俱舍論 白話全本 · 冊2Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Complete Vernacular · Vol. 2
根義·諸門分別Meaning of a Faculty and Distinctions through the Several Gates
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔正1〕根是什麼意思——誰對誰有增上作用
論(承前起問):因為前面分別界的緣故,二十二根已經在界品裡一一列出了;現在就在這裡問一句:所謂「根」,究竟是什麼意思?答:最勝、自在、光顯,這就叫作「根」——由這幾層意思合起來,總成「根」的『增上』之義。(『增上』就是有壓倒性的、作得了主的作用。)那麼這個增上作用,是誰對誰而說的呢?頌說:
頌:傳說眼等五根各對四件事有增上作用;女、男、命、意這四根各對兩件事有增上作用;樂等五受與信等八根,則分別在雜染與清淨兩邊有增上作用——各各不同地作增上。
論:眼等五根各對四件事能作增上:一是莊嚴身,二是導養身,三是生識等,四是不共事。
先說眼根與耳根。莊嚴身,是說一個人若眼盲耳聾,身相就顯得醜陋(有眼耳,身相才端整)。導養身,是說靠著看見、聽見,才能避開危險與災難(身體因此得以維持長養)。生識等,是說眼耳能發起眼識、耳識這兩種識以及與識相應的心所。不共事,是說眼能見色、耳能聞聲,各有各的用處,別的根替代不了。
再說鼻根、舌根、身根。莊嚴身同前面眼耳所說。導養身,是說靠著這三根才能受用段食(一口一口吃下去的飲食)。生識等,是說能發起鼻識、舌識、身識這三種識以及相應心所。不共事,是說能嗅香、嘗味、覺觸,各別有用。
女根、男根、命根、意根,各對兩件事能作增上。
先說女根、男根的兩種增上:一是「有情異」,二是「分別異」。有情異,是說由這兩根,才使得有情分成女、男兩類。分別異,是說由這兩根,才有形相、言語聲音、乳房等等的差別。另有一種說法:這兩根是在雜染與清淨上有增上作用,所以說「於二」。為什麼這樣說呢?因為本性上有所損壞的人——就是扇搋(先天無根者)、半擇(根不全者)以及兼具二形的人——他們既不會得不律儀、不會造無間業、不會斷善根等等各種雜染法,也不會得律儀、得沙門果、離欲染等等各種清淨法。(雜染與清淨兩邊都無分,可見女男根在染淨上確有增上。)
命根的兩種增上,是說對於「眾同分」(一期生命同一類別的相續體)能相續下去、又能任持住。
意根的兩種增上,是說能接續後有,以及自在隨行。所謂能續後有,如契經所說:那時中有(健達縛)在愛、恚兩種心之中,隨其中一種現前(於是投胎接續下一期生命)——或者與貪愛俱起,或者與瞋恚俱起。所謂自在隨行,如契經所說:
引頌:心能引導世間,心能普遍攝受一切;像這樣,心這一法,一切法都自在地隨它而行。
論(續):樂等五受(樂、苦、喜、憂、捨)與信等八根(信、勤、念、定、慧,加上未知當知、已知、具知三無漏根),在雜染與清淨之中依次作增上。樂等五受於雜染有增上,因為貪等隨眠是隨著這些受而增長的。信等八根於清淨有增上,因為種種清淨法是隨著這八根而生長的。
另有一些論師說:樂等五受對於清淨也有增上作用。像契經說『因為樂,心才得定』、『苦是信的所依』,又說『出離所依的是喜、憂、捨』。(意思是五受也能助成清淨。)——毘婆沙師是這樣傳說的。
又有一些論師說:能導養身其實不是眼等根的作用,那是識的增上;要識了別了,才能避開危險、受用段食。見色等等的作用也不離識,所以「不共事」這一項,在眼等根上不能另立為一種增上作用——這樣一來,眼等就不是憑這些理由成為「根」的了。若是這樣,那該怎麼說?頌說:
〔正2–4〕改立根的理由——了自境、從身立二、同住雜染清淨、後三增上
頌:因為對『了別自己的境界』有增上,所以總立為六根;從身根之中另立女、男二根,因為它們對女性、男性有增上;因為對眾同分之住、對雜染、對清淨有增上,所以應知命根、五受、信等五也立為根;未知當知、已知、具知這三根也是如此——它們對於獲得後後之道以及涅槃等等有增上作用。
論:所謂「了自境」,指的是六識身(眼識乃至意識)。眼等五根,對於能了別各自境界的識有增上作用;第六意根,對於能了別一切境界的識有增上作用——所以眼等六根各各立為根。
有人問:色等境界對於能了別的識不也有增上嗎?那也該立為根才對。答:境對於識沒有增上作用。所謂增上作用,是說『最勝而自在』。眼根在它所發起的了色之識當中最勝自在,所以叫增上——一來,眼是了別種種色的共通之因(一個眼根能為了別眾色的諸識作通因);二來,識隨著眼根而有明利或昏昧的差別。色境卻不是這樣,兩點都相反(一種色只作一種識的因,識也不隨色而明昧)。乃至意根對於法境,道理也是如此。
再從身根另立女根、男根,是因為它們在女性、男性當中有增上作用。女根男根的體並不離開身根,只是在身的一分上立這個名字罷了。依其次第說:在女性、男性當中,這女根男根有增上作用;這一處與身根的其餘部分稍有不同,所以從身根裡別立為兩根。
女子的身形類別、聲音、作業、志趣愛樂各有差別,這叫作女性。男子的身形類別、聲音、作業、志趣愛樂與女子不同,這叫作男性。這兩種性的差別是由女根男根而來的,所以說女、男根對於二性有增上。
對於眾同分之「住」,命根有增上作用;對於雜染,樂等五受有增上作用。為什麼?因為契經說:在樂受上貪隨著增長,在苦受上瞋隨著增長,在不苦不樂受上無明隨著增長。對於清淨,信等五根有增上作用。為什麼?因為靠這五根的勢力,能伏住種種煩惱、引發聖道。
頌裡說「應知」二字,是勸人承許這幾類一一都能成為根。三種無漏根對於獲得後後之道以及涅槃等等有增上作用。頌裡說「亦爾」二字,是以類推的方式顯示這三根一一也都能成為根——就是說:未知當知根對於獲得已知根之道有增上作用,已知根對於獲得具知根之道有增上作用,具知根對於獲得涅槃有增上作用,因為心若未解脫,是不能般涅槃的。
頌裡「等」這個字,是要顯示另外還有一種說法。是哪一種呢?就是:在見道所斷煩惱的滅除當中,未知當知根有增上作用;在修道所斷煩惱的滅除當中,已知根有增上作用;在現法樂住當中,具知根有增上作用——因為由它能領受解脫的喜樂。
有人難:若憑「有增上」就立為根,那麼無明等等也該立為根了,因為無明等作為因,對於行等等果各各都有增上作用。又語具等等也該立為根——語具(發聲的器官)、手、足、大小便處,對於說話、拿取、行走、排洩、生樂這些事,依次也都有增上啊。答:這些事不應立為根,因為所承許的「根」有它一定的相狀。頌說:
〔正5〕根相的總判——心之所依·此別·此住·此雜染·此資糧·此淨
頌:心的所依、這所依的差別、這一期的住、這一期的雜染、這清淨的資糧、這清淨本身——由這六個尺度來立根。
論:所謂「心所依」,就是眼等六根。這內六處是有情的根本。這所依的相狀差別,是由女根男根而來。又由命根,使這一期生命得以住。這一期之所以成為雜染,是由五受根。這清淨的資糧,是信等五根。這清淨的成就,是由後三無漏根。憑這六項,立根這件事就都交代完了。
所以不該承許無明等等以及語具等等也立為根——它們沒有這裡所說的這種增上作用。
另有一些論師另立一套根相的說法。頌說:
〔正6〕餘師的另一套——流轉所依·生·住·受用;還滅亦然
頌:或者說,依流轉所依,以及生、住、受用四義,建立前十四根;還滅這一邊,後八根也照這樣建立。
論:頌裡「或」這個字,是顯示以下是另外一些論師的意思——他們是就流轉與還滅兩門來立二十二根的。
流轉所依,就是眼等六根。生,由女根男根,因為有情從那裡出生。住,由命根,因為靠它而住。受用,由五受,因為靠它們領納境界。就憑這四義建立前十四根。
還滅位中,也就依這四種義類的分別,立後八根。還滅的所依是信等五根;至於三無漏根,由第一個(未知當知根)而生,由第二個(已知根)而住,由第三個(具知根)而受用。根的數量就照這樣定下來,不多也不少。也正是依這樣的因緣,經中排出了二十二根的次第。
(回應前面的責難:)不應該把語具在說話上立為根,因為說話要等到學習有了差別才成得了(不是語具自然就有的增上)。手、足也不該在拿取、行走上各立為根,因為它們沒有另外的體性——所謂拿取、行走,只是手足在不同處所、以不同相狀差別生起時的名稱罷了。而且離開手足也一樣有拿取行走,例如用腹部爬行的那一類眾生。所以手足不能就那些事建立為根。
大便處對於排洩之事不該立根,因為重物在空中本來就會落下去,又由風力引它出來(不是那一處在作主)。小便處對於生樂之事不該立根,因為那樂本來就是女根男根所引起的。再說,喉、齒、眼瞼、四肢關節也都該立為根了——因為它們對吞嚥、咀嚼、開闔、屈伸有力用啊。乃至一切因對於自己所作的事都有力用,那就都該立根了。它們雖然有用,卻不是增上,所以不立為根;語具等等也一樣不是增上,所以不該立為根。
這裡面,眼等乃至男根,前面(界品)已經說過了。命根的體是心不相應行,將來在心不相應行那一段自會廣辯。信等的體是心所法,將來在心所法那一段也會廣辯。只有樂等五受與三無漏根,再沒有別處可辯,所以現在應當解釋。頌說:
〔正7·正8〕五受之分與三無漏根之立
頌:身上的不悅名為苦根,身上的悅名為樂根;第三靜慮的心悅也名為樂,其餘地的心悅則名為喜;心的不悅名為憂根;居中的捨受,身心兩邊沒有差別(合為一根)。見道、修道、無學道,各依九根立三無漏根。
論:頌裡的「身」,指的是身受——因為它依身而起,也就是與五識相應的受。所謂「不悅」,是損惱的意思;在身受之中能損惱的,名為苦根。所謂「悅」,是攝益(滋養助益)的意思;就在身受之中能攝益的,名為樂根。
還有第三靜慮的心相應受,能攝益的也名為樂根——因為第三靜慮之中沒有身受(五識不起),那裡的心悅就叫作樂。就是這同一種心悅,除掉第三靜慮不算,在下面三地(欲界、初靜慮、第二靜慮)就叫作喜根。為什麼分開?因為第三靜慮的心悅安穩寂靜,已經離了喜貪,所以只名為樂根;下三地的心悅粗浮躁動、還有喜貪,所以只名為喜根。
與意識相應而能損惱的受,是心的不悅,名叫憂根。
頌裡的「中」,是說既不悅也不是不悅,就是不苦不樂受;這種居中的受名為捨根。
問:這捨根,是身受,還是心受?答:應說兩者都通。問:憑什麼理由把身心兩種合立為一根?答:因為這種受不論在身在心,同樣都是沒有分別的。要知道,在心的苦樂多半是由分別而生,在身則不然,是隨著境界的力量而起;阿羅漢等聖者身上的苦樂,也一樣是這樣生起的(可見身受不隨分別)。所以苦樂立根時,身、心要各別安立;而捨受沒有分別、任運而生,所以立根時身心合為一個。
再說,苦受與樂受,在身、在心,作損作益的相狀各不相同,所以分別立根;捨受在身在心同樣沒有分別,既不損也不益,相狀沒有差異,所以總立為一根。
意、樂、喜、捨與信等五根,這九根在三道之中,依次建立三種無漏根。就是說:在見道中,依意等九根立「未知當知根」;若在修道,就依這同樣的九根立「已知根」;在無學道,也依這九根立「具知根」。
這三個名字是憑什麼立的呢?答:在見道當中,有『未曾知而當知』的行相在轉,所以說那個人名為未知當知。若在修道,已經沒有未曾知的了,只是為了斷除其餘的隨眠,於是在同樣的境上再三地了知,所以說那個人名為已知。在無學道,知道自己已經知了,所以名為「知」;有這種知的人,名為具知。或者說,把這種知修習到已成自性的人,名為具知——就是得了盡智、無生智,因而如實地自知:我已遍知苦,不必再遍知了,乃至廣說。這樣的人所有的根,就名為未知當知根等等。
以上已經解釋完根體的種種不同,接下來該辨明各種門類義理的差別了。這二十二根中,有幾種是有漏、幾種是無漏?頌說:
〔正9〕有漏無漏門
頌:只有最後三根是無漏;七種有色根以及命、憂、苦,應知只是有漏;其餘九根則兩邊都通。
論:前面所說最後三根(未知當知、已知、具知),體性只是無漏——「無漏」就是無垢的意思,垢與漏名字不同而體是一個。七種有色根以及命根、憂根、苦根,一向是有漏。所謂七有色根,是眼等五根加上女根男根,因為都是色蘊所攝。意、樂、喜、捨與信等五根,這九根都通有漏與無漏。
有一些論師說:信等五根也只是無漏。理由是世尊說過:『若完全沒有這信等五根,我說那人住在外異生之列。』(可見有信等五根的都是聖者。)——答:這不是可靠的證明,因為那句話是依無漏根而說的。怎麼知道呢?因為世尊是先依無漏的信等五根建立了種種聖位的差別,然後才說這句話的。
或者說:異生大略有兩種,一是內、二是外。所謂內,是還沒斷善根的;所謂外,是善根已斷的。世尊是依「外異生」才這樣說:『若完全沒有這信等五根,我說那人住在外異生之列。』
又契經說:『有一些有情處在世間,或者已生、或者已長,有上、中、下種種根的差別。』這是佛還沒轉法輪時說的(那時還沒有無漏根),所以知道信等五根也通有漏。
又世尊說:『我若對這信等五根,還沒有如實了知它的集、沒、味、過患、出離,就不能超越這天人世間以及魔、梵等等,乃至不能證得無上正等菩提。』——無漏之法是不可以這樣分品類來觀察的(集沒味患出離是有漏法上的觀察),所以信等五根通於有漏與無漏。
有漏無漏已經說完。二十二根中,有幾種是異熟、幾種不是異熟?頌說:
〔正10〕異熟非異熟門,兼傍論留捨壽行
頌:只有命根是異熟;憂根以及後八根不是異熟;七色根、意根與其餘四受,一一都通異熟與非異熟兩邊。
論:只有一個命根決定是異熟。
(有人難:)若是這樣,那麼諸阿羅漢「留多壽行」所延續的,正是命根;這樣的命根是誰的異熟呢?答:如本論(發智論)所說:什麼叫作苾芻「留多壽行」?就是阿羅漢成就了神通、得了心自在,或者對僧眾、或者對某一個人,把衣鉢等等維持性命的資具隨分布施出去;布施完了發願,隨即入第四邊際靜慮,從定起來以後心念口言:『凡我能感得富樂異熟的業,願都轉而招感壽命的異熟果。』那時他那些能感富樂異熟的業,就都轉而招感壽命的異熟果了。
另有一種主張:是引取宿業所剩下的異熟果。他們說:前生曾經受過的業還有剩餘的異熟,靠今生所修的邊際定力把它引取出來受用。
什麼叫作苾芻「捨多壽行」?就是阿羅漢成就神通、得心自在,對僧眾等等如前布施,布施完了發願,隨即入第四邊際靜慮,從定起來以後心念口言:『凡我能感得壽命異熟的業,願都轉而招感富樂的異熟果。』那時他那些能感壽命異熟的業,就都轉而招感富樂的異熟果了。
尊者妙音這樣說:那位阿羅漢起了第四邊際定的力量,引色界大種在身中現前;而那些大種或者順於壽行、或者違於壽行,由這個因緣,或者留住壽行、或者捨去壽行。
(論主說:)應當這樣說才對——那位阿羅漢憑這自在的三摩地力,把曾經得到的、由宿業所生的諸根大種住持時間的勢分轉掉,另外引取未曾有過的、由定力所起的諸根大種住持時間的勢分。所以這個命根不是異熟,其餘一切命根都是異熟。
因為討論引出討論(傍論):那位阿羅漢有什麼因緣要留多壽行呢?是為了利益安樂他人,或者為了使聖教久住世間;他觀察到自己身上的壽行將盡,又觀察到別人沒有這兩種堪能(沒有人能替他做這件事)。又有什麼因緣要捨多壽行呢?那位阿羅漢自己觀察到住在世間對別人的利益安樂之事已經很少,或者為疾病等等的苦所逼迫。如有一首頌說:
引頌:梵行已經善妙地成立,聖道已經好好地修過;壽命將盡的時候心裡歡喜,就像放下一身的病痛一樣。
論(續):這裡應當知道:在哪些處所、由哪些人,能夠這樣地留壽或捨壽?答:是三洲(東勝身、南贍部、西牛貨)的人,女男相續不斷(根不缺)、屬於不時解脫(利根)、又得了邊際定的那些阿羅漢——因為他們身中有自在的定,而且沒有煩惱。
經上說:世尊留了多命行、捨了多壽行。「命」與「壽」有什麼分別?有人說:沒有分別,如本論所說:『什麼是命根?就是三界的壽。』另有一些論師說:先世業的果名為壽行,現在業的果名為命行。又有人說:憑它而使眾同分得住的,名為壽行;憑它而暫時住的,名為命行。
經文說「多」字,是要顯示所留所捨的是多念——命行壽行不是一剎那的事,命行壽行有可留可捨的性質(故用「多」)。又有人說:這個「多」字是為了遮止『有一個命、壽的實體經多時而住』的想法。又有人說:這個字是要顯示並沒有一個實在的命體壽體,只是在許多「行」上假立命、壽這兩個名字罷了;若不是這樣,就不該說「行」這個字。
世尊為什麼要捨多壽行、留多命行呢?為了顯示他對「死」得了自在,所以捨多壽行;為了顯示他對「活」得了自在,所以留多命行。只留三個月而不增不減,是因為超過這個時限就再沒有可度化的事了,少於這個時限則利生不能究竟。又是為了成立他先前自己所說的話:『我因為善修四神足的緣故,想住一劫或一劫有餘,都能如心中所期而住。』毘婆沙師這樣說:這是顯示如今能降伏蘊魔與死魔兩種魔——世尊先前在菩提樹下,已經降伏了天魔與煩惱魔。
傍論已經結束,回到正論。憂根以及後面信等八根都不是異熟,因為它們是有記的(有善惡記別)。其餘的則兩邊都通。義理上准此已成:就是七色根、意根,除憂之外的其餘四受,這十二根一一都通異熟與非異熟兩類。
七種有色根,若是由飲食等長養而來的就不是異熟,其餘的是異熟。意根與四受,若是善的、染污的,若是威儀路(行住坐臥)、工巧處(技藝)以及能變化心所攝的,隨其所應也不是異熟,其餘的是異熟。
(有人問:)若說憂根不是異熟,那這條經該怎麼會通?如契經說:『有三種業——順喜受業、順憂受業、順捨受業。』答:依「與受相應」來說「順」,就沒有過失了——是說業與憂相應所以名為順憂受業,就像觸與樂相應而說名為順樂受觸。(並不是說憂是那業的異熟果。)
(難:)若是這樣,順喜受業、順捨受業也該照這樣講了,因為是同一部經說的。答:隨你要怎麼講,對我都沒有妨礙——講成異熟相應,道理上都沒有過失,我沒有無處可逃的難處。
(問:)這樣會通經文,真正的理由到底是什麼?為什麼憂不是異熟?答:因為憂是由分別種種不如意的差別事而生起的,止息時也一樣要靠分別;異熟卻不是這樣(異熟是任運而起、任運而息的)。
(難:)若是這樣,喜根也該不是異熟了,它也是由分別而生、由分別而息啊。
(有部反難:)若承許憂根是異熟,那麼造了無間業以後,當下就生起憂——這業在那個時候就該說是果已成熟了(這不合理)。(對方反例:)也該照這樣責難喜根才對:若承許喜根是異熟,那麼造了殊勝福業以後當下就生喜,這業在那時也該說果已成熟了。
毘婆沙師都這樣說:因為已經離欲的人沒有憂根,異熟卻不會這樣(異熟不因離欲而沒有),所以憂不是異熟。
(難:)若是這樣,該說說離欲有情的異熟喜根——憑什麼相狀知道它還有?(答:)隨著那邊有什麼相狀,這邊的相狀也就照樣可知:就是說善的喜根在這個位次上還可能有,那麼無記的異熟喜根,也應當比類而知並非沒有。至於在這個位次當中,憂根一切種類都不可能有,所以決定不是異熟。
眼等八根,若在善趣就是善業的異熟,若在惡趣就是惡業的異熟。意根不論在善趣惡趣,都是兩種業所感的異熟。喜、樂、捨根不論在哪一趣,都是善業的異熟。苦根不論在善趣惡趣,都是惡業的異熟。在善趣之中若有二形的人,那也只是就『根的處所』而說——那二根所依的處所是不善業所招的,並不是不善業能招感根體;善趣的色根仍舊是善業所引的。
以上已說是異熟等等。二十二根中,有幾種是有異熟、幾種是無異熟?頌說:
〔正11〕有異熟無異熟門
頌:憂根決定有異熟;前八根與後三根沒有異熟;意根、其餘四受與信等,一一都通兩邊。
論:如前面所爭論的,憂根應知決定有異熟。頌裡說「定」這個字,是依「唯」與「越」兩層意思——是要顯示憂根只有異熟(沒有無異熟的),並且因為它兼具兩種意義,所以越次先說。所謂具兩種意義,是說憂既不是無記(它是靠強力的思而生起的),也不是無漏(它只在散地)。因為這樣,才越次先說「憂根定有異熟」。
眼等前八根以及最後三根,決定沒有異熟——前八根是無記性的緣故,後三根是無漏的緣故。其餘的兩邊都通,義理上准此已成:就是意根、其餘四受,以及信等(「等」字含攝精進等其餘四根),這十根一一都通兩類。
意、樂、喜、捨,若是不善的、善而有漏的,就有異熟;若是無記的、無漏的,就沒有異熟。苦根若是善的、不善的就有異熟,若是無記的就沒有異熟。信等五根若是有漏的就有異熟,若是無漏的就沒有異熟。
以上已說有異熟等等。二十二根中,有幾種是善、幾種是不善、幾種是無記?頌說:
〔正12〕三性門
頌:只有後八根是善;憂根通善與不善;意根與其餘的受通三性;前八根只是無記。
論:信等八根一向是善。這八根在數列上雖然排在後面,因為承著前面(頌文)的次序,所以先說。憂根只通善性與不善性。意根以及其餘的受,一一通善、不善、無記三性。眼等八根只是無記性。
以上已說善不善等等。二十二根中,有幾種是欲界繫、幾種是色界繫、幾種是無色界繫?頌說:
〔正13〕界繫門
頌:欲界、色界、無色界,依次除去後三根;色界再除女、男、憂、苦;無色界再除五色根與喜、樂。
論:欲界要除掉後三無漏根,因為那三根只是不繫(不屬三界);由此可知欲界繫的只有十九根。
色界如前面一樣除掉三無漏根,再除掉男、女、憂、苦四根;由此可知也通色界繫的是十五根。
為什麼除女男二根?因為色界已經離了婬欲之法,又因為有女男根會使身相顯得醜陋。(有人難:)若是這樣,為什麼經上說那邊是「男」?(反問:)在哪裡說的?(答:)契經中說。如契經說:『沒有這樣的道理、也沒有這樣的可能,會有女身作大梵;有這樣的道理、有這樣的可能,是男身作大梵。』(會通:)那是另有一種男相,就是欲界之中男身所有的相貌(並不是說色界有男根)。
為什麼沒有苦根?因為色界的身清淨微妙(不是苦的所依),又因為那裡沒有不善法(沒有苦的境)。為什麼沒有憂根?因為由奢摩他(止)滋潤著身心相續(不是憂的所依),又因為那裡決定沒有惱害之事(沒有憂的境)。
無色界如前面一樣,除掉三無漏根與女、男、憂、苦,再除掉五種色根以及喜根、樂根;由此可知通無色界繫的只剩八根,就是意、命、捨與信等五根。
以上已說欲界繫等等。二十二根中,有幾種是見所斷、幾種是修所斷、幾種是非所斷?頌說:
〔正14〕三斷門
頌:意根與三受通三種;憂根通見所斷與修所斷;九根只是修所斷;五根則或修所斷、或非所斷。
論:意、喜、樂、捨一一都通三種,因為它們見所斷、修所斷、非所斷都通。憂根只通見所斷與修所斷,因為它不是無漏。七色根、命根、苦根只是修所斷——因為它們不是染污的,不是由六種煩惱所生的,而且都是有漏的。信等五根,或者是修所斷、或者是非所斷——因為它們不是染污(所以不是見所斷),而且通於有漏與無漏。最後三根只是非所斷,因為都是無漏,而且沒有過失的法不是所斷。
以上已說各門義類的差別。在哪一界,最初得到幾種異熟根?頌說:
〔正15〕受生得異熟門
頌:欲界的胎生、卵生、濕生,初得兩種異熟根;化生初得六根、七根或八根;色界初得六根;上界(無色)只得命根。
論:欲界的胎生、卵生、濕生,在最初受生的時候,只得到身根與命根這兩種異熟根,因為這三種生的根是逐漸生起的。
(問:)那時為什麼得不到意根與捨根?(答:)因為續生的時候必定是染污的(染污心不是異熟,故不算異熟根)。
化生在最初的位次得六根、七根或八根:無形(沒有女男根)的初得六根,例如劫初的人。哪六根?就是眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、命。若是一形的初得七根,例如諸天。若是二形的初得八根。(問:)難道有二形而受化生的嗎?(答:)惡趣之中容許有二形化生。
以上說了欲界最初得根的情形,現在接著說色界與無色界。欲界是欲較勝,所以只說「欲」;色界是色較勝,所以只說「色」。契經也說:『寂靜解脫,超過色與無色。』色界最初得六種異熟根,如前面欲界化生無形者所說。「上唯命」,是說無色界定較勝、生也較勝,所以說「上」字;無色界中最初所得的異熟根只有命根,沒有別的。
以上說了異熟根最初得的情形。在哪一界,臨死時有幾根最後滅?頌說:
〔正16〕死位滅根門
頌:正死時所滅的諸根——無色界三根,色界八根;欲界頓死者十根、九根或八根,漸死者只四根;若是善心死,各加信等五根。
論:在無色界將要命終的時候,命、意、捨這三根在最後滅。若在色界將要命終的時候,就是前面那三根加上眼等五根,這八種在最後滅——因為一切化生必定諸根具足地生、具足地死。
若在欲界頓時命終的,十根、九根或八根在最後滅:二形的人最後滅十根,就是女根男根加上前面那八種;一形的最後滅九根,在女男之中隨除一種;無形的最後滅八根,就是沒有女男,只有前面八種。
以上所說是依頓時命終而說。若是漸漸命終的,最後只捨四根——就是在欲界漸漸命終時,身、命、意、捨在最後滅;這四根必定沒有先後滅的道理(一定同時)。
以上所說,應知只是依著染污心或無記心而命終的人說的。若在三界之中以善心死的時候,信等五根必定都具備,所以前面所說的一切位次,數目上都應該加上信等五——就是在無色界增到八根,乃至欲界漸終增到九根;中間的多少,照道理應該可以推知。
分別根這一大段裡,一切關於根的法都應當思擇。二十二根中,有幾根能證得什麼沙門果?頌說:
〔正17〕得果用根門
頌:九根得兩頭的兩果;中間兩果用七根、八根或九根;十一根得阿羅漢——那是依一身之中容許有而說的。
論:頌裡的「邊」,指預流果與阿羅漢果,因為在沙門四果中居初與居後。「中」,指一來果與不還果,因為對照初後來看它們在中間。
最初的預流果,由九根而得:就是意根與捨根、信等五根、未知當知根、已知根,合為九。未知當知根在無間道,已知根在解脫道;這兩根互相資助而得最初果——依其次第,對於離繫得能作引因與依因。
阿羅漢果也由九根而得:就是意根、信等五根、已知根、具知根,以及喜、樂、捨之中隨取一種,合為九。已知根在無間道,具知根在解脫道;這兩根互相資助而得最後果——依其次第,對於離繫得能作引因與依因。
中間兩果,隨其所應,各由七根、八根或九根而得。為什麼?
先說一來果。次第證的人,依世間道由七根而得,就是意根與捨根、信等五根;依出世道由八根而得,就是前面那七根加上已知根為第八。倍離欲貪而超越證的人,如預流果一樣由九根而得。
不還果,次第證的人依世間道由七根得、依出世道由八根得,和前面次第得一來果一樣。全離欲貪而超越證的人,由九根而得,和前面超越得一來果一樣。
總的說雖然如此,其中還有差別:因為這是依「地」而有差別的,所以樂、喜、捨中可以隨取一種;至於前面所說『超越得前果』的情形,就只有一個捨根(不通樂喜)。
又,次第證不還果的人,若在第九解脫道中進入根本地,依世間道就由八根而得——因為他的無間道是與捨受相應的,而解脫道中另有喜受,這兩者互相資助而得第三果;對於離繫得作二種因,如前面所說。依出世道則由九根而得——八根如前,加已知根為第九,因為無間道與解脫道都有它。
(有人難:)根本的阿毘達磨(發智論)不是問過『由幾根得阿羅漢』嗎?答的是『十一根』。怎麼你這裡說由九根得?
(答:)實際得第四果只由九根。本論所以說十一根,是依『一個身中容許有』而說的。就是說:容許有這樣一個補特伽羅,從無學位屢屢退失以後,由樂、喜、捨隨一現前,屢屢又證得阿羅漢果(前後合計就用到十一根)。因為這樣,本論才說十一根。然而沒有一時三受同時生起的道理,所以現在說決定由九根。
(問:)在不還果中為什麼不這樣說?(答:)因為沒有用樂根證不還果的,而後來卻有退失的道理;也沒有退了以後由樂根再得的(因為先離欲而超越證第三果的人沒有退回的道理)——這種離欲之果是由世間、出世間二道所得,極為堅牢。
如今應當思擇:成就什麼根?那些根當中有幾根是決定成就的?頌說:
〔正18–20〕定成就門
頌:成就命、意、捨的,各各決定成就三根;若成就樂根、身根的,各各決定成就四根;成就眼等以及喜根的,各各決定成就五根;若成就苦根的,那人決定成就七根;若成就女根、男根、憂根、信等的,各各成就八根;後二無漏根各成就十一,最初的無漏根成就十三。
論:命、意、捨這三根之中隨成就一個,那人一定成就這三根——這三根之中不會有缺了哪一個而還能成就其餘的道理。除掉這三根,其餘的根都不一定,或者成就、或者不成就。
其中:眼、耳、鼻、舌四根,生在無色界的決定不成就;若生在欲界而還沒得到或已經失去的,也不成就。身根,只有生在無色界的決定不成就。女根男根二根,生在上二界的決定不成就;若生欲界而未得已失的,也不成就。樂根,異生生在第四靜慮以及無色界的決定不成就。喜根,異生生在第三、第四靜慮以及無色界的決定不成就。苦根,若生在色界、無色界的決定不成就。憂根,一切離了欲貪的人決定不成就。信等五根,斷了善根的人決定不成就。最初的無漏根(未知當知根),一切異生以及已經住果的人決定不成就。第二個無漏根(已知根),一切異生、見道位、無學位的人決定不成就。最後的無漏根(具知根),一切異生以及有學位的人決定不成就。在不被上面這些條件遮除的位次上,應知如前面所說,那些根都是決定成就的。
若成就樂根,決定成就四根,就是命、意、捨加上這樂根。若成就身根,也決定成就四根,就是命、意、捨加上這身根。若成就眼根,決定成就五根,就是命、意、捨、身根、眼根。耳、鼻、舌根應知也是五根——前四根與眼根那條相同,第五就是它自己那一根。
若成就喜根,也決定成就五根,就是命、意、捨、樂根、喜根。(問:)第二靜慮地所生而還沒得第三靜慮的人,已捨下地又未得上地,他成就的是什麼樂根?(答:)應當說他成就第三靜慮的染污樂根,其餘的都還沒得到。
若成就苦根,決定成就七根,就是身根、命根、意根與除憂之外的四受。若成就女根,決定成就八根——七根如苦根那條所說,第八是女根。若成就男根也決定成就八根——七根如苦根所說,第八是男根。若成就憂根也決定成就八根——七根如苦根所說,第八是憂根。若成就信等,也各各成就八根,就是命、意、捨與信等五根。
若成就具知根,決定成就十一根,就是命與意、樂、喜、捨根、信等五根以及具知根。若成就已知根,也決定成就十一根——十根如上所說,加上已知根。若成就未知根,決定成就十三根,就是身、命、意、苦、樂、喜、捨、信等五根以及未知當知根。
那麼最少的人成就幾根呢?頌說:
〔正21〕成根極少門
頌:最少八根——無善根的人成就五受、身、命、意;愚(異生)生在無色界的,成就善(信等五)與命、意、捨。
論:已經斷了善根的人名為「無善」。他若最少,也成就八根,就是五受根以及身、命、意。所謂「受」,就是能受,因為能領納;或者因為它是受的體性,所以名為受——就像圓滿的體性就用「圓滿」來命名一樣。
像斷善根的人最少成就八根一樣,愚生在無色界的也成就八根。「愚」是指異生,因為他還沒見諦。哪八根?就是信等五根加上命、意、捨根。信等五根一向是善,所以總名為「善」。(問:)若是這樣,那該把三無漏根也攝進來(那也是善)。(答:)不是的——這裡是依著「八根」而說的,而且說的是「愚生無色界」(異生沒有無漏根)。
那麼最多的人成就幾根呢?頌說:
〔正22〕成根極多門
頌:最多成就十九根——二形的人除掉三種淨根;聖者尚未離欲的,除掉二淨根與一形。
論:具二形的人,眼等諸根都具足,除掉三無漏根,成就其餘的十九根。無漏之所以名為「淨」,是因為它離了兩種繫縛。二形的人必定是欲界的異生,還沒離欲貪,所以有十九根。
(問:)只有這種人具十九根嗎,還是另外還有?(答:)聖者尚未離欲的也具十九根——就是說有學的聖者還沒離欲貪的,成就得最多也是十九根,只是所除的是二無漏根與一形。若住在見道,除掉已知根與具知根;若住在修道,除掉未知當知根與具知根。女男二根隨除一種——因為諸聖者不會是二形。
收卷:因為分別界的緣故,連帶分別了是根、非根的差別,於是就著這個因緣廣辯二十二根完畢。
〔Stanza 1〕What the Word “Faculty” Means—Who Exercises Dominance over What
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Because the elements were analyzed earlier, the twenty-two faculties have already been enumerated one by one in the Chapter on the Elements; here, then, one question is put: what does “faculty” mean? Answer: supreme, sovereign, manifestly evident—this is what is called a “faculty”; these several senses taken together constitute the faculty’s sense of ‘dominance.’ (‘Dominance’ means a function that overrides everything else and can exercise mastery.) With respect to whom, then, and over what, is this dominant function asserted? The stanza says:
Stanza: It is transmitted that the five faculties beginning with the eye are each dominant with respect to four matters; the female, male, life, and mental faculties are each dominant with respect to two; and the five feelings beginning with pleasure together with the eight faculties beginning with confidence are dominant on the two sides of defilement and purification—each exercising dominance in its own way.
Treatise: The five faculties beginning with the eye are each able to exercise dominance with respect to four matters: first, adorning the body; second, guiding and sustaining the body; third, producing consciousness and the rest; fourth, exclusive activity.
Take first the eye faculty and the ear faculty. Adorning the body means that a person blind or deaf is unsightly in bodily form (with eyes and ears the bodily form is well composed). Guiding and sustaining the body means that only by seeing and hearing can one avoid dangers and calamities (and so the body is maintained and nourished). Producing consciousness and the rest means that the eye and ear give rise to the two consciousnesses, eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness, together with the mental factors associated with them. Exclusive activity means that the eye sees form and the ear hears sound, each having its own use, for which no other faculty can substitute.
Take next the nose, tongue, and body faculties. Adorning the body is as stated above for eye and ear. Guiding and sustaining the body means that only through these three can one make use of food taken in portions (nourishment eaten mouthful by mouthful). Producing consciousness and the rest means that they give rise to the three consciousnesses—nose-, tongue-, and body-consciousness—together with the associated mental factors. Exclusive activity means smelling odor, tasting flavor, and feeling the tangible, each with its own separate use.
The female, male, life, and mental faculties are each able to exercise dominance with respect to two matters.
Take first the two kinds of dominance of the female and male faculties: first, difference among sentient beings; second, difference in characteristics. Difference among sentient beings means that it is by these two faculties that sentient beings are divided into the two classes, female and male. Difference in characteristics means that it is by these two faculties that there come to be differences of bodily shape, of spoken sound, of breasts, and the rest. There is another account: these two faculties are dominant with respect to defilement and purification, and this is why the stanza says “with respect to two.” Why say so? Because those impaired in their very nature—one congenitally without a sexual faculty, one whose sexual faculty is incomplete, and a person of both sexes—will neither acquire non-restraint, nor commit deeds of immediate retribution, nor cut off their wholesome roots, nor incur the other defiled dharmas; and equally they will not acquire discipline, nor attain the fruits of the ascetic life, nor become free of the defilement of desire, nor gain the other purifying dharmas. (Having no share on either side, defiled or pure, they show that the female and male faculties are indeed dominant with respect to defilement and purification.)
The two kinds of dominance of the life faculty are that, with respect to the commonality of sentient beings (the continuum of one life-span belonging to a single class), it can continue it and can sustain it.
The two kinds of dominance of the mental faculty are that it can continue later existence and that it is sovereign in what follows it. As for continuing later existence, the sūtra says: at that time the intermediate existence—the gandharva—has present one of two minds, whichever it may be (and so takes rebirth and continues the next life)—either arising together with craving or arising together with hostility. As for sovereign following, the sūtra says:
Quoted stanza: Mind can lead the world; mind can gather in all things everywhere. Such is this single dharma, mind: all dharmas follow it under its sovereignty.
Treatise (continued): The five feelings beginning with pleasure (pleasure, pain, joy, sorrow, equanimity) and the eight faculties beginning with confidence (confidence, diligence, mindfulness, concentration, and discernment, together with the three faculties without outflows: coming to know what is not yet known, what is known, and full knowledge) are dominant, respectively, with respect to defilement and to purification. The five feelings beginning with pleasure are dominant with respect to defilement, because greed and the other latent tendencies increase by attachment to these feelings. The eight faculties beginning with confidence are dominant with respect to purification, because the various purifying dharmas arise and grow in dependence on these eight.
Certain other masters say that the five feelings beginning with pleasure are dominant with respect to purification as well. As the sūtra says, ‘Because of pleasure the mind becomes concentrated,’ and ‘pain is the support of confidence,’ and again ‘what renunciation depends upon are joy, sorrow, and equanimity.’ (The sense is that the five feelings too can assist purification.)—So the Vaibhāṣikas transmit it.
Certain other masters again say that guiding and sustaining the body is in truth not the work of the eye and the other faculties but the dominance of consciousness: only when consciousness has discerned can one avoid dangers or make use of food taken in portions. Seeing form and the rest likewise do not occur apart from consciousness; hence “exclusive activity” cannot be set up as a separate kind of dominance belonging to the eye and the other faculties—and in that case the eye and the rest do not become “faculties” on these grounds at all. If so, how should the matter be stated? The stanza says:
〔Stanzas 2–4〕The Faculties Established Anew—Discerning One’s Own Object, Two Set Up from the Body, the Abiding of the Commonality, Defilement and Purification, and the Dominance of the Last Three
Stanza: Because of dominance with respect to ‘discerning one’s own object,’ six faculties are established in all; from the body faculty the female and male faculties are set up separately, because they are dominant with respect to femaleness and maleness; because of dominance with respect to the abiding of the commonality of sentient beings, with respect to defilement, and with respect to purification, one should know that the life faculty, the five feelings, and the five beginning with confidence are established as faculties too; and the three faculties—coming to know what is not yet known, what is known, and full knowledge—are likewise so, for they are dominant with respect to attaining each successive path and nirvāṇa and the rest.
Treatise: ‘Discerning one’s own object’ refers to the six bodies of consciousness (from eye-consciousness through mind-consciousness). The five faculties beginning with the eye are dominant with respect to the consciousness that discerns each one’s own object; the sixth, the mental faculty, is dominant with respect to the consciousness that discerns all objects—hence the six faculties beginning with the eye are each established as faculties.
Someone asks: do not form and the other objects also exercise dominance over the consciousness that discerns them? They too ought to be established as faculties. Answer: an object exercises no dominance over consciousness. Dominant function means being ‘supreme and sovereign.’ The eye faculty is supreme and sovereign within the consciousness of form that it gives rise to, and this is why it is called dominant—first, because the eye is the common cause for discerning every kind of form (one eye faculty serves as the common cause for the many consciousnesses that discern many forms); second, because consciousness is sharp or dull according to the eye faculty. The form-object is not so; on both points it is the reverse (one form is the cause of only one consciousness, and consciousness is not sharp or dull according to form). The same holds as far as the mental faculty with respect to dharma-objects.
Next, the female and male faculties are set up separately from the body faculty because they are dominant within femaleness and maleness. The entities of the female and male faculties are not apart from the body faculty; this name is merely set up upon one portion of the body. Stated in order: within femaleness and maleness these two faculties are dominant; this one portion differs somewhat from the remainder of the body faculty, and so two faculties are set up separately out of the body faculty.
Differences in the bodily class, the voice, the activity, and the aspirations and inclinations of a woman are called femaleness. Differences in the bodily class, the voice, the activity, and the aspirations and inclinations of a man, unlike a woman’s, are called maleness. The difference between these two sexes comes from the female and male faculties, and this is why they are said to be dominant with respect to the two sexes.
With respect to the ‘abiding’ of the commonality of sentient beings, the life faculty is dominant; with respect to defilement, the five feelings beginning with pleasure are dominant. Why? Because the sūtra says: upon pleasant feeling greed increases; upon painful feeling hatred increases; upon feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant ignorance increases. With respect to purification, the five faculties beginning with confidence are dominant. Why? Because by the strength of these five faculties one can subdue the various afflictions and give rise to the noble path.
The words ‘one should know’ in the stanza urge acceptance that each of these classes can become a faculty. The three faculties without outflows are dominant with respect to attaining each successive path and nirvāṇa and the rest. The words ‘likewise so’ in the stanza show by extension that each of these three too can become a faculty—that is: the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known is dominant with respect to attaining the path of the faculty of what is known; the faculty of what is known is dominant with respect to attaining the path of the faculty of full knowledge; and the faculty of full knowledge is dominant with respect to attaining nirvāṇa, since one whose mind is not liberated cannot reach parinirvāṇa.
The word ‘and the rest’ in the stanza is meant to show that there is yet another account. Which one? This: with respect to the removal of the afflictions abandoned through seeing, the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known is dominant; with respect to the removal of the afflictions abandoned through cultivation, the faculty of what is known is dominant; and with respect to a pleasant abiding in the present dharma, the faculty of full knowledge is dominant, because through it one experiences the joy of liberation.
Someone objects: if a thing is established as a faculty merely because it is dominant, then ignorance and the rest ought also to be established as faculties, since ignorance and the rest, being causes, are each dominant with respect to the formations and the other results. And the organs of speech and the rest ought also to be faculties—the organ of speech, the hands, the feet, and the organs of excretion and of urination are respectively dominant with respect to speaking, grasping, walking, excreting, and producing pleasure. Answer: these matters should not be established as faculties, because what is accepted as a “faculty” has a definite characteristic. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 5〕The Comprehensive Criterion of a Faculty—The Support of Mind, Its Distinction, Its Abiding, Its Defilement, Its Provision, Its Purification
Stanza: The support of mind, the distinction of that support, the abiding of this life-span, the defilement of this life-span, the provision for this purification, and this purification itself—by these six measures the faculties are established.
Treatise: The ‘support of mind’ means the six faculties beginning with the eye. These six internal sense fields are the root of a sentient being. The distinguishing characteristic of that support comes from the female and male faculties. Again, by the life faculty this one life-span is made to abide. That this life-span becomes defiled is due to the five feeling faculties. The provision for this purification is the five faculties beginning with confidence. The accomplishment of this purification is due to the last three faculties without outflows. By these six items the matter of establishing faculties is fully accounted for.
Therefore one should not accept that ignorance and the rest, or the organs of speech and the rest, are established as faculties too—they do not have the kind of dominance stated here.
Certain other masters set up a different account of the characteristic of a faculty. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 6〕The Other Masters’ Alternative Account—Support in Cyclic Existence, Arising, Abiding, Experience; Likewise in Return to Cessation
Stanza: Or else, by the support in cyclic existence together with the three senses of arising, abiding, and experience, the first fourteen faculties are established; on the side of return to cessation, the last eight faculties are established in the same way.
Treatise: The word ‘or’ in the stanza shows that what follows is the intent of certain other masters—they establish the twenty-two faculties by the two gates of cyclic existence and return to cessation.
Support in cyclic existence means the six faculties beginning with the eye. Arising is by the female and male faculties, since sentient beings are born from them. Abiding is by the life faculty, since it is in dependence on it that they abide. Experience is by the five feelings, since it is by them that objects are received. By just these four senses the first fourteen faculties are established.
In the stage of return to cessation as well, the last eight faculties are established by the analysis of these same four kinds of sense. The support of return to cessation is the five faculties beginning with confidence; as for the three faculties without outflows, arising is by the first (the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known), abiding by the second (the faculty of what is known), and experience by the third (the faculty of full knowledge). The number of the faculties is fixed in just this way, neither more nor fewer. It is also on such grounds that the sūtra lays out the sequence of the twenty-two faculties.
(In answer to the earlier objection:) The organ of speech should not be established as a faculty with respect to speaking, because speaking is accomplished only when training has made its difference (the dominance is not the organ’s own). Nor should the hands and feet each be established as faculties with respect to grasping and walking, because they have no separate entity—‘grasping’ and ‘walking’ are merely names for hands and feet arising in different places and with different characteristics. Moreover, apart from hands and feet there is grasping and walking all the same, as with the kind of beings that crawl upon the belly. Hence hands and feet cannot be established as faculties with respect to those activities.
The organ of excretion should not be established as a faculty with respect to excreting, because a heavy thing falls of itself in space and is besides drawn out by the force of wind (that place is not what exercises mastery). The organ of urination should not be established as a faculty with respect to producing pleasure, because that pleasure is in fact produced by the female and male faculties. Furthermore, the throat, the teeth, the eyelids, and the joints of the limbs would all have to be established as faculties—for they have power with respect to swallowing, chewing, opening and closing, and bending and stretching. And so on, until every cause that has power with respect to its own activity would have to be established as a faculty. Though these have power, they are not dominant, and so they are not established as faculties; the organs of speech and the rest are likewise not dominant, and so should not be established as faculties.
Among these, the eye and the rest as far as the male faculty have already been discussed earlier (in the Chapter on the Elements). The entity of the life faculty is a formation not associated with mind, and it will be analyzed at length in due course in the section on formations not associated with mind. The entity of confidence and the rest is mental factors, and they too will be analyzed at length in the section on mental factors. Only the five feelings beginning with pleasure and the three faculties without outflows have no other place in which to be analyzed, and so should be explained now. The stanza says:
〔Stanzas 7 and 8〕The Division of the Five Feelings and the Establishment of the Three Faculties without Outflows
Stanza: Bodily displeasure is called the pain faculty, and bodily pleasure the pleasure faculty; the mental pleasure of the third meditative absorption is also called pleasure, while mental pleasure in the other levels is called joy; mental displeasure is called the sorrow faculty; intermediate feeling makes no difference between body and mind (and so is a single faculty). On the paths of seeing, of cultivation, and beyond training, the three faculties without outflows are established, each in dependence on nine faculties.
Treatise: ‘Body’ in the stanza means bodily feeling—because it arises in dependence on the body, that is, feeling associated with the five consciousnesses. ‘Displeasure’ means causing harm and distress; within bodily feeling, that which causes harm and distress is called the pain faculty. ‘Pleasure’ means embracing and benefiting (nourishing and assisting); within that same bodily feeling, that which embraces and benefits is called the pleasure faculty.
There is also the feeling associated with mind in the third meditative absorption; that which embraces and benefits is likewise called the pleasure faculty—for in the third meditative absorption there is no bodily feeling (the five consciousnesses do not arise), and so the mental pleasure there is called pleasure. This very same mental pleasure, when the third meditative absorption is set aside, is called the joy faculty in the three lower levels (the desire realm, the first meditative absorption, and the second). Why the division? Because the mental pleasure of the third meditative absorption is settled and still, already free of the craving for joy, and so is called only the pleasure faculty; while the mental pleasure of the three lower levels is coarse and agitated and still has the craving for joy, and so is called only the joy faculty.
Feeling associated with mental consciousness that causes harm and distress is mental displeasure, and is called the sorrow faculty.
‘Intermediate’ in the stanza means neither pleasure nor displeasure, that is, feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant; this intermediate feeling is called the equanimity faculty.
Question: is this equanimity faculty bodily feeling or mental feeling? Answer: it should be said to extend to both. Question: on what grounds are the two, bodily and mental, established together as one faculty? Because this feeling, whether in the body or in the mind, is equally without discrimination. It should be known that pain and pleasure in the mind arise for the most part from discrimination, whereas in the body it is not so: they arise following the force of the object; and the pain and pleasure in the body of an arhat or other noble one arise in just this way (which shows that bodily feeling does not follow discrimination). Therefore, when pain and pleasure are established as faculties, body and mind are set up separately; but equanimity is without discrimination and arises spontaneously, and so in establishing it as a faculty body and mind are combined into one.
Furthermore, painful feeling and pleasant feeling have different characteristics of harming and of benefiting in body and in mind, and so are established as separate faculties; equanimity is equally without discrimination in body and in mind, neither harming nor benefiting, with no difference of characteristic, and so is established altogether as a single faculty.
Mind, pleasure, joy, equanimity, and the five faculties beginning with confidence—these nine faculties, on the three paths, establish in order the three faculties without outflows. That is: on the path of seeing, the ‘faculty of coming to know what is not yet known’ is established in dependence on the nine faculties beginning with mind; on the path of cultivation, the ‘faculty of what is known’ is established in dependence on those same nine; and on the path beyond training, the ‘faculty of full knowledge’ is established in dependence on those nine as well.
On what grounds are these three names established? Answer: on the path of seeing there operates a mode of ‘what has never yet been known and is to be known,’ and so that person is said to be one who comes to know what is not yet known. On the path of cultivation there is no longer anything never yet known; it is only in order to sever the remaining latent tendencies that one knows the same objects again and again, and so that person is said to be one of what is known. On the path beyond training one knows that one has already known, and so it is called knowing; one who possesses this knowing is called one of full knowledge. Or else: one who has cultivated this knowing until it has become his own nature is called one of full knowledge—that is, one who has attained the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising and therefore knows of himself, as it really is: ‘I have fully known suffering and need not fully know it again,’ and so on at length. The faculties possessed by such a person are called the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known, and the rest.
The various differences among the entities of the faculties having now been explained, what should next be clarified are the distinctions of meaning under the several gates. Among these twenty-two faculties, how many are with outflows and how many without outflows? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 9〕The Gate of With and Without Outflows
Stanza: Only the last three faculties are without outflows; the seven faculties that are form, together with life, sorrow, and pain, should be known to be with outflows only; the remaining nine extend to both sides.
Treatise: The last three faculties spoken of above (coming to know what is not yet known, what is known, and full knowledge) are in their entity only without outflows—“without outflows” means stainless; stain and outflow differ in name but are one in substance. The seven faculties that are form, together with the life faculty, the sorrow faculty, and the pain faculty, are invariably with outflows. The seven faculties that are form are the five beginning with the eye plus the female and male faculties, since all are included in the aggregate of form. Mind, pleasure, joy, equanimity, and the five faculties beginning with confidence—these nine extend to both with outflows and without outflows.
Certain masters say that the five faculties beginning with confidence too are only without outflows. Their reason is that the World-Honored One said: ‘If someone is wholly without these five faculties beginning with confidence, I declare that he stands in the class of outer ordinary beings.’ (Which would show that all who possess the five faculties beginning with confidence are noble ones.)—Answer: this is not a reliable proof, for that statement was made with reference to the faculties without outflows. How is this known? Because the World-Honored One first established the various distinctions of noble station in dependence on the five faculties beginning with confidence that are without outflows, and only then made this statement.
Or else: ordinary beings are roughly of two kinds, inner and outer. ‘Inner’ means those who have not cut off their wholesome roots; ‘outer’ means those whose wholesome roots are already cut off. It was with reference to ‘outer ordinary beings’ that the World-Honored One spoke thus: ‘If someone is wholly without these five faculties beginning with confidence, I declare that he stands in the class of outer ordinary beings.’
Again the sūtra says: ‘There are sentient beings dwelling in the world, some already born and some already grown, having faculties of every difference—superior, middling, and inferior.’ This was spoken before the Buddha had turned the wheel of Dharma (when there were as yet no faculties without outflows), and so it is known that the five faculties beginning with confidence extend to what is with outflows as well.
Again the World-Honored One said: ‘So long as I had not known, as it really is, the origin, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape with respect to these five faculties beginning with confidence, I could not transcend this world with its gods and humans, its Māra and its Brahmā, and could not, in the end, realize unsurpassed perfect awakening.’—A dharma without outflows cannot be examined under such a division of aspects (origin, disappearance, gratification, danger, and escape are examinations made upon dharmas with outflows), and so the five faculties beginning with confidence extend to both with outflows and without outflows.
With outflows and without outflows have now been explained. Among the twenty-two faculties, how many are maturation and how many are not maturation? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 10〕The Gate of Maturation and Non-Maturation, with the Incidental Discussion on Prolonging and Relinquishing the Life-Formations
Stanza: Only the life faculty is maturation; the sorrow faculty and the last eight faculties are not maturation; the seven faculties that are form, the mental faculty, and the remaining four feelings each extend to both maturation and non-maturation.
Treatise: Only the single life faculty is definitely maturation.
(Someone objects:) If so, then what the arhats prolong when they ‘prolong the life-formations’ is precisely the life faculty; of whose karma is such a life faculty the maturation? Answer: as the root treatise (the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom) says: what is it for a monk to ‘prolong the life-formations’? It is that an arhat who has accomplished the superknowledges and attained sovereignty of mind gives away, according to his portion, robes and bowl and the other requisites that sustain life, either to the Saṅgha or to a single person; and having given, he makes a vow and thereupon enters the fourth limit-stage meditative absorption. Rising from that concentration, he thinks and says aloud: ‘Whatever karma of mine could bring about the maturation of wealth and pleasure, may it all be turned instead to bring about the maturation-result of lifespan.’ At that moment all his karma capable of bringing about the maturation of wealth and pleasure is turned to bring about the maturation-result of lifespan.
