
Question: how many terraces are there? What are their measures? Which gods dwell on which terrace? The stanza says:
〔Root 64 · Root 65〕The Four Terraces of the Sublime and Lofty Mountain and the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings
Stanza: The Sublime and Lofty Mountain has four terraces, each distant from the next by ten thousand. The breadths by which they jut out sideways are, in order, sixteen thousand, eight thousand, four thousand, and two thousand. Firm Hand, Garland Holder, Ever Proud, and the Multitude of the Great Kings dwell in order upon the four terraces, and dwell also upon the remaining seven golden mountains.
Treatise: Mount Sumeru has four terraces: reckoning from the surface of the water up to the first terrace, the distance is ten thousand yojanas; and so on, up to the distance from the third terrace to the fourth, which is likewise ten thousand.
These four terraces jut out sideways from the Sublime and Lofty Mountain and encircle it, taking up the whole of its lower half. The first juts out sideways sixteen thousand, and the second, third, and fourth in order eight thousand, four thousand, and two thousand.
There is a yakṣa god named Firm Hand, who dwells on the first terrace; one named Garland Holder, who dwells on the second; one named Ever Proud, who dwells on the third. All three of these belong to the host of gods of the four great heavenly kings. The fourth terrace is the place where the four great heavenly kings dwell together with their several retinues, and it is on this ground that the sūtras speak of “the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings.”
Just as the terraces on the four sides of the Sublime and Lofty Mountain are inhabited by the Multitude of the Four Great Kings and their retinues, so likewise upon the seven golden mountains, Upholding the Pair, Upholding the Axle, and the rest, there are gods dwelling, and those are fiefs belonging to the four great heavenly kings — this is called “the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings that dwells in dependence on the ground.” Among the gods of the desire realm, the extent of this heaven is the widest.
Question: in what place does the Heaven of the Thirty-Three dwell? The stanza says:
〔Roots 66–69〕The Heaven of the Thirty-Three and the City Fair to Behold
Stanza: The summit of the Sublime and Lofty Mountain is eighty thousand on each side, and the Heaven of the Thirty-Three dwells there. At each of the four corners there is a peak, which is where Vajra-Hand dwells. The palace city at the center is named Fair to Behold, its circumference ten thousand yojanas, a golden city wall a yojana and a half high, adorned with jewels of every kind, its ground soft to the touch. Within the city there is a Hall of Surpassing Excellence, one thousand yojanas in circumference. Outside the city four parks adorn it, namely Many Chariots, Coarse and Harsh, Mixed Groves, and the Grove of Joy. Four excellent pools lie one on each of the four sides, each twenty from its park. To the northeast is the Round-Growth Tree, to the southwest the Hall of Good Dharma.
Treatise: The Heaven of the Thirty-Three dwells on the summit of Mount Meru. The summit is eighty thousand on each of its four sides, no different in measure from the four sides at the mountain’s foot. Another party of masters says: (the summit) is eighty thousand in circumference, and they state separately that each of the four sides is only twenty thousand.
At each of the four corners of the summit there is a peak, five hundred in height and in breadth. There is a yakṣa god named Vajra-Hand who dwells within them and guards the gods.
At the center of the summit there is a palace city named Fair to Behold, two thousand five hundred on each side and ten thousand yojanas in circumference. The height of the golden city wall is a yojana and a half; the ground is level and is likewise constituted of true gold, and it is adorned with a hundred and one kinds of jewel. The ground is soft to the touch as tūla floss (a floss that comes out of the fruit of a certain tree), and when one treads upon it, it rises and sinks with the foot. This is the great capital city of Śakra, lord of the gods.
Within the city there is a Hall of Surpassing Excellence, fully adorned with every kind of excellent jewel; because it surpasses the other palaces of the gods it is called “Surpassing Excellence.” It is two hundred and fifty on each side, and one thousand yojanas in circumference. So much for the several delightful things within the city.
Outside the city, on its four sides, there are four parks that adorn it, the places where those gods disport themselves together: first the Park of Many Chariots, second the Coarse and Harsh Park, third the Park of Mixed Groves, fourth the Park of the Grove of Joy; these are the outer ornament and adornment of the great city. On the four sides of the four parks there are four excellent pools, each twenty yojanas away from its park in between, and these are the excellent playgrounds of those gods, where the gods vie with one another and take their pleasure and sport.
Northeast of the city there is a Round-Growth Tree, the most excellent place where the Heaven of the Thirty-Three enjoy the pleasures of desire. Its coiling roots are fifty yojanas deep and broad; its towering trunk grows upward and its branches spread out on every side, its height and its breadth being a hundred yojanas each. Its slender leaves put forth flowers, whose excellent fragrance is rich and pervading, and with the wind it can perfume a hundred yojanas; and when the wind is against it, it still extends over fifty.
Question: with the wind it may be so, but how can it perfume against the wind? One party of masters says: fragrance has no principle by which it perfumes against the wind; it is only in dependence upon its “not passing beyond the bounds of the tree” that it is said to perfume against the wind. In truth of principle, the Round-Growth Tree does have such a quality, and the fragrance that streams from it is able to perfume against the wind; and although it is dammed back by the force of the harmonious winds of the heavens, yet it can stream on unbroken in continuity toward other quarters, only growing weaker and subtler by degrees until it stops at no great distance, and cannot reach so far as when it perfumes with the wind.
Question: does a flower fragrance of this kind, resting in its own place, turn on in continuity with the wind toward other quarters, or does it merely perfume the wind so that a fragrance arises separately? Answer: this matter has no settled conclusion; the preceptors allow both accounts and find no fault in either.
Question: if so, why then did the Bhagavat say:
〔Quoted Stanza〕The World-Honored One’s Stanza on the Fragrance of Flowers, and the Hall of Good Dharma
Quoted stanza: The fragrance of flowers cannot perfume against the wind, and the fragrance of roots and stems and the rest is likewise; but the fragrance of a good man’s qualities is rich and pervading, and against the wind streams its fair name abroad through every quarter.
Treatise: That was said with respect to the fragrances of the human world, for the fragrances commonly known to people of the world truly have no such power. A sūtra transmitted by the Mahīśāsakas says: this fragrance (of the Round-Growth Tree) perfumes a hundred yojanas with the wind, and when there is no wind extends over fifty only.
At the southwest corner outside the city is the Hall of Good Dharma, where the Heaven of the Thirty-Three assemble from time to time and discuss in detail what is according to the Dharma and what is not.
The outer receptacle inhabited by the Heaven of the Thirty-Three has now been analyzed; what then of the receptacles inhabited by the remaining gods possessed of form? The stanza says:
〔First Half of Root 70〕Above the Heaven of the Thirty-Three, the Palaces Dwell in Space
Stanza: The gods possessed of form above this dwell in dependence upon palaces in space.
Treatise: Above the Heaven of the Thirty-Three spoken of above there are still gods possessed of form, who dwell in dependence upon palaces in space.
Question: what is meant by “the gods possessed of form above”? Answer: the Yāma Heaven, the Tuṣita Heaven, the Heaven of Delight in Working Transformations, and the Heaven of Sovereignty over Others’ Transformations, together with the Brahmakāyika Heaven and the rest spoken of above, sixteen places in all. Together with the foregoing (the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings and the Heaven of the Thirty-Three), there are twenty-two heavens in all, and all of them dwell in dependence upon an outer receptacle.
Among the hosts of gods thus spoken of, the stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 70〕The Manner of Sexual Union Differs among the Six Heavens of Desire
Stanza: The six heavens of desire undergo the objects of desire, and their sexual union is, in order, by intercourse, embracing, holding hands, laughing, and looking.
Treatise: Only the six heavens of desire undergo excellent objects of desire. Of these, the first two are the heavens that dwell in dependence upon the ground (the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings and the Heaven of the Thirty-Three), and there sexual union is accomplished by the joining of bodies, no different from the human world; only that when the breath of wind is released the burning distress is removed, and it is not as in the human world where there is other impurity besides. For the host of gods of the Yāma Heaven, one embrace accomplishes sexual union; for the Tuṣita Heaven, holding hands alone; for the Heaven of Delight in Working Transformations, laughing toward one another; and for the Heaven of Sovereignty over Others’ Transformations, gazing at one another accomplishes it.
The Vaibhāṣikas explain it thus: all six heavens accomplish sexual union by the joining of bodies, and what the Designations of the World says about embracing and the rest is meant only to display the difference in the length of time they require (to accomplish sexual union). It is because the higher the heaven the more excellent the objects of desire and the swifter the greedy mind, that it is so.
Upon the knees of the male and female among those gods, boys and girls are suddenly born by transformation, and these are said to be the sons and daughters born to that god.
Question: what is the bodily measure of the host of gods at their first birth? The stanza says:
〔First Half of Root 71〕The Bodily Measure of the Host of Gods at Their First Birth
Stanza: (The gods of desire) at their first birth are like children of five years up to ten, while the gods of the form realm at their first birth are already full in bodily measure and possessed of heavenly garments.
Treatise: The six heavens of desire, at their first birth, are like people of five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten years in order; and once born, their bodily form quickly grows to fullness. The host of gods of the form realm, at the time of their first birth, are complete and full in bodily measure, and are possessed of excellent garments.
All the hosts of gods speak “the noble speech,” that is, their language is the same as that of Central India.
Question: how should the distinction between birth amid desires and birth amid pleasure be understood? The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 71〕Three Kinds of Birth amid Desires, Three Kinds of Birth amid Pleasure
Stanza: Birth amid desires is of three kinds and extends to human beings and gods; birth amid pleasure is of three kinds, in nine places.
Treatise: The three kinds of birth amid desires are as follows —
There is one class of sentient beings who delight to undergo the several excellent objects of desire present before them, and who turn in sovereign freedom among such ready-made objects of desire; and these are the whole of the human destiny together with the four heavens below (from the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings up to the Tuṣita Heaven).
There is one class of sentient beings who delight to undergo the several excellent objects of desire that they have themselves produced by transformation, and who turn in sovereign freedom among the excellent objects of desire of their own transforming; and these are the fifth heaven alone, the Heaven of Delight in Working Transformations.
There is one class of sentient beings who delight to undergo the several excellent objects of desire that others have produced by transformation, and who turn in sovereign freedom among the excellent objects of desire of others’ transforming; and these are the sixth heaven, the Heaven of Sovereignty over Others’ Transformations.
In dependence upon “undergoing the objects of desire present before one just as they arise,” upon “delighting to undergo objects of desire of one’s own transforming,” and upon “delighting to undergo objects of desire of others’ transforming,” the three distinctions of “birth amid desires” are accordingly analyzed within the desire realm.
The three kinds of birth amid pleasure are as follows — within the three meditative absorptions, in nine places, one is born and there receives three kinds of pleasure: that is, those gods abide in the “joy and pleasure born of seclusion” (the first meditative absorption), in the “joy and pleasure born of absorption” (the second meditative absorption), and, through separation from joy, in pleasure alone (the third meditative absorption), abiding long, long separated from suffering, and long receiving pleasure, and are therefore called “birth amid pleasure.”
(An appended question): those born in the intermediate absorption (where the great Brahmā dwells) have no joy or pleasure at all; it should be pondered why they too are called a heaven of birth amid pleasure.
Question: as for the twenty-two places of the gods spoken of above, what are the measures by which they are distant from one another, above and below? The stanza says:
〔First Half of Root 72〕The Distance Upward from a Given Heaven Equals Its Distance Downward
Stanza: As is the measure by which a given heaven is distant from what is below, so likewise is the number by which it is distant from what is above.
Treatise: The measure in yojanas by which each heaven is separated from the next is not easily counted out one by one; only a general principle can be given: as is the measure by which a given heaven is distant from what is below, so is its distance from what is above to be reckoned on that pattern.
According as one reckons from whichever heaven, as is the measure by which it is distant from the great sea below, so is the distance it can reach upward the same as its distance downward. That is to say: from the fourth terrace of the Sublime and Lofty Mountain down to the great sea is forty thousand yojanas, and that is the original dwelling place of the four great heavenly kings; then from there upward to the Heaven of the Thirty-Three is likewise equal to the measure by which that heaven is distant from the great sea below. As is the measure by which the Heaven of the Thirty-Three is distant from the great sea below, so is the measure upward to the Yāma Heaven. And so on, up to the measure in yojanas by which the Sudarśana Heaven is distant from the great sea below, from which upward to the Akaniṣṭha Heaven is likewise equal to the measure by which that heaven is distant from the great sea below.
From this point upward there is no further place of dwelling; this place is the highest, and is named the Akaniṣṭha, the limit of form. Another party of masters says: it is named the Heaven of the Limit of Resistance — by “resistance” they mean form as accumulated, and since resistance is exhausted upon reaching here, it obtains the name “limit.”
Question: can gods born in a lower place ascend, and can they see what is above? The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 72〕Apart from Supernormal Power or Dependence on Another’s Power, the Gods Below Cannot Ascend and Cannot See What Is Above
Stanza: Apart from the power of supernormal power and dependence upon another’s power, the gods below cannot ascend and cannot see what is above.
Treatise: The Heaven of the Thirty-Three, by their own power of supernormal power, can ascend from their own place to the Yāma Heaven; or else in dependence upon another’s power, that is, one who has attained the supernormal powers, or a host of gods of an upper realm, may convey them to the Yāma Heaven. The ascending of the remaining gods is to be reckoned on this same pattern.
If a god above comes down, or a god below arrives above, then those below get to see the god above; but as for the eye of a lower realm and lower level, it cannot see the form of an upper realm and upper level. The eye below, however, cannot see an upper realm or upper level, because that is not its object field — just as one does not feel the tangible object of that upper realm. Therefore, when a god comes down from an upper level to a lower level, he does not come in his own body but must make a transformation body of the lower level.
Another party of masters says: those gods of a lower level can, according as they wish, also see the form of an upper level, just as one born in this desire realm can see the gods above from below.
Question: what is the measure of the supports of the palaces of the Yāma Heaven and the rest? One party of masters says: the supports of the four heavens above this are equal in measure to the summit of the Sublime and Lofty Mountain. Another party of masters says: each heaven upward doubles the one before. Yet other masters say: the supports of the palaces of the level of the first meditative absorption equal one set of four great continents, those of the second meditative absorption a small-thousand world-sphere, those of the third a middling-thousand world-sphere, and those of the fourth a great-thousand world-sphere. Still other masters say: the three lower meditative absorptions equal in order a small thousand, a middling thousand, and a great thousand, while the measure of the fourth meditative absorption is without limit.
Question: at what measure is a small thousand, a middling thousand, or a great thousand spoken of? The stanza says:
〔Root 73 · Root 74〕The Small Thousand, the Middling Thousand, and the Great Thousand
Stanza: The four great continents, the sun and moon, Sumeru, the gods of the desire realm, and the Brahmā world, a thousand of each, are called one small-thousand world-sphere. This small thousand multiplied a thousandfold is called one middling thousand. This middling thousand multiplied a thousandfold is the great thousand, and they all come into being together and are dissolved together.
Treatise: A thousand sets of four great continents, and so on up to a thousand Brahmā worlds — these stated together are one small thousand. A thousandfold of the small thousand is called one middling-thousand world. A thousand middling-thousand worlds are named together one great thousand. Such a great thousand comes into being together and is dissolved together. The characteristics of coming into being together and being dissolved together will be analyzed at length below (in the section on the measure of aeons).
