俱舍論白話全本 · 冊5Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Complete Vernacular · Vol. 5

分別隨眠品第五 · 3 單元 · 第 5／9 冊 · Chapter 5: Analysis of the Latent Tendencies · 3 units · Vol. 5 of 9 · 冊目次Volume index

隨眠體·諸門分別（前五門）The Nature of the Latent Tendencies · Distinctions through the Several Gates (the First Five Gates)

白話Vernacular

〔正1〕隨眠是諸有的根本——六種隨眠

論（承前起問）：前面說過，世間的種種差別都是由業而生的。而業要靠隨眠（潛伏而隨逐有情的煩惱）才得以生長；離開了隨眠，業就沒有招感後有的能力。為什麼這樣說呢？隨眠一共有幾種？頌說：

頌：隨眠是三有（欲有·色有·無有色的有）的根本。它的差別有六種——就是貪、瞋，也包括慢，還有無明、見與疑。

論：由於這隨眠正是諸有的根本，所以業一旦離了它，就沒有招感後有的能力。

那麼為什麼隨眠能夠作諸有的根本呢？因為種種煩惱一旦現起，能夠成辦十種事情——第一是堅固根本（使煩惱的根柢更牢），第二是建立相續（使煩惱一念接一念不斷），第三是整治自田（把心地整治成適合自己生長的田地），第四是引生等流（引出與自己同類的後續煩惱），第五是發起業有（發動能感後有的業），第六是收攝自具（把資助自己的種種條件收攏過來），第七是迷惑所緣（使心對所對的境界看不清楚），第八是導引識流（牽著識的相續往它要去的方向走），第九是越過善品（跨過、踰越善法那一分），第十是廣縛之義（廣泛地繫縛有情），使有情不能超越自己所在的界與地。由於隨眠能作諸有的根本，所以業憑著它才有招感後有的能力。

這裡簡略地說，隨眠的差別應當知道有六種——就是貪、瞋、慢、無明、見、疑。

頌文中說了一個『亦』字，用意在顯示：慢等等其餘的煩惱，也是靠著貪的力量而在境上隨增（隨著所緣的境而增長勢力）。至於『由貪隨增』的意思，後面還要辨明。

頌文中又有一個『及』字，是要顯示這六種的體性各各不同（不是同一個東西的六個名字）。

論（設問轉出七隨眠）：如果隨眠的體只有六種，那麼經中為什麼說有七種隨眠呢？頌說：

〔正2〕六開為七——有貪之名為什麼只安在上二界

頌：這六種，由於貪有差別而成為七種。所謂『有貪』，是指上二界（色界與無色界）的貪；因為那種貪多半是向著內門而轉的，並且是為了遮止把上二界當作解脫的那種想法。

論：就是前面所說的六種隨眠之中，把貪分成兩份，所以經中說有七種。

哪七種呢？一是欲貪隨眠、二是瞋隨眠、三是有貪隨眠、四是慢隨眠、五是無明隨眠、六是見隨眠、七是疑隨眠。

論（傍論起·隨眠與心相應不相應之諍）：『欲貪隨眠』這個名字，應當依什麼義去解釋？是說欲貪的體本身就是隨眠（前後二字同指一物）？還是說這是屬於欲貪的那個隨眠（隨眠另是一物而屬於欲貪）？其餘六種的名字要徵問起來，也都是同樣的兩關。

（難方反問）若是這樣，又有什麼過失呢？

（論主重顯這兩關的疑處）兩種讀法都有過失。

（難方就第一關發難）如果說欲貪的體本身就是隨眠，那就違背了契經。像契經所說：如果有一類人，並不是長時間被欲貪之纏（現起而纏縛心的煩惱）纏著心而住；即使心裡暫時起了欲貪之纏，他也能如實了知出離的方便，因此他對於欲貪之纏能夠正確地遣除，並且連隨眠也一併斷了。（既然說『並且隨眠也斷』，可見纏與隨眠是兩件事，不能說欲貪的體就是隨眠。）

（有部一方就第二關發難）如果說這是屬於欲貪的那個隨眠，那麼隨眠就應當是心不相應行（不與心相應的那一類法）了，這又違背了對法（阿毘達磨的本論）。像本論所說：欲貪隨眠與三根相應。（既然說它與根相應，可見它是相應法，不是不相應行。）

（毘婆沙師答·立自宗）毘婆沙師這樣說：欲貪等等的體，本身就是隨眠。

（難方徵問）豈不是違背了經嗎？

（毘婆沙師通經）沒有違經的過失。經中說『並且隨眠也斷』，是說連隨縛（隨逐而繫縛的那一分）也一併斷了。或者說，經是就『得』（得到煩惱的那個得）上假說隨眠的，就像在火等等之上安立苦等等的想一樣（火不是苦，而說觸火是苦，是就其所生而假說）。阿毘達磨是依實相而說的——就是把種種煩惱本身叫作隨眠。由這樣說，隨眠就是相應法。

（難方責問）有什麼道理可以作證，知道它決定是相應的？

（毘婆沙師舉三事為證）因為種種隨眠能夠染惱心、能夠覆障心、能夠違害善法。這是說：隨眠的力量能夠染惱心，使還沒有生起的善不能生起、已經生起的善退失，所以隨眠的體不是不相應行。假如不相應行能夠辦成這樣的事，那麼一切善法就應當永遠沒有生起的時候了——因為不相應行是恆常現前的（它若能障善，善就永無起時）。既然種種善法確實還有生起的時候，所以知道隨眠是相應法。

（難方非之）這些都不成其為證。為什麼呢？如果承認隨眠不是相應法的人，本來就不會承認上面那三件事（染惱心·覆障心·違善）是隨眠所辦的。（既不承認前提，你這證就落空。）

論（論主評取經部）：然而經部師所說的最為善巧。

經部在這裡是怎麼說的呢？他們說：這是屬於欲貪的那個隨眠。然而隨眠的體既不是與心相應，也不是與心不相應——因為它並不是另外一個東西。煩惱在睡位（潛伏而不現行的位次）時，就叫作隨眠；在覺位（現起而活動的位次）時，就叫作纏。

什麼叫作睡？就是煩惱不現行而只有種子隨逐著。什麼叫作覺？就是種種煩惱現起而纏縛心。

什麼叫作煩惱的種子？就是在自體之上的一種差別功能——它從煩惱生出來，又能生出煩惱。好比記憶的種子：它是由『證知』（曾經明白領受過那件事）而生的，又能生出將來的憶念，這也是一種功能上的差別。又好比芽等等：它由先前的果實而生出，又能生出後來的果實，這同樣是一種功能上的差別。

（經部反破不相應之說）如果有人執定煩惱之外另有一個叫隨眠的心不相應行，把它叫作煩惱的種子；那麼也應當承許記憶的種子不只是一種功能，而是另有一個不相應行能夠引生後來的憶念。這一邊既然不是這樣（沒有人把記憶的種子說成一個不相應的實物），那一邊怎麼能是這樣呢？因為找不出可以使二者差別的因緣。

（有部一方引經為難）若是這樣，就與《六六契經》相違了，因為經中說『於樂受有貪隨眠』（在樂受之上有貪的隨眠）。

（經部通經）經只是說『有』，並沒有說在那個時候就有隨眠現行，這有什麼相違害的呢？

（有部一方問）那麼是在什麼時候有？

（經部答）是在它睡的時候有；或者是就『因』上假立一個隨眠的想（就貪這個因，安上隨眠這個果名）。

論（收傍論·歸正論）：傍論姑且到此為止，應當回來辨正論。

論（有貪之立名）：說貪分為二份，就是欲貪與有貪。這裡的『有貪』以什麼為體呢？就是色界、無色界這二界之中的貪。

這個名字為什麼只安在那二界上？因為那種貪多半是依託內門而轉的。這是說：那二界的有情多半生起對定的貪，而一切對定的貪都是向內門而轉的（不緣外五欲之境），所以只在那二界立『有貪』之名。

又因為有人對於上二界起了解脫的想（誤以為生到那裡就是解脫），為了遮止這種想法，所以在上界立『有貪』之名，用以顯示它們所緣的並不是真實的解脫。這裡是就『自體』而安上一個『有』字（有＝三有之有，仍在生死之中）。

那二界的有情，多半對於等至（定的境界）以及所依止的身，深深地生起味著；所以說他們只是味著自體，並不是味著外境——因為他們已經離了欲界的貪了。由於這樣，才只在那二界立『有貪』之名。