There is another position: it is that the residue of maturation from past karma is drawn out. They say that a maturation still remaining from karma undergone in a former life is drawn out for experience by the power of the limit-stage concentration cultivated in the present life.
What is it for a monk to ‘relinquish the life-formations’? It is that an arhat who has accomplished the superknowledges and attained sovereignty of mind gives to the Saṅgha and the rest as before; and having given, he makes a vow and thereupon enters the fourth limit-stage meditative absorption. Rising from that concentration, he thinks and says aloud: ‘Whatever karma of mine could bring about the maturation of lifespan, may it all be turned instead to bring about the maturation-result of wealth and pleasure.’ At that moment all his karma capable of bringing about the maturation of lifespan is turned to bring about the maturation-result of wealth and pleasure.
The Venerable Ghoṣa speaks thus: that arhat rouses the power of the fourth limit-stage concentration and causes the great elements of the form realm to become present within his body; and those great elements either accord with the life-formations or run counter to them, and by this set of causes and conditions he either retains the life-formations or relinquishes them.
(The author of the treatise says:) It should rather be stated thus—that arhat, by this sovereign power of concentration, turns aside the portion of duration belonging to the great elements of the faculties that were produced by past karma and formerly obtained, and draws out instead a portion of duration, never had before, belonging to great elements of the faculties produced by the power of concentration. Therefore this life faculty is not maturation, while all the remaining life faculties are maturation.
Because one discussion gives rise to another (a incidental discussion): for what set of causes and conditions does that arhat prolong the life-formations? It is for the benefit and ease of others, or so that the noble teaching may long endure in the world; he observes that the life-formations of his own body are about to be exhausted, and observes that others do not have these two capabilities (there is no one able to do this work in his stead). And for what set of causes and conditions does he relinquish the life-formations? That arhat observes that what remains of benefit and ease to others in his dwelling in the world is very little, or he is oppressed by the suffering of illness and the like. As one stanza says:
Quoted stanza: The holy life has been excellently established; the noble path has been well cultivated; when the lifespan is exhausted he rejoices, as one who lays down a whole body of illnesses.
Treatise (continued): Here it should be known: in what places, and by which persons, can the lifespan be prolonged or relinquished in this way? Answer: by those arhats among the humans of the three continents (Videha in the east, Jambudvīpa in the south, Godānīya in the west) whose female or male continuity is unbroken (their faculties not deficient), who are liberated not dependent on circumstance (of sharp faculties), and who have attained the limit-stage concentration—because there is a sovereign concentration within their bodies and they are without afflictions.
The sūtra says: the World-Honored One prolonged many vital formations and relinquished many life-formations. What difference is there between ‘vital’ and ‘life’? Some say there is no difference, as the root treatise says: ‘What is the life faculty? Lifespan in the three realms.’ Certain other masters say: the result of karma of a former life is called life-formations; the result of present karma is called vital formations. Others again say: that by which the commonality of sentient beings is made to abide is called life-formations; that by which one abides for a time is called vital formations.
The sūtra’s word ‘many’ is meant to show that what is prolonged or relinquished is many moments—vital and life formations are not a matter of a single instant, and vital and life formations have the property of being able to be prolonged or relinquished (hence ‘many’). Others say that this word ‘many’ is meant to preclude the notion that some real entity, a vital principle or a lifespan, abides through a long time. Others again say that this word is meant to show that there is no real entity of a vital principle or of a lifespan at all: the two names ‘vital’ and ‘life’ are merely set up provisionally upon a plurality of ‘formations’; were it not so, the word ‘formations’ should not have been used.
Why did the World-Honored One relinquish many life-formations and prolong many vital formations? To show that he had attained sovereignty over dying, he relinquished many life-formations; to show that he had attained sovereignty over living, he prolonged many vital formations. That he retained just three months, neither more nor less, is because beyond that term there would be no further work of ripening beings, while short of that term the benefit to beings would not be brought to completion. It was also to establish what he himself had said earlier: ‘Because I have well cultivated the four bases of supernormal power, I can, should I wish to abide for an aeon or for more than an aeon, abide just as my mind intends.’ The Vaibhāṣikas speak thus: this shows that he now subdued the two Māras, the Māra of the aggregates and the Māra of death—for the World-Honored One had already subdued the Māra of the heavens and the Māra of the afflictions beneath the tree of awakening.
The incidental discussion having ended, we return to the main discussion. The sorrow faculty and the last eight faculties beginning with confidence are all not maturation, because they are determinate (bearing a definite mark of wholesome or unwholesome). The remainder extend to both. What follows by implication is thereby established: namely that the seven faculties that are form, the mental faculty, and the four feelings apart from sorrow—these twelve faculties each extend to both classes, maturation and non-maturation.
As for the seven faculties that are form, those that come about through nourishment by food and the like are not maturation, and the rest are maturation. As for the mental faculty and the four feelings: those that are wholesome or defiled, and those included in the modes of deportment (walking, standing, sitting, and lying down), in the fields of craft (the skilled arts), and in the mind capable of transformation, are correspondingly not maturation, and the rest are maturation.
(Someone asks:) If the sorrow faculty is not maturation, how is this sūtra to be reconciled? As the sūtra says: ‘There are three kinds of karma—karma conducive to the feeling of joy, karma conducive to the feeling of sorrow, and karma conducive to the feeling of equanimity.’ Answer: if ‘conducive’ is said with reference to being ‘associated with’ that feeling, there is no fault—it means that the karma is associated with sorrow and is therefore called karma conducive to the feeling of sorrow, just as contact associated with pleasure is called contact conducive to the feeling of pleasure. (It is not being said that sorrow is the maturation-result of that karma.)
(Objection:) If so, karma conducive to the feeling of joy and karma conducive to the feeling of equanimity should be explained in the same way, since one and the same sūtra states them. Answer: explain them as you wish; it does me no harm—whether explained as maturation or as association, there is no fault in the reasoning, and I am left with no difficulty from which there is no escape.
(Question:) In reconciling the sūtra text in this way, what then is the real reason? Why is sorrow not maturation? Answer: because sorrow arises through discriminating the various matters that are not to one’s liking, and when it ceases it likewise depends on discrimination; maturation is not so (maturation arises and ceases spontaneously).
(Objection:) If so, the joy faculty too should not be maturation, for it likewise arises through discrimination and ceases through discrimination.
(The Sarvāstivādins counter:) If the sorrow faculty were accepted as maturation, then after committing karma of immediate retribution sorrow arises at once—and that karma would then have to be said to have already ripened into its result at that very moment (which is unreasonable). (The opponent gives a counter-instance:) The joy faculty should be pressed in exactly the same way: if the joy faculty is accepted as maturation, then after performing an outstanding meritorious deed joy arises at once, and that karma too would have to be said to have already ripened into its result at that moment.
The Vaibhāṣikas all speak thus: because one who is already free of desire has no sorrow faculty, whereas maturation is not so (maturation does not disappear on account of freedom from desire), sorrow is not maturation.
(Objection:) If so, something should be said about the maturation joy faculty of a being free of desire—by what characteristic is it known that it is still present? (Answer:) Whatever characteristic obtains on that side, the characteristic on this side may be known in the same way: that is, since a wholesome joy faculty may still be present at this station, an indeterminate maturation joy faculty should likewise be known by inference not to be absent. As for the sorrow faculty at this station, no kind of it whatsoever can be present, and so it is definitely not maturation.
The eight faculties beginning with the eye, in a good destiny, are the maturation of wholesome karma, and in a bad destiny the maturation of unwholesome karma. The mental faculty, whether in a good or a bad destiny, is the maturation brought about by karma of both kinds. The joy, pleasure, and equanimity faculties, in whatever destiny, are the maturation of wholesome karma. The pain faculty, whether in a good or a bad destiny, is the maturation of unwholesome karma. If in a good destiny there is a person of both sexes, this too is said only with reference to the ‘place’ of the faculty—the place upon which those two faculties depend is brought about by unwholesome karma; it is not that unwholesome karma can bring about the entity of a faculty, and the faculties that are form in a good destiny are still drawn forth by wholesome karma.
Maturation and the rest have now been explained. Among the twenty-two faculties, how many have maturation and how many do not have maturation? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 11〕The Gate of Having and Not Having Maturation
Stanza: The sorrow faculty definitely has maturation; the first eight faculties and the last three do not have maturation; the mental faculty, the remaining four feelings, and confidence and the rest each extend to both.
Treatise: As was disputed above, the sorrow faculty should be known definitely to have maturation. The word ‘definitely’ in the stanza rests on two senses, ‘only’ and ‘out of turn’—it is meant to show that the sorrow faculty only has maturation (there being no share of it that lacks maturation), and, because it possesses two features at once, that it is stated ahead of its turn. To possess two features means that sorrow is neither indeterminate (for it arises from forceful volition) nor without outflows (for it belongs only to the unconcentrated levels). It is for this reason that ‘the sorrow faculty definitely has maturation’ is stated ahead of its turn.
The first eight faculties beginning with the eye, together with the last three, definitely do not have maturation—the first eight because they are indeterminate, the last three because they are without outflows. The remainder extend to both, and what follows by implication is thereby established: namely the mental faculty, the remaining four feelings, and confidence and the rest (the word ‘and the rest’ takes in diligence and the other four faculties)—these ten faculties each extend to both classes.
Mind, pleasure, joy, and equanimity, if unwholesome, or if wholesome and with outflows, have maturation; if indeterminate or without outflows, they do not have maturation. The pain faculty, if wholesome or unwholesome, has maturation; if indeterminate, it does not. The five faculties beginning with confidence, if with outflows, have maturation; if without outflows, they do not.
Having maturation and the rest have now been explained. Among the twenty-two faculties, how many are wholesome, how many unwholesome, and how many indeterminate? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 12〕The Gate of the Three Ethical Qualities
Stanza: Only the last eight faculties are wholesome; the sorrow faculty extends to the wholesome and the unwholesome; the mental faculty and the remaining feelings extend to all three qualities; the first eight faculties are indeterminate only.
Treatise: The eight faculties beginning with confidence are invariably wholesome. Although these eight stand later in the enumeration, they are stated first because the discussion carries on from what precedes. The sorrow faculty extends only to the wholesome and the unwholesome. The mental faculty and the remaining feelings each extend to all three qualities—wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. The eight faculties beginning with the eye are indeterminate only.
Wholesome, unwholesome, and the rest have now been explained. Among the twenty-two faculties, how many belong to the desire realm, how many to the form realm, and how many to the formless realm? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 13〕The Gate of Realm Affiliation
Stanza: The desire, form, and formless realms exclude, in order, the last three; the form realm further excludes female, male, sorrow, and pain; the formless realm further excludes the five faculties that are form together with joy and pleasure.
Treatise: The desire realm excludes the last three faculties without outflows, because those three faculties are unbound to any realm; from this it is known that only nineteen faculties belong to the desire realm.
The form realm, as before, excludes the three faculties without outflows and further excludes the four faculties male, female, sorrow, and pain; from this it is known that fifteen faculties extend to belonging to the form realm as well.
Why are the female and male faculties excluded? Because the form realm is already free of the dharmas of sexual desire, and because possessing female and male faculties would make the bodily form unsightly. (Someone objects:) If so, why does the sūtra speak of ‘male’ there? (Counter-question:) Where is this said? (Answer:) It is said in a sūtra. As the sūtra says: ‘There is no such principle and no such possibility that a female body should be the Great Brahmā; there is such a principle and such a possibility that a male body should be the Great Brahmā.’ (Reconciliation:) That refers to another kind of male appearance, namely the features possessed by a male body in the desire realm (it is not that the form realm really has a male faculty).
Why is there no pain faculty? Because bodies in the form realm are pure and subtle (not a support for pain), and because there are no unwholesome dharmas there (no object of pain). Why is there no sorrow faculty? Because calm abiding moistens the continuum of body and mind (not a support for sorrow), and because there is definitely nothing there that harms or injures (no object of sorrow).
The formless realm, as before, excludes the three faculties without outflows together with female, male, sorrow, and pain, and further excludes the five faculties that are form together with the joy faculty and the pleasure faculty; from this it is known that only eight faculties extend to belonging to the formless realm—namely mind, life, equanimity, and the five beginning with confidence.
Belonging to the desire realm and the rest have now been explained. Among the twenty-two faculties, how many are abandoned through seeing, how many abandoned through cultivation, and how many not subject to abandonment? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 14〕The Gate of the Three Modes of Abandonment
Stanza: The mental faculty and three feelings extend to all three; the sorrow faculty extends to what is abandoned through seeing and through cultivation; nine faculties are abandoned through cultivation only; and five are either abandoned through cultivation or not subject to abandonment.
Treatise: Mind, joy, pleasure, and equanimity each extend to all three, because each may be abandoned through seeing, abandoned through cultivation, or not subject to abandonment. The sorrow faculty extends only to what is abandoned through seeing and through cultivation, because it is not without outflows. The seven faculties that are form, the life faculty, and the pain faculty are abandoned through cultivation only—because they are not defiled, are not produced by the six kinds of affliction, and are all with outflows. The five faculties beginning with confidence are either abandoned through cultivation or not subject to abandonment—because they are not defiled (and so are not abandoned through seeing) and extend to both with outflows and without outflows. The last three faculties are not subject to abandonment only, because all are without outflows, and a dharma without fault is not something to be abandoned.
The distinctions of meaning under the several gates have now been explained. In which realm, and how many maturation faculties, are first obtained? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 15〕The Gate of the Maturation Faculties Obtained at Birth
Stanza: In the desire realm, birth from the womb, from an egg, and from moisture first obtain two maturation faculties; birth by transformation first obtains six, seven, or eight; the form realm first obtains six; the upper realm obtains the life faculty only.
Treatise: In the desire realm, birth from the womb, from an egg, and from moisture, at the first moment of taking birth, obtain only the two maturation faculties of body and life, because in these three modes of birth the faculties arise gradually.
(Question:) Why are the mental faculty and the equanimity faculty not obtained at that time? (Answer:) Because the mind at the moment of continuing into birth is necessarily defiled (a defiled mind is not maturation, and so is not counted among the maturation faculties).
Birth by transformation obtains six, seven, or eight faculties at its first stage: one without sexual form (having neither female nor male faculty) first obtains six, as with the humans at the beginning of an aeon. Which six? Eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and life. One with a single sexual form first obtains seven, as with the gods. One with both sexual forms first obtains eight. (Question:) Are there then beings of both sexes who take birth by transformation? (Answer:) Within the bad destinies birth by transformation with both sexes is admitted.
The first obtaining of faculties in the desire realm having been stated, next come the form and formless realms. In the desire realm desire predominates, and so only ‘desire’ is said; in the form realm form predominates, and so only ‘form’ is said. The sūtra too says: ‘Peaceful liberations that transcend form and the formless.’ The form realm first obtains six maturation faculties, as stated above for one without sexual form born by transformation. ‘The upper realm obtains life only’—in the formless realm concentration predominates and birth predominates, and so the word ‘upper’ is used; in the formless realm the maturation faculty first obtained is the life faculty alone and nothing else.
The first obtaining of maturation faculties has now been stated. In which realm, and how many faculties, cease last at the moment of death? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 16〕The Gate of the Faculties That Cease at Death
Stanza: The faculties that cease at the moment of dying—three in the formless realm, eight in the form realm; in the desire realm ten, nine, or eight for one who dies all at once, and only four for one who dies gradually; if one dies with a wholesome mind, add in each case the five beginning with confidence.
Treatise: When life is about to end in the formless realm, the three faculties life, mind, and equanimity cease last. When life is about to end in the form realm, those same three together with the five beginning with the eye—these eight cease last—because all who are born by transformation are necessarily born with their faculties complete and die with them complete.
For one whose life ends all at once in the desire realm, ten, nine, or eight faculties cease last: for a person of both sexes, ten faculties cease last, namely the female and male faculties together with the preceding eight; for one of a single sex, nine cease last, one of female and male being excluded; for one without sexual form, eight cease last—that is, without female and male, only the preceding eight.
What has been said above is stated with reference to dying all at once. If one dies gradually, only four faculties are relinquished last—that is, when life ends gradually in the desire realm, body, life, mind, and equanimity cease last; and there is definitely no principle by which these four cease one before another (they must cease together).
What has been said above should be known to refer only to those who die with a defiled or an indeterminate mind. If one dies with a wholesome mind in any of the three realms, the five faculties beginning with confidence are necessarily all present, and so to every station stated above the five beginning with confidence should be added in number—that is, in the formless realm the count rises to eight, and as far as gradual death in the desire realm it rises to nine; the counts in between may be known by the same reasoning.
In this great section analyzing the faculties, every dharma concerning the faculties should be pondered. Among the twenty-two faculties, how many can attain which fruit of the ascetic life? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 17〕The Gate of the Faculties Used in Attaining the Fruits
Stanza: Nine faculties attain the two fruits at the two edges; the two middle fruits use seven, eight, or nine faculties; eleven faculties attain arhatship—and that is said with reference to what may be present within a single body.
Treatise: ‘Edges’ in the stanza means the fruit of stream-entry and the fruit of arhatship, because among the four fruits of the ascetic life they stand first and last. ‘Middle’ means the fruit of once-return and the fruit of non-return, because set against the first and the last they lie in between.
The first fruit, stream-entry, is attained by nine faculties: namely the mental faculty and the equanimity faculty, the five beginning with confidence, the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known, and the faculty of what is known—nine in all. The faculty of coming to know what is not yet known is on the uninterrupted path, the faculty of what is known on the path of liberation; these two aid one another in attaining the first fruit—serving, in that order, as the drawing cause and the supporting cause with respect to the attainment of release from bondage.
The fruit of arhatship too is attained by nine faculties: namely the mental faculty, the five beginning with confidence, the faculty of what is known, the faculty of full knowledge, and any one taken from among joy, pleasure, and equanimity—nine in all. The faculty of what is known is on the uninterrupted path, the faculty of full knowledge on the path of liberation; these two aid one another in attaining the last fruit—serving, in that order, as the drawing cause and the supporting cause with respect to the attainment of release from bondage.
The two middle fruits are attained, as the case may be, by seven, eight, or nine faculties. Why?
Take first the fruit of once-return. One who realizes it in sequence attains it by the mundane path through seven faculties, namely the mental faculty and the equanimity faculty and the five beginning with confidence; by the supramundane path he attains it through eight faculties, namely the seven just named plus the faculty of what is known as the eighth. One who has become free of the craving of desire in double measure and so realizes it by leaping over attains it through nine faculties, as with the fruit of stream-entry.
For the fruit of non-return, one who realizes it in sequence attains it by the mundane path through seven faculties and by the supramundane path through eight, just as with attaining the fruit of once-return in sequence. One who has become wholly free of the craving of desire and realizes it by leaping over attains it through nine faculties, just as with attaining the fruit of once-return by leaping over.
Though this is so in general, there is still a difference within it: because the matter differs according to the level, any one of pleasure, joy, and equanimity may be taken; whereas in the case stated above of ‘attaining the earlier fruits by leaping over’ there is only the single equanimity faculty (pleasure and joy not being included).
Again, for one who realizes the fruit of non-return in sequence: if on the ninth path of liberation he enters a fundamental level, then by the mundane path he attains it through eight faculties—because his uninterrupted path is associated with equanimous feeling while his path of liberation has joyful feeling besides, and these two aid one another in attaining the third fruit; with respect to the attainment of release from bondage they serve as the two kinds of cause, as stated above. By the supramundane path he attains it through nine faculties—the eight as before plus the faculty of what is known as the ninth, since it is present on both the uninterrupted path and the path of liberation.
(Someone objects:) Did not the root Abhidharma (the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom) ask ‘by how many faculties is arhatship attained?’ and answer ‘by eleven faculties’? How is it that you say here it is attained by nine?
(Answer:) In actual fact the fourth fruit is attained by nine faculties only. The root treatise says eleven with reference to what ‘may be present within a single body.’ That is: it is admitted that there may be such a person who, after falling repeatedly from the station beyond training, realizes the fruit of arhatship again and again with any one of pleasure, joy, and equanimity present (so that eleven faculties are used in all, counting earlier and later occasions together). It is for this reason that the root treatise says eleven faculties. Yet there is no principle by which three feelings arise at one time, and so it is said here that it is definitely attained by nine faculties.
(Question:) Why is the same not said with regard to the fruit of non-return? (Answer:) Because none attains the fruit of non-return with the pleasure faculty, whereas a principle of falling away does exist afterwards; nor is there re-attainment by the pleasure faculty after falling away (since one who has first become free of desire and realizes the third fruit by leaping over has no principle of falling back)—for this fruit of freedom from desire, attained by both the mundane and the supramundane paths, is exceedingly firm.
Now it should be pondered: which faculties does one possess, and among those faculties how many are necessarily possessed? The stanza says:
〔Stanzas 18–20〕The Gate of Necessary Possession
Stanza: One who possesses life, mind, or equanimity necessarily possesses three faculties in each case; one who possesses the pleasure faculty or the body faculty necessarily possesses four in each case; one who possesses the eye and the rest, or the joy faculty, necessarily possesses five in each case; one who possesses the pain faculty necessarily possesses seven; one who possesses the female, the male, or the sorrow faculty, or confidence and the rest, possesses eight in each case; the last two faculties without outflows each carry eleven, and the first faculty without outflows carries thirteen.
Treatise: Whoever possesses any one among the three faculties life, mind, and equanimity necessarily possesses all three—there is no principle by which one of these three could be lacking while the others were still possessed. Apart from these three, the remaining faculties are all indefinite: they may or may not be possessed.
Among them: the four faculties eye, ear, nose, and tongue are definitely not possessed by one born in the formless realm; and one born in the desire realm who has not yet obtained them, or who has lost them, does not possess them either. The body faculty is definitely not possessed only by one born in the formless realm. The two faculties female and male are definitely not possessed by one born in the two upper realms; and one born in the desire realm who has not yet obtained them or who has lost them does not possess them either. The pleasure faculty is definitely not possessed by an ordinary being born in the fourth meditative absorption or in the formless realm. The joy faculty is definitely not possessed by an ordinary being born in the third or fourth meditative absorption or in the formless realm. The pain faculty is definitely not possessed by one born in the form or formless realm. The sorrow faculty is definitely not possessed by anyone free of the craving of desire. The five faculties beginning with confidence are definitely not possessed by one whose wholesome roots are cut off. The first faculty without outflows (the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known) is definitely not possessed by any ordinary being or by one already established in a fruit. The second faculty without outflows (the faculty of what is known) is definitely not possessed by any ordinary being, nor by one on the path of seeing, nor by one beyond training. The last faculty without outflows (the faculty of full knowledge) is definitely not possessed by any ordinary being or by one still in training. At the stations not excluded by the conditions above, it should be known, as stated before, that those faculties are necessarily possessed.
If one possesses the pleasure faculty, one necessarily possesses four faculties—life, mind, equanimity, and this pleasure faculty. If one possesses the body faculty, one likewise necessarily possesses four—life, mind, equanimity, and this body faculty. If one possesses the eye faculty, one necessarily possesses five—life, mind, equanimity, the body faculty, and the eye faculty. For the ear, nose, and tongue faculties it should be known that there are likewise five—the first four as in the case of the eye, the fifth being that faculty itself.
If one possesses the joy faculty, one likewise necessarily possesses five—life, mind, equanimity, the pleasure faculty, and the joy faculty. (Question:) One born on the level of the second meditative absorption who has not yet obtained the third—having relinquished the lower level and not yet obtained the upper—which pleasure faculty does he possess? (Answer:) It should be said that he possesses the defiled pleasure faculty of the third meditative absorption; the rest he has not yet obtained.
If one possesses the pain faculty, one necessarily possesses seven—the body faculty, the life faculty, the mental faculty, and the four feelings apart from sorrow. If one possesses the female faculty, one necessarily possesses eight—the seven as stated for the pain faculty, with the female faculty as the eighth. If one possesses the male faculty, one likewise necessarily possesses eight—the seven as stated for the pain faculty, with the male faculty as the eighth. If one possesses the sorrow faculty, one likewise necessarily possesses eight—the seven as stated for the pain faculty, with the sorrow faculty as the eighth. If one possesses confidence and the rest, one likewise possesses eight in each case—life, mind, equanimity, and the five beginning with confidence.
If one possesses the faculty of full knowledge, one necessarily possesses eleven faculties—life and mind, pleasure, joy, and equanimity, the five beginning with confidence, and the faculty of full knowledge. If one possesses the faculty of what is known, one likewise necessarily possesses eleven—the ten as stated above plus the faculty of what is known. If one possesses the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known, one necessarily possesses thirteen—body, life, mind, pain, pleasure, joy, equanimity, the five beginning with confidence, and the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known.
How many faculties, then, does one possess who possesses fewest? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 21〕The Gate of the Fewest Faculties Possessed
Stanza: Fewest is eight—one without wholesome roots possesses the five feelings, body, life, and mind; a fool (an ordinary being) born in the formless realm possesses the wholesome (the five beginning with confidence) together with life, mind, and equanimity.
Treatise: One whose wholesome roots are already cut off is called “without wholesome roots.” If he possesses fewest, he still possesses eight faculties—namely the five feeling faculties together with body, life, and mind. ‘Feeling’ means what receives, because it takes in; or else it is so named because receiving is its very nature—just as what is complete in nature is named by the word ‘complete.’
Just as one whose wholesome roots are cut off possesses fewest at eight faculties, so a fool born in the formless realm likewise possesses eight. ‘Fool’ designates an ordinary being, because he has not yet seen the truths. Which eight? The five faculties beginning with confidence together with the life, mind, and equanimity faculties. The five faculties beginning with confidence are invariably wholesome, and so are called ‘the wholesome’ as a class. (Question:) If so, the three faculties without outflows should be included as well (for they too are wholesome). (Answer:) No—for the statement is made with reference to ‘eight faculties,’ and what is spoken of is ‘a fool born in the formless realm’ (an ordinary being has no faculty without outflows).
How many faculties, then, does one possess who possesses most? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 22〕The Gate of the Most Faculties Possessed
Stanza: Most is nineteen faculties—a person of both sexes excludes the three pure faculties; a noble one not yet free of desire excludes two pure faculties and one sexual form.
Treatise: A person possessing both sexes has all the faculties beginning with the eye complete; excluding the three faculties without outflows, he possesses the remaining nineteen. What is without outflows is called “pure” because it is free of the two bonds. A person of both sexes is necessarily an ordinary being of the desire realm and is not yet free of the craving of desire, and so has nineteen faculties.
(Question:) Is it only such a person who has nineteen faculties, or is there another besides? (Answer:) A noble one not yet free of desire also has nineteen—that is, a noble one still in training who is not yet free of the craving of desire possesses at most nineteen faculties as well, except that what he excludes is two faculties without outflows and one sexual form. If he abides on the path of seeing, he excludes the faculty of what is known and the faculty of full knowledge; if he abides on the path of cultivation, he excludes the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known and the faculty of full knowledge. One of the two faculties female and male is excluded, because no noble one is of both sexes.
Closing of the fascicle: Because the distinction between faculties and non-faculties arose in the analysis of the elements, the twenty-two faculties have on that occasion been extensively analyzed to their conclusion.
俱生·心心所Co-Arising · Mind and Mental Factors
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔卷首〕一切法分五品,本卷先辨前四品之同起
論:現在應當思擇這樣一個問題——一切「有為法」(由眾多條件聚合而造作出來的法)既然各自的相狀不同,生起時也就各各有別;那麼,有沒有哪些法是決定要一起生起的呢?答:有決定一起生起的。總說起來,一切法簡略分為五品(五大類):第一是色(物質性的法)、第二是心(心王,即識的本身)、第三是心所(依附於心而起的種種心理作用)、第四是心不相應行(既不是色也不是心、卻依色心分位而假立的法)、第五是無為(不由眾緣造作、無生無滅之法)。無為法本來就沒有「生」,所以在這裡不談。如今先辨明色法是怎樣決定一起生起的。頌說:
〔正23〕色法決定俱生:八事、九事、十事
頌:欲界中最細的色聚,若不含聲、也不含根,就有八事同時俱生;若含身根,便是九事;若含眼等其餘的根,便是十事。
論:色的聚合到了最細微處,就立「微聚」這個名——用來顯示再沒有比它更細的了。這微聚若在欲界,其中沒有聲、也沒有根,那就是八事俱生,八者缺一不可。哪八事呢?就是四大種(地、水、火、風四種能造之體)以及四種所造之色——色、香、味、觸。若是沒有聲而有根的那些極微聚,其中俱生之事就或是九、或是十:含身根的聚,是九事俱生——八事如前,加上身根為第九;含其餘之根的聚,是十事俱生——九事如前,再加上眼等其中一根。眼、耳、鼻、舌一定不離身根〔所以含眼根處必也含身根〕;而眼耳鼻舌四根彼此相望,各自所處之位不同〔所以不會同在一聚中互相累加〕。以上諸聚,若其中有聲生起,就依次增為九、十、十一——因為有聲之處,聲必不離根而生,也就是由『有執受的大種』(有心識執持的身內大種)為因而發起的。
問:若說四大種是不相離而生的,那麼在諸多色聚裡,堅、濕、煖、動為什麼只能察覺到其中一種、察覺不到其餘?答:在那個聚中,勢用偏強的那一大顯得明了可得,其餘三大的體並非沒有。就像感覺針尖與竹籌合在一起去觸〔只覺針而不覺籌〕,又像嘗鹽與麵粉合成的味〔只覺鹹而不覺麵〕。問:那又怎麼知道那裡確實還有其餘三大呢?答:因為那裡有攝(水之收攝)、熟(火之成熟)、長(風之增長)、持(地之任持)這四種業用在。另有一說:遇到適當的緣時,堅硬之物便顯出流動、濕潤等相,可見本來就有;譬如水聚之中因為極冷的緣故而有煖相現起——雖然四大不相離,只是冷的作用偏強罷了;就像受與聲,其作用也有強有弱。又有其餘論師說:在這樣的聚中,其餘幾大只有種子(能生之功能)而尚未現起體相,所以契經說「於木聚中有種種界」——這裡的「界」就是種子。
問:風裡怎麼知道有顯色呢?〔風不可見〕答:這一義只能依教而信,不能靠推比得知。或者說:與風相合的香既然現前可以嗅得,而香與顯色又是不相離的〔所以可知風中有顯色〕。前面說過色界中沒有香與味,所以色界之聚若無聲便是六、七、八〔事俱生〕,有聲便是七、八、九俱生;這可以依前類推,所以不另外說。
問:這裡所說的「事」,是就體(法的自體)來說,還是就處(十二處的歸類)來說?答:若這樣問,有什麼過失?答:兩邊都有過失。若依體來說,八、九、十等就太少了——因為諸微聚必定有形色,是由許多極微共同積集而成的;重性與輕性一定隨有其一,滑性與澁性也隨有其一;有的地方還有冷、有飢、有渴。這樣一來,所說的數目就有太少之過。若依處來說,八、九、十等又太多了——因為四大種都歸「觸處」所攝,那就應該說成四等;這樣一來,所說的數目就有太多之失。答:其實兩邊都無過失。應知此中所說的「事」,一分是依體說的,指的是所依的大種;一分是依處說的,指的是能依的所造色。問:若是這樣,大種之「事」就該成很多了——因為所造之色各各不同,各自依著一組四大種。答:應知此處是依體類而說的,因為諸四大種其類別無有差異〔所以合說為四〕。問:何必作這樣的分別語呢?答:語言是隨人之欲而生起的,義理才是應當思擇的。以上已經辨明色法決定俱生。其餘諸法的決定俱生,接下來當辨。頌說:
〔正24前半〕心與心所必定同時生起
頌:心與心所必定同起;一切有為諸行必與四相同起,並且或與「得」同起。
論:心與心所必定同時生起,隨便缺少其中一個,另一個就不會現起。所謂「諸行」,就是一切有為法,也就是色、心、心所、心不相應行。前一句中「必俱」二字之義流貫到這裡——是說色、心等諸行生起時,必定與有為四相(生、住、異、滅)一同現起。說「或得」,是指諸行之中唯有有情之法會與「得」(成就的那一種力)同起;其餘〔非情之〕法則不然,所以用一個「或」字。前面說到「心所」,那什麼是心所呢?頌說:
〔正24後半〕心所總分五品
頌:心所且分五品,就是大地法等五類之別。
論:諸心所法且分五品。哪五品?第一是大地法、第二是大善地法、第三是大煩惱地法、第四是大不善地法、第五是小煩惱地法。「地」就是行處(活動所依之場所):若此法是彼法所活動之處,就說此法是彼法的「地」。「大法」之地所以叫大地〔這裡的大地指心王,因為受等十法遍一切心,故名大法〕;此中若有某法是大地所有的,就叫大地法——也就是恒常在一切心中都有的那些法。那些法是什麼?頌說:
〔正25〕大地法十:受、想、思、觸、欲、慧、念、作意、勝解、三摩地
頌:受、想、思、觸、欲,慧、念與作意,勝解、三摩地——這十法遍於一切心。
論:傳說是這樣的:如上所列的十法,在心的每一剎那和合而普遍地都有。此中——受,就是三種領納:苦、樂、非苦非樂,因為有這樣的差別。想,就是在境上攝取差別之相〔分辨這是什麼、不是什麼〕。思,就是能令心有所造作〔推動心去作業〕。觸,就是根、境、識三者和合而生,能有觸對〔心與境的接上〕。欲,就是希求所要作的事業。慧,就是對於諸法能有簡擇〔分別抉擇〕。念,就是對於所緣明白記持而不忘失。作意,就是能令心警覺〔把心喚起來趣向境〕。勝解,就是能對於境作出印可〔確認『就是這樣、不是那樣』〕。三摩地,就是心專注於一境之性。諸心心所的行相極其微細,一一相續地去分別尚且困難,何況要分辨同一剎那中同時俱有?譬如有色的諸藥為色根所取,它們味道的差別尚且難以了知,何況無色之法只能靠覺慧去取。以上已說十種大地法。「大善法」之地叫大善地;此中若有某法是大善地所有的,就叫大善地法——也就是恒常在一切善心中都有的那些法。那些法是什麼?頌說:
〔正26〕大善地法十:信、不放逸、輕安、捨、慚、愧、無貪、無瞋、不害、勤
頌:信與不放逸,輕安、捨、慚、愧,無貪無瞋二根及不害,還有勤——這些唯遍於善心。
論:如上諸法唯遍一切善心。此中信,就是令心澄淨〔像清水珠投入濁水,濁水便澄清〕。另有一說:對於四諦、三寶、業果,當下能忍可認許,所以叫作信。不放逸,就是修習諸善法、遠離諸不善法。問:那什麼叫「修」呢?答:就是對於善法專注不移為其體性。其餘部派的經中有這樣的解釋——能守護心,就叫不放逸。輕安,就是心的堪任性〔心變得柔軟、可用〕。
問:豈不是也有經說「身輕安」嗎?答:雖然不是沒有這樣說,但這就像「身受」一樣〔受本是心所,若與五識相應就叫身受〕,應知輕安也是如此。問:〔若身輕安是五識相應的有漏法,〕怎能立它為覺支(七覺支之一)呢?答:應知此處所說的身輕安,是身的堪任性〔即輕安之觸〕。問:那又怎能說它是覺支呢?答:因為它能隨順覺支,所以無過——由於身的輕安能引發覺支中的心輕安。問:在別處也見有這樣〔相隨順而立名〕的說法嗎?答:有。如經中說:喜以及順喜之法,都名為喜覺支;瞋以及瞋的因緣,都名為瞋恚蓋;正見、正思惟、正勤,合名為慧蘊——思惟與勤雖然本身不是慧的體性,但因為隨順於慧,也得了慧之名。所以身輕安因為隨順覺支,得覺支之名並無過失。
心的平等性、無警覺性,就叫作捨〔不偏不倚、不再刻意提起〕。問:怎能說在同一個心中既有〔作意的〕警覺性、又有〔捨的〕無警覺性?作意與捨二者竟能相應而起?答:前面不是已經說過諸心心所其相微細、難可了知嗎?問:有些難了之事,經過審細推度還是可以知道的;這一件卻最難知——說它們相違背,卻又不相乖反。答:這一個〔作意〕有警覺,在那一個〔捨〕上則沒有;二者既然懸殊,有什麼乖反可言?問:若是這樣,它們就不該同緣一境;否則一切〔性質相違之法〕都該互相相應了。答:像這樣的種類,其餘諸法此中都應當拿來一併思求;照著那些法的理趣去看,如今在此處應知也是一樣。慚與愧二種,如後面當說。二根,就是無貪、無瞋〔三善根中的兩個〕;無癡這一善根是以慧為體性的,前面已經把它說在大地法中了,所以不重複立為大善地法。說不害,就是沒有損惱〔他人之心〕。勤,就是令心勇悍為其體性。以上已說大善地法。「大煩惱法」之地叫大煩惱地;此中若有某法是大煩惱地所有的,就叫大煩惱地法——也就是恒常在染污心中都有的那些法。那些法是什麼?頌說:
〔正27前半〕大煩惱地法六:癡、放逸、懈怠、不信、惛沈、掉舉
頌:癡、放逸、懈怠、不信、惛沈、掉舉——這六法恒常而且唯獨在染污心中。
論:此中癡,就是所謂愚癡,也就是無明、無智、無顯〔照不明、決不斷、彰不了〕。逸就是放逸,不修諸善——它正是「修諸善」〔即不放逸〕所對治之法。怠就是懈怠,心不勇悍——它正是前面所說的「勤」所對治之法。不信,就是心不澄淨——正是前面所說的「信」所對治之法。惛就是惛沈;對法論中說:什麼是惛沈?就是身重性、心重性,身無堪任性、心無堪任性,身惛沈性、心惛沈性——這叫惛沈。問:這〔惛沈〕是心所,怎麼會叫「身」呢?答:就像「身受」那樣說,所以也沒有過失。掉就是掉舉,令心不能安靜。唯有這樣六種,才叫大煩惱地法。
問:豈不是根本的《阿毘達磨》〔本論〕中說有十種大煩惱地法,而且那部論裡並不說惛沈?哪十種呢——就是不信、懈怠、失念、心亂、無明、不正知、非理作意、邪勝解、掉舉、放逸。答:天愛呀〔西方戲稱愚人之語〕!你如今只知道那論的字面,卻不明白它的用意。問:用意是什麼?答:失念、心亂、不正知、非理作意、邪勝解這五個,已經說在大地法中了〔它們分別以念、定、慧、作意、勝解為體〕,不應該重複立為大煩惱地法;就像無癡以慧為體,所以〔在大善地法中〕不另立,那五個也應當如此。染污的「念」就叫失念,染污的「等持」就叫心亂,諸染污的「慧」叫不正知,染污的作意與勝解就叫非理作意與邪勝解——所以才那樣說。
問:那麼『是大地法的,也就是大煩惱地法嗎?』答:應作四句分別:第一句〔是大地法而非大煩惱地法〕,就是受、想、思、觸、欲;第二句〔是大煩惱地法而非大地法〕,就是不信、懈怠、無明、掉舉、放逸;第三句〔二者皆是〕,就是前面說的念等五法;第四句〔二者皆非〕,就是除去前三句所餘。另有人主張「邪等持」並不就是「心亂」,他所作的四句與此不同。
又問:你們〔有部〕既然承認惛沈通於一切煩惱相應,卻不把它說在大煩惱地法中,這是誰的過失呢?有人這樣說:本該說在此處,而不說的原因是它隨順等持——他們認為凡以惛沈為行相的人容易發起等持,不像掉舉行的人。問:誰是惛沈行而非掉舉行?誰是掉舉行而非惛沈行?這二者未曾不同時而行。答:雖然如此,應知是就其偏增而說「行」的。答:雖然知道說「行」是隨其作用偏增而說,但建立「地法」是要依有體之法而立的,所以這一地法唯有六個才在義理上說得通——因為這六個唯獨遍與染心同起,不通於其餘。以上已說大煩惱地法。「大不善法」之地叫大不善地;此中若有某法是大不善地所有的,就叫大不善地法——也就是恒常在不善心中都有的那些法。那些法是什麼?頌說:
〔正27後半〕大不善地法二:無慚、無愧
頌:唯遍於一切不善心的,是無慚與無愧。
論:唯有兩個心所是只與一切不善心同起的,就是無慚與無愧,所以唯此二種名為大不善地法。這二法的相狀,如後面當辨。以上已說大不善地法。「小煩惱法」之地叫小煩惱地;此中若有某法是小煩惱地所有的,就叫小煩惱地法——也就是只與一小部分染污心同起的那些法。那些法是什麼?頌說:
〔正28〕小煩惱地法十:忿、覆、慳、嫉、惱、害、恨、諂、誑、憍
頌:忿、覆、慳、嫉、惱,害、恨、諂、誑、憍——像這一類,就叫小煩惱地法。
論:像這一類法,唯是修道所斷〔不是見道所斷〕、唯在意識地生起、唯與無明相應、各別現行〔不會兩個同時起〕,所以叫小煩惱地法。這些法如後面說隨煩惱時當廣分別。以上已說五品心所。此外還有其餘的不定心所——惡作、睡眠、尋、伺等法,此處應當說。那麼,在哪一類心之中,有幾個心所是決定俱生的?頌說:
〔正29–31〕欲界五類心各具幾心所
頌:欲界必有尋與伺,所以善心品中有二十二心所;有時再增惡作〔為二十三〕。不善心中的不共無明品與見相應品,唯有二十;四煩惱品、忿等隨煩惱品、惡作品,各二十一。有覆無記品有十八,無覆無記品許有十二。睡眠遍與諸品不相違,若有睡眠,各品皆增一。
論:且說欲界之中,心分五類:善心唯一類;不善心有二類——與「不共無明」相應的,和與其餘煩惱等相應的;無記心有二類——有覆無記與無覆無記。而欲界之心必定有尋、有伺,所以善心品必有二十二個心所俱生,就是十大地法、十大善地法,加上不定二法之尋與伺。並不是一切善心都有惡作,若有時就增到二十三。
問:什麼是惡作?答:所作的惡事之體叫作「惡作」。應知此處是以『緣惡作之法』而立名為惡作的——就是緣著自己所作之惡而心生追悔的那個性質。譬如緣「空」的解脫門就叫作「空解脫門」〔它的體其實是定〕,緣「不淨」的無貪就叫作「不淨〔觀〕」〔它的體其實是無貪〕。又如世間常就所依之處說能依之事,好比說『一切村邑國土都來集會』〔其實來的是人〕;惡作正是追悔所依之處,所以就所依而名為惡作。又如在果體上假立因之名,好比說『這六觸處應知名為宿作業』〔六處是果,宿業是因〕。
問:若所緣的是「未作」的事,怎麼也叫惡作?答:對於未作之事也可以立「作」之名,好比追悔時說:『我先前沒有作這樣的事業,這是我的惡作。』問:什麼樣的惡作叫作善?答:就是對於『該作的善沒作、不該作的惡卻作了』而心生追悔——這是善的惡作;與此相違的〔悔自己作了善、悔自己沒作惡〕就叫不善。這二種各各依善、惡二處而起。
若是不善的不共無明品,必有二十個心所俱生,就是十大地法、六大煩惱地法、二大不善地法,並二不定之尋與伺。問:什麼叫不共心品?答:就是這一類心中只有無明,沒有其餘的貪等煩惱。在不善的見相應心品中,也有二十個心所俱生,名數就如前面不共品所說;並不因為多了「見」而成二十一——因為「見」就是十大地法中「慧」的作用差別而已。所說「不善見相應心」,是指這心中或有邪見、或有見取、或有戒禁取。在貪、瞋、慢、疑四種不善煩惱心品中,有二十一個心所俱生——二十如不共品,再加貪等其中之一。在前面所說忿等隨煩惱相應品中,也有二十一個心所俱生——二十如不共品,再加忿等其中之一。不善惡作相應心品中,也有二十一個心所俱生——就是把惡作算作第二十一。簡略地說:不善心中的不共品與見相應品唯有二十,其餘四煩惱與隨煩惱相應品有二十一。
若在無記有覆心品,唯有十八個心所俱生,就是十大地法、六大煩惱地法,並二不定之尋與伺。欲界的無記有覆心,是指與薩迦耶見(身見)及邊執見相應的心;此中也不因「見」而增數,應知理由如前所釋。在其餘的無記無覆心品,許有十二個心所俱生,就是十大地法並不定之尋、伺。外方諸師主張惡作也通於無記,那麼此相應品便有十三個心所俱起。應知睡眠與前面所說的一切心品都不相違,因為它通於善、不善、無記三性;隨哪一品有睡眠,就說那一品增一——即由二十二增為二十三、由二十三增為二十四;不善與無記依此類推。以上已說欲界心所俱生諸品之定量;接著當說上界。頌說:
〔正32〕上界心所之遞減
頌:初靜慮除去唯不善者以及惡作、睡眠;中間靜慮又除去尋;再往上還兼除伺等。
論:初靜慮中,於前面所說的諸心所法,除去「唯不善」者以及惡作、睡眠,其餘都具有。所謂「唯不善」者,就是瞋煩惱,以及除去諂、誑、憍之外其餘的忿等〔七個小煩惱〕,還有無慚、無愧。說『其餘都有』,就如欲界中所說。中間靜慮除去前面所除的,又再除去尋,其餘都具有。第二靜慮以上乃至無色界中,除去前面所除的,又除去「伺等」——「等」字是顯示還要除去諂與誑;其餘都如前具有。
經中說:諂與誑最高只到梵天,因為那裡還有「眾相依」〔君臣尊卑相待〕的緣故,再往上就沒有了。曾有這樣一事:大梵王正處在自己的梵眾之中,忽然被馬勝苾芻問道:『這四大種要到哪一位次才會滅盡無餘?』梵王不知道無餘滅的位次,便含糊詭亂地答道:『我在這梵眾之中是大梵,是自在者、作者、化者、生者、養者,是一切〔眾生〕之父。』說完這話,就把馬勝引出眾外,諂媚地說慚愧話道歉,叫他回去問佛。以上已說於諸界諸地各種心品中心所之數量;接著當說前面所辨諸心所中的少分差別。無慚與無愧、愛與敬,它們的差別是什麼?頌說:
〔正33〕無慚無愧之別;愛與敬之別
頌:無慚是不尊重〔功德與有德者〕,無愧是於罪不見怖畏;愛就是信、敬就是慚,這二者唯在欲界與色界有。
論:此中無慚與無愧的分別是——對於諸功德以及有德之人,沒有恭敬、沒有推崇,沒有什麼顧忌畏難,沒有什麼隨順依屬,這叫作無慚,它正是「恭敬」的敵對之法。被諸善士所訶責厭棄之法叫作罪;對於這樣的罪不見有可怖畏〔之果〕,就叫作無愧。此中說「怖」,是顯示由非可愛之果能生怖畏。
問:說「不見怖」是要顯什麼義?是『見了卻不怖』叫不見怖,還是『不見其怖〔果〕』叫不見怖?答:若這樣問有什麼失?答:兩邊都有過失——若是見了而不怖,那就該顯出的是〔邪〕智慧;若是不見其怖果,那就該顯出的是無明。答:這句話並不是要顯示見或不見。問:那要顯什麼?答:這是要顯示另有一法是隨煩惱,它是那〔邪智與無明〕二者之因,這才叫無愧。
另有其他論師說:對於自己所造之罪,就自身來看而不覺羞恥,叫作無慚;就他人來看而不覺羞恥,叫作無愧。問:若是這樣,這二者所觀不同,怎能同時俱起?答:並不是說這二者是同一時間分別去觀自與他;而是說:那「無恥」在觀自己時作用偏勝,就叫無慚;那「無恥」在觀他人時作用偏增,就叫無愧。慚與愧的差別把上面翻轉過來就知道了:翻第一釋,就是有恭敬、有推崇,有所顧忌畏難、有所隨順依屬,叫作慚;於罪見到怖畏,叫作愧。翻第二釋,就是對於所造之罪,就自身看而有羞恥叫作慚,就他人看而有羞恥叫作愧。以上已說無慚無愧的差別。
愛與敬的分別是——「愛」就是愛樂,它的體就是信。然而愛有二種:一是有染污的、二是無染污的。有染污的就是貪,好比愛妻子等;無染污的就是信,好比愛師長等。〔以信與愛作四句〕:有信而非愛的,就是緣苦諦、集諦的信〔忍可其為苦集,卻不可愛樂〕;有愛而非信的,就是諸染污之愛;信愛俱通的,就是緣滅諦、道諦的信〔既忍可又欣樂〕;信愛俱非的,就是除去前三句所餘。另有一說:信是忍可認許有德,由此在先,然後才生愛樂,所以愛不是信。
「敬」就是敬重,它的體就是慚——如前面解慚時說到「有敬」等。〔以慚與敬作句〕:有慚而非敬的,就是緣苦諦、集諦的慚;慚敬俱通的,就是緣滅諦、道諦的慚。另有一說:敬是有所崇重,由此在先,然後才生慚恥,所以敬不是慚。
若就所緣之境是補特伽羅(有情、人)來說,愛與敬的有無應作四句:有愛無敬的,如對妻子、同住的門人等;有敬無愛的,如對他人之師、有德的貴人等;有愛有敬的,如對自己的師父、父母、伯叔等;無愛無敬的,就是除去前三句所餘。這樣的愛與敬,欲界、色界有,無色界沒有。問:豈不是信與慚屬大善地法,無色界也有嗎?答:愛敬有二種——緣「法」的與緣「補特伽羅」的;緣法的愛敬三界都有,此處所說的是緣補特伽羅的,所以欲界色界有、無色界沒有。以上已說愛敬之別。尋、伺、慢、憍的差別是什麼?頌說:
〔正34〕尋伺之別;慢憍之別
頌:尋伺就是心的麁與細;慢是對他人而心自高舉,憍是因染著自身之法而心高、無所顧忌。
論:尋伺的分別是——就是心之麁與細:心的麁性叫尋,心的細性叫伺。問:這二者怎能與同一個心相應〔麁細相違〕?有人這樣解釋:好比冷水上浮著熟酥,上面又被烈日之光照觸——酥因為水與日的作用,既不凝結也不融釋;同樣,一個心中有尋有伺,心由於尋伺之故,不至於太細也不至於太麁,所以在一個心中二者俱有作用。
〔論主難:〕若是這樣,尋伺就只是麁細之「因」,不是麁細之「體」;就像水與日光是凝與釋之因,日之體本身並不是凝或釋。又,麁細之性是相待而立的——依界、依地、依品類的高下互相對照〔上比下細、下比上麁〕,那麼乃至有頂天也該有尋伺了。又,麁細之性並沒有各別的體類,不能依它來分別尋與伺。
又有解釋說:尋伺二法是語言行(發語的原因),所以契經說『要有尋伺才有語言,沒有尋伺就沒有這語言行』;其中麁者名尋、細者名伺——在一個心之內,有一個別法是麁、另一個別法是細,在理上有什麼相違?〔論主難:〕若真有各別的體類,理上實在無違;然而並沒有各別的體類,所以就成了違理——因為在同一體類之中,不容有上下〔麁細〕同時生起。若說體類也有差別,那就該說出體類的別相是什麼。答:這二者的體類別相很難說,只能由上下〔相形〕來顯其別相。〔論主難:〕並不是由上下就能顯出別相——因為在每一類之中都各有上下。由此應知,尋伺二法決定不可執為與同一心相應。問:若是這樣,契經中為什麼說初靜慮具足五支〔尋、伺、喜、樂、定〕?答:說「具五支」是就一地而說,不是就一剎那而說,所以沒有過失。以上已說尋伺之別。
慢憍的分別是——慢,就是對著他人而心自高舉之性:稱量自己與他人在德行品類上的差別,心中自高自恃、輕蔑他人,所以叫作慢。憍,就是以染著自身之法為先,令心傲逸而無所顧忌之性。另有論師說:好比因酒而生的欣悅高舉之差別叫作「醉」,同樣,因貪而生的欣悅高舉之差別就叫作「憍」。這就是慢與憍差別之相。以上已說諸心心所品類不同、俱生互異之相。然而心與心所在契經中隨義建立了種種名稱,如今當辨這些名義的差別。頌說:
〔正35〕心意識體一;心心所之四名與相應五義
頌:心、意、識三名其體是一;心與心所都名有所依、有所緣、有行相、相應——而「相應」之義有五。
論:集起的緣故叫作心,思量的緣故叫作意,了別的緣故叫作識。另有解釋說:淨與不淨之界種種差別,所以叫作心;就是這個〔心〕為其他〔識〕作所依止,所以叫作意;作能依止的,所以叫作識。所以心、意、識三個名所詮之義雖有不同,而體是一個。
如同心意識三名義異而體一,諸心心所名為「有所依」「有所緣」「有行相」「相應」也是一樣——名義雖殊而體是一。就是說:心心所都叫有所依,因為要託所依之根〔才能生起〕;或叫有所緣,因為要攝取所緣之境;或叫有行相,就是在所緣境的品類差別上等起行相〔心上現起的境之影像〕;或叫相應,因為是平等和合的。
問:依什麼義叫作「等和合」?答:因為有五義:心心所在五義上平等,所以說相應——就是所依、所緣、行相、時、事都平等。所謂事平等,是說在一個相應之中,如同心之體只是一個,諸心所法也各各只是一個。以上已說心心所的廣分別義。心不相應行是什麼?頌說:
〔正36〕心不相應行十四之總標
頌:心不相應行,就是得、非得、同分、無想果、二定〔無想定與滅盡定〕、命根、四相、名身等這一類。
論:像這些法與心不相應,也不是色等之性,而為行蘊所攝,所以叫作心不相應行。其中且先辨得與非得之相。頌說:
〔正37〕得與非得的自性與所依
頌:「得」就是獲與成就,「非得」與此相違;得與非得只在自身相續以及二滅之上。
論:得有二種:一是從來未得、或已得而失,如今獲到——這叫「獲」;二是得了而不失、相續下來——這叫「成就」。應知非得與此相違〔就是不獲與不成就〕。
問:在哪些法之中有得與非得?答:在自身相續以及二滅(擇滅、非擇滅)之中。就是說:有為法之中,若是墮在自身相續裡的,才有得與非得;不在他人相續裡,因為沒有誰能成就他身之法;也不在非相續〔外在非情〕之上,因為沒有誰能成就非情之法。且說有為法決定如此。至於無為法,唯有在二滅之上有得與非得。一切有情沒有不成就非擇滅的,所以對法論中「傳說」如此:誰成就無漏法?就是一切有情——除了〔見道〕最初剎那那位具縛的聖者、以及其餘一切具縛的異生之外,其餘有情都成就擇滅。決定沒有誰成就虛空,所以對虛空不說有得;既然沒有得,非得也就沒有——因為本宗說得與非得是相翻而立的。凡是有得的也就有非得,這由義理可以比准而知,所以不另作解釋。
問:憑什麼知道另有一個別物叫作「得」?答:因為契經這樣說。如契經說:『聖者對於那十無學法,由生、由得、由成就的緣故,已斷五支……』乃至廣說。問:若是這樣,非情以及他人相續也該可以成就了。答:為什麼這樣說?問:因為契經這樣說。如契經說:『苾芻應當知道,有轉輪王成就七寶……』乃至廣說。答:此處是把「自在」說作成就——就是轉輪王對於那七寶有自在之力,隨其所樂而運轉〔所以說成就〕。問:這裡既然把自在說作成就,其餘〔經文〕又憑什麼知道另有別物?答:承認另有別物有什麼不合理?