Question: as the measures of the outer receptacles differ one from another, do bodily measures also differ? Answer: they differ likewise. Question: how so? The stanza says:
〔Root 75 · Root 76 · First Half of Root 77〕The Bodily Measures of the People of the Four Continents and of the Gods
Stanza: The bodily measure of the people of Jambudvīpa is three and a half cubits or four cubits. The people of the eastern, western, and northern continents increase in order by a doubling each time. The gods of the desire realm take the krośa as their unit, each heaven adding a quarter. The gods of the form realm take the yojana as their unit, the first four heavens each adding a half, and above these each heaven doubling, only the Anabhraka Heaven subtracting three.
Treatise: The people of Jambudvīpa are for the most part three and a half cubits tall, and a small number of them grow to four cubits. The people of the continent of Videha in the east are eight cubits tall, those of the continent of Godānīya in the west sixteen cubits, and those of Uttarakuru in the north thirty-two cubits.
The bodily measure of the lowest of the six heavens of the desire realm is a quarter of a krośa, and thereafter each heaven adds a quarter, until at the sixth heaven the bodily measure is a krośa and a half.
The bodily measures of the gods of the form realm: first the Brahmakāyika Heaven half a yojana, the Brahmapurohita Heaven a full yojana, the Mahābrahmā Heaven a yojana and a half, the Parīttābha Heaven a full two yojanas. Above these, all the remaining gods increase by a doubling each time, only the Anabhraka Heaven subtracting three yojanas — that is, the Apramāṇābha Heaven increases from twice to four, and so on until at the Akaniṣṭha Heaven the increase reaches a full sixteen thousand.
Question: since bodily measures differ one from another, is there a distinction in lifespan? Answer: there is a distinction likewise. Question: how so? The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 77 · Roots 78–80〕The Lifespans of Human Beings, of the Gods of Desire, of the Gods of Form, and of the Formless Gods
Stanza: The northern continent has a fixed lifespan of one thousand years, and the western and eastern continents halve it each in turn; in this Jambudvīpa the lifespan is not fixed, at the last it is ten years only, and at the first it is beyond measuring. Fifty human years are one day and night of the lowest heaven, and reckoning by this the lifespan is five hundred years, the five heavens above increasing by a doubling each time. In the form realm there is no distinction of day and night, and the number of aeons equals the bodily measure. In the formless realm the first is twenty thousand aeons, and thereafter each adds twenty thousand. For the heavens from the Parīttābha upward and for those below it, the aeon is respectively the whole and the half of a great aeon.
Treatise: The people of Uttarakuru in the north have a fixed lifespan of a thousand years, the people of the continent of Godānīya in the west live five hundred years, the people of the continent of Videha in the east two hundred and fifty years, and the people of Jambudvīpa in the south have no fixed limit of lifespan — when the aeon has decreased to its last, the longest life is ten years only; at the beginning of the aeon, human life is beyond measure and cannot be reckoned by hundreds or thousands or the like.
So much for the length and shortness of lifespan in the human world.
The day and night of the heavens must be established first, and only then can the length and shortness of the lifespans of the gods be reckoned. Question: how is day and night established in the heavens? Answer: fifty human years are one day and one night of the lowest of the six heavens of desire; and reckoning by this day and night, thirty days making a month and twelve months a year, that heaven has a lifespan of five hundred years.
The five heavens of desire above double it by degrees: a hundred human years are one day and one night of the second heaven, and reckoning by this day and night into months and years, that heaven has a lifespan of a thousand years. For the four heavens of the Yāma and the rest, two hundred, four hundred, eight hundred, and one thousand six hundred human years are in order one day and one night; and reckoning by these days and nights into months and years, their lifespans are in order two thousand, four thousand, eight thousand, and sixteen thousand years.
Question: above Upholding the Pair there is no sun or moon; how do those gods establish day and night and the matter of light? On what do they establish them? Answer: they establish day and night by the opening and closing of flowers, such as the kumuda and the padma; and further by the difference between the crying and the silence of the birds, or by the difference between the gods’ sleeping and waking; and they accomplish outer light by means of the light of their own bodies.
So much for the length and shortness of the lifespans of the gods of the desire realm.
Among the gods of the form realm there is no distinction of day and night, and the length and shortness of lifespan is known by the number of aeons alone. The length and shortness of their lifespan in aeons equals the number of their bodily measure: if the bodily measure is half a yojana, the lifespan is half an aeon; if the bodily measure is one yojana, the lifespan is one aeon; and so on, until where the bodily measure is sixteen thousand long, the lifespan is likewise sixteen thousand aeons.
So much for the length and shortness of the lifespans of the gods of the form realm.
The four heavens of the formless realm, from below upward, have lifespans in order of twenty thousand, forty thousand, sixty thousand, and eighty thousand aeons.
Question: as for the “aeon” spoken of above, what is its measure? Is it an aeon of dissolution, an aeon of formation, an intermediate aeon, or a great aeon? Answer: from the Parīttābha Heaven upward the whole of a great aeon is taken as the aeon, and for the heavens below it the half of a great aeon is taken as the aeon. It is precisely on this account that the great Brahmā king is said to exceed the Brahmapurohita Heaven in lifespan by an aeon and a half — that is, with twenty intermediate aeons each for formation, abiding, and dissolution, sixty intermediate aeons make an aeon and a half; and so the forty intermediate aeons that are half a great aeon serve as the measure of the aeon by which the lifespans of the three heavens below are reckoned.
So much for the length and shortness of lifespan in the good destinies. And what of the evil destinies? The stanza says:
〔Roots 81–83〕The Lifespans of the Hells, of Animals, and of Ghosts
Stanza: For the six hells above, beginning with Equal Reviving, the lifespans of the gods of the desire realm serve in order as one day and night, and their lifespans are likewise the same as those of the gods. The hell of Extreme Heat is half an intermediate aeon, the Unremitting hell a full intermediate aeon. For animals the longest is one intermediate aeon. Ghosts take one human month as a day and live five hundred years. As for the lifespan of Arbuda, it is like a vāha of sesame, from which one seed is taken out every hundred years until it is exhausted; and thereafter each increases twentyfold.
Treatise: The lifespans of the six heavens of desire, the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings and the rest, serve in order as one day and one night for the six narakas beginning with Equal Reviving; and the lifespans of these six hells are also, in order, the same as those of the gods. That is to say: the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings has a lifespan of five hundred years, and this is one day and one night in the hell of Equal Reviving; reckoning such days and nights into months and years, and counting by such years, their lifespan is five hundred years. And so on up to the Heaven of Sovereignty over Others’ Transformations, whose lifespan is sixteen thousand years, and this is one day and one night in the hell of Burning Heat; reckoning such days and nights into months and years, their lifespan is sixteen thousand years of that kind.
The hell of Extreme Heat has a lifespan of half an intermediate aeon, and the Unremitting hell of one intermediate aeon.
The lifespan of animals is for the most part without fixed limit; but if the life is exceedingly long, it too is one intermediate aeon, that is, the great nāga kings such as Nanda and the rest. Hence the World-Honored One said: there are eight great nāgas, all of whom can abide for an aeon and can uphold the great earth.
Ghosts take one human month as a day, and reckoning by this into months and years, they live five hundred years.
Question: what is the lifespan of the cold narakas? Answer: the World-Honored One committed it to a simile to display their lifespan — as when twenty human khārī make one vāha of sesame in the land of Magadha (both “khārī” and “vāha” are units of capacity, one vāha being twenty khārī), and a man fills it level to the brim with black sesame, and suppose again that a man were able to take one seed away every hundred years: in such a case the sesame would readily come to a time of exhaustion, whereas the lifespan of one born in the hell of Arbuda would be hard to exhaust. Twenty times this number is the lifespan of the second cold hell, and so thereafter each increases twentyfold — such are the lifespans of the eight cold hells.