既然說『有貪』是在上二界，那麼由此類推可知：欲界的貪就叫作『欲貪』，所以頌中不必另外標出來。

論（轉出十隨眠）：就是上面所說的六種隨眠，在本論之中又分成十種。怎麼成十的呢？頌說：

〔正3〕六開為十——五見與五非見

頌：這六種，由於『見』有差別而成十種。所謂差別，就是有身見、邊執見、邪見、見取、戒禁取。

論：六種隨眠之中，『見』依所行的行相不同而分成五種；其餘的五種不是見。把數目累加起來，總共成十。

所以在這十種之中，五種是見的體性——一是有身見、二是邊執見、三是邪見、四是見取、五是戒禁取。另外五種不是見的體性——一是貪、二是瞋、三是慢、四是無明、五是疑。

論（轉出九十八隨眠）：又就是上面所說的六種隨眠，在本論之中說成九十八種。是依什麼義說成九十八的呢？頌說：

〔正4·正5〕十開為九十八——行·部·界三重差別

頌：這六種，由於行、部、界三者有差別，所以成為九十八。欲界之中，見苦諦所斷等等（五部），依次是十、七、七、八、四。所謂如次具足或離去，就是離三見、離二見、離見與疑。色界與無色界，五部各各除去瞋，其餘的都與欲界一樣說。

論：六種隨眠由於行（所行的行相）、部（所斷的部類）、界（所繫的界地）有差別，所以成為九十八。

這是說：在六種之中，由於見的行相不同而分別為十，這在前面已經辨過了。就是這已辨的十種隨眠，再由部與界的不同而成九十八。

所謂『部』，是指見苦諦、見集諦、見滅諦、見道諦所斷，加上修所斷，共五部。所謂『界』，是指欲界、色界、無色界三界。

且就欲界的五部不同來說，乘上十種隨眠而成三十六。這是說：從見苦諦所斷一直到修所斷，依次有十、七、七、八、四。就是上面這五部，對於十種隨眠，依著一、二、一、一的次第（第一部具足十種；第二第三兩部同樣離三；第四部離二；第五部離見與疑），分別是具足、或是離三見、離二見、離見疑。

也就是說：見苦諦所斷的具足十種；見集諦、見滅諦所斷的各有七種，離去了有身見、邊見、戒禁取這三見；見道諦所斷的有八種，離去了有身見與邊執見這二見；修所斷的有四種，離去了五見與疑。這樣合起來成三十六種。

前面的三十二種叫作見所斷，因為一見到諦理時它們就斷了；最後的四種叫作修所斷，因為要見四諦之後，在後後的時位中屢屢修習聖道，它們才斷得掉。

這樣就已經顯示出：十種隨眠之中，薩迦耶見（有身見）只在一部，就是見苦所斷；邊執見也是這樣。戒禁取通在兩部，就是見苦所斷與見道所斷。邪見通在四部，就是見苦、見集、見滅、見道所斷；見取與疑也是這樣。其餘貪等等四種各各通在五部，就是見四諦所斷與修所斷。

那麼這裡以什麼為相，才叫作見苦所斷？乃至以什麼為相才是修所斷？答：如果所緣的境正是『見這一諦所斷』的那一類法，就叫作見這一諦所斷；其餘的就叫作修所斷。

這樣，六種之中見分為十二（五見各有所通之部，合計十二）、疑分為四、其餘四種各通五部而為二十，所以欲界之中有三十六。

色界與無色界的五部之中各各除去瞋（上二界無瞋），其餘的與欲界相同，所以各有三十一。

由於這樣，本論就以六種隨眠在行、部、界三者上的差殊，說為九十八。

在這裡所辨的九十八之中，八十八是見所斷，因為它們是被『忍』所害的；十種隨眠是修所斷，因為它們是被『智』所害的。

論（轉出見修斷之定不定）：這樣所說的見所斷與修所斷，是決定如此嗎？答：不是。那是怎樣？頌說：

〔正6〕見斷修斷不是死板的——有頂與八地的分別

頌：被忍所害的隨眠，若在有頂地，唯是見所斷；其餘的則通於見斷與修斷。被智所害的，唯是修所斷。

論：『忍』這個字，通指法智忍與類智忍。

在被忍所害的種種隨眠之中，屬於有頂地（非想非非想處）所攝的，唯是見所斷——因為唯有類智忍才能斷得了它。

其餘八地所攝的，則通於見斷與修斷。這是說：聖者去斷的時候，唯是見斷而非修斷，因為是由法智忍、類智忍照著所應而斷的；如果是異生（凡夫）去斷，那就唯是修斷而非見斷，因為他是靠屢屢修習世俗智去斷的。

被智所害的種種隨眠，則是一切地所攝的，唯是修所斷；因為種種聖者與種種異生，各照著他們所應的，都是靠屢屢修習無漏智或世俗智去斷的。

論（附錄一異說）：有其餘的論師說：外道的種種仙人不能夠伏斷見所斷的惑。像《大分別諸業契經》所說：已經離了欲貪的種種外道之類，還有緣著欲界而起的邪見現行。以及《梵網經》也說：那一類人有緣著欲界的種種見現行。這是說：在『前際分別論者』（依過去世作種種分別的一派）之中，有的執一切全是常、有的執一分是常、有的執諸法無因而生等等。

（推論的理由是）不會是色界的惑緣著欲界而生的，因為他對於欲界的境已經離貪了；所以那些見決定是欲界的種種見還沒有斷。

（毘婆沙師另作解釋）毘婆沙師解釋那部經的意思說：那是起見的時候暫時退失了，就像提婆達多那樣。

論（轉出五見自體）：由於所行的行相有殊異，把見分成五種，名字前面已經列過了；它們各自的體是怎樣的呢？頌說：

〔正7〕五見各自的體

頌：執我與我所，執斷與執常，撥為全無，把劣的說成勝的，把不是因不是道的妄說為因為道——這就是五見的自體。

論：執著『我』以及『我所』的，就是薩迦耶見。

（先釋此名）『薩』是壞的意思，『迦耶』是聚的意思——合起來就是『無常而和合的蘊』之義。迦耶就是薩，所以叫作薩迦耶。這薩迦耶就是五取蘊。之所以立這個名字，是為了遮止『常』與『一』的想；因為必定要先有那樣的想，才會在其上執著有我。

（另一家的解釋）毘婆沙師這樣解釋：『有』的意思叫作薩，『身』的意思如前面所說。（他們的理由是）不可能沒有所緣的東西而去計我與我所，所以說這見是緣著『有身』而起的。因為是緣著薩迦耶而起這個見，所以就標這個見叫作薩迦耶見。

（隨即設一難並通之）凡是只緣有漏法而起的種種見，豈不都應當標上薩迦耶的名字？然而佛只在『我與我所』的執著上標這個名字，是要讓人知道：這個見所緣的是薩迦耶（五取蘊），並不是真有一個我與我所——因為我與我所畢竟是沒有的。像契經所說：苾芻應當知道，世間的沙門、婆羅門等等，種種執有我的人，隨其所觀所見的，一切都只是在五取蘊上生起的。

（二）就在所執的我與我所這件事上，執它是斷、或執它是常，就叫作邊執見——因為是虛妄地執取斷與常這兩邊。

（三）在實有體的苦等四諦上起見而撥說為無，就叫作邪見。（設問）一切虛妄的見都是顛倒而轉的，都應該叫作『邪』，為什麼只把『撥無』的叫作邪見呢？答：因為它的過失太重。就像說『臭酥』——酥本來都有氣味，只有臭得極了的才特別叫臭酥。這是因為只有這一種是純粹的損減（把有的說成沒有），其餘四種都還是增益（在沒有的上頭添出東西來）。

（四）在劣的上頭說它是勝，就叫作見取。有漏法叫作『劣』，因為它是聖道所要斷的。把劣的執為勝的，總名見取。按道理說，本應立『見等取』之名（不只取見，還取見所依的蘊等），略去了『等』字，才只叫見取。

（五）在不是因、不是道的上頭，說它是因、是道的那種見，一切總說名為戒禁取。像把大自在天、生主，或其餘不是世間之因的東西，虛妄地起因的執著；像投水、赴火等等種種邪行，本不是生天之因而虛妄地起因的執著；像只是受持戒禁、以及與此相應的種種智等等，本不是解脫之道而虛妄地起道的執著。按道理說，本應立『戒禁等取』之名，略去了『等』字，才只叫戒禁取。

這就是五見的自體，應當知道。

論（轉出非因計因之所斷）：如果在不是因的上頭起『這是因』的見，這個見為什麼不是見集所斷（集諦正是講因的）呢？頌說：

〔正8〕非因計因為什麼唯是見苦所斷

頌：對於大自在天等等，把不是因的妄執為因——這是從『常』與『我』二倒生出來的，所以唯是見苦所斷。

論：執著大自在天、生主，或其餘的東西是世間之因、能生世間的人，必定先要計度那個東西的體是常、是一、是我、是作者，然後才起因的執著。

一見到苦諦的時候，對於自在天等等的常執與我執就永斷無餘了，所以由它們所生的因執也就跟著斷了。（所以斷處在見苦，不在見集。）

論（設難與往復）：若是這樣，那麼有人執『投水赴火等等種種邪行是生天之因』，或者執『只要受持戒禁等等便能得清淨』，這些就不應當是見苦所斷了（它們並沒有先計常我）。

然而本論說：有種種外道起這樣的見、立這樣的論——如果有士夫、補特伽羅受持牛戒、鹿戒、狗戒，便能得清淨、得解脫、得出離，永遠超越眾苦，安樂地到達超越苦樂之處。像這樣種種『不是因而執為因』的，一切都應當知道，是戒禁取、是見苦所斷，如那裡所廣說的。