問:這樣就是不合理——所執的「得」,沒有體可知,不像色、聲等〔可由五識現量取〕,也不像貪、瞋等〔可由他心智取〕;也沒有作用可知,不像眼、耳等〔可由見聞之用比知有根〕。所以不容有一個別物叫作得;執有別物,這就是不合理。
若說這「得」也有作用——就是作所得諸法生起之因;那麼無為法〔不生〕就該沒有得了。又,所得之法在尚未得、或已捨〔因為界地轉換以及離染〕的時候,那時現前並沒有得,那將來要怎麼生起呢?若說是『俱生之得』作生起之因,那麼〔四相中的〕生與生生又還有什麼可作?又,非情之法〔沒有得〕就該決定不生了。又,具縛的〔凡夫〕,其下品、中品、上品煩惱現起的差別就該沒有了——因為得沒有差別。若說是由其餘的因才有差別,那就應該由那個〔餘因〕使諸法得生,「得」還有什麼用?所以他們所說『得有作用、就是作所得諸法生因』,在理上不能成立。
問:誰說這「得」是作法之生因?問:若是這樣,這得有什麼作用?答:是作為「差別」的建立之因。問:為什麼這樣說?答:若沒有得,那麼異生與聖者起世俗心的時候,就沒法建立異生與諸聖者的差別了。問:豈不是煩惱有已斷、未斷的差別,就該有差別了嗎?答:若執沒有得,怎能說煩惱已斷及未斷?承認有得的人,斷與未斷才說得通——因為煩惱之得已離、未離的緣故。答:這是由所依〔身〕有差別的緣故,煩惱已斷未斷之義就成立了:諸聖者由見道、修道之力,令所依身轉變得與本來不同,對於那二道所斷之惑,再沒有能力令它現起——好比種子被火燒過,轉變得與從前不同,沒有能生之用;同樣,聖者所依身中沒有生惑之能,就叫煩惱斷。或者由世間道損伏所依身中的煩惱種子,也叫作斷;與此相違就叫未斷。凡未斷的就說名成就,凡已斷的就名不成就——這二種都只是假立,不是實有。
善法有二種:一是不由功力而修得的、二是要由功力才修得的,也就是生得善與加行善。不由功力而修得的,若所依身中種子沒有被損,就名成就;若種子已被損,就名不成就——譬如斷善根的人,由邪見之力損壞所依身中的善根種子,應知這就名為斷,並不是所依身中的善根種子被畢竟殺害才叫斷。要由功力才修得的,若所依身中那法已經生起過、生起它的功力自在而無損,就名成就;與此相違就名不成就。這二種也是假立而非實有。所以所依身中只是有種子未被拔除、未被損傷而增長自在,在這樣的位次上立「成就」之名,並沒有一個別物。
問:此中什麼法叫作種子?答:就是名與色〔五蘊〕在生自果上所有的展轉隣近之功能;這是由相續、轉變、差別而成的。問:什麼叫轉變?答:就是相續之中前後有異之性。問:什麼叫相續?答:就是因果性的三世諸行。問:什麼叫差別?答:就是有無間生果的功能。
然而有處經中說「若成就貪便不能修四念住」——那經的意思是說:耽著貪煩惱的人不能厭捨〔現行之貪〕,所以叫作成就;在隨順耽著貪愛的那段時分,對於四念住必定不能修〔並非說種子成就就不能修〕。像這樣的「成就」,遍一切種類都唯是假立而非實有;唯遮遣此〔成就〕而名為「不成就」的,也是假立而非實有。毘婆沙師說:這二種都另有別物,是實而非假。〔論主說:〕這樣看來二條路都可算是善說。問:為什麼?答:〔經部之說〕不違於理,〔有部之說〕是我所宗。以上已辨得與非得的自性;它們的差別怎樣?且先辨「得」。頌說:
〔正38·正39前半〕得的五門差別
頌:三世之法各有三世之得;善等之法唯有善等之得。有繫之法其得唯在自界,無繫之法其得通於四種。非學非無學之法其得有三,非所斷之法其得有二。
論:三世門——三世之法,其得各有三種:過去之法有過去之得、有未來之得、有現在之得;未來與現在之法也各有三種得。
三性門——又善等之法其得也唯是善等:就是善、不善以及無記之法,依其次第各有善、不善、無記三種得。
界繫門——又有繫之法其得唯在自界:就是欲界、色界、無色界之法,依其次第唯有欲、色、無色三種得。若是無繫〔無漏〕之法,其得通於四種:就是說無漏法總的來說有四種得,即三界之得以及無漏之得。分別來說:非擇滅之得通於三界繫;擇滅之得是色界、無色界繫以及無漏;道諦之得唯是無漏。所以無繫之法其得有四種。
三學門——又有學之法其得唯是有學,無學之法其得唯是無學;非學非無學之得則有差別:總說有三種。分別來說:一切有漏法以及三種無為都叫非學非無學法。且有漏之法唯有非學非無學之得;非擇滅之得,以及不由聖道所引的擇滅之得,也是如此。若是由有學道所引的擇滅,其得就是有學;若是由無學道所引的擇滅,其得就是無學。
三斷門——又見所斷、修所斷之法,依其次第有見所斷、修所斷之得。非所斷之法其得則有差別:總說有二種。分別來說:諸無漏法名為非所斷;非擇滅之得唯是修所斷,不由聖道所引的擇滅之得也是如此;由聖道所引的擇滅之得以及道諦之得,都是非所斷。前面雖然總說『三世之法各三』,如今應當簡別其中的差別之相。頌說:
〔正39後半·正40前半〕無記等法之得於三世的差別
頌:無記之得唯是俱起,但要除去二通與變化;有覆〔無記〕之色其得也是俱起;欲界的〔善不善色〕沒有法前之得。
論:無覆無記之得唯是與法俱起,沒有前生後生的——因為勢力微劣:法若在過去,得也在過去;法若在未來,得也在未來;法若在現在,得也在現在。
問:一切無覆無記法之得都是這樣嗎?答:不是。問:怎樣?答:要除去眼耳二通以及能變化〔之心〕。就是說:眼通、耳通之慧以及能變化之心,因為勢力強盛、又是由加行差別所成辦的緣故,雖然攝在無覆無記性中,卻有前得、後得以及俱起之得。若是工巧處與威儀路而極為數習的,其得也許是如此。
問:唯有無覆無記法之得才只是俱起嗎?答:不是。問:怎樣?答:有覆無記之色,其得也是如此——就是說諸有覆無記的表色,其得也如前面所說,只有俱起。雖然〔發它的煩惱〕有上品,卻仍不能發起無表色,可見勢力微劣,因此決定沒有法前、法後之得。
問:如同無記法之得有這樣的別異,善與不善之得也有差異嗎?答:也有。問:怎樣?答:就是欲界所繫的善色與不善色,其得沒有「法前」的,唯有俱生之得以及法後之得。問:非得是否也像得那樣,有如上這些品類的差別?答:不是。問:怎樣?頌說:
〔正40後半·正41〕非得之差別及其捨
頌:非得唯是無覆無記;過去未來各有三世之非得。三界法與不繫法各有三界之非得;由於承認聖道之非得就叫異生性〔可知非得不通無漏〕。得到那法或轉易地時,便捨那非得。
論:三性差別——一切非得都唯攝在無覆無記性中。
三世差別——過去與未來各有三種:就是說現在之法決定沒有現在的非得,唯有過去的非得與未來的非得;而過去、未來之法一一各有三世的非得。
界繫差別——三界所繫之法以及不繫之法,各有三界的非得:就是說欲界所繫之法有三界的非得〔隨所依身在何界〕,色界、無色界所繫以及不繫之法也是如此。決定沒有哪個非得是無漏的。為什麼?因為承認『聖道之非得』就叫作異生性〔凡夫之性〕的緣故。如本論所說:『什麼是異生性?就是不獲聖法。』「不獲」正是非得的異名;若說異生性是無漏,於理不通。
問:不獲哪些聖法才叫異生性?答:就是不獲一切〔三乘聖法〕——因為本論並沒有分別地說。這個「不獲」之言,是表示離於「獲」;若不是這樣〔而說只要有所不獲就是異生〕,那麼諸佛世尊也不成就聲聞、獨覺種性的聖法,就該叫作異生了。問:若是這樣,那本論應該加上一個「純」字〔說「純不獲聖法」〕。答:不必加說,因為這一句話中已含有「純」之義了——好比說『這一類〔眾生〕食水、食風』〔雖不說純,也知是純食水風〕。
另有一說:不獲苦法智忍以及與它俱生之法,才叫異生性。〔對此〕不可以難說:『到道類智時捨了這法,豈不該成為非聖?』——因為先前已經永害了那〔苦法忍的〕非得。問:若是這樣,這〔苦法忍之〕性既然通於三乘,那不獲哪一乘的才叫異生性?答:這也應當說「不獲一切」。問:若是這樣,這就與前面同樣有難了。答:這個難也應當像前面那樣通釋。問:若是這樣,重複說一遍豈不白費工夫?〔論主說:〕還是像經部師所說的為善。問:經部所說是什麼義?答:就是『曾經未生起過聖法』的那個相續分位之差別,叫作異生性。
問:這樣的非得什麼時候當捨?答:對於某法的非得,在得到那法時、或者轉易地時,就捨這個非得。好比聖道之非得叫作異生性,得到這聖道時、或者易地時便捨它。其餘諸法之非得,依此類推應當思擇。若非得之得斷了,非得的非得生起,這就叫作捨了非得。
問:得與非得,難道還另有得與非得嗎?答:應當說這二者各各還有其餘的得與非得。問:若是這樣,豈不是有無窮之過?答:沒有無窮之過,因為承認諸得可以展轉互相成就。就是說:法生起時,連同它自體共三法俱起——第一是本法、第二是法得〔大得〕、第三是得得〔小得〕。在相續之中,由法得生起而成就了本法以及得得;由得得生起而成就了法得,所以此中沒有無窮之過。像這樣,若善、若染污之法,一一自體最初生起時,連同自體共三法俱起;第二剎那便有六法俱起,就是三個法得與三個得得;第三剎那有十八法俱起,就是對第一、第二剎那所生的〔九〕法,有九個法得與九個得得。像這樣,諸得後後展轉增多。
一切過去未來的煩惱與隨煩惱以及生得善,剎那剎那相應〔而起〕,加上俱有〔諸法〕,在無始無終的生死輪轉中就有無邊之得——只一個有情在生死相續中,剎那剎那便起無邊之得;像這樣一切有情的相續一一各別,剎那剎那便有無量無邊的諸得同時俱起。這樣眾多的得極多地集會在一處,因為沒有質礙的緣故,可以互相容受。若不是這樣,一個有情的得,虛空就已容不下了,何況第二個有情等等。
〔Head of the Fascicle〕All Dharmas Fall into Five Classes; This Fascicle Analyzes the Joint Arising of the First Four
Treatise: It should now be pondered whether, since all “conditioned dharmas” (dharmas fabricated by the coming together of many conditions) differ in their characteristics and therefore differ severally in their arising, there are any dharmas that must arise together. Answer: there are dharmas that definitely arise together. Stated in general, all dharmas fall in brief into five classes: first, form (dharmas that are material); second, mind (mind as sovereign, that is, consciousness itself); third, mental factors (the various mental operations that arise in dependence on mind); fourth, formations not associated with mind (dharmas that are neither form nor mind, provisionally set up upon the stations of form and mind); fifth, the unconditioned (dharmas not fabricated by conditions, without arising or cessation). The unconditioned has no “arising” at all, and so is not discussed here. Now the way in which form definitely arises together will be analyzed first. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 23〕Form Definitely Arises Together: Eight Entities, Nine Entities, Ten Entities
Stanza: In the desire realm the finest aggregate of form, if it contains no sound and no faculty, has eight entities arising together; if it contains the body faculty, nine; if it contains the eye or another of the remaining faculties, ten.
Treatise: When the aggregation of form reaches its finest, the name minute aggregate is established for it—to show that there is nothing finer than this. If such a minute aggregate is in the desire realm and has in it neither sound nor faculty, then eight entities arise together, and not one of the eight may be lacking. Which eight? The four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind, the four that can produce) together with four kinds of derived form—color, odor, flavor, and the tangible. As for those aggregates of ultimate atoms that have no sound but do have a faculty, the entities arising together in them are either nine or ten: an aggregate containing the body faculty has nine entities arising together—the eight as before with the body faculty as the ninth; an aggregate containing one of the remaining faculties has ten entities arising together—the nine as before with one of the faculties beginning with the eye added. Eye, ear, nose, and tongue are never apart from the body faculty〔so an aggregate containing the eye faculty must contain the body faculty as well〕; while the four faculties eye, ear, nose, and tongue, set against one another, each occupy a different place〔so they are not heaped one upon another in a single aggregate〕. In all the aggregates above, if sound arises within them, the count rises in order to nine, ten, or eleven—for where there is sound, sound never arises apart from a faculty, being produced with appropriated great elements (great elements held by consciousness within the body) for its cause.
Question: if the four great elements are said to arise inseparably, why is it that in the many aggregates of form only one among hardness, wetness, warmth, and motion can be perceived and not the rest? Answer: in such an aggregate the element whose force predominates is clearly perceptible, while the entities of the other three are not absent. It is like feeling a needle-point and a bamboo tally bound together〔only the needle is felt, not the tally〕, or like tasting the flavor of salt mixed with flour〔only the saltiness is tasted, not the flour〕. Question: how then is it known that the other three are really there? Answer: because there are present the four operations of gathering (water’s drawing together), ripening (fire’s bringing to maturity), increasing (wind’s growth), and sustaining (earth’s upholding). There is another account: when a fitting condition is met, a hard thing displays the characteristics of flowing and moistening, which shows that they were there all along; just as in an aggregate of water a characteristic of warmth appears on account of extreme cold—though the four elements are inseparable, it is only that the operation of cold predominates, just as with feeling and with sound the operation may be strong or weak. And certain other masters say that within such an aggregate the remaining elements have only their seed (the capability of producing) and have not yet manifested their entity and characteristic, which is why the sūtra says 「於木聚中有種種界」 tr. “within an aggregate of wood there are various elements”—and 「界」 tr. “element” here means seed.
Question: how is it known that there is visible form within wind?〔Wind is not visible.〕 Answer: this point can only be accepted on the authority of the teaching and cannot be arrived at by inference. Or else: since the odor combined with wind is present and can be smelled, and since odor and visible form are inseparable〔it is known that there is visible form within wind〕. It was said above that in the form realm there is no odor and no flavor; therefore an aggregate in the form realm, if without sound, has six, seven, or eight〔entities arising together〕, and if with sound has seven, eight, or nine arising together. This may be inferred from the foregoing and is therefore not stated separately.
Question: is the word “entity” used here with reference to substance (a dharma’s own entity) or to sense field (the classification into twelve sense fields)? Answer: if you ask thus, what fault follows? Answer: fault follows on either side. If it is stated with reference to substance, then eight, nine, or ten is too few—for the minute aggregates must have shape, being an accumulation of many ultimate atoms together; heaviness or lightness necessarily accompanies them, and smoothness or roughness likewise; in some places there is also cold, hunger, and thirst. On this reckoning the number stated is at fault by being too few. If it is stated with reference to sense field, then eight, nine, or ten is too many—for the four great elements are all included in the sense field of the tangible, so that four and the rest should have been said. On this reckoning the number stated is at fault by being too many. Answer: in fact there is no fault on either side. It should be known that the word “entity” here is in one part stated with reference to substance, namely the great elements that are the support, and in one part stated with reference to sense field, namely the derived form that is supported. Question: if so, the “entities” of the great elements would come to be very many—for the several kinds of derived form each differ and each depend upon their own set of four great elements. Answer: it should be known that the statement here is made with reference to kinds of substance, since the several sets of four great elements are without difference of kind〔and so are stated together as four〕. Question: what need is there for such distinguishing talk? Answer: speech arises as one pleases; it is the sense that should be pondered. The definite co-arising of form has now been analyzed. The definite co-arising of the remaining dharmas should be analyzed next. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 24, First Half〕Mind and Mental Factors Necessarily Arise Together
Stanza: Mind and mental factors necessarily arise together; all conditioned formations arise together with the four characteristics, and some with acquisition.
Treatise: Mind and mental factors necessarily arise together: should either of them be lacking, the other does not appear. What is meant by “formations” is all conditioned dharmas, that is, form, mind, mental factors, and the formations not associated with mind. The two words “necessarily together” in the preceding line flow down to this line—meaning that when the formations of form, mind, and the rest arise, they necessarily appear together with the four conditioned characteristics (arising, abiding, change, and cessation). The words “and some with acquisition” mean that among the formations only dharmas belonging to a sentient being arise together with acquisition (that force by which something is possessed); dharmas〔belonging to what is not sentient〕are not so, and hence the word “some.” Mental factors were mentioned above; what, then, is a mental factor? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 24, Second Half〕Mental Factors Divided in General into Five Classes
Stanza: Mental factors fall provisionally into five classes, that is, the five distinguished as the factors of the great ground and the rest.
Treatise: The dharmas that are mental factors fall provisionally into five classes. Which five? First, the factors of the great ground; second, the factors of the great wholesome ground; third, the factors of the great defiled ground; fourth, the factors of the great unwholesome ground; fifth, the factors of the small defiled ground. “Ground” means the place of activity: if this dharma is the place in which that dharma is active, this dharma is said to be the “ground” of that. The ground of the “great dharmas” is therefore called the great ground〔the great ground here is mind as sovereign, and feeling and the other ten are called great dharmas because they pervade every mind〕; and any dharma here that belongs to the great ground is called a factor of the great ground—that is, those dharmas present in every mind at all times. What are they? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 25〕The Ten Factors of the Great Ground: Feeling, Perception, Volition, Contact, Desire, Discernment, Mindfulness, Attention, Resolve, Concentration
Stanza: Feeling, perception, volition, contact, and desire; discernment, mindfulness, and attention; resolve and concentration—these ten pervade every mind.
Treatise: It is transmitted thus: the ten dharmas listed above are present together and pervasively in every moment of mind. Among them—feeling is the three kinds of reception: painful, pleasant, and neither painful nor pleasant, since it has these distinctions. Perception is the taking up of the distinguishing characteristics of an object〔discriminating what a thing is and is not〕. Volition is what causes mind to fabricate〔driving mind to act〕. Contact is what arises from the coming together of faculty, object, and consciousness, and is able to make touch〔the meeting of mind with its object〕. Desire is seeking after the work to be done. Discernment is the ability to select among dharmas〔to distinguish and decide〕. Mindfulness is holding the object clearly in mind without losing it. Attention is what causes mind to be alert〔rousing mind and turning it toward an object〕. Resolve is the ability to endorse an object〔to settle that ‘it is thus and not otherwise’〕. Concentration is mind’s being one-pointed upon a single object. The modes of apprehension of mind and mental factors are exceedingly subtle: it is hard enough to distinguish them one by one as they succeed one another, still more so to distinguish those simultaneously present within one and the same moment. It is as with the various medicines that have form and are grasped by the faculties that are form: even the differences of their flavors are hard to know—how much more so dharmas without form, which can be grasped only by awakened discernment. The ten factors of the great ground have now been stated. The ground of the “great wholesome dharmas” is called the great wholesome ground; and any dharma here that belongs to the great wholesome ground is called a factor of the great wholesome ground—that is, those dharmas present in every wholesome mind at all times. What are they? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 26〕The Ten Factors of the Great Wholesome Ground: Confidence, Heedfulness, Pliancy, Equanimity, Conscience, Shame, Non-Greed, Non-Hatred, Non-Harming, Diligence
Stanza: Confidence and heedfulness, pliancy, equanimity, conscience, and shame, the two roots non-greed and non-hatred, and non-harming, together with diligence—these pervade wholesome minds alone.
Treatise: The dharmas above pervade every wholesome mind alone. Among them, confidence is what makes mind clear and settled〔like a water-clearing gem dropped into turbid water, whereupon the turbid water becomes clear〕. There is another account: it is the immediate acceptance and endorsement of the four truths, the three jewels, and karma and its results, and for that reason is called confidence. Heedfulness is the cultivating of wholesome dharmas and the keeping apart from unwholesome dharmas. Question: what then is “cultivating”? Answer: its very nature is the unwavering focus upon wholesome dharmas. In the scriptures of the other schools there is this explanation—guarding the mind is called heedfulness. Pliancy is mind’s workability〔mind become supple and usable〕.
Question: does not a sūtra also speak of “bodily pliancy”? Answer: although it is not the case that this is never said, it is like “bodily feeling”〔feeling is properly a mental factor, and when associated with the five consciousnesses is called bodily feeling〕; pliancy should be understood in the same way. Question:〔if bodily pliancy is a dharma with outflows associated with the five consciousnesses,〕how can it be established as a factor of awakening (one of the seven factors of awakening)? Answer: it should be known that the bodily pliancy spoken of here is the body’s workability〔that is, the contact of pliancy〕. Question: how then can it be called a factor of awakening? Answer: because it conforms to the factors of awakening there is no fault—since bodily pliancy can give rise to mental pliancy among the factors of awakening. Question: is such a way of speaking〔naming by conformity〕found elsewhere as well? Answer: it is. As the sūtra says: joy and the dharmas conducive to joy are alike called the awakening factor of joy; hatred and the causes and conditions of hatred are alike called the hindrance of ill will; right view, right intention, and right effort are together called the aggregate of discernment—and although intention and effort are not in themselves of the nature of discernment, they acquire the name of discernment because they conform to it. Therefore there is no fault in bodily pliancy acquiring the name of a factor of awakening because it conforms to the factors of awakening.
Mind’s evenness, its being without alertness, is called equanimity〔neither leaning to one side nor deliberately rousing itself〕. Question: how can it be said that within one and the same mind there is both alertness〔of attention〕and the absence of alertness〔of equanimity〕? Can attention and equanimity really be associated together? Answer: was it not already said above that the characteristics of mind and mental factors are subtle and hard to know? Question: some things that are hard to know can still be known when carefully examined; but this one is the hardest of all—to say that they are contrary and yet that they do not conflict. Answer: this one〔attention〕has alertness; upon that one〔equanimity〕there is none; the two being thus quite distinct, what conflict can there be? Question: if so, they should not take one and the same object; otherwise all〔dharmas of contrary nature〕would have to be associated with one another. Answer: with such a class of cases, the remaining dharmas here should all be sought out together; and following the tenor of those dharmas, the same should be understood here now. Conscience and shame, the two, will be stated below. The two roots are non-greed and non-hatred〔two of the three wholesome roots〕; the wholesome root non-delusion has discernment for its nature and has already been stated above among the factors of the great ground, and so is not again established as a factor of the great wholesome ground. Non-harming is the absence of harm and distress〔toward others〕. Diligence has for its nature the making of mind vigorous. The factors of the great wholesome ground have now been stated. The ground of the “great defiled dharmas” is called the great defiled ground; and any dharma here that belongs to the great defiled ground is called a factor of the great defiled ground—that is, those dharmas present in a defiled mind at all times. What are they? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 27, First Half〕The Six Factors of the Great Defiled Ground: Delusion, Heedlessness, Indolence, Lack of Confidence, Torpor, Restlessness
Stanza: Delusion, heedlessness, indolence, lack of confidence, torpor, and restlessness—these six are constant and belong to defiled minds alone.
Treatise: Among them, delusion is what is called folly and delusion, that is, ignorance, absence of cognition, absence of manifestation〔not illuminating, not deciding, not making clear〕. Heedless means heedlessness, not cultivating what is wholesome—and it is precisely what “cultivating what is wholesome”〔that is, heedfulness〕counteracts. Indolent means indolence, mind not vigorous—and it is precisely what the “diligence” stated above counteracts. Lack of confidence is mind not clear and settled—precisely what the “confidence” stated above counteracts. Torpid means torpor; the Abhidharma treatise says: what is torpor? It is heaviness of body and heaviness of mind, unworkability of body and unworkability of mind, torpidness of body and torpidness of mind—this is called torpor. Question: this〔torpor〕is a mental factor; how then is it called “bodily”? Answer: it is said as “bodily feeling” is said, and so there is no fault. Restless means restlessness, which makes mind unable to be still. Only such six as these are called factors of the great defiled ground.
Question: does not the root Abhidharma〔the root treatise〕say that there are ten factors of the great defiled ground, and does that treatise not omit torpor? Which ten?—lack of confidence, indolence, lost mindfulness, distracted mind, ignorance, incorrect knowing, improper attention, wrong resolve, restlessness, and heedlessness. Answer: Beloved of the gods!〔a westerners’ jesting term for a fool〕You now know only the letter of that treatise and do not grasp its intent. Question: what is the intent? Answer: the five—lost mindfulness, distracted mind, incorrect knowing, improper attention, and wrong resolve—have already been stated among the factors of the great ground〔having respectively mindfulness, concentration, discernment, attention, and resolve for their entity〕, and should not be established a second time as factors of the great defiled ground; just as non-delusion, having discernment for its entity, is not established separately〔among the factors of the great wholesome ground〕, so it should be with those five. Defiled “mindfulness” is called lost mindfulness, defiled “concentration” is called distracted mind, defiled “discernment” is called incorrect knowing, and defiled attention and resolve are called improper attention and wrong resolve—and that is why it was so stated.
Question: then is it the case that ‘whatever is a factor of the great ground is also a factor of the great defiled ground’? Answer: a fourfold analysis should be made. The first case〔a factor of the great ground but not of the great defiled ground〕is feeling, perception, volition, contact, and desire; the second case〔a factor of the great defiled ground but not of the great ground〕is lack of confidence, indolence, ignorance, restlessness, and heedlessness; the third case〔both〕is the five beginning with mindfulness stated above; the fourth case〔neither〕is whatever remains when the first three are set aside. Another master maintains that “wrong concentration” is not the same as “distracted mind,” and the fourfold analysis he makes differs from this.
A further question: since you〔Sarvāstivādins〕grant that torpor extends to association with every affliction, and yet do not state it among the factors of the great defiled ground, whose is the fault? Some speak thus: it ought to have been stated here, and the reason it was not is that it conforms to concentration—they hold that one whose mode is torpor readily gives rise to concentration, unlike one whose mode is restlessness. Question: who is of the mode of torpor and not of restlessness? Who is of the mode of restlessness and not of torpor? These two have never failed to operate at the same time. Answer: even so, it should be known that “mode” is said with reference to what predominates. Answer: granted that “mode” is said according to the predominance of operation, the establishing of a “ground-factor” must be made in dependence on a dharma that has its own entity, and so it is only as six that this ground-factor holds good in reasoning—because these six alone arise pervasively together with a defiled mind and do not extend elsewhere. The factors of the great defiled ground have now been stated. The ground of the “great unwholesome dharmas” is called the great unwholesome ground; and any dharma here that belongs to the great unwholesome ground is called a factor of the great unwholesome ground—that is, those dharmas present in an unwholesome mind at all times. What are they? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 27, Second Half〕The Two Factors of the Great Unwholesome Ground: Non-Conscience and Shamelessness
Stanza: What pervade every unwholesome mind alone are non-conscience and shamelessness.
Treatise: Only two mental factors arise together with every unwholesome mind alone, namely non-conscience and shamelessness, and so these two alone are called factors of the great unwholesome ground. The characteristics of these two dharmas will be analyzed below. The factors of the great unwholesome ground have now been stated. The ground of the “small defiled dharmas” is called the small defiled ground; and any dharma here that belongs to the small defiled ground is called a factor of the small defiled ground—that is, those dharmas that arise together only with a small portion of defiled minds. What are they? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 28〕The Ten Factors of the Small Defiled Ground: Rage, Concealment, Avarice, Envy, Vexation, Harmfulness, Resentment, Flattery, Deception, Self-Intoxication
Stanza: Rage, concealment, avarice, envy, vexation; harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deception, and self-intoxication—dharmas of this class are called factors of the small defiled ground.
Treatise: Dharmas of this class are abandoned through cultivation alone〔not through seeing〕, arise only on the ground of mental consciousness, are associated with ignorance alone, and operate each separately〔never two at once〕, and are therefore called factors of the small defiled ground. These dharmas will be analyzed at length below when the secondary afflictions are stated. The five classes of mental factors have now been stated. Besides these there are also the remaining indeterminate mental factors—regret, sleep, applied thought, sustained thought, and the like—which should be stated here. In which class of mind, then, how many mental factors definitely arise together? The stanza says:
〔Stanzas 29–31〕How Many Mental Factors Each of the Five Classes of Mind in the Desire Realm Has
Stanza: In the desire realm applied thought and sustained thought are necessarily present, and so the wholesome class has twenty-two mental factors, with regret sometimes added〔making twenty-three〕. Among unwholesome minds, the class associated with independent ignorance and the class associated with view have twenty only; the class of the four afflictions, the class of the secondary afflictions such as rage, and the class of regret have twenty-one each. The obscured-indeterminate class has eighteen; the unobscured-indeterminate class is granted twelve. Sleep is not incompatible with any class, and where there is sleep every class gains one.
Treatise: Taking the desire realm, mind falls into five classes: wholesome mind is a single class; unwholesome mind is of two classes—that associated with “independent ignorance,” and that associated with the remaining afflictions and the rest; indeterminate mind is of two classes—obscured-indeterminate and unobscured-indeterminate. And since mind in the desire realm necessarily has applied thought and sustained thought, the wholesome class necessarily has twenty-two mental factors arising together, namely the ten factors of the great ground, the ten factors of the great wholesome ground, and the two indeterminate dharmas applied thought and sustained thought. Not every wholesome mind has regret; where it is present the count rises to twenty-three.
Question: what is regret? Answer: the entity of an evil deed done is called “an evil deed done.” It should be known that the name regret is here established from ‘the dharma that takes an evil deed done as its object’—that is, the nature that regrets and repents in taking one’s own evil deed as its object. Just as the door of liberation that takes “emptiness” as its object is called the “emptiness door of liberation”〔though its entity is in fact concentration〕, and the non-greed that takes “the unclean” as its object is called “the unclean〔contemplation〕”〔though its entity is in fact non-greed〕. Again, just as the world commonly names what is supported by the place that supports it, as when it is said that ‘all villages, towns, and lands are assembling’〔though what assemble are people〕; and regret is precisely the place upon which repentance depends, and so takes its name from that support. Again, as when the name of a cause is provisionally set up upon the entity of a result, as when it is said that ‘these six sense fields of contact should be known as karma done in the past’〔the six sense fields being the result and past karma the cause〕.
Question: if the object is a thing “not done,” how can it also be called regret? Answer: the name “done” may be established even for what is not done, as when in repenting one says: ‘I did not formerly do such work; this is my regret.’ Question: what kind of regret is wholesome? Answer: repenting over ‘not having done the good that should be done, and having done the evil that should not be done’—this is wholesome regret; the contrary〔repenting having done good, repenting not having done evil〕is called unwholesome. These two arise respectively in dependence upon the two grounds, the wholesome and the evil.
If it is the unwholesome class associated with independent ignorance, twenty mental factors necessarily arise together, namely the ten factors of the great ground, the six factors of the great defiled ground, the two factors of the great unwholesome ground, and the two indeterminate dharmas applied thought and sustained thought. Question: what is meant by the independent class of mind? Answer: it is the class of mind in which there is only ignorance, without the remaining afflictions such as greed. In the unwholesome class of mind associated with view twenty mental factors likewise arise together, the names and numbers being as stated for the independent class above; it does not become twenty-one because view has been added—for “view” is only a difference of operation belonging to “discernment” among the ten factors of the great ground. By “unwholesome mind associated with view” is meant a mind in which there is either wrong view, or the grasping at views, or the grasping at rules and observances. In the class of mind of the four unwholesome afflictions, greed, hatred, pride, and doubt, twenty-one mental factors arise together—twenty as in the independent class, plus one of greed and the rest. In the class associated with the secondary afflictions such as rage spoken of above, twenty-one mental factors likewise arise together—twenty as in the independent class, plus one of rage and the rest. In the unwholesome class of mind associated with regret, twenty-one mental factors likewise arise together—that is, with regret counted as the twenty-first. Stated in brief: among unwholesome minds the independent class and the class associated with view have twenty only, while the classes associated with the remaining four afflictions and with the secondary afflictions have twenty-one.
If it is the obscured-indeterminate class of mind, only eighteen mental factors arise together, namely the ten factors of the great ground and the six factors of the great defiled ground, together with the two indeterminate dharmas applied thought and sustained thought. Obscured-indeterminate mind in the desire realm means the mind associated with the view of a real person (the view of self) and with the extreme view; here too the count is not increased on account of “view,” the reason being as explained above. In the remaining unobscured-indeterminate class of mind, twelve mental factors are granted to arise together, namely the ten factors of the great ground together with the indeterminate applied thought and sustained thought. The masters abroad maintain that regret extends to the indeterminate as well, in which case this associated class would have thirteen mental factors arising together. It should be known that sleep is not incompatible with any of the classes of mind stated above, since it extends to all three ethical qualities—wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; whichever class has sleep is said to gain one, so that twenty-two becomes twenty-three and twenty-three becomes twenty-four, and the unwholesome and indeterminate are to be reckoned in the same way. The fixed measure of the classes of mental factors arising together in the desire realm has now been stated; the upper realms should be stated next. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 32〕The Progressive Reduction of Mental Factors in the Upper Realms
Stanza: The first meditative absorption removes what is unwholesome alone, together with regret and sleep; the intermediate absorption further removes applied thought; higher still there is the further removal of sustained thought and the rest.
Treatise: In the first meditative absorption, of the mental factors stated above, what is “unwholesome alone” is removed, together with regret and sleep, and the rest are all present. By “what is unwholesome alone” is meant the affliction of hatred, together with the remaining ones such as rage〔the seven small afflictions〕apart from flattery, deception, and self-intoxication, and also non-conscience and shamelessness. The words ‘the rest are all present’ are as stated for the desire realm. The intermediate absorption removes what was removed above and further removes applied thought, the rest being all present. From the second meditative absorption upward as far as the formless realm, what was removed above is removed and “sustained thought and the rest” is removed besides—the word “and the rest” showing that flattery and deception are removed too; the rest are all present as before.
The sūtra says that flattery and deception reach at most as high as the Brahmā heaven, because there there is still “mutual dependence among the multitude”〔the ordering of ruler and subject, of higher and lower〕, and above that they are not found. There was once this event: the Great Brahmā King was in the midst of his own Brahmā assembly when he was suddenly asked by the monk Aśvajit, ‘At what station do these four great elements cease without remainder?’ The Brahmā King did not know the station of cessation without remainder, and so answered evasively and confusedly: ‘Here in this Brahmā assembly I am the Great Brahmā, the sovereign, the maker, the transformer, the producer, the nourisher, the father of all〔beings〕.’ Having said this, he drew Aśvajit outside the assembly and, speaking flatteringly, made a shamefaced apology and told him to go back and ask the Buddha. The number of mental factors in the several classes of mind in the several realms and levels has now been stated; there should next be stated a few of the distinctions among the mental factors analyzed above. What is the difference between non-conscience and shamelessness, and between love and respect? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 33〕The Difference between Non-Conscience and Shamelessness; the Difference between Love and Respect
Stanza: Non-conscience is not honoring〔qualities and those who have them〕; shamelessness is seeing no fear in wrongdoing; love is confidence and respect is conscience, and these two exist only in the desire and form realms.
Treatise: Among them the difference between non-conscience and shamelessness is this—to have, toward qualities and toward those who possess them, no reverence and no esteem, nothing that gives one pause, and nothing to which one submits oneself, is called non-conscience, and it is precisely the adversary of “reverence.” A dharma reproved and rejected by the good is called wrongdoing; to see nothing to fear〔in the results〕of such wrongdoing is called shamelessness. The word “fear” here shows that fear can arise from an undesired result.
Question: what is the “seeing no fear” meant to show? Is it ‘seeing and yet not fearing’ that is called seeing no fear, or is it ‘not seeing its fearsome〔result〕’ that is called seeing no fear? Answer: what fault follows if you ask thus? Answer: fault follows on either side—if it is seeing and yet not fearing, then what is shown must be〔wrong〕cognition; if it is not seeing its fearsome result, then what is shown must be ignorance. Answer: this phrase is not meant to show either seeing or not seeing. Question: what then is it meant to show? Answer: it is meant to show that there is another dharma, a secondary affliction, which is the cause of those two〔wrong cognition and ignorance〕, and this is what is called shamelessness.
Certain other masters say: to feel no disgrace regarding the wrongdoing one has committed, in respect of oneself, is called non-conscience; and to feel no disgrace in respect of others is called shamelessness. Question: if so, the two differ in what they regard—how can they arise together? Answer: it is not being said that the two regard self and other separately at one and the same time; rather, that “shamelessness” whose operation predominates in regarding oneself is called non-conscience, and that shamelessness whose operation predominates in regarding others is called shamelessness. The difference between conscience and shame is known by reversing the above: reversing the first explanation, to have reverence and esteem, something that gives one pause, and something to which one submits oneself, is called conscience; and to see fear in wrongdoing is called shame. Reversing the second explanation, to feel disgrace in respect of oneself for the wrongdoing committed is called conscience, and to feel disgrace in respect of others is called shame. The difference between non-conscience and shamelessness has now been stated.
The difference between love and respect is this—“love” is loving delight, and its entity is confidence. Yet love is of two kinds: defiled and undefiled. The defiled is greed, as in love for wife and children; the undefiled is confidence, as in love for teachers and elders.〔Making a fourfold analysis of confidence and love:〕confidence and not love is the confidence that takes the truths of suffering and origin as its object〔accepting them as suffering and origin, and yet not delighting in them〕; love and not confidence is every defiled love; both confidence and love is the confidence that takes the truths of cessation and the path as its object〔both accepting and delighting〕; neither confidence nor love is whatever remains when the first three are set aside. There is another account: confidence is the acceptance and endorsement of what has qualities, and it is upon this that loving delight arises afterwards, and so love is not confidence.
“Respect” is reverent regard, and its entity is conscience—as was said above in explaining conscience, ‘having reverence’ and the rest.〔Making cases of conscience and respect:〕conscience and not respect is the conscience that takes the truths of suffering and origin as its object; both conscience and respect is the conscience that takes the truths of cessation and the path as its object. There is another account: respect is holding something in esteem, and it is upon this that conscience and disgrace arise afterwards, and so respect is not conscience.
If the object is a pudgala (a sentient being, a person), the presence or absence of love and respect should be set out in four cases: love without respect, as toward wife and children and toward disciples living together; respect without love, as toward another’s teacher and toward men of quality and rank; both love and respect, as toward one’s own teacher, one’s parents, one’s uncles; neither love nor respect, whatever remains when the first three are set aside. Love and respect of this sort exist in the desire and form realms and not in the formless realm. Question: are not confidence and conscience factors of the great wholesome ground, and are they not present in the formless realm as well? Answer: love and respect are of two kinds—those that take dharmas as their object and those that take a pudgala as their object; those that take dharmas as their object exist in all three realms, while what is spoken of here are those that take a pudgala as their object, and so they exist in the desire and form realms and not in the formless realm. The difference between love and respect has now been stated. What is the difference between applied thought and sustained thought, and between pride and self-intoxication? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 34〕The Difference between Applied and Sustained Thought; the Difference between Pride and Self-Intoxication
Stanza: Applied and sustained thought are the coarseness and fineness of mind; pride is mind exalting itself against another, and self-intoxication is mind grown high and unrestrained through attachment to what belongs to oneself.
Treatise: The difference between applied and sustained thought is this—they are the coarseness and fineness of mind: mind’s coarse nature is called applied thought, and mind’s fine nature is called sustained thought. Question: how can these two be associated with one and the same mind〔coarse and fine being contrary〕? Some explain thus: it is like clarified butter floating on cold water with the light of a blazing sun striking it from above—by the working of the water and of the sun the butter neither congeals nor melts; just so, in one mind there is applied thought and sustained thought, and by reason of them mind becomes neither too fine nor too coarse, so that both have their operation within one mind.
〔The author of the treatise objects:〕if so, applied and sustained thought are only the cause of coarseness and fineness and not their entity; just as water and sunlight are the cause of congealing and melting, while the entity of the sun is not itself congealing or melting. Again, the natures of coarse and fine are established relatively—by comparing realms, levels, and grades of high and low against one another〔the upper being fine relative to the lower, the lower coarse relative to the upper〕—so that even the summit of existence would then have applied and sustained thought. Again, the natures of coarse and fine have no separate kinds of entity, and applied and sustained thought cannot be distinguished by them.
There is another explanation, that the two dharmas applied thought and sustained thought are verbal formations (the cause of utterance), and that the sūtra therefore says ‘there is speech only where there are applied and sustained thought, and where there are none there is no such verbal formation’; among them the coarse is called applied thought and the fine sustained thought—within a single mind, one distinct dharma being coarse and another distinct dharma fine, what conflict is there in reason?〔The author of the treatise objects:〕if there really were separate kinds of entity there would indeed be no conflict in reason; but there are no separate kinds of entity, and so a conflict with reason does follow—for within a single kind of entity it is not admissible that high and low〔coarse and fine〕arise at the same time. If it be said that the kinds of entity do differ, then the distinguishing characteristic of those kinds should be stated. Answer: the distinguishing characteristic of the kinds of these two is hard to state, and their distinguishing characteristic can be shown only by higher and lower〔set against each other〕.〔The author of the treatise objects:〕a distinguishing characteristic cannot be shown by higher and lower—for within each kind there are again higher and lower. From this it should be known that the two dharmas applied and sustained thought definitely may not be held to be associated with one and the same mind. Question: if so, why does the sūtra say that the first meditative absorption is complete with five limbs〔applied thought, sustained thought, joy, pleasure, and concentration〕? Answer: “complete with five limbs” is said with reference to a level and not with reference to a single moment, and so there is no fault. The difference between applied and sustained thought has now been stated.
The difference between pride and self-intoxication is this—pride is the nature of mind exalting itself against another: weighing the difference in the qualities and classes of oneself and of another, mind exalts and relies upon itself and slights another, and so it is called pride. Self-intoxication is the nature of mind grown haughty and unrestrained, preceded by attachment to what belongs to oneself. Another master says: just as the difference of elated exaltation produced by liquor is called “drunkenness,” so the difference of elated exaltation produced by greed is called “self-intoxication.” Such is the characteristic difference between pride and self-intoxication. The differences among the classes of mind and mental factors and the ways in which they arise together have now been stated. Yet mind and mental factors are given various names in the sūtras according to the sense intended, and the differences of these names and senses should now be analyzed. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 35〕Mind, Thought, and Consciousness Are One in Entity; the Four Names of Mind and Mental Factors and the Five Senses of Association
Stanza: The three names mind, thought, and consciousness are one in entity; mind and mental factors are alike called “having a support,” “having an object,” “having a mode of apprehension,” and “associated”—and “associated” has five senses.
Treatise: Because it gathers and gives rise, it is called mind; because it deliberates, it is called thought; because it discerns, it is called consciousness. There is another explanation: because of the various differences of pure and impure elements it is called mind; because this very thing〔mind〕serves as the support of another〔consciousness〕it is called thought; and because it is what does the depending, it is called consciousness. Therefore, although the senses conveyed by the three names mind, thought, and consciousness differ, the entity is one.
Just as the three names mind, thought, and consciousness differ in sense and are one in entity, so it is with mind and mental factors being called “having a support,” “having an object,” “having a mode of apprehension,” and “associated”—the names and senses differ and the entity is one. That is: mind and mental factors are all called having a support, because they must rely on a supporting faculty〔in order to arise〕; or having an object, because they must take up an object; or having a mode of apprehension, because upon the distinctions among the classes of the object they raise up a mode of apprehension〔the image of the object appearing upon mind〕; or associated, because they are evenly conjoined.
Question: in what sense are they called “evenly conjoined”? Answer: because of five senses: mind and mental factors are even in five senses, and are therefore said to be associated—namely, support, object, mode of apprehension, time, and entity are all even. What is meant by evenness of entity is that within a single association, just as the entity of mind is only one, so each of the dharmas that are mental factors is only one. The extensive analysis of mind and mental factors has now been stated. What are the formations not associated with mind? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 36〕The General Enumeration of the Fourteen Formations Not Associated with Mind
Stanza: The formations not associated with mind are acquisition, non-acquisition, commonality, the result of non-perception, the two absorptions〔the absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation〕, the life faculty, the four characteristics, the name-bodies and the rest—dharmas of this class.
Treatise: Dharmas such as these are not associated with mind and are not of the nature of form and the rest, yet are included in the aggregate of formations, and are therefore called formations not associated with mind. Among them the characteristics of acquisition and non-acquisition will be analyzed first. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 37〕The Nature of Acquisition and Non-Acquisition, and What They Rest Upon
Stanza: “Acquisition” is obtaining and possession; “non-acquisition” is the contrary of this; acquisition and non-acquisition rest only upon one’s own continuum and upon the two cessations.
Treatise: Acquisition is of two kinds: first, what has never been acquired, or has been acquired and lost, being now obtained—this is called “obtaining”; second, what has been acquired and not lost, continuing on—this is called “possession.” It should be known that non-acquisition is the contrary of these〔that is, non-obtaining and non-possession〕.
Question: in which dharmas are acquisition and non-acquisition found? Answer: in one’s own continuum and in the two cessations (cessation through discernment and cessation independent of discernment). That is: among conditioned dharmas, only those falling within one’s own continuum have acquisition and non-acquisition; not those in another’s continuum, since no one can possess a dharma belonging to another’s body; nor upon what is not a continuum〔external and insentient〕, since no one can possess a dharma of what is insentient. So it is definitely with conditioned dharmas. As for unconditioned dharmas, acquisition and non-acquisition are found only upon the two cessations. There is no sentient being that does not possess cessation independent of discernment, and so in the Abhidharma treatise it is transmitted thus: who possesses dharmas without outflows? All sentient beings—and apart from the noble one still fully bound in the first moment〔of the path of seeing〕and all remaining fully bound ordinary beings, the rest of sentient beings possess cessation through discernment. There is definitely no one who possesses space, and so no acquisition is spoken of with regard to space; and since there is no acquisition, neither is there non-acquisition—for this school holds that acquisition and non-acquisition are established as the reverse of one another. That whatever has acquisition also has non-acquisition may be inferred by reasoning, and so is not separately explained.
Question: on what ground is it known that there is a separate thing called “acquisition”? Answer: because the sūtra so says. As the sūtra says: ‘A noble one, with regard to those ten dharmas of one beyond training, by their arising, by their acquisition, by their possession, has cut off the five limbs …’ and so on at length. Question: if so, then what is insentient and another’s continuum should also be possessed. Answer: why do you say so? Question: because the sūtra so says. As the sūtra says: ‘Monks, you should know that there is a wheel-turning monarch who possesses the seven treasures …’ and so on at length. Answer: here sovereignty is spoken of as possession—that is, the wheel-turning monarch has sovereign power over those seven treasures and sets them in motion as he pleases〔and so is said to possess them〕. Question: since here sovereignty is spoken of as possession, on what ground is it known from the remaining〔sūtra passages〕that there is a separate thing? Answer: what is unreasonable in granting that there is a separate thing?
Question: this is what is unreasonable—the “acquisition” you posit has no entity that can be known, as color and sound and the rest can be〔known by direct perception through the five consciousnesses〕or as greed and hatred and the rest can be〔known by the cognition of others’ minds〕; nor has it any operation that can be known, as the eye and ear and the rest have〔whose presence is inferred from the operation of seeing and hearing〕. Therefore it is not admissible that there be a separate thing called acquisition; and to posit a separate thing is precisely what is unreasonable.
If it be said that this “acquisition” does have an operation—namely, being the cause of the arising of the dharmas acquired—then an unconditioned dharma〔which does not arise〕should have no acquisition. Again, when a dharma to be acquired has not yet been acquired, or has been relinquished〔through change of realm and level or through freedom from defilement〕, at that time no acquisition is present—how then is it to arise in the future? If it be said that a ‘co-arising acquisition’ is the cause of arising, then what work is left for arising and the arising of arising〔among the four characteristics〕? Again, an insentient dharma〔having no acquisition〕would then definitely never arise. Again, for one fully bound〔an ordinary being〕there could be no difference between the appearing of afflictions of the lower, middling, and higher grades—since acquisition has no differences. And if it be said that the difference comes from some other cause, then it is by that〔other cause〕that the dharmas should arise, and what use is “acquisition”? Therefore what they say—that acquisition has an operation, namely being the cause of the arising of the dharmas acquired—does not hold good in reason.
Question: who says that this “acquisition” is the cause of the arising of a dharma? Question: if so, what operation has this acquisition? Answer: it is the cause by which differences are established. Question: why do you say so? Answer: if there were no acquisition, then when an ordinary being and a noble one give rise to a worldly mind there would be no way of establishing the difference between an ordinary being and the noble ones. Question: is there not a difference already, in that afflictions have been cut off or not cut off? Answer: if you hold that there is no acquisition, how can you say that afflictions are cut off or not cut off? Only for one who grants acquisition do cutting off and not cutting off make sense—because the acquisition of the affliction has been separated from or not separated from. Answer: it is because of a difference in the support〔the body〕that the sense of afflictions being cut off or not cut off is established: the noble ones, by the power of the paths of seeing and of cultivation, cause the supporting body to be transformed and made other than it was, so that with regard to the afflictions abandoned by those two paths there is no longer any power to make them appear—just as a seed burnt by fire is transformed and made other than before and has no power to produce; so too, when in the noble one’s supporting body there is no capacity to produce an affliction, that is called the affliction’s being cut off. Or when by the mundane path the seeds of affliction in the supporting body are subdued, that too is called cutting off; the contrary is called not cut off. Whatever is not cut off is said to be possessed, and whatever is cut off is said not to be possessed—and both of these are merely provisional and not real.
Wholesome dharmas are of two kinds: those cultivated without effort and those cultivated only by effort, that is, wholesome acquired by birth and wholesome acquired through preparation. As for what is cultivated without effort: if the seed in the supporting body has not been damaged, it is said to be possessed; if the seed has been damaged, it is said not to be possessed—as with one whose wholesome roots are cut off, who by the force of wrong view has damaged the seeds of wholesome roots in his supporting body; it should be known that this is what is called cutting off, and it is not that the seeds of wholesome roots in the supporting body must be utterly slain for it to be called cutting off. As for what is cultivated only by effort: if that dharma has already arisen in the supporting body and the effort producing it is sovereign and undamaged, it is said to be possessed; the contrary is said not to be possessed. These two also are provisional and not real. Therefore the name “possession” is established simply at the station in which, in the supporting body, a seed is unuprooted, undamaged, and grown sovereign, and there is no separate thing at all.
Question: what dharma here is called a seed? Answer: it is the capability—serially transmitted or immediately proximate—that name and form〔the five aggregates〕have with respect to producing their own result; and this is constituted by continuum, transformation, and distinctiveness. Question: what is transformation? Answer: it is the nature of being other before and after within a continuum. Question: what is continuum? Answer: it is the formations of the three times in their causal and resultant nature. Question: what is distinctiveness? Answer: it is the capability of producing a result without interval.
Yet in one place a sūtra says ‘if one possesses greed one cannot cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness’—the sense of that sūtra being that one who indulges in the affliction of greed cannot turn away from it〔as it is actually occurring〕, and so is said to possess it; and during the time when he is disposed to indulge in greed and craving he certainly cannot cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness〔it is not that mere possession of the seed prevents cultivation〕. “Possession” of this sort is in every kind merely provisional and not real; and “non-possession,” which is named simply by the negation of this〔possession〕, is likewise provisional and not real. The Vaibhāṣikas say: both of these are separate things, real and not provisional.〔The author of the treatise says:〕viewing the matter thus, both roads may be reckoned well stated. Question: why? Answer:〔the Sautrāntika account〕does not conflict with reason;〔the Sarvāstivāda account〕is what my own school holds. The nature of acquisition and non-acquisition has now been analyzed; what are their differences? Acquisition will be analyzed first. The stanza says:
〔Stanzas 38 and 39, First Half〕The Five Gates of Difference in Acquisition
Stanza: Dharmas of the three times each have acquisitions of the three times; dharmas that are wholesome and the rest have acquisitions that are wholesome and the rest only. A dharma bound to a realm has its acquisition in its own realm only; a dharma unbound has acquisitions extending to four kinds. A dharma neither of training nor beyond training has three kinds of acquisition, and a dharma not subject to abandonment has two.
Treatise: The gate of the three times—dharmas of the three times each have three kinds of acquisition: a past dharma has a past acquisition, a future acquisition, and a present acquisition; future and present dharmas likewise each have three kinds of acquisition.
The gate of the three ethical qualities—again, dharmas that are wholesome and the rest have acquisitions that are wholesome and the rest only: that is, wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate dharmas have respectively wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate acquisitions.
The gate of realm affiliation—again, a dharma bound to a realm has its acquisition in its own realm only: that is, dharmas of the desire, form, and formless realms have respectively acquisitions of the desire, form, and formless realms only. If a dharma is unbound〔without outflows〕, its acquisition extends to four kinds: that is, dharmas without outflows have, in general, four kinds of acquisition—acquisitions of the three realms together with an acquisition without outflows. Taken separately: the acquisition of cessation independent of discernment extends to all three realms; the acquisition of cessation through discernment belongs to the form and formless realms and is also without outflows; the acquisition of the truth of the path is without outflows alone. Therefore an unbound dharma has four kinds of acquisition.
The gate of the three kinds of training—again, a dharma of training has an acquisition of training only, and a dharma beyond training an acquisition beyond training only; the acquisition of what is neither of training nor beyond training admits of a distinction: in general there are three kinds. Taken separately: all dharmas with outflows and the three unconditioned dharmas are called dharmas neither of training nor beyond training. Dharmas with outflows have acquisitions neither of training nor beyond training only; and so it is with the acquisition of cessation independent of discernment and with the acquisition of a cessation through discernment not induced by the noble path. If it is a cessation through discernment induced by the path of training, its acquisition is of training; if induced by the path beyond training, its acquisition is beyond training.
The gate of the three modes of abandonment—again, dharmas abandoned through seeing and abandoned through cultivation have respectively acquisitions abandoned through seeing and abandoned through cultivation. The acquisition of a dharma not subject to abandonment admits of a distinction: in general there are two kinds. Taken separately: the dharmas without outflows are called not subject to abandonment; the acquisition of cessation independent of discernment is abandoned through cultivation only, and so is the acquisition of a cessation through discernment not induced by the noble path; the acquisition of a cessation through discernment induced by the noble path, and the acquisition of the truth of the path, are both not subject to abandonment. Though it was stated above in general that ‘dharmas of the three times each have three,’ the distinguishing characteristics within this should now be sorted out. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 39, Second Half, and Stanza 40, First Half〕The Differences in the Three Times of the Acquisition of Indeterminate and Other Dharmas
Stanza: The acquisition of what is indeterminate arises only together with it, save for the two superknowledges and transformation; the acquisition of obscured〔indeterminate〕form likewise arises only together with it; in the desire realm〔wholesome and unwholesome form〕has no acquisition preceding the dharma.