Question: do these lifespans admit of untimely death midway? The stanza says:
〔First Half of Root 84〕Untimely Death, and Those Who Do Not Die Untimely
Stanza: In every place there is untimely death, save only in Uttarakuru in the north.
Treatise: In every place the lifespan admits of dying untimely midway, save only Uttarakuru in the north, whose fixed lifespan is a thousand years.
This, however, is said with respect to “place” and not with respect to particular sentient beings — for there are certain other sentient beings who do not die untimely. That is to say: the bodhisattva bound to one more birth who dwells in the Tuṣita Heaven (the bodhisattva who has but one birth left before buddhahood), and one in his last existence, one to whom the Buddha has given prediction, one whom the Buddha has sent, one who follows through faith, one who follows the dharma, and further the mothers who carry a bodhisattva in the womb and who carry a wheel-turning monarch in the womb — these, each as is fitting, are all without untimely death.
極少量·年劫·三災The Least Measures · Years and Aeons · The Three Catastrophes
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔承前起問〕兩把尺已經用過了,它們的最小刻度是什麼
論(承前):前面已經用「踰繕那」(一種長度單位,音譯詞,舊譯作『由旬』)等等,分辨了器世間(山河大地、日月天宮這些容納有情的環境)以及有情身量的大小差別;又用「年」等等,分辨了各處壽命長短的不同。這兩把尺——一把量空間、一把量時間——它們各自的『刻度到底能小到什麼地步』,前面都還沒有說,現在應該說了。
再者,這兩種量的建立,沒有一樣不是依著『名稱』而成立的(沒有名字,就無從說某某量)。所以空間量、時間量這兩者,加上「名」這第三者,它們的極少之量都還未曾詳說;如今應當先辨明這三種極少之量。頌說:
〔正84後半〕三種極少——色的極少、名的極少、時的極少
頌:極微是色法的極少,一個字是名的極少,一剎那是時間的極少。
論:把種種色法一層一層分析下去,分析到不能再分,就是「一極微」;所以『一個極微』就是色法的極少單位。照同樣的辦法,把種種名稱與時間也分析下去,分析到「一字」與「一剎那」,就是名與時的極少單位。
所謂『一個字的名』是什麼?就像說一個「瞿」字(單獨一個字就能作名,這就是名的最小者)。
那麼,什麼叫作「一剎那」的量呢?論給了兩個說法:一是『眾多條件湊合起來,一個法剛剛獲得它自身存在的那一瞬』;二是『若有正在移動的東西,它移過一個極微那麼長的距離,這一段就是一剎那』。此外,對法諸師(專治阿毘達磨的論師們)另有一個譬喻的說法:像一個壯健的人快速彈一下手指,這一彈指的時間裡就經過了六十五個剎那——這樣算出來的,就叫作一剎那的量。
三種極少已經知道了;那麼前面所說的空間量與時間量,它們整套的刻度又是怎樣的呢?現在且先辨明前一種,也就是踰繕那這一系的長度量。頌說:
〔正85·正86〕長度量的全表——從極微到踰繕那,一路七倍遞增
頌:極微、微、金塵、水塵,兔毛塵、羊毛塵、牛毛塵、隙遊塵,蟣、虱、穬麥、指節——從前一級到後一級,每一級都是七倍地增上去。二十四個指頭橫排是一「肘」,四肘是一「弓」的長度,五百弓是一俱盧舍;八個俱盧舍,就是一踰繕那。
論:這一串以「極微」為最初、以「指節」為最末,要知道後一級對前一級一律是七倍地增加。也就是說:七個極微合成一「微」的量;把「微」累積到七個,成為一個「金塵」;七個金塵,成為「水塵」的量;水塵累積到七個,成為一個「兔毛塵」;七個兔毛塵,成為「羊毛塵」的量;羊毛塵累積七個,成為一個「牛毛塵」;七個牛毛塵,成為「隙遊塵」的量(就是從窗隙射進來的光柱裡,肉眼可見的浮塵);七個隙遊塵成為一「蟣」(蟣是虱子的卵);七蟣成為一「虱」;七虱成為一「穬麥」(一種帶芒的麥粒);七麥成為一「指節」(一節指骨的長度)。
到這裡七倍遞增就結束了:三個指節合為一「指」——這一步是三倍,不是七倍。因為指節與指的關係是世間人人都清楚的常識,所以頌文裡就不另外分別交代了。
再往上是尋常的丈量單位:二十四個指頭橫著排開就是一「肘」;四肘豎著累起來就是一「弓」,也叫作「尋」;五百弓豎著累起來就是一「俱盧舍」——一俱盧舍大約就是從村落走到阿練若(僧眾修行的寂靜處,離村不遠不近的林野)中間那一段路的長度。八個俱盧舍,就說成一「踰繕那」。
長度這一套已經說完了,現在該辨明後一種——年等等的時間量了。頌說:
〔正87·正88〕時間量的全表——從剎那到年,以及一年裡少掉的六個夜
頌:一百二十個剎那,是一「怛剎那」的量;六十個怛剎那,是一「臘縛」;三十個臘縛,是一「須臾」;三十個須臾,是一晝夜;三十個晝夜是一個月;十二個月為一年;一年之中有一半的月份要減夜。
論:剎那一百二十個為一怛剎那;六十個怛剎那為一臘縛;三十個臘縛為一「牟呼栗多」(就是須臾);三十個牟呼栗多為一晝夜。這一晝夜之中有時增、有時減、有時相等——增減指的是晝與夜彼此的消長,總量始終是三十個牟呼栗多:有時夜長晝短(此方之冬至),有時晝長夜短(此方之夏至),有時晝夜均平(此方之春分、秋分)。三十個晝夜為一個月,總共十二個月為一年。
一年之中又分作三「際」(三個季節段落),就是寒際、熱際、雨際,各佔四個月。十二個月當中,有六個月要「減夜」(那六個月的夜比常數短,等於每月少算一夜);所以整整一年裡,夜總共減去六。為什麼是這樣算的呢?所以有一首舊頌這樣說:
引頌:在寒、熱、雨這三際當中,每一際過了一個半月之後,於剩下的那半個月裡,有智慧的人便知道要減夜了。
論(續):從剎那一路辨到年,這樣就說完了。接下來時間要拉長到「劫」——各種劫的量並不相同,現在就依次來辨明。頌說:
〔正89–92〕四種劫——壞劫、成劫、中劫、大劫
頌:應知劫有四種,就是壞劫、成劫、中劫、大劫。壞劫,從地獄不再有新生的有情起算,直到外面的器世間全部毀盡為止。成劫,從風輪生起算,直到地獄裡最初有有情出生為止。中劫,是從人壽無量歲減到只剩十歲為第一個;其後有十八個一增一減的;最後一個是增到八萬歲為止。這樣『成了之後安住』的階段,就叫作中間的二十劫。成劫、壞劫、壞了以後的空劫,它們的時間量都與住劫相等。八十個中劫合成一個大劫;而成佛要經三個『大劫的無數』。
論:
〔壞劫〕 所謂「壞劫」,是說從地獄裡的有情不再有新生者開始,一直到外面的器世間全部毀盡為止。「壞」有兩種分法:一種分法是『趣壞』與『界壞』(依五趣說毀壞、依三界說毀壞);另一種分法是『有情壞』與『外器壞』(先毀有情世間,後毀器世間)。
這個世間先經過二十個中劫的『住』,此後又有相等的二十個中劫,壞劫就到了。什麼時候算壞劫的開始呢?當地獄的有情命終之後不再有新的有情生進去,這就是壞劫之始;一直到地獄裡再沒有一個有情,那時候就叫作『地獄已壞』。
那些造了必定要在地獄受報之業的有情怎麼辦呢?由業力牽引,把他們安置到別的世界的地獄裡去受。由這一點,就可以類推畜生道與餓鬼道也是這樣毀壞的。不過牠們各自是先毀在本處住的那一批;至於和人天雜居的那些(例如人間的畜生、鬼),就跟著人天一起毀壞。
再說人趣。什麼時候人趣毀壞呢?當這個贍部洲(我們所住的南洲)裡有一個人,沒有老師教而自然而然地證得了初靜慮(初禪),從定中出來便唱出這樣的話:『離生喜樂,甚樂甚靜』(遠離欲界而生的喜樂,太快樂了、太寂靜了)。其他人聽了,也都跟著入定;命終之後,一起生到梵世(初禪天)裡去。這樣一直到本洲的有情全部走光,就叫作『贍部洲人已壞』。東勝身洲與西牛貨洲,照這個例子說即可。至於北俱盧洲,那裡的人壽盡之後是生到欲界天去的——因為北洲人沒有能力入定離欲。一直到人趣裡再沒有一個有情,那時候就叫作『人趣已壞』。
再說天趣。什麼時候天趣毀壞呢?當四大王眾天裡有某一位,自然而然地證得初靜慮,乃至一同生到梵世中去;等到那一層天的有情全部走光,就叫作『大王眾天已壞』。其餘的五層欲界天(三十三天、夜摩、覩史多、樂變化、他化自在),照這個例子說即可。一直到欲界裡再沒有一個有情,就叫作『欲界之中有情已壞』。
再往上。什麼時候梵世毀壞呢?當梵世裡有某一位有情,沒有老師教而自然而然地證得第二靜慮,從那個定出來便唱出這樣的話:『定生喜樂,甚樂甚靜』(由定而生的喜樂,太快樂了、太寂靜了)。其餘的天眾聽了,也都入那個定;命終之後一起生到極光淨天(二禪最上一層)。這樣一直到梵世中的有情全部走光——這就叫作『有情世間已經壞了』,只剩下器世間空空曠曠地擺在那裡。
〔器世間之毀〕 接著,其餘十方世界的一切有情,凡是感得這一個三千大千世界的業都用盡了,於是這裡漸漸出現七個日輪:眾海乾涸、群山洞然起火,洲渚(陸地島嶼)與底下的風輪、水輪、金輪三層都一併被焚燒,狂風吹著猛烈的火焰上燒天宮,一直燒到梵宮,連灰燼都不留。
要注意:是本地的火焰燒本地的宮殿,並不是別一地的災能毀壞另一地——之所以說『下面的火被風一飄就焚燒上地』,是就『相互引發』這一層而說的,意思是欲界的火猛焰上升,作為條件而引生色界的火焰(並非欲界的火真燒到色界去)。其餘的水災、風災也是這樣,照著這個道理去理解就可以。
從地獄開始逐層減損,一直到器世間毀盡,總名為「壞劫」。
〔成劫〕 所謂「成劫」,是說從風輪生起,一直到地獄裡開始有有情出生為止。這個世間被災所壞之後,有二十個中劫只是一片虛空;過了這麼長的時間之後,又應當有相等的二十個中劫,成劫就到了。
由一切有情共同業力的增上,虛空中漸漸有極細的風生起,這就是器世間將要形成的前兆。風漸漸強盛,於是照前面(子4)所說的樣子成立風輪、水輪、金輪等等;不過先成立的是大梵王宮,一直到夜摩天宮(空居天由上而下先成),然後才起風輪等等(地居的部分後成)——這就叫作『外面的器世間已經成立』。
接著是有情世間。最初有一位有情從極光淨天命終,生到大梵天處,作大梵王。此後其餘有情也從那裡命終,有的生為梵輔天、有的生為梵眾天、有的生到他化自在天宮。就這樣一層一層往下生,一直生到人趣的北俱盧洲、西牛貨洲、東勝身洲、南贍部洲,然後才生餓鬼、畜生、地獄。法則本來就是如此:最後毀壞的,一定是最先形成的(反過來說,最先毀壞的地獄,是最後才形成的)。
如果最初有一位有情生到無間地獄,就應當知道二十個中劫的成劫已經圓滿了。此後又有二十個中劫,名為『成了之後安住』,依次而起——也就是說,從風生起而造出器世間開始,一直到後來有情漸漸安住為止。
〔中劫〕 這個贍部洲的人壽,起初經歷極長而不可計量的時間;到了住劫之初,壽命才開始漸漸減少。從無量歲減到最低的十歲,這就名為第一個住中劫。此後的十八個中劫,每一個都有增也有減:從十歲增到八萬歲,再從八萬歲減到十歲,這樣才名為第二個中劫;其後的十七個,照例都是如此。在這十八個之後,再從十歲增到最高的八萬歲,就名為第二十劫。
要記住兩個上下限:一切劫的增,不會超過八萬歲;一切劫的減,最低只到十歲。中間十八個劫是一增一減,時間量恰好相等;而最初的那一劫只有減、最後的那一劫只有增,所以這二十個劫的時量全都相等。這一整段總名為「成已住劫」。
至於其餘的成劫、壞劫、以及壞了以後的空劫,它們並沒有像住劫那樣的『增減二十階』的差別;然而由於時間量與住劫相同,所以也比照住劫,各自算成二十個中劫。成劫之中,最初的一個劫是生起器世間,後面的十九個劫是有情漸漸來住;壞劫之中,最後的一個劫是毀減器世間,前面的十九個劫是有情漸漸捨離。
這樣,所說的成、住、壞、空四段,各是二十個中劫,累積起來共八十個;這八十個中劫合起來,就成一個「大劫」的量。
〔劫的體性〕 那麼劫這個東西的體性是什麼呢?答:只是五蘊(色、受、想、行、識——劫不是另有一物,只是身心諸法在時間上的一段相續)。
〔三劫阿僧企耶〕 經中說,要經過『三劫阿僧企耶』(三個無數大劫)精進修行,才能成佛。在前面所說的四種劫當中,是累積哪一種劫才成為三個無數呢?答:是把前面所說的「大劫」累積成十、成百、成千,乃至累積成三個無數。
既然叫作「無數」,為什麼又說有「三」個?答:所謂『無數』二字,並不是顯示『不能數』的意思。《解脫經》說在六十個數位當中,「阿僧企耶」是其中的一個數位(是一個確定的位數之名,不是『數不出來』)。
那六十個數位是怎麼數的呢?如那部經所說:有一個沒有剩餘的數,最初為一;十個一為十、十個十為百、十個百為千、十個千為萬、十個萬為一「洛叉」、十個「洛叉」為一「度洛叉」、十個「度洛叉」為一「俱胝」、十個「俱胝」為一「末陀」、十個「末陀」為一「阿庾多」、十個「阿庾多」為一「大阿庾多」、十個「大阿庾多」為一「那庾多」、十個「那庾多」為一「大那庾多」、十個「大那庾多」為一「鉢羅庾多」、十個「鉢羅庾多」為一「大鉢羅庾多」、十個「大鉢羅庾多」為一「矜羯羅」、十個「矜羯羅」為一「大矜羯羅」、十個「大矜羯羅」為一「頻跋羅」、十個「頻跋羅」為一「大頻跋羅」、十個「大頻跋羅」為一「阿芻婆」、十個「阿芻婆」為一「大阿芻婆」、十個「大阿芻婆」為一「毘婆訶」、十個「毘婆訶」為一「大毘婆訶」、十個「大毘婆訶」為一「嗢蹭伽」、十個「嗢蹭伽」為一「大嗢蹭伽」、十個「大嗢蹭伽」為一「婆喝那」、十個「婆喝那」為一「大婆喝那」、十個「大婆喝那」為一「地致婆」、十個「地致婆」為一「大地致婆」、十個「大地致婆」為一「醯都」、十個「醯都」為一「大醯都」、十個「大醯都」為一「羯臘婆」、十個「羯臘婆」為一「大羯臘婆」、十個「大羯臘婆」為一「印達羅」、十個「印達羅」為一「大印達羅」、十個「大印達羅」為一「三磨鉢耽」、十個「三磨鉢耽」為一「大三磨鉢耽」、十個「大三磨鉢耽」為一「揭底」、十個「揭底」為一「大揭底」、十個「大揭底」為一「拈筏羅闍」、十個「拈筏羅闍」為一「大拈筏羅闍」、十個「大拈筏羅闍」為一「姥達羅」、十個「姥達羅」為一「大姥達羅」、十個「大姥達羅」為一「跋藍」、十個「跋藍」為一「大跋藍」、十個「大跋藍」為一「珊若」、十個「珊若」為一「大珊若」、十個「大珊若」為一「毘步多」、十個「毘步多」為一「大毘步多」、十個「大毘步多」為一「跋邏攙」、十個「跋邏攙」為一「大跋邏攙」、十個「大跋邏攙」為一「阿僧企耶」。
不過在這一套數位裡,後面有八個已經失傳忘記了(所以現存的只到第五十二位)。若是把大劫一直數到這個數位上的阿僧企耶,就名為『一個劫無數』。這個劫無數再累積到三,經中就說為『三劫無數』。所以並不是算不出來、數不清楚,才說為三劫無數(而是這個位數本身就叫作無數)。
〔何以要發長時之願〕 有人問:菩薩為什麼要發下長時間的誓願、精進修行,才期望佛果呢(何不求快)?反過來問:又為什麼不許他發長時之願來修呢?
答:無上菩提極難獲得,不是靠少量的願與行就有可能成就的。菩薩必須經過三個無數劫,修集廣大的福德資糧與智慧資糧、修六波羅蜜多(布施、持戒、忍辱、精進、靜慮、般若),經過許許多多的苦行,才證得無上正等菩提;所以一定應當發下長時之願。
又問:若是用其餘的方便也能得到涅槃(如聲聞速證),何必為了菩提而長久地修那麼多苦行?
答:因為要利樂一切有情,所以才求菩提、發長時之願。他心裡是這樣想的:『怎樣才能使我具備廣大的能力,在痛苦的洪流當中救濟一切含識?』因此寧可捨掉(速取涅槃的)那條路,而求無上菩提。
又問:救濟別的有情,對自己有什麼好處?
答:菩薩救濟眾生,正是滿足了自己的悲心;所以『濟他』本身就是自己的利益(不必另求一個好處)。
又問:誰會相信菩薩有這樣的事?
答:對於那種只想潤益自己、沒有大慈悲的人來說,這件事確實難信;但對於那種無心潤益自己、卻有大慈悲的人來說,這件事並不難信。就像世上確實有些人長期串習了沒有哀愍的心,即使對自己毫無好處,也樂於損害他人——這是大家都看得到的。同樣地,菩薩長期串習慈悲,即使對自己沒有利益,也樂於利益他人,為什麼不能相信呢?
再者,就像有情由於反覆串習的力量,對於本無我的諸行不能了知它只是有為法,執著它是「我」而生起愛著,並且因此甘心背負種種苦——這也是有智慧的人都看得到的。同樣地,菩薩由於反覆串習的力量,捨掉了愛自己的心而增長了愛他人的心,並且因此甘心背負種種苦,為什麼不能相信呢?
再者,由於種姓(根性類別)不同,才會生起這樣的志願:把他人的苦當作自己的苦、把他人的樂當作自己的樂,不把自己的苦樂當一回事;在他們看來,並沒有一種『利益他人以外另有的自我利益』。依著這個意思,所以有一首舊頌這樣說:
引頌:下等的士夫勤修種種方便,恒常只求自己一身的安樂;中等的士夫求滅除苦,因為他看出所謂的樂只是苦的所依,並非真樂;上等的士夫則恒常勤求——寧可自己受苦而使他人安樂,並且要使他人的苦永遠滅盡,因為他把他人當成了自己。
〔正93〕佛與獨覺出現在什麼時候
論(承前起問):劫量的種種差別已經辨明了。那麼,諸佛與獨覺出現在世間,是在劫增的時候呢,還是在劫減的階段?頌說:
頌:從八萬歲減下來直到一百歲之間,諸佛出現於世間;獨覺則在劫增、劫減兩個階段都可以出現;其中麟角喻獨覺,要修一百大劫。
論:從這個贍部洲的人壽八萬歲起,漸漸減到最低的一百歲,在這一段中間,諸佛才出現。
為什麼在劫增的階段沒有佛出世呢?因為那時有情的快樂正在增長,很難教他們生起厭離之心。
為什麼減到一百歲以下也沒有佛出世呢?因為五濁極度增盛,難以教化。所謂五濁,就是:一壽濁、二劫濁、三煩惱濁、四見濁、五有情濁。當劫減將要到末尾時,壽命等等都變得鄙劣低下,像渣滓污穢一樣,所以叫作「濁」。
這五濁各損害什麼?由前面兩濁(壽濁、劫濁),依其次第,壽命與生活資具極度地被損減。由中間兩濁(煩惱濁、見濁),善品被損減——煩惱濁使人耽著欲樂,見濁使人自苦其身修無益苦行;或者說,一個損在家人的善、一個損出家人的善。由最後一濁(有情濁),損害自身,也就是壞了自身的身量、色力、憶念、智慧、勤勇以及無病。
〔獨覺〕 獨覺出現則通於劫增與劫減兩段。然而獨覺有兩種不同:一是「部行」(成群結隊的),二是「麟角喻」(像麒麟只有一隻角,比喻獨來獨往的)。
部行獨覺原先是聲聞,得到勝果的時候轉名為『獨勝』。另有一種說法:他們原先是異生(凡夫),曾經修過聲聞的順決擇分(見道前的加行善根),如今自己證道而得獨勝之名。這一說的根據,是《本事》中所說的一個故事:有一座山上,總共住著五百位修苦行的外道仙人。有一隻獼猴曾經和一位獨覺住得很近,看熟了那位獨覺的威儀;後來牠輾轉遊行到了那些外道仙人那裡,就把先前看見的獨覺威儀表演出來。那些仙人看見了,都生起敬慕之心,不久之後全都證得了獨覺菩提。——若說他們原先已是聖人(前一說),就不應該還在修外道苦行了(所以有這第二說)。
至於麟角喻獨覺,是說一定獨居的。兩種獨覺當中,麟角喻這一種,要經過一百大劫修集菩提資糧,然後才成為麟角喻獨覺。
〔獨覺何以不化他〕 所謂「獨覺」,是說在現在這一生中,不必稟受他人的教導而唯獨自己悟道;因為他能夠調伏自己,卻不調伏他人。
那麼,為什麼說獨覺不調伏他人呢?並不是他沒有能力演說正法——因為他也得到了無礙解(辯才自在);而且他能憶念過去世所聽聞的、諸佛所宣說的聖教義理。也不可以說他沒有慈悲——因為他為了攝受有情,也會現神通。也不可以說當時沒有堪受法的根機——因為那時的有情也有能力生起世間離欲的對治道。
那到底是為什麼?雖然上面這些道理都在,但由於他宿世的串習,對於說法這件事少有欣樂與勝解,沒有『要說』的希望。又因為他知道有情難以接受深法——眾生順著生死之流已經太久,很難叫他們逆流而上。又因為他要避開攝受徒眾這件事,害怕喧鬧雜亂,所以不為他人宣說正法。
〔正94·正95〕轉輪王——什麼時候出、有幾種、能不能同時有兩位、以什麼威勢、有什麼相
論(承前起問):轉輪王出世是在什麼時候?有幾種?可以有幾位同時?以什麼威勢降伏四方?身上有什麼相?頌說:
頌:轉輪王出現在人壽八萬歲以上的時候,分金輪、銀輪、銅輪、鐵輪四種,依次統領一洲、二洲、三洲、四洲(金四、銀三、銅二、鐵一,與輪的次第相逆);他和佛一樣,不會有兩位同時出世。四王的降伏方式不同:金輪王是他方自來迎請,銀輪王是自己前往,銅輪王是較量威德,鐵輪王是列陣得勝而止——但都不加傷害。輪王雖有三十二相,卻不像佛的相那樣『處所端正、明了、圓滿』,所以與佛不能相等。
論:
〔出世之時〕 從這個贍部洲人壽無量歲,一直到八萬歲的這一段,才有轉輪王出生。等到減至八萬歲以下,有情的富樂與壽量都在損減、種種惡漸漸盛起來,已經不是大人(有大人相者)出生的器量了,所以就沒有輪王。
這位王之所以叫「轉輪王」,是因為他憑著輪寶的旋轉所到、應機導化,威勢降伏一切。
〔四種輪王〕 《施設足》論中說輪王有四種,是依金、銀、銅、鐵四種輪各別而分的。依其次第,金為最勝、銀為上、銅為中、鐵為下;而所王領的洲數則是相逆的——鐵輪王統領一洲,銅輪王統領二洲,銀輪王統領三洲,金輪王統領四洲。
契經就最勝的一種只說金輪,所以契經說:如果有一位王生在剎帝利種姓、繼承了灌頂之位,在十五日受齋戒的時候,沐浴頭與身、受持殊勝的齋戒,登上高臺殿堂、臣僚環侍左右,這時東方忽然有金輪寶出現——那輪有一千根輻條,轂與輞(車輪的中心與外圈)具足,眾相圓滿潔淨,像巧匠做成的一樣,舒放美妙的光明而來,應於王所。那麼這位王必定就是轉金輪王。其餘轉銀、銅、鐵輪的王,也照這個樣子去理解。
〔輪王與佛皆無二俱生〕 輪王和佛一樣,不會有兩位同時出生。所以契經說:沒有這樣的處所、沒有這樣的地位,可以不分前後而有兩位如來、應、正等覺同時出現於世;有的只是『一個時處唯有一位如來』。就像說如來如此,輪王也是如此。
〔一界唯一佛,還是十方唯一佛〕 這裡應當仔細思擇:契經所說的『唯一』,是就一個三千大千世界而說,還是就一切世界而說?