（再徵）這又是因為什麼而是見苦所斷呢？

（若答『因為迷於苦諦』）那就有太過的失——因為凡是緣有漏的惑都是迷於苦諦的（若如此，一切緣有漏惑都成見苦所斷）。

（再進一步徵）另外還有什麼相狀，可以把戒禁取分別出來，說它是見道所斷呢？種種緣著見道所斷之法而生起的惑，豈不也都應當叫作『迷於苦諦』嗎？

又：緣道諦而起的邪見與疑，如果是撥無、或是疑無解脫之道，那怎麼還會執著『這個能得永遠的清淨』呢？（撥無與執取，方向相反。）

如果那個人撥無了真解脫道，卻虛妄地執有另外的清淨之因，那就是執『其餘的東西能得清淨』，這已經不是邪見等了。（所以）說它是緣見道所斷諸法而起的，道理也不成立。

又如果有人緣著見集諦、見滅諦所斷之法而起的邪見等等，把它執為清淨之因，這又是因為什麼而不是見那二諦所斷呢？

（收）所以這裡所執的義，應當再作思擇。

論（轉出四顛倒）：像前面所說的『從常我倒而生』，是不是只有這兩種顛倒呢？應當知道顛倒總共有四種——一是在無常上執常的顛倒、二是在諸苦上執樂的顛倒、三是在不淨上執淨的顛倒、四是在無我上執我的顛倒。這四種顛倒，它的體是怎樣的呢？頌說：

〔正9〕四顛倒的體：從三見而立

頌：四顛倒的自體，是從三種見而立的。因為必須是一向顛倒、是推度的體性、是虛妄增益，所以只取這幾種。想與心，是隨著見的力量而也叫作倒。

論：從三種見立四倒的體。這是說：邊見之中只取常見作為常倒；種種見取之中，取那計樂、計淨的作為樂倒與淨倒；有身見之中只取我見作為我倒。

（一個異說）有人說：我倒是把有身見全部都攝進去的。

（設問）我倒怎麼能攝我所見呢？（反問）為什麼不能攝？因為它同樣是被顛倒所纏縛的緣故。種種計我的人，在那件事上認為自己有自在之力，這就是我所見。這就是我見由兩個門而轉——一個是『是我』，一個是『屬我』。如果它們是各別的見，那麼由『我』而起的與由『為我』而起的，見也應當各別（然而實際上並不各別）。

論（何以只取這三見·倒之三因）：為什麼其餘的惑不是顛倒的體呢？因為要具足三個因，最勝的那一種才成為倒。

所謂三因，一是一向顛倒（沒有一分是真的）、二是推度的體性（會作判斷、下定論）、三是虛妄增益（在無中添出有來）。

這是說：戒禁取不是一向顛倒，因為它所緣的還有少分是淨的（受持戒禁本身並非全無淨分）；斷見與邪見不是虛妄增益，因為它們是從『無』的那一門而轉的（是損減不是增益）；其餘的種種煩惱不能推度，因為它們不是見的體性。由於要具足三因，最勝的那一種才成為倒，所以其餘的惑不是顛倒的體。

論（會通經中的想倒心倒）：若是這樣，那麼契經中為什麼說：在無常上計常，有想倒、心倒、見倒；在苦、不淨、無我上也是這樣（各有三倒）？

答：按實理應當知道，唯有見才是倒；想與心是隨著見而也立一個倒的名字，因為它們與見相應、行相相同的緣故。

（再問）若是這樣，為什麼不說受等等（也隨見立倒）呢？答：因為受等等在世間並不是很成立的說法。這是說：心倒與想倒在世間是大家都認得的，受等等就不然，所以經中不說。

這樣種種顛倒，預流果的人已經斷了——因為見以及與見相應的法都是見所斷的緣故。

論（異部十二倒之說與毘婆沙師之不許）：有其餘部派說：顛倒有十二種——就是在『於無常計常』這一倒之中，有想、心、見三種顛倒；乃至在『於無我計我』這一倒之中也是這樣（四倒各三，共十二）。在這十二之中，八種唯是見所斷；四種則通於見斷與修斷，就是樂與淨的想倒與心倒。

（他們進一步推論）如果不是這樣，那麼還沒有離欲的聖者已經離了樂想與淨想了，怎麼還會起欲貪呢？

毘婆沙師不許這個說法。（他們反難）如果有樂想、淨想現行，就得承許聖者還有樂倒淨倒；聖者也會起『有情』的想與心，那麼照樣也應當承許他有我倒了（然而聖者決定無我倒）。（他們順釋自宗）並不是在女人等等以及在自己身上離了有情之想與心，才會起欲貪的（起欲貪不必先有倒想）。

（他們引經正通）因為契經說：如果有多聞的種種聖弟子，對於苦聖諦如實地見知，乃至到那個時候，那位聖弟子的『在無常上計常』的想倒、心倒、見倒都已經永斷了，乃至廣說。所以知道：想與心唯有取『與見倒相應』的力量而起的，才是倒，其餘的不是。

然而聖者有時也會因暫時的迷亂，猝然地對境起欲貪現前——就像對著旋轉的火輪、對著畫出來的藥叉（夜叉像）而生迷亂一樣（明知不實而一時錯認）。

論（引一頌為難）：若是這樣，那麼為什麼尊者慶喜告訴那位尊者辯自在說：

引頌（非本頌）：由於有『想』的亂倒，所以你的心才焦熱；遠離了那個想以後，貪就止息，心也就清淨了。

論（另一師的會通）：所以有其餘的論師又這樣說：八種想倒心倒，有學的人還沒有完全斷盡。像這八種現起的煩惱，要靠如實地見知聖諦才得永斷；離開這個，再沒有別的永斷的方便。所以這裡所說的（想心倒唯與見倒相應）並不違背那部經。

論（轉出七慢九慢）：是只有『見』這個隨眠有很多差別呢，還是其餘的也有？答：慢也有。是怎樣的呢？頌說：

〔正10〕七慢與九慢類·聖者不現行的那一分

頌：慢有七種，九慢類是從其中三種流出的。它們都通於見所斷與修所斷。聖者就像對殺生之纏等等一樣——雖有修所斷的那一分，卻不現行。

論：且說慢隨眠的差別有七種——一是慢、二是過慢、三是慢過慢、四是我慢、五是增上慢、六是卑慢、七是邪慢。

使心高舉起來的，總立一個『慢』名；由於所行所轉不同，所以分成七種。

（一與二）對於比自己劣的、對於與自己相等的，依次認為自己更勝、認為自己相等，使心高舉，總說為『慢』。（三）對於與自己相等的、對於比自己勝的，依次認為自己勝、認為自己相等，總名『過慢』。（四）對於比自己勝的還說自己更勝，名為『慢過慢』。（五）在五取蘊上執著我與我所，使心高舉，名為『我慢』。（六）在還沒有證得的殊勝功德上，說自己已經證得，名為『增上慢』。（七）對於多分勝過自己的人，說自己只差一點點，名為『卑慢』。（八）在自己並無功德之中，說自己有德，名為『邪慢』。

論（九慢類）：然而本論說慢類有九種——一是我勝慢類、二是我等慢類、三是我劣慢類、四是有勝我慢類、五是有等我慢類、六是有劣我慢類、七是無勝我慢類、八是無等我慢類、九是無劣我慢類。

這樣九種，是從前面七慢之中的三種離出來的。是從哪三種呢？就是從前面的慢、過慢、卑慢這三種。如果依著見而生，所行的次第有殊異，就成了三組三類。

第一組三個，依次就是過慢、慢、卑慢。中間一組三個，依次就是卑慢、慢、過慢。後面一組三個，依次就是慢、過慢、卑慢。

（設一問）對於多分勝過自己的說自己只差一點點，卑慢是可以成立的，因為還有一個高舉之處；那麼『無劣我慢』的高舉之處是什麼呢？答：就是對於這樣自己所愛樂的殊勝有情之群，雖然知道自己極其下劣，卻仍舊自我尊重（我雖不如，仍與彼為類）。