Treatise: The acquisition of what is unobscured-indeterminate arises only together with the dharma and is neither earlier nor later—because its force is feeble: if the dharma is past, the acquisition is past; if the dharma is future, the acquisition is future; if the dharma is present, the acquisition is present.
Question: is the acquisition of every unobscured-indeterminate dharma like this? Answer: no. Question: how so? Answer: the two superknowledges of the eye and the ear are to be excepted, and also what is capable of transformation〔that is, the mind〕. That is: the discernment that is the superknowledge of the eye and of the ear, and the mind capable of transformation, being of strong force and accomplished through the distinctions of preparatory practice, though included within the unobscured-indeterminate quality, have acquisitions preceding, following, and arising together with them. If the field of craft and the mode of deportment are practiced to an extreme degree, their acquisitions too may perhaps be like this.
Question: is it only the acquisition of an unobscured-indeterminate dharma that arises together with it alone? Answer: no. Question: how so? Answer: obscured-indeterminate form has its acquisition likewise—that is, obscured-indeterminate manifest form has its acquisition, as stated above, arising together with it alone. For although〔the affliction that produces it〕may be of the higher grade, it still cannot give rise to nonmanifest form, which shows that its force is feeble; and therefore it definitely has no acquisition preceding or following the dharma.
Question: as the acquisition of an indeterminate dharma has such distinctions, do the acquisitions of the wholesome and the unwholesome have differences too? Answer: they do. Question: how so? Answer: wholesome form and unwholesome form belonging to the desire realm have no acquisition “preceding the dharma,” but have only a co-arising acquisition and an acquisition following the dharma. Question: does non-acquisition, like acquisition, have all these classes of difference? Answer: no. Question: how so? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 40, Second Half, and Stanza 41〕The Differences of Non-Acquisition and Its Relinquishing
Stanza: Non-acquisition is unobscured-indeterminate alone; past and future dharmas each have non-acquisitions of the three times. Dharmas of the three realms and unbound dharmas each have non-acquisitions of the three realms; since the non-acquisition of the noble path is granted to be ordinary-being status〔it is known that non-acquisition does not extend to what is without outflows〕. When that dharma is acquired, or when the level is changed, that non-acquisition is relinquished.
Treatise: The difference of the three ethical qualities—every non-acquisition is included within the unobscured-indeterminate quality alone.
The difference of the three times—past and future each have three kinds: that is, a present dharma definitely has no present non-acquisition but only a past non-acquisition and a future non-acquisition; while past and future dharmas each have non-acquisitions of all three times.
The difference of realm affiliation—dharmas bound to the three realms and unbound dharmas each have non-acquisitions of the three realms: that is, a dharma bound to the desire realm has non-acquisitions of the three realms〔according to the realm in which the supporting body is〕, and so it is with dharmas bound to the form and formless realms and with unbound dharmas. There is definitely no non-acquisition that is without outflows. Why? Because it is granted that ‘the non-acquisition of the noble path’ is what is called ordinary-being status〔the status of a worldling〕. As the root treatise says: ‘What is ordinary-being status? It is not obtaining the noble dharmas.’ “Not obtaining” is precisely another name for non-acquisition; and to say that ordinary-being status is without outflows does not hold good in reason.
Question: the non-obtaining of which noble dharmas is called ordinary-being status? Answer: the non-obtaining of all〔the noble dharmas of the three vehicles〕—since the root treatise states no distinction. These words “not obtaining” express separation from “obtaining”; were it otherwise〔and did merely failing to obtain something make one an ordinary being〕, then the Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, who also do not possess the noble dharmas of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha lineages, would have to be called ordinary beings. Question: if so, the root treatise ought to have added the word “wholly”〔saying “wholly not obtaining the noble dharmas”〕. Answer: there is no need to add it, for the sense of “wholly” is already contained in this one phrase—just as when it is said that ‘this class〔of beings〕feeds on water, feeds on wind’〔though “wholly” is not said, it is understood that they feed on water and wind alone〕.
There is another account: it is the non-obtaining of receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering and of the dharmas arising together with it that is called ordinary-being status. 〔Against this〕it cannot be objected that ‘at the subsequent cognition concerning the path this dharma is relinquished—must one not then become a non-noble one?’—because the non-acquisition of that〔receptivity concerning suffering〕has already been permanently destroyed before. Question: if so, since this〔nature of receptivity concerning suffering〕extends to all three vehicles, the non-obtaining of which vehicle’s is called ordinary-being status? Answer: here too it should be said “the non-obtaining of all.” Question: if so, then the same objection as before arises. Answer: this objection too should be resolved as before. Question: if so, is the second statement not made to no purpose?〔The author of the treatise says:〕what the Sautrāntika masters say is better. Question: what is the Sautrāntika sense? Answer: it is that the difference of station within a continuum in which noble dharmas ‘have never yet arisen’ is what is called ordinary-being status.
Question: when is such a non-acquisition relinquished? Answer: the non-acquisition of a dharma is relinquished when that dharma is acquired, or when the level is changed. Just as the non-acquisition of the noble path is called ordinary-being status and is relinquished when this noble path is acquired or when the level is changed. The non-acquisitions of the other dharmas should be pondered in the same way. When the acquisition of a non-acquisition is cut off and the non-acquisition of the non-acquisition arises, this is called relinquishing the non-acquisition.
Question: do acquisition and non-acquisition have further acquisitions and non-acquisitions of their own? Answer: it should be said that these two each have a further acquisition and non-acquisition. Question: if so, does not an infinite regress follow? Answer: no infinite regress follows, since it is granted that acquisitions may reciprocally cause one another to be possessed. That is: when a dharma arises, three dharmas arise together with its own entity—first, the root dharma; second, the acquisition of the dharma〔the major acquisition〕; third, the acquisition of the acquisition〔the minor acquisition〕. Within the continuum, the arising of the acquisition of the dharma causes the root dharma and the acquisition of the acquisition to be possessed; and the arising of the acquisition of the acquisition causes the acquisition of the dharma to be possessed—so that no infinite regress follows here. In this way, when the entity of a wholesome or a defiled dharma first arises, three dharmas arise together with that entity; at the second moment six dharmas arise together, namely three acquisitions of dharmas and three acquisitions of acquisitions; at the third moment eighteen dharmas arise together, namely, with respect to the〔nine〕dharmas produced at the first and second moments, nine acquisitions of dharmas and nine acquisitions of acquisitions. In this way the acquisitions increase further and further one after another.
All past and future afflictions and secondary afflictions, together with the wholesome acquired by birth, being associated moment by moment〔as they arise〕and together with the coexistent〔dharmas〕, produce in the turning of birth and death without beginning or end acquisitions without limit—in a single sentient being alone, moment by moment in the continuum of birth and death, acquisitions without limit arise; and in this way the continua of all sentient beings, each of them separate, produce moment by moment immeasurable and limitless acquisitions arising all together. Acquisitions so many as this gather in one place in the greatest number, and because they are without resistance they can contain one another. Were it not so, space would already not contain the acquisitions of a single sentient being, still less those of a second and the rest.
心不相應行Formations Not Associated with Mind
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔正42·一句〕同分——有情彼此相似的那個實物
頌:同分,就是使有情彼此「等同」的那個法。
論:另外有一件實在的東西,名為「同分」——它使諸有情展轉之間類別相等。《本論》(指有部的根本論書)把它叫作「眾同分」。這同分又分兩種:一是無差別的,二是有差別的。無差別的同分,指的是諸有情所共有的「有情同分」——因為一切有情各各平等地都有它。有差別的同分,指的是諸有情依界、地、趣、生、種姓,以及男、女、近事(在家受戒者)、苾芻(出家眾)、學(有學)、無學等等而各別成立的同分——因為同一類的有情各各平等地都有它。此外還有法同分,就是隨著蘊、處、界而立的〔使諸法彼此相似的那個法〕。
如果沒有一件實在的東西、以「無差別」為相而名為同分,那麼在彼此展轉差別的諸有情之中,『這也是有情、那也是有情』這種平等無差別的認知與言說,就不應該成立。同樣地,對蘊等〔三科諸法〕的平等無差別的認知與言說〔若無法同分也不應成立〕——道理照這樣去理解就是。
有沒有這樣的情形:死了又生,卻既不捨去、也不新得有情同分?應當作四句分別。第一句:在某一處死了,又還生在同一處〔同分不捨不得〕。第二句:進入「正性離生」(見道)之位的時候,捨去異生同分,得到聖者同分〔有捨有得〕。第三句:在這一趣死了而生到其餘的趣等〔亦捨亦得,就趣而言〕。第四句:除去前面三種情形〔以外的一切〕。
〔以下論主代經部發問。〕如果另外有一件實在的東西名為「異生同分」,那又何必別立一個「異生性」呢?並不是說「人同分」之外另有一個「人性」啊。而且,同分並不是世間眼前所能見到的——因為它不是色法;也不是覺慧所能了別的——因為它沒有別的作用。世人雖然不了知有〔一個實體的〕有情同分,卻照樣對有情作『沒有差別』的認知;所以縱使它有體,又有什麼用處呢?
再者,憑什麼不許有「無情同分」呢?穀、麥、豆、金、鐵,以及菴羅樹、半娜娑樹等等,也都有各自同類彼此相似的情形啊。又,諸同分彼此也是展轉有差別的,怎麼在那些同分上面不再另立一層同分,卻仍然能生起『它們沒有差別』的認知與言說呢?
還有,〔你這樣立〕正好等於成立了勝論外道所執的主張:他們那一宗執有「總同句義」,說對一切法生起『總是同一個有』的言說與智解,就是由這個總同句義發生的;他們又執有「同異句義」,說對不同品類生起『這同、那異』的言說與智解,就是由這個同異句義發生的。
毘婆沙師這樣回答:他們所執的與我們這個〔同分〕義類不同——因為他們說的是『一件東西在許多東西上運轉』〔我們的同分是一一有情各別而有、念念無常〕。而且,退一步說,不論那樣算不算成立了外道的主張,這個同分必定有實在的體,因為契經這樣說過。如世尊說:『若還來此,得人同分』,乃至廣說。
〔經部答:〕雖然有這樣的經文,可是經裡並沒有說『另外有一件實在的東西名為同分』。〔有部問:〕若是這樣,經裡所說的同分是什麼?〔經部答:〕就是這一類諸行生起的時候,在其中假立為『人同分』等等——就像說穀、麥、豆等等的同分那樣〔只是假名〕。〔論主評:〕這不是善說,因為違背我〔有部〕宗。
同分已經辨明。無想是什麼?頌說:
〔正42·二至四句〕無想——無想天中閉心的那個異熟
頌:無想,是在無想天中令心與心所法都滅去的法;它是異熟,所居之處在廣果天。
論:如果生在無想有情天中,有一種法能令心與心所滅去,這法名為「無想」。它是實在的東西,能遮擋未來的心與心所法,令它們暫時不起——就像堤堰擋住江河一樣。這法一向是異熟果。是什麼的異熟呢?是無想定的異熟。
無想有情住在哪裡?住在廣果天。廣果天中有一處高勝的地方——就像〔初靜慮之中另有〕中間靜慮那樣——名為無想天。
那些有情是恆常無想呢,還是也有想?在生與死的那一段位次中,是多時有想的。之所以叫「無想」,是因為那些有情在中間長時之內想不生起的緣故。如契經所說:那些有情由於「想」生起的緣故,才從那個地方殞沒。而那些有情就像久睡醒來一樣,重新生起了想。
從那裡殞沒以後,必定生在欲界,不會生到其餘處所——因為先前所修定行的勢力已經用盡,而在那裡又不能再修定;就像箭射向空中,力量用盡便要墮下。如果有情將要生到那個地方,必定先有欲界的「順後受業」〔留待後生受報的業〕——就像將要生到北俱盧洲的人,必定應當有生天之業〔那裡命終定生天〕。
無想已經辨明。二定是什麼?就是無想定與滅盡定。先說無想定,它的相是怎樣的?頌說:
〔正43〕無想定——為求解脫而閉心的外道之定
頌:無想定和前面的無想一樣〔也令心心所滅〕;它在後靜慮,作意是為求解脫;性唯是善,唯順生受;不是聖者所得,初得時只得一世。
論:如前所說,有一種法能令心與心所滅去,名為「無想」;同樣地,另有一種法能令心與心所滅去,名為「無想定」。無想者的定,名為無想定;或者說,定即是無想,名為無想定〔前者是依主釋,後者是持業釋〕。頌中說「如是」二字,只是要顯示:這個定滅去心與心所這一點,跟無想相同。
這個定在哪一地?在後靜慮,也就是在第四靜慮,不在其餘諸地。修無想定是為求什麼?是為求解脫。那些人執「無想」就是真解脫,為了求證得它,才修無想定。
前面說過無想是異熟,所以它屬無記性,不必再說。如今這無想定則一向是善。因為它是善,所以能招感無想有情天中的五蘊異熟。既然是善性,那麼它順於哪一種受〔報時〕?唯順生受——不是順現受、順後受,也不是不定受。若起了這個定之後雖然又退失了,傳說此人現生必定還能再起,將來當生在無想有情天中;所以得了這個定的人,必定不能入正性離生〔見道〕。
又,這個定只有異生能得,聖者不得——因為諸聖者看待無想定就像看見深坑一樣,不樂於進去。要執「無想」為真解脫、生起出離之想,才會去修這個定;而一切聖者都不執有漏為真解脫、為真出離,所以對這個定必定不去修行。
若諸聖者修得第四靜慮定的時候,是不是像得靜慮那樣,連過去、未來的無想定也一併得到?其餘〔的無想定〕也是不得的。為什麼呢?那無想定雖然曾經修習過,但因為它是無心的,必須以大加行方便才修得,所以初得的時候只得一世——就是只得現在世;如同最初受得別解脫戒〔亦唯得現在〕。得了這個定以後,第二念等等乃至還沒有捨棄之前,也就成就了過去世的〔那份〕;但因為無心,所以沒有「未來修」。
其次說滅盡定,它的相是怎樣的?頌說:
〔正44·正45前半〕滅盡定——聖者為求靜住而入的無心定
頌:滅盡定也和前面一樣〔令心心所滅〕;作意是為求靜住,地在有頂;性是善,順生順後二受不定;唯聖者由加行而得;佛則是成佛時得、不是先前得,因為三十四念的緣故。
論:如同無想定,滅定也是這樣。這個「亦然」二字,是要比例什麼義?是比例無想定的「心心所滅」。如前面說『另有一種法能令心心所滅,名無想定』,同樣地,另有一種法能令心心所滅,名為滅盡定。
這二定的差別相是這樣:前面的無想定是為求解脫,以「出離想」的作意為先導;這個滅盡定是為求靜住,以「止息想」的作意為先導。前面的無想定在後靜慮;這個滅盡定唯在有頂,也就是非想非非想處。
這個定同前面的無想定一樣,性唯是善,不是無記、不是染污——因為是善心所等起的緣故。前面的無想定唯順生受;這個滅盡定則通於順生、順後以及不定受——就異熟而言,或有順生受、或有順後受、或有不定受、或全然不受。所謂全然不受,是說如果在下地就般涅槃了〔便不受有頂之報〕。這個定所招的是哪一地、幾蘊的異熟?唯招有頂的四蘊異熟〔有頂無色,故無色蘊〕。
前面的無想定唯異生能得;這個滅盡定唯聖者能得,異生不能起——因為異生怖畏斷滅;又因為它唯靠聖道之力才能生起;又因為要以「現法涅槃」的勝解才能進入。
這個定也同前面一樣,不是「離染得」。那是由什麼而得?是由加行而得——必須由加行才能證得的緣故。又,初得的時候只得現在,不得過去、也不修未來——因為要靠心力才能修的緣故。第二念等等乃至還沒有捨棄之前,也就成就了過去世的〔那份〕。
世尊也是由加行而得的嗎?不是。那是怎樣?是成佛的時候得——就是說佛世尊在「盡智」生起時得。佛沒有一種功德是由加行得的:只要暫起欲樂、令它現前,一切圓滿之德便隨其所樂而起;所以佛的眾德都是離染得。
〔問:〕世尊在此以前不曾起過滅盡定,那麼在得盡智的時候,怎麼就成了「俱分解脫」〔慧障、定障俱解脫〕呢?〔答:〕因為對於起滅定這件事已經得自在的緣故,如同已經起過的人一樣成就俱解脫。
西方師說:菩薩在學位的時候先起這個定,然後才得菩提。〔問:〕為什麼這裡不許他們這個說法?〔答:〕如果許他們的說法,就順了尊者鄔波毱多的《理目足論》——如那部論所說:『應當說如來先起滅定,後生盡智。』迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說:不是先起滅定、後才生盡智。為什麼呢?傳說菩薩是以三十四念得菩提的。〔那三十四念是:〕在諦現觀中有十六念;離有頂貪有十八念——就是斷有頂九品煩惱,起九無間道、九解脫道;這樣十八,加上前面十六,成三十四。一切菩薩必定先在無所有處已得離貪,才入見道,不必再斷下地煩惱;在這中間沒有機會起「不同類心」〔滅定之心是有漏,與無漏三十四念不同類〕,所以諸菩薩在學位中不應起滅盡定。
外國諸師這樣說:如果中間起了不同類心,那有什麼過失?〔答:〕若是這樣,便有「越期心」之過〔違背了自己所立的誓限〕。然而諸菩薩是不越期心的。〔外國師:〕照理說菩薩確實不越期心,但並不是不越無漏聖道〔起有漏心不算越〕。〔答:〕若是這樣,那期心又怎麼算不越?所謂期心,就是『我未得諸漏永盡,終不解開這結加趺坐』。〔菩薩〕必定不越如此期心,因為唯在一坐之時把諸事究竟完成的緣故。前一說〔迦濕彌羅師說〕為善,因為是我所宗。
雖然已經說了二定有許多相同與相異之相,但在其中還有同異〔要說〕。頌說:
〔正45後半〕二定所依身之同與異
頌:二定都依欲界、色界〔之身而起〕;滅定最初生起唯在人中。
論:所謂二定,就是無想定與滅盡定。這二定都依欲界、色界二界而得現起。如果有人不許在色界也能起無想定,那就違背這段文——《本論》說:『或有是色有,此有非五行。』說的是:色纏有情,或生在有想天而住於不同類心,或入無想定、或入滅盡定;或生在無想天已而得入無想——這就叫作『是色有,此有非五行』〔在色界而不具五蘊之行〕。由此證知,這二定都依欲界、色界而得現起,這是它們的相同之相。
說到相異之相:無想定在欲界、色界二界都能最初生起;滅定的最初生起唯在人中。這個定在人中最初修起以後,須先有退失,才生到色界,再依色界之身重新修起。
這滅盡定也會退嗎?應當說也會退。若不是這樣,就違害了《鄔陀夷經》。經中說:『具壽!有些苾芻,先前在此處具足清淨尸羅、具足三摩地、具足般羅若,能數數入出滅受想定,這是有的。應當如實了知:他們在現法中、或臨終之位,不能勤修令解滿足;從此身壞以後,超過段食諸天,隨受一處意成天身。生到那裡以後,又能數數入出滅受想定,這也是有的。』應當如實了知:這「意成天身」,佛說是色界;而滅受想定唯在有頂。若得了這個定必定不退,那怎麼會往色界受生呢?
有其餘部派執:第四靜慮也有滅定。依他們所執,滅定不退這個義也說得通。〔答:〕『第四靜慮有滅盡定』這個義必定不成。為什麼呢?因為契經說有「九次第定」〔滅定居第九,在有頂之上〕。〔難:〕若必定如此,那怎麼會有「超越定」之義?〔答:〕這個次第是就初學而說的;得自在的時候,隨其所樂可以超越而入。
這樣,二定有多種差異:地有異——一個在第四靜慮、一個在有頂地;加行有異——一個以出離想、一個以止息想作意為先;相續有異——一個在異生相續中起、一個在聖者相續中起;異熟有異——一個感無想天、一個感有頂的異熟果;順受有異——一個唯順生受、一個順生順後及不定受;初起有異——一個在欲色二界、一個唯在人中最初生起。
二定總以「心心所滅」為自性,為什麼只叫作「無想」與「滅受想」呢?因為在二定的加行之中,只厭逆這〔想或受想〕的緣故——就像〔他心智〕也能知受等,卻只名為「他心智」〔從加行偏重處立名〕。
如今二定之中心已長時間斷絕了,怎麼在後來心又能生起?毘婆沙師許過去是有的,所以前心可以作後心的等無間緣。有其餘師說:就像生在無色界,色已長時間斷絕,怎麼在後來色又能生起?那色的再生必定是由心而不是由色〔前色不存〕;照這樣,出定之心也應如此——是由「有根身」而生,不是由〔前〕心而起。所以那些先代的諸軌範師都說:心與有根身這二法互為種子。所謂二法,就是心與有根身。
尊者世友在《問論》中說:如果執滅定完全沒有心,才會有這種過失;我說滅定還有細心〔所以不必立互為種子〕,因此沒有這個過失。尊者妙音說這不合道理。為什麼呢?如果這個定中還有識,那麼根、境、識三和合的緣故,必定應當有觸;由觸為緣,就應當有受與想。如世尊說:『意及法為緣,生於意識;三和合觸,俱起受、想、思。』那麼這個定中受、想等法也應當不滅了〔便不成滅受想定〕。
如果說:正如經說「受緣愛」,然而阿羅漢雖然有諸受卻不生愛;那麼觸也應如此——並不是一切觸都作受等的緣。〔答:〕這個例子不對,因為有簡別的差異。經自己有所簡別,說:『若無明觸所生諸受,為緣生愛。』卻從來沒有一處簡別過「觸生受」。所以二者有差別。
由這個道理,毘婆沙師說滅定之中諸心都滅。〔問:〕如果完全沒有心,怎麼還叫作「定」?〔答:〕因為它令大種平等而行,所以說名為定;或者由於〔入定前的〕心力平等地到達這裡,所以名為定。
這二定是實有還是假有?應當說是實有——因為它能遮礙心令心不生的緣故。有的說:這個論證於理不然,因為是先前的定心能遮礙的緣故。就是說:先前的定心與其餘的心相違而起,由於它一起,只是令其餘的心暫時不轉;這〔定心〕能引發違逆心的所依,令它相續下去,所以只在「心不轉」的這個分位上假立為定,並沒有別的實體。這只是「心不轉」的分位假立之定:入定之前沒有、出定之後也沒有,所以假說它是有為所攝。或者說:就是那個所依由定心所引,令它如此而起,於是假立為定。
應知無想也是這樣:由先前之心與其餘的心相違而起,由於它一起,只令其餘的心暫時不轉;就在「心不轉」的分位上假立為無想,其餘的說法如前。〔論主評:〕這不是善說,因為違背我宗。
二定已經辨明。命根是什麼?頌說:
〔正46前半〕命根——就是「壽」,能持煖與識
頌:命根的體就是「壽」,它能任持煖與識。
論:命的體就是壽。所以《對法》說:『什麼是命根?就是三界的壽。』這樣還未明白:什麼法叫作壽?就是另有一種法能任持煖與識,說名為壽。所以世尊說:
〔引頌〕壽、煖、識三法離身之時
頌:壽、煖以及識,這三法捨離身體的時候,所捨下的身體便僵直倒臥,如同木頭一般沒有思覺。
論:所以,另有一種法,能作任持煖與識相續而住的因,說名為「壽」。
〔以下是命根實有假有之傍論。〕若是這樣,這個壽又是什麼法能任持它?就是煖與識反過來任持這個壽。若是這樣,這三法互相任持、相續而轉,那麼哪一法先滅?由於這一法滅,其餘二法才隨著滅。〔若沒有一法先滅,〕那麼這三法應當恆常不謝。既然如此,這個壽應當是「業」能任持——因為它隨著業所引而相續轉的緣故。
若是這樣,那憑什麼不許只由業任持煖與識,而還要有壽呢?於理不應如此:不可讓『一切識從始至終恆是異熟』〔若無壽而唯業持識,則識恆異熟,與事實不合〕。既然如此,那應當說是業能持煖、煖又持識,何必要這個壽?〔答:〕這樣的話,識在無色界中就沒有能持它的了,因為那裡沒有煖。〔難:〕那應當說在無色界裡是識以業為能持。〔答:〕怎麼可以隨你的意思、一次次地變換說法?或說這個識唯有煖能持、或又說唯有業持識〔前後不一〕。而且前面已經說過了。前面說的是什麼?就是前面說的:不可讓『一切識從始至終都是異熟』。所以必定應當許有另一種法能任持煖與識,說名為壽。
〔經部說:〕如今我也不是說完全沒有壽體,只是說壽體不是另外一件實在的東西。〔問:〕若是這樣,什麼法叫作壽體?〔答:〕就是三界之業所引的「同分住時勢分」,說為壽體。由三界之業所引的同分,其住時的勢分相續決定,隨其所應住的時間,就住那麼多時;所以這個勢分說為壽體。就像穀種等所引的、乃至到成熟時的那段勢分;又像放箭所引的、乃至到停住時的那段勢分。
〔外道插難:〕有人說有一種「行」是德的差別,依箭等而生,由於它的力量,乃至箭還沒有落地就恆常行走不息。〔論主破:〕它的體是一、又沒有障礙,那麼往趣別的方向時,急、緩、到達時間的種種分位差別就不應該有;而且應當畢竟沒有墮落的時候。如果說是被風所障礙,那麼應當一發出就墮落、或者永遠不墮落——因為能障礙的風前後沒有差別。
〔論主印取有部:〕『另有一件實在的東西,能任持煖與識,名為壽體』——這個說法為善。
〔以下辨死之因。〕是因為壽盡而死,還是另有其餘的因?《施設論》說:有因壽盡而死的,也有非因福盡而死的,廣作四句分別。第一句:是感壽異熟的業力盡了。第二句:是感富樂果的業力盡了。第三句:是能感這兩種的業一齊盡了。第四句:是不能避開橫來之緣〔非時而死〕。此外也應當說『因捨壽行而死』〔如佛與阿羅漢自捨壽行〕。在壽盡之位中,福盡對於死已經沒有作用了;所以二者一齊盡的時候有死,就說為「俱盡故死」。
《發智論》說:這個壽應當說是隨相續而轉的呢,還是應當說一起便住?——欲纏有情不入無想定、不入滅盡定的,應當說這個壽是隨相續而轉;若入無想定、若入滅盡定,以及色纏、無色纏一切有情,應當說這個壽是一起便住。那話是什麼意思?如果所依之身可以被損害,壽就跟著被損害,這叫作第一種「隨相續轉」;如果所依之身不可被損害、像起了就那樣住著,這叫作第二種「一起便住」。
迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說:前一句顯示有障礙,後一句顯示無障礙;由此決定有「非時死」。所以契經說有四種「得自體」:有一種得自體是唯可自害、不可他害的。廣作四句分別。唯可自害不可他害的:指生在欲界的戲忘念天、意憤恚天——他們由於發起了增上的喜或怒,所以在那裡殞沒,不是由於其餘的緣。此外也應當說「諸佛自般涅槃」〔亦屬自而非他〕。唯可他害不可自害的:指處在胎、卵之中的諸有情類。二者俱可害的:指其餘大多數的欲界有情。二者俱不可害的:指在中有位、色界無色界的一切有情,以及欲界的一分有情——如那落迦(地獄)、北俱盧洲、正住見道者、住慈定者、住滅定及無想定者、王仙、佛使、佛所記別之人——達弭羅、嗢怛羅、殑耆羅、長者子耶舍、鳩磨羅時婆——以及最後身菩薩、以及這位菩薩的母親懷菩薩胎的時候、一切轉輪王、以及輪王的母親懷輪王胎的時候。
若是這樣,為什麼契經中說:『大德!哪一種有情所得的自體是非可自害、非可他害的?』『舍利子!就是在非想非非想處受生的有情。』〔只舉有頂〕?傳說:其餘的無色靜慮所得的自體,可被自地的聖道所害,也可被上一他地的近分所害;唯有有頂,自地與上地二害都沒有,所以說為「俱非可害」。
〔難:〕難道有頂不也被他地的聖道所害,應當叫作他害嗎?〔答:〕這裡應當說是「舉後顯初」——就像有的地方是「舉初顯後」。什麼地方是舉初顯後?如契經說:『如梵眾天,是名第一樂生天。』什麼地方是舉後顯初?如契經說:『如極光淨天,是名第二樂生天。』
〔難者又說:〕那些經裡的「如」字是顯示譬喻之義,才可以那樣說「舉一顯餘」——因為譬喻之法是舉一而顯同類的。這裡〔舍利子問答之經〕沒有「如」字,所以不可以照那樣類推。〔答:〕如果一定要有譬喻之義才會有「如」字,那麼「如」字在其餘的經裡就不應該有了。可是其餘的經這樣說:『有色有情,身異想異,如人一分,天是第一識住。』所以可知:不是譬喻也有「如」字。
傍論到此為止。命根已經辨明。諸相是什麼?頌說:
〔正46後半〕四有為相——生、住、異、滅
頌:所謂「相」,就是諸有為法的生、住、異、滅之性。
論:由於這四種是有為之相,所以法若有這四種,就應當是有為;與此相違的,就是無為法。這四相在諸法上:能令它起,名為「生」;能令它安住,名為「住」;能令它衰變,名為「異」;能令它壞滅,名為「滅」。「性」就是體的意思。
〔難:〕經上不是說有「三種有為之有為相」嗎?〔答:〕在那部經中理應說有四種,沒有說的是哪一種?就是「住相」。不過經中所說的「住異」,正是這裡「異」的別名——如同「生」名為「起」、「滅」名為「盡」;照這樣應知,「異」名為「住異」。
如果一種法能令諸行在三世中遷流,這部經就把它說為有為之相,為的是令諸有情生起厭離怖畏之心。就是說:那些諸行被「生」力所遷,令它們從未來流入現在;被「異」與「滅」相之力所遷迫,令它們從現在流入過去——因為令它們衰變與壞滅的緣故。傳說:就像有人身處稠密的樹林裡,有三個怨敵想要加害他:一個把他從稠林裡牽拉出來,一個削弱他的力氣,一個壞他的命根。三相對於諸行,應知也是這樣。
至於「住」,它在那些行上是攝受安立、常樂而不與它們相捨離的,所以不立在有為相之中。又,無為法也有「自相住」,住相與那個相濫,所以經不說它。
有人說:這部經是把「住」與「異」總合為一,名為「住異相」〔所以經說三相〕。〔問:〕何必這樣總合起來說?〔答:〕「住」是有情所愛著之處;為了令人厭捨它,才與「異」合起來說——就像把黑耳與吉祥一同示人〔見了黑耳便連吉祥也捨〕。所以必定有四種有為相。
〔難:〕這生等四相既然也是有為,就應當另外還有生等四相;若另外還有相,便招致無窮之過,因為那些相又還有其餘的生等相。〔答:〕應當說另外還有,然而不是無窮。為什麼呢?頌說:
〔正47前半〕四隨相——各於八法與一法有功能
頌:這四本相又有「生生」等〔四隨相〕;本相於八法、隨相於一法各有功能。
論:「此」指前面所說的四種本相。「生生等」,指四種隨相——生生、住住、異異、滅滅。諸行成為有為,是由四本相;本相成為有為,是由四隨相。
〔難:〕難道本相不像所相之法那樣,一一都應當有四種隨相,這樣又各各四種、展轉無窮嗎?〔答:〕沒有這個過失,因為四本相與四隨相在「八法」與「一法」上的功能有別。
什麼叫作功能?就是法的作用,或者說「士用」〔如人之作為〕。四種本相一一都對八法有用,四種隨相一一都只對一法有用。這是什麼意思?就是說:一法生的時候,連同它自己的體,共有九法一齊生起——自體為一,本相與隨相為八。本相中的「生」,除掉它自己,能生其餘的八法;隨相中的「生生」,在這九法之內只生本相的「生」。譬如母雞,有的一次生許多子,有的只生一子;「生」與「生生」,一個生八、一個生一,它們的力用也是這樣。本相中的「住」也是除掉自己而住其餘八法;隨相中的「住住」,在九法之中只住本相的「住」。「異」與「滅」相,隨其所應也是這樣。所以生等相雖然又有相,而隨相只有四種,沒有無窮之失。
〔以下經部起難。〕經部師說:憑什麼要這樣分割虛空〔在無物處強分名目〕?並不是生等相有實在的法體如你們所分別的那樣。為什麼呢?因為沒有決定的量〔可以證明〕。就是說:這些相不像色等那樣,有決定的現量、比量或至教量能證明其體實有。
〔有部引經:〕若是這樣,為什麼契經中說:『有為之起亦可了知,盡及住異亦可了知』?〔論主答:〕天愛!你們只執著文句而迷失了義理。薄伽梵說:義才是所依。這部經所說的實義是什麼?就是:愚夫之類被無明所盲,在諸行相續之上執有我、我所,長夜於其中生起耽著;世尊為了斷除他們這種執著,要顯示『行的相續其體是有為、是緣生之性』,所以才這樣說有三種有為之有為相——並不是要顯示諸行在一剎那中就具有這三相;因為一剎那中的起等三相是不可知的,而不可知的東西不應立為「相」。所以那部契經接著又說:『有為之起亦可了知,盡及住異亦可了知。』
至於經中重複說「有為」二字,是要令人知道『這相是表示有為』,不要以為這相是表示『有為法之存在』——像白鷺聚集表示有水並非沒有那樣;也不要以為它是表示有為法之善惡——像童女之相表示善或不善那樣。
諸行相續最初生起名為「生」,到終盡之位說名為「滅」,中間相續隨轉名為「住」,這前後的差別名為「住異」。世尊依這個義對難陀說:『這位善男子善知受之生、善知受之住,以及善知受之衰異壞滅。』所以說頌道:
〔引頌〕相續四相之一
頌:相續最初名為「生」,「滅」就是終盡之位,中間隨轉名為「住」,「住異」就是前後之別。
又有頌說:
〔引頌〕相續四相之二
頌:本來沒有、如今有了,就是「生」;相續隨轉,就是「住」;前後有別,就是「住異」;相續斷絕,名為「滅」。
又有頌說:
〔引頌〕剎那無住之頌
頌:由於諸法是剎那的,沒有「住」而只有「滅」;它們是自然而滅的,所以執有「住」〔相〕不合道理。
論:所以只在「相續」上說住——這樣一來,《對法》所說的道理才成立。所以那部論說:『什麼叫作住?就是一切行已生而未滅。』並不是「生已不滅」名為剎那法之性〔剎那法生已即滅,無不滅之位〕。
雖然《發智論》這樣說:『在一心之中,誰起名生?誰盡名死?誰住異名老?』然而那部論文是依『眾同分相續之心』而說的,不是就一剎那說。
又,就一一剎那的諸有為法而言,離開「執有實物」,四相也成立。怎麼成立?就是:一一念本無而今有,名為「生」;有了又還無,名為「滅」;後後剎那接續前前而起,名為「住」;就那前後有差別,名為「住異」。
〔難:〕在前後之念相似而生的時候,前後相望難道不是沒有差別嗎?〔答:〕那差別之相要怎麼知道?就像金剛等物,有擲出與未擲出之別,以及強力擲與弱力擲、墮落遲速有差別的緣故——可見大種的轉變差別之義是成立的。諸行相似相續而生的時候,前後相望沒有多大差別,所以雖然有異而看起來相似。
〔難:〕若是這樣,那麼最後的聲、光剎那,以及涅槃時最後的六處,因為沒有後念,就應當沒有「住異」;這樣一來,你所立的相就不遍於一切有為了。〔答:〕這裡並不是把「住」說為有為相。那是什麼意思?是說「住之異」。所以若有住,也必定有異;由此立相,沒有「不遍」之失。
然而這部經中世尊所說的有為之相,簡略地顯示,就是:有為法本無今有、有了又還無,以及相續而住;就這前後相望的差別。在這裡何必要用生等別物呢?
〔有部難:〕怎麼可以把「所相之法」就立為「能相」?〔經部答:〕就像大士之相並不異於大士;角、犎、𩑶、蹄、尾這些牛相並不異於牛;又像堅等就是地等界之相而不異於地等;遠遠看見上升之物而知是煙相,也不異於煙的體。這有為之相,道理也應如此。雖然已了知有為色等的自性,但在還沒有了知「先無後無相續差別」之前,仍然不知道它的體是有為;所以並不是『色等之性』本身就是有為相——然而也不是離開那色等之性另有生等實物。
〔有部反問:〕若是離開有為色等自性而有生等之物,又有什麼不合理?〔經部答:〕一法在一時之中就應當同時正生、正住、正衰異、正壞滅——因為你許四相俱有的緣故。〔有部答:〕這個難不成立,因為作用的時間有別:生的作用在未來,現在已生的不再生。諸法生了正在現在的時候,住等三相的作用才起;不是生用的時候有其餘三種用。所以雖然俱有而不相違。
〔經部再破:〕且應當思擇:未來法的體是有還是無,然後才好說「生」在那個位次上有用還是無用。假使許未來的生有作用,那怎麼還算未來?請說出「未來相」來。法在現在的時候生用已謝,那怎麼還算現在?請說出「現在相」來。
又,住等三種作用都在現在,那就應當一法之體在一剎那中同時有安住、衰異、壞滅。如果這時住相能住此法,同時異、滅又能衰壞它,那麼這時候這個法該叫作安住呢、叫作衰異呢、還是叫作壞滅呢?那些說『住等作用不同時』的人,他們的說法就違背了剎那滅之義。
如果說:我是說一法的諸相作用都究竟完成才名為一剎那。那麼你如今應當說:憑什麼住相與異、滅二相一齊生起,而「住」卻能先發用去住所住之法,使它不異不滅?如果說住的力量強所以能先用,那麼後來怎麼又變弱,以致連同本法一齊遭受異、滅所衰壞?
如果說住相已經起了作用就不應再起,如同「生」那樣——「生」是可以這樣說的:所謂生的作用,是引所生之法令它入現在;已經入了就不應再引入。「住」卻不應這樣:所謂住的作用,是安住所住之法令它不衰不滅;已經住了正可以令它永遠安住下去。由這個道理,住相的作用應當恆常地起,不可以拿「生」來作例子說它沒有再用。
又,是誰障礙住的作用,令它暫有還無?如果說是異、滅能作障礙,那麼異、滅之力應該更強,為什麼不在先發用?又,住的作用一停止,異、滅與本法自然就不住了;那麼異、滅二相要在什麼地方、怎樣地起作用?而且還有什麼事需要這二種作用呢?由於住的攝持,諸法生了才暫時不滅;住的作用一旦捨去,法必定不住而即刻自然滅去——所以異、滅之用再沒有可作的了。
又,一法生了而未壞名為「住」、住了而壞時名為「滅」,這道理姑且還可以;至於「異」在一法之中,進也好退也好,一路推徵下去,於理都不應有。為什麼呢?「異」是指前後性相的轉變,並不是就這一法本身可以說「異於此」。所以說頌道:
〔引頌〕一法立異終不成
頌:若說就是先前那個〔而說異〕,異便不成立;若說異於先前的,那就不是同一法了。所以在一法之上,要立「異」終究不能成立。
論:雖然其餘部派說:遇到滅的因緣,滅相才能滅所滅之法。然而他們所說的,就好像有人說:服瀉藥的時候還要有天神來令它通利。〔既然〕滅的因緣就能滅所滅,何必另外執有一個滅相?又,心與心所他們也許是剎那滅的,並不須要再等待其餘的滅因緣;那麼「滅」與「住」的作用就應當沒有先後了——這樣一來,一法在一時之中也住也滅,就不合正理。
所以依「相續」而說有為之相,既不違正理,又善順契經。
〔以下答未來法何不頓生。〕如果「生」在未來就能生所生之法,那麼未來的一切法為什麼不一齊生起?頌說:
〔正47後半〕生能生所生,不離因緣和合
頌:「生」能生所生之法,但不能離開因緣和合。
論:不是離開其餘的因緣和合,單憑生相之力就能生所生;所以諸未來法不是全都頓時生起。
〔經部難:〕若是這樣,我們就只看見因緣有生的功能,並沒有另外的生相。因緣一和合,諸法就生;不和合就不生——何必勞駕一個生相?可見只有因緣之力能起〔諸法〕。
〔有部答:〕難道一切有的法都是你所能知道的嗎?法性幽微、極難了知,所以雖然現有其體而不可知。生相如果沒有,就不應當有「生」的認知;而且第六轉的語言〔「之」字所表的屬主關係〕也不能成立——像說「色之生」「受之生」等等。就如同不應該說「色之色」那樣。像你責難「無生」一樣,乃至「無滅」也都可以這樣責難,隨其所應。
〔經部反責:〕若是這樣,為了成立「空、無我」的認知,是不是也應當在法之外執有『空性、無我性』?為了成立「一二大小各別合離彼此有性」等等的認知,是不是也應當像外道那樣,在法之外執有數、量、各別、合、離、彼、此、有等等別性?又為了成立第六轉的語言,是不是應當執另有「色之聚性」?又如說「色之自性」,這第六轉的語言又怎麼成立?
所以生等只是假立的,沒有別的實物。為了說明諸行「本無今有」而假立為「生」。這樣的「本無今有」之生相,依於色等法而種類眾多;為了簡別其餘的,才說第六轉的語言「色之生」「受之生」等等,為的是令別人知道『這個生唯屬於色而不是其餘的受等』。其餘的例子也是這樣。就像世間說「栴檀之香」「石子之體」,這裡也應當如此。至於住等,隨其所應也照這樣去理解。
〔有部難:〕如果諸行離開生相就能生,那麼虛空無為等等為什麼不生?〔經部答:〕諸行叫作「生」,是由於本無今有;無為之體恆常地有,怎麼能說它生?又,就像法爾如此,並不說一切法都有生;同樣地,也應當許『不是一切法都可生』。又,就像有為法同樣都有生相,而你們也許因緣對於有為法或有功能、或無功能;同樣地,也應當許一切有為與無為法同樣都沒有生相,而諸因緣對那二類法一個有生用、一個沒有生用。
〔有部結:〕毘婆沙師說生等相另有實物,這個道理應當成立。為什麼呢?豈能因為設難的人多,就放棄自己所宗?不會因為怕有鹿來就不種麥,也不會因為怕多蠅來附就不吃美團。所以對於責難應當勤加通釋,對於本宗之義應當隨順修行。
這樣,諸有為相已經辨明。名身等之類,它的義是怎樣的?頌說:
〔正48前半〕名身、句身、文身
頌:所謂「名身」等,就是想、章、字的「總說」。
論:「等」字是等取句身、文身。應知這裡所說的「名」就是「作想」——如說色、聲、香、味等等之想。「句」就是「章」,能把義詮說得究竟——如說『諸行無常』等章。或者說:能辨明業用、德、時的相應與差別,這樣的章就稱為句。「文」就是「字」——如說𧙃、阿、壹、伊等字。
〔難:〕這些字不也是書寫符號的名稱嗎?〔答:〕不是為了顯示書寫符號才製造諸字,而是為了顯示諸字才製造書寫符號。〔因為要考慮〕怎樣才能令人雖然沒有聽到說出來、卻也能理解,所以才造書寫符號。所以諸字並不是書寫符號的名稱。
什麼叫作「名等身」?就是想等的「總說」。所謂總說,就是合集之義——因為在合集之義中說到「嗢遮」這個字界的緣故。這裡所說的名身,就是色、聲、香等〔多名相合〕;句身,就是『諸行無常』『一切法無我』『涅槃寂靜』等等;文身,就是迦、佉、伽等等。
〔難:〕這三者不是以「語」為性的嗎?既以聲為體,就該屬色的自性所攝,怎麼反而說是心不相應行?〔答:〕這三者並不是以語為自性。語是音聲,而不是單憑音聲就能令人了義。〔問:〕那怎樣才令人了義?〔答:〕是語發起「名」,名能顯義,這才能令人了知。
〔又〕不是所有的音聲都稱為「語」;必須由於它而使義可以了知,這樣的音聲才稱為語。什麼樣的音聲能令義可了?就是能說的人在諸義之中已經共同立定為『能詮的定量』〔約定俗成〕的那種。且如古人在九種義之中共立一個「瞿」聲作為能詮的定量。所以有頌說:
〔引頌〕瞿聲九義
頌:方、獸、地、光、言、金剛、眼、天、水——在這九種義上,智者立了一個「瞿」聲〔來共同指稱〕。
論:那些執「名能顯義」的人,也必定應當承認:這樣的「義之名」也是共立為能詮定量的。既然這句義是由「名」才能顯,而單憑音聲顯示的作用就已經辦妥了,那又何必橫加計度、另立一個實有的「名」?
再說,還沒弄明白這個「名」是怎樣由語發起的:是由語所顯,還是由語所生?如果是由語所生,那麼由於一切語都是聲性,一切聲都應當能生名;如果說能生名的聲有差別,那麼這個差別已經足以顯義了,何必再等一個別的「名」?如果是由語所顯,那麼由於一切語都是聲性,一切聲都應當能顯名;如果說能顯名的聲有差別,那麼這個差別已經足以顯義了,何必再等一個別的「名」?
又,諸念之聲不能聚集,也沒有一個法是一分一分漸漸生起的,那麼「名」的生起怎麼可以由語來發?〔有人比附說:〕那怎麼解釋『等待過去諸表業剎那,由最後的表業剎那能生無表』呢?〔答:〕若是這樣,就要到最後一位的聲才生名;那麼只聽最後一聲就應當能了義了〔事實不然〕。
如果這樣執:語能生文、文又生名、名才顯義。這裡的責難應當同前面所說一樣——因為諸念之文也不能聚集。至於「語顯名」的過失,也應當比照「語生名」來說。又,異於語的「文」,那些明慧的人專注思擇也辨不出它的相〔可見語外無別文〕。又,文由語而或顯或生,比照「語於名」來說,都不合道理。
又,如果有人執:名如同生等〔四相〕一樣與義俱生。那麼現在世的名去指目過去、未來之義,就不應該有了。又,父母等隨自己的意願給孩子等立名,怎麼能說名如同生等一樣與義俱起?又,無為法應當沒有名,因為它沒有「生」義——可是你們並不承認〔無為無名〕。
然而世尊說頌『依於名及文而生』——這只是說:這在諸義上是眾人共立的分量。聲就是名,這個名的安布差別就成為頌。由於這個義,才說「頌依於名」。這頌就是名的安布差別;執它是實有之物,不合正理——如同眾樹成行、諸心次第〔行與次第都不在樹與心之外〕。
或者只應當執另有「文」的體,就把它們總集起來作為名等身;再執有其餘的〔名、句〕便是多餘無用。
〔有部結:〕毘婆沙師說另有實物作為名等身,是心不相應行蘊所攝,是實而不是假。為什麼呢?因為不是一切法都是尋思所能了知的。
這名身等是何界所繫?是有情數還是非有情數?是異熟生、是所長養,還是等流性?是善、是不善,還是無記?這些都應當辨明。頌說:
〔正48後半〕名身等之界繫、五類、三性
頌:〔名身等〕唯欲界、色界所繫,有情數所攝,是等流性、無覆無記性。
論:這名身等唯是欲界、色界二界所繫。有的說也通無色界所繫,然而不可說〔說不出來〕。又,名身等是有情數所攝——因為是能說的人所成就的,不是所顯之義〔義通非情〕。又,名身等唯是等流〔非異熟、非長養〕。又唯是無覆無記性所攝。
如上所說,其餘不相應行還沒有說到的義,如今應當略作辨明。頌說:
〔正49〕同分等餘義總辨
頌:同分也和〔名身等〕一樣,並且通無色界、也通異熟;得與諸相通三類;非得與二定唯是等流。
論:說「亦如是」,是要顯示同分如同名身等一樣,通於欲界色界、有情數、等流、無覆無記。說「并無色」,是顯示它不只在欲色二界。說「并異熟」,是顯示它不只是等流。所以〔同分〕就界而言通於三界,就類而言通於等流、異熟二義。
「得」以及諸相,就類而言並通於三種——就是有剎那、等流、異熟。「非得」與二定唯是等流。說一個「唯」字,是要表明它們不是異熟等。
如上所未說之義已經說完。無想與命根,如前面已經辨明過了〔所以此處不再說〕。
〔問:〕為什麼不說「得」等唯是有情數所攝?〔答:〕因為前面已經說過『有情所成』等等了。〔問:〕為什麼不說「相」是通於有情數與非有情數的?〔答:〕因為前面已經說過『一切有為都與四相俱』了。其餘還沒有說到的,隨其所應可以類推而知。
〔Stanza 42, First Line〕Commonality—The Real Thing by Which Sentient Beings Resemble One Another
Stanza: Commonality is the dharma that makes sentient beings “alike.”
Treatise: There is a separate real thing named “commonality”—it makes sentient beings equal in class as they succeed one another. The Root Treatise (the fundamental treatise of the Sarvāstivādins) calls it “the commonality of sentient beings.” This commonality is again of two kinds: undifferentiated and differentiated. Undifferentiated commonality is the “commonality of sentient beings” shared by all sentient beings—because every sentient being possesses it equally. Differentiated commonality is the commonality established severally for sentient beings according to realm, level, destiny, mode of birth, and lineage, and according to female, male, lay follower (a householder who has taken the precepts), monk (one gone forth), one in training, one beyond training, and the rest—because sentient beings of one class each possess it equally. There is also dharma-commonality, established according to the aggregates, sense fields, and elements〔the dharma by which dharmas resemble one another〕.
If there were no real thing having “undifferentedness” for its characteristic and named commonality, then among sentient beings that differ one from another the equal and undifferentiated cognition and expression, ‘this too is a sentient being, that too is a sentient being,’ ought not to be established. So too with the equal and undifferentiated cognition and expression regarding the aggregates and the rest〔the dharmas of the three classifications〕〔which would likewise not be established without dharma-commonality〕—the reasoning is to be understood in the same way.
Is there a case of dying and being born again in which the commonality of sentient beings is neither relinquished nor newly acquired? A fourfold analysis should be made. The first case: dying in one place and being born again in that same place〔commonality neither relinquished nor acquired〕. The second case: at the moment of entering “the certainty of the noble path” (the path of seeing), relinquishing the commonality of an ordinary being and acquiring the commonality of a noble one〔both relinquished and acquired〕. The third case: dying in this destiny and being born in another destiny and the like〔both relinquished and acquired, as regards destiny〕. The fourth case: excluding the three cases above〔all that remains〕.
〔What follows is the author of the treatise raising questions on behalf of the Sautrāntikas.〕If there were a separate real thing named “the commonality of an ordinary being,” what need would there be to establish “ordinary-being status” separately? It is not as though there were a “humanness” apart from the commonality of a human being. Moreover, commonality is not what the world can see with its eyes—for it is not form; nor is it what awakened discernment can discern—for it has no separate operation. People, though they do not know that there is〔a substantial〕commonality of sentient beings, all the same form the cognition of ‘no difference’ regarding sentient beings; so even granting that it has an entity, what use is it?
Again, on what ground is “commonality of the insentient” not allowed? Grain, wheat, beans, gold, iron, and the mango and the jackfruit tree, and the rest—do not these too have their several likenesses within their own kinds? Again, the several commonalities also differ one from another; how is it that no further commonality is established upon those commonalities, and yet the cognition and expression that ‘they have no difference’ can still arise?
Further,〔by establishing it thus〕you exactly establish the position held by the Vaiśeṣika outsiders: that school holds that there is a “category of universal sameness,” saying that the expression and understanding of ‘all is one and the same being’ which arises with regard to all dharmas is produced by this category of universal sameness; and it further holds that there is a “category of sameness-and-difference,” saying that the expression and understanding of ‘this is the same, that is different’ which arises with regard to distinct classes is produced by this category of sameness-and-difference.
The Vaibhāṣikas answer thus: what they hold is not of the same kind of sense as this〔commonality〕of ours—for they speak of ‘one thing operating upon many things’〔whereas our commonality belongs to each sentient being severally and is momentary and impermanent〕. And, granting the point either way, whether or not that amounts to establishing the outsiders’ position, this commonality must have a real entity, because the sūtra says so. As the World-Honored One said: ‘If he comes back here, he acquires the commonality of a human being,’ and so on at length.
〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕Though there is such a scriptural text, the sūtra does not say that ‘there is a separate real thing named commonality.’〔The Sarvāstivādins ask:〕If so, what is the commonality the sūtra speaks of?〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕It is that when formations of this class arise, ‘the commonality of a human being’ and the like are provisionally established upon them—just as one speaks of the commonality of grain, wheat, beans, and the rest〔a mere name〕.〔The author of the treatise judges:〕This is not well stated, because it contradicts my own〔Sarvāstivāda〕school.
Commonality has now been analyzed. What is the result of non-perception? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 42, Lines Two through Four〕The Result of Non-Perception—The Maturation That Shuts Off Mind in the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings
Stanza: The result of non-perception is the dharma that, within the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, makes mind and the dharmas that are mental factors cease; it is maturation, and its dwelling is in the Bṛhatphala Heaven.
Treatise: If one is born among the non-percipient sentient beings of that heaven, there is a dharma that can make mind and mental factors cease, and this dharma is named “the result of non-perception.” It is a real thing, able to block future mind and mental factors and make them not arise for a time—just as a dyke blocks a river. This dharma is invariably a maturation result. The maturation of what? Of the absorption without perception.
Where do the non-percipient sentient beings dwell? In the Bṛhatphala Heaven. Within the Bṛhatphala Heaven there is a high and superior place—just as〔within the first meditative absorption there is〕the intermediate absorption—named the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings.
Are those sentient beings constantly without perception, or do they also have perception? In the phases of being born and of dying they have perception for a long while. They are called “non-percipient” because in the long interval between, perception does not arise in them. As the sūtra says: those sentient beings pass away from that place because perception arises. And those sentient beings, like one waking from a long sleep, give rise to perception again.
After passing away from there they are necessarily born in the desire realm and not in any other place—because the force of the concentrated practice cultivated earlier is exhausted, and there they cannot cultivate concentration again; just as an arrow shot into the sky must fall when its force is spent. If a sentient being is about to be born in that place, he must first have karma of the desire realm “to be experienced in a later life”〔karma whose result is held over to a later birth〕—just as one who is about to be born in Uttarakuru must have karma for birth among the gods〔since one who dies there is necessarily born among gods〕.
The result of non-perception has now been analyzed. What are the two absorptions? They are the absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation. The absorption without perception is stated first: what is its characteristic? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 43〕The Absorption without Perception—The Outsiders’ Absorption That Shuts Off Mind in Search of Liberation
Stanza: The absorption without perception is like the result of non-perception stated above〔making mind and mental factors cease〕; it is in the later meditative absorption, its attention is directed to seeking liberation; its quality is wholesome only, and it is to be experienced in the next life only; it is not attained by noble ones, and at its first attainment only one time-period is obtained.
Treatise: As stated above, there is a dharma able to make mind and mental factors cease, named “the result of non-perception”; in the same way there is another dharma able to make mind and mental factors cease, named “the absorption without perception.” The absorption of one who is without perception is called the absorption without perception; or else, the absorption that is itself non-perception is called the absorption without perception〔the former is a dependent-determinative reading, the latter an appositional-determinative one〕. The words “is like this” in the stanza are only meant to show this much: that in making mind and mental factors cease, this absorption is the same as the result of non-perception.