有一派說:其餘的世界必定沒有佛出生。為什麼?因為不應當說薄伽梵(世尊)的功能有所障礙——唯獨一位世尊便能普遍在十方教化。如果說有某一處,這位佛在那裡沒有教化的能力,那麼其餘各處也應當如此(豈不是處處都不能教化了)。
他們還舉一段教證:世尊告訴舍利子說:假設有人來到你這裡,問你『在此刻,可有哪位梵志、沙門與喬答摩氏(世尊的姓)平等平等地證得無上覺嗎』,你得到這個問題應當怎麼回答?當時舍利子回答世尊說:我得到這個問題會這樣答——此刻並沒有哪位梵志、沙門證得無上菩提而與我世尊相等。之所以這樣說,是因為我從世尊處親自聽聞、親自受持:沒有這樣的處所、沒有這樣的地位,可以不分前後而有兩位如來應正等覺出現於世;有的只是『一個時處唯有一位如來』。
有人反問:若是這樣,為什麼《梵王經》說『我如今在這三千大千諸世界中得自在轉』(只說三千大千,豈不是佛的範圍有限)?答:那句話另有密意。密意是什麼?就是:若世尊不起加行(不特別作意),便只觀這三千大千;若世尊發起加行,那麼無邊的世界都是佛眼所及的境界。天耳通等等,照這個道理去理解就可以。
另有一派部師說:其餘的世界也另有佛出現於世間。為什麼?因為同時有許多菩薩都在修集菩提資糧;一個世界一個時候可以沒有多佛,但是多個世界有多佛,有什麼道理能遮止呢?所以無邊的世界中有無邊的佛出現。
他們還進一步論證:如果唯有一佛,那麼即使他住世一劫,尚且不能周遍地為一個世界作完佛事,何況以同於人壽的短暫壽命,去利益無邊的世界?然而諸有情居住在無邊的世界,時間、處所、根性的差別無邊無量,佛應當普遍觀察這些有情:在某某時、某某處應當見到世尊,佛便應著他們的根機現神通、說法,使他們的過失未生的不生、已生的能斷滅,使他們的功德未生的得生、已生的能圓滿。這樣的事,一位佛怎麼可能同時完成?所以同時必定有多佛。
至於前一派所引的『沒有處所地位可以不分前後有二如來出世』那一段,也應當共同思擇:這句話是就一個世界說,還是就多個世界說?如果是就多個世界說,那麼轉輪王在其餘世界中也應當沒有——因為經文正是拿『如佛』來遮止輪王的俱生的。既然承許輪王在別的世界另外可以有,為什麼不承許別的世界另外有佛呢?佛出世間具足吉祥與福德,多界有多佛有什麼過失而要遮止?多個世界中諸佛一齊出現,正好能饒益無量有情,使他們獲得增上生(人天善趣)與決定勝道(出世解脫)。
〔那麼一界為何無二佛〕 一佛家反難:若是這樣,為什麼一個世界之中不會有兩位如來同時出現?十方佛家答有四理:一是沒有必要——一個世界之中有一位佛,就足以饒益一切。二是願力的緣故——諸如來在作菩薩的時候先發過誓願:『願我當來在那沒有救、沒有依、盲闇的世界中成等正覺,利益安樂一切有情,為他們作救、作依、作眼、作導。』三是為了使人敬重——一個世界之中唯有一位如來,人們才會深深敬重。四是為了使人趕快修行——要讓人知道『一切智尊極難值遇』,他所立的教法應當趕快修行,不要等佛般涅槃了或往別處去了,才使我們無救無依。所以一個世界之中不會有兩位佛出現。
〔四王的威勢〕 前面所說的四種輪王,他們安定四方的威勢也有差別。金輪王是這樣的:諸小國王各自前來迎接,作這樣的請求——『我們的國土寬廣豐饒,安隱富樂、人口眾多,唯願天尊親自垂降教敕,我們都是天尊的隨從。』銀輪王則是自己前往那些國土,威嚴一到近處,那一方就臣伏了。銅輪王到了那個國家以後,要宣揚威勢、較量德望,那一方才推服他為勝。鐵輪王也到那個國家,要現出威勢、擺開陣勢,剋敵得勝之後便停止。
但是一切輪王都不加傷害:使對方降伏、自己得勝之後,就讓各方各自安居原處,並且勸化他們修十善業道;所以輪王死後必定得生天上。
〔七寶〕 經中說輪王出現於世,便有七寶出現世間。哪七種?一是輪寶、二是象寶、三是馬寶、四是珠寶、五是女寶、六是主藏臣寶(掌管財庫的大臣)、七是主兵臣寶(掌管軍事的大臣)。
有人問:象、馬、女、主藏臣、主兵臣這五寶都是有情所攝,怎麼可能由甲的業去生出乙這個有情?別的有情並不是從甲的業生起的呀。答:那是因為先前造業時彼此相屬(共業互相關聯);其中若有一位隨著自己的業而出生,其餘幾位也同時乘著各自的業而生起(並非甲的業直接造出乙)。
〔輪王與佛之異〕 前面所說的諸轉輪王,不只是有七寶與其餘的王不同,也另有三十二種大士相的殊勝。若是這樣,輪王與佛有什麼分別?答:佛的大士相『處所端正、明了、圓滿』,王的相就不是這樣了,所以兩者有差別。
〔正96〕劫初的人——從如色界天,到貪味、懶惰、貯積、盜賊,而後立王
論(承前起問):劫初的人們,究竟有王還是沒有王?頌說:
頌:劫初的人像色界天一樣;後來漸漸增長對地味的貪著;由於懶惰而起了貯積,由貯積而起了盜賊,為了防賊才雇人守田(王便由此而立)。
論:
〔劫初之人〕 劫初的人都像色界天人一樣,所以契經說:劫初的人有色身而是『從意所生』(不由胎生),支體圓滿、諸根不缺,形色端正莊嚴、身上帶著光明,能騰空自在往來,以喜樂為食,壽命長久。
〔地味與段食之始〕 那時有一種「地味」漸漸生出來,味道甘美、香氣濃郁。有一個人生性貪著滋味,聞到香氣便起了愛心,取來嘗一嘗就吃了下去;其餘的人跟著學,爭相取食。從這時候起,才叫作『開始受用段食』(一口一口吃的粗食)。
因為靠段食滋養的緣故,身體漸漸變得堅硬沉重,原有的光明隱沒了,黑暗便生起來;日、月、眾星就從這時候出現(因為身光沒了,才需要外面的光)。
〔四番食物遞減〕 由於漸漸貪味,地味便隱沒了;接著又有「地皮餅」生出來。眾人又爭相貪食,地餅也隱沒了;這時又有「林藤」出現。爭相貪食的緣故,林藤又隱沒了;於是有不必耕種而自然生長的「香稻」,大家共同採取來充作食物。
〔男女根與非梵行之始〕 這種食物比較粗糙,殘餘的穢物留在身中;為了要排除它,便生出了二道(大小便道),因此就有了男根與女根。由於這兩種根不同,形相也就有了差異;由於宿世串習的力量,彼此便互相注視,因此生起了非理作意,欲貪像鬼魅一樣惑亂身心,使人失去正念、猖狂而行非梵行。人間的『欲鬼』就是從這時候開始發作的。
〔貯積與盜賊之始〕 那時候的人隨著早晚要吃就去取香稻,並不貯積。後來有人生性懶惰,一次多取香稻貯存起來,打算留著以後吃;其餘的人跟著學,貯存的漸漸多了。
由此對稻子生起了『我所有』的心,各自放縱貪情、多多收取而不知足;因此凡是收割過的地方就不再重新生長。於是大家一起分田,各自防範著(怕稻子遠遠地被人取盡)。
有了自己那一分田,就生起吝惜守護的心;看到別人那一分田,就懷著侵奪的念頭——「劫盜」這一項過失就是從這時候開始的。
〔立王與剎帝利、婆羅門二名之始〕 為了要遮止防範這件事,大家聚在一起商議,衡量眾人之中選出一位有德的人,各自把所收的六分之一交給他,雇請他防護,封他為『田主』——「剎帝利」這個名稱就是這樣立起來的。大眾欽服承事,恩澤流布於全國土,所以又名為「大三末多王」(眾人共許之王);自此以後的諸王,都以這位王為第一。
那時候的人當中,也有厭離居家生活,喜歡住在空閑處精進修持戒行的,因此得到「婆羅門」這個名稱。
〔刑罰與虛誑語之始〕 後來有一位王貪吝財物,不能平均供給國土人民,因此貧困匱乏的人多去作賊。王為了禁止,就施行輕重不等的刑罰——「殺害」這一項業就是從這時候開始的。當時有犯罪的人心裡害怕刑罰,就隱瞞自己的過失、用另一套說詞發言——「虛誑語」就是從這時候起頭的。
〔正97〕小三災——刀兵、疾疫、飢饉
論(承前起問):在劫減的階段有小三災,它們的相貌是怎樣的?頌說:
頌:由於惡業道增長,人壽便減少,減到十歲時三災就出現了;刀兵、疾疫、飢饉依次而來,各經七日、七月、七年才停止。
論:
〔災之因〕 從諸有情興起虛誑語開始,種種惡業道一層層地增長,所以這個洲的人壽逐漸減少,一直減到最低的十歲,小三災就出現了。所以這些災患是以兩件事為根本的:一是耽著美食,二是生性懶惰(前面劫初一節的貪味與懶惰,正是這裡的根)。這個小三災是在中劫的末尾才起的。所謂三災,就是:一刀兵、二疾疫、三飢饉。
〔刀兵災〕 也就是說:在中劫末十歲的時候,人們被非法的貪染污了相續之心,不平等的愛映蔽了他們的心,邪法纏繞、瞋毒增上,彼此一見面便生起猛利的加害之心——就像現在的獵人看見野獸一樣。這時候他們隨手所拿的東西都變成利刀,各自逞其兇狂互相殘害。
〔疾疫災〕 又在中劫末十歲的時候,人們由於具有前面所說的種種過失,非人(鬼神一類)吐出毒氣,疾疫流行,遇上了就命終,很難救治。
〔飢饉災〕 又在中劫末十歲的時候,人們也具有前面所說的種種過失,天龍發怒譴責而不降甘雨,因此世間長久遭受飢饉,既沒有支撐接濟,大多數人便命終了。
〔飢饉三名之釋〕 所以說『由於飢饉的緣故,便有「聚集」「白骨」「運籌」』。
為什麼叫「聚集」?有兩種因:一是人的聚集——那時候的人因為極度飢餓瘦弱,聚在一起而死。二是種子的聚集——那時候的人為了利益後人,省下自己所吃的糧食放在小箱子裡,準備留作種子。所以飢饉的時候名為『有聚集』。
為什麼叫「白骨」?也有兩種因:一是那時候的人身形枯乾,命終沒多久白骨便顯露出來。二是那時候的人被飢饉所逼,把白骨聚集起來煎成汁來喝。
為什麼叫「運籌」?也有兩種因:一是由於糧食太少,要行籌(用竹籤排班)才有得吃——一家之中從年長的到年幼的,依著籌輪到那一天,才分得少許粗飯。二是拿籌去挑撥從前打穀場上積存的舊蘊(陳年殘穀),挑得少許穀粒,多加水煎煮,大家分著喝,用來救濟殘餘的性命。
〔對治之法〕 然而有可靠的聖教說了對治這三災的方法:如果有人能夠一晝一夜持不殺生戒,在未來生中決定不會遇上刀兵災起。如果能夠拿一顆訶梨怛雞(訶子,一種藥果),以殷重清淨的心奉施僧眾,在當來世決定不會遇上疾疫災起。如果能夠拿一摶食(一團食物),以殷重清淨的心奉施僧眾,在當來世決定不會遇上飢饉災起。
〔三災各經多久〕 這三災各自要經歷多久?刀兵災起,最多只有七日;疾疫災起,是七個月零七日;飢饉災,是七年七個月零七日;過了這個時限便停止了。
〔他洲之相〕 停止之後人壽漸漸增長。東、西二洲也有類似的災起,就是瞋心增盛、身力羸弱、屢屢感到飢渴;至於北俱盧洲則完全沒有。
論(承前起問):前面說過火災焚燒世界,其餘的災也是這樣,照著道理去理解就是了。那麼其餘的是哪些?現在就具體地辨明。頌說:
〔正98·正99〕大三災——火、水、風,三定為頂
頌:大三災是火、水、風三種,以上面的三個靜慮天為各自的頂;這是因為那三個靜慮各有『與外災同類』的內災。第四靜慮沒有外災,所以叫作「不動」。然而第四靜慮的宮殿也不是常住的,因為它與有情一起生、一起滅。次第是:要七次火災之後才一次水災,滿七次水災之後,再七次火災,最後才起一次風災。
論:
〔三災之起與所壞〕 這個大三災逼迫有情,使他們捨棄下地而聚集到上面的天中去。最初的火災興起,是由七個日輪出現;其次的水災生起,是由連綿的大雨;最後的風災發生,是由風的互相衝擊。這三災的力量毀壞器世間,一直到連極微也沒有剩下的。
〔外道執極微常之破〕 有一類外道執著極微是常住的,他們說那時候還有剩餘的極微在。為什麼他們要這樣執著?因為(他們認為)若不留下極微,後來的粗物生起就沒有種子了。
論主反問:前面不是說過嗎——由諸有情的業所生的風就能作種子。或者說,就以前一次災難末了的那股風為緣,所引生的風即是種子。又如化地部的契經中說:風從別的地方把種子吹來這裡。
外道說:即使如此,我們仍不承認芽等生起時,是種子等作為因而親自引生的。論主問:若是這樣,芽等從何而生?答:從『自分』(自己的部分)而生;這樣自分又從更小的自分而生,輾轉下去,一直到最細的『有分』從極微而生。
論主問:那麼在芽等的生起當中,種子等到底有什麼作用?答:除了能夠引集芽等的極微以外,種子等再沒有生芽等的力量。
論主問:為什麼一定要作這樣的執著?答:因為從不同類的東西生出結果,決定不合道理。問:不合什麼道理?答:那樣就會沒有決定性了(什麼都能生什麼)。論主說:功能本身是決定的,所以並沒有『不決定』的過失;例如聲音、熟變(果實由生變熟)等等,都是從不同類而決定地生起的。外道答:那些是德法(性質),有其特殊性;實法(實體)就不是這樣。現見實法唯獨從同類生,像藤生出枝、線縷織成衣一樣。
論主破曰:這不合道理。問:哪裡不合?答:因為你所引的例子本身就不是雙方共許的(拿還沒成立的東西來作能立)。問:如今所引的哪裡不共許?答:因為我們並不承許『藤』與『枝』、『縷』與『衣』是各別的兩物。就是那藤、那些縷聚合起來,安排布置的方式不同,就得到『枝』『衣』之名;就像螞蟻排成一行叫『蟻行』(並不是另有一個實體叫蟻行)。
問:怎麼知道是這樣?答:在單獨一縷的聚合中,從來得不到『衣』,只得到縷而已。(如果衣是另一個實體,一縷上也該有它。)問:是誰在障礙,使得不到衣呢?答:若說一縷之中沒有整件衣,那就應該說『一縷上有衣的部分而沒有衣』;那麼就應當承許:整件衣只是諸部分的聚集,並不是另外還有一個叫作『衣』的有分(整體)。
論主又問:再說,你怎麼知道『衣的部分』異於『縷』?如果說衣一定要等許多所依聚合才成,那麼只有許多經線聚合時也應當得到衣(可是沒有)。或者應當畢竟沒有得衣之理——因為衣的中間與其餘邊緣並不同時對著根(眼根一次看不全)。如果說可以逐次地都對著根,那麼眼根、身根就只得到諸部分而已,不應當說它們得到了『有分』之衣;只是在諸部分上逐次了別,然後總起一個『有分』的覺知罷了——就像旋轉的火把看成一個火輪。
因為如果離開了縷,另有屬於衣的色、類、業(顏色、形類、作用),那麼衣的色等三者就不可得了。如果說錦衣上的顏色等是屬於衣的,那麼你就應當承許『實法可以從不同類生起』——因為一根一根的縷,其顏色並沒有那麼多種變化(錦衣的花色是多縷合成的)。或者說:在某一分上沒有那些不同的顏色,那一邊就應當看不見衣,因為是顏色在顯出衣的。或者說:就在那一分上也應當看見不同的顏色,因為衣必定有『不同色等』之相。你既承許『有分』的體唯是一個,卻又有種種色、類、業的差殊,果真有這種東西,那可真是太靈異了。
再者,在一團火的光明範圍裡,遠近不同則燒與照的作用有異;照你的說法,觸與色的差別便不能成立了。
〔極微對根之理〕 各別的極微雖然超出根的所取範圍,但是共同聚集起來就可以被現前的根所證知——就像你們自宗所說的『聚合能生果』,或者像眼等根聚合能發識一樣。又像眼睛有翳的人看見散落的髮絲時,若是許多根相鄰在一起,他就看得見;一根一根遠遠地散著,就沒有看見的能力。極微對根的道理也應當是這樣。
〔極微與色等非異體〕 再者,正是就色等而立『極微』之名的。色等壞的時候極微也就壞了。你們說極微屬於『實』所攝、色等屬於『德』所收,異體不應當決定同時滅——但這兩者體性各別,道理上必定講不通。因為仔細觀察時,離開色等並沒有另外的地水火風可得,所以並非體性各別。又你們自宗也承許地等是眼根、身根所取的,那和色、觸又有什麼不同呢?又如燒毛織的㲲布、紅花等等的時候,那個『毛』『花』的覺知也就沒有了——可見毛等的覺知只是緣著色等的差別而生起的,因為被火熟變之後它們的形量彼此相等〔且與未燒之前也無二致〕,再也分不出哪個是毛、哪個是㲲、哪個是紅花。就像看地上兩行相雜的瓦器、記認哪個是瓶哪個是盆一樣,如果不看形狀就記認不出來(顏色相同,能分別的只是形)。
〔止諍〕 誰會去採錄這種愚癡之類的狂言呢?所以對那一宗的廣泛諍論就到此為止。
〔三災之頂〕 這三災的頂在什麼地方?第二靜慮是火災的頂,因為它以下都被火所焚燒。第三靜慮是水災的頂,因為它以下都被水所浸爛。第四靜慮是風災的頂,因為它以下都被風所飄散。隨著哪一種災所能到的上限,就名為那一種災的頂。
〔內災與外災同類〕 為什麼下面三個靜慮會遭受火、水、風災?因為初、二、三這三個靜慮之中,各有與那一種外災同類的『內災』。也就是說:初靜慮以「尋、伺」為內災,它能燒惱心等,所以外面遭火災。第二靜慮以「喜受」為內災,它與輕安一同滋潤身心,像水一樣——遍身的粗重由此都被除去,所以經中說苦根到第二靜慮就滅了——因此外面遭水災。第三靜慮以「動息」(出入息的動)為內災,息也就是風之類,所以外面遭風災。若是入了這個靜慮,就有這樣的內災;生在這個靜慮的時候,就遭遇那相應的外災而毀壞。
〔何以不立地災〕 為什麼不把『地』也立為一種災?因為器世間本身就是地;只可以說火等與地相違,不可以說地又違反地。
〔第四靜慮無外災〕 第四靜慮以什麼為外災?答:它沒有外災,因為它離開了內災(沒有尋伺、沒有喜受、沒有動息)。因此佛說它名為「不動」——內外三災都到不了。另有一種說法:那一地有淨居天在,所以不遭諸災所壞;因為淨居天不可能生到無色界天去,也不應當再往別處去(若地被壞,他們就無處可住了)。
〔然而彼器亦非常〕 有人問:若是這樣,那一地的器世間豈不應當是常住的?答:不是的,因為它與有情一起生、一起滅。也就是說:那一層天處並沒有一整片共同的地形,只是像天上的眾星一樣,居處各別。有情在那裡出生的時候、死去的時候,所住的天宮就隨之生起、隨之滅去;所以那裡的器世間之體也不是常住的。
〔三災之次第〕 所說的三災,次第是怎樣的?必須先連續無間地起七次火災,其次必定有一次水災生起。此後再無間地起七次火災,經過七次火災又還有一次水災;這樣一直到滿七次水災為止。然後再起七次火災,最後才有風災生起。這樣總共是八個『七次火災』、一個『七次水災』,加上一次風災。
〔何以如此〕 為什麼會是這樣?因為那些有情所修的定因越往上越殊勝,所以感得的身量與壽命也越來越長;由此他們所居住的地方也就越來越久住(下地易壞、上地難壞,所以災的次數要層層累積上去)。
收卷:由這個道理,就能善巧地解釋《施設足》論中『遍淨天壽六十四劫』那一句文了。
〔Taking Up the Question from What Precedes〕Two Rules Have Already Been Used — What Is Their Smallest Graduation
Treatise (carrying on from what precedes): Above, by means of the yojana (a unit of length, a transcribed term, given in the older translation by a different transcription) and the rest, the differences in size within the receptacle world (the mountains, rivers, and great earth, and the sun, moon, and heavenly palaces — the surroundings that hold sentient beings) and in the bodily measure of sentient beings have been analyzed; and by means of the year and the rest, the differences of long and short in the lifespan of each place have been analyzed. Of these two rules — the one measuring space, the other time — how small a graduation each of them can reach has nowhere been stated above, and it should be stated now.
Further, the establishing of these two measures is in no case established apart from names (without a name there is no way to speak of any measure at all). Therefore of these two, the measure of space and the measure of time, together with a third, name, the least measure has in no case yet been set out in full; and now the three least measures should first be analyzed. The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 84〕The Three Least Measures — the Least of Form, the Least of Name, the Least of Time
Stanza: The ultimate atom is the least of form, a single letter the least of name, and a single moment the least of time.
Treatise: When the several kinds of form are analyzed layer by layer until they can be analyzed no further, that is one ultimate atom; and so a single ultimate atom is the least unit of form. By the same procedure, when the several names and times are likewise analyzed down to a single letter and a single moment, these are the least units of name and of time.
What is meant by a name of a single letter? It is like saying the one letter qu (a single letter alone can serve as a name, and this is the least of name).