以上且是依《發智論》的解釋。若依《品類足論》解釋慢類，那麼『我勝慢』是從三種慢出的——就是慢、過慢、慢過慢這三種，因為所觀的境有劣、等、勝的差別。

論（七慢之所斷與聖者不現行）：這樣七種慢，是哪一種所斷呢？答：一切都通於見所斷與修所斷。

（設問）那些修所斷的，聖者在還沒有斷盡的時候，是可以現行的嗎？答：這不一定。這是說：有修所斷而聖者決定不現行的——比如殺生之纏是修所斷的，而種種聖者必定不現行。

所謂殺生之纏，是顯示由這個惑而發起故意去斷眾生的命。『等』這個字是要顯示偷盜、婬欲、誑語這些纏，以及無有愛的全部、有愛的一分。

什麼是『無有愛』？就是三界都是無常的，而對這個無常起貪求，叫作無有愛。什麼是『有愛的一分』？就是願自己將來成為藹羅筏拏那樣的大龍王等等。

這些纏與愛，一切都是緣著修所斷之法而起的，所以唯是修所斷。

論（轉出何以聖者未斷不起）：已經說過慢類等等有屬於修所斷的，那麼為什麼聖者還沒有斷卻不起呢？頌說：

〔正11〕聖者身中有而不起的理由

頌：慢類等等與我慢，以及惡作（追悔）之中屬不善的那一分——聖者身中雖有而不現起，因為它們是被見與疑所增長的。

論：『等』這個字是要顯示殺生等等種種纏，以及無有愛的全部、有愛的一分。

這些慢類等等、我慢、以及不善的惡悔，都是被見與疑親自增長起來的。它們雖然是修所斷，但由於見與疑的背脊已經被折斷了（聖者見道已斷見與疑），所以聖者不能起。

這是說：慢類與我慢是被有身見所增長的，殺生等等的纏是被邪見所增長的，種種無有愛是被斷見所增長的，有愛的一分是被常見所增長的，不善的惡作是被疑所增長的；所以在聖者身中，這些都決定不起。

論（轉入諸門分別·門一）：九十八種隨眠之中，有幾種是遍行的、有幾種不是遍行的呢？頌說：

〔正12·正13〕門一·遍行與非遍行

頌：見苦諦、見集諦所斷的種種見與疑，以及與它們相應的、還有不共無明——這些是遍行的，遍行於自己的界與自己的地。在這其中除去二見，其餘九種還能夠緣上界上地。除去『得』以外，其餘隨行的法，也是遍行所攝。

論：唯有見苦諦、見集諦所斷的見與疑，以及與它們相應的不共無明（不與其餘煩惱相共而獨起的無明），力量能夠遍行於自己界地的五部，所以這十一種都得到『遍行』之名。這十一種就是七種見、二種疑、二種無明。

這樣的十一種，對於自己界地五部的種種法能夠遍緣；作為隨眠又能為因而遍生五部的染法。依這三種義（遍緣·為因·遍生五部）立『遍行』之名。

論（頓緣或漸緣之徵）：這裡所說的『遍緣五部』，是就漸次而緣呢，還是就一時頓緣呢？

如果是漸次而緣，那麼其餘的隨眠也應當算遍行了（因為誰都可以次第緣過去）。如果是一時頓緣，那麼有誰能夠對欲界的一切法一時頓時計為最勝、計為能得清淨、或計為世間之因呢？

答：並不是說一時頓緣自己界地的一切法，只是說它有力量能夠一時頓緣五部而已。

論（難方之難·愛慢是否亦遍行）：雖然這樣說，遍行也不只是這十一種。因為凡是在某處有我見現行的，在那處就必定會起我愛、我慢；如果在某處有『淨』『勝』之見現行的，在那處就必定會生希求與高舉。這樣一來，愛與慢也應當是遍行了。

（毘婆沙師反責）若是這樣，那麼由於它們是一時頓緣見所斷與修所斷之法而起的，就應當說這兩種到底是哪一種所斷呢？

（難方答）應當說是修所斷，因為它們是雜緣境的緣故；或者也應當說是見所斷，因為是由見的力量所引起的。

（毘婆沙師述自宗作結）毘婆沙師這樣說：這兩種煩惱是自相惑而不是共相惑，沒有頓緣的力量，所以不是遍行。因此遍行唯有這十一種。其餘不是遍行的，依此類推自然明白，所以不必另說。

論（九種能緣上界上地）：在這十一種之中，除去有身見與邊執見，其餘九種也能夠緣上界上地。

頌中的『上』字，正是要說明上界與上地，同時也兼顯：沒有緣下界下地的隨眠（上不緣下）。

這九種雖然能夠通緣自地與上地，然而按理沒有『自地與上地一時頓緣』這回事。

在『緣上』這件事上，姑且就界來說：或者只緣一界，或者兩界合起來緣。所以本論說：有種種隨眠是欲界所繫而緣色界所繫的，有種種隨眠是欲界所繫而緣無色界所繫的，有種種隨眠是欲界所繫而緣色界無色界所繫的，有種種隨眠是色界所繫而緣無色界所繫的。至於就地來分別，依著界的說法去思量就可以了。

論（身邊二見何以不緣上）：生在欲界的人，如果緣著大梵天而起『有情』之見、或起『常』見，那麼為什麼說身見、邊見不緣上界上地呢？

答：因為他並不是把大梵執為自己的我與我所（身見要緣自己所繫之蘊）；而邊見必定是由身見而起的（身見既不緣上，邊見自然也不緣上）。

（再問）若是這樣，那麼計大梵為有情、為常，這是什麼見所攝？

對法諸師說：這兩種不是見，是邪智所攝。

（再問）為什麼其餘的惑緣著它就算是見，這兩種也緣著它卻不算見呢？

答：這是以本宗為量而這樣說的（依本宗的判準如此安立）。

論（遍行之體是否只是隨眠）：遍行的體，是只有隨眠嗎？答：不是。那是怎樣？答：連同隨行之法一起。

這是說：上面所說的十一種隨眠，連同它們的隨行之法，都是遍行所攝。然而要除去它們的『得』——因為『得』與它們不是同一個果。

由於這樣，所以有人這樣發問：種種遍行的隨眠，都是遍行因嗎？答：對這個問題應當作四句分別。第一句（是遍行隨眠而非遍行因）的，就是未來世的遍行隨眠。第二句（是遍行因而非遍行隨眠）的，就是過去現在世與它俱有的法。第三句與第四句，照著道理去辨就可以了。

論（轉入門二）：九十八種隨眠之中，有幾種是緣有漏的、有幾種是緣無漏的呢？頌說：

〔正14至正16〕門二·緣有漏與緣無漏

頌：見滅諦、見道諦所斷的邪見與疑，以及與它們相應的、還有不共無明——這六種能夠緣無漏。在這其中緣滅諦的，唯緣自地的滅；緣道諦的，則緣六地或九地，因為對治有別而彼此互為同類之因。貪、瞋、慢、二取，都不是緣無漏的——因為所緣應當捨離、不是怨害、是寂靜的、是清淨的、是最勝的體性。

論：唯有見滅諦、見道諦所斷的邪見、疑，以及與它們相應的不共無明，各各三種合成六種，能夠緣無漏。其餘的緣有漏，依此類推自然明白。

在這六種之中，緣滅諦的，各各以自地的滅為所緣——因為種種滅彼此相望不是因果（此地之滅不能為彼地之滅的因）。這是說：欲界所繫的三種隨眠，唯緣欲界諸行的擇滅；乃至有頂地的三種隨眠，唯緣有頂諸行的擇滅。

緣道諦的，則緣六地或九地。這是說：欲界所繫的三種隨眠，唯緣六地的法智品道——不論是對治欲界的、還是能對治其餘的，都是它所緣的，因為同是一類的緣故。色界無色界的八地各有三種隨眠，一一都唯能通緣九地的類智品道——不論是對治自地的、還是能對治其餘的，都是它所緣的，因為同是一類的緣故。

論（何以緣滅不通而緣道通）：為什麼緣滅只緣自地而不緣其餘，緣道卻能通於六地九地的同類呢？

答：因為種種地的道彼此互為因（同類相因）。（再徵）雖然法智品與類智品也彼此互為因，然而類智品不對治欲界，所以類智品的道不是欲界三種隨眠的所緣。

（再徵）法智品既然能對治色無色界，就應當作那八地各三種隨眠的所緣才是。答：並不是法智品全都能對治色無色界——因為苦法智品、集法智品不是那二界的對治；也不是全部都能對治色無色界——因為它不能對治那二界的見所斷。這兩個開頭的條件既然沒有（既非普遍對治、又非全分對治），所以不是它們的所緣。

就由這個道理，也顯示出：遍行的惑緣苦諦集諦的種種地是沒有遮攔的——因為所緣的境彼此互為因，而不是能對治的緣故（對治才有隔限，境相為因則無隔限）。

論（何以貪等五不緣無漏）：為什麼貪、瞋、慢、戒禁取、見取，這些見無漏（滅道二諦）所斷的，卻不是緣無漏的呢？

（一）因為貪的隨眠所緣的應當是要捨離的東西；如果緣無漏，那就不成過失了——像善法欲就不應當捨離（可見緣無漏的欲不算貪）。（二）緣著怨害之事才起瞋的隨眠，而滅道二諦不是怨害，所以不是瞋的境。（三）緣著麁動之事才起慢的隨眠，而滅道二諦是寂靜的，所以不是慢的境。（四）在不淨之法上執為淨因的叫作戒禁取，而滅道二諦是真淨，所以不應當作戒禁取的境。（五）在不勝之法上執為最勝的叫作見取，而滅道二諦是真勝，所以也不應當作見取的境。