On which level is this absorption? In the later meditative absorption, that is, in the fourth meditative absorption, and on no other level. In search of what is the absorption without perception cultivated? In search of liberation. Those people hold “non-perception” to be true liberation, and in order to realize it they cultivate the absorption without perception.
It was said above that the result of non-perception is maturation, and so it is of indeterminate quality, which need not be stated again. This absorption without perception, however, is invariably wholesome. Because it is wholesome, it can bring about the five-aggregate maturation among the non-percipient sentient beings of that heaven. Being of wholesome quality, then, in which manner is it to be experienced〔as to the time of its result〕? To be experienced in the next life only—not in the present life, not in a later life, and not indeterminately. If one has aroused this absorption and afterwards falls away from it, it is transmitted that such a person will certainly be able to arouse it again in this present life and will in future be born among the non-percipient sentient beings of that heaven; hence one who has attained this absorption certainly cannot enter the certainty of the noble path〔the path of seeing〕.
Again, this absorption can be attained by ordinary beings only and not by noble ones—for the noble ones regard the absorption without perception as they would the sight of a deep pit and take no pleasure in entering it. Only by holding “non-perception” to be true liberation and giving rise to the notion of renunciation does one cultivate this absorption; and no noble one holds what is with outflows to be true liberation or true renunciation, and so they certainly do not practice this absorption.
When noble ones attain the absorption of the fourth meditative absorption, do they, as with attaining a meditative absorption, thereby also attain the past and future absorption without perception? They do not attain even the rest〔of that absorption without perception〕. Why? Because although that absorption without perception has been cultivated before, being without mind it must be attained by a great preparatory effort, and so at its first attainment only one time-period is obtained—that is, the present time only; as with first receiving the individual liberation precepts〔where too only the present is obtained〕. After attaining this absorption, from the second moment onward and until it has not yet been relinquished, one also possesses〔that share〕belonging to the past; but because it is without mind, there is no “future cultivation.”
Next the absorption of cessation is stated: what is its characteristic? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 44 and Stanza 45, First Half〕The Absorption of Cessation—The Mindless Absorption a Noble One Enters in Search of Peaceful Abiding
Stanza: The absorption of cessation is likewise as above〔making mind and mental factors cease〕; its attention is directed to seeking peaceful abiding, and its level is the summit of existence; its quality is wholesome, and its being experienced in the next life or in a later life is indeterminate; it is attained by noble ones only, through preparatory practice; the Buddha attains it at the moment of becoming a buddha and not before, because of the thirty-four moments.
Treatise: As with the absorption without perception, so it is with the absorption of cessation. What is the sense that the words “likewise so” take by analogy? They take by analogy the “ceasing of mind and mental factors” in the absorption without perception. As was said above, ‘there is another dharma able to make mind and mental factors cease, named the absorption without perception’; in the same way, there is another dharma able to make mind and mental factors cease, named the absorption of cessation.
The differing characteristics of these two absorptions are as follows: the former, the absorption without perception, is for seeking liberation, and is preceded by an attention with the “notion of renunciation”; this absorption of cessation is for seeking peaceful abiding, and is preceded by an attention with the “notion of stilling.” The former, the absorption without perception, is in the later meditative absorption; this absorption of cessation is only at the summit of existence, that is, at the station of neither perception nor non-perception.
This absorption, like the absorption without perception above, is of wholesome quality only, neither indeterminate nor defiled—because it is set in motion by a wholesome mind. The former, the absorption without perception, is to be experienced in the next life only; this absorption of cessation extends to being experienced in the next life, in a later life, and indeterminately—as regards its maturation, it may be experienced in the next life, or in a later life, or indeterminately, or not experienced at all. “Not experienced at all” means that if one reaches parinirvāṇa upon a lower level〔one does not experience the result at the summit of existence〕. Of which level and of how many aggregates does this absorption bring about the maturation? It brings about the four-aggregate maturation at the summit of existence only〔the summit of existence being formless, there is no aggregate of form there〕.
The former, the absorption without perception, is attained by ordinary beings only; this absorption of cessation is attained by noble ones only and cannot be aroused by an ordinary being—because ordinary beings fear annihilation; and because it can be aroused only by the force of the noble path; and because it is entered only through the resolve upon “nirvāṇa in the present dharma.”
This absorption too, like the former, is not “attained by leaving defilement behind.” By what, then, is it attained? By preparatory practice—because it must be realized through preparatory practice. Again, at its first attainment only the present is obtained; the past is not obtained and the future is not cultivated—because it can be cultivated only by the force of mind. From the second moment onward and until it has not yet been relinquished, one also possesses〔that share〕belonging to the past.
Does the World-Honored One too attain it through preparatory practice? He does not. How, then? He attains it at the moment of becoming a buddha—that is, the Buddha, the World-Honored One, attains it when the “knowledge of exhaustion” arises. The Buddha has no quality attained through preparatory practice: he need only briefly arouse the wish and make it present, and every perfect quality arises just as he pleases; hence all the Buddha’s qualities are attained by leaving defilement behind.
〔Question:〕The World-Honored One had never before aroused the absorption of cessation; how then, at the moment of attaining the knowledge of exhaustion, did he become one “liberated in both parts”〔liberated from the obstruction of discernment and from the obstruction of concentration alike〕?〔Answer:〕Because he had attained sovereignty with regard to arousing the absorption of cessation, he is one liberated in both parts just as one who has already aroused it.
The masters of the West say: the bodhisattva, while still in training, first aroused this absorption and only then attained awakening.〔Question:〕Why is their account not allowed here?〔Answer:〕If their account were allowed, it would accord with the Venerable Upagupta’s Treatise That Is the Feet of Reason’s Eye—as that treatise says: ‘It should be said that the Tathāgata first aroused the absorption of cessation and afterwards produced the knowledge of exhaustion.’ The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say: it is not that he first aroused the absorption of cessation and only afterwards produced the knowledge of exhaustion. Why? It is transmitted that the bodhisattva attained awakening in thirty-four moments.〔Those thirty-four moments are:〕in the direct realization of the truths there are sixteen moments; in leaving behind the craving of the summit of existence there are eighteen—that is, cutting off the nine grades of affliction of the summit of existence, arousing nine uninterrupted paths and nine paths of liberation; these eighteen, added to the preceding sixteen, make thirty-four. Every bodhisattva must already have left behind craving as far as the station of nothingness before he enters the path of seeing, and need not cut off the afflictions of the lower levels again; and in the midst of this there is no occasion for a “mind of an unlike kind” to arise〔the mind of the absorption of cessation is with outflows, unlike the thirty-four moments without outflows〕; hence bodhisattvas while in training should not arouse the absorption of cessation.
The masters abroad speak thus: if a mind of an unlike kind did arise in the midst, what fault would there be?〔Answer:〕If so, there would be the fault of “transgressing the resolve of mind”〔going against the limit he had himself set〕. Yet bodhisattvas do not transgress the resolve of mind.〔The masters abroad:〕Reasonably, a bodhisattva does not transgress the resolve of mind; but it is not that he does not transgress the noble path without outflows〔arousing a mind with outflows is no transgression〕.〔Answer:〕If so, how is the resolve of mind not transgressed? The resolve of mind is this: ‘Until I attain the permanent exhaustion of the outflows, I shall not unloose this cross-legged posture.’〔The bodhisattva〕certainly does not transgress such a resolve of mind, because it is within a single sitting that he brings all things to their conclusion. The former account〔that of the masters of Kaśmīra〕is the better, because it is what my own school holds.
Although many characteristics in which the two absorptions are alike and unlike have already been stated, there are further likenesses and differences among them〔still to be stated〕. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 45, Second Half〕The Likeness and Difference of the Bodies upon Which the Two Absorptions Depend
Stanza: Both absorptions depend upon the desire and form realms〔for the bodies in which they arise〕; the absorption of cessation first arises among humans only.
Treatise: By “the two absorptions” are meant the absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation. Both these absorptions can become present in dependence upon the two realms, desire and form. If someone does not allow that the absorption without perception can also be aroused in the form realm, that contradicts this passage—the Root Treatise says: ‘There may be an existence that is form, and this existence is not of five formations.’ The meaning is: a sentient being bound to form may be born in a heaven with perception and dwell in a mind of an unlike kind, or may enter the absorption without perception, or may enter the absorption of cessation; or, having been born in the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, may enter non-perception—and this is what is called ‘an existence that is form, and this existence is not of five formations’〔being in the form realm and yet not having the formations of five aggregates〕. By this it is proved that both these absorptions can become present in dependence upon the desire and form realms, and this is their likeness.
As to their difference: the absorption without perception can first arise in both realms, desire and form; the absorption of cessation first arises among humans only. Only after this absorption has first been cultivated among humans, and there has first been a falling away from it, is one born in the form realm and cultivates it again in dependence upon a body of the form realm.
Does this absorption of cessation too fall away? It should be said that it does. Were it not so, it would injure the Udāyin Sūtra. That sūtra says: ‘Venerable one! There are monks who, having formerly here been complete in pure moral discipline, complete in concentration, and complete in discernment, are able to enter and emerge from the absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception again and again—this does occur. It should be known as it really is that in the present dharma, or at the moment of death, they cannot diligently cultivate so as to fulfill liberation; and that after the breaking up of this body they pass beyond the gods who take food in portions and are reborn in one place or another with a heavenly body formed by mind. Having been born there, they are again able to enter and emerge from the absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception again and again—this too does occur.’ It should be known as it really is that this “heavenly body formed by mind” the Buddha declares to be of the form realm, while the absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception is only at the summit of existence. If one who has attained this absorption certainly did not fall away, how could he take birth in the form realm?
Some other schools hold that the fourth meditative absorption also has the absorption of cessation. On what they hold, the position that the absorption of cessation does not fall away is also tenable.〔Answer:〕The position that ‘the fourth meditative absorption has the absorption of cessation’ certainly does not hold. Why? Because the sūtra speaks of “nine successive absorptions”〔the absorption of cessation standing ninth, above the summit of existence〕.〔Objection:〕If this must be so, how can there be the sense of a “leaping absorption”?〔Answer:〕This succession is stated with reference to a beginner; when sovereignty is attained, one may leap over and enter as one pleases.
Thus the two absorptions have several differences: a difference of level—the one in the fourth meditative absorption, the other on the level of the summit of existence; a difference of preparation—the one preceded by an attention with the notion of renunciation, the other by an attention with the notion of stilling; a difference of continuum—the one arising in the continuum of an ordinary being, the other in the continuum of a noble one; a difference of maturation—the one bringing about the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, the other the maturation result of the summit of existence; a difference in the manner of experience—the one to be experienced in the next life only, the other in the next life, in a later life, and indeterminately; a difference of first arising—the one first arising in the two realms of desire and form, the other among humans only.
The two absorptions have as their own nature simply “the ceasing of mind and mental factors”; why then are they called only “non-perception” and “cessation of feeling and perception”? Because in the preparatory practice of the two absorptions it is only these〔perception, or feeling and perception〕that are turned away from in disgust—just as〔the cognition of another’s mind〕can also know feeling and the rest and yet is called only “the cognition of another’s mind”〔being named from where the preparatory practice weighs〕.
Now that within the two absorptions mind has been cut off for a long time, how does mind arise again afterwards? The Vaibhāṣikas allow that the past exists, and so an earlier mind can serve as the immediately antecedent condition of a later mind. Certain other masters say: just as, when one is born in the formless realm, form is cut off for a long time, how does form arise again afterwards? The re-arising of that form must be from mind and not from form〔the earlier form not existing〕; in the same way, the mind that emerges from the absorption should also be so—it arises from the “body endowed with faculties” and not from〔a previous〕mind. And so those preceptors of former times all said that the two dharmas, mind and the body endowed with faculties, are seeds of one another. By the two dharmas are meant mind and the body endowed with faculties.
The Venerable Vasumitra says in the Treatise of Questions: if one holds that the absorption of cessation is wholly without mind, then this fault does arise; I say that in the absorption of cessation there is still a subtle mind〔and so there is no need to posit their being seeds of one another〕, and therefore this fault does not arise. The Venerable Ghoṣa says that this does not hold in reason. Why? If there were consciousness in this absorption, then, faculty, object, and consciousness having come together, there would necessarily be contact; and with contact for a condition there would be feeling and perception. As the World-Honored One said: ‘With mind and dharmas for conditions, mind-consciousness arises; and with the contact of the three come together arise feeling, perception, and volition.’ Then within this absorption feeling, perception, and the rest would also not cease〔and it would not be an absorption of the cessation of feeling and perception〕.
If it be said: just as the sūtra says “feeling is the condition of craving,” and yet an arhat, though he has feelings, does not give rise to craving; so it should be with contact—not every contact serves as the condition of feeling and the rest.〔Answer:〕This example does not hold, because there is a difference of qualification. The sūtra qualifies it of itself, saying: ‘Feelings produced by a contact of ignorance are the condition for the arising of craving.’ But nowhere has it ever qualified “contact producing feeling.” Hence the two differ.
For this reason the Vaibhāṣikas say that within the absorption of cessation all minds cease.〔Question:〕If there is wholly no mind, how is it still called an “absorption”?〔Answer:〕Because it makes the great elements operate evenly, it is called an absorption; or else, because the force of the〔preceding〕mind of concentration reaches evenly to this point, it is called an absorption.
Are these two absorptions really existent or provisionally existent? It should be said that they are really existent—because they can block mind and make mind not arise. Some say: this proof does not hold in reason, because it is the preceding mind of concentration that does the blocking. That is: the preceding mind of concentration arises in opposition to other minds, and by its arising it merely makes other minds not operate for a time; it〔the mind of concentration〕can give rise to a support opposed to mind and make it continue on, and so an absorption is provisionally established only upon this station in which “mind does not operate,” and there is no separate entity. This is an absorption merely provisionally established upon the station in which mind does not operate: it is not there before the absorption is entered nor after it is emerged from, and so it is provisionally said to be included among the conditioned. Or else: it is that very support, drawn on by the mind of concentration and made to arise in that way, upon which an absorption is provisionally established.
It should be known that the result of non-perception is likewise: a preceding mind arises in opposition to other minds, and by its arising it merely makes other minds not operate for a time; and upon the station in which “mind does not operate” the result of non-perception is provisionally established, the rest being as stated above.〔The author of the treatise judges:〕This is not well stated, because it contradicts my own school.
The two absorptions have now been analyzed. What is the life faculty? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 46, First Half〕The Life Faculty—It Is “Lifespan,” Able to Sustain Warmth and Consciousness
Stanza: The entity of the life faculty is lifespan, and it is able to sustain warmth and consciousness.
Treatise: The entity of life is lifespan. Therefore the Abhidharma says: ‘What is the life faculty? Lifespan in the three realms.’ This is still not clear: what dharma is called lifespan? It is that there is another dharma able to sustain warmth and consciousness, and this is called lifespan. Therefore the World-Honored One said:
〔Quoted Stanza〕When the Three Dharmas Lifespan, Warmth, and Consciousness Leave the Body
Stanza: Lifespan, warmth, and consciousness—when these three dharmas leave the body, the body they leave lies stiff and prone, like a piece of wood without thought or feeling.
Treatise: Therefore there is another dharma serving as the cause that sustains warmth and consciousness in continuing to abide, and it is called “lifespan.”
〔What follows is the incidental discussion on whether the life faculty is really or provisionally existent.〕If so, what dharma is able to sustain this lifespan? It is warmth and consciousness that in turn sustain this lifespan.〔If so,〕these three dharmas sustain one another and turn on together—then which dharma ceases first? And by that one’s ceasing, the other two would cease after it.〔If none ceases first,〕then these three dharmas should be everlasting and never pass away. That being so, this lifespan must be sustained by “karma”—because it continues on as karma draws it.
If so, on what ground is it not allowed that karma alone sustains warmth and consciousness, and that lifespan is required besides? In reason it should not be so: one must not let it follow that ‘all consciousness from beginning to end is constantly maturation’〔for if there were no lifespan and karma alone sustained consciousness, consciousness would be constantly maturation, which does not accord with the facts〕. That being so, it should be said that karma sustains warmth and warmth in turn sustains consciousness—what need is there for this lifespan?〔Answer:〕In that case, in the formless realm there would be nothing to sustain consciousness, since there is no warmth there.〔Objection:〕Then it should be said that in the formless realm consciousness is sustained by karma.〔Answer:〕How can you shift your account again and again to suit yourself—now saying that this consciousness is sustained by warmth alone, now again that karma alone sustains consciousness? And this has already been said above. What was said above? Just this: one must not let it follow that ‘all consciousness from beginning to end is maturation.’ Therefore it must be granted that there is another dharma able to sustain warmth and consciousness, and it is called lifespan.
〔The Sautrāntikas say:〕Now I too do not say that there is no entity of lifespan at all; I say only that the entity of lifespan is not a separate real thing.〔Question:〕If so, what dharma is called the entity of lifespan?〔Answer:〕It is the “portion of duration of the commonality” drawn forth by the karma of the three realms, and this is said to be the entity of lifespan. The commonality drawn forth by the karma of the three realms has a portion of duration that continues on with determinacy, and one abides for just so long as one is to abide; hence this portion is said to be the entity of lifespan. It is like the portion drawn forth by a seed of grain and the rest, lasting until the time of ripening; or like the portion drawn forth by the shooting of an arrow, lasting until the time of coming to rest.
〔An outsider interposes an objection:〕Some say that there is a “formation” that is a distinct quality, arising in dependence on an arrow and the like, and that by its force the arrow keeps travelling without cease so long as it has not fallen to the ground.〔The author of the treatise refutes:〕Its entity being one and having no resistance, there ought to be no differences of station in going toward a different direction—of speed, of slowness, of time of arrival; and it ought never to fall at all. If it be said that it is obstructed by wind, then it ought either to fall as soon as it is released or never to fall—since the wind that obstructs has no difference before and after.
〔The author of the treatise endorses the Sarvāstivādins:〕‘There is a separate real thing able to sustain warmth and consciousness, named the entity of lifespan’—this account is the better.
〔What follows analyzes the cause of death.〕Does one die because lifespan is exhausted, or is there some other cause? The Treatise of Designations says: there is dying because lifespan is exhausted, and there is dying not because merit is exhausted, making a fourfold analysis at length. The first case: the force of the karma bringing about the maturation of lifespan is exhausted. The second case: the force of the karma bringing about the result of wealth and pleasure is exhausted. The third case: the karma able to bring about both is exhausted together. The fourth case: one cannot avoid a violent condition coming from without〔an untimely death〕. Besides these it should also be said that ‘one dies through relinquishing the life-formations’〔as the Buddha and the arhats relinquish the life-formations themselves〕. At the station where lifespan is exhausted, the exhaustion of merit has no further operation with regard to death; hence when both are exhausted together there is death, and this is called “dying because both are exhausted.”
The Treatise on the Development of Wisdom says: should this lifespan be said to turn along with the continuum, or should it be said to abide as soon as it arises?—Of sentient beings bound to the desire realm who do not enter the absorption without perception and do not enter the absorption of cessation, it should be said that this lifespan turns along with the continuum; of those who enter the absorption without perception or the absorption of cessation, and of all sentient beings bound to form and to the formless, it should be said that this lifespan abides as soon as it arises. What does that mean? If the supporting body can be injured, lifespan is injured along with it, and this is called the first kind, “turning along with the continuum”; if the supporting body cannot be injured but abides just as it arose, this is called the second kind, “abiding as soon as it arises.”
The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say: the first clause shows that there is obstruction and the second that there is none; and by this it is settled that there is “untimely death.” Therefore the sūtra speaks of four kinds of “acquiring a body of one’s own”: there is a kind of acquiring a body of one’s own that can be injured only by oneself and not by another. A fourfold analysis is made at length. That which can be injured only by oneself and not by another: the gods of playful forgetfulness and the gods of mental wrath born in the desire realm—because they arouse an excessive delight or anger and so pass away there, and not by any other condition. Besides these it should also be said “the Buddhas who enter parinirvāṇa of themselves”〔this too being by oneself and not by another〕. That which can be injured only by another and not by oneself: the classes of sentient beings within the womb or the egg. That which can be injured by both: most of the remaining sentient beings of the desire realm. That which can be injured by neither: all sentient beings in the intermediate existence and in the form and formless realms, and a portion of those in the desire realm—such as the beings of naraka (the hells), those of Uttarakuru, one properly abiding on the path of seeing, one abiding in the absorption of loving-kindness, one abiding in the absorption of cessation or the absorption without perception, royal seers, the Buddha’s envoys, and those the Buddha has prophesied—Damira, Uttara, Gaṅgila, Yaśas the householder’s son, and Kumārajīva—together with the bodhisattva in his final body, and the mother of that bodhisattva while she bears the bodhisattva in her womb, and every wheel-turning monarch, and the mother of a wheel-turning monarch while she bears him in her womb.
If so, why does the sūtra say: ‘Great one! Which sentient being’s acquired body of his own can be injured neither by himself nor by another?’ ‘Śāriputra! It is the sentient being reborn in the station of neither perception nor non-perception’〔naming only the summit of existence〕? It is transmitted: the bodies of their own acquired in the remaining formless meditative absorptions can be injured by the noble path of their own level and can also be injured by the preliminary stage of one level above; only at the summit of existence are both these injuries absent, and so it is said to be “injurable by neither.”
〔Objection:〕Is not the summit of existence also injured by the noble path of another level, and should it not then be called injurable by another?〔Answer:〕Here it should be said to be “naming the last to display the first”—just as elsewhere it is “naming the first to display the last.” Where is the first named to display the last? As the sūtra says: ‘Like the Brahmakāyika gods—this is called the first heaven of pleasant birth.’ Where is the last named to display the first? As the sūtra says: ‘Like the Ābhāsvara gods—this is called the second heaven of pleasant birth.’
〔The objector says again:〕The word “like” in those sūtras displays the sense of a simile, and only so may one say “naming one to display the rest”—because the way of a simile is to name one and display its like. Here〔in the sūtra of Śāriputra’s question and answer〕there is no word “like,” and so one may not reason in the same way.〔Answer:〕If the word “like” occurred only where there is the sense of a simile, then the word “like” ought not to occur in the other sūtras. But another sūtra says thus: ‘Sentient beings with form, differing in body and differing in perception, like a portion of humans and the gods—this is the first station of consciousness.’ Hence it is known that the word “like” occurs where there is no simile as well.
The incidental discussion stops here. The life faculty has now been analyzed. What are the characteristics? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 46, Second Half〕The Four Conditioned Marks—Arising, Abiding, Change, and Cessation
Stanza: What are called the marks are the arising, abiding, change, and cessation of conditioned dharmas.
Treatise: Since these four are the marks of the conditioned, a dharma that has these four should be conditioned, and what is contrary to this is an unconditioned dharma. These four marks, with regard to dharmas: what can make a dharma arise is called “arising”; what can make it settle is called “abiding”; what can make it decay is called “change”; what can make it break up is called “cessation.” “Nature” has the sense of entity.
〔Objection:〕Does not the sūtra speak of “three conditioned marks of the conditioned”?〔Answer:〕In that sūtra four should reasonably have been stated; which is the one not stated? It is the mark of “abiding.” Yet what the sūtra calls “change of what abides” is precisely another name for “change” here—just as “arising” is called “origination” and “cessation” is called “exhaustion”; so it should be known that “change” is called “change of what abides.”
If a dharma can make the formations flow through the three times, this sūtra speaks of it as a conditioned mark, in order to make sentient beings give rise to a mind of weariness and dread. That is: those formations are moved by the force of “arising” and made to flow from the future into the present; and are pressed by the force of the marks “change” and “cessation” and made to flow from the present into the past—because they are made to decay and to break up. It is transmitted: it is like a man in the midst of a dense forest with three enemies wishing to injure him: one drags him out of the dense forest, one weakens his strength, and one destroys his life faculty. So it should be known are the three marks with regard to the formations.
As for “abiding,” it takes hold and settles those formations, is pleasant to them and does not part from them, and so it is not established among the conditioned marks. Again, unconditioned dharmas also have “abiding in their own characteristic,” and the mark of abiding would be confused with that, so the sūtra does not state it.
Some say: this sūtra takes “abiding” and “change” together as one, called the “mark of the change of what abides”〔and so the sūtra states three marks〕.〔Question:〕Why state them thus together?〔Answer:〕“Abiding” is what sentient beings cling to and love; in order to make them weary of it and cast it away, it is stated together with “change”—just as Black-Ear is shown together with Auspicious〔so that seeing Black-Ear one casts Auspicious away too〕. Therefore there are certainly four conditioned marks.
〔Objection:〕Since these four marks, arising and the rest, are themselves conditioned, there should be further marks of arising and the rest for them; and if there are further marks, an infinite regress follows, because those marks would again have their own further marks of arising and the rest.〔Answer:〕It should be said that there are further ones, and yet there is no infinite regress. Why? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 47, First Half〕The Four Secondary Marks—Their Function upon Eight Dharmas and upon One
Stanza: These four primary marks have in turn the “arising of arising” and the rest〔the four secondary marks〕; the primary marks have their function upon eight dharmas, the secondary marks upon one.
Treatise: “These” refers to the four primary marks stated above. “The arising of arising and the rest” refers to the four secondary marks—the arising of arising, the abiding of abiding, the change of change, and the cessation of cessation. That the formations are conditioned is by the four primary marks; that the primary marks are conditioned is by the four secondary marks.
〔Objection:〕Should not the primary marks, like the dharma they mark, each have four secondary marks, and those again four each, and so on without end?〔Answer:〕There is no such fault, because the four primary marks and the four secondary marks differ in their function upon “eight dharmas” and upon “one dharma.”
What is called function? It is a dharma’s operation, or what is called “human effort”〔as with a man’s doing〕. Each of the four primary marks has its operation upon eight dharmas, and each of the four secondary marks upon one dharma only. What does this mean? It means: when one dharma arises, together with its own entity nine dharmas arise all at once—its own entity being one, and the primary and secondary marks being eight. The “arising” among the primary marks, excluding itself, can give rise to the other eight; the “arising of arising” among the secondary marks gives rise, among these nine dharmas, only to the “arising” of the primary marks. It is like a hen: some hens bear many chicks and some bear only one; the powers of “arising” and “the arising of arising,” the one giving rise to eight and the other to one, are likewise. The “abiding” among the primary marks likewise excludes itself and makes the other eight abide; the “abiding of abiding” among the secondary marks makes only the “abiding” of the primary marks abide among the nine. “Change” and “cessation” are correspondingly the same. Hence, although the marks of arising and the rest have marks of their own again, the secondary marks are only four, and there is no fault of infinite regress.
〔What follows is the Sautrāntikas raising an objection.〕The Sautrāntika masters say: on what ground is empty space cut up in this fashion〔dividing names where there is nothing〕? It is not that the marks of arising and the rest have a real dharma-entity such as you distinguish. Why? Because there is no determinate means of knowledge〔that could prove it〕. That is: these marks are not like color and the rest, for which there is a determinate direct perception, inference, or authoritative testimony that could prove their entity to be real.
〔The Sarvāstivādins cite scripture:〕If so, why does the sūtra say: ‘The origination of the conditioned may be known; its exhaustion and its change of what abides may also be known’?〔The author of the treatise answers:〕Beloved of the gods! You cling to the letter and lose the sense. The Blessed One said: it is the sense that is to be relied upon. What is the real sense stated in this sūtra? It is this: the class of the foolish, blinded by ignorance, clings to self and what belongs to self upon the continuum of the formations and through the long night gives rise to attachment there; and the World-Honored One, in order to cut off that clinging of theirs, wished to display that ‘the continuum of the formations is in its entity conditioned and of the nature of what arises from conditions,’ and therefore spoke thus of three conditioned marks of the conditioned—it is not to display that the formations possess these three marks within a single moment; for the origination and the rest of a single moment cannot be known, and what cannot be known should not be established as a “mark.” Therefore that sūtra goes on to say: ‘The origination of the conditioned may be known; its exhaustion and its change of what abides may also be known.’
As for the sūtra’s repeating the two words “conditioned,” it is to make one know that ‘this mark declares the conditioned,’ and not to think that the mark declares ‘the existence of a conditioned dharma’—as a gathering of white egrets declares that water is not absent; nor to think that it declares the wholesomeness or unwholesomeness of a conditioned dharma—as the marks of a maiden declare the wholesome or the unwholesome.
The first arising of the continuum of the formations is called “arising”; at the station of final exhaustion it is called “cessation”; the continuum turning on in the middle is called “abiding”; and the difference between what is earlier and what is later is called “change of what abides.” It was upon this sense that the World-Honored One said to Nanda: ‘This good son well knows the arising of feeling, well knows the abiding of feeling, and well knows the decay, change, and breaking up of feeling.’ Therefore a stanza says:
〔Quoted Stanza〕The Four Marks of the Continuum, First
Stanza: The first of a continuum is called “arising”; “cessation” is the station of final exhaustion; the turning on in the middle is called “abiding”; “change of what abides” is the difference of earlier and later.
And there is a further stanza:
〔Quoted Stanza〕The Four Marks of the Continuum, Second
Stanza: Not being before and being now is “arising”; the continuum turning on is “abiding”; a difference of earlier and later is “change of what abides”; the cutting off of the continuum is called “cessation.”
And there is a further stanza:
〔Quoted Stanza〕The Stanza on There Being No Abiding in a Moment
Stanza: Since dharmas are momentary, there is no “abiding” but only cessation; they cease of themselves, and so to hold that there is “abiding”〔as a mark〕does not hold in reason.
Treatise: Therefore “abiding” is spoken of only upon the continuum—and in this way what the Abhidharma says is established. For that treatise says: ‘What is called abiding? It is every formation that has arisen and not yet ceased.’ It is not that “having arisen and not ceasing” is the nature of a momentary dharma〔a momentary dharma, having arisen, ceases at once and has no station of not ceasing〕.
Although the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom says thus: ‘Within a single mind, what arising is called birth? What exhaustion is called death? What change of what abides is called aging?’—yet that treatise’s text is stated with reference to ‘the mind in the continuum of the commonality of sentient beings’ and not with reference to a single moment.
Again, even with respect to conditioned dharmas moment by moment, the four marks are established once one has left aside “holding that there are real things.” How are they established? Thus: each thought’s not being before and being now is called “arising”; being and then not being again is called “cessation”; the later moments succeeding the earlier and arising is called “abiding”; and that difference of earlier and later is called “change of what abides.”
〔Objection:〕When earlier and later thoughts arise alike, is there not in fact no difference between the earlier and the later?〔Answer:〕How is that mark of difference to be known? It is like a diamond and the like, where there is a difference between being thrown and not thrown, and between being thrown with strong force and with weak force, and a difference of speed and slowness in falling—which shows that the sense of a difference in the transformation of the great elements is established. When formations arise in a continuum alike, there is no great difference between earlier and later, and so, though there is change, they look alike.
〔Objection:〕If so, the last moment of sound or of light, and the last six sense fields at nirvāṇa, having no later thought, should have no “change of what abides”; and then the mark you establish would not extend to all the conditioned.〔Answer:〕Here “abiding” is not being spoken of as a conditioned mark. What then is meant? What is meant is “the change of what abides.” Hence if there is abiding, there is necessarily change; and by establishing the mark thus, there is no fault of not extending to all.
Yet the conditioned mark stated by the World-Honored One in this sūtra, displayed in brief, is just this: that a conditioned dharma is not before and is now, is and then is not again, and continues on in abiding; and the difference between the earlier and the later set against each other. Here what need is there of separate things such as arising and the rest?
〔The Sarvāstivādins object:〕How can what is “the dharma marked” be established as “what marks”?〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕Just as the marks of a great man are not other than a great man; as the marks of a bull—horns, hump, dewlap, hooves, and tail—are not other than the bull; and as hardness and the rest are the marks of the earth element and the rest and are not other than earth and the rest; and as seeing at a distance something rising and knowing it to be the mark of smoke is not other than the entity of smoke. The conditioned mark should be so in reason as well. Though one has understood the intrinsic nature of a conditioned form and the rest, so long as one has not understood “the difference of the continuum of not being before and not being after,” one still does not know that its entity is conditioned; and so it is not that ‘the nature of form and the rest’ is itself the conditioned mark—and yet neither is there, apart from that nature of form and the rest, a separate real thing such as arising and the rest.
〔The Sarvāstivādins ask in return:〕If, apart from the intrinsic nature of a conditioned form and the rest, there are things such as arising and the rest, what does not hold in reason?〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕One dharma at one time would have to be at once presently arising, presently abiding, presently decaying and changing, and presently breaking up—because you allow that the four marks are present together.〔The Sarvāstivādins answer:〕This objection does not hold, because the times of their operation differ: the operation of arising is in the future, and what has already arisen in the present does not arise again. When dharmas have arisen and are in the present, only then do the operations of the three marks abiding and the rest begin; it is not that at the time of the operation of arising the other three operate. Hence, though present together, they are not in conflict.
〔The Sautrāntikas refute further:〕It should first be considered whether the entity of a future dharma exists or not, and only then should it be said whether “arising” has an operation at that station or not. Supposing you allow that the arising of a future thing has an operation, how is it still future? Please state the “mark of the future.” When a dharma is in the present, the operation of arising has already passed away; how is it still present? Please state the “mark of the present.”
Again, the three operations of abiding and the rest are all in the present; then the entity of one dharma would at one moment be at once settling, decaying, and breaking up. If at that time the mark of abiding can make this dharma abide, while at the same time change and cessation can make it decay and break up, then at that time is this dharma to be called abiding, decaying, or breaking up? Those who say ‘the operations of abiding and the rest are not simultaneous’—their account contradicts the sense of momentary cessation.
If it be said: I say that a moment is when the operations of all a dharma’s marks are brought to completion—then you should now say on what ground the mark of abiding arises together with the two marks change and cessation and yet “abiding” can operate first and make the dharma it makes abide neither change nor cease. If it be said that the force of abiding is strong and so it operates first, then how does it afterwards grow weak, so that together with the root dharma it too suffers decay from change and cessation?
If it be said that the mark of abiding, having once operated, should not operate again, as with “arising”—of “arising” this may be said: the operation of arising is to draw the dharma it produces into the present, and once drawn in it need not be drawn in again. But of “abiding” this should not be said: the operation of abiding is to settle the dharma it makes abide and make it neither decay nor cease; and having made it abide, it may well make it abide forever. For this reason the operation of the mark of abiding should arise constantly, and one may not take “arising” as an example to say that it has no further operation.
Again, who obstructs the operation of abiding and makes it be for a moment and then be no more? If it be said that change and cessation obstruct it, then the force of change and cessation should be the stronger—why do they not operate first? Again, once the operation of abiding stops, change and cessation and the root dharma of themselves do not abide; where then and how do the two marks change and cessation operate? And what work is left for these two operations to do? By the holding of abiding, dharmas that have arisen do not cease for a time; and once the operation of abiding is relinquished, the dharma certainly does not abide and ceases of itself at once—so that there is nothing left for the operations of change and cessation to do.
Again, that a dharma having arisen and not yet broken up is called “abiding,” and having abided and at the time of breaking up is called “cessation”—this may pass for now; but as for “change,” pressed forward or backward within one dharma, in reason it cannot be. Why? “Change” means the transformation of the nature and characteristic between earlier and later, and it is not that upon this very dharma one may say it is “changed from this.” Therefore a stanza says:
〔Quoted Stanza〕Change Cannot Be Established upon One Dharma
Stanza: If it is said to be that very earlier one〔and change asserted of it〕, change is not established; if it is said to differ from the earlier, it is not one and the same dharma. Therefore, upon one dharma, to establish “change” cannot in the end be established.
Treatise: Although another school says that only when the causes and conditions of cessation are met can the mark of cessation cause the cessation of what it makes cease—yet what they say is like someone saying that when a purgative is taken a god must also come to make it work.〔Since〕the causes and conditions of cessation can themselves make it cease, what need is there to posit a mark of cessation besides? Again, they too allow that mind and mental factors cease momentarily and need not wait for any further cause and condition of cessation; then the operations of “cessation” and “abiding” would have no earlier and later—and in that case one dharma at one time both abiding and ceasing does not accord with correct reasoning.
Therefore to speak of the conditioned marks in dependence on “the continuum” neither contradicts correct reasoning and accords well with the sūtras.
〔What follows answers why future dharmas do not arise all at once.〕If “arising,” while in the future, can give rise to the dharma it produces, why do not all future dharmas arise all at once? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 47, Second Half〕Arising Gives Rise to What It Produces, Not Apart from the Meeting of Causes and Conditions
Stanza: “Arising” can give rise to the dharma it produces, yet not apart from the meeting of causes and conditions.
Treatise: It is not that, apart from the meeting of the other causes and conditions, the force of the mark of arising alone can give rise to what it produces; hence future dharmas do not all arise at once.
〔The Sautrāntikas object:〕If so, we see only that causes and conditions have the capacity to give rise, and there is no separate mark of arising. When causes and conditions meet, dharmas arise; when they do not meet, they do not arise—what need is there to trouble a mark of arising? It is evident that the force of causes and conditions alone gives rise〔to dharmas〕.
〔The Sarvāstivādins answer:〕Are all existent dharmas such as you can know? The nature of dharmas is subtle and exceedingly hard to know, and so, though a thing presently has its entity, it may be unknowable. Were there no mark of arising, there ought to be no cognition of “arising”; and further, the expression in the sixth case〔the possessive relation expressed by “of”〕could not be established—as when one says “the arising of form,” “the arising of feeling,” and the like. Just as one ought not to say “the form of form.” And as you object that there is no arising, so also, as fits each case, may one object all the way to there being no cessation.
〔The Sautrāntikas object in return:〕If so, in order to establish the cognitions of “emptiness” and “non-self,” must one also posit ‘the nature of emptiness’ and ‘the nature of non-self’ apart from dharmas? In order to establish the cognitions of “one and two, large and small, several, joined and separate, this and that, being,” and the rest, must one, like the outsiders, posit apart from dharmas separate natures of number, magnitude, severalty, junction, separation, that, this, being, and the rest? And in order to establish the expression in the sixth case, must one posit a separate “nature of a collection, of form”? And when one says “the intrinsic nature of form,” how is this expression in the sixth case to be established?
Therefore arising and the rest are merely provisionally established and have no separate real thing. To explain that the formations are “not before and are now,” it is provisionally established as “arising.” Such a mark of arising that is “not before and now” is of many kinds according to the dharmas of form and the rest upon which it depends; and to distinguish it from the others, the expression in the sixth case, “the arising of form,” “the arising of feeling,” and the like, is used, in order to let another know that ‘this arising belongs to form alone and not to feeling and the rest.’ The other cases are likewise. It is like the world saying “the fragrance of sandalwood” or “the substance of a stone,” and here it should be the same. As for abiding and the rest, they should be understood in the same way as fits each case.
〔The Sarvāstivādins object:〕If formations can arise apart from a mark of arising, why do unconditioned space and the rest not arise?〔The Sautrāntikas answer:〕Formations are called “arising” because they are not before and are now; the entity of the unconditioned exists constantly—how can it be said to arise? Again, just as it is so by the nature of things, and one does not say that all dharmas have arising; in the same way it should also be allowed that ‘not all dharmas can arise.’ Again, just as conditioned dharmas alike have a mark of arising, and you also allow that causes and conditions may or may not have a capacity with regard to a conditioned dharma; in the same way it should be allowed that all dharmas, conditioned and unconditioned alike, have no mark of arising, and that the causes and conditions have the operation of giving rise to the one class and not to the other.
〔The Sarvāstivādins conclude:〕The Vaibhāṣikas say that the marks of arising and the rest are separate real things, and this position should stand. Why? How could one abandon one’s own school merely because those who raise objections are many? One does not refrain from sowing wheat for fear that deer may come, nor refrain from eating a sweet ball for fear that many flies may settle on it. Hence one should diligently apply oneself to answering objections and should practice in accordance with the sense of one’s own school.
Thus the conditioned marks have been analyzed. What is the sense of the name-bodies and the like? The stanza says:
〔Stanza 48, First Half〕Name-Body, Phrase-Body, Syllable-Body
Stanza: What are called the name-bodies and the rest are the “collective expression” of ideation, statement, and letter-sound.
Treatise: The word “and the rest” takes in the phrase-body and the syllable-body. It should be known that the “name” spoken of here is “ideation”—as one says the ideations of form, sound, odor, flavor, and the rest. A “phrase” is a “statement,” able to express a sense to completion—as the statement ‘all formations are impermanent’ and the like. Or else: a statement able to make clear the correspondence and difference of action, quality, and time is called a phrase. A “syllable” is a “letter-sound”—as one says the letters a, ā, i, ī, and the rest.
〔Objection:〕Are these letters not also the names of written signs?〔Answer:〕It is not that the letters were made in order to display written signs, but that written signs were made in order to display the letters.〔Since one must consider〕how a person may understand even without having heard them spoken, written signs were made. Hence the letters are not names of written signs.
What is called “the body of names and the rest”? It is the “collective expression” of ideations and the rest. What is called collective expression is the sense of gathering together—because in the sense of gathering together the verbal base utsa is spoken of. The name-body spoken of here is form, sound, odor, and the rest〔many names joined〕; the phrase-body is ‘all formations are impermanent,’ ‘all dharmas are without self,’ ‘nirvāṇa is peace,’ and the like; the syllable-body is ka, kha, ga, and the rest.
〔Objection:〕Are these three not of the nature of speech? Having sound for their entity, they belong to the intrinsic nature of form; how then can they instead be said to be formations not associated with mind?〔Answer:〕These three are not of the intrinsic nature of speech. Speech is vocal sound, and it is not that by vocal sound alone the sense can be made known to another.〔Question:〕How then is the sense made known?〔Answer:〕It is speech that gives rise to “name,” and name that displays the sense—and only so can it be made known.
〔Moreover〕not every vocal sound is called “speech”; only a vocal sound by which the sense can be made known is called speech. What sort of vocal sound makes the sense knowable? One that speakers have jointly settled among the several senses as “the fixed measure of what expresses”〔by common convention〕. Thus the ancients jointly settled upon the single sound go among nine senses as the fixed measure of what expresses. Therefore a stanza says:
〔Quoted Stanza〕The Nine Senses of the Sound Go
Stanza: Direction, beast, earth, light, speech, diamond, eye, heaven, and water—upon these nine senses the wise established the single sound go〔as their common designation〕.
Treatise: Those who hold that “name displays the sense” must likewise grant that such a “name of a sense” is also jointly settled as a fixed measure of what expresses. And since this sense of a phrase is displayed only by “name,” while the work of displaying by vocal sound alone is already accomplished, what need is there to reckon crosswise and posit besides a really existent “name”?
Further, it has not yet been made clear how this “name” is given rise to by speech: is it displayed by speech, or produced by speech? If it is produced by speech, then since all speech is of the nature of sound, every sound ought to be able to produce a name; and if it be said that the sound able to produce a name has a distinguishing feature, then that distinguishing feature already suffices to display the sense—what need is there to wait upon a separate “name”? If it is displayed by speech, then since all speech is of the nature of sound, every sound ought to be able to display a name; and if it be said that the sound able to display a name has a distinguishing feature, then that distinguishing feature already suffices to display the sense—what need is there to wait upon a separate “name”?
Again, the sounds of the several moments cannot be gathered together, nor is there any dharma that arises little by little in parts; how then can the arising of a “name” be given rise to by speech?〔Someone draws an analogy:〕How then do you explain that ‘after the moments of past manifest karma, the last moment of manifest karma can produce nonmanifest karma’?〔Answer:〕If so, only at the last position of the sound would a name be produced; then hearing only the last sound ought to make the sense known〔which is not the fact〕.
If one holds thus: speech produces the syllable, the syllable in turn produces the name, and the name displays the sense—here the objections are the same as stated above, because the syllables of the several moments likewise cannot be gathered together. And as for the fault in “speech displays the name,” it too should be stated on the model of “speech produces the name.” Again, of a “syllable” other than speech, even the clear-witted, applying their thought, cannot make out its characteristic〔which shows that apart from speech there is no separate syllable〕. Again, that the syllable is either displayed or produced by speech, on the model of “speech with respect to name,” does not hold in reason.
Again, if someone holds that the name, like arising and the rest〔the four marks〕, arises together with the sense—then a present name designating a past or a future sense ought to be impossible. Again, parents and others give names to their children as they please; how can it be said that the name arises together with the sense as arising and the rest do? Again, unconditioned dharmas ought to have no name, since they have no sense of “arising”—and yet you do not grant this〔that the unconditioned has no name〕.
Yet the World-Honored One said in a stanza that ‘it arises in dependence on name and syllable’—this only says that these are the measure jointly settled by many upon the several senses. Sound is itself name, and the differing arrangement of this name makes a stanza. It is upon this sense that “a stanza depends on name” is said. This stanza is the differing arrangement of names; to hold that it is a really existent thing does not accord with correct reasoning—as with many trees forming a row, or minds in succession〔the row and the succession being nothing apart from the trees and the minds〕.
Or else one should hold only that there is a separate entity of “syllable,” and gather them together to make the name-bodies and the rest; to posit the others〔name and phrase〕besides is superfluous and useless.
〔The Sarvāstivādins conclude:〕The Vaibhāṣikas say that there are separate real things as the name-bodies and the rest, included in the aggregate of formations not associated with mind, real and not provisional. Why? Because not every dharma is such as reflective thought can know.
To which realms do these name-bodies and the rest belong? Are they of the class of sentient beings or not? Are they maturation-born, nourished, or of homogeneous outflow? Are they wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate? All this should be analyzed. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 48, Second Half〕The Realm Affiliation, Five Classes, and Three Qualities of the Name-Bodies and the Rest
Stanza:〔The name-bodies and the rest〕belong to the desire and form realms only, are included in the class of sentient beings, are of homogeneous outflow, and are of unobscured-indeterminate quality.
Treatise: These name-bodies and the rest belong to the two realms, desire and form, only. Some say that they also belong to the formless realm, and yet it cannot be stated〔they cannot say how〕. Again, the name-bodies and the rest are included in the class of sentient beings—because they are possessed by a speaker and are not the sense displayed〔the sense extending to the insentient as well〕. Again, the name-bodies and the rest are of homogeneous outflow only〔neither maturation nor nourished〕. And they are included in the unobscured-indeterminate quality only.
As stated above, the senses of the remaining formations not associated with mind that have not yet been stated should now be analyzed in brief. The stanza says:
〔Stanza 49〕A General Analysis of the Remaining Senses of Commonality and the Rest
Stanza: Commonality is likewise as〔the name-bodies and the rest〕, and also extends to the formless realm and also to maturation; acquisition and the marks extend to three classes; non-acquisition and the two absorptions are of homogeneous outflow only.
Treatise: The words “likewise so” are meant to show that commonality, like the name-bodies and the rest, extends to the desire and form realms, to the class of sentient beings, to homogeneous outflow, and to the unobscured-indeterminate. The words “and the formless” show that it is not confined to the two realms desire and form. The words “and maturation” show that it is not confined to homogeneous outflow. Hence, as to realm,〔commonality〕extends to all three realms, and as to class it extends to the two senses of homogeneous outflow and maturation.
“Acquisition” and the marks, as to class, extend to all three—that is, momentary, of homogeneous outflow, and maturation. “Non-acquisition” and the two absorptions are of homogeneous outflow only. The single word “only” is to make clear that they are not maturation and the rest.
The senses not stated above have now been stated. The result of non-perception and the life faculty were analyzed above〔and so are not stated again here〕.
〔Question:〕Why is it not said that acquisition and the rest are included in the class of sentient beings only?〔Answer:〕Because it was already said above that they are ‘what a sentient being possesses,’ and the rest.〔Question:〕Why is it not said that the marks extend to both the class of sentient beings and what is not of that class?〔Answer:〕Because it was already said above that ‘all that is conditioned is together with the four marks.’ What remains unstated may be known by inference as fits each case.
六因·五果Six Causes · Five Results
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔正50〕總標六因
承前:前面已經說完了心不相應行法。先前在講「生相」能生起所生之法的時候曾提到——那並不是離開其餘的因與緣、單憑生相自己就能辦成的。那麼此中什麼法叫做「因緣」呢?先說因。因有六種。是哪六種?頌說:
頌:能作因與俱有因,同類因與相應因,遍行因和異熟因——對法諸師承許「因」只有這六種。
論:因有六種:第一是能作因,第二是俱有因,第三是同類因,第四是相應因,第五是遍行因,第六是異熟因。阿毘達磨(對法)諸師承許因只有這樣六種。那麼先問:第一個「能作因」的相貌是什麼樣的?頌說:
〔正51〔1句〕〕能作因:不障礙就是因
頌:除了它自己以外,其餘一切法都是它的能作因。
論:任何一個有為法生起時,只把它自己的體排除在外,其餘一切法都是它的「能作因」——因為那些法在它生起的時候都不加障礙地安住著。雖然其餘五因就其性質而言也能作果、也可以叫作能作,但那五種各有自己的別名,只有這一種再沒有別的名稱可用,所以就把這個總的名稱給了它——好比「色處」等等,本來是總稱,卻就當作了別名。
有人質疑:不是說『還沒有知道四諦之理,諸漏(煩惱)將要生起;由於已經知道了,諸漏才不生』嗎?那麼「智」對於漏的生起就是能障礙的了;又如日光能障蔽人現前看見眾星。那怎麼還說有為法生起時,除了自體以外一切法都是它的能作因呢?——應當知道:說的是『此法生起的那個時候,那些法都沒有障礙地安住著』,所以那些法對這個法才是能作因。(智起、日光生的時候,漏與見星本來就不生;智與日光不現起時,才是漏與見星生起之時,那時它們正是不障礙地安住著。)
進一步問:如果某法在此法生起時本來有能力障礙它、而竟不去障礙,那還可以立為因;譬如國中之人因為國主不加損害,都這樣說:我是靠著國主才得到安樂的。可是如果某法對此法的生起根本沒有障礙的作用(連障礙的能力都沒有),那麼即使它不障礙,憑什麼算是因呢?——就像涅槃以及畢竟不生之法,對一切有為法的生起而言;又如地獄(那落迦)等有情的相續,對無色界諸蘊的生起而言:它們「有」也等於「沒有」,根本沒有能障礙的作用。答:雖然沒有障礙的作用,仍然立為因,就像沒有力量的國王——國人一樣可以照前面那樣說「我因國主而得安樂」。
這是就一切能作因通說(只取「不障礙」這一義)。若就其中殊勝者而言,能作因並非全無生果之力:例如眼根與色境對於眼識等的生起、飲食對於身體、種子等對於芽等,都是實有生力的。
又有人這樣詰難:如果一切法都因為不障礙而成為能作因,那為什麼諸法不一齊頓時生起?一個人殺生的時候,為什麼不是一切人都像那個殺者一樣同成殺業?——這個難不能成立。因為只是「不障礙」這一點,才許一切法為能作因;並不是說它們對果的生起都有親自造作之力(親因與等起心不具,所以不頓生、不同罪)。
另有一類論師說:一切能作因對於果的生起都有能作之力。那麼且問:涅槃等對於眼識的生起,怎麼說它有能作之力?答:意識緣涅槃等為境而生起,或成善心、或成惡心;因為有了這個意識,後來眼識才依次第得以生起——這是輾轉相因的緣故。所以涅槃等對於眼識的生起確有能作之力。其餘諸法也依這一方隅類推,輾轉都應知道有能生之力。
能作因的相貌已經說完。第二,俱有因的相貌是什麼?頌說:
〔正51〔2–4句〕〕俱有因:互相作對方的果
頌:互相作對方的果,就是俱有因——如同四大種彼此、如同能相與所相、如同心與心隨轉法。
論:如果甲乙二法互相作對方的「士用果」(因作用之力所得之果),那麼這二法就互相是對方的俱有因。它的相貌怎樣?就像地水火風四大種,彼此相望互為俱有因;同樣,諸「相」(生住異滅四相)與所相之法、心與心隨轉法,也都互相為因。這樣一來,俱有因就憑「互為果」這一義,把一切有為法都相應地攝盡了。
不過有一處例外要辨明:本法與「隨相」(小四相)並不互為果——本法並不是隨相所生的果——然而本法對隨相仍是俱有因(隨相是隨著本法轉的),反過來隨相對本法就不是俱有因。這一點此處應當分辨。
那麼,什麼叫做「心隨轉法」?頌說:
〔正52〔1–3句〕〕心隨轉法的體
頌:諸心所法、靜慮與無漏這兩種律儀,以及它們和心自身的諸相——這些就是心隨轉法。
論:一切與心相應之法(諸心所),靜慮律儀與無漏律儀這兩種律儀,還有這些法以及心自身的生、住、異、滅諸相——凡此皆名心隨轉法。(二種律儀是入定時才有、出定即無的無表色,所以隨心而轉。)
那麼,為什麼這些法叫做「隨心而轉」?頌說:
〔正52〔4句〕〕十因判隨轉:時、果、善等
頌:由於時相同、果相同、善等三性相同。
論:簡略地說,由於「時」相同、「果」等相同、「善」等相同,所以說這些法名為心隨轉。
其一,就「時」而言:這些法與心同一個生、同一個住、同一個滅,並且同墮於一世(過去、現在、未來同屬一世)。這四項合為「時」門,顯示唯有與心同時者才叫隨轉。
其二,就「果」等而言:這些法與心同得一果、同感一異熟、同得一等流。
應當知道:這裡前面說的那個「一」(一生一住一滅)是顯「同時」,後面說的那個「一」(一果一異熟一等流)是顯「共同」——同一個字,兩處意思不一樣。
其三,就「善」等而言:這些法與心同是善性、或同是不善性、或同是無記性。
由這時四、果三、性三合計「十因」,所以名為心隨轉。
此中就法數說:心王最少也要與五十八法互為俱有因——即十大地法、它們的四十個本相、以及心自己的四本相與四隨相共八,合為五十八法。而反過來,這五十八法之中除去心的四個隨相,其餘五十四法才是心的俱有因。
另有一師說:作心之因的只有十四法——即十大地法連同心的四本相(不取大地法上的四十本相)。這一說法不好。為什麼呢?因為違背《品類足論》所說。像那部論中說:『或有苦諦,以有身見為因,而不與有身見為因——就是除掉未來的有身見及其相應法的生、老、住、非常之外,其餘的染污苦諦』;『或有苦諦,以有身見為因,也與有身見為因——就是前面所除掉的那些法』。(既然所除之中含有「相應法」的四相,可見大地法上的本相也與心互為俱有因。)不過有的傳本不誦「及彼相應法」這五個字。迦濕彌羅國的毘婆沙師說:那段文必定應當這樣誦;或者即使沒有這幾個字,也應當依義理知道那是省略的說法。
其次要辨「俱有」與「俱有因」不是一回事。凡由俱有因而成為因的,那必定是俱有;但也有雖俱有卻不是由俱有因而成因的——那就是:諸隨相各自對於本法、諸隨相彼此相對、隨心轉法的隨相對於心、這些隨相彼此相對、一切同時生起的有對造色彼此相對、一部分同時生起的無對造色彼此相對、一切同時生起的造色與大種彼此相對、一切同時生起的「得」與「所得」彼此相對。這些法雖然名為俱有,卻不是由俱有因而成因——因為它們並不同取一果、一異熟、一等流。至於「得」與所得,更不一定同時而行,或前、或後、或俱生,所以尤其不是俱有因。
以上這些道理姑且可以承認。但是——世間所公認的因果相生之事,是種子在前、芽在後;從來沒有見過像你們所說的「同時因果」。所以現在應當說清楚:同時生起的一堆法之中,怎麼會有因果的意義?