What, then, is called the measure of a single moment? The treatise gives two accounts: first, the instant in which, when the many conditions have come together, a dharma just obtains its own existence; second, if there is something in motion, the stretch in which it passes over the length of one ultimate atom, and that stretch is one moment. Besides these, the Abhidharma masters (the treatise masters who make Abhidharma their special study) have a further account by way of simile: as a strong man snaps his fingers once quickly, and within the time of that one snap sixty-five moments have passed — reckoned in this way, it is called the measure of one moment.
The three least measures are now known; what then of the whole set of graduations of the measure of space and the measure of time spoken of above? For the present the former will be analyzed first, that is, the measures of length in the series of the yojana. The stanza says:
〔Root 85 · Root 86〕The Full Table of Lengths — from the Ultimate Atom to the Yojana, Increasing Sevenfold at Every Step
Stanza: The ultimate atom, the mote, gold dust, water dust; hare’s-hair dust, sheep’s-wool dust, ox-hair dust, crevice-roaming dust; the nit, the louse, the barley grain, the finger joint — from each grade to the next, every grade increases sevenfold. Twenty-four fingers laid side by side make one cubit, four cubits the length of one bow, and five hundred bows one krośa; and eight krośas make one yojana.
Treatise: In this series, which begins with the ultimate atom and ends with the finger joint, it should be known that each later grade is without exception sevenfold the one before. That is to say: seven ultimate atoms make the measure of one mote; motes accumulated to seven make one gold dust; seven gold dusts make the measure of water dust; water dusts accumulated to seven make one hare’s-hair dust; seven hare’s-hair dusts make the measure of sheep’s-wool dust; sheep’s-wool dusts accumulated to seven make one ox-hair dust; seven ox-hair dusts make the measure of crevice-roaming dust (that is, the floating dust visible to the naked eye within the shaft of light that comes through a crack in a window); seven crevice-roaming dusts make one nit (a nit being the egg of a louse); seven nits make one louse; seven lice make one barley grain (a bearded grain of barley); and seven barley grains make one finger joint (the length of one bone of a finger).
Here the sevenfold increase comes to an end: three finger joints together make one finger — and this step is threefold, not sevenfold. Because the relation of joint to finger is common knowledge plain to everyone in the world, the stanza gives it no separate statement of its own.
Above this come the ordinary units of measurement: twenty-four fingers laid out side by side make one cubit; four cubits stacked lengthwise make one bow, which is also called a fathom; five hundred bows laid end to end make one krośa — and one krośa is about the length of the road between a village and a forest hermitage (the quiet place where the community practices, in woodland neither too near the village nor too far from it). Eight krośas are then spoken of as one yojana.
This whole set of lengths has now been stated, and the latter kind should now be analyzed — the measures of time, the year and the rest. The stanza says:
〔Root 87 · Root 88〕The Full Table of Times — from the Moment to the Year, and the Six Nights a Year Loses
Stanza: One hundred and twenty moments are the measure of one tatkṣaṇa; sixty tatkṣaṇas make one lava; thirty lavas make one brief hour; thirty brief hours make one day and night; thirty days and nights make one month; twelve months make one year; and within a year half of the months must have their nights diminished.
Treatise: One hundred and twenty moments make one tatkṣaṇa; sixty tatkṣaṇas make one lava; thirty lavas make one muhūrta (that is, the brief hour); thirty muhūrtas make one day and night. Within this day and night there is sometimes increase, sometimes decrease, and sometimes equality — increase and decrease meaning the waxing and waning of day and night against each other, the total remaining always thirty muhūrtas: sometimes the night is long and the day short (the winter solstice in these parts), sometimes the day is long and the night short (the summer solstice in these parts), and sometimes day and night are level (the spring and the autumn equinox in these parts). Thirty days and nights make one month, and twelve months in all make one year.
A year is further divided into three seasons (three stretches of the year’s course), namely the cold season, the hot season, and the rainy season, each occupying four months. Of the twelve months, six must have their nights diminished (the nights of those six months being shorter than the standard, which comes to reckoning one night the less in each of them); and so in a full year the nights are diminished by six in all. Why is it reckoned so? For this reason there is an old stanza that says:
Quoted stanza: Within the three seasons, the cold, the hot, and the rainy, when a month and a half of each season has passed, in the half month that remains the wise know that the nights are to be diminished.
Treatise (continued): The analysis from the moment all the way to the year is thus complete. Next, time is to be drawn out to the aeon — and the measures of the several aeons are not the same, so they will now be analyzed in order. The stanza says:
〔Roots 89–92〕The Four Aeons — the Aeon of Dissolution, of Formation, the Intermediate Aeon, the Great Aeon
Stanza: It should be known that aeons are of four kinds, namely the aeon of dissolution, the aeon of formation, the intermediate aeon, and the great aeon. The aeon of dissolution is reckoned from the time when no new sentient being is born in the hells until the outward receptacle world is wholly destroyed. The aeon of formation is reckoned from the arising of the wind circle until the first sentient being is born in the hells. As for the intermediate aeon, the first is that in which the human lifespan decreases from immeasurable years to ten alone; after it come eighteen, each of one increase and one decrease; and the last is that which increases up to eighty thousand years. This stage of abiding after formation is what is called the twenty intermediate aeons. The aeon of formation, the aeon of dissolution, and the aeon of emptiness after dissolution are all equal in measure of time to the aeon of abiding. Eighty intermediate aeons together make one great aeon; and to become a buddha one must pass through three asaṃkhyeyas of great aeons.
Treatise:
〔The Aeon of Dissolution〕 What is called the aeon of dissolution runs from the point where no new sentient being is born among those in the hells until the outward receptacle world is wholly destroyed. Dissolution is divided in two ways: by one division it is the dissolution of the destinies and the dissolution of the realms (dissolution stated in terms of the five destinies and stated in terms of the three realms); by another division it is the dissolution of sentient beings and the dissolution of the outward receptacle (the world of sentient beings being destroyed first and the receptacle world afterward).
This world first passes twenty intermediate aeons of abiding, and thereafter there are twenty intermediate aeons equal to them, and the aeon of dissolution has come. From what point is the beginning of the aeon of dissolution reckoned? When the sentient beings of the hells die and no new sentient being is born into them, that is the beginning of the aeon of dissolution; and when not one sentient being is left in the hells, that is called the hells having been destroyed.
What of those sentient beings who have done actions that must certainly be requited in the hells? Drawn by the force of action, they are set in the hells of another world to undergo it there. From this it may be inferred that the destinies of animals and of hungry ghosts are destroyed in the same way. Yet in each of these it is those dwelling in their own proper place who are destroyed first; while those dwelling mingled among human beings and gods (the animals and the ghosts among human beings, for instance) are destroyed together with human beings and gods.
Next the destiny of human beings. At what point is the destiny of human beings destroyed? When someone in this Jambudvīpa (the southern continent in which we dwell), without a teacher, spontaneously attains the first meditative absorption, and coming out of that absorption sings out these words: “The joy and pleasure born of seclusion — how pleasant, how still!” (the joy and pleasure born of withdrawal from the desire realm — how very pleasant, how very still). The others, hearing him, all likewise enter absorption; and when their lives end they are together born into the Brahmā world (the heaven of the first absorption). Thus it goes on until the sentient beings of this continent are all gone, and that is called the people of Jambudvīpa having been destroyed. Videha in the east and Godānīya in the west may be stated on this same pattern. As for Uttarakuru in the north, the people there, when their lifespan is exhausted, are born among the gods of the desire realm — for the people of the northern continent have not the power to enter absorption and become free from desire. And when not one sentient being is left in the destiny of human beings, that is called the destiny of human beings having been destroyed.