所以貪等等不緣無漏。

論（轉入門三）：九十八種隨眠之中，有幾種是由所緣而隨增的、有幾種是由相應而隨增的呢？頌說：

〔正17·正18〕門三·所緣隨增與相應隨增

頌：還沒有斷的遍行隨眠，於自地的一切法（都由所緣而隨增）；不是遍行的，則只於自部的法由所緣而隨增。不是無漏、不是緣上界的（才有隨增），因為無漏與上境不被攝為己有而且與之相違。隨著與它相應的法，由相應而隨增。

論：遍行的隨眠，普遍地在自地五部的種種法上由所緣而隨增，因為它能遍緣自地之法。其餘五部之中不是遍行的隨眠，由所緣而隨增的唯在自部，因為它只以自部為所緣。

這是就總的說。如果分別地說，那麼六種緣無漏的惑、九種緣上界的惑，在它們的所緣境上是沒有隨增之義的。

為什麼呢？因為無漏與上地之境，不被攝受為己有，而且是相違的。

這是說：如果有一法，被這一地之中的身見與愛攝為己有，那才可以有『被這一地之中所有的隨眠由所緣而隨增』的道理，就像衣服潮濕了，塵埃就會隨著附住在上面。而種種無漏法以及上地之法，並不被種種下地的身見與愛攝為己有，所以緣它們的下地之惑，不是所緣隨增。

（附辨）住在下地的心而希求上地等等，那是善法欲，不叫作隨眠。

聖道、涅槃以及上地之法，與能緣它們的下地之惑是相違的，所以那兩類也沒有所緣隨增的道理——就像在炎熱的石頭上，腳不會停住。

（另一說）有人說：隨眠是『隨順』的意思。不是無漏與上境，才隨順種種下地的隨眠；所以雖然是它的所緣，卻沒有隨增的道理——就像患風病的人服用乾澀的藥，病對於藥不是所隨增的。

論（相應隨增）：已經就所緣辨了隨增之義，現在應當辨相應隨增。這是說：隨便哪一種隨眠，在與它自己相應的法上，由於相應的緣故就在那上面隨增。

種種說隨增的，都是指還沒有斷的時候；所以第一頌的開頭先標出『未斷』二字。

（附一問）有沒有那樣的隨眠——它不緣無漏、也不緣上界，而它的隨增卻只在相應而不在所緣？答：有。就是緣上地的種種遍行隨眠。

論（轉入門四）：九十八種隨眠之中，有幾種是不善的、有幾種是無記的呢？頌說：

〔正19〕門四·不善與無記

頌：上二界的隨眠，以及欲界的身見、邊見，還有與它們俱起的癡，是無記的；除此之外的其餘一切，都是不善的。

論：色界無色界的一切隨眠唯是無記性。因為染污之法如果是不善的，就會有苦的異熟；而苦的異熟之果上二界是沒有的——那種能逼惱他人的因，在那裡決定沒有。

身見、邊見這二見，以及與它們相應的癡，凡屬欲界所繫的，也是無記性。

為什麼呢？（一）因為這與布施等等並不相違——為了『我』將來能得安樂，現在正好勤修布施持戒等等。（二）執斷的邊見還能隨順解脫，所以世尊說：在種種外道的種種見趣之中，這個見最勝——就是『我不有、我所也不有；我當來不有、我所當來也不有』。（三）又這二見只是迷於自己的事，並不是要逼害其他有情。

（設難）若是這樣，那麼貪求天上的快樂以及起我慢，照例也應當是無記了（它們也不逼害他人）。

（另一師說）先軌範師這樣說：俱生的身見是無記性——像禽獸等等身見現行那樣；如果是分別而生的（由邪教邪思惟而起的），就是不善性。

其餘欲界所繫的一切隨眠，與上面所說的相違，都是不善性。

論（轉入門五）：在上面所說的不善之惑之中，有幾種是不善根、有幾種不是不善根呢？頌說：

〔正20前半〕門五之一·三不善根

頌：不善根在欲界——就是貪、瞋、不善的癡。

論：唯有欲界所繫的一切貪與瞋，以及不善的癡，是不善根所攝。依著次第，世尊說為貪、瞋、癡三不善根。

（何以立根）體性唯是不善的煩惱，才能作不善法的根而立為不善根。其餘的就不是這樣了——所剩下的種種煩惱不是不善根，這一義依上文類推已經成立，所以頌中不說。

論（轉出無記根）：在上面所說的無記之惑之中，有幾種是無記根、有幾種不是無記根呢？頌說：

〔正20後半·正21〕門五之二·無記根三與外方之四

頌：無記根有三種——無記的愛、癡、慧。其餘的不立，因為疑是二趣而轉、慢是高舉而轉。外方諸師則立四種——其中是愛、見、慢、癡，因為修上定的人三者決定都依於癡。

論：迦濕彌羅國的種種毘婆沙師說：無記根也有三種——就是種種無記的愛、癡、慧這三種，下至異熟所生的那一分也是無記根所攝。

（設問）為什麼疑與慢不是無記根呢？答：因為疑是向二趣而轉的、慢是高舉而轉的。

那些論師的意思是說：疑是向著兩條路互相流轉的，體性動搖不定，所以不應當立為根；慢是在所緣上以高舉之相而轉的，與根的法不同，所以也不立為根。因為要作根的，必定應當堅住而向下而轉（如樹根下扎），這是世間共同了解的，所以那二種不是根。

論（外方四無記根之說）：外方的種種論師則立四種——就是種種無記的愛、見、慢、癡。（『無記』這個名，是在遮止善與惡二者。）

為什麼這四種立為無記根呢？因為種種愚夫修上界之定的，不外乎依託愛、見、慢這三者；而這三者又都是依著無明的力量而轉的，所以立這四種為無記根。

論（轉出四記門）：種種契經之中說的十四無記事，那個也是這裡所說的無記所攝嗎？答：不是。那是怎樣？答：那部經只是就『應當捨置的問』而立無記之名。所謂問記之門，總共有四種。是哪四種呢？頌說：

〔正22〕門五之附·四種記門

頌：應當一向記、應當分別記、應當反詰記、應當捨置記——就像問死、問生、問勝劣、問我與蘊是一是異等等。

論：且說四種問——一是應當一向記的、二是應當分別記的、三是應當反詰記的、四是應當捨置記的。這四種依著次第（配下面四問）。

像有發問的人，問死、問生、問勝劣、問我與蘊是一是異等等。所謂『記有四種』，就是回答這四種問。

（一）如果這樣問：一切有情都會死嗎？應當一向記——一切有情都決定會死。

（二）如果這樣問：一切死了的都會再生嗎？應當分別記——還有煩惱的會再生，其餘的不會。

（三）如果這樣問：人是勝還是劣？應當反詰記——是拿什麼來比？如果他說是拿天來比，就應當記人是劣；如果他說是拿下趣（惡趣）來比，就應當記人是勝。

（四）如果這樣問：蘊與有情是一還是異？應當捨置記——因為有情並非實有，所以一與異的性都不成立，就像石女的兒子談不上白或黑的性。

論（設難之一·捨置何以名記）：捨置了卻立一個『記』的名，是怎麼回事？答：因為記他的問時說了『這個不應當記』（說出這一句，本身就是一種記）。

論（外人設難與論主釋通·其一）：有人這樣說：那第二問也應當一向記——一切死了的並不都會再生（可以直接這樣答）。

（論主釋通）然而發問的人說的是『一切死了的都會再生嗎』，按理應當分別記；對他所問的作總答是不成的，因為雖然使他知道了一個總的說法，他還是沒有解開（他問的是『一切』，須分別開來答才解得開）。

論（外人設難與論主釋通·其二）：又有人這樣說：那第三問也應當一向記——人也是勝也是劣，因為所待（所比對的對象）不同的緣故，就像識既是果又是因（待前為果、待後為因）。

（論主釋通）然而那個發問的人是作一向的問，而你的答不是一向記，所以應當成為分別記才對。但這裡應當詰問他的問意是拿什麼來比，所以這叫作應反詰記。

論（外人設難與論主釋通·其三）：又有人這樣說：那第四問既然完全不記蘊與有情是異是一，怎麼能叫作記呢？

（論主釋通）然而他所問的，按理應當捨置。既然說了『應當捨置』，怎麼不算是記呢？

論（對法諸師依四問廣釋四記）：對法諸師這樣說：

（一）所謂一向記：如果有人問——世尊是如來、應、正等覺嗎？所說的法要是善說的嗎？種種弟子眾所行的是妙行嗎？色乃至識都是無常嗎？苦乃至道是善加施設的嗎？這些都應當一向記，因為契合實義。

（二）所謂分別記：如果有人以直心請求說——願尊者為我說法。就應當為他分別：法有很多，就是過去、未來、現在，你要說哪一種？如果他說為我說過去法，應當再分別：過去法之中也有很多，色乃至識。如果他請說色，應當分別說：色中有三種，善、惡、無記。如果他請說善，應當分別說：善中有七種，就是離殺生，廣說乃至離雜穢語。如果他又請說離殺生，應當分別說：這有三種，就是由無貪、無瞋、無癡三善根所發起的。如果他請說由無貪所發的，應當分別說：這又有二種，就是表與無表，你要說哪一種？