答(有部):豈不是現前就看得見嗎——燈焰與燈明、芽與影,都是同時而互為因果的。
反詰(經部):這正應當仔細分辨——究竟是燈焰與燈明互為因果呢,還是由前一念的因緣和合(人功、燈器、油、炷)而使焰與明一齊生起呢?至於影,是因為別的東西擋住了光明才有影現,怎麼能說這影是以芽為因?(若說是芽生影,那麼有芽而無日光時也應當有影。)
救(有部):你這樣否認我的同時因果,於理不應如此——因為果之體有沒有,是隨著因之有沒有而定的。善於因明的人說因果之相是這樣的:如果『此因有則彼果有、此因無則彼果無』,那麼此定是因、彼定是果。而在俱有法之中,一個有則一切有、一個無則一切無——這正符合因果之理。
再問(經部):同時而起可以說有因果之理,但怎麼可以說「互為因果」呢?答(有部):就依前面所說(此有彼有、此無彼無是雙向的),互為因果也並不相違。
若是這樣,那麼像前面所說互不相離的諸造色,豈不也應當互為因?同樣,造色與諸大種、心隨相等與心等法,都是互不相離的,豈不都應當互為因?
如果說:譬如三根木杖互相依靠而站立,俱有法的因果義就這樣成立——那還要再想一想:這三根杖究竟是靠著同時互相依倚之力才站住的呢,還是由前一念的因緣合力使那三根杖同時生起而站住的呢?而且那裡面另外還有繩子、鉤子、地面等物連繫扶持才站得住的。答:這裡也同樣另有同類因等(別的助緣)在,所以俱有因的意義仍然得以成立。
俱有因的相貌已經說完。第三,同類因的相貌是什麼?頌說:
〔正53·正54前半〕同類因:相似、自部自地、前生
頌:同類因是相似之法;限於同一部、同一地,且必是前生之法。無漏道則九地輾轉互為因,但只與相等或殊勝者為果。加行所生之法也是這樣——就是聞所成、思所成等。
論:所謂同類因,就是相似之法與相似之法互為同類因。譬如善的五蘊與善的五蘊輾轉相望為同類因;染污與染污、無記與無記,五蘊相望也應知如此。
此中有異說:有的論師說,「淨無記」之蘊,五蘊都是色蘊之果〔色能為五蘊之因〕,而四蘊不是色之因;有的論師說,五蘊都是四蘊之果〔四蘊能為五蘊之因〕,而色不是四蘊之因;還有的論師說,色與四蘊相望,輾轉都不為因。
又:同一身中,胎位最初的「羯剌藍」位能與後面十位為同類因;第二「頞部曇」等九位,每一位都除去自己之前的位,而與其餘各位為因。若是對別人身中的同類十位,那麼每一位都能與那十位為因。依這一方隅,外界的麥、稻等自類相生,也應廣加思擇。
如果不許色法作色法的同類因,那種主張便違背根本論的明文——因為根本論說:『過去大種、未來大種為因、為增上』等等。
那麼,是不是凡相似之法對相似之法都可以說是同類因?不是。怎麼講?只有「自部、自地」才與自部自地為因,所以頌說「自部地」。「部」指五部——即見苦所斷、見集所斷、見滅所斷、見道所斷、修所斷。「地」指九地——即欲界算一地,加四靜慮、四無色共八地。此中見苦所斷之法只與見苦所斷為同類因、不與其餘四部為因;乃至修所斷只與修所斷為同類因。而其中每一部之內,欲界地只與欲界為同類因,初靜慮地只與初靜慮為同類因,乃至有頂地只與有頂地為同類因——不同地相望都沒有為因的道理。
還不止如此。什麼呢?頌說「前生」:只有先前已生之法,才與後來相似的、正生或未生之法作同類因。怎麼知道是這樣?因為根本論這樣說。如《發智論》說:『什麼是同類因?就是前生的善根與後生的自界善根及其相應法為同類因。』這樣,過去對其餘二世、過去現在對未來等等,都應照此廣說。
然而那部論裡又有這樣一問:『如果甲法與乙法為因,是否有時甲法對乙法不為因呢?』論主答說:『沒有不為因之時。』——這是就俱有因、相應因、異熟因這三種因隱密而說的(那三因通未來),所以沒有過失。
有人卻說:未來正生位的法必定能與彼為同類因,所以那段文是依最後(正生)位隱密地作此答的。這種解釋,對所詰之難並不算善解——因為未來之法在正生位之前並不是同類因,要到正生位之後才成為同類因(那就仍有『不為因之時』)。而且若照他那樣講,論中接著又問:『如果甲法與乙法為等無間,是否有時甲法對乙法不為等無間呢?』論主答的是:『若此法未至已生。』若照他的解法,那裡也應當答『沒有不為緣之時』才對,何以卻答『若此法未至已生』呢?
他又補救說:那是為了顯示兩種問答方式(一隱一顯),像那一處那樣說,這一處也可以那樣說;像這一處那樣說,那一處也可以那樣說。——這樣造文能得到什麼好處呢?只顯得論主不善於行文罷了。所以應知前面那個解釋(依三因密說)才是善解。
若是這樣,那麼為什麼《品類足論》說:『或有苦諦以有身見為因、而不與有身見為因——除掉未來的有身見及其相應苦諦之外,其餘的染污苦諦;或有苦諦以有身見為因、也與有身見為因——就是前面所除的那些法』呢?(若未來無同類因,何須除「未來有身見相應苦諦」?)答:那段文應當說成『除掉未來的有身見『相應苦諦』』(即只是相應而非同類因所攝)。縱使真有像他所說的那種誦法,依義理也應當知道那不是(未來有同類因的證據)。
又怎麼會通《施設足論》呢?那部論說:諸法有四事決定——所謂因、果、所依、所緣。應知那段文中的「因」是指能作因、俱有因、相應因、異熟因(四種通未來者);「果」是指增上果、士用果、異熟果;「所依」是指眼等六根;「所緣」是指色等六境。(其中並不含同類因與等流果,所以不成妨難。)
若是這樣,同類因豈不成了『本來沒有而後來才有』?——承許如此,並無過失:這是就「位」而說,不是就「體」而說;由和合、作用之「位」而立果,並非就體立果。
那麼假使同類因在未來世也有,像異熟因那樣,會有什麼過失?答:未來世若有,根本論就應當這樣說;根本論只說能取果、與果的那些同類因(在過去現在),所以沒有過失。
而且從義理上說也不能有:因為同類因引生等流果,若說此因在未來就有,道理上必定不然——未來世法沒有前後之分。而不應當說『已生之法作為未生之法的等流』,就像過去法不是現在之果一樣;否則就有『果在前、因在後』的過失。所以未來世沒有同類因。
若是這樣,異熟因也應當未來世非有才對?——不然,因為異熟果不會在因之前、也不會與因同時(果必在因後)。答:未來世法既沒有前後,就沒有前述那種過失,因為異熟因與果不相似。也就是說:同類因與果相似,若沒有前後之分,就會互為因;既互為因就會互為果,互為因果是與理相違的。而異熟因與果不相似,即使離了前後之別也沒有上述過失。所以同類因是就「位」建立的,故未來非有;異熟因是就「相」建立的,故未來也非無。
說同類因「唯自地」,是依什麼而說?是依有漏而說。若是無漏道,那麼輾轉相望,每一地的道都能與九地為因——即未至定、靜慮中間、四根本靜慮、三根本無色,這九地的道諦都互相為因。為什麼?因為無漏道在諸地之中都像客人暫住,不墮界所攝,不被諸地之愛執為己有,所以九地之道雖然地不相同,卻能輾轉為因——因為同是無漏一類。
然而只能與「相等」或「殊勝」者為因,不能作低劣者之因,因為它是加行(用功)所生的。且如已生的苦法智忍,還與未來的苦法智忍為同類因,這叫作「等」;而這個忍又能與其後從苦法智直到無生智為同類因,這叫作「勝」。這樣廣說,乃至已生的諸無生智只與同等者為同類因,因為再沒有比它更勝的了。
又:已生的見道、修道、無學道,依次第與三、二、一為同類因(見道與三道為因,修道與修無學二道為因,無學道只與無學為因)。又此中鈍根之道與鈍根、利根都為同類因;利根之道則只作利根之道的因。如隨信行、信勝解、時解脫這三種鈍根聖者之道,依次與六、四、二為同類因;隨法行、見至、不時解脫這三種利根聖者之道,依次與三、二、一為同類因。
又問:上地之道可以作下地之因,那怎麼還說「或等或勝」(上地是勝,下地是劣,豈不成了與劣為因)?答:由「因增長」與「由根」二義而說。所謂因增長,是說見道等九品之中下下品等,在後後位中因轉增長(所以上地之下品仍可與下地之上品為因而不成劣);所謂由根,是上地鈍根之道與下地利根之道為因。雖然在同一相續之中不可能既起隨信行道又起隨法行道,但已生之道可以作未來(另一類)之因。
「加行生亦然」:不但聖道如此,其餘世間之法凡是加行所生的,也同樣只與相等、殊勝者為因,不作低劣者之因。加行所生之法體是什麼?就是聞所成慧、思所成慧等。「等」字是等取修所成慧——因聞、思、修所生的功德叫作「彼所成」,因為是加功用行才發生的,所以只與等、勝為因,不與劣為因。
如欲界所繫:聞所成法能與自界的聞所成、思所成為同類因,而不作修所成之因(欲界沒有修所成);思所成法與思所成為同類因,而不作聞所成之因,因為聞比思劣。若是色界所繫:聞所成法能與自界的聞所成、修所成為同類因,而不作思所成之因(色界沒有思所成,舉心思量便入定了);修所成法只與自界修所成為同類因,不作聞所成之因,因為聞劣。無色界所繫:修所成法只與自界修所成為同類因,不作聞、思所成之因——無聞(無耳根)故、思劣故。
這些法又各有九品:若是下下品,能作九品之因;下中品作八品之因;乃至上上品只作上上品之因,因為要除去前面比它劣的。至於生得善法,九品相望可以輾轉互為因(不限等勝);染污法也是如此。
無覆無記總有四種:異熟生、威儀路、工巧處、化心(變化心)俱起之品,依次能與四、三、二、一為因(後者較勝故)。又欲界的化心有四靜慮之果,但不作上靜慮果的下靜慮果之因——因為加行所生之法不會得到低劣之果,正如勤加功力種稻種麥,不會白費劬勞而一無所獲。
因為有這樣的道理,所以有人問:可有已生的無漏法,卻不作未生位無漏法之因的嗎?有——譬如已生的苦法智品對於未生位的苦法忍品(智勝於忍,不作劣因);又一切勝法對於一切劣法。可有一身之中先所決定得到的無漏法,卻不作後生之因的嗎?有——譬如未來的苦法忍品對於其後已生的苦法智品(果必不在因前);或者說,因為同類因未來沒有。可有前生的無漏法,卻不作後起無漏法之因的嗎?有——譬如前生殊勝的無漏法對於後起低劣的無漏法,如從上果退墮而下果現前之時。又如前面已生的『苦法智之得』,對於後面已生的『苦法忍之得』,也不是同類因,因為後者比前者劣。
同類因的相貌已經說完。第四,相應因的相貌是什麼?頌說:
〔正54後半〕相應因:五義平等而同依
頌:相應因決定唯是心與心所,而且必須同一所依。
論:只有心與心所是相應因。
若是這樣,那麼所緣、行相各別的心心所,豈不也應當互為相應因?——不是。所緣、行相相同的才可以說是相應。
若是這樣,那麼異時而所緣、行相相同的,豈不也應當說是相應因?——不是。必須所緣、行相以及時間都相同,才叫相應。
若是這樣,那麼異身而所緣、行相與時間都相同的(如大眾同時共觀初月),豈不也應當說是相應?——為了用一句話總遮這許多妨難,所以頌說「同依」:必須是同一所依的心心所法,才能互相為相應因。此中「同」字顯示所依是同一個——譬如眼識用此一剎那的眼根為所依,與它相應的受等心所也就用這同一個眼根為所依;乃至意識與其相應法同依意根,應知也是這樣。
相應因的體其實就是俱有因,那麼這二因在意義上有什麼差別?答:由「互為果」這一義立俱有因,好比一群商侶互相依倚、共同走過險道;由『五種平等而共相應』這一義立相應因,就好比那群商侶同吃同做飲食等事業,其中缺了一個人便都不相應了——所以「互為因」的意義最為成立。
相應因的相貌已經說完。第五,遍行因的相貌是什麼?頌說:
〔正55前半〕遍行因:前生的遍行惑作同地染法之通因
頌:遍行因是指前生的遍行諸法,作同一地一切染法之因。
論:所謂遍行因,就是先前已生的遍行諸法,與後起的同地染污諸法為遍行因。至於「遍行諸法」是哪些(十一遍行隨眠及其相應俱有法),在隨眠品中講到遍行義處會廣加分別。
這一種因為什麼要在同類因之外另立?因為它是一切染法的「通因」——同類因只作自部之因,而遍行因不但作自部染法之因,也作其餘各部染法之因;由於它的勢力,其餘部的煩惱以及它們的眷屬(相應俱有法)也隨之生長。
問:聖者身中的諸染污法(修所斷惑),難道也用這見所斷的遍行為因嗎?答:迦濕彌羅國的毘婆沙師說,一切染污法都以見所斷為因。所以《品類足論》這樣說:『什麼是見所斷為因之法?就是諸染污法,以及見所斷法所感的異熟。』又說:『什麼是無記為因之法?就是諸無記有為法以及不善法。』又說:『或有苦諦以有身見為因、而不與有身見為因……除掉未來的有身見及其相應法的生、老、住、無常之外,其餘的染污苦諦。』(三處文都證見所斷通與一切染法為因。)
若是這樣,怎麼會通《施設足論》所說呢?那部論說:『可有法是不善、而唯以不善為因的嗎?有——就是聖人離欲而退時最初生起的染污思。』(若一切染皆以見斷為因,此處何以只說不善為因?)答:那是依『未斷之因』隱密而說的——見所斷法雖然也是此思之因,但聖者已斷見惑,所以略去不說。
遍行因的相貌已經說完。第六,異熟因的相貌是什麼?頌說:
〔正55後半〕異熟因:不善與有漏善
頌:異熟因就是不善法,以及唯屬有漏的善法。
論:只有諸不善法以及有漏善法才是異熟因,因為它們是能招異熟之法。
問:為什麼無記法不招異熟?答:因為力量太弱,好比朽壞的種子。問:為什麼無漏法不招異熟?答:因為沒有「愛」來滋潤,好比堅實的種子若無水澆灌(也不能發芽);而且無漏不是三界所繫之地,怎麼能招感繫地的異熟?其餘之法(不善與有漏善)二義具足(有愛潤、是繫地),所以能招,好比堅實之種又得水滋潤。
「異熟因」這個名怎麼理解?是「異熟之因」(依主釋)呢,還是「異熟即因」(持業釋)?答:兩種解釋都可通,有什麼過失?——若只作「異熟之因」解,聖教就不應當說「異熟生眼」(那是就果說異熟);若只作「異熟即因」解,聖教就不應當說「業之異熟」(那是就因說異熟)。二釋俱通的道理,前面已經辨過了。
那麼「異熟」二字的意義究竟是什麼?毘婆沙師這樣解釋:異類而熟,就是異熟之義——異熟因唯是異類而熟(因是善惡,果是無記);俱有等因唯是同類而熟;能作一因則兼通同類與異類。所以唯有這一種名為異熟因。
(論主辨其不足):「熟」這個果,不應當是其餘諸因所得之果。果要具足二義才配稱「熟」:第一,須由相續轉變差別,它的體才得以生起(造業之後不即感果,要待相續將欲感果時方名轉變差別);第二,須隨著因的勢力有勝有劣,時間上有一定的分限(或十年、或百年)。而俱有、相應二因所生的果體,並不須要由相續轉變差別才得生起,因為取果的時候就同時與果了(缺第一義);能作、同類、遍行三因之果,也不是隨著因的勢力勝劣而時間有分限,因為善惡等業窮盡生死之際,果還數數而生、時間沒有限量(缺第二義)。因此只應當這樣解釋:變異而熟,才是異熟之義;不應當只用一個「異」字來簡別其餘諸因(那樣攝義不周)。
其次辨異熟因『幾蘊共感一果』。在欲界之中:有時一蘊為異熟因共感一果——指行蘊中的有記「得」及其生等四相;有時二蘊為異熟因共感一果——指善或不善的身業、語業(色蘊)及其生等(行蘊);有時四蘊為異熟因共感一果——指善或不善的心、心所法及其生等。
在色界之中:有時一蘊共感一果——指有記的「得」、無想等至及其生等;有時二蘊共感一果——指初靜慮的善有表業及其生等;有時四蘊共感一果——指非等引(散心)的善心心所及其生等;有時五蘊共感一果——指等引(定心)的心心所法連同隨轉色及其生等。
在無色界之中:有時一蘊共感一果——指有記的「得」、滅盡等至及其生等;有時四蘊共感一果——指一切善的心心所法及其生等。
再辨一業所感的處數。有業只感一處異熟——就是感法處,即命根等。若感意處,一定同時感二處——意處與法處。若感觸處,應知也是如此(觸處與法處)。若感身處,一定感三處——身處、觸處、法處。感色、香、味也應知如此。若感眼處,一定感四處——眼處以及身、觸、法三處。感耳、鼻、舌也應知如此。又有業能感或五、或六、或七、或八、或九、或十、或十一處——因為業有的果少、有的果多。就像外面的種子,結的果有的少有的多:果少的如穀、麥等,果多的如蓮、石榴、諾瞿陀樹等。
又:有『一世之業感三世異熟』,卻沒有『三世之業感一世異熟』——不會白費劬勞而使果比因還少。有『一念之業感多念異熟』,卻沒有『多念之業感一念異熟』,道理同上。
然而異熟果決不與業同時,因為造業的當時並不受果;也不是無間(次一剎那)就受,因為次一剎那是被等無間緣之力所引的(那是等流而非異熟)。而且異熟因所感的是異類之果,必須等待相續轉變才能辦成。
以上六因各別之相已說完。那麼這六因決定居於哪一世?因居於世是決定的。這義理雖然已經說過,卻還沒有用頌收攝,所以應當再辨一次。頌說:
〔正56前半〕六因的三世定
頌:遍行因與同類因通二世;相應、俱有、異熟三因通三世。
論:遍行因與同類因只居於過去、現在二世,未來世沒有——道理如前面(就位建立)所說。相應因、俱有因、異熟因這三因,在三世之中都普遍具有。頌中既然沒有說能作因居於何世,依義類推便可知道:能作因通於三世,也通於「非世」(無為法也是能作因)。
六因各別之相與三世之定已經說完。那麼什麼法是「果」,是對著它才成立為因的呢?頌說:
〔正56後半〕果唯有為與離繫;無為無因無果
頌:果就是一切有為法以及離繫(擇滅);無為法自身則無因也無果。
論:如根本論所說:『什麼是果法?就是諸有為法以及擇滅。』
若是這樣,無為(擇滅)既然承許是果,那就應當有因——因為要對著那個因,才可以說這是果;又此無為既然承許是(能作)因,那就應當有果——因為要對著那個果,才可以說這是因。答:唯有有為之法有因有果,諸無為法則不然。為什麼?因為無為沒有六因、沒有五果。
問:為什麼不許諸無間道對離繫果作能作因?答:能作因是就『對它的生起不作障礙』而立的;無為根本沒有「生」,道對它能作什麼?
問:那它是誰的果?「果」的意義又何在?答:它是道之果,因為是由道之力而證得的。
問:若是這樣,道之果應當只是那個「得」(得擇滅之得)才對,因為道對「得」有能生之力,對擇滅本身並沒有。答:不是。道對「得」與對「擇滅」的功能有差別:對「得」的功能是「能生」,對「滅」的功能是「能證」。由這個道理,道雖然不是滅之生因,卻仍可說擇滅是道之果。
問:既然諸無為沒有增上果,怎麼還可以說它是能作因?答:因為諸無為對他法的生起不作障礙,所以立為能作因;然而說它沒有果,是因為離開世間之法便沒有取果、與果的作用(無為不在三世,無取與之用)。
(以下為經部與有部論無為之實有,本論廣錄二造之言。)
經部師說:無為不是因。因為沒有一部經說「因」是無為的,卻有經說「因」唯是有為。
問:哪一處經這樣說?答:如有經說:『諸因諸緣能生色者,皆是無常。無常的因緣所生的諸色,怎麼會是常?』乃至識也如此廣說。
反詰:若是這樣,無為也應當不能給能緣之識作「所緣緣」了(因為經說因緣皆無常)。答:經只說「能生」者才無常,故無為仍可作所緣緣——經只說「諸因諸緣能生識者皆是無常」,並沒有說『一切為識之緣者皆是無常』,所以不成妨難。
再詰:既然如此,經也只說『能生之因』是無常,那也就沒有撥除『無為唯以不障礙而為能作因』了。答:有契經說無為法為所緣緣,卻沒有契經說無為法為能作因,所以不應當立它為『唯不障礙』之因性。反駁:雖然沒有經說,也沒有一處經遮止;而且無量的經到今天已經隱沒了,怎能斷定就是沒有經說呢?
問:那麼什麼法名為「離繫」?答:就是根本論中所說的擇滅。反詰:先前不是問過『什麼叫擇滅』,答說「是離繫」嗎?如今問『什麼叫離繫』,又答「是擇滅」——這樣兩個答案互相依靠,對於它的自性終究顯不出來。所以應當另開一門來顯它的自性。
(有部答):這個法的自性實有而離言說,唯有諸聖者各自內心證知;只能方便就總相說它是善、是常,別有一個實物名為擇滅、也名離繫。
經部師說:一切無為法都不是實有——並沒有像色、受等那樣別有實物,因為這裡所指的正是「沒有」。
問:若是這樣,為什麼還叫作虛空等?答:只是「無所觸」便名為虛空——譬如在黑暗中無所觸對,人就說『這是虛空』。已起的隨眠與生種滅去之位,由簡擇之力使其餘的(苦與惑)不再生起,就名為擇滅;離開簡擇之力,只因為缺緣而使其餘的不再生起,就名為非擇滅——譬如殘餘的眾同分中途夭亡者的其餘諸蘊(本該生而不生)。
又有餘部的師說:由於慧的功能使隨眠不生,名為擇滅;隨眠因缺緣而後苦不生、並非由慧之能,名為非擇滅。(經部破):離開簡擇之力,這個滅根本不能成立,所以這種「不生」仍應攝在擇滅之中。
又有人說:諸法生起之後自然歸於「後無」,所以名非擇滅。(駁):這樣執取的話,非擇滅之體就成了無常——因為法沒有滅之前,這非擇滅是沒有的。反詰:豈不是你們的擇滅也一樣嗎?它以簡擇為先,那就是先無後有,也應當是無常。答:擇滅並不是『先有簡擇,然後才有』的。為什麼?並不是先有簡擇之後,未生之法才有「不生」——那「不生」本來就有;只是若無簡擇,諸法便會生起,簡擇一生起,法就永不生了。對於這個「不起」,簡擇是有功能的——就是說:先前沒有障生之物,如今簡擇成了障生之物,並不是造出了一個「不生」。
(有部再難):如果只把「不生」當作涅槃,那麼這段經文怎麼會通?經說:「五根若修若習若多修習,能令過去未來現在眾苦永斷」這個「永斷」之體就是涅槃;而「不生」之義只在未來,不在過去現在——豈不相違?
(經部答):雖然有這段文,卻不違義理。這段經的意思是說:緣過去、現在之苦的煩惱斷了,所以名為眾苦斷。就像世尊說:『你們對於色應當斷除貪欲;貪欲斷時,便名色斷以及色的遍智。』乃至識也如此廣說。過去、現在之苦的「斷」,意思也應當如此。假使另有經說「斷過去未來現在諸煩惱」,依前面的道理解釋,意思也不相違。
或者這段經另有意趣:過去煩惱是指過去生所起的煩惱,現在煩惱是指現在生所起的煩惱。像「愛行」之中說的十八種愛行,過去世所起的是依過去生說的,未來、現在應知也是這樣。而這二世所起的煩惱,為了生起未來諸煩惱,在現在的相續之中引起了種子;這個種子斷了,那些煩惱也就名為斷——就像異熟果盡了也說名為業盡。未來的眾苦以及諸煩惱,因為沒有種子,畢竟不生,所以說名為斷。若不是這樣解釋,過去與現在(已滅、正滅)憑什麼還須要斷呢?對已經滅去的以及正在滅的,不須要再設劬勞使它滅。
(有部又難):如果無為法的體全然是無,為什麼經說:『所有諸法,若諸有為、若諸無為,其中離染最為第一』?怎麼能在「無」之中立一個「第一」?
(經部答):我也不說諸無為法的體全然是無,只是應當照我所說的那樣「有」。譬如說『這個聲有先前的非有、有後來的非有』——那個「非有」是不可以說成『實有』的,然而這句話裡「有」字的用法仍然成立。說「有無為」,應知也是如此。雖然是非有卻可以稱歎——所以諸災橫畢竟非有,名為離染;這在一切「有」與「非有」之中最為殊勝,為了使所化的人深生欣樂,所以應當稱歎它為第一。
(有部又難):如果無為法只是「非有」,那就因為沒有,不應當名為「滅聖諦」了。
(經部答):先說「聖諦」是什麼意思——豈不是屬於「無倒」之義嗎?聖者的見,於有、於無都無顛倒:對苦見它只是苦,對苦的非有見它只是非有。這對於聖諦之義有什麼相違?
(再難):既是非有,怎麼可以立為第三聖諦?(答):因為它是第二諦(集諦)之後,聖者無間所見、所說的,所以成為第三。
(再難):如果無為法的體唯是無,那麼緣虛空、緣涅槃的識就成了緣無境之識。(答):緣無境也沒有過失;這一點在辨去來(過去未來實有與否)之處應當思擇。
(經部反問):如果承許無為別有實體,會有什麼失、又有什麼德?——承許便可以擁護毘婆沙宗,這算是「德」;假使真有可護的,天神一定知道,自會來擁護。然而承許它實有,卻顯出虛妄的計執,這才是「失」。為什麼?因為這既不是像色、受等那樣有體可得,也不是像眼、耳等那樣有用可得。
又:如果無為別有實體,怎麼可以用第六轉聲(屬格)說「彼事之滅」?因為滅與彼事並不互相隸屬——二者相望既非因果。若只是遮遣彼事,第六轉聲才可以成立:彼事之「無」名為滅,所以說「彼事之滅」。
(有部答):滅雖然別有實體,但由於彼事得到「斷」的時候才得到這個滅,所以可以說這滅屬於彼事。(經部難):什麼原因使這個滅一定屬於這一個「得」?(有部引經通難):如契經說「苾芻獲得現法涅槃」——若是非有,怎麼可說「獲得」?(經部答):由於得到對治,便獲得永違煩惱與後有所依之身,所以名為得涅槃。
(經部引聖教):又有聖教能顯涅槃唯以「非有」為其自性。如契經說:『所有眾苦,皆無餘斷,各別捨棄,盡、離染、滅、靜息、永沒;其餘之苦不再相續、不取、不生。此極寂靜,此極美妙——就是捨掉諸依以及一切愛盡、離染、滅,名為涅槃。』
(有部詰):為什麼不許『說不生者,是依此(實有的涅槃)而無生,所以說不生』呢?(經部答):我們看這個第七轉聲(依格)的「依此」,對於證滅之「有」全無功力。何以要說「依此無生」?如果「依此」是屬於「已有」之義,那就應當本來不生(涅槃是常故);如果「依此」是屬於「已得」之義,那就應當許為「依道之得」——所以只能說依道、或依道之得,使苦不生。你應當信受這一點。
由此便能善解經中所說的譬喻:如燈焰之涅槃,心解脫也是這樣。這段經的意思是說:如燈的涅槃,只是燈焰謝滅,並沒有另外一個東西;世尊心得解脫也是如此,只是諸蘊滅去,更沒有別的所有。
阿毘達磨也這樣說:『什麼是無事法?就是諸無為法。』所謂「無事」,就是沒有體性。
(有部答):毘婆沙師不許這種解釋。若問他們「事」的意義是什麼,他們說「事」略有五種:一是自性事——如有處說「若已得此事,彼成就此事」;二是所緣事——如有處說『一切法為智所知,隨其事』;三是繫縛事——如有處說『若於此事為愛結所繫,彼於此事亦為恚結所繫嗎』;四是所因事——如有處說『什麼是有事法?就是諸有為法』;五是所攝事——如有處說「田事宅事妻子等事」。如今此處所說的「事」是取第四種(因名為事),是顯無為法都沒有因;所以無為雖然是實有之物,卻因為常無作用而無因無果。
總論到此完畢。那麼在諸果之中,應當說哪一種果是哪一種因所得的?頌說:
〔正57〕六因各得何果
頌:最後那一因(異熟因)得異熟果,最前那一因(能作因)得增上果;同類因與遍行因得等流果;俱有因與相應因得士用果。
論:所說「後因」,是指異熟因——在六因之中它排在最後,所以稱「後」;五果中最初的異熟果,就是這一因所得的。所說「前因」,是指能作因——在六因之中它排在最初,所以稱「前」;五果中最後的增上果,就是這一因所得的。「增上之果」,名為增上果。
問:能作因只是不障礙地安住,有什麼「增上」可言?答:就由「不障礙」這一點而得增上之名。或者說,能作因也有殊勝之力:如十處、十界對於五識身,諸有情的業對於器世界;耳等根對於眼識的生起等等,也有輾轉增上的生力——因為聽說了什麼,便生起想看的欲望(於是眼識生)。這一類的增上,都應如理思量。
同類因與遍行因得等流果,因為這二因之果都與因相似。俱有因與相應因得士用果——並不是離開「士」〔作者〕之體另有一個「士用」;就是這二因作用所得之果,名為士用果。
問:「士用」這個名是指什麼法?答:就是指諸法所有的作用——像士夫(人)的作為一樣,所以得「士用」之名。這是從譬喻立名,就像世間說「鴉足藥草」「醉象將軍」(藥草似鴉足,將軍能入陣如醉象)。
問:是只有這二因有士用果,還是其餘也有?有的論師說:其餘諸因也有這種果,只除異熟因;因為士用果與因或同時生、或無間生,異熟果卻不是這樣。又有的論師說:異熟因也有隔越久遠的士用果,譬如農夫(春耕而秋)所收的果實。
異熟等五果的相貌是什麼樣?頌說:
〔正58·正59〕五果各相
頌:異熟果是無記法,唯屬有情,是有記(善惡)所生。等流果與自因相似。離繫果是由慧而盡(擇滅)。若某法是因彼之力而生的,這個果名為士用果。除去前面已生的有為法之外,其餘的有為法就是(前法的)增上果。
論:只有在無覆無記法之中才有異熟果。
問:那麼它是否也通於非有情數(外器世界),還是唯限有情?又是否通於等流與所長養?答:應知異熟果唯是「有記所生」——一切不善以及善有漏能記別(招感)異熟,所以名為「有記」;從那有記之業以後才有異熟生起,不是同時、也不是無間,所以名為「有記生」。這就是異熟果之相。(既唯有記所生,可知不通等流與所長養——因為那二者通三性所生。)
問:非有情數(山河大地)也是從業生的,為什麼不名異熟?答:因為是共有的——別人也一樣能這樣受用。而異熟果決沒有其餘人共同受用之義:不會別人造業而由另一人因此受得異熟果。問:那增上果也是業所生的,怎麼可以共受?答:因為是從「共業」生的。
與自因相似之法名為等流果——就是與同類因、遍行因二者相似。
問:如果遍行因也得等流果,為什麼不許它就叫同類因?答:因為遍行因所得的果,只是由於同地、同是染性而與因相似,並不是由於「種類」〔部〕相似;若是由種類相似而使果似因,那果之所因才叫同類因。所以有這樣一問:『若是同類因,是否也是遍行因?』應當作四句分別:第一句,非遍行之法作同類因(是同類因而非遍行因);第二句,他部的遍行法作遍行因(是遍行因而非同類因);第三句,自部的遍行法作遍行因(二者俱是);第四句,除去前三句之相(二者俱非)。
由「慧」使惑「盡」之法名為離繫果:「滅」故名為盡,「擇」故名為慧——就是說擇滅名為離繫果。
若某法是因著彼法的勢力而生起的,就說這個法名為士用果。譬如因下地加行心之力而使上地的有漏、無漏定生起,以及因清淨靜慮心之力而使變化心生起,這一類都是。至於擇滅,應當說是由道之力而「得」(不生士用果)。
諸有為法之中,除去前面已生的,其餘的有為法就是(前法之)增上果。(因為果對因或同時或在後,決不會在前。)
問:士用果與增上果二者有什麼差別?答:「士用果」之名唯對著作者而立;「增上果」之稱則通對此作者以外的其他一切。譬如工匠所造成之物:對能造的工匠而言,兼得士用果與增上果之名;對工匠以外的人而言,就只是增上果。
在上面所說的六種因之中,在哪一位、哪一因取果與果?頌說:
〔正60〕取果與果之時
頌:五因取果唯在現在;俱有、相應二因與果也是如此。同類、遍行二因通過去現在與果;異熟一因唯在過去與果。
論:五因(除能作因)取果唯在現在,決定不在過去——因為已經取過了;也不在未來——因為未來無作用。(能作因也應照此說在現在取果,但因為能作因不一定有果,所以此頌不說。)
俱有因、相應因的「與果」也是如此,唯在現在——因為這二因取果與果必定同時。
同類因、遍行因的「與果」則通於過去與現在。在過去與果可以理解;怎麼說現在也與果?因為有的等流果是無間(緊接著)生的。若果已經生了,因便成過去,那是「已與果」,不應當再與。
善的同類因,有時取果卻不與果,應當作四句分別:第一句(取而不與),是斷善根時最後所捨的那個「得」;第二句(與而不取),是續善根時最初所得的那個「得」——應當說那時是『續者之前得』(即先前所捨的那個得);第三句(亦取亦與),是不斷善根時其餘各位;第四句(不取不與),是除去前面三種相。
又在不善的同類因之中也有四句:第一句,是離欲貪時最後所捨的得;第二句,是退失欲貪時最初所得的得——應當說那時是『退者之前得』;第三句,是未離欲貪時其餘各位;第四句,是除去前三相。
有覆無記的同類因之中也有四句——在得阿羅漢果時、退失時、未得時以及其餘各位,應如理配說。
無覆無記的同類因之中則有「順後句」:與果的時候一定也取果;或者有時取果而不與果——就是阿羅漢最後的諸蘊(入無餘涅槃時,取而無所與)。
若就有所緣(心心所)的剎那差別而言,善的同類因也有四句:第一句(取而不與),是善心無間生起染污或無記心;第二句(與而不取),與上句相反;第三句(亦取亦與),是善心無間還起善心;第四句,是除去前三相。不善心等隨其所應,也有四句,依例應知。
問:「取果」「與果」的意義是什麼?答:能作它的種子,所以名為取果;正在給予它力量(使之現起),所以名為與果。
異熟因的與果唯在過去,因為異熟果既不與因同時、也不是無間而生。
又有其餘論師,在前五果之外別說四果:一是安立果,譬如水輪是風輪之果,乃至草木等是大地之果;二是加行果,譬如無生智等是遠由不淨觀等加行而得之果;三是和合果,譬如眼識等是眼根等(和合)之果;四是修習果,譬如變化心等是諸靜慮修習之果。這四種果都攝在士用果與增上果之中。
說因與果已經完畢。接著應當思擇:此中什麼法是由幾種因所生的?法略有四類——染污法、異熟生法、初無漏法、以及前三之外的其餘法。問:其餘法是什麼?答:就是除去異熟以外的其餘無記法,以及除去初無漏以外的其餘善法。這四類法(各從幾因生)?頌說:
〔正61·正62前半〕四法各從幾因生
頌:染污法、異熟生法、其餘法、初無漏聖法,依次除去異熟因、除去遍行因、除去異熟與遍行二因、以及再除同類因,其餘之因能生。這是就心與心所說的;至於色與不相應行,還要再除去相應因。
論:諸染污法,除去異熟因,由其餘五因而生(染污法不是異熟因所生之果)。異熟生法,除去遍行因,由其餘五因而生(遍行因所生唯是染污)。第三類的其餘法,雙除異熟、遍行二因,由其餘四因而生。初無漏法,雙除前二因以及同類因,由其餘三因而生(初無漏之前沒有同類之法)。
問:這四類法是就什麼說的?答:是就心與心所法說的。
問:至於不相應行以及色這四類法,又是由幾因所生?答:就像心心所所除之因以外,再除去相應因——應知其餘之法是從四因、三因、二因這些其餘之因所生。此中染污與異熟生的色、不相應行,由其餘四因生;第三類其餘法,由其餘三因生;初無漏法,由其餘二因生。至於『一因所生之法』,決定是沒有的。
〔Root 50〕General Listing of the Six Causes
Carrying forward: The formations not associated with mind have now been explained. Earlier, when the arising-mark was said to produce what is to arise, it was noted that this is not accomplished by the arising-mark alone, apart from the remaining causes and conditions. Which dharmas here, then, are called causes and conditions? Causes are stated first. There are six kinds of cause. Which six? The stanza says:
Stanza: The enabling cause and the coexistent cause, the homogeneous cause and the associated cause, the all-pervading cause and the maturation cause — the Abhidharma masters allow that there are only these six kinds of cause.
Treatise: There are six kinds of cause: first the enabling cause, second the coexistent cause, third the homogeneous cause, fourth the associated cause, fifth the all-pervading cause, sixth the maturation cause. The masters of Abhidharma allow that there are only these six kinds of cause. Now the first question: what is the character of the first, the enabling cause? The stanza says:
〔Root 51〔Line 1〕〕The Enabling Cause: Not Obstructing Is Itself Being a Cause
Stanza: Apart from the dharma itself, all other dharmas are its enabling causes.
Treatise: When any conditioned dharma arises, only its own entity is excluded, and all other dharmas are its enabling causes — because at the time it arises those dharmas abide without adding any obstruction. Although the remaining five causes also, by their very nature, act upon a result and may be called enabling, each of those five has a name of its own, while this one alone has no other name available, and so the general name is given to it — just as “sense field of visible form” and the rest are properly general terms yet are used as particular names.
Someone objects: is it not said that, so long as the truths have not been known, the outflows are about to arise, and that because they have been known the outflows do not arise? Then cognition does obstruct the arising of the outflows; and again, sunlight obstructs a person from seeing the stars before him. How then can it be said that when a conditioned dharma arises, all dharmas apart from its own entity are its enabling causes? — It should be understood that what is said is that at the time this dharma arises, those dharmas all abide without obstruction, and that it is on this account that they are enabling causes of it. (When cognition arises, and when sunlight arises, the outflows and the seeing of stars simply do not arise; only when cognition and sunlight are not present is it the time for the outflows and the seeing of stars to arise, and at that time those very dharmas abide without obstructing them.)
A further question: if a dharma had the power to obstruct this dharma when it arises and yet did not obstruct it, it might be established as a cause — just as the people of a realm, because their sovereign does them no harm, all say, “It is because of our sovereign that we obtain ease.” But if a dharma has no obstructing operation at all with respect to the arising of this dharma (not even the capacity to obstruct), then, however much it does not obstruct, on what ground is it a cause? — Take nirvāṇa and dharmas that will never arise, with respect to the arising of any conditioned dharma; or the continuum of beings in the hells and elsewhere, with respect to the arising of the aggregates of the formless realm: their being present amounts to their being absent, and they have no obstructing operation whatever. The answer: although they have no obstructing operation, they are still established as causes, just as with a king who has no power — the people of the realm may say, exactly as before, “Because of our sovereign we obtain ease.”
This is said of all enabling causes in general, taking only the one sense of not obstructing. Where the more excellent among them are concerned, the enabling cause is not wholly without power to produce a result: the eye faculty and the visible object, for instance, with respect to the arising of visual consciousness and the rest; food with respect to the body; seeds and the rest with respect to sprouts and the rest — these do genuinely have productive power.
Another objection is raised: if all dharmas become enabling causes because they do not obstruct, why do not all dharmas arise all at once? When one person kills, why does not everyone alike incur the act of killing as that killer does? — The objection does not stand. It is only on the one point of not obstructing that all dharmas are allowed to be enabling causes; it is not said that they all have an intimate productive force with respect to the arising of the result. (The intimate cause and the mind that equally instigates are not present, and so there is no arising all at once and no shared offense.)
Another class of masters says: all enabling causes have an enabling power with respect to the arising of the result. To them one may put the question: what enabling power has nirvāṇa and the rest with respect to the arising of visual consciousness? The answer: mental consciousness arises taking nirvāṇa and the rest as its object, and becomes either a wholesome or an unwholesome mind; and because that mental consciousness has occurred, visual consciousness afterwards obtains its arising in due sequence — for they are causes of one another in a chain. So nirvāṇa and the rest do have an enabling power with respect to the arising of visual consciousness. The remaining dharmas are to be inferred on this same model, and all should be known to have productive power in a chain.
The character of the enabling cause has been explained. Second, what is the character of the coexistent cause? The stanza says:
〔Root 51〔Lines 2–4〕〕The Coexistent Cause: Serving as One Another’s Results
Stanza: Serving as one another’s results is the coexistent cause — as with the four great elements among themselves, as with what marks and what is marked, as with mind and the dharmas that follow mind.
Treatise: If two dharmas serve as one another’s results of human effort (the result obtained through the force of the cause’s operation), then those two dharmas are one another’s coexistent causes. What is their character? Just as the four great elements — earth, water, fire, wind — are reciprocally coexistent causes with respect to one another; and likewise the marks (the four marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation) and the dharma they mark, and mind and the dharmas that follow mind, are all causes of one another. In this way the coexistent cause, by the single sense of being one another’s results, gathers in all conditioned dharmas accordingly.
One exception, however, must be sorted out: a primary dharma and its secondary marks (the four lesser marks) are not one another’s results — the primary dharma is not a result produced by the secondary marks — and yet the primary dharma is still a coexistent cause of the secondary marks (the secondary marks follow the primary dharma), while conversely the secondary marks are not coexistent causes of the primary dharma. This point should be argued out here.
What, then, are called the dharmas that follow mind? The stanza says:
〔Root 52〔Lines 1–3〕〕The Entities of the Dharmas That Follow Mind
Stanza: The mental factors, the two disciplines of absorption and of the without-outflows, and the marks of these together with mind itself — these are the dharmas that follow mind.
Treatise: All dharmas associated with mind (the mental factors), the two disciplines — the discipline of absorption and the discipline without outflows — and the marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation belonging to these dharmas and to mind itself: all of these are called dharmas that follow mind. (The two disciplines are nonmanifest form that exists when one enters absorption and is absent when one leaves it, and so they follow mind.)
Why, then, are these dharmas called followers of mind? The stanza says:
〔Root 52〔Line 4〕〕Ten Reasons Adjudicate Following: Time, Result, Ethical Quality, and the Rest
Stanza: Because time is the same, result is the same, and the three ethical qualities, wholesome and the rest, are the same.
Treatise: Stated briefly, it is because time is the same, result and the rest are the same, and the wholesome and the rest are the same, that these dharmas are said to follow mind.
First, as to time: these dharmas have one arising, one abiding, and one cessation with mind, and they fall together into one time-period (past, present, or future, all belonging to one period). These four items together make the gate of time, showing that only what is simultaneous with mind is called a follower.
Second, as to result and the rest: these dharmas obtain one result with mind, call forth one maturation with mind, and obtain one homogeneous outflow with mind.
It should be understood that the “one” stated first here (one arising, one abiding, one cessation) shows simultaneity, while the “one” stated afterwards (one result, one maturation, one homogeneous outflow) shows commonality — one and the same word, with a different meaning in the two places.
Third, as to the wholesome and the rest: these dharmas are, together with mind, wholesome in quality, or unwholesome in quality, or indeterminate in quality.
From the four items of time, the three of result, and the three of quality, ten reasons are reckoned in all, and hence the name dharmas that follow mind.
Here, stated in terms of dharma-numbers: mind as sovereign is a reciprocal coexistent cause with at least fifty-eight dharmas — namely the ten factors of the great ground, their forty primary marks, and mind’s own four primary marks and four secondary marks, eight in all, making fifty-eight dharmas together. Conversely, among these fifty-eight, once mind’s four secondary marks are removed, the remaining fifty-four are the coexistent causes of mind.
Another master says: only fourteen dharmas are causes of mind — that is, the ten factors of the great ground together with mind’s four primary marks (not taking in the forty primary marks upon the factors of the great ground). This position is not good. Why? Because it contradicts the express words of the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas. As that treatise says: “There are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are not causes of the view of a real person — that is, apart from the future view of a real person and the arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence of the dharmas associated with it, the remaining defiled dharmas of the truth of suffering”; and, “There are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are also causes of the view of a real person — that is, the dharmas just excluded.” (Since what is excluded includes the four marks of the associated dharmas, it is evident that the primary marks upon the factors of the great ground are also reciprocal coexistent causes with mind.) Some transmitted versions, however, do not recite the five characters “and the dharmas associated with it.” The Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say that the passage must certainly be recited thus; or that even without those characters one should know from the sense that the statement is abbreviated.
Next it must be sorted out that coexisting and the coexistent cause are not the same thing. Whatever is a cause by way of the coexistent cause certainly coexists; but there are also things that coexist and yet are not causes by way of the coexistent cause — namely: the secondary marks with respect to their own primary dharma; the secondary marks with respect to one another; the secondary marks of the dharmas that follow mind with respect to mind; those secondary marks with respect to one another; all simultaneously arisen resistant derived forms with respect to one another; some simultaneously arisen nonresistant derived forms with respect to one another; all simultaneously arisen derived forms and great elements with respect to one another; and all simultaneously arisen acquisitions and what is acquired with respect to one another. These dharmas, though called coexistent, are not causes by way of the coexistent cause — because they do not take one result, one maturation, and one homogeneous outflow together. As for an acquisition and what is acquired, they do not even necessarily proceed at the same time, but may be earlier, later, or co-arisen, and so are all the less coexistent causes.
These points may be granted for the moment. But — in the causation universally acknowledged in the world, the seed is earlier and the sprout later; simultaneous cause and result of the sort you speak of has never been seen. So it must now be made clear: among a mass of dharmas arising at the same time, how can there be any sense of cause and result?
The Sarvāstivādins answer: Is it not evident to sight? A lamp flame and its light, a sprout and its shadow, are simultaneous and yet are one another’s cause and result.
The Sautrāntikas counter: This is exactly what should be argued out in detail — are the lamp flame and its light one another’s cause and result, or do the causes and conditions conjoined in the preceding moment (human effort, the lamp vessel, the oil, the wick) make flame and light arise together? As for the shadow, it appears because something else blocks the light; how can that shadow be said to have the sprout as its cause? (If the sprout produced the shadow, then where there is a sprout but no sunlight there should still be a shadow.)
The Sarvāstivādins defend the position: Your denial of our simultaneous cause and result does not stand to reason — because whether the result’s entity exists or not is settled by whether the cause exists or not. Those skilled in reasoning state the character of cause and result thus: if, when this cause exists the result exists, and when this cause does not exist the result does not exist, then this is definitely the cause and that definitely the result. And among coexistent dharmas, when one exists all exist and when one does not exist none does — which accords exactly with the principle of cause and result.
The Sautrāntikas ask again: Granting that things arising at the same time may be said to have the principle of cause and result, how can they be said to be one another’s cause and result? The Sarvāstivādins answer: By what was said just above (that when this exists that exists and when this does not exist that does not, which runs both ways), there is no contradiction in their being one another’s cause and result.
If that is so, then should not the derived forms spoken of above as inseparable from one another also be one another’s causes? Likewise derived forms and the great elements, and the secondary marks of what follows mind together with mind and the rest, are all inseparable from one another; should they not all be one another’s causes?
If it be said: just as three staves standing by leaning on one another, so the sense of cause and result among coexistent dharmas is established — then this too must be thought through again: do those three staves stand by the force of leaning on one another at the same time, or do the causes and conditions conjoined in a preceding moment make those three staves arise together and so stand? And besides, cords, hooks, the ground, and the like are there as well, holding and supporting them so that they stand. The answer: here too there are likewise the homogeneous cause and the rest (other supporting conditions) at work, and therefore the sense of the coexistent cause is still established.
The character of the coexistent cause has been explained. Third, what is the character of the homogeneous cause? The stanza says:
〔Root 53 · First Half of Root 54〕The Homogeneous Cause: Similar, of One’s Own Category and Level, Arisen Before
Stanza: The homogeneous cause is what is similar; it is confined to the same category and the same level, and must be a dharma arisen before. The path without outflows, however, is reciprocally a cause across the nine levels, though only what is equal or superior is its result. Dharmas arising from preparation are likewise — that is, what is formed through hearing, what is formed through reflection, and the rest.
Treatise: The homogeneous cause is similar dharmas being one another’s homogeneous causes. For instance, wholesome five aggregates and wholesome five aggregates are reciprocally homogeneous causes with respect to one another; and the defiled with the defiled, and the indeterminate with the indeterminate, the five aggregates considered reciprocally, should be known in the same way.
Here there are divergent views: some masters say that, of the pure indeterminate aggregates, all five aggregates are results of the aggregate of form〔form can be a cause of the five aggregates〕and the four aggregates are not causes of form; some masters say that all five aggregates are results of the four aggregates〔the four aggregates can be causes of the five aggregates〕and form is not a cause of the four aggregates; and still other masters say that form and the four aggregates, considered reciprocally, are in neither direction causes.
Again: within one and the same body, the first embryonic stage, the kalala, can be a homogeneous cause of the ten stages that follow; and each of the nine stages beginning with the second, the arbuda, excluding the stages before itself, is a cause of the remaining stages. With respect to the ten like stages in another’s body, each stage can be a cause of all ten. On this same model, the self-same production of barley, rice, and the rest in the external world should also be widely considered.
If one does not allow that form can be a homogeneous cause of form, that position contradicts the express words of the root treatise — for the root treatise says, “past great elements are causes and dominant conditions of future great elements,” and so on.
Are all similar dharmas, then, to be called homogeneous causes of similar dharmas? They are not. How so? Only what is of one’s own category and one’s own level is a cause for that same category and level, and so the stanza says “the same category and level.” Category means the five categories — that is, what is abandoned by seeing suffering, what is abandoned by seeing origination, what is abandoned by seeing cessation, what is abandoned by seeing the path, and what is abandoned by cultivation. Level means the nine levels — that is, the desire realm reckoned as one level, plus the four absorptions and the four formless attainments, eight in all. Here, dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering are homogeneous causes only for what is abandoned by seeing suffering and are not causes for the other four categories; and so on up to what is abandoned by cultivation being a homogeneous cause only for what is abandoned by cultivation. And within each single category, the level of the desire realm is a homogeneous cause only for the desire realm, the level of the first absorption only for the first absorption, and so on up to the level of the summit of existence being a homogeneous cause only for the summit of existence — between different levels there is no principle of being a cause at all.
Nor is that all. What more? The stanza says “arisen before”: only a dharma already arisen earlier is a homogeneous cause of a later dharma that is similar to it, whether that later dharma is imminently arising or not yet arisen. How is this known to be so? Because the root treatise says so. As the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom says: “What is the homogeneous cause? Previously arisen wholesome roots are homogeneous causes of subsequently arisen wholesome roots of their own realm and of the dharmas associated with them.” In this way the past with respect to the other two time-periods, and past and present with respect to the future, and so forth, should all be stated at length accordingly.
That treatise, however, also contains this question: “If a dharma is a cause of another dharma, is there ever a time when it is not a cause of that dharma?” And its author answers: “There is no time when it is not a cause.” — This was said covertly with respect to the three causes of coexistence, association, and maturation (those three extending to the future), and so there is no fault.
Someone says instead: a future dharma at the stage of imminent arising can certainly be a homogeneous cause for it, and so that passage was answered covertly on the basis of the final stage, the stage of imminent arising. This explanation is not a good resolution of the objection raised — because a future dharma is not a homogeneous cause before the stage of imminent arising, and becomes a homogeneous cause only after that stage (so that there still is a time when it is not a cause). Moreover, on his reading, when the treatise goes on to ask, “If a dharma is immediately antecedent to another dharma, is there ever a time when it is not immediately antecedent to it?”, its author answers, “When this dharma has not yet reached the state of having arisen.” On his explanation, that place too ought to have been answered, “There is no time when it is not a condition”; why then does it answer, “When this dharma has not yet reached the state of having arisen”?
He then repairs his position by saying: this was to display the two modes of question and answer, one covert and one plain — as it is stated there, so it might have been stated here, and as it is stated here, so it might have been stated there. — And what merit is gained by composing the text so? It only shows that the treatise’s author was not skilled in composition. Hence it should be known that the earlier explanation, the covert reference to the three causes, is the good one.
If that is so, why then does the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas say, “There are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are not causes of the view of a real person — that is, apart from the future view of a real person and the dharmas of the truth of suffering associated with it, the remaining defiled dharmas of the truth of suffering; and there are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are also causes of the view of a real person — that is, the dharmas just excluded”? (If there is no homogeneous cause in the future, why exclude “the future dharmas of the truth of suffering associated with the view of a real person”?) The answer: that passage should be stated as “apart from the future dharmas of the truth of suffering associated with the view of a real person” (that is, merely associated, and not included under the homogeneous cause). And even if the recitation really were as he says, one should know from the sense that it is not so (not evidence for a homogeneous cause in the future).
And how is the Treatise of Designations to be reconciled? That treatise says that dharmas have four determinate matters — namely cause, result, support, and object. It should be known that the word “cause” in that passage refers to the enabling cause, the coexistent cause, the associated cause, and the maturation cause (the four that extend to the future); “result” refers to the dominant result, the result of human effort, and the maturation result; “support” refers to the six faculties, the eye and the rest; and “object” refers to the six objects, visible form and the rest. (The homogeneous cause and the homogeneous result are not included there, and so no difficulty arises.)
If that is so, does not the homogeneous cause then become something that was not and comes to be? — This is allowed, and there is no fault: it is stated with respect to position and not with respect to entity; the result is established by the position of conjunction and operation, and not established with respect to entity.
Then supposing the homogeneous cause did exist in the future as well, as the maturation cause does, what fault would there be? The answer: if it existed in the future, the root treatise should have said so; but the root treatise speaks only of those homogeneous causes that can take a result and give a result (that is, in past and present), and so there is no fault.
Furthermore, on principle it cannot exist there: for the homogeneous cause draws forth a homogeneous result, and to say that this cause exists already in the future is by all reasoning impossible — future dharmas have no division into earlier and later. And it should not be said that an already arisen dharma is the homogeneous outflow of a not yet arisen dharma, just as a past dharma is not a result of a present one; otherwise there would be the fault of the result being earlier and the cause later. Therefore there is no homogeneous cause in the future.