Next the destiny of gods. At what point is the destiny of gods destroyed? When some one among the gods of the Heaven of the Multitude of the Four Great Kings spontaneously attains the first meditative absorption, and so on until they are together born into the Brahmā world; and when the sentient beings of that heaven are all gone, that is called the Heaven of the Multitude of the Great Kings having been destroyed. The remaining five heavens of the desire realm (the Heaven of the Thirty-Three, the Yāma, the Tuṣita, the Heaven of Delight in Working Transformations, and the Heaven of Sovereignty over Others’ Transformations) may be stated on this same pattern. And when not one sentient being is left in the desire realm, that is called the sentient beings within the desire realm having been destroyed.
Higher still. At what point is the Brahmā world destroyed? When some sentient being in the Brahmā world, without a teacher, spontaneously attains the second meditative absorption, and coming out of that absorption sings out these words: “The joy and pleasure born of absorption — how pleasant, how still!” (the joy and pleasure that arise from absorption — how very pleasant, how very still). The remaining host of gods, hearing him, all enter that absorption; and when their lives end they are together born into the Ābhāsvara Heaven (the highest level of the second absorption). Thus it goes on until the sentient beings within the Brahmā world are all gone — and this is called the world of sentient beings having been destroyed, only the receptacle world being left standing there vast and empty.
〔The Destruction of the Receptacle World〕 Next, when among all the sentient beings of the remaining worlds of the ten directions every action that draws forth this one trichiliocosm has been used up, seven sun-discs appear here by degrees: the seas dry up, the ranked mountains catch fire and blaze through, the continents and islets together with the three underlying circles of wind, water, and gold are all burned up alike, and a raging wind drives the fierce flames upward to burn the heavenly palaces, burning on as far as the palace of Brahmā without leaving so much as ash behind.
It should be noted that it is the flames of a given level that burn the palaces of that same level, and that the catastrophe of another level cannot destroy that other level — the reason for saying that the fire below, driven by the wind, burns the level above is that it is said with respect to the drawing forth of one thing by another, meaning that the fierce flames of the desire realm rise and serve as the condition that draws forth the flames of the form realm (it is not that the fire of the desire realm literally burns its way up into the form realm). The remaining catastrophes of water and of wind are likewise, and are to be understood on this same principle.
The diminishing level by level from the hells onward, until the receptacle world is wholly destroyed, is named in sum the aeon of dissolution.
〔The Aeon of Formation〕 What is called the aeon of formation runs from the arising of the wind circle until sentient beings begin to be born in the hells. After this world has been destroyed by catastrophe there are twenty intermediate aeons of nothing but empty space; and after so long a time there should again be twenty intermediate aeons equal to them, and the aeon of formation has come.
By the dominance of the shared force of the actions of all sentient beings, an exceedingly fine wind arises by degrees within empty space, and this is the sign that the receptacle world is about to be formed. The wind grows stronger by degrees, and thereupon the wind circle, the water circle, the gold circle, and the rest are established in the manner stated above (in Unit 4); yet what is established first is the palace of the great Brahmā king, and so on down to the palace of the Yāma Heaven (the heavens dwelling in space being formed first, from above downward), and only then do the wind circle and the rest arise (the portion dwelling upon the ground being formed later) — and this is called the outward receptacle world having been established.
Next comes the world of sentient beings. First one sentient being dies in the Ābhāsvara Heaven and is born in the place of the great Brahmā, becoming the great Brahmā king. Thereafter the remaining sentient beings also die there, some being born as gods of the Brahmapurohita Heaven, some as gods of the Brahmakāyika Heaven, and some into the palace of the Heaven of Sovereignty over Others’ Transformations. Thus they are born downward level by level, on as far as Uttarakuru in the north, Godānīya in the west, Videha in the east, and Jambudvīpa in the south within the destiny of human beings, and only then as hungry ghosts, animals, and hell beings. It is by the very nature of things: what is destroyed last must be formed first (and conversely, the hells, which are destroyed first, are formed last).
If a first sentient being is born in the Unremitting Hell, it should be known that the twenty intermediate aeons of the aeon of formation are already fulfilled. Thereafter twenty further intermediate aeons, named abiding after formation, arise in due order — that is, from the arising of the wind and the making of the receptacle world onward, until sentient beings afterward come by degrees to abide there.
〔The Intermediate Aeon〕 The human lifespan in this Jambudvīpa at first passes through an exceedingly long and immeasurable time; only at the beginning of the aeon of abiding does the lifespan begin to decrease by degrees. Its decrease from immeasurable years down to the lowest of ten years is named the first intermediate aeon of abiding. Of the eighteen intermediate aeons that follow, each has both an increase and a decrease: an increase from ten years up to eighty thousand, and a decrease again from eighty thousand down to ten, and only so is it named the second intermediate aeon; and the seventeen after it are all of them likewise by the same rule. After these eighteen there is a further increase from ten years up to the highest of eighty thousand, and this is named the twentieth aeon.
Two limits, upper and lower, are to be kept in mind: in every aeon the increase does not pass beyond eighty thousand years, and in every aeon the decrease reaches only ten years at the least. The eighteen aeons in the middle have one increase and one decrease and are exactly equal in measure of time; while the first of them has only a decrease and the last only an increase, and so the measures of time of all twenty of these aeons are equal. This whole stretch is named in sum the aeon of abiding after formation.
As for the remaining aeon of formation, aeon of dissolution, and the aeon of emptiness after dissolution, they have no such difference of twenty graded increases and decreases as the aeon of abiding has; yet because their measure of time is the same as that of the aeon of abiding, they too are reckoned, by comparison with it, as twenty intermediate aeons each. Within the aeon of formation the first aeon is the arising of the receptacle world and the nineteen after it are the coming of sentient beings by degrees to dwell there; within the aeon of dissolution the last aeon is the destruction of the receptacle world and the nineteen before it are the departing of sentient beings by degrees.
Thus the four stretches spoken of — formation, abiding, dissolution, and emptiness — are each of twenty intermediate aeons, and accumulated they come to eighty in all; and these eighty intermediate aeons together make the measure of one great aeon.
〔The Nature of an Aeon〕 What, then, is the nature of this thing called an aeon? Answer: it is the five aggregates alone (form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness — an aeon is not some further thing, but only a stretch of the dharmas of body and mind continuing in time).
〔The Three Asaṃkhyeya Aeons〕 A sūtra says that one must practice with vigor through three asaṃkhyeyas of aeons (three innumerables of great aeons) before one can become a buddha. Among the four kinds of aeon stated above, which kind is it that is accumulated to make the three innumerables? Answer: it is the great aeon stated above that is accumulated into tens, into hundreds, into thousands, and so on until it is accumulated into three innumerables.
Since it is called innumerable, why is it further said to be three? Answer: the word innumerable does not display the sense that a thing cannot be numbered. The Sūtra of Liberation says that among the sixty places of number, asaṃkhyeya is one of those places (the name of a fixed place in the series, not a thing that cannot be counted out).
How, then, are those sixty places of number counted? As that sūtra says: there is a number without remainder, and the first is one; ten ones make ten, ten tens make a hundred, ten hundreds make a thousand, ten thousands make ten thousand, ten of ten thousand make one lakṣa, ten lakṣas make one duluocha, ten duluocha make one juzhi, ten juzhi make one motuo, ten motuo make one ayuduo, ten ayuduo make one great ayuduo, ten great ayuduo make one nayuduo, ten nayuduo make one great nayuduo, ten great nayuduo make one boluoyuduo, ten boluoyuduo make one great boluoyuduo, ten great boluoyuduo make one jinjieluo, ten jinjieluo make one great jinjieluo, ten great jinjieluo make one pinbaluo, ten pinbaluo make one great pinbaluo, ten great pinbaluo make one achupo, ten achupo make one great achupo, ten great achupo make one pipohe, ten pipohe make one great pipohe, ten great pipohe make one wacengqie, ten wacengqie make one great wacengqie, ten great wacengqie make one pohena, ten pohena make one great pohena, ten great pohena make one dizhipo, ten dizhipo make one great dizhipo, ten great dizhipo make one xidu, ten xidu make one great xidu, ten great xidu make one jielapo, ten jielapo make one great jielapo, ten great jielapo make one yindaluo, ten yindaluo make one great yindaluo, ten great yindaluo make one sanmobodan, ten sanmobodan make one great sanmobodan, ten great sanmobodan make one jiedi, ten jiedi make one great jiedi, ten great jiedi make one nianfaluoshe, ten nianfaluoshe make one great nianfaluoshe, ten great nianfaluoshe make one mudaluo, ten mudaluo make one great mudaluo, ten great mudaluo make one balan, ten balan make one great balan, ten great balan make one shanruo, ten shanruo make one great shanruo, ten great shanruo make one pibuduo, ten pibuduo make one great pibuduo, ten great pibuduo make one baluochan, ten baluochan make one great baluochan, and ten great baluochan make one asaṃkhyeya.
Yet within this series of places the last eight have been lost and forgotten (so that only fifty-two now survive). If great aeons are counted up to the asaṃkhyeya at that place in the series, that is named one innumerable of aeons. And when this innumerable of aeons is further accumulated to three, the sūtra speaks of it as three innumerables of aeons. So it is not that they are called three innumerables of aeons because they cannot be reckoned or counted out (but because that very place in the series is itself named innumerable).
〔Why a Vow for So Long a Time Must Be Made〕 Someone asks: why must a bodhisattva make a vow for so long a time and practice with vigor before he looks for the fruit of buddhahood (why does he not seek it quickly)? Ask it the other way about: and why should he not be allowed to make a vow for a long time and to practice by it?
Answer: unsurpassed awakening is exceedingly hard to obtain, and there is no possibility of accomplishing it by a small measure of vow and practice. A bodhisattva must pass through three innumerable aeons, gathering the vast provisions of merit and the provisions of wisdom, cultivating the six perfections (giving, keeping the precepts, patience, vigor, meditative absorption, and discernment), and passing through very many austerities, before he realizes unsurpassed, right, and full awakening; and so a vow for a long time must certainly be made.
He asks again: if nirvāṇa can be obtained by other means as well (as a śrāvaka realizes it quickly), why cultivate so many austerities for so long for the sake of awakening?
Answer: it is in order to benefit and gladden all sentient beings that he seeks awakening and makes a vow for a long time. In his mind he thinks thus: “How may I come to possess a vast capacity, so as to relieve every conscious being within the flood of suffering?” And therefore he would sooner give up that road (of quickly taking up nirvāṇa) and seek unsurpassed awakening.
He asks again: in relieving other sentient beings, what benefit is there to oneself?
Answer: in relieving beings a bodhisattva is precisely fulfilling his own compassion; and so relieving others is itself his own benefit (there is no need to look elsewhere for a further advantage).
He asks again: who would believe that a bodhisattva has such a thing in him?
Answer: to a man who thinks only of enriching himself and who has no great compassion, this is indeed hard to believe; but to a man who has no mind to enrich himself and who does have great compassion, this is not hard to believe at all. Just so there are in the world men who have long habituated themselves to a mind without pity, and who delight in harming others even where there is no advantage at all to themselves — a thing everyone can see. In the same way a bodhisattva has long habituated himself to compassion, and delights in benefiting others even where there is no benefit to himself; why should this not be believed?
Further, just as sentient beings, by the force of repeated habituation, fail to understand of the formations, which are of themselves without self, that they are merely conditioned dharmas, and grasp them as “I” and give rise to attachment, and for that reason willingly shoulder every kind of suffering — a thing too that the wise can all see. In the same way a bodhisattva, by the force of repeated habituation, has given up the mind that loves himself and increased the mind that loves others, and for that reason willingly shoulders every kind of suffering; why should this not be believed?
Further, it is because of a difference of lineage (the class of one’s capacities) that such an aspiration arises: to take the suffering of others for one’s own suffering and the pleasure of others for one’s own pleasure, and to make nothing of one’s own suffering and pleasure; in their sight there is no such thing as a benefit to oneself lying apart from the benefiting of others. In accordance with this sense there is an old stanza that says:
Quoted stanza: The lesser man diligently cultivates every kind of means, and constantly seeks the ease and pleasure of his own single body; the middling man seeks the extinction of suffering, for he has seen that what is called pleasure is only the basis of suffering and is no true pleasure; the highest man constantly and diligently seeks this — that he himself should suffer and others be at ease, and that the suffering of others should be forever extinguished, because he has taken others for himself.
〔Root 93〕When Buddhas and Pratyekabuddhas Appear
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): The several differences in the measures of aeons have now been analyzed. When, then, do the buddhas and the pratyekabuddhas appear in the world — in a time when the aeon is increasing, or in the stretch when it is decreasing? The stanza says:
Stanza: From the decrease out of eighty thousand years down to a hundred years, the buddhas appear in the world; pratyekabuddhas may appear in either stretch, when the aeon increases and when it decreases; and of these, the pratyekabuddha likened to the qilin’s horn must cultivate for a hundred great aeons.
Treatise: From the point where the human lifespan of this Jambudvīpa is eighty thousand years, decreasing by degrees to the lowest of a hundred years — within this stretch alone do the buddhas appear.
Why is there no buddha born into the world in the stretch when the aeon increases? Because at that time the pleasure of sentient beings is increasing, and it is hard to make them give rise to a mind of weariness and withdrawal.
Why is there no buddha born into the world below a hundred years either? Because the five turbidities have increased to the utmost and it is hard to convert them. The five turbidities are these: first, the turbidity of lifespan; second, the turbidity of the aeon; third, the turbidity of the afflictions; fourth, the turbidity of views; fifth, the turbidity of sentient beings. When the decrease of the aeon is drawing to its end, the lifespan and the rest all become mean and low, like dregs and filth, and are therefore called turbid.
What does each of these five turbidities injure? By the first two (the turbidity of lifespan and the turbidity of the aeon), in their due order, the lifespan and the requisites of living are diminished to the utmost. By the middle two (the turbidity of the afflictions and the turbidity of views), the class of the wholesome is diminished — the turbidity of the afflictions making men indulge in the pleasures of desire, and the turbidity of views making them torment their own bodies with austerities that are of no benefit; or, it may be said, the one injures the wholesome of the householder and the other the wholesome of the renunciant. By the last (the turbidity of sentient beings), one’s own person is injured, that is, one’s bodily measure, strength of body, memory, discernment, vigor, and freedom from sickness are ruined.
〔Pratyekabuddhas〕 The appearance of pratyekabuddhas, however, extends to both stretches, the increase and the decrease of the aeon. Yet pratyekabuddhas are of two different kinds: first, those who go in a group; second, those likened to the qilin’s horn (as the qilin has but a single horn, a figure for one who comes and goes alone).
A pratyekabuddha who goes in a group was formerly a śrāvaka, and on obtaining the higher fruit his name is changed to “solitarily excellent.” There is a further account: they were formerly ordinary beings, had cultivated the śrāvakas’ factors conducive to penetration (the roots of good in the preparatory practice before the path of seeing), and now realize the path by themselves and gain the name solitarily excellent. The warrant for this account is a story told in the Accounts of Former Matters: upon a certain mountain there dwelt five hundred non-Buddhist seers who practiced austerities. A monkey had once dwelt close beside a pratyekabuddha and had grown familiar with the bearing of that pratyekabuddha; afterward, wandering by stages, it came to those non-Buddhist seers and acted out the bearing of the pratyekabuddha it had seen before. The seers, seeing it, all gave rise to a mind of reverent admiration, and before long they all realized the awakening of a pratyekabuddha. — For were it said that they were already noble ones before (as in the former account), they ought not still to have been practicing non-Buddhist austerities (and hence this second account).