（三）所謂反詰記：如果有人以諂心請求說——願尊者為我說法。就應當反詰他：法有很多，你要說哪一種？不應當為他分別。乃至使他默然而住，或者使他自己說出來而沒有機會挑毛病。

論（就此再設一難）：豈不是這二種（分別記與反詰記）之中都沒有『問』，只有請說；也沒有『記』，只有反詰一句『你要說哪一種』——這二種怎麼能算是問與記呢？

答：像有人請求說『為我說道』，這豈不就是問道嗎？就由反詰去記他所問，這豈不就是記道嗎？

（再難）若是這樣，那二種都應當是反詰記了（何必分作二種）。答：不是。因為問意有直心與諂心的殊異，而所記有分別與無分別的不同（直心者為之分別，諂心者但反詰）。

（四）所謂捨置記：如果有人問——世間是有邊的、還是無邊的等等？這就應當捨置，不應當為他說。

論（依契經辨四記之相）：現在依契經來辨問記之相。像大眾部的契經中說：苾芻應當知道，問記有四種。是哪四種呢？就是有的問應當一向記，乃至有的問只應當捨置。

怎樣的問應當一向記？就是問——種種行都是無常嗎？這個問就叫作應當一向記。

怎樣的問應當分別記？就是如果有人問——種種有故意而造作的業已經造了，將要受什麼果？這個問就叫作應當分別記。

怎樣的問應當反詰記？就是如果有人問——士夫的『想』與『我』是一還是異？就應當反詰他說：你是依哪一個我而這樣問的？如果他說是依麁的我，就應當記說『與想是異』。這個問就叫作應當反詰記。

怎樣的問只應當捨置？就是如果有人問——世間是常、是無常、也常也無常、非常非無常？世間是有邊、是無邊、也有邊也無邊、非有邊非無邊？如來死後是有、是非有、也有也非有、非有非非有？命者就是身、還是命者異於身？這個問就叫作只應當捨置。

〔Root 1〕The Latent Tendencies Are the Root of the Several Existences — the Six Latent Tendencies

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): It was said before that the manifold differences of the world all arise from action. And action grows only when the latent tendencies (the afflictions that lie hidden and follow along after sentient beings) sustain it; parted from the latent tendencies, action has no power to call forth a coming existence. Why is this so said? And how many in all are the latent tendencies? The stanza says:

Stanza: The latent tendencies are the root of the three existences (the existence of desire · the existence of form · the existence without form). Their differences are six — namely greed and hatred, and also pride, and further ignorance, view, and doubt.

Treatise: Because these latent tendencies are precisely the root of the several existences, action once parted from them has no power to call forth a coming existence.

Why, then, can the latent tendencies serve as the root of the several existences? Because the afflictions, once they have arisen, are able to perform ten kinds of function — first, strengthening the root (making the foundation of the afflictions firmer); second, establishing the continuity (making the afflictions run on thought after thought unbroken); third, tilling its own field (working the ground of mind into a field fit for its own growth); fourth, drawing forth the homogeneous (drawing out a sequel of afflictions of its own kind); fifth, setting going action and existence (setting in motion the action that can call forth a coming existence); sixth, gathering its own equipment (drawing in the several conditions that furnish it); seventh, bewildering the object (making the mind unable to see clearly the object-field it faces); eighth, leading the stream of consciousness (dragging the continuity of consciousness in the direction it means to go); ninth, overstepping the wholesome class (stepping across and overpassing that portion which is wholesome dharma); tenth, the sense of binding widely (binding sentient beings far and wide), so that sentient beings cannot overstep the realm and the level in which they stand. Because the latent tendencies can serve as the root of the several existences, it is by relying upon them that action has the power to call forth a coming existence.

Here, spoken of in brief, it should be known that the differences of the latent tendencies are six — namely greed, hatred, pride, ignorance, view, and doubt.

In the stanza the one word ‘also’ is used, and its intent is to display that pride and the other remaining afflictions likewise increase upon their objects by the force of greed (growing their strength along with the object taken). As for the sense of ‘increasing by the force of greed,’ that will be analyzed further below.

In the stanza there is again the one word ‘and,’ which is meant to display that the entities of these six are each different (that they are not six names for one thing).

Treatise (a question posed, bringing out the seven latent tendencies): If the entities of the latent tendencies are six only, why then does the sūtra say that there are seven latent tendencies? The stanza says:

〔Root 2〕Six Opened into Seven — Why the Name “Craving for Existence” Is Fixed Only upon the Upper Two Realms

Stanza: These six become seven by a difference in greed. What is called ‘craving for existence’ is the greed of the upper two realms (the form realm and the formless realm); for that greed for the most part turns toward the inner gate, and it is moreover in order to block the notion that the upper two realms are liberation.

Treatise: That is, within the six latent tendencies spoken of above, greed is divided into two portions, and so the sūtra says there are seven.

Which seven? First the latent tendency of greed for desire, second the latent tendency of hatred, third the latent tendency of craving for existence, fourth the latent tendency of pride, fifth the latent tendency of ignorance, sixth the latent tendency of view, seventh the latent tendency of doubt.

Treatise (the incidental discussion begins · the dispute whether the latent tendencies are associated with mind or not): By what sense is the name ‘the latent tendency of greed for desire’ to be explained? Is it that the entity of greed for desire is itself the latent tendency (the two words pointing at one and the same thing)? Or is it that this is the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire (the latent tendency being another thing that belongs to greed for desire)? Press the names of the other six with the same question, and there are the same two alternatives in each case.

(The objector asks in return) If it be so, what fault is there?

(The author displays again the doubtful point of the two alternatives) Both readings have a fault.

(The objector presses upon the first alternative) If it be said that the entity of greed for desire is itself the latent tendency, that contradicts the sūtra. As the sūtra says: if there be a certain kind of person who does not for a long time dwell with his mind entangled by the entanglement of greed for desire (the affliction that arises and entangles the mind); and if, when the entanglement of greed for desire arises in his mind for a while, he yet knows as it really is the means of going forth, then by this he is able rightly to expel the entanglement of greed for desire, together with the cutting off of the latent tendency. (Since it says ‘together with the cutting off of the latent tendency,’ plainly entanglement and latent tendency are two things, and it cannot be said that the entity of greed for desire is the latent tendency.)

(The Sarvāstivāda side presses upon the second alternative) If it be said that this is the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire, then the latent tendency would have to be a formation not associated with mind (a dharma of that class which is not associated with mind), and this again contradicts the Abhidharma (the root treatise of Abhidharma). As the root treatise says: the latent tendency of greed for desire is associated with three faculties. (Since it says that it is associated with faculties, plainly it is an associated dharma and not a dissociated formation.)

(The Vaibhāṣika masters answer · establishing their own tenet) The Vaibhāṣika masters say thus: the entities of greed for desire and the rest are themselves the latent tendencies.

(The objector presses) Does this not contradict the sūtra?

(The Vaibhāṣikas explain the sūtra through) There is no fault of contradicting the sūtra. Where the sūtra says ‘together with the cutting off of the latent tendency,’ it says that the accompanying bondage (that portion which follows along and binds) is cut off together with it. Or else, the sūtra speaks of the latent tendency conventionally upon the ‘acquisition’ (the acquisition of the affliction), as one sets up the notion of suffering and the rest upon fire and the rest (fire is not suffering, and yet touching fire is called suffering, which is a conventional way of speaking from what it produces). The Abhidharma speaks in accordance with the real mark — that is, it calls the afflictions themselves the latent tendencies. Speaking thus, the latent tendencies are associated dharmas.

(The objector reproaches) By what principle can it be brought in evidence and known that they are definitely associated?

(The Vaibhāṣikas bring three functions in evidence) Because the several latent tendencies can defile and vex the mind, can cover and obstruct the mind, and can go against and injure the wholesome. That is to say: the force of the latent tendencies can defile and vex the mind, so that the wholesome not yet arisen cannot arise and the wholesome already arisen falls away; therefore the entity of a latent tendency is not a dissociated formation. Suppose a dissociated formation could perform work of this kind: then all wholesome dharmas ought never to have a time of arising — for dissociated formations are constantly present (if such a thing could obstruct the wholesome, the wholesome would never arise). Since the several wholesome dharmas do indeed still have a time of arising, it is known that the latent tendencies are associated dharmas.

(The objector denies it) None of this amounts to proof. Why? Because one who grants that the latent tendencies are not associated dharmas will not in the first place grant that those three matters above (defiling and vexing the mind · covering and obstructing the mind · going against the wholesome) are performed by the latent tendencies. (The premise not being granted, your proof falls to nothing.)

Treatise (the author appraises and takes the Sautrāntikas): Yet what the Sautrāntika masters say is the best.

What, then, do the Sautrāntikas say here? They say: this is the latent tendency belonging to greed for desire. Yet the entity of a latent tendency is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from mind — for it is not another thing at all. When an affliction is in the stage of sleep (the station in which it lies hidden and is not active), it is called a latent tendency; when it is in the stage of waking (the station in which it has arisen and is at work), it is called an entanglement.