If that is so, should not the maturation cause likewise be absent in the future? — It should not, because a maturation result is never earlier than its cause and never simultaneous with it (the result must be later than the cause). The answer: since future dharmas have no earlier and later, the fault just stated does not follow, because the maturation cause and its result are not similar. That is to say: the homogeneous cause and its result are similar, and if there were no earlier and later they would be one another’s causes; and being one another’s causes they would be one another’s results, and to be one another’s cause and result contradicts reason. The maturation cause and its result are not similar, and so even apart from the distinction of earlier and later the fault stated above does not arise. Therefore the homogeneous cause is established with respect to position, and so is absent in the future; the maturation cause is established with respect to character, and so is not absent in the future either.
On what basis is it said that the homogeneous cause is “only of one’s own level”? It is said with respect to what has outflows. In the case of the path without outflows, considered reciprocally, the path of each level can be a cause for all nine levels — that is, access concentration, intermediate absorption, the four fundamental absorptions, and the three fundamental formless attainments: the truth of the path in these nine levels is reciprocally a cause. Why? Because the path without outflows abides in every level like a guest lodging for a time, is not included within any realm, and is not appropriated as its own by the craving belonging to any level; so the paths of the nine levels, though the levels differ, can be reciprocally causes — for they are alike of the one class, the without-outflows.
Yet it is a cause only for what is equal or superior, and cannot be a cause of what is inferior, because it arises from preparation, that is, from applied effort. Thus an already arisen receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering is still a homogeneous cause of a future receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering, and this is called “equal”; and that same receptivity can also be a homogeneous cause of everything thereafter, from the cognition of dharma concerning suffering up to the knowledge of non-arising, and this is called “superior.” Stated at length in this way, up to the point where already arisen knowledges of non-arising are homogeneous causes only for what is equal to them, since there is nothing more excellent than they.
Again: the already arisen path of seeing, path of cultivation, and path beyond training are homogeneous causes for three, for two, and for one respectively (the path of seeing being a cause for all three paths, the path of cultivation for the two paths of cultivation and beyond training, and the path beyond training only for the path beyond training). And here a path of dull faculties is a homogeneous cause both for dull and for sharp faculties, whereas a path of sharp faculties is a cause only for a path of sharp faculties. Thus the paths of the three noble persons of dull faculties — one who follows through faith, one resolute through faith, and one whose liberation depends on circumstance — are homogeneous causes for six, for four, and for two respectively; and the paths of the three noble persons of sharp faculties — one who follows the dharma, one attained through view, and one whose liberation does not depend on circumstance — are homogeneous causes for three, for two, and for one respectively.
A further question: a path of a higher level may be a cause of a lower level; how then is it still said to be “equal or superior” (a higher level being superior and a lower inferior, so that it becomes a cause for what is inferior)? The answer: this is said by the two senses of increase in the cause and of faculty. Increase in the cause means that among the nine grades of the path of seeing and the rest, the lowest of the low and the others increase in causal force at each successive stage (so that a lower grade of a higher level may still be a cause for a higher grade of a lower level without being inferior). By faculty is meant that a path of dull faculties at a higher level is a cause for a path of sharp faculties at a lower level. And although within one continuum it is impossible for both the path of one who follows through faith and the path of one who follows the dharma to arise, an already arisen path may be a cause for a future path of the other class.
“Dharmas arising from preparation are likewise”: not only the noble path, but any worldly dharma that arises from preparation is likewise a cause only for what is equal or superior and not for what is inferior. What are the entities of dharmas arising from preparation? They are discernment formed through hearing, discernment formed through reflection, and the rest. The word “rest” takes in discernment formed through cultivation — the qualities produced by hearing, reflection, and cultivation are called “formed by them,” and because they arise only through applied effort they are causes for what is equal or superior and not for what is inferior.
Thus, as belonging to the desire realm: what is formed through hearing can be a homogeneous cause of what is formed through hearing and of what is formed through reflection within its own realm, and is not a cause of what is formed through cultivation (the desire realm has nothing formed through cultivation); what is formed through reflection is a homogeneous cause of what is formed through reflection and is not a cause of what is formed through hearing, since hearing is inferior to reflection. As belonging to the form realm: what is formed through hearing can be a homogeneous cause of what is formed through hearing and of what is formed through cultivation within its own realm, and is not a cause of what is formed through reflection (the form realm has nothing formed through reflection, for as soon as the mind sets itself to consider, it enters absorption); what is formed through cultivation is a homogeneous cause only of what is formed through cultivation in its own realm and is not a cause of what is formed through hearing, since hearing is inferior. As belonging to the formless realm: what is formed through cultivation is a homogeneous cause only of what is formed through cultivation in its own realm, and is not a cause of what is formed through hearing or reflection — there being no hearing there (no ear faculty), and reflection being inferior.
These dharmas further have nine grades each: the lowest of the low can be a cause for all nine grades; the low-middle for eight grades; and so on up to the highest of the high, which is a cause only for the highest of the high, since all the grades inferior to it are excluded. As for wholesome dharmas acquired by birth, the nine grades may be reciprocally causes for one another (not restricted to equal or superior); and it is the same with defiled dharmas.
The unobscured-indeterminate is of four kinds in all: those co-arisen with the maturation-born, with the mode of deportment, with the field of craft, and with the transformation mind; and these are causes for four, for three, for two, and for one respectively (each later one being more excellent). Moreover the transformation mind of the desire realm has the four absorptions as its results, but the transformation mind that is the result of a lower absorption is not a cause of the transformation mind that is the result of a higher absorption — because a dharma arising from preparation does not obtain an inferior result, just as one who diligently applies effort to sowing rice and barley does not toil in vain and reap nothing at all.
Because this is so, someone asks: is there an already arisen dharma without outflows that is not a cause of a dharma without outflows still at the stage of not having arisen? There is — for instance an already arisen class of the cognition of dharma concerning suffering with respect to the not yet arisen class of the receptivity concerning suffering (cognition being superior to receptivity, and so not a cause of the inferior); and, generally, any superior dharma with respect to any inferior dharma. Is there a dharma without outflows already determinately obtained within one continuum that is not a cause of what arises later? There is — for instance the future class of the receptivity concerning suffering with respect to the class of the cognition of dharma concerning suffering already arisen after it (a result never being earlier than its cause); or else, because there is no homogeneous cause in the future. Is there a previously arisen dharma without outflows that is not a cause of a dharma without outflows arising later? There is — for instance a previously arisen superior dharma without outflows with respect to an inferior dharma without outflows arising later, as when one falls back from a higher fruit and the lower fruit becomes present. And likewise the previously arisen acquisition of the cognition of dharma concerning suffering is not a homogeneous cause of the subsequently arisen acquisition of the receptivity concerning suffering, since the latter is inferior to the former.
The character of the homogeneous cause has been explained. Fourth, what is the character of the associated cause? The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 54〕The Associated Cause: Equal in Five Senses and Sharing One Support
Stanza: The associated cause is settled as mind and mental factors alone, and they must have one and the same support.
Treatise: Only mind and mental factors are associated causes.
If that is so, should not mind and mental factors whose objects and modes of apprehension differ also be one another’s associated causes? — They should not. Only those whose object and mode of apprehension are the same may be said to be in association.
If that is so, should not those whose objects and modes of apprehension are the same but whose times differ also be said to be associated causes? — They should not. Only when object, mode of apprehension, and time are all the same is it called association.
If that is so, should not those in different bodies whose object, mode of apprehension, and time are all the same (as when a crowd looks together at the new moon at the same moment) also be said to be in association? — In order to bar all these difficulties in a single phrase, the stanza says “the same support”: only mind and mental factors having one and the same support can be one another’s associated causes. Here the word “same” shows that the support is a single one — for instance, visual consciousness takes the eye faculty of this one moment as its support, and the feeling and other mental factors associated with it take that same eye faculty as their support; and so on up to mental consciousness and its associated dharmas taking the mental faculty as their common support, which should be understood in the same way.
The entity of the associated cause is in fact the coexistent cause; what difference in meaning, then, is there between the two causes? The answer: the coexistent cause is established by the sense of being one another’s results, like a company of merchants relying on one another and passing together through a dangerous road; the associated cause is established by the sense of being associated together in five equalities, like that same company of merchants eating together and working together at the business of food and drink and the rest, where if one man among them is missing none of them is in association — and so the sense of being one another’s causes is most fully established.
The character of the associated cause has been explained. Fifth, what is the character of the all-pervading cause? The stanza says:
〔First Half of Root 55〕The All-Pervading Cause: Previously Arisen All-Pervading Afflictions as the General Cause of Defiled Dharmas on the Same Level
Stanza: The all-pervading cause means the all-pervading dharmas arisen before, which are causes of all defiled dharmas on one and the same level.
Treatise: The all-pervading cause is the previously arisen all-pervading dharmas being all-pervading causes of subsequently arisen defiled dharmas of the same level. As for which dharmas the all-pervading dharmas are (the eleven all-pervading latent tendencies together with the dharmas associated and coexistent with them), this will be analyzed at length in the chapter on latent tendencies, where the sense of pervasion is treated.
Why must this cause be established separately from the homogeneous cause? Because it is the general cause of all defiled dharmas — the homogeneous cause is a cause only within its own category, whereas the all-pervading cause is a cause not only of defiled dharmas of its own category but also of the defiled dharmas of every other category; and by its force the afflictions of the other categories, together with their retinues (the dharmas associated and coexistent with them), grow along with it.
Question: do the defiled dharmas within the continuum of a noble one (the defilements abandoned by cultivation) also take these all-pervading dharmas abandoned by seeing as their cause? Answer: the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīra say that all defiled dharmas take what is abandoned by seeing as their cause. So the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas says: “What are the dharmas that have what is abandoned by seeing as their cause? They are the defiled dharmas, together with the maturation called forth by dharmas abandoned by seeing.” And again: “What are the dharmas that have the indeterminate as their cause? They are all indeterminate conditioned dharmas together with the unwholesome dharmas.” And again: “There are dharmas of the truth of suffering that have the view of a real person as their cause and are not causes of the view of a real person . . . that is, apart from the future view of a real person and the arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence of the dharmas associated with it, the remaining defiled dharmas of the truth of suffering.” (All three passages attest that what is abandoned by seeing is a general cause of every defiled dharma.)
If that is so, how is the Treatise of Designations to be reconciled? That treatise says: “Is there a dharma that is unwholesome and has only the unwholesome as its cause? There is — the first defiled volition arising when a noble one falls back from freedom from desire.” (If every defiled dharma has what is abandoned by seeing as its cause, why is only the unwholesome stated here as its cause?) Answer: that was said covertly with respect to a cause not yet abandoned — what is abandoned by seeing is also a cause of that volition, but the noble one has already abandoned the defilements of seeing, and so it is passed over unstated.
The character of the all-pervading cause has been explained. Sixth, what is the character of the maturation cause? The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 55〕The Maturation Cause: the Unwholesome and the Wholesome with Outflows
Stanza: The maturation cause is the unwholesome dharmas, together with those wholesome dharmas that have outflows alone.
Treatise: Only unwholesome dharmas and wholesome dharmas with outflows are maturation causes, because they are dharmas that can call forth maturation.
Question: why do indeterminate dharmas not call forth maturation? Answer: because their force is too weak, like a rotted seed. Question: why do dharmas without outflows not call forth maturation? Answer: because there is no craving to moisten them, like a sound seed with no water to irrigate it (which likewise cannot sprout); and moreover the without-outflows does not belong to any of the levels bound within the three realms, so how could it call forth a maturation belonging to a bound level? The remaining dharmas (the unwholesome and the wholesome with outflows) have both senses complete — they have the moistening of craving and they belong to a bound level — and so can call it forth, like a sound seed that has also received the moisture of water.
How is the name “maturation cause” to be understood? Is it “the cause of maturation” (a dependent-determinative analysis), or is it “maturation which is itself the cause” (an appositional-determinative analysis)? Answer: both explanations hold, and what fault is there in that? — If it were only “the cause of maturation,” the holy teaching should not say “the maturation-born eye” (which speaks of maturation with respect to the result); if it were only “maturation which is itself the cause,” the holy teaching should not say “the maturation of an action” (which speaks of maturation with respect to the cause). That both explanations hold has already been argued above.
What, then, is the meaning of the two words “maturation”? The Vaibhāṣikas explain it thus: ripening as a different kind is the sense of maturation — the maturation cause alone ripens as a different kind (the cause being wholesome or unwholesome and the result indeterminate); the coexistent cause and the rest ripen only as the same kind; and the one enabling cause extends to both same kind and different kind. Therefore this one alone is named the maturation cause.
(The author argues that this is insufficient): the result called “ripening” should not be a result obtained by the other causes. To deserve the name “ripening” a result must have two senses complete. First, its entity must arise only through the transformation and differentiation of a continuum (after an action is done the result is not called forth at once, and only when the continuum is about to call forth the result is it called transformation and differentiation). Second, its duration must have a definite limit in accordance with the relative strength of the cause’s force (ten years, say, or a hundred). Now the entities of the results produced by the coexistent and associated causes do not need to arise through the transformation and differentiation of a continuum, since they give the result at the very time they take it (the first sense is lacking); and the results of the enabling, homogeneous, and all-pervading causes do not have a temporal limit in accordance with the relative strength of the cause’s force, since to the very end of birth-and-death the results of wholesome and unwholesome actions and the rest still arise again and again with no limit of time (the second sense is lacking). Therefore it should be explained thus: ripening through transformation is the sense of maturation; and one should not distinguish it from the other causes by the single word “different” (which does not cover the sense fully).
Next, how many aggregates the maturation cause takes to call forth one result together. Within the desire realm: sometimes one aggregate is the maturation cause calling forth one result together — namely a determinate acquisition within the aggregate of formations, together with its four marks of arising and the rest; sometimes two aggregates are the maturation cause calling forth one result together — namely wholesome or unwholesome bodily and verbal action (the aggregate of form) together with their arising and the rest (the aggregate of formations); sometimes four aggregates are the maturation cause calling forth one result together — namely wholesome or unwholesome mind and mental factors together with their arising and the rest.
Within the form realm: sometimes one aggregate calls forth one result together — namely a determinate acquisition, or the attainment of non-perception, together with their arising and the rest; sometimes two aggregates call forth one result together — namely wholesome manifest action of the first absorption together with its arising and the rest; sometimes four aggregates call forth one result together — namely wholesome mind and mental factors not in equipoise (a scattered mind) together with their arising and the rest; sometimes five aggregates call forth one result together — namely mind and mental factors in equipoise (a concentrated mind) together with the form that follows them and with their arising and the rest.
Within the formless realm: sometimes one aggregate calls forth one result together — namely a determinate acquisition, or the attainment of cessation, together with their arising and the rest; sometimes four aggregates call forth one result together — namely all wholesome mind and mental factors together with their arising and the rest.
Next, the number of sense fields of maturation called forth by a single action. There is action that calls forth maturation in one sense field only — that is, it calls forth the sense field of dharmas, such as the life faculty. If it calls forth the mental sense field, it certainly calls forth two sense fields at once — the mental sense field and the sense field of dharmas. If it calls forth the sense field of the tangible, it should be known to be the same (the tangible and dharmas). If it calls forth the sense field of the body, it certainly calls forth three — the body, the tangible, and dharmas. Calling forth visible form, odor, and taste should be known in the same way. If it calls forth the sense field of the eye, it certainly calls forth four — the eye together with body, tangible, and dharmas. Calling forth the ear, nose, and tongue should be known in the same way. And there is action that can call forth five, or six, or seven, or eight, or nine, or ten, or eleven sense fields — because some actions have few results and some many, just as among the seeds of the outer world some bear few fruits and some many: few, as with grain and barley; many, as with the lotus, the pomegranate, and the banyan tree.
Again: there is action of one lifetime that calls forth maturation in three lifetimes, but no action of three lifetimes that calls forth maturation in one — for one does not toil in vain and get a result smaller than the cause. There is action of one moment that calls forth maturation in many moments, but no action of many moments that calls forth maturation in one, on the same reasoning.
A maturation result, however, is never simultaneous with the action, since at the very time of acting the result is not undergone; nor is it undergone immediately, in the very next moment, since the next moment is drawn forth by the force of the immediately antecedent condition (which is homogeneous outflow, not maturation). Moreover, since what the maturation cause calls forth is a result of a different kind, it can be brought about only when a continuum has transformed.
The particular characters of the six causes have now been explained. In which time-period, then, are these six causes determinately located? A cause’s residence in a time-period is determinate. Though this principle has already been stated, it has not yet been gathered into a stanza, and so it should be sorted out once more. The stanza says:
〔First Half of Root 56〕The Determinate Time-Periods of the Six Causes
Stanza: The all-pervading cause and the homogeneous cause extend to two time-periods; the associated, coexistent, and maturation causes extend to all three.
Treatise: The all-pervading cause and the homogeneous cause reside only in the two time-periods of past and present and are absent in the future — for the reason stated above, that they are established with respect to position. The three causes of association, coexistence, and maturation are present throughout all three time-periods. Since the stanza does not state in which time-period the enabling cause resides, one may infer from the class of the sense that the enabling cause extends to the three time-periods and also to what is outside time (unconditioned dharmas are enabling causes too).
The particular characters of the six causes and the determination of their time-periods have been explained. What dharma, then, is a result, with respect to which something is established as a cause? The stanza says:
〔Second Half of Root 56〕Results Are Only the Conditioned and Release from Bondage; the Unconditioned Has Neither Cause nor Result
Stanza: Results are all conditioned dharmas together with release from bondage (cessation through discernment); unconditioned dharmas themselves have neither cause nor result.
Treatise: As the root treatise says: “What are result-dharmas? They are all conditioned dharmas together with cessation through discernment.”
If that is so, then since the unconditioned (cessation through discernment) is allowed to be a result, it ought to have a cause — for only with respect to that cause can it be called a result; and since this unconditioned is also allowed to be a cause (an enabling cause), it ought to have a result — for only with respect to that result can it be called a cause. Answer: only conditioned dharmas have causes and results, and unconditioned dharmas do not. Why? Because the unconditioned has none of the six causes and none of the five results.
Question: why is it not allowed that the paths of unimpeded progress are enabling causes of the result of release from bondage? Answer: an enabling cause is established with respect to not obstructing the arising of something; but the unconditioned has no arising at all, so what can the path enable in it?
Question: whose result, then, is it? And wherein lies the sense of “result”? Answer: it is the result of the path, because it is realized by the force of the path.
Question: if that is so, then the result of the path should be only that acquisition (the acquisition of cessation through discernment), since the path has productive power with respect to the acquisition and none with respect to cessation through discernment itself. Answer: it is not so. The path’s function with respect to the acquisition and its function with respect to the cessation differ: with respect to the acquisition its function is to produce, and with respect to the cessation its function is to realize. On this principle, although the path is not a producing cause of the cessation, one may still say that cessation through discernment is a result of the path.
Question: since unconditioned dharmas have no dominant result, how can they still be said to be enabling causes? Answer: because unconditioned dharmas do not obstruct the arising of other dharmas, they are established as enabling causes; yet they are said to have no result because, apart from the dharmas of the world, there is no operation of taking a result and giving a result (the unconditioned is not within the three time-periods and so has no taking or giving).
(What follows is the Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda debate over whether the unconditioned is really existent; the treatise records the words of both parties at length.)
The Sautrāntika masters say: The unconditioned is not a cause. For no sūtra says that a cause is unconditioned, while there is a sūtra saying that causes are conditioned only.
Question: which sūtra says so? Answer: as a sūtra says, “Whatever causes and conditions produce form are all impermanent. Forms produced by impermanent causes and conditions — how could they be permanent?” And so on at length up to consciousness.
Counter: if that is so, then the unconditioned should also be unable to serve as an object condition for a consciousness that takes it as object (since the sūtra says that causes and conditions are all impermanent). Answer: the sūtra says only that what produces is impermanent, and so the unconditioned may still be an object condition — the sūtra says only that “whatever causes and conditions produce consciousness are all impermanent,” and does not say that everything that serves as a condition of consciousness is impermanent; so no difficulty arises.
Counter again: in that case the sūtra likewise says only that a productive cause is impermanent, and so it has not ruled out the unconditioned being an enabling cause merely by not obstructing. Answer: there is a scripture saying that unconditioned dharmas are object conditions, but no scripture saying that unconditioned dharmas are enabling causes; and so they should not be established as causes merely by not obstructing. Rejoinder: though no sūtra says so, neither is there any place where a sūtra forbids it; and immeasurable sūtras have by now been lost, so how can it be decided that no sūtra says so?
Question: what dharma, then, is called release from bondage? Answer: cessation through discernment, as stated in the root treatise. Counter: was it not asked earlier what cessation through discernment is, and answered that it is release from bondage? And now, when it is asked what release from bondage is, the answer is that it is cessation through discernment — with the two answers thus leaning on each other, its intrinsic nature is in the end never displayed. Another gate should therefore be opened to display its intrinsic nature.
(The Sarvāstivādins answer): The intrinsic nature of this dharma is really existent and beyond words; only the noble ones know it, each by inward realization. One can only say by way of expedient, in general terms, that it is wholesome and permanent, and that there is a separate real thing named cessation through discernment, also named release from bondage.
The Sautrāntika masters say: No unconditioned dharma is really existent — there is no separate real thing there as there is with form, feeling, and the rest, because what is indicated here is precisely an absence.
Question: if that is so, why are they still called space and the like? Answer: it is merely the absence of anything tangible that is named space — as in the dark, where nothing is met with by touch, and people say, “This is space.” And when an arisen latent tendency together with the seed that produces it has reached the stage of ceasing, and by the force of selection the remainder (suffering and the defilements) does not arise again, that is named cessation through discernment; while when, apart from the force of selection, the remainder does not arise again merely through the lack of a condition, that is named cessation independent of discernment — as with the remaining aggregates of one who dies untimely in the midst of the commonality of a lifespan (aggregates that should have arisen and do not).
Some masters of another school say: it is by the capacity of discernment that latent tendencies do not arise, and this is named cessation through discernment; while when latent tendencies lack a condition so that subsequent suffering does not arise, and this is not by the capacity of discernment, it is named cessation independent of discernment. (The Sautrāntikas refute this): apart from the force of selection this cessation cannot be established at all, and so this non-arising too should be included under cessation through discernment.
Others say: dharmas, once arisen, naturally come to a subsequent absence, and this is named cessation independent of discernment. (Refutation): if it is grasped in this way, the entity of cessation independent of discernment becomes impermanent — for before a dharma has ceased, this cessation independent of discernment does not exist. Counter: is it not the same with your cessation through discernment? It has selection as its antecedent, and so it too first is not and afterwards is, and should likewise be impermanent. Answer: cessation through discernment is not something that first has selection and only then comes to be. Why? It is not that only after selection has occurred does a not yet arisen dharma acquire its non-arising — that non-arising was there all along; it is only that without selection the dharmas would arise, and once selection has arisen the dharmas never arise again. With respect to this non-arising, selection does have a capacity — that is to say, previously there was nothing to obstruct arising, and now selection has become what obstructs arising; it has not manufactured a non-arising.
(The Sarvāstivādins object again): If mere non-arising is taken to be nirvāṇa, how is this passage of scripture to be reconciled? The sūtra says, “The five faculties, if cultivated, if practiced, if much practiced, can cause the sufferings of past, future, and present to be forever cut off.” The entity of this “forever cut off” is nirvāṇa; but the sense of non-arising applies only to the future and not to past and present — is this not a contradiction?
(The Sautrāntikas answer): Though there is such a passage, it does not contradict the principle. The sense of this sūtra is that the afflictions that take past and present suffering as their object are cut off, and therefore it is called the cutting off of the sufferings. Just as the World-Honored One said: “With respect to form you should cut off desire and craving; when desire and craving are cut off, that is called the cutting off of form and the full understanding of form.” And so on at length up to consciousness. The “cutting off” of past and present suffering should be understood in the same sense. And if there is some other sūtra that says “cutting off past, future, and present afflictions,” explained on the foregoing principle its sense likewise does not contradict.
Or else this sūtra has another intent: past afflictions means the afflictions arisen in past lives, and present afflictions means the afflictions arisen in the present life. So among the modes of craving, the eighteen modes of craving spoken of there as arisen in the past time-period are spoken of with respect to past lives, and the future and present should be known in the same way. And the afflictions arisen in these two time-periods, in order to produce future afflictions, have drawn forth seeds within the present continuum; when those seeds are cut off, those afflictions are called cut off — just as when the maturation result is exhausted the action too is called exhausted. Future sufferings and afflictions, having no seed, definitely do not arise, and so are said to be cut off. If it were not explained thus, on what ground would past and present (already ceased, presently ceasing) still need to be cut off? For what has already ceased and what is presently ceasing, one need not exert further effort to make it cease.
(The Sarvāstivādins object again): If the entity of unconditioned dharmas is wholly an absence, why does a sūtra say, “Among all dharmas, whether conditioned or unconditioned, freedom from defilement is foremost”? How can a “foremost” be established within an absence?
(The Sautrāntikas answer): Neither do I say that the entity of unconditioned dharmas is wholly an absence; it is only that they should “be” in the way I have described. For instance, it is said, “This sound has a prior non-existence and has a subsequent non-existence” — that non-existence may not be spoken of as really existent, and yet the use of the word “has” in that sentence still stands. To say “there is an unconditioned” should be understood in the same way. And though it is non-existent it can still be extolled — thus calamities and misfortunes are utterly non-existent, and this is named freedom from defilement; among all that exists and does not exist this is the most excellent, and in order that those to be trained may conceive deep gladness in it, it should be extolled as foremost.
(The Sarvāstivādins object again): If unconditioned dharmas are merely non-existent, then, being non-existent, they should not be named the noble truth of cessation.
(The Sautrāntikas answer): First state what “noble truth” means — does it not belong to the sense of being without inversion? The noble one’s seeing is without inversion both toward what exists and toward what does not: toward suffering he sees that it is just suffering, and toward the non-existence of suffering he sees that it is just non-existence. What in this contradicts the sense of a noble truth?
(Objection again): Since it is non-existent, how can it be established as the third noble truth? (Answer): Because it is what the noble ones see and state immediately after the second truth, the truth of origination, it becomes the third.
(Objection again): If the entity of unconditioned dharmas is nothing but an absence, then the consciousness that takes space or nirvāṇa as its object becomes a consciousness with a non-existent object. (Answer): There is no fault in a non-existent object; this point should be considered where the past and the future are examined.
(The Sautrāntikas ask in return): If one allows that the unconditioned has a separate real entity, what is lost and what is gained? — Allowing it makes it possible to defend the Vaibhāṣika school, and this may count as the gain; and if there really were something worth defending, the gods would surely know it and would come to defend it themselves. Yet allowing it to be really existent displays a false and constructed grasping, and this is the loss. Why? Because it is neither something whose entity can be found, as with form and feeling, nor something whose function can be found, as with the eye and the ear.
Again: if the unconditioned had a separate real entity, how could one use the sixth case-ending, the genitive, and say “the cessation of that thing”? For the cessation and that thing do not belong to one another — the two are not related as cause and result. Only if it is merely the negating of that thing can the sixth case-ending stand: the absence of that thing is named its cessation, and so one says “the cessation of that thing.”
(The Sarvāstivādins answer): Although cessation has a separate real entity, it is at the time when that thing obtains its cutting off that this cessation is obtained, and so this cessation may be said to belong to that thing. (The Sautrāntikas object): What is it that makes this cessation belong to this one acquisition? (The Sarvāstivādins reconcile the objection by citing scripture): As a sūtra says, “A bhikṣu obtains nirvāṇa in the present life” — if it were non-existent, how could “obtains” be said? (The Sautrāntikas answer): Because one obtains the antidote, one obtains a permanent separation from the afflictions and from the body that is the basis of further existence, and this is named obtaining nirvāṇa.
(The Sautrāntikas cite the holy teaching): There is moreover holy teaching that shows nirvāṇa to have non-existence alone as its intrinsic nature. As a sūtra says: “All sufferings are cut off without remainder, severally relinquished, exhausted, freed from defilement, ceased, stilled, forever gone; the remaining suffering does not continue, is not appropriated, does not arise. This is utterly at peace, this is utterly excellent — that is, the casting off of all the bases together with the exhaustion of all craving, freedom from defilement, and cessation, which is named nirvāṇa.”
(The Sarvāstivādins press): Why not allow that “what is said to be non-arising is non-arising in dependence on this really existent nirvāṇa, and is therefore called non-arising”? (The Sautrāntikas answer): Looking at this seventh case-ending, the locative, in “in dependence on this,” we find it has no force at all with respect to the existence of the cessation realized. Why should it be said to be “non-arising in dependence on this”? If “in dependence on this” belongs to the sense of what already exists, then there should have been no arising from the beginning (since nirvāṇa is permanent); and if “in dependence on this” belongs to the sense of what has been obtained, then it should be allowed to be “in dependence on the acquisition of the path” — so one can say only that it is in dependence on the path, or on the acquisition of the path, that suffering does not arise. This you should accept.
By this one can rightly understand the simile stated in the sūtra: as with the nirvāṇa of a lamp flame, so it is with the liberation of mind. The sense of that passage is that the nirvāṇa of a lamp is merely the passing away of the flame and is not some further thing; and so it is with the World-Honored One’s mind attaining liberation — it is merely the ceasing of the aggregates, and there is nothing else there at all.
The Abhidharma too says: “What are dharmas without entity? They are the unconditioned dharmas.” And “without entity” means without intrinsic nature.
(The Sarvāstivādins answer): The Vaibhāṣikas do not allow this explanation. If they are asked what “entity” means, they say that entity is of five kinds in brief. First, entity as intrinsic nature — as where it is said, “If one has obtained this entity, one possesses this entity.” Second, entity as object — as where it is said, “All dharmas are known by cognition, each according to its entity.” Third, entity as bondage — as where it is said, “If one is bound by the fetter of craving with respect to this entity, is one also bound by the fetter of hatred with respect to this entity?” Fourth, entity as cause — as where it is said, “What are dharmas possessed of entity? They are the conditioned dharmas.” Fifth, entity as what is included — as where it is said, “the entity that is a field, the entity that is a house, the entities that are wife and children.” The “entity” spoken of here takes the fourth sense (cause being named entity), and shows that unconditioned dharmas have no cause; so the unconditioned, though a really existent thing, is without cause and without result because it is permanently without operation.
The general discussion ends here. Among the results, then, which result should be said to be obtained by which cause? The stanza says:
〔Root 57〕Which Result Each of the Six Causes Obtains
Stanza: The last cause (the maturation cause) obtains the maturation result, and the first cause (the enabling cause) obtains the dominant result; the homogeneous cause and the all-pervading cause obtain the homogeneous result; the coexistent cause and the associated cause obtain the result of human effort.
Treatise: What is called “the last cause” is the maturation cause — among the six causes it stands last, and so is called last; and the first of the five results, the maturation result, is what this cause obtains. What is called “the first cause” is the enabling cause — among the six causes it stands first, and so is called first; and the last of the five results, the dominant result, is what this cause obtains. A “dominant result” is a result of dominance.
Question: the enabling cause merely abides without obstructing; what dominance can be spoken of? Answer: it is on this very point of not obstructing that it obtains the name of dominance. Or else, the enabling cause also has excellent power: as the ten sense fields and ten elements have with respect to the five bodies of consciousness, and the actions of sentient beings with respect to the receptacle world; and the ear faculty and the rest with respect to the arising of visual consciousness, and so on, also have a productive power that is dominant in a chain — for on hearing of something one conceives the wish to see it (and so visual consciousness arises). Dominance of this kind should all be considered according to reason.
The homogeneous cause and the all-pervading cause obtain the homogeneous result, because the results of these two causes both resemble their causes. The coexistent cause and the associated cause obtain the result of human effort — and it is not that there is a separate “human effort” apart from the entity of the “person”〔the agent〕; it is simply that the result obtained by the operation of these two causes is named the result of human effort.
Question: what dharma does the name “human effort” refer to? Answer: it refers to the operation belonging to dharmas — like the doings of a person, and so it obtains the name of human effort. The name is established from a simile, just as the world speaks of the crow’s-foot herb and the drunken-elephant general (the herb resembling a crow’s foot, the general entering the ranks like a drunken elephant).
Question: do only these two causes have the result of human effort, or do the others as well? Some masters say: the other causes also have this result, excepting only the maturation cause — because a result of human effort either arises simultaneously with its cause or arises immediately after it, whereas a maturation result does not. And other masters say: the maturation cause too has a result of human effort separated by a long interval, as with the harvest a farmer gathers.
What are the characters of the five results, maturation and the rest? The stanza says:
〔Root 58 · Root 59〕The Characters of Each of the Five Results
Stanza: The maturation result is an indeterminate dharma, belonging only to sentient beings, and produced by the determinate, that is, by the wholesome and the unwholesome. The homogeneous result resembles its own cause. The result of release from bondage is exhaustion through discernment, that is, cessation through discernment. If a dharma arises through the force of another, that result is named the result of human effort. Apart from conditioned dharmas already arisen before, the remaining conditioned dharmas are the dominant result of those earlier dharmas.
Treatise: A maturation result is found only among unobscured-indeterminate dharmas.
Question: does it then extend also to what is not counted among sentient beings (the outer receptacle world), or is it restricted to sentient beings? And does it extend to the homogeneous and to the nourished? Answer: it should be known that a maturation result is only “produced by the determinate” — all unwholesome dharmas and wholesome dharmas with outflows can determine, that is, call forth, maturation, and so are named determinate; and maturation arises only after that determinate action, neither simultaneously nor immediately, and so is named “produced by the determinate.” This is the character of a maturation result. (Since it is produced by the determinate alone, it follows that it does not extend to the homogeneous or to the nourished, for those two are produced by all three ethical qualities.)
Question: what is not counted among sentient beings (mountains, rivers, the great earth) also arises from action; why is it not named maturation? Answer: because it is held in common — others can enjoy it just the same. Whereas a maturation result has no sense whatever of being enjoyed in common by others: it never happens that one person acts and another thereby undergoes the maturation result. Question: the dominant result too is produced by action; how then can it be enjoyed in common? Answer: because it arises from action held in common.
A dharma resembling its own cause is named the homogeneous result — that is, resembling the two causes, homogeneous and all-pervading.
Question: if the all-pervading cause also obtains a homogeneous result, why is it not allowed simply to be called a homogeneous cause? Answer: because the result obtained by the all-pervading cause resembles its cause only in belonging to the same level and being alike defiled in nature, and not by resemblance of kind〔category〕; only where the result resembles the cause by kind is the cause of that result named a homogeneous cause. Hence this question is raised: “If something is a homogeneous cause, is it also an all-pervading cause?” Four alternatives should be distinguished. First alternative: a non-all-pervading dharma acting as a homogeneous cause (a homogeneous cause but not an all-pervading cause). Second alternative: an all-pervading dharma of another category acting as an all-pervading cause (an all-pervading cause but not a homogeneous cause). Third alternative: an all-pervading dharma of its own category acting as an all-pervading cause (both at once). Fourth alternative: apart from the characters of the preceding three (neither of the two).
A dharma whose defilements are exhausted by discernment is named the result of release from bondage: because it is cessation it is called exhaustion, and because it is selection it is called discernment — that is to say, cessation through discernment is named the result of release from bondage.
If a dharma arises through the force of another dharma, that dharma is said to be named the result of human effort. For instance, when by the force of a preparatory mind of a lower level an absorption of a higher level, with or without outflows, is made to arise, and when by the force of a pure mind of meditative absorption a transformation mind is made to arise — such cases are all of this kind. As for cessation through discernment, it should be said to be obtained by the force of the path (and not to be a result of human effort produced by it).
Among conditioned dharmas, apart from those already arisen before, the remaining conditioned dharmas are the dominant result of those earlier dharmas. (For a result is either simultaneous with its cause or later than it, and is never earlier.)
Question: what difference is there between the result of human effort and the dominant result? Answer: the name “result of human effort” is established only with respect to the agent; the designation “dominant result” extends to everything other than that agent. For instance, a thing made by a craftsman: with respect to the craftsman who made it, it takes both names, result of human effort and dominant result; with respect to anyone other than the craftsman, it is only a dominant result.
Among the six causes stated above, at which stage does which cause take a result and give a result? The stanza says:
〔Root 60〕The Times of Taking and Giving a Result
Stanza: Five causes take their result only in the present; the coexistent and associated causes give their result likewise. The homogeneous and all-pervading causes give their result in past and present; the one maturation cause gives its result only in the past.
Treatise: The five causes (excluding the enabling cause) take their result only in the present, and certainly not in the past — because they have already taken it; nor in the future — because the future has no operation. (The enabling cause should likewise be said to take its result in the present, but since the enabling cause does not necessarily have a result, this stanza does not state it.)
The giving of a result by the coexistent cause and the associated cause is likewise only in the present — because these two causes necessarily take their result and give it at the same time.
The giving of a result by the homogeneous cause and the all-pervading cause extends to both past and present. Giving in the past is readily understood; how is it said that they give in the present as well? Because some homogeneous results arise immediately, right after the cause. And once the result has arisen the cause becomes past, and that is “having already given the result,” and it should not give again.
For a wholesome homogeneous cause there are cases of taking the result without giving it, and four alternatives should be distinguished. First alternative (takes but does not give): the last acquisition relinquished at the time when wholesome roots are cut off. Second alternative (gives but does not take): the first acquisition obtained at the time when wholesome roots are restored — and it should be said that at that time it is the prior acquisition of what is restored (that is, the acquisition relinquished earlier). Third alternative (both takes and gives): all the other stages at which wholesome roots are not cut off. Fourth alternative (neither takes nor gives): apart from the characters of the preceding three.
Among unwholesome homogeneous causes there are likewise four alternatives. First alternative: the last acquisition relinquished at the time of becoming free from craving for the desire realm. Second alternative: the first acquisition obtained at the time of falling back into craving for the desire realm — and it should be said that at that time it is the prior acquisition of the one who falls back. Third alternative: all the other stages at which one is not yet free from craving for the desire realm. Fourth alternative: apart from the preceding three characters.
Among obscured-indeterminate homogeneous causes there are likewise four alternatives — at the time of obtaining the fruit of an arhat, at the time of falling back, at the time of not yet having obtained it, and at the other stages, to be assigned according to reason.
Among unobscured-indeterminate homogeneous causes there is a following-consequent clause: whenever it gives a result it certainly also takes one; and there are cases of taking a result without giving one — namely the last aggregates of an arhat (at entry into nirvāṇa without remainder, taking with nothing given).
Considered in terms of the momentary distinctions among what has an object (mind and mental factors), a wholesome homogeneous cause likewise has four alternatives. First alternative (takes but does not give): a wholesome mind immediately followed by the arising of a defiled or indeterminate mind. Second alternative (gives but does not take): the reverse of the first. Third alternative (both takes and gives): a wholesome mind immediately followed by another wholesome mind. Fourth alternative: apart from the preceding three characters. For an unwholesome mind and the rest there are likewise four alternatives, each as applicable, to be known on the same pattern.
Question: what is the meaning of taking a result and giving a result? Answer: because a cause can serve as the seed of a result it is named taking the result; because it is presently giving that result the power to become manifest it is named giving the result.
The maturation cause gives its result only in the past, because a maturation result is neither simultaneous with its cause nor arisen immediately after it.
There are also other masters who, beyond the preceding five results, separately state four results. First, the establishment result — as the water disc is a result of the wind disc, and so on up to grasses and trees being results of the great earth. Second, the preparatory result — as the knowledge of non-arising and the rest are results obtained remotely from the preparation of the contemplation of impurity and the like. Third, the conjunction result — as visual consciousness and the rest are results of the eye faculty and the rest in conjunction. Fourth, the cultivation result — as transformation minds and the rest are results of the cultivation of the meditative absorptions. All four of these results are included within the result of human effort and the dominant result.
The statement of causes and results is complete. Next it should be considered: which dharmas here are produced by how many causes? Dharmas are of four classes in brief — defiled dharmas, maturation-born dharmas, the first dharmas without outflows, and the remaining dharmas other than those three. Question: what are the remaining dharmas? Answer: the remaining indeterminate dharmas apart from maturation, and the remaining wholesome dharmas apart from the first without outflows. From how many causes does each of these four classes arise? The stanza says:
〔Root 61 · First Half of Root 62〕From How Many Causes Each of the Four Classes Arises
Stanza: Defiled dharmas, maturation-born dharmas, the remaining dharmas, and the first noble dharmas without outflows — excluding, in that order, the maturation cause, the all-pervading cause, the two causes of maturation and all-pervasion, and further the homogeneous cause, are produced by the remaining causes. This is stated with respect to mind and mental factors; as for form and the formations not associated with mind, the associated cause must further be excluded.
Treatise: Defiled dharmas, excluding the maturation cause, arise from the remaining five causes (a defiled dharma is not a result produced by the maturation cause). Maturation-born dharmas, excluding the all-pervading cause, arise from the remaining five causes (what the all-pervading cause produces is defiled only). The third class, the remaining dharmas, excluding both the maturation and the all-pervading causes, arise from the remaining four causes. The first dharmas without outflows, excluding both those causes and the homogeneous cause as well, arise from the remaining three causes (before the first without-outflows there is no dharma of the same kind).
Question: with respect to what are these four classes of dharmas stated? Answer: they are stated with respect to mind and mental factors.
Question: and from how many causes do these four classes arise in the case of the formations not associated with mind and of form? Answer: beyond the causes excluded for mind and mental factors, the associated cause is further excluded — it should be known that the remaining dharmas arise from four causes, three causes, and two causes, these being the remaining causes. Here defiled and maturation-born form and formations not associated with mind arise from the remaining four causes; the third class, the remaining dharmas, arise from the remaining three causes; and the first dharmas without outflows arise from the remaining two causes. As for a dharma produced by a single cause, there definitely is none.
四緣·十二心Four Conditions · Twelve Minds
全文五層 →Full five layers →〔正62後半·正63〕四緣的名目與體性
頌:說有四種緣。因緣,就是六因之中除能作因以外的五因;等無間緣,是除最後心以外、已生起的心與心所;所緣緣,是一切法;增上緣,就是能作因。
論:這四緣是在哪裡說的呢?是在契經之中說的。如契經中說有「四緣性」,就是因緣性、等無間緣性、所緣緣性、增上緣性。這裡所說的「性」,指的是『緣的種類』(不是另有一個叫作性的東西)。
先說因緣:在六因(能作、俱有、同類、相應、遍行、異熟)之中,除去能作因,其餘五因就是因緣性。
次說等無間緣:除去阿羅漢臨入涅槃時最後一剎那的心與心所之外,其餘一切已經生起過的心與心所,都是等無間緣性。為什麼叫「等無間」?因為這種緣所生的法,前後相等而中間沒有間隔,依這個意思立「等無間」之名。
正因為要「等」,所以色法等都不能立為等無間緣——因為色法的生起並不相等。譬如:欲界的色,有時無間生起欲界與色界二種無表色;有時又無間生起欲界的無表色與無漏的無表色(合為二種)。像這樣,諸色法是雜亂地一起現前的,而等無間緣所生的法必須沒有雜亂,所以色法不立為等無間緣。
尊者世友對這一點另有說法:在同一個身中,原有一分長養色相續不斷,後來又有第二分長養色生起,二者並不互相違害(可以並存),所以不能立為等無間緣。大德(法救)又說:諸色法無間生起時,有時少、有時多——有時從多生少,好比燒一大堆稻稈成為一小堆灰;有時又從少生多,好比一粒細小的種子長成諾瞿陀樹,根、莖、枝、葉逐漸繁茂,樹幹高聳、枝條低垂,蔭覆一大片地方。
有人問難:難道心所無間生起時,就沒有多少不等的品類嗎?譬如善心、不善心、無記心之中所具的心所數目不同,又如有尋有伺的三摩地與別種三摩地之中所具的心所數目也不同。答:這種多少之差是就「不同類」互相比較才有的;若就同一類自身而言,就沒有不相等的情形——沒有一個「受」無間生起多個「受」,也沒有多個「受」無間生起一個「受」;想等其餘心所也是如此,所以沒有「不等」的過失。
又問:那麼是否只有自類的前法才能作後法的等無間緣?答:不是。那是怎樣呢?答:前一念心品(心與相應諸心所合為一品)整體地作後一念心品的等無間緣,並不限於自類相對。前面所說『就受等自體之類中沒有少生多』,只是用來解釋「等」字的意思而已。
有一類人只承認同類相續,他們主張唯有自類才有等無間緣——心只生心、受只生受,乃至其餘一一如此廣說。依他們的說法,若從沒有染污的心無間生起染污心,那麼這個染污心中所有的煩惱,是用先前已滅的煩惱作等無間緣的;就好比從滅盡定出來時,心是用先前正入滅盡定時已滅的那個心作緣而生起的。他們這種說法不好,因為若是這樣,最初的無漏心(此前並無同類的無漏心)就應當缺少等無間緣而仍能生起了。
不相應行也和諸色一樣是雜亂現前的,所以不是等無間緣——因為屬三界的與不繫屬三界的不相應行可以同時現前。
有人問:為什麼不許未來世有等無間緣呢?答:因為未來的法是雜亂而住的,沒有前後次第可言。
又問:既然未來無前後,世尊如何能知道未來世『這個法無間之後、那個法應當生起』?答:是比類過去與現在之法而現前了知的。傳說:世尊看見過去世由這一類業感這一類果,這個法無間生起那個法;又看見現在世由這一類業感這一類果,這個法無間生起那個法。這樣看過之後,便能於未來那些雜亂而住的諸法之中,如實了達『此法之後應生彼法』。
雖然是這樣知的,卻不是比量之智。因為佛只是藉著比類過去現在的因果次第,便能於未來雜亂而住的諸法上現量了達——即某某有情於未來世造某某業、招某某果;這是「願智」所攝,所以不是比智。
問難:若是如此,世尊在還沒有看見前際(過去)的時候,對後際(未來)之法就應當不能知了。有另一派又說:有情身內原有未來世果的『因之先兆』,那是不相應行蘊中的一種差別法;佛只要觀察這個先兆便能知未來,不必現前遊入靜慮而起生死通慧。若是這樣,那諸佛就成了依相占卜而知未來,並非現量親證了。
所以應當依經部諸師所說:世尊只要舉心一念,就遍知諸法,既不是比度,也不是占相。這個說法才好。如世尊自己說過:諸佛的德用、諸佛的境界,是不可思議的。
又問:若未來沒有決定的前後次第安立,為什麼經中偏偏說「世第一法」無間唯生「苦法智忍」而不生其餘之法?如是乃至廣說到「金剛喻定」無間唯生「盡智」而不生其餘之法?答:若某一法的生起繫屬於另一法,必須那一法無間,這一法才得生起——好比芽等的生起要憑藉種子等。然而這裡並沒有等無間緣(種子與芽是色法,色法無等無間緣)。
又問:諸阿羅漢的最後心心所,為什麼說不是等無間緣?答:因為沒有其餘的心與心所接續它而生起。難:如此說來,凡是無間滅去的心也名為「意」(意界),那麼最後心之後既然不生起識,它也就不應當名為意了。答:「意」是就「作所依」而顯的,不是就「起作用」而顯的;這最後心仍有可作所依的意義(只是其餘助緣缺少,所以後識不生),所以仍得名意。而等無間緣是就「起作用」而顯的:凡是被這個緣取為果的法,決定沒有任何法、任何有情能加以障礙而令它不生。所以最後心雖然可以得「意」之名,卻不可說是等無間緣。
兩重四句分別。 問:凡是與心作「等無間(果)」的法,也都是『心無間(接在心後生起)』嗎?答:應作四句分別。第一句(是心等無間而非心無間):從無心定出來時的心心所,以及第二剎那以後的二定剎那。第二句(是心無間而非心等無間):最初生起的二定剎那之生、住、異、滅四相,以及有心位中諸心心所之生、住、異、滅四相。第三句(二者俱是):最初生起的二定剎那,以及有心位中的心心所法。第四句(二者俱非):第二剎那以後的二定剎那之生、住、異、滅四相,以及無心定出時心心所之生、住、異、滅四相。
再問:凡是與心作等無間的法,也都是「與無心定為無間」嗎?答:也應作四句,只是次序對調——前面的第三、第四句就是這裡的第一、第二句;前面的第一、第二句就是這裡的第三、第四句。
又問:從二定出來的諸心心所,回頭望入定時的那個心,中間隔了很遠(隔了整段無心的時間),怎麼還能說是「等無間」呢?答:因為中間並沒有其他心心所來間隔(所隔者非心)。等無間緣至此解釋完畢。
所緣緣:所緣緣性就是一切法,對心與心所而言,隨其所應而立。譬如眼識及與它相應的心所,以一切色為所緣緣;如是耳識及相應法以一切聲,鼻識相應以一切香,舌識相應以一切味,身識相應以一切觸,意識相應則以一切法為所緣緣。
若某法對某法而言是所緣,那就沒有一個時候它對彼不是所緣——即使在『沒有正被緣』的時位,它仍然算是所緣所攝,因為『正被緣』與『不被緣』二者的相是一樣的。譬如薪柴之類,即使沒有在燒的時候,也仍然叫作「所燒」,相沒有差別。
問:心心所法對於所緣,在「處、事、剎那」三方面都有決定(決定緣此處、此事、此剎那);那麼對於所依(根)是不是也有這樣的決定呢?答:應說也有這樣的決定。不過在現在世時,心心所是親附於自己的所依的;在過去、未來則與所依相離。也有人說:在過去世也仍然親附所依。所緣緣性至此解釋完畢。
增上緣:增上緣性就是能作因——因為就是拿能作因來作增上緣的緣故。這個緣的體最寬廣,所以名為增上緣,因為一切法都是增上緣。
問:既然一切法也都是所緣緣(所緣緣性即一切法),為什麼偏說增上緣體最寬廣?答:與心同時俱起的諸法,不曾作過(自己這一念心的)所緣,卻仍能作增上緣,所以唯有增上緣體最寬。或者換一個說法:是就『所作寬廣』而名增上緣——因為一切法各各除去自己的體性之外,對一切有為法都能作增上緣。
問:有沒有哪個法,對某個法而言完全不是四緣中的任何一緣?答:有。就是自己的體性對自己的體性(自性於自性,任何一緣都不作)。對他性也有嗎?也有:如有為法對無為法,無為法對無為法(無為法不生,故不受緣)。
〔正64〕四緣在什麼時位上起作用
頌:二因於正滅時起作用,三因於正生時起作用,其餘二緣則與此相違而起作用。
論:前面說過五因是因緣性。這五因之中,俱有因與相應因二因的作用在「正滅時」。所謂「正滅時」,是顯示此法正在現在世——因為滅相正現前,所以名為正滅時。俱有、相應二因,是在果法將滅之位才起作用的;由於這二因能令與自己俱生的果法有作用的緣故。
所說三因於正生者:是指未來的法正處於「將生」之位——因為生相現前,所以名為正生時。同類因、遍行因、異熟因這三種因,是在果法正生之位作用才興起的。
因緣的二種時位既已說完,二緣的作用則與此相反。等無間緣是在法的「正生位」起作用,因為那果法要生時,前一念心心所要讓出位置給它。而所緣緣是在能緣之心的「正滅位」起作用,因為心心所必須在現在世時才能取境。至於增上緣,則在一切時位上都無障礙而住,所以它的作用隨著「無障礙」之位,一切都不遮止(生位滅位皆得)。
〔正65〕哪些法由幾個緣而生;破『一因生一切』之執
頌:心與心所由四緣生,二無心定只由三緣生,其餘諸法由二緣生。世間不是自在天等一因所生,因為諸法是次第而起等等的緣故。
論:心心所法由四緣生。其中因緣就是前說五因;等無間緣,就是前一念無間、已生起的、非最後的心心所法;所緣緣,就是隨其所應,或是色等五境、或是一切法;增上緣,就是隨其所應,各除自己的體性以外的其餘一切法。
滅盡定與無想定二定由三緣生,除去所緣緣,因為二定不是能緣(無心,故不緣境)。就因緣說,是由二因:一是俱有因,即生、住、異、滅等四相;二是同類因,即先前已生的同地善法。就等無間緣說,即入定前的那個心與相應法。增上緣則如前所說。像這樣,二定是由心等所引生的;而它又障礙心等的生起,所以它對於心而言只是『心等無間(之法)』,卻不是「等無間緣」。
其餘的不相應行以及諸色法,由因緣、增上二緣所生。
一切世間都只是從以上所說的諸因諸緣而起,並不是自在天、我、勝性等某一個因所生起的。
有人問:憑什麼這樣說?答:如果你們也承認一切事的成立要由其他的因,那豈不就捨棄了『一切世間由自在等一因而生』的立論?
其一,以「次第」破。 又,諸世間不是自在天等一因所生,因為它們是次第而起的。若世間真是自在等一因所生,那麼一切就應當同時俱生,不應次第而起;然而現見諸法是次第而生的,所以決定不是一因所起。
若說自在天是隨著自己的欲樂而如此(他要這個法現在生、那個法現在滅、那個法在後時生滅),那麼就成了『不是一因所生』,因為還要由樂欲的差別而生。或者退一步說:那些差別的欲應當一時俱生才對,因為所依的自在天本身沒有差別。
若說這些差別的欲還要等待其他的因,所以不俱起,那就不是「一切唯用自在一法為因」了。或者說:所等待的因也應當再等待其他的因,才有差別而次第生起——如此則所待之因將沒有邊際。若說它不再等待其他差別因,那麼這個因就沒有次第生起的意義,那些差別的欲也就不是次第生的了。
若承認諸因輾轉差別、沒有邊際,那就是信受「無始」了——如此徒然執著自在天為諸法之因,其實並未超出釋門的因緣正理。
若說自在天的欲雖然是頓時而生,而諸世間所以不俱起,是因為世間隨自在天的欲而生——這也不合理,因為那自在天的欲,前後二位並沒有差別(既無差別,果何以有先後)。
其二,以「無用」破。 又,那個自在天費了大功力生起諸世間,究竟得到什麼利益?若說是為了引發自己的歡喜而生諸世間,那麼這個歡喜若離開其餘的方便就不能發起,那就是自在天在「發喜」這件事上還要依待其他,那他就不算自在了。在喜這件事上既然如此,其餘的事也應當一樣,因為找不出可以分別看待的因緣。
或者說:若自在天造出地獄等無量苦具來逼害有情,只為看見這樣的景象而生起自己的喜樂——咄!這樣的自在天要來何用?依那些外道所說的頌,倒真是說得對了。
〔引頌·非本頌〕外道所誦的一首頌
頌:因為險惡、銳利、能燒,可畏而恆常逼害,喜歡吃血、肉、骨髓,所以名叫魯達羅。
論(頌後續破):其三,以「違世間」破。 又,若信受一切世間唯是自在天一因所起,那就等於誹謗抹煞了現前可見的世間其餘因緣與人的功力等事(種田織布、造車蓋屋,難道都不必人力)。
若說自在天要等待其餘因緣的助發功能才成為因,那只是朋附恭敬自在天的說法罷了——因為離開其餘因緣,實在看不出自在天另有什麼作用。或者說:那個自在天既然要靠其餘因緣幫助才能生,他就不該叫作自在了。
若執『最初的生起以自在天為因,其後相續生起的才等待其餘的因』,那麼最初所起的既然不待其餘之因,就應當像自在天一樣無始本有了。
至於「我」與「勝性」等說,也隨其所應,如破自在天那樣廣加徵詰遣除。所以沒有一個法是唯由一因而生的。
奇怪呀!世間人不修殊勝的智慧,像愚癡的禽獸一樣,實在可悲。他們在一生一生之中各各造下自己的業,自己領受異熟果與士用果,卻虛妄計執有自在天等作為原因。
姑且停止破斥邪說,應當辨明正義。
〔正66〕四大種與所造色互相為因
論(承前問):前面說『其餘諸法由二緣生』,那麼其中大種與所造色,自他互相對望時,是怎樣互為因緣的呢?