As for the pratyekabuddha likened to the qilin’s horn, it means one who certainly dwells alone. Of the two kinds of pratyekabuddha, this one likened to the qilin’s horn must pass a hundred great aeons gathering the provisions for awakening, and only then does he become a pratyekabuddha likened to the qilin’s horn.
〔Why a Pratyekabuddha Does Not Convert Others〕 What is called a pratyekabuddha means one who in the present body, without receiving the teaching of another, awakens to the path by himself alone; for he is able to tame himself, yet does not tame others.
Why, then, is it said that a pratyekabuddha does not tame others? It is not that he lacks the ability to expound the right dharma — for he too has obtained the unobstructed knowledges (mastery of eloquence); and he can call to mind the meaning of the sacred teaching heard in past lives and proclaimed by the buddhas. Nor may it be said that he lacks compassion — for in order to gather sentient beings in he too displays supernormal powers. Nor may it be said that there were then no capacities fit to receive the dharma — for the sentient beings of that time too were able to give rise to the worldly antidote of freedom from desire.
What, then, is the reason? Although all the considerations above hold, yet by his habituation in former lives he has little delight and resolve in the matter of teaching the dharma, and no wish to speak. And because he knows that sentient beings can hardly receive the deep dharma — beings have gone along with the stream of birth and death too long, and it is hard to make them go against the current. And because he would avoid the gathering of a following, fearing clamor and confusion, he does not expound the right dharma to others.
〔Root 94 · Root 95〕The Wheel-Turning Monarch — When He Appears, How Many Kinds, Whether Two at Once, by What Majesty, with What Marks
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): When is a wheel-turning monarch born into the world? How many kinds are there? How many may there be at one time? By what majesty does he subdue the four quarters? And what marks are there upon his body? The stanza says:
Stanza: A wheel-turning monarch appears when the human lifespan is eighty thousand years and above; he is of four kinds, of the golden, the silver, the copper, and the iron wheel, ruling in due order one continent, two, three, and four (the golden four, the silver three, the copper two, and the iron one, the order running counter to the order of the wheels); and like a buddha, there are never two of them born at one time. The four kings subdue in different ways: the king of the golden wheel is one whom the other quarters come of themselves to welcome and invite; the king of the silver wheel goes there himself; the king of the copper wheel matches majesty and virtue; the king of the iron wheel draws up his ranks and stops when he has won — yet none of them inflicts injury. Though a wheel-turning monarch has the thirty-two marks, they are not as a buddha’s marks are, right in their placing, distinct, and complete, and so he cannot be the equal of a buddha.
Treatise:
〔The Time of His Appearance〕 It is in the stretch running from the point where the human lifespan of this Jambudvīpa is immeasurable years down to eighty thousand years that a wheel-turning monarch is born. When it has decreased below eighty thousand years, the wealth and pleasure and the lifespan of sentient beings are alike diminishing and every kind of evil grows strong by degrees, and it is no longer a vessel fit for the birth of a great person (one who bears the marks of a great person), and so there is no wheel-turning monarch.
This king is called a wheel-turning monarch because, wherever the turning of the wheel treasure reaches, he guides and converts according to capacity and subdues all by his majesty.
〔The Four Kinds of Wheel-Turning Monarch〕 The Treatise of Designations says that wheel-turning monarchs are of four kinds, divided according to the four wheels of gold, silver, copper, and iron, each distinct. In their due order gold is the most excellent, silver superior, copper middling, and iron lowest; while the number of continents each rules runs counter to this — the king of the iron wheel rules one continent, the king of the copper wheel two, the king of the silver wheel three, and the king of the golden wheel four.
The sūtra, speaking only of the most excellent kind, mentions the golden wheel alone; and so the sūtra says: if there be a king born in the kṣatriya lineage who has succeeded to the anointed station, and who on the fifteenth day, at the time of undertaking the fast, has bathed his head and body and taken upon himself the excellent fast, and has ascended to a high terraced hall with his ministers ranged about him — at that time a golden wheel treasure suddenly appears in the east, a wheel of a thousand spokes, complete with hub and rim (the center and the outer ring of a wheel), perfect and clean in all its marks as though made by a skilled craftsman, coming forth spreading a lovely light and answering to the king’s place. Then that king is certainly a king who turns the golden wheel. And the remaining kings who turn the silver, the copper, and the iron wheel are to be understood on this same pattern.
〔Neither a Wheel-Turning Monarch nor a Buddha Is Born Two at Once〕 Like a buddha, a wheel-turning monarch is never born two at one time. And so the sūtra says: there is no such place and no such station where, without a before and after, two Tathāgatas, Worthy Ones, Fully and Perfectly Awakened, appear in the world at one time; there is only this, that in one time and place there is but one Tathāgata. And as it is said of the Tathāgata, so it is of a wheel-turning monarch.
〔One Buddha in One World, or One Buddha in All the Ten Directions〕 Here it should be carefully considered: is the words “but one” spoken by the sūtra said with respect to a single trichiliocosm, or with respect to all worlds?
One party says: in the other worlds no buddha is certainly born. Why? Because it should not be said that the capacity of the Bhagavat (the World-Honored One) is in any way obstructed — one World-Honored One alone can universally convert throughout the ten directions. If it were said that there is some place where this buddha has not the capacity to convert, then it should be so in all the other places as well (would he not then be unable to convert anywhere at all?).
They further adduce a passage of scripture as proof: the World-Honored One told Śāriputra: suppose someone were to come to you and ask you, “At this present time, is there any brahmin or ascetic who has realized unsurpassed awakening equally and in the same measure as Gautama” (the World-Honored One’s clan name)? — receiving this question, how should you answer? Śāriputra then answered the World-Honored One: receiving this question I should answer thus — at this present time there is no brahmin or ascetic who has realized unsurpassed awakening and is the equal of my World-Honored One. I say so because I have myself heard from the World-Honored One and have myself taken up: there is no such place and no such station where, without a before and after, two Tathāgatas, Worthy Ones, Fully and Perfectly Awakened, appear in the world; there is only this, that in one time and place there is but one Tathāgata.
Someone asks in return: if so, why does the Brahmā King Sūtra say, “I now turn freely within these worlds of the trichiliocosm” (speaking only of the trichiliocosm — is the buddha’s range then limited)? Answer: that sentence has a hidden intent. What is the hidden intent? It is this: if the World-Honored One does not arouse a preparatory effort (does not attend to it especially), he observes this trichiliocosm alone; and if the World-Honored One does arouse a preparatory effort, then boundless worlds are all the object-field within reach of the buddha eye. The supernormal power of the divine ear and the rest are to be understood on this same principle.
Masters of another school say: in the other worlds too there are further buddhas appearing in the world. Why? Because at one and the same time many bodhisattvas are gathering the provisions for awakening; in one world at one time there may indeed be no plurality of buddhas, but what reasoning can block a plurality of buddhas in a plurality of worlds? And so in boundless worlds boundless buddhas appear.
They argue further: if there were but one buddha, then even were he to remain in the world for an aeon he still could not universally finish the work of a buddha for a single world; how much less could he benefit boundless worlds with a lifespan as brief as the lifespan of men? Yet sentient beings dwell in boundless worlds, and the differences of time, of place, and of capacity are boundless and immeasurable, and a buddha ought to observe these sentient beings universally: at such a time and in such a place they should see the World-Honored One, and the buddha should then, answering to their capacities, display supernormal powers and teach the dharma, so that of their faults those not yet arisen do not arise and those already arisen are cut off, and of their qualities those not yet arisen come to arise and those already arisen are brought to fullness. How could one buddha accomplish such a thing all at once? And so at one time there must certainly be many buddhas.
As for that passage adduced by the former party, that there is no place and no station where two Tathāgatas appear without a before and after, it too should be considered together: is this sentence said with respect to one world, or with respect to many worlds? If it is said with respect to many worlds, then there should be no wheel-turning monarch in the other worlds either — for the sūtra text uses the very words “as with a buddha” to block a wheel-turning monarch’s being born together with another. Since it is granted that a wheel-turning monarch may exist separately in another world, why should it not be granted that there is a buddha separately in another world? A buddha’s appearing in the world is furnished with auspiciousness and merit; what fault is there in a plurality of buddhas in a plurality of worlds that it should be blocked? Buddhas appearing together in many worlds are precisely what can benefit immeasurable sentient beings and let them obtain a higher birth (the good destinies of men and gods) and the certain and excellent path (liberation beyond the world).
〔Why, Then, Are There No Two Buddhas in One World〕 The party of one buddha objects in return: if so, why are there never two Tathāgatas appearing at once within a single world? The party of buddhas in the ten directions answers with four reasons: first, because there is no need — one buddha within a single world suffices to benefit all. Second, by the force of a vow — the Tathāgatas, when they were bodhisattvas, first made this vow: “May I in time to come attain full and perfect awakening in that world which is without rescue, without refuge, and blind with darkness, benefiting and gladdening all sentient beings, and be for them a rescue, a refuge, an eye, and a guide.” Third, in order that men may revere — only where there is but one Tathāgata within a single world will men revere him deeply. Fourth, in order that men may practice quickly — they are to know that the honored one of all knowledge is exceedingly hard to meet with, and that the teaching he has established should be practiced quickly, and not left until the buddha has entered parinirvāṇa or has gone elsewhere, so that we are left without rescue and without refuge. And so two buddhas never appear within a single world.
〔The Majesty of the Four Kings〕 Of the four kinds of wheel-turning monarch spoken of above, the majesty with which they settle the four quarters also differs. With the king of the golden wheel it is thus: the several lesser kings come each of themselves to welcome him and make this request — “Our lands are broad and rich, secure, prosperous, and pleasant, and our peoples many; we ask only that the Honored of Heaven himself hand down his commands, and we shall all be the Honored of Heaven’s followers.” The king of the silver wheel, for his part, goes himself to those lands, and as soon as his majesty draws near that quarter submits. The king of the copper wheel, having come to that country, must proclaim his majesty and match his virtue and repute, and only then does that quarter yield to him as the better. The king of the iron wheel likewise comes to that country, and must display his majesty and draw up his ranks, and when he has overcome the foe and won he stops.
Yet no wheel-turning monarch inflicts injury: once the other side has submitted and he himself has won, he lets each quarter dwell at ease where it was, and exhorts and converts them to cultivate the ten wholesome courses of action; and so after his death a wheel-turning monarch is certainly born among the gods.
〔The Seven Treasures〕 A sūtra says that when a wheel-turning monarch appears in the world, seven treasures appear in the world with him. Which seven? First the wheel treasure; second the elephant treasure; third the horse treasure; fourth the jewel treasure; fifth the woman treasure; sixth the treasure of the minister of the treasury (the minister in charge of the storehouse of wealth); seventh the treasure of the minister of war (the minister in charge of military affairs).
Someone asks: the five treasures of the elephant, the horse, the woman, the minister of the treasury, and the minister of war are all gathered under sentient beings; how could one person’s action produce another sentient being? Another sentient being does not arise from that person’s action. Answer: it is because in doing their actions formerly they belonged to one another (their shared actions being bound up together); and if one among them is born following his own action, the rest also arise at the same time, each riding upon his own action (it is not that the one person’s action directly makes the other).
〔The Difference between a Wheel-Turning Monarch and a Buddha〕 The wheel-turning monarchs spoken of above differ from other kings not in having the seven treasures alone, but have besides the excellence of the thirty-two marks of a great person. If so, what distinguishes a wheel-turning monarch from a buddha? Answer: a buddha’s marks of a great person are right in their placing, distinct, and complete, and a king’s marks are not so, and hence there is a difference between the two.
〔Root 96〕The People at the Beginning of the Aeon — from Being Like the Gods of the Form Realm, to Greed for Savor, Indolence, Storing Up, Thieves, and Then the Establishing of a King
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Did the people at the beginning of the aeon have a king, or had they none? The stanza says:
Stanza: The people at the beginning of the aeon were like the gods of the form realm; afterward their greed for the savor of the earth increased by degrees; out of indolence storing up arose, and from storing up thieves arose, and to guard against thieves a man was hired to watch the fields (and by this a king was established).
Treatise:
〔The People at the Beginning of the Aeon〕 The people at the beginning of the aeon were all like the gods of the form realm, and so the sūtra says: the people at the beginning of the aeon had bodies of form and were born from mind (not born from a womb), their limbs complete and their faculties unimpaired, their shape and color upright and adorned and their bodies bearing light, able to rise into the sky and go freely to and fro, feeding upon joy and pleasure, and long of life.
〔The Savor of the Earth and the Beginning of Morsel Food〕 At that time a savor of the earth came forth by degrees, sweet in taste and rich in fragrance. One man was by nature greedy for savor, and smelling the fragrance gave rise to a mind of attachment; he took some, tasted it, and ate it down; and the rest followed his example and vied in taking it for food. From this time on it was called the beginning of the use of morsel food (the coarse food eaten mouthful by mouthful).
Because they were nourished by morsel food, their bodies grew hard and heavy by degrees, the light they had once had sank away, and darkness arose; and sun, moon, and the host of stars appeared from this time on (for only when the light of the body was gone was an outward light needed).
〔The Four Rounds of Diminishing Food〕 Because they grew greedy for savor by degrees, the savor of the earth sank away; and next an earth-skin cake came forth. The people again vied in greed for it as food, and the earth-cake too sank away; and then a forest creeper appeared. Because they vied in greed for it as food, the forest creeper too sank away; and then there was a fragrant rice that grew of itself without being sown, and all of them together gathered it for their food.
〔The Male and Female Faculties and the Beginning of Unchaste Conduct〕 This food was somewhat coarse, and the refuse remaining from it stayed in the body; and in order to expel it two passages appeared (the passages of excretion), and by them there came to be the male faculty and the female faculty. Because these two faculties differed, their shapes too became different; and by the force of habituation in former lives they looked upon one another, and thereby improper attention arose, and the greed of desire, like a possessing demon, confounded body and mind, so that they lost right mindfulness and in their frenzy engaged in unchaste conduct. The demon of desire among human beings first broke out from this time on.
〔Storing Up and the Beginning of Theft〕 The people of that time went and took the fragrant rice as they needed it morning and evening, and did not store it up. Afterward one man was by nature indolent, and took much rice at once and stored it, meaning to keep it to eat later; and the rest followed his example, and what was stored grew by degrees.
Thereby the thought “this is mine” arose toward the rice, and each of them gave rein to his greed and harvested much without being satisfied; and thereupon wherever they had reaped it grew no more. So they all together divided the fields and each kept guard over his own (fearing that the rice further off would be taken by others until none was left).
Having each his own portion of field, a mind of grudging and guarding arose; and seeing another’s portion of field, they harbored thoughts of seizing it — and the fault of theft began from this time on.
〔The Establishing of a King and the Beginning of the Two Names Kṣatriya and Brahmin〕 In order to block and guard against this, they all gathered and took counsel, weighed the people and chose out from among them one who had virtue, each handing over to him a sixth part of what he had reaped, hiring him to keep guard, and investing him as lord of the fields — and the name kṣatriya was established in just this way. The multitude honored and served him and his favor flowed out over the whole land, and so he was further named King Mahāsaṃmata (the king agreed upon by the multitude); and all kings from that time on take this king as their first.
Among the people of that time there were also those who wearied of household life and delighted in dwelling in open and quiet places, cultivating with vigor the observance of the precepts, and thereby they gained the name brahmin.