What is called sleep? It is the affliction not being active, with only a seed following along. What is called waking? It is the several afflictions arisen and entangling the mind.

What is called the seed of an affliction? It is a capability that is a differentiation upon one’s own entity — it arises from an affliction and is able in turn to produce an affliction. It is like the seed of memory: that seed arises from ‘knowing in evidence’ (having once clearly received and undergone that matter), and can in turn produce a recollection to come, and this too is a differentiation of capability. It is again like a sprout and the rest: it arises from a former fruit and can produce a later fruit, and this likewise is a differentiation of capability.

(The Sautrāntikas refute in return the account of dissociation) If someone insists that apart from the afflictions there is a further formation not associated with mind called the latent tendency, and calls that the seed of the affliction; then he ought likewise to grant that the seed of memory is not a mere capability, but that there is a further dissociated formation able to draw forth the recollection to come. Since it is not so on the one side (no one makes the seed of memory a dissociated real thing), how can it be so on the other? Because the causal ground of a difference between the two cannot be found.

(The Sarvāstivāda side cites a sūtra by way of objection) If it be so, this contradicts the Sūtra of the Six Sixes, for the sūtra says ‘upon a pleasant feeling there is a latent tendency of greed’ (upon a pleasant feeling there is the latent tendency of greed).

(The Sautrāntikas explain the sūtra through) The sūtra says only that there is one; it does not say that at that very moment a latent tendency is active. What contradiction is there in this?

(The Sarvāstivāda side asks) At what time, then, is there one?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) At the time when it sleeps there is one; or else the notion of a latent tendency is conventionally set up upon the ‘cause’ (upon greed, which is the cause, the name of the result, ‘latent tendency,’ being fixed).

Treatise (gathering up the incidental discussion · returning to the main discussion): Let the incidental discussion rest here for now; the main discussion should be taken up again.

Treatise (the setting up of the name ‘craving for existence’): To say that greed is divided into two portions is to say greed for desire and craving for existence. What here has ‘craving for existence’ for its entity? It is the greed within the two realms of form and of formlessness.

Why is this name fixed upon those two realms alone? Because that greed for the most part turns in dependence upon the inner gate. That is to say: the sentient beings of those two realms for the most part give rise to greed for absorption, and all greed for absorption turns toward the inner gate (not taking the five outer objects of desire as object), and so the name ‘craving for existence’ is set up in those two realms alone.

Again, because some give rise to the notion of liberation with regard to the upper two realms (mistakenly supposing that to be born there is liberation), it is in order to block that notion that the name ‘craving for existence’ is set up in the upper realms, so as to display that what they take as object is not true liberation. Here it is upon their ‘own entity’ that the word ‘existence’ is fixed (existence being the existence of the three existences, still within birth and death).

The sentient beings of those two realms for the most part give rise to a deep savoring attachment toward meditative attainment (the state reached in absorption) and toward the body upon which they depend; and so it is said that they savor and cling to their own entity alone, and do not savor and cling to an outer object — for they have already left greed for the realm of desire. It is for this reason that the name ‘craving for existence’ is set up in those two realms alone.

Since ‘craving for existence’ is said to be in the upper two realms, it may be known by extension that the greed of the realm of desire is called ‘greed for desire,’ and so the stanza need not mark it out separately.

Treatise (bringing out the ten latent tendencies): These same six latent tendencies spoken of above are, within the root treatise, further divided into ten. How do they become ten? The stanza says:

〔Root 3〕Six Opened into Ten — the Five Views and the Five That Are Not Views

Stanza: These six become ten by a difference in ‘view.’ The difference is the view of a real person, the extreme view, wrong view, adherence to views, and adherence to observances and vows.

Treatise: Within the six latent tendencies, ‘view’ is divided into five according to the difference of the modes in which it operates; the remaining five are not views. Adding the counts together, they come to ten in all.

Hence among these ten, five are of the nature of view — first the view of a real person, second the extreme view, third wrong view, fourth adherence to views, fifth adherence to observances and vows. The other five are not of the nature of view — first greed, second hatred, third pride, fourth ignorance, fifth doubt.

Treatise (bringing out the ninety-eight latent tendencies): Again, these same six latent tendencies spoken of above are, within the root treatise, spoken of as ninety-eight. By what sense are they spoken of as ninety-eight? The stanza says:

〔Roots 4 and 5〕Ten Opened into Ninety-Eight — the Threefold Difference of Mode · Category · Realm

Stanza: These six, by a difference in the three of mode, category, and realm, become ninety-eight. Within the realm of desire, what is abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering and the rest (the five categories) have, in order, ten, seven, seven, eight, and four. What is called being complete in order, or lacking, is the lacking of three views, the lacking of two views, and the lacking of the views and doubt. In the realm of form and the formless realm, the five categories each lack hatred, and the rest are spoken of as in the realm of desire.

Treatise: The six latent tendencies, by a difference in mode (the modes in which they operate), category (the class by which they are abandoned), and realm (the realm and level to which they are affiliated), become ninety-eight.

That is to say: within the six, they are analyzed into ten by the difference in the modes of view, which has already been analyzed above. These same ten latent tendencies, already analyzed, become ninety-eight by the differences of category and of realm.

What is called ‘category’ means what is abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering, by seeing the truth of origination, by seeing the truth of cessation, and by seeing the truth of the path, together with what is abandoned by cultivation, five categories in all. What is called ‘realm’ means the three realms of desire, of form, and of formlessness.

Take first the difference of the five categories in the realm of desire: multiplied into the ten latent tendencies they make thirty-six. That is to say: from what is abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering down to what is abandoned by cultivation there are, in order, ten, seven, seven, eight, and four. These same five categories, with respect to the ten latent tendencies, are, in the order one, two, one, one (the first category being complete in all ten; the second and third categories alike lacking three; the fourth lacking two; the fifth lacking the views and doubt), respectively complete, or lacking three views, lacking two views, and lacking the views and doubt.

That is to say: what is abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering is complete in all ten; what is abandoned by seeing the truth of origination and by seeing the truth of cessation have seven each, lacking the three views of the view of a real person, the extreme view, and adherence to observances and vows; what is abandoned by seeing the truth of the path has eight, lacking the two views of the view of a real person and the extreme view; what is abandoned by cultivation has four, lacking the five views and doubt. Gathered together in this way they make thirty-six.

The former thirty-two are called what is abandoned by seeing, since they are cut off as soon as the principle of the truths is seen; the last four are called what is abandoned by cultivation, since only after seeing the four truths, by cultivating the noble path again and again in the stations that come after, are they cut off.

Thus it has already been displayed that among the ten latent tendencies the view of a real person (the view of self) is in one category only, namely what is abandoned by seeing suffering; and the extreme view is likewise. Adherence to observances and vows extends to two categories, namely what is abandoned by seeing suffering and by seeing the path. Wrong view extends to four categories, namely what is abandoned by seeing suffering, origination, cessation, and the path; and adherence to views and doubt are likewise. The remaining four, greed and the rest, each extend to all five categories, namely what is abandoned by seeing the four truths and by cultivation.

Then what is the mark here by which a thing is called abandoned by seeing suffering, and so on to, by what mark is it abandoned by cultivation? Answer: if what it takes as object is of that class of dharma which is ‘abandoned by seeing this truth,’ it is called abandoned by seeing this truth; the rest are called abandoned by cultivation.

Thus, within the six, view is divided into twelve (each of the five views having the categories to which it extends, twelve in the sum), doubt is divided into four, and the remaining four each extend to five categories and make twenty; and so within the realm of desire there are thirty-six.

In the realm of form and the formless realm, the five categories each lack hatred (there being no hatred in the upper two realms), and the rest are the same as in the realm of desire, and so each has thirty-one.

For this reason the root treatise, by the differences of the six latent tendencies in the three of mode, category, and realm, speaks of them as ninety-eight.

Among the ninety-eight here analyzed, eighty-eight are abandoned by seeing, since they are injured by ‘receptivity’; ten latent tendencies are abandoned by cultivation, since they are injured by ‘cognition.’

Treatise (bringing out whether abandonment by seeing and by cultivation is settled or unsettled): Is what has thus been said of abandonment by seeing and abandonment by cultivation decidedly so? Answer: it is not. How is it then? The stanza says:

〔Root 6〕Abandonment by Seeing and by Cultivation Is Not Rigid — the Distinction of the Summit of Existence and the Eight Levels

Stanza: Of the latent tendencies injured by receptivity, those at the level of the summit of existence are abandoned by seeing alone; the rest extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation. Those injured by cognition are abandoned by cultivation alone.

Treatise: The word ‘receptivity’ speaks in general of the receptivity to the cognition of dharma and the receptivity to the subsequent cognition.

Among the several latent tendencies injured by receptivity, those gathered into the level of the summit of existence (the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception) are abandoned by seeing alone — for only the receptivity to the subsequent cognition is able to abandon them.