頌:大種對大種作二因,對所造色作五種因;所造色對所造色作三種因,對大種則唯作一因。
論:先說「大為大二因」:諸大種彼此互相對望,只有俱有因與同類因二義(同時互相依持故有俱有因,前生引後同類故有同類因)。
「大於所造能為五因」:是哪五種?就是生、依、立、持、養五者的差別。這五因其實都只是能作因的差別而已。從大種而起,所以說為「生因」;生起以後仍隨逐大種而轉,如同弟子依止師長,所以說為「依因」;能任持所造色,如同牆壁承載圖畫,所以說為「立因」;能令它相續不斷,所以說為「持因」;能令它增長,所以說為「養因」。這樣就顯出大種對於所造色是作「起、變、持、住、長」的因性。
「造為造三種」:諸所造色彼此互相對望,可以有三種因,就是俱有因、同類因、異熟因(能作因對一切法無差別地都轉,所以不常列入計數)。俱有因,是指隨心而轉的身業與語業(此二互為俱有),不是其餘的所造色。同類因,是指一切前生的所造色對於後起的同類者。異熟因,是指身、語二業能招感異熟的眼根等果。
「為大唯一因」:所造色對於大種只作一種因,就是異熟因——因為身、語二業能招感異熟的大種果。
〔正67〕心有十二種
論(承前問):前面已經總說『諸心心所之中,前者能為後者的等無間緣』,但還沒有決定說明:哪一種心無間之後有幾種心生起?又從幾種心之後有哪一種心生起?現在應當決定地說。若略說,心有十二種。是哪十二種呢?
頌:欲界有四心——善、不善、有覆無記、無覆無記;色界與無色界各三心,除去不善;無漏另有二心。
論:且就欲界說,有四種心:善、不善、有覆無記、無覆無記。色界與無色界各有三心:除去不善,其餘如上所說(善、有覆無記、無覆無記)。這樣共十種,說的都是有漏心。若說無漏心,唯有二種:有學心與無學心。合起來就成十二心。
〔正68–71〕十二心如何互相生起
頌:欲界善心生九心,它又從八心生;欲界染心從十心生、生四心,其餘(無覆無記)從五心生、生七心。色界善心生十一心,它又從九心生;色界有覆心從八心生,又生六心;色界無覆心從三心生,又能生六心。無色界善心生九心,它又從六心生;無色界有覆心生七心也從七心生,無覆心則同色界之例。有學心從四心生、生五心,無學心從五心生、生四心。
論:欲界善心無間能生九心:一是自界四心;二是色界二心——入定時生彼善心、續生(結生)時生彼染心,依次而說;三是無色界一心,即續生時(生彼染心)。欲界善心無間可以生起無色界的染心,卻不能生無色界的善心,因為太遙遠了。無色界對欲界有「四遠」而稱遠:一所依遠、二行相遠、三所緣遠、四對治遠。此外又能生學心與無學心,即入觀的時候。
這個欲界善心又從八心無間而起:自界四心;色界二心——出定時從彼善心而起,又當被那染污定所逼惱時,從彼染心生起下地的善心(為的是依下地善心防止退墮);以及學心、無學心,即出觀的時候。
欲界染心(指不善與有覆無記二種),這二種各從十心無間而生——就是十二心中除去學、無學二心;因為在續生之位,三界一切心都可以無間生起欲界的染心。而這染心無間能生四心:就是自界四心,其餘的沒有生起之理。
其餘是指欲界的無覆無記心。這種心從五心無間而生:自界四心,以及色界善心(因為欲界的變化心是從彼定心而生的)。這種心無間又能生七心:自界四心;色界二心,即善與染污——欲界的變化心還生彼善心(還入定),而在續生位則生彼染心;再加上無色界一心,即續生位時這個無覆心能生彼染心。
色界善心無間能生十一心:就是除去無色界的無覆無記心。它又從九心無間而起:除去欲界二種染污心,以及除去無色界的無覆無記心。
色界有覆心從八心無間而生:除去欲界二染以及學、無學心。它無間能生六心:自界三心,加上欲界的善、不善、有覆無記三心。
色界無覆心從三心無間而起:只有自界三心,其餘沒有生起之理。它無間能生六心:自界三心,以及欲界與無色界的染心。
無色界善心無間能生九心:除去欲界善心,以及欲界、色界的無覆無記心。它又從六心無間而生:自界三心,加上色界善心,以及學、無學心。
無色界有覆心無間能生七心:自界三心,加上色界善心,以及欲界、色界的染心。它也從七心無間而起:除去欲界、色界的染心,以及學、無學心。
無色界無覆心如色界無覆心所說:從三心無間生,就是自界三心,其餘都不合理;它無間能生六心:自界三心,以及欲界、色界的染心。
學心從四心無間而生:就是學心自身及三界善心。它無間能生五心:就是前面四心再加無學一心。
其餘是指無學心,從五心無間而生:三界善心以及學、無學二心。它無間能生四心:三界善心以及無學一心。
十二心互相生起,至此說完。
〔正72·正73〕十二心開為二十心
論(承前問):怎樣把這十二心分為二十心呢?
頌:十二開成二十——三界的善心各分為加行得與生得二種;欲界的無覆無記分為四種:異熟生、威儀路、工巧處、通果心;色界則除去工巧處,其餘的數目如前所說。
論:三界善心各分二種,因為有「加行所得」與『生來即得』的差別。欲界無覆無記分為四心:一異熟生、二威儀路、三工巧處、四通果心。色界的無覆心分為三種,除去工巧處——因為上界都沒有造作種種工巧之事。這樣,十二心便成二十心:善心分為六(三界各二),無覆無記分為八(欲界四、色界三、無色界一);無色界沒有威儀路等,其餘之數如上,所以合成二十。
威儀路等三種無覆心,是以色、香、味、觸為所緣境;工巧處等則還兼緣於聲。這三種心唯是意識。至於威儀路與工巧處的「加行」,也通於四識、五識。另有一些論師說:有由威儀路與工巧處所引起的意識,能具足緣十二處之境。
這二十心如何互相生起? 且說欲界八種心中——
加行善心無間生十心:自界七心(除去通果心),加上色界一心(加行善心),以及學、無學二心。它又從八心無間而起:自界四心(二善二染),色界二心(加行善心與有覆無記),以及學、無學二心。
生得善心無間生九心:自界七心(除去通果心),以及色界、無色界的有覆無記二心。它又從十一心而起:自界七心(除去通果心),色界二心(加行善心與有覆無記),以及學、無學二心。
二種染污心無間生七心:自界七心(除去通果心)。它們又從十四心而起:自界七心(除去通果心),色界四心(除去加行善與通果心),以及無色界三心(除去加行善)。
異熟生心與威儀路心無間生八心:自界六心(除去加行善與通果心),以及色界、無色界的有覆無記二心。它們又從七心無間而起:自界七心(除去通果心)。
工巧處心無間生六心:自界六心(除去加行善與通果心)。它又從七心無間而起:自界七心(除去通果心)。
從通果心無間生二心:自界一心(即通果心)與色界一心(即加行善心)。它也從這二心無間而起,就是前面所說的自界與色界二心。
其次說色界六種心中——
從加行善心無間生十二心:自界六心,欲界三心(加行善、生得善與通果心),無色界一心(加行善心),以及學、無學心。它又從十心無間而起:自界四心(除去威儀路與異熟生),欲界二心(加行善與通果心),無色界二心(加行善與有覆無記),以及學、無學心。
生得善心無間生八心:自界五心(除去通果心),欲界二心(不善與有覆),以及無色界一心(有覆無記)。它又從五心無間而起:自界五心(除去通果心)。
有覆無記心無間生九心:自界五心(除去通果心),以及欲界四心(二善二染)。它又從十一心而起:自界五心(除去通果心),欲界三心(生得善心、威儀路、異熟生),以及無色界三心(除去加行善)。
異熟生心與威儀路心無間生七心:自界四心(除去加行善與通果心),欲界二心(不善、有覆),以及無色界一心(有覆無記)。它們又從五心無間而起:自界五心(除去通果心)。
從通果心無間生二心:自界二心(加行善與通果心)。它也從這二心無間而起,就是前面所說的自界二心。
其次說無色界四種心中——
加行善心無間生七心:自界四心,色界一心(加行善心),以及學、無學心。它又從六心無間而起:自界三心(唯除異熟生),色界一心(加行善心),以及學、無學心。
生得善心無間生七心:自界四心,色界一心(有覆無記),以及欲界二心(不善、有覆)。它又從四心無間而起:自界四心。
有覆無記心無間生八心:自界四心,色界二心(加行善與有覆),以及欲界二心(不善、有覆)。它又從十心無間而起:自界四心,色界三心(生得善、異熟生與威儀路),以及欲界三心(名目同色界所說)。
異熟生心無間生六心:自界三心(除去加行善),色界一心(有覆無記),以及欲界二心(不善、有覆)。它又從四心無間而起:自界四心。
其次說無漏二種心中——
從有學心無間生六心:通三界的加行善心,加上欲界的生得善心,以及學、無學心。它又從四心無間而起:三界的加行善心與有學心。
從無學心無間生五心:即前面有學心所生的六心之中,除去有學一心。它又從五心無間而起:三界的加行善心以及學、無學心。
幾個補充的問答。 問:什麼緣故加行善心無間能生異熟生、工巧處、威儀路三心,而那三心無間卻不能生加行善心?答:因為那三心勢力羸劣,不是由作功用(努力)所引發的;而工巧、威儀是樂於作功用去引發才轉起的,所以不能順著生起加行善心。至於『出定之心』不由功用而轉,所以加行善心無間可以生它們。
問:若是這樣,染污心無間也不應該生加行善心,因為二者不相順。答:雖然如此,但當厭倦煩惱之現行時,為了想要了知(煩惱),也可以生起加行;而欲界的生得善心因為明利之故(更容易接續)。
又:可以從那學心、無學心,以及色界加行善心,無間生起欲界生得善心;但欲界生得善心不是作功用所引發的,所以不能從它反過來引生那些心。又:欲界生得善心因為明利,可以從色界染心無間而生;色界生得善心因為不明利,所以不能從無色界染心無間而起。
三種作意。 作意有三種:一是自相作意,譬如觀色以變礙為相,乃至觀識以了別為相,如是等觀相應的作意;二是共相作意,就是四諦十六行相相應的作意;三是勝解作意,就是不淨觀、四無量、有色解脫、勝處、遍處,如是等觀相應的作意。
這三種作意無間都能令聖道現前,而聖道無間也都能具起這三種作意。若這樣說,就順於經中所說「不淨觀俱行修念等覺分」這句話。
另有論師說:唯有從共相作意無間,聖道才現前;而聖道無間則通起三種作意。至於經說「不淨觀俱行修念等覺分」,是因為修不淨觀調伏心以後,才能引生共相作意,從此無間聖道現前——是依這輾轉相生的密意而說的。
又有人說:唯有從共相作意無間聖道現前,而聖道無間也唯能起共相作意。若是這樣,那麼有依未至定等三地證入正性離生的人,聖道無間可以生欲界的共相作意(因為地不太遠);但若依第二、第三、第四靜慮證入正性離生,聖道無間又能起哪一種作意呢?不能起欲界的共相作意,因為太遙遠了;也不是在那個地中已有曾得的共相作意——與已曾得的順決擇分不同(若說起自地未曾得的共相作意,那其實就是聖道);而諸聖者的順決擇分也不可能再現前,因為已經得果之後不可能重新發起加行道。
若說另有一種共相作意,是在順決擇分俱時已修得的,由於繫屬於彼、是彼之同類——譬如觀諸行皆是無常、觀一切法皆是非我、涅槃寂靜,聖道無間可以引它現前。毘婆沙師不許這種說法,因為違背正理。
若依未至定得阿羅漢果,其後出觀之心,或即是未至定地、或是欲界地。若依無所有處得阿羅漢果,其後出觀之心,或即是無所有處地、或是有頂地。若依其餘諸地得阿羅漢果,其後出觀之心唯是自地,不通其餘之地。
於欲界中有三種作意:一聞所成、二思所成、三生所得。色界也有三種作意:一聞所成、二修所成、三生所得,而沒有思所成——因為在那裡舉心思惟時就入定了。無色界唯有二種作意:一修所成、二生所得。
這其中有五種作意無間能令聖道現前,除去「生所得」的那三種,因為聖道是繫屬於加行心的。而聖道無間也能發生欲界的生得作意,因為它明利之故。
〔正74〕某一心現前時,可以得到幾心
論(承前問):於前面所說的十二心中,哪一心現前時、有幾心可得?
頌:三界的染心之中,依次可得六心、六心、二心;色界善心可得三心,有學心可得四心;其餘諸心現前時,都只能得自心而已。
論:欲界染心正現前之位,十二心之內可以得到六心——因為這些心先前不成就,如今成就了。由於『以疑心續善根』以及「從上界退還」,欲界善心在那時名為得;由於『起惑而退』以及「從上界退還」,得欲界二心(不善與有覆),並得色界一有覆心;由於起惑而退,得無色界一有覆心,並得學心。所以名為得六。
色界染心正現前之位,十二心之內也得六心。由於從無色界退還,得欲界一無覆無記心以及色界三心;色界染心自身也由退而得;由於起惑而退,得無色界一有覆心,並得學心。所以名為得六。
無色界染心正現前之位,十二心之內唯得二心:由於起惑而退,得彼染心並得學心。所以名為得二。
色界善心正現前之位,十二心之內可得三心,就是彼善心以及欲界、色界的無覆無記心——這是由於昇進的緣故。
若有學心正現前之位,十二心之內可得四心,就是有學心以及欲界、色界的無覆無記心,並無色界善心——這是由於最初證入正性離生,以及由聖道離欲界、色界之染的緣故。
「餘」是指前面所說染等諸心以外的其餘心;論中沒有說那些心正現前時得心的差別。應知那些心正現前之位,唯有自心可得(不兼得他心)。
另有一家對此總括而說一頌。
〔引頌·非本頌〕他家總說得心的一頌
頌:有智慧的人說:染心現起時得九心,善心之中得六心,無記心則唯得無記。
論(論主之評):於善心中,應當說得七心才對——一、由正見續善根時,欲界善心生起之位名為得;二、三、離欲界染的究竟位中,頓時得欲界與色界的無覆無記二心;四、五、得色界與無色界的三摩地時,那二界的善心說名為得;六、七、最初證入正性離生之位與證阿羅漢果時,學心與無學心說名為得。其餘的(染心與無記)依前面所釋,就可以知道它們的相狀了。
〔引頌·非本頌〕總攝前義的一頌
論(承前):為了總攝前面所說之義,再說一頌。
頌:由託生(結生)、由入定、由離染、由退,以及在續善根之位,這五種時位上會「得心」——因為那些心是先前所不曾成就的。
〔Second Half of Root 62 · Root 63〕The Names and Entities of the Four Conditions
Stanza: It is said that there are four kinds of condition. The causal condition is the five causes among the six, excluding the enabling cause; the immediately antecedent condition is mind and mental factors already arisen, excluding the last mind; the object condition is all dharmas; the dominant condition is the enabling cause.
Treatise: Where are these four conditions stated? They are stated in a sūtra. As a sūtra says, there is “the nature of the four conditions,” namely the nature of the causal condition, of the immediately antecedent condition, of the object condition, and of the dominant condition. The word “nature” spoken of here refers to the class of a condition (there is no further thing called a nature).
First the causal condition: among the six causes (enabling, coexistent, homogeneous, associated, all-pervading, maturation), excluding the enabling cause, the remaining five causes are the nature of the causal condition.
Next the immediately antecedent condition: excluding the last moment of mind and mental factors of an arhat about to enter nirvāṇa, all other mind and mental factors that have already arisen are the nature of the immediately antecedent condition. Why is it called immediately antecedent? Because the dharmas this condition produces are equal before and after with no interval between, and on this sense the name immediately antecedent is established.
Just because equality is required, form and the rest cannot be established as immediately antecedent conditions — for the arising of form is not equal. For instance, a form of the desire realm sometimes gives rise without interval to two kinds of nonmanifest form, of the desire realm and of the form realm; and sometimes it gives rise without interval to nonmanifest form of the desire realm and nonmanifest form without outflows (two kinds together). In this way forms become present mixed together, whereas what the immediately antecedent condition produces must be without mixture; and so form is not established as an immediately antecedent condition.
The Venerable Vasumitra has a further account of this point: within one and the same body a portion of nourished form continues unbroken, and afterwards a second portion of nourished form arises, and the two do not injure or contradict each other (they can coexist), and so they cannot be established as an immediately antecedent condition. The Venerable One (Dharmatrāta) says further that when forms arise without interval they are sometimes few and sometimes many — sometimes many produce few, as burning a great heap of rice straw makes a small heap of ash; and sometimes few produce many, as a single fine seed grows into a banyan tree whose root, trunk, branches, and leaves flourish by degrees, the trunk rising high and the boughs hanging low, casting shade over a wide space.
Someone objects: when mental factors arise without interval, are there no classes of them differing in number? For instance, the number of mental factors in a wholesome, an unwholesome, and an indeterminate mind differs; and so too the number of mental factors in a concentration with applied and sustained thought differs from that in other concentrations. Answer: such differences of number obtain only when unlike kinds are compared with one another; within one and the same kind there is no case of inequality — no one feeling arises without interval into many feelings, and no many feelings arise without interval into one feeling; and perception and the other mental factors are the same, so there is no fault of inequality.
Again it is asked: is it then only a preceding dharma of one’s own kind that can be an immediately antecedent condition of a later one? Answer: it is not. How then? The preceding class of mind (mind together with its associated mental factors making one class) serves as a whole as the immediately antecedent condition of the following class of mind, and is not limited to what is set over against its own kind. What was said above, that within the kind that is the entity of feeling and the rest few do not produce many, was said only to explain the sense of the word “equal.”
There is a class of people who admit only continuity within a kind, holding that an immediately antecedent condition obtains only within one’s own kind — that mind produces only mind and feeling only feeling, and so on at length for each of the rest. On their account, when a defiled mind arises without interval from an undefiled mind, the afflictions within that defiled mind take as their immediately antecedent condition the afflictions that ceased earlier; just as, on emerging from the absorption of cessation, the mind arises taking as its condition the mind that ceased earlier when one was entering the absorption of cessation. Their account is not good, for on it the first mind without outflows (before which there is no mind without outflows of the same kind) would have to arise while lacking an immediately antecedent condition.
Formations not associated with mind, like forms, also become present mixed together, and so are not immediately antecedent conditions — for formations not associated with mind that belong to the three realms and those not bound within the three realms may become present at the same time.
Someone asks: why is an immediately antecedent condition not allowed in the future time-period? Answer: because future dharmas abide mixed together and admit of no sequence of before and after.
Again it is asked: since the future has no before and after, how can the World-Honored One know of the future time-period that “after this dharma without interval that dharma should arise”? Answer: he knows it manifestly by comparison with past and present dharmas. It is transmitted that the World-Honored One sees that in the past time-period such and such an action called forth such and such a result, and that after this dharma without interval that dharma arose; and sees that in the present time-period such and such an action calls forth such and such a result, and that after this dharma without interval that dharma arises. Having so seen, he can then, among those dharmas of the future that abide mixed together, know as it really is that after this dharma that dharma should arise.
Although he knows in this way, it is not inferential cognition. For the Buddha, merely by comparing the causal sequences of past and present, is able to know manifestly, upon those future dharmas that abide mixed together, that such and such a sentient being will in a future time-period perform such and such an action and call forth such and such a result; this is included in the knowledge of aspiration, and so is not inferential knowledge.
Objection: if so, then before the World-Honored One had seen the prior limit, the past, he ought to have been unable to know dharmas of the later limit, the future. Another party says instead: within the continuum of a sentient being there is from the first a “prior sign of the cause” of a future result, which is a differentiated dharma within the aggregate of formations not associated with mind; the Buddha need only observe this sign to know the future, and need not range manifestly into the meditative absorptions and arouse the supernormal knowledge of birth and death. If that were so, the Buddhas would know the future by divining from signs and not by direct realization.
Therefore one should follow what the Sautrāntika masters say: the World-Honored One, on merely directing his mind in a single moment, knows all dharmas everywhere, neither by inference nor by reading signs. This account is the good one. As the World-Honored One himself said: the powers of the Buddhas and the domain of the Buddhas are inconceivable.
Again it is asked: if the future has no determinate sequence of before and after established, why does scripture say precisely that the highest worldly dharma is without interval followed only by the receptivity to the cognition of dharma concerning suffering and by no other dharma? And so on at length up to the vajra-like concentration being without interval followed only by the knowledge of exhaustion and by no other dharma? Answer: if the arising of one dharma is bound to another dharma, then only when that dharma is immediately antecedent can this dharma arise — as the arising of a sprout and the rest depends on a seed and the rest. Yet there is no immediately antecedent condition in that case (seed and sprout are form, and form has no immediately antecedent condition).
Again it is asked: why is it said that the last mind and mental factors of an arhat are not an immediately antecedent condition? Answer: because no further mind and mental factors continue on from them and arise. Objection: on this account, every mind that has ceased without interval is also named mind-faculty; then, since no consciousness arises after the last mind, it too ought not to be named mind-faculty. Answer: mind-faculty is displayed by way of serving as a support, not by way of exercising an operation; and this last mind still has the sense of being available as a support (it is only that the remaining assisting conditions are lacking, and so no subsequent consciousness arises), and so it still obtains the name mind-faculty. The immediately antecedent condition, however, is displayed by way of exercising an operation: of any dharma taken as a result by this condition, there are definitely no dharmas and no sentient beings that can obstruct it so as to keep it from arising. Therefore the last mind, though it may obtain the name mind-faculty, may not be said to be an immediately antecedent condition.
Two fourfold analyses. Question: is every dharma that is an immediately antecedent result of mind also a dharma that arises directly after mind? Answer: four alternatives should be distinguished. First alternative (immediately antecedent to mind but not arising directly after mind): the mind and mental factors on emerging from a mindless absorption, and the moments of the two absorptions from the second moment onward. Second alternative (arising directly after mind but not immediately antecedent to mind): the four marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation belonging to the first arisen moment of the two absorptions, and the four marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation belonging to mind and mental factors in a state possessed of mind. Third alternative (both): the first arisen moment of the two absorptions, and mind and mental factors in a state possessed of mind. Fourth alternative (neither): the four marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation belonging to the moments of the two absorptions from the second moment onward, and the four marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation belonging to the mind and mental factors on emerging from a mindless absorption.
It is asked again: is every dharma immediately antecedent to mind also a dharma directly after a mindless absorption? Answer: four alternatives are to be made here likewise, only with the order transposed — the third and fourth alternatives above are the first and second here, and the first and second above are the third and fourth here.
Again it is asked: when mind and mental factors emerge from the two absorptions and look back to the mind at the time of entering, a long stretch lies between (a whole span of mindlessness), so how can they still be said to be immediately antecedent? Answer: because no other mind and mental factors intervene in between (what intervenes is not mind). The explanation of the immediately antecedent condition ends here.
The object condition: the nature of the object condition is all dharmas, established with respect to mind and mental factors each as applicable. For instance, visual consciousness and the mental factors associated with it take all visible form as object condition; likewise auditory consciousness and its associated dharmas take all sound, olfactory consciousness and its associates all odor, gustatory consciousness and its associates all taste, tactile consciousness and its associates all tangibles, and mental consciousness and its associates take all dharmas as object condition.
If a dharma is an object for another dharma, then there is no time at which it is not an object for that one — even at a time when it is not actually being taken as an object, it still counts as included among objects, because being actually taken as an object and not being taken as an object have one and the same character. It is like firewood and the like, which even when not being burned is still called fuel, since there is no difference in character.
Question: mind and mental factors are determinate toward their object in three respects, place, entity, and moment (determinately taking this place, this entity, this moment); is there likewise such determinacy toward the support, the faculty? Answer: it should be said that there is such determinacy likewise. Yet in the present time-period mind and mental factors intimately adhere to their own support, while in past and future they are separated from the support. Some say instead: in the past time-period too they still intimately adhere to their support. The explanation of the nature of the object condition ends here.
The dominant condition: the nature of the dominant condition is just the enabling cause — for it is the enabling cause that is taken as the dominant condition. The entity of this condition is the broadest of all, and so it is named the dominant condition, because all dharmas are dominant conditions.
Question: since all dharmas are also object conditions (the nature of the object condition being all dharmas), why is it said of the dominant condition alone that its entity is broadest? Answer: the dharmas arising together with a given mind have never served as the object of that very moment of mind, and yet they can still serve as dominant conditions; and so the entity of the dominant condition alone is broadest. Or, to put it another way: it is named the dominant condition with respect to the breadth of what it does — for all dharmas, each excluding its own entity, can serve as dominant conditions for all conditioned dharmas.
Question: is there any dharma that, with respect to some dharma, is none whatever of the four conditions? Answer: there is. It is one’s own entity with respect to one’s own entity (an intrinsic nature serves as none of the conditions for itself). Is there such a case with respect to another nature as well? There is: a conditioned dharma with respect to an unconditioned dharma, and an unconditioned dharma with respect to an unconditioned dharma (an unconditioned dharma does not arise, and so receives no condition).
〔Root 64〕At Which Positions the Four Conditions Operate
Stanza: Two causes operate at the moment of ceasing, three causes operate at the moment of arising, and the remaining two conditions operate contrariwise.
Treatise: It was said above that the five causes are the nature of the causal condition. Among these five causes, the coexistent cause and the associated cause operate at the moment of ceasing. “The moment of ceasing” displays that the dharma is in the present time-period — because the mark of ceasing is before us, it is named the moment of ceasing. The coexistent and associated causes exercise their operation only at the stage where the resultant dharma is about to cease, since these two causes cause the resultant dharma that arises together with them to have its operation.
As for the three causes at the moment of arising: this refers to a future dharma standing at the stage of being about to arise — because the mark of arising is before us, it is named the moment of arising. The homogeneous cause, the all-pervading cause, and the maturation cause, these three, have their operation arise at the stage where the resultant dharma is arising.
The two positions of the causal condition having been stated, the operation of the two conditions is the reverse of this. The immediately antecedent condition operates at the stage of a dharma’s arising, because when that resultant dharma is to arise the preceding mind and mental factors must yield their place to it. The object condition operates at the stage of the ceasing of the mind that takes it, because mind and mental factors must be in the present time-period in order to grasp an object. As for the dominant condition, it abides at every position without obstruction, and so its operation follows the position of not obstructing and bars nothing at all (it obtains at the stage of arising and at the stage of ceasing alike).
〔Root 65〕From How Many Conditions Each Dharma Arises; Refuting the Grasping That One Cause Produces All
Stanza: Mind and mental factors arise from four conditions, the two mindless absorptions from three only, and the remaining dharmas from two conditions. The world is not produced by Īśvara or the like as a single cause, because dharmas arise in sequence and for other such reasons.
Treatise: Mind and mental factors arise from four conditions. Their causal condition is the five causes stated above; their immediately antecedent condition is the mind and mental factors of the preceding moment, already arisen and not the last; their object condition is, each as applicable, either the five objects beginning with visible form or all dharmas; and their dominant condition is, each as applicable, all other dharmas excluding its own entity.
The absorption of cessation and the absorption without perception, these two, arise from three conditions, excluding the object condition, because the two absorptions do not take an object (being mindless, they do not take an object). As to the causal condition, it is by two causes: first the coexistent cause, that is, the four marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation; second the homogeneous cause, that is, previously arisen wholesome dharmas of the same level. As to the immediately antecedent condition, it is the mind and its associated dharmas before entry into the absorption. The dominant condition is as stated above. In this way the two absorptions are drawn forth by mind and the rest; and because they obstruct the arising of mind and the rest, they are for mind merely dharmas immediately antecedent to it, and are not its immediately antecedent condition.
The remaining formations not associated with mind and the forms arise from two conditions, the causal condition and the dominant condition.
All the worlds arise only from the causes and conditions stated above, and are not produced by any single cause such as Īśvara, a self, or the primal nature.
Someone asks: on what ground is this said? Answer: if you too grant that the establishing of anything requires other causes, have you not thereby abandoned the position that all the worlds arise from Īśvara and the like as a single cause?
First, the refutation by sequence. Again, the worlds are not produced by Īśvara or the like as a single cause, because they arise in sequence. If the worlds truly arose from Īśvara or the like as a single cause, then everything ought to arise all at once and not in sequence; yet we plainly see dharmas arising in sequence, and so they are definitely not produced by a single cause.
If it be said that Īśvara does this according to his own wish (that he wills this dharma to arise now, that dharma to cease now, and another to arise and cease later), then it is not produced by a single cause after all, since it further arises through differences of wish. Or, taking a step back: those differing wishes ought to arise all at once, since the Īśvara they depend on is himself without difference.
If it be said that those differing wishes must further await other causes and so do not arise all at once, then it is not the case that everything takes Īśvara alone as its cause. Or, if it be said that the causes awaited must in turn await yet other causes in order to differ and arise in sequence, then the causes awaited will have no limit. And if it be said that they await no further differing cause, then that cause has no sense of arising in sequence, and those differing wishes are not sequential either.
If it be granted that the causes differ in turn without limit, that is to accept beginninglessness — and in that case, though one vainly clings to Īśvara as the cause of dharmas, one has in fact not gone beyond the correct principle of causes and conditions in the Buddha’s school.
If it be said that Īśvara’s wish, though arising all at once, does not make the worlds arise all at once, because the worlds arise according to his wish — this too is unreasonable, for that wish of Īśvara’s has no difference in its earlier and later positions (and where there is no difference, how should the results be earlier and later?).
Second, the refutation by uselessness. Again, when Īśvara exerts great effort to produce the worlds, what benefit does he obtain in the end? If it be said that he produces the worlds in order to arouse his own delight, then, since that delight cannot be aroused apart from other means, Īśvara must depend on something else in the arousing of delight, and so he is not sovereign. And as it is with delight, so it should be with everything else, since no ground can be found for treating them differently.
Or again: if Īśvara produces the hells and other measureless instruments of suffering to oppress and harm sentient beings, merely in order to arouse his own delight at the sight of such a spectacle — enough! What use is such an Īśvara? By the stanza those non-Buddhists themselves recite, this is indeed truly well said.
〔Quoted Stanza · Not a Root Stanza〕A Stanza Recited by the Non-Buddhists
Stanza: Because he is perilous, sharp, and able to burn, fearsome and constantly oppressing and harming, and delights to feed on blood, flesh, and marrow, he is therefore named Rudra.
Treatise (the refutation continuing after the stanza): Third, the refutation by contradiction with the world. Again, to accept that all the worlds arise only from Īśvara as a single cause is to slander and wipe out the other causes and conditions of the world that are plainly visible, and the human effort and the rest (are farming and weaving, cart-making and house-building, all to be had without human labor?).
If it be said that Īśvara becomes a cause only by awaiting the assisting capacities of the other causes and conditions, that is merely the language of partisan reverence for Īśvara — for apart from the other causes and conditions no distinct function of his can in fact be seen. Or again: if that Īśvara can produce only with the help of other causes and conditions, then he ought not to be called sovereign.
If one holds that the first arising has Īśvara as its cause while only what arises thereafter in continuity awaits other causes, then, since what first arose awaited no other cause, it ought to be beginningless and originally existent, just like Īśvara.
As for the accounts of a self and of the primal nature and the rest, each as applicable is to be examined and dismissed at length just as Īśvara was. Therefore there is no dharma that arises from a single cause alone.
Strange indeed! The people of the world do not cultivate excellent wisdom, and are like foolish beasts and birds — this is truly to be pitied. Life after life they each perform their own actions and each undergo their own maturation result and result of human effort, and yet they falsely construct Īśvara and the like as the cause.
Enough for now of refuting error; the correct doctrine should be set out.
〔Root 66〕The Four Great Elements and Derived Form as Causes for One Another
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): It was said above that the remaining dharmas arise from two conditions. Among them, when the great elements and derived form are set over against each other, in what way are they causal conditions for each other?
Stanza: The great elements are two causes for the great elements and five kinds of cause for derived form; derived form is three kinds of cause for derived form, and for the great elements one cause only.
Treatise: First, the great elements as two causes for the great elements: the great elements set over against one another have only the two senses of the coexistent cause and the homogeneous cause (being simultaneous and mutually supporting, they have the coexistent cause; the earlier arisen drawing forth the later of the same kind, they have the homogeneous cause).
The great elements as able to be five causes for derived form: which five? They are the differentiations of producing, supporting, establishing, upholding, and nourishing. These five causes are in fact only differentiations of the enabling cause. Because derived form arises from the great elements, they are called the producing cause; because once arisen it proceeds still in dependence upon the great elements, as a disciple depends on a teacher, they are called the supporting cause; because they can uphold derived form, as a wall carries a painting, they are called the establishing cause; because they cause it to continue unbroken, they are called the upholding cause; because they cause it to increase, they are called the nourishing cause. Thus is displayed the causal nature of the great elements with respect to derived form as arousing, altering, holding, maintaining, and increasing.
Derived form as three kinds of cause for derived form: derived forms set over against one another may have three kinds of cause, namely the coexistent cause, the homogeneous cause, and the maturation cause (the enabling cause proceeds without differentiation toward all dharmas, and so is commonly not entered in the count). The coexistent cause refers to bodily and verbal action that follows mind (these two being coexistent with one another), and not to the other derived forms. The homogeneous cause refers to all previously arisen derived form with respect to what arises later and is of the same kind. The maturation cause refers to bodily and verbal action being able to call forth the maturation result of the eye faculty and the rest.
Derived form as one cause only for the great elements: derived form is only one kind of cause for the great elements, namely the maturation cause — because bodily and verbal action can call forth a maturation result that is a great element.
〔Root 67〕Mind Is of Twelve Kinds
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): It has been stated in general above that among mind and mental factors the earlier can be the immediately antecedent condition of the later; but it has not yet been determinately stated after which kind of mind how many kinds of mind arise, nor after how many kinds of mind which kind arises. This should now be stated determinately. Stated briefly, mind is of twelve kinds. Which twelve?
Stanza: The desire realm has four minds — wholesome, unwholesome, obscured-indeterminate, and unobscured-indeterminate; the form realm and the formless realm have three each, excluding the unwholesome; and there are two further minds without outflows.
Treatise: Take first the desire realm, which has four kinds of mind: wholesome, unwholesome, obscured-indeterminate, and unobscured-indeterminate. The form realm and the formless realm have three minds each: excluding the unwholesome, the rest are as stated above (wholesome, obscured-indeterminate, unobscured-indeterminate). These ten in all are minds with outflows. As for minds without outflows, there are only two: the mind of one in training and the mind of one beyond training. Together they make twelve minds.
〔Roots 68–71〕How the Twelve Minds Arise from One Another
Stanza: The wholesome mind of the desire realm produces nine minds and itself arises from eight; the defiled mind of the desire realm arises from ten and produces four; the rest (the unobscured-indeterminate) arises from five and produces seven. The wholesome mind of the form realm produces eleven and itself arises from nine; the obscured mind of the form realm arises from eight and produces six; the unobscured mind of the form realm arises from three and can produce six. The wholesome mind of the formless realm produces nine and itself arises from six; the obscured mind of the formless realm produces seven and also arises from seven, and its unobscured mind follows the pattern of the form realm. The mind of one in training arises from four and produces five; the mind of one beyond training arises from five and produces four.
Treatise: The wholesome mind of the desire realm can without interval produce nine minds: first, the four minds of its own realm; second, two minds of the form realm — at the time of entering absorption it produces the wholesome mind of that realm, and at rebirth-linking it produces the defiled mind of that realm, in that order; third, one mind of the formless realm, namely at rebirth-linking (producing the defiled mind of that realm). The wholesome mind of the desire realm can without interval produce the defiled mind of the formless realm, but cannot produce the wholesome mind of the formless realm, because it is too far away. The formless realm is called far from the desire realm by four distances: first, distance of support; second, distance of mode of apprehension; third, distance of object; fourth, distance of antidote. Besides these it can also produce the mind of one in training and the mind of one beyond training, that is, at the time of entering contemplation.
This wholesome mind of the desire realm also arises without interval from eight minds: the four minds of its own realm; two minds of the form realm — at the time of emerging from absorption it arises from the wholesome mind of that realm, and again, when one is distressed by a defiled absorption, from the defiled mind of that realm there arises a wholesome mind of the lower level (in order to rely on the lower wholesome mind to guard against falling back); and the mind of one in training and the mind of one beyond training, that is, at the time of emerging from contemplation.
The defiled minds of the desire realm (that is, the unwholesome and the obscured-indeterminate), these two each arise without interval from ten minds — that is, from the twelve minds excluding the minds of one in training and of one beyond training; for at the stage of rebirth-linking any mind of any of the three realms can without interval produce a defiled mind of the desire realm. And these defiled minds can without interval produce four minds: the four minds of their own realm, there being no principle by which they produce the rest.
The rest refers to the unobscured-indeterminate mind of the desire realm. This mind arises without interval from five minds: the four minds of its own realm, and the wholesome mind of the form realm (since the transformation mind of the desire realm arises from that mind of absorption). This mind can also without interval produce seven minds: the four minds of its own realm; two minds of the form realm, namely the wholesome and the defiled — for the transformation mind of the desire realm further produces the wholesome mind of that realm (re-entering absorption), while at the stage of rebirth-linking it produces the defiled mind of that realm; and one mind of the formless realm, that is, at the stage of rebirth-linking this unobscured mind can produce the defiled mind of that realm.
The wholesome mind of the form realm can without interval produce eleven minds: that is, all but the unobscured-indeterminate mind of the formless realm. It also arises without interval from nine minds: excluding the two defiled minds of the desire realm and excluding the unobscured-indeterminate mind of the formless realm.
The obscured mind of the form realm arises without interval from eight minds: excluding the two defiled minds of the desire realm and the minds of one in training and of one beyond training. It can without interval produce six minds: the three minds of its own realm, together with the wholesome, unwholesome, and obscured-indeterminate minds of the desire realm.
The unobscured mind of the form realm arises without interval from three minds: only the three minds of its own realm, there being no principle by which it arises from the rest. It can without interval produce six minds: the three minds of its own realm, and the defiled minds of the desire realm and of the formless realm.
The wholesome mind of the formless realm can without interval produce nine minds: excluding the wholesome mind of the desire realm and the unobscured-indeterminate minds of the desire and form realms. It also arises without interval from six minds: the three minds of its own realm, together with the wholesome mind of the form realm and the minds of one in training and of one beyond training.
The obscured mind of the formless realm can without interval produce seven minds: the three minds of its own realm, together with the wholesome mind of the form realm and the defiled minds of the desire and form realms. It also arises without interval from seven minds: excluding the defiled minds of the desire and form realms and the minds of one in training and of one beyond training.
The unobscured mind of the formless realm is as stated for the unobscured mind of the form realm: it arises without interval from three minds, namely the three minds of its own realm, the rest being unreasonable; and it can without interval produce six minds: the three minds of its own realm, and the defiled minds of the desire and form realms.
The mind of one in training arises without interval from four minds: the mind of one in training itself and the wholesome minds of the three realms. It can without interval produce five minds: the four just named plus the one mind of one beyond training.
The rest refers to the mind of one beyond training, which arises without interval from five minds: the wholesome minds of the three realms and the two minds of one in training and of one beyond training. It can without interval produce four minds: the wholesome minds of the three realms and the one mind of one beyond training.
The mutual arising of the twelve minds is explained to this point.
〔Root 72 · Root 73〕The Twelve Minds Unfolded into Twenty
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): How are these twelve minds divided into twenty minds?
Stanza: The twelve are opened into twenty — the wholesome mind of each of the three realms divides into two, acquired through preparation and acquired by birth; the unobscured-indeterminate of the desire realm divides into four, maturation-born, mode of deportment, field of craft, and supernormal-result mind; the form realm drops the field of craft, and the remaining numbers are as stated above.
Treatise: The wholesome mind of each of the three realms divides into two kinds, because of the difference between what is obtained through preparation and what is had from birth. The unobscured-indeterminate of the desire realm divides into four minds: first maturation-born, second mode of deportment, third field of craft, fourth supernormal-result mind. The unobscured mind of the form realm divides into three, excluding the field of craft — because in the higher realms there is no making of the various crafts. In this way the twelve minds become twenty: the wholesome divides into six (two in each of the three realms) and the unobscured-indeterminate into eight (four in the desire realm, three in the form realm, one in the formless realm); the formless realm has no mode of deportment and the rest, and the remaining numbers are as above, so that they make twenty in all.
The three unobscured minds of the mode of deportment and the rest take visible form, odor, taste, and the tangible as their objects; the field of craft and the rest take sound as object besides. These three minds are mental consciousness alone. As for the preparatory stages of the mode of deportment and of the field of craft, they extend also to the four consciousnesses and the five consciousnesses. Some other masters say: there is a mental consciousness drawn forth by the mode of deportment and by the field of craft which can take all twelve sense fields as its object.
How do these twenty minds arise from one another? Take first the eight minds of the desire realm —
The wholesome mind acquired through preparation can without interval produce ten minds: seven minds of its own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind), one mind of the form realm (the wholesome mind acquired through preparation), and the two minds of one in training and of one beyond training. It also arises without interval from eight minds: four minds of its own realm (two wholesome and two defiled), two minds of the form realm (the wholesome mind acquired through preparation and the obscured-indeterminate), and the two minds of one in training and of one beyond training.
The wholesome mind acquired by birth can without interval produce nine minds: seven minds of its own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind), and the two obscured-indeterminate minds of the form and formless realms. It also arises from eleven minds: seven minds of its own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind), two minds of the form realm (the wholesome mind acquired through preparation and the obscured-indeterminate), and the two minds of one in training and of one beyond training.
The two defiled minds can without interval produce seven minds: seven minds of their own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind). They also arise from fourteen minds: seven minds of their own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind), four minds of the form realm (excluding the wholesome acquired through preparation and the supernormal-result mind), and three minds of the formless realm (excluding the wholesome acquired through preparation).
The maturation-born mind and the mode-of-deportment mind can without interval produce eight minds: six minds of their own realm (excluding the wholesome acquired through preparation and the supernormal-result mind), and the two obscured-indeterminate minds of the form and formless realms. They also arise without interval from seven minds: seven minds of their own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind).
The field-of-craft mind can without interval produce six minds: six minds of its own realm (excluding the wholesome acquired through preparation and the supernormal-result mind). It also arises without interval from seven minds: seven minds of its own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind).
From the supernormal-result mind two minds arise without interval: one mind of its own realm (the supernormal-result mind) and one mind of the form realm (the wholesome mind acquired through preparation). It likewise arises without interval from these two minds, namely the two just named of its own realm and of the form realm.
Next, among the six minds of the form realm —
From the wholesome mind acquired through preparation twelve minds arise without interval: six minds of its own realm, three minds of the desire realm (the wholesome acquired through preparation, the wholesome acquired by birth, and the supernormal-result mind), one mind of the formless realm (the wholesome acquired through preparation), and the minds of one in training and of one beyond training. It also arises without interval from ten minds: four minds of its own realm (excluding the mode of deportment and the maturation-born), two minds of the desire realm (the wholesome acquired through preparation and the supernormal-result mind), two minds of the formless realm (the wholesome acquired through preparation and the obscured-indeterminate), and the minds of one in training and of one beyond training.
The wholesome mind acquired by birth can without interval produce eight minds: five minds of its own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind), two minds of the desire realm (the unwholesome and the obscured), and one mind of the formless realm (the obscured-indeterminate). It also arises without interval from five minds: five minds of its own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind).
The obscured-indeterminate mind can without interval produce nine minds: five minds of its own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind), and the four minds of the desire realm (two wholesome and two defiled). It also arises from eleven minds: five minds of its own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind), three minds of the desire realm (the wholesome acquired by birth, the mode of deportment, and the maturation-born), and three minds of the formless realm (excluding the wholesome acquired through preparation).
The maturation-born mind and the mode-of-deportment mind can without interval produce seven minds: four minds of their own realm (excluding the wholesome acquired through preparation and the supernormal-result mind), two minds of the desire realm (the unwholesome and the obscured), and one mind of the formless realm (the obscured-indeterminate). They also arise without interval from five minds: five minds of their own realm (excluding the supernormal-result mind).
From the supernormal-result mind two minds arise without interval: two minds of its own realm (the wholesome acquired through preparation and the supernormal-result mind). It likewise arises without interval from these two minds, namely the two just named of its own realm.
Next, among the four minds of the formless realm —
The wholesome mind acquired through preparation can without interval produce seven minds: four minds of its own realm, one mind of the form realm (the wholesome acquired through preparation), and the minds of one in training and of one beyond training. It also arises without interval from six minds: three minds of its own realm (excluding only the maturation-born), one mind of the form realm (the wholesome acquired through preparation), and the minds of one in training and of one beyond training.
The wholesome mind acquired by birth can without interval produce seven minds: four minds of its own realm, one mind of the form realm (the obscured-indeterminate), and two minds of the desire realm (the unwholesome and the obscured). It also arises without interval from four minds: the four minds of its own realm.
The obscured-indeterminate mind can without interval produce eight minds: four minds of its own realm, two minds of the form realm (the wholesome acquired through preparation and the obscured), and two minds of the desire realm (the unwholesome and the obscured). It also arises without interval from ten minds: four minds of its own realm, three minds of the form realm (the wholesome acquired by birth, the maturation-born, and the mode of deportment), and three minds of the desire realm (of the same names as stated for the form realm).
The maturation-born mind can without interval produce six minds: three minds of its own realm (excluding the wholesome acquired through preparation), one mind of the form realm (the obscured-indeterminate), and two minds of the desire realm (the unwholesome and the obscured). It also arises without interval from four minds: the four minds of its own realm.
Next, among the two minds without outflows —
From the mind of one in training six minds arise without interval: the wholesome minds acquired through preparation in all three realms, together with the wholesome mind of the desire realm acquired by birth, and the minds of one in training and of one beyond training. It also arises without interval from four minds: the wholesome minds acquired through preparation in the three realms, and the mind of one in training.
From the mind of one beyond training five minds arise without interval: that is, of the six minds produced by the mind of one in training just named, excluding the one mind of one in training. It also arises without interval from five minds: the wholesome minds acquired through preparation in the three realms, and the minds of one in training and of one beyond training.
Some supplementary questions and answers. Question: for what reason can a wholesome mind acquired through preparation without interval produce the three minds of maturation-born, field of craft, and mode of deportment, while those three cannot without interval produce a wholesome mind acquired through preparation? Answer: because those three minds are weak in force and are not drawn forth by applied effort; whereas the field of craft and the mode of deportment proceed by gladly exerting applied effort to draw them forth, and so they cannot accord with producing a wholesome mind acquired through preparation. As for the mind of emerging from absorption, it proceeds without applied effort, and so a wholesome mind acquired through preparation may without interval produce them.
Question: if so, then neither should a defiled mind without interval produce a wholesome mind acquired through preparation, since the two do not accord. Answer: even so, when one is wearied by the present activity of the afflictions, then in order to know them one may also arouse preparation; and the wholesome mind of the desire realm acquired by birth, being bright and keen, follows on the more readily.
Again: from the mind of one in training, the mind of one beyond training, and the wholesome mind of the form realm acquired through preparation, the wholesome mind of the desire realm acquired by birth may arise without interval; but the wholesome mind of the desire realm acquired by birth is not drawn forth by applied effort, and so those minds cannot conversely be drawn forth from it. Again: the wholesome mind of the desire realm acquired by birth, being bright and keen, may arise without interval from a defiled mind of the form realm; whereas the wholesome mind of the form realm acquired by birth, not being bright and keen, cannot arise without interval from a defiled mind of the formless realm.
Three kinds of attention. Attention is of three kinds: first, attention to an individual characteristic, as in contemplating form as having the character of resistance, and so on up to contemplating consciousness as having the character of discerning, and the attention associated with such contemplations; second, attention to a common characteristic, that is, the attention associated with the sixteen modes of apprehension of the four truths; third, attention through resolve, that is, the contemplation of impurity, the four immeasurables, the liberations possessed of form, the bases of mastery, and the totalities, and the attention associated with such contemplations.
All three kinds of attention can without interval cause the noble path to become present, and the noble path can without interval arouse all three kinds of attention. Stated in this way, it accords with the sūtra’s words, “one cultivates the awakening-factor of mindfulness and the rest in company with the contemplation of impurity.”
Some other masters say: only from attention to a common characteristic does the noble path without interval become present, while the noble path without interval arouses all three kinds of attention. As for the sūtra’s saying “one cultivates the awakening-factor of mindfulness and the rest in company with the contemplation of impurity,” that is because only after the contemplation of impurity has tamed the mind can attention to a common characteristic be drawn forth, from which without interval the noble path becomes present — it is stated with the hidden intent of this arising in turn.
Others say again: only from attention to a common characteristic does the noble path without interval become present, and the noble path without interval can arouse attention to a common characteristic alone. If so, then one who enters the certainty of the noble path in dependence on access concentration and the other two of the three levels may have the noble path without interval produce the attention to a common characteristic of the desire realm (that level not being too far); but if one enters the certainty of the noble path in dependence on the second, third, or fourth absorption, which attention can the noble path without interval arouse? It cannot arouse the attention to a common characteristic of the desire realm, because that is too far away; nor is there in that level an attention to a common characteristic already obtained before — unlike the factors conducive to penetration already obtained (and if it be said to be an attention to a common characteristic of one’s own level not previously obtained, that just is the noble path); and the factors conducive to penetration of a noble person cannot become present again, since after the fruit has been obtained the path of preparation cannot be freshly aroused.
If it be said that there is another attention to a common characteristic, cultivated and obtained simultaneously with the factors conducive to penetration and belonging to them as of their kind — as in contemplating that all formations are impermanent, that all dharmas are not a self, and that nirvāṇa is at peace — which the noble path can without interval draw into presence: the Vaibhāṣikas do not allow this account, because it contradicts correct principle.
If one obtains the fruit of an arhat in dependence on access concentration, the mind of emerging from contemplation thereafter is either of the level of access concentration or of the level of the desire realm. If one obtains the fruit of an arhat in dependence on the sphere of nothingness, the mind of emerging from contemplation thereafter is either of the level of the sphere of nothingness or of the level of the summit of existence. If one obtains the fruit of an arhat in dependence on the remaining levels, the mind of emerging from contemplation thereafter is of one’s own level alone and does not extend to the other levels.
In the desire realm there are three kinds of attention: first, formed through hearing; second, formed through reflection; third, acquired by birth. The form realm likewise has three kinds of attention: first, formed through hearing; second, formed through cultivation; third, acquired by birth — and it has nothing formed through reflection, since there, as soon as the mind is raised to consider, one enters absorption. The formless realm has only two kinds of attention: first, formed through cultivation; second, acquired by birth.
Among these, five kinds of attention can without interval cause the noble path to become present, excluding the three that are acquired by birth, since the noble path is bound to a mind of preparation. And the noble path without interval can also give rise to the attention of the desire realm acquired by birth, because it is bright and keen.
〔Root 74〕How Many Minds May Be Acquired When a Given Mind Is Present
Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Among the twelve minds stated above, when which mind is present may how many minds be acquired?
Stanza: Among the defiled minds of the three realms, six, six, and two minds may be acquired in order; with the wholesome mind of the form realm three may be acquired, and with the mind of one in training four; when the remaining minds are present, only their own mind may be acquired.
Treatise: At the position where a defiled mind of the desire realm is present, six minds among the twelve may be acquired — because these minds were not accomplished before and are accomplished now. By restoring wholesome roots through a mind of doubt and by falling back from a higher realm, the wholesome mind of the desire realm is at that time called acquired; by falling back through the arising of an affliction and by falling back from a higher realm, two minds of the desire realm are acquired (the unwholesome and the obscured), together with one obscured mind of the form realm; and by falling back through the arising of an affliction, one obscured mind of the formless realm is acquired, together with the mind of one in training. Hence it is called acquiring six.
At the position where a defiled mind of the form realm is present, six minds among the twelve are likewise acquired. By falling back from the formless realm, one unobscured-indeterminate mind of the desire realm and three minds of the form realm are acquired; the defiled mind of the form realm itself is also acquired by falling back; and by falling back through the arising of an affliction, one obscured mind of the formless realm is acquired, together with the mind of one in training. Hence it is called acquiring six.
At the position where a defiled mind of the formless realm is present, only two minds among the twelve are acquired: by falling back through the arising of an affliction, that defiled mind is acquired together with the mind of one in training. Hence it is called acquiring two.
At the position where a wholesome mind of the form realm is present, three minds among the twelve may be acquired, namely that wholesome mind together with the unobscured-indeterminate minds of the desire and form realms — and this is by reason of advancing upward.
At the position where the mind of one in training is present, four minds among the twelve may be acquired, namely the mind of one in training together with the unobscured-indeterminate minds of the desire and form realms and the wholesome mind of the formless realm — and this is by reason of first entering the certainty of the noble path and of becoming free, through the noble path, from the defilements of the desire and form realms.
The rest refers to the minds other than the defiled and the others stated above; the treatise does not state the differences in minds acquired when those are present. It should be known that at the position where those minds are present, only their own mind may be acquired (no other mind being acquired along with it).
Another school states this in general in a single stanza.
〔Quoted Stanza · Not a Root Stanza〕Another School’s Summary Stanza on Acquiring Minds
Stanza: Those possessed of wisdom say: when a defiled mind arises nine minds are acquired; with a wholesome mind six minds are acquired; and with an indeterminate mind only the indeterminate is acquired.
Treatise (the author’s assessment): With a wholesome mind it should rather be said that seven minds are acquired. First, at the position where the wholesome mind of the desire realm arises when wholesome roots are restored through right view, it is called acquired; second and third, at the culminating position of becoming free from the defilements of the desire realm, the two unobscured-indeterminate minds of the desire and form realms are acquired all at once; fourth and fifth, at the time of obtaining the concentrations of the form and formless realms, the wholesome minds of those two realms are said to be acquired; sixth and seventh, at the position of first entering the certainty of the noble path and at the time of realizing the fruit of an arhat, the mind of one in training and the mind of one beyond training are said to be acquired. As for the rest (the defiled and the indeterminate), their character may be known from what has been explained above.
〔Quoted Stanza · Not a Root Stanza〕A Stanza Gathering the Preceding Sense
Treatise (continuing): In order to gather in the sense stated above, a further stanza is spoken.
Stanza: By taking birth (rebirth-linking), by entering absorption, by becoming free from defilement, by falling back, and at the position of restoring wholesome roots — at these five positions a mind is acquired, because those minds were not accomplished before.