〔Punishment and the Beginning of False Speech〕 Afterward there was a king who was greedy and grudging of goods and could not supply the people of his land equally, and thereby many who were poor and in want turned thief. In order to forbid it the king inflicted punishments light and heavy — and the action of killing began from this time on. There were then guilty men who feared punishment in their hearts and hid their own faults and spoke with another account — and false speech had its beginning from this time on.
〔Root 97〕The Three Lesser Catastrophes — the Sword, Pestilence, Famine
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): In the stretch when the aeon decreases there are three lesser catastrophes; what is the appearance of them? The stanza says:
Stanza: Because the evil courses of action increase, the human lifespan decreases; and when it has decreased to ten years the three catastrophes appear; sword, pestilence, and famine come in due order, and each passes seven days, seven months, and seven years before it stops.
Treatise:
〔The Cause of the Catastrophes〕 From the point where sentient beings gave rise to false speech, the several evil courses of action increased layer upon layer, and so the human lifespan of this continent decreased by degrees down to the lowest of ten years, and the three lesser catastrophes appeared. These calamities therefore have two things for their root: first, greed for fine food; second, an indolent nature (the greed for savor and the indolence of the section on the beginning of the aeon above are precisely the root here). These three lesser catastrophes arise only at the end of an intermediate aeon. The three catastrophes are these: first the sword, second pestilence, third famine.
〔The Catastrophe of the Sword〕 That is to say: at ten years of age at the end of an intermediate aeon, men’s continuity of mind is defiled by unlawful greed, unequal love overshadows their minds, wrong dharmas entangle them and the poison of hatred is dominant, and at the mere sight of one another a fierce mind of harming arises — just as hunters today at the sight of wild beasts. At that time whatever they take up in their hands turns into a sharp blade, and each in his ferocity and frenzy destroys the other.
〔The Catastrophe of Pestilence〕 Again, at ten years of age at the end of an intermediate aeon, because men are possessed of the several faults stated above, nonhuman beings (of the class of ghosts and spirits) spew out poisonous vapors, pestilence spreads abroad, and whoever meets with it dies and can hardly be cured.
〔The Catastrophe of Famine〕 Again, at ten years of age at the end of an intermediate aeon, men are likewise possessed of the several faults stated above, and the gods and the nāgas in anger reprove them and send down no sweet rain, and thereby the world long suffers famine, and having neither support nor relief the greater part of them die.
〔The Explanation of the Three Names of Famine〕 And so it is said that by reason of famine there come to be massing, white bones, and tally-drawing.
Why is it called massing? There are two causes: first, the massing of people — the people of that time, famished and wasted to the utmost, gathered together and died. Second, the massing of seed — the people of that time, to benefit those who should come after, spared some of the grain they ate and put it in small boxes, meaning to keep it for seed. And so a time of famine is named a time in which there is massing.
Why is it called white bones? There are likewise two causes: first, the bodies of the people of that time were dried and withered, and not long after death their white bones showed forth. Second, the people of that time, pressed by famine, gathered white bones together and boiled them into a broth to drink.
Why is it called tally-drawing? There are likewise two causes: first, because the grain was too little, tallies had to be plied (bamboo slips used to set an order) before there was anything to eat — within one household, from the eldest to the youngest, only on the day the tally came round did one receive a little coarse rice. Second, tallies were used to poke among the old stores heaped up on the threshing floor of former days (the stale remnants of grain), and what few grains were got were boiled with much water, and all of them shared the drink to relieve what was left of their lives.
〔The Means of Remedy〕 Yet there is trustworthy sacred teaching that states the means of remedying these three catastrophes: if a man can keep the precept against killing for one day and one night, in a future life he will certainly not meet with the arising of the catastrophe of the sword. If he can take a single harītakī (the myrobalan, a kind of medicinal fruit) and offer it to the community with an earnest and pure mind, in a life to come he will certainly not meet with the arising of the catastrophe of pestilence. If he can take a single ball of food (one lump of food) and offer it to the community with an earnest and pure mind, in a life to come he will certainly not meet with the arising of the catastrophe of famine.
〔How Long Each of the Three Catastrophes Lasts〕 How long does each of these three catastrophes last? When the catastrophe of the sword arises it is at most seven days; when the catastrophe of pestilence arises it is seven months and seven days; the catastrophe of famine is seven years, seven months, and seven days; and when this term is past it stops.
〔The Appearance of Them in the Other Continents〕 After it stops the human lifespan increases by degrees. In the two continents of the east and the west there arise catastrophes resembling these, namely that the mind of hatred grows strong, bodily strength is weak, and hunger and thirst are felt again and again; while in Uttarakuru in the north there are none at all.
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): It was said above that the catastrophe of fire burns the world, and that the remaining catastrophes are likewise and are to be understood on that principle. What, then, are the remaining ones? They will now be analyzed in particular. The stanza says:
〔Root 98 · Root 99〕The Three Great Catastrophes — Fire, Water, Wind, with Three Absorptions as Their Summits
Stanza: The three great catastrophes are the three of fire, water, and wind, having the three meditative absorptions above as their several summits; this is because those three absorptions each have an inward catastrophe of the same kind as the outward one. The fourth meditative absorption has no outward catastrophe, and is therefore called Immovable. Yet the palaces of the fourth absorption are not permanent either, since they arise together with sentient beings and cease together with them. The order is this: seven catastrophes of fire must pass before one of water, and when seven catastrophes of water are full there are seven catastrophes of fire again, and only at the last does one catastrophe of wind arise.
Treatise:
〔The Arising of the Three Catastrophes and What They Destroy〕 These three great catastrophes press upon sentient beings and make them give up the lower levels and gather among the heavens above. The first, the catastrophe of fire, arises through the appearance of seven sun-discs; the next, the catastrophe of water, arises through unbroken great rains; the last, the catastrophe of wind, occurs through winds striking against one another. The force of these three catastrophes destroys the receptacle world, until not so much as an ultimate atom remains.
〔The Refutation of the Non-Buddhists Who Hold the Ultimate Atom to Be Permanent〕 There is a class of non-Buddhists who hold that the ultimate atom is permanent, and who say that at that time ultimate atoms still remain. Why do they hold this? Because (as they think) if no ultimate atom were left, the coarse things arising later would have no seed.
The author asks in return: was it not said above that the wind produced by the actions of sentient beings can itself serve as the seed? Or else, taking as condition that wind at the end of the previous catastrophe, the wind it draws forth is the seed. And again, as a sūtra of the Mahīśāsakas says: the wind blows the seeds here from elsewhere.
The non-Buddhist says: even so, we still do not grant that when a sprout and the rest arise, it is the seed and the rest that as cause draw them forth directly. The author asks: if so, from what do the sprout and the rest arise? Answer: they arise from their own parts; and those own parts again arise from yet smaller own parts, and so on in turn, until the finest whole-having-parts arises from ultimate atoms.
The author asks: what, then, is the function of the seed and the rest in the arising of the sprout and the rest? Answer: apart from being able to draw together the ultimate atoms of the sprout and the rest, the seed and the rest have no further power to produce the sprout and the rest.
The author asks: why must this be held? Answer: because for a result to be produced from something of an unlike kind is certainly contrary to principle. Question: contrary to what principle? Answer: in that case there would be no determinacy (anything could produce anything). The author says: the capacity is itself determinate, and so there is no fault of indeterminacy; sound, for instance, and the change of ripening (a fruit turning from raw to ripe) and the rest all arise determinately from what is of an unlike kind. The non-Buddhist answers: those are qualities, which have their own particular character; a substance is not so. We plainly see that a substance arises only from what is of its own kind, as a vine produces its branches and threads are woven into cloth.
The author refutes this: it is contrary to principle. Question: where is it contrary? Answer: because the example you adduce is itself not granted by both sides (you take what has not been established and use it as your proof). Question: where in what has now been adduced is it not granted by both sides? Answer: because we do not grant that the vine and its branches, or the threads and the cloth, are two separate things. It is that very vine and those very threads gathered together, and arranged and set out in a different fashion, that obtain the names branch and cloth; just as ants ranged in a line are called a line of ants (there being no further real entity called a line of ants).
Question: how is it known to be so? Answer: within the gathering of a single thread the cloth is never obtained, but only the thread. (If the cloth were a further real entity, it ought to be present upon one thread as well.) Question: who is it that obstructs, so that the cloth is not obtained? Answer: if it be said that the whole cloth is not present within one thread, then it ought to be said that upon one thread there is a part of the cloth but not the cloth; and then it must be granted that the whole cloth is only the gathering of the several parts, and that there is no further whole-having-parts called cloth.
The author asks further: and again, how do you know that the parts of the cloth are other than the threads? If it be said that cloth is made only when many supports are gathered, then cloth ought to be obtained when many warp threads alone are gathered (yet it is not). Or else there ought to be no way of obtaining cloth at all — for the middle of the cloth and its remaining edges are not set before a faculty at one time (the eye faculty cannot take it all in at once). And if it be said that they may all be set before the faculty successively, then the eye faculty and the body faculty obtain only the several parts, and it should not be said that they obtain a whole-having-parts cloth; it is only that upon the several parts they discern successively and then raise up a single cognition of a whole-having-parts — just as a whirled firebrand is seen as a wheel of fire.
For if apart from the threads there were a color, a kind, and an activity belonging to the cloth (its color, its shape-class, and its function), then those three, the color of the cloth and the rest, could not be obtained. If it be said that the colors and the rest upon a brocade garment belong to the cloth, then you must grant that a substance can arise from what is of an unlike kind — for the color of each single thread has no such variety of difference (the figuring of a brocade being made of many threads together). Or else: where upon some one part those varied colors are absent, on that side the cloth ought not to be seen, since it is color that displays the cloth. Or else: upon that very part varied colors ought also to be seen, since the cloth must have the mark of varied colors and the rest. You grant that the entity of the whole-having-parts is one alone, and yet that it has the differences of manifold color, kind, and activity; if such a thing truly existed, it would be a great marvel indeed.
Further, within the range of the light of a single mass of fire, the functions of burning and of illuminating differ according as a thing is near or far; and on your account the difference of the tangible and of color could not be established.
〔How Ultimate Atoms Stand toward a Faculty〕 Though ultimate atoms taken singly pass beyond the range of what a faculty can take, when gathered together in common they can be known by a faculty in its presence — just as your own school says that a gathering can produce a result, or as the eye faculty and the rest gathered together can arouse consciousness. It is again like a man with a cataract in his eye seeing scattered hairs: if many of them lie adjacent to one another he can see them, while if they lie one by one far apart he has no power to see them. And the principle of ultimate atoms standing toward a faculty ought to be like this.
〔Ultimate Atoms and Color and the Rest Are Not Distinct in Entity〕 Further, it is precisely with respect to color and the rest that the name ultimate atom is established. When color and the rest are destroyed, the ultimate atoms are destroyed as well. You say that ultimate atoms are gathered under substance and color and the rest under quality, and that things distinct in entity should not certainly cease at one time — but that these two are distinct in their entity certainly cannot be made out in principle. For upon careful examination no earth, water, fire, or wind can be obtained apart from color and the rest, and so they are not distinct in entity. And your own school too grants that earth and the rest are taken by the eye faculty and the body faculty; how then do they differ from color and the tangible? And again, when woolen cloth or safflower and the rest are burned, the cognition of the wool and of the flower is likewise gone — from which it is plain that the cognition of wool and the rest arises only in dependence upon the differences of color and the rest, for after the change of ripening wrought by fire their shape and measure are equal to one another 〔and no different from what they were before the burning〕, and it can no longer be told which is wool, which is fine cotton cloth, and which is safflower. It is as when one looks at two rows of earthenware set among each other upon the ground and marks which is a jar and which a basin: if one does not look at the shape one cannot mark them out (their color being the same, what distinguishes them is shape alone).
〔Ending the Dispute〕 Who would set down the wild words of such a foolish sort? And so the wide dispute against that school ends here.
〔The Summits of the Three Catastrophes〕 Where are the summits of these three catastrophes? The second meditative absorption is the summit of the catastrophe of fire, because all below it is burned by fire. The third meditative absorption is the summit of the catastrophe of water, because all below it is soaked away by water. The fourth meditative absorption is the summit of the catastrophe of wind, because all below it is scattered by wind. Whatever upper limit each catastrophe can reach is named the summit of that catastrophe.
〔The Inward Catastrophe Is of the Same Kind as the Outward〕 Why do the three lower meditative absorptions meet with the catastrophes of fire, water, and wind? Because within those three absorptions, the first, the second, and the third, there is in each an inward catastrophe of the same kind as that outward one. That is to say: the first absorption has applied and sustained thought for its inward catastrophe, and these can burn and vex the mind and the rest, and so without it meets the catastrophe of fire. The second absorption has the feeling of joy for its inward catastrophe, and this together with pliancy moistens body and mind as water does — the coarse heaviness throughout the body being thereby all removed, which is why a sūtra says that the faculty of suffering ceases at the second absorption — and so without it meets the catastrophe of water. The third absorption has the movement of the breath (the movement of breathing in and out) for its inward catastrophe, and breath is of the kind of wind, and so without it meets the catastrophe of wind. If one enters this absorption, one has such an inward catastrophe; and when one is born in this absorption, one meets with the corresponding outward catastrophe and is destroyed.
〔Why Earth Is Not Established as a Catastrophe〕 Why is earth not also established as a kind of catastrophe? Because the receptacle world is itself earth; one may say only that fire and the rest are contrary to earth, and may not say that earth is contrary to earth again.
〔The Fourth Absorption Has No Outward Catastrophe〕 What has the fourth meditative absorption for its outward catastrophe? Answer: it has no outward catastrophe, because it has left the inward catastrophes behind (having no applied and sustained thought, no feeling of joy, and no movement of the breath). For this the Buddha said that it is named Immovable — the three catastrophes, inward and outward, cannot reach it. There is a further account: the gods of the Pure Abodes are upon that level, and so it does not meet with destruction by the catastrophes; for the gods of the Pure Abodes cannot be born into the heavens of the formless realm, nor should they go anywhere else (and if their level were destroyed they would have nowhere to dwell).
〔Yet That Receptacle Too Is Not Permanent〕 Someone asks: if so, should not the receptacle world of that level be permanent? Answer: it is not so, because it arises together with sentient beings and ceases together with them. That is to say: that heavenly place has no one common ground-form spread over it, but is like the host of stars in the sky, each dwelling apart. When a sentient being is born there and when he dies, the heavenly palace he dwells in arises with him and ceases with him; and so the entity of the receptacle world there is not permanent either.
〔The Order of the Three Catastrophes〕 What is the order of the three catastrophes spoken of? Seven catastrophes of fire must first arise in unbroken succession, and next one catastrophe of water certainly arises. Thereafter seven catastrophes of fire arise again without interval, and when seven catastrophes of fire have passed there is again one of water; and so on until seven catastrophes of water are full. Then seven catastrophes of fire arise again, and only at the last does a catastrophe of wind arise. Thus there are in all eight sets of seven catastrophes of fire, one set of seven catastrophes of water, and one catastrophe of wind.
〔Why It Is So〕 Why is it so? Because the causal absorption cultivated by those sentient beings is the more excellent the higher one goes, and so the bodily measure and the lifespan they draw forth grow longer and longer; and thereby the places where they dwell also abide the longer (a lower level being easily destroyed and a higher hard to destroy, so that the number of the catastrophes must be accumulated level upon level).
Closing the fascicle: By this principle one can skillfully explain that sentence in the Treatise of Designations, that the lifespan of the Śubhakṛtsna gods is sixty-four aeons.