Those gathered into the other eight levels extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation. That is to say: when a noble one abandons them, it is by seeing and not by cultivation, since he abandons by the receptivity to the cognition of dharma and the receptivity to the subsequent cognition as each is fitting; but if an ordinary being (a common man) abandons them, then it is by cultivation and not by seeing, since he abandons by cultivating conventional cognition again and again.

The several latent tendencies injured by cognition, being gathered into all levels, are abandoned by cultivation alone; for the several noble ones and the several ordinary beings alike, each as is fitting for him, abandon them by cultivating again and again the cognition without outflows or conventional cognition.

Treatise (a divergent account appended): Some other masters say: the several seers among the non-Buddhists cannot suppress or abandon the confusions abandoned by seeing. As the Sūtra of the Great Analysis of the Several Actions says: the several kinds of non-Buddhists who have already left greed for desire still have wrong views active that take the realm of desire as object. And the Brahmā Net Sūtra also says: that class of persons have the several views active that take the realm of desire as object. That is to say: among the ‘theorists of the prior limit’ (the party that makes its several discriminations in dependence upon past lives) some hold that all is eternal, some that a portion is eternal, some that dharmas arise without a cause, and so on.

(The reason of the inference is that) it will not be a confusion of the realm of form taking the realm of desire as object, since with respect to the objects of the realm of desire he has already left greed; and therefore those views are decidedly the several views of the realm of desire not yet cut off.

(The Vaibhāṣika masters explain otherwise) The Vaibhāṣika masters explain the sense of that sūtra thus: that is a momentary falling back at the time when the view arises, as in the case of Devadatta.

Treatise (bringing out the entities of the five views): Because the modes in which they operate differ, view is divided into five, whose names have been listed above; what is the entity of each of them? The stanza says:

〔Root 7〕The Entity of Each of the Five Views

Stanza: To hold to a self and to what belongs to self; to hold to annihilation and to hold to eternity; to deny outright as wholly nonexistent; to call the inferior superior; to say falsely of what is neither cause nor path that it is cause and path — these are the entities of the five views.

Treatise: To hold to ‘self’ and to ‘what belongs to self’ is the view of a real person.

(First the name is glossed) ‘Sat’ has the sense of perishing, ‘kāya’ has the sense of aggregation — taken together they have the sense of ‘aggregates conjoined and impermanent.’ Kāya is just sat, and so it is called satkāya. This satkāya is just the five aggregates of appropriation. This name is set up in order to block the notion of ‘eternity’ and of ‘unity’; for that notion must come first before a self is held to upon it.

(The gloss of another house) The Vaibhāṣika masters gloss it thus: the sense of ‘existing’ is called sat, and the sense of ‘person’ is as said above. (Their ground is that) it is impossible to reckon a self and what belongs to self without an object taken, and so it is said that this view arises taking an ‘existing person’ as object. Because it is taking satkāya as object that this view arises, this view is accordingly marked as the view of a real person.

(An objection is at once posed and explained through) Ought not all the several views that arise taking only dharmas with outflows as object to be marked with the name satkāya? Yet the Buddha marks this name upon the holding to ‘self and what belongs to self’ alone, in order to let men know that what this view takes as object is satkāya (the five aggregates of appropriation), and that there is no real self or what belongs to self — for self and what belongs to self are in the end nonexistent. As the sūtra says: bhikṣus should know that the several śramaṇas, brahmins, and the rest in the world who hold to a self, whatever they observe and see, all arise upon the five aggregates of appropriation alone.

(2) Just upon this matter of the self and what belongs to self that are held to, to hold it to be annihilated or to hold it to be eternal is called the extreme view — for it falsely holds to the two extremes of annihilation and eternity.

(3) To give rise to a view denying outright as nonexistent, within the really existent truths of suffering and the rest, is called wrong view. (A question posed) All false views turn invertedly and all ought to be called ‘wrong’; why is only ‘denying outright’ called wrong view? Answer: because its fault is the graver. It is as when one says ‘stinking ghee’ — all ghee has a smell, and only what is stinking in the extreme is specially called stinking ghee. This is because this one alone is pure diminishment (calling what is, nonexistent), while the other four are still superimposition (adding something upon what is not).

(4) To say of the inferior that it is superior is called adherence to views. What has outflows is called ‘inferior,’ since it is what the noble path abandons. To hold the inferior to be superior is given the general name of adherence to views. In strictness the name ought to be set up as ‘adherence to views and the rest’ (it adhering not to views alone but to the aggregates and the rest upon which the views depend); the word ‘and the rest’ being dropped, it is called adherence to views only.

(5) The view that says of what is neither cause nor path that it is cause and path, all of this together is called adherence to observances and vows. As when Maheśvara, the Lord of Creatures, or other things that are not the cause of the world are falsely held to be a cause; as when throwing oneself into water, going into fire, and other such perverse practices, which are not the cause of birth in heaven, are falsely held to be a cause; as when the mere keeping of observances and vows, together with the several cognitions associated with it, which are not the path of liberation, are falsely held to be the path. In strictness the name ought to be set up as ‘adherence to observances and vows and the rest’; the word ‘and the rest’ being dropped, it is called adherence to observances and vows only.

These, it should be known, are the entities of the five views.

Treatise (bringing out what abandons the holding of what is not a cause to be a cause): If a view arises upon what is not a cause that ‘this is the cause,’ why is this view not abandoned by seeing origination (the truth of origination being precisely what speaks of causes)? The stanza says:

〔Root 8〕Why Holding What Is Not a Cause to Be a Cause Is Abandoned by Seeing Suffering Alone

Stanza: With regard to Maheśvara and the rest, falsely to hold what is not a cause to be a cause — this arises from the two inversions of ‘eternity’ and ‘self,’ and so is abandoned by seeing suffering alone.

Treatise: One who holds Maheśvara, the Lord of Creatures, or some other thing to be the cause of the world and able to produce the world must first deliberate that the entity of that thing is eternal, is one, is a self, and is an agent, and only then does the holding to a cause arise.

As soon as the truth of suffering is seen, the holding to eternity and the holding to self with regard to Maheśvara and the rest are forever cut off without remainder, and so the holding to a cause produced by them is cut off along with them. (Hence the place of abandonment is at the seeing of suffering, and not at the seeing of origination.)

Treatise (an objection posed and the exchange): If it be so, then those who hold that ‘perverse practices such as throwing oneself into water or going into fire are the cause of birth in heaven,’ or who hold that ‘merely keeping observances and vows and the rest can bring purity,’ ought not to be abandoned by seeing suffering (for they have not first reckoned eternity and self).

Yet the root treatise says: there are several non-Buddhists who give rise to such a view and set up such a doctrine — that if a man, a pudgala, keeps the ox-observance, the deer-observance, or the dog-observance, he can attain purity, attain liberation, attain going forth, forever overpass the mass of sufferings, and arrive happily at the place beyond suffering and pleasure. All such holdings of ‘what is not a cause to be a cause’ should be known to be adherence to observances and vows and to be abandoned by seeing suffering, as is there set out at length.

(Pressed again) And on what ground is this abandoned by seeing suffering?

(If one answers ‘because it is bewildered about the truth of suffering’) that has the fault of overreach — for all afflictions taking what has outflows as object are bewildered about the truth of suffering (if it were so, all afflictions taking what has outflows as object would become abandoned by seeing suffering).

(Pressed a step further) What further mark is there by which adherence to observances and vows may be told apart and said to be abandoned by seeing the path? Ought not the several afflictions that arise taking as object the dharmas abandoned by seeing the path all likewise to be called ‘bewildered about the truth of suffering’?

Again: if the wrong view and the doubt that arise taking the truth of the path as object are a denying outright, or a doubting, of the path of liberation, how could they still hold that ‘this can attain everlasting purity’? (Denying outright and adhering run in opposite directions.)

If that man denies outright the true path of liberation and yet falsely holds that there is some other cause of purity, that is holding that ‘some other thing can attain purity,’ and this is no longer wrong view and the rest. (Therefore) to say that it arises taking as object the several dharmas abandoned by seeing the path does not hold in principle either.

Again, if someone gives rise to a wrong view and the rest taking as object the dharmas abandoned by seeing the truth of origination and by seeing the truth of cessation, and holds it to be the cause of purity, on what ground is this not abandoned by seeing those two truths?

(Gathering up) Therefore the sense here held should be further examined.

Treatise (bringing out the four inversions): As was said above, ‘arising from the inversions of eternity and self’ — are there only these two inversions? It should be known that the inversions are four in all — first the inversion of holding the impermanent to be eternal, second the inversion of holding the several sufferings to be pleasure, third the inversion of holding the impure to be pure, fourth the inversion of holding what is without self to be a self. What is the entity of these four inversions? The stanza says:

〔Root 9〕The Entity of the Four Inversions: Set Up from Three Views

Stanza: The entity of the four inversions is set up from three kinds of view. Because they must be inverted in every part, be of the nature of deliberative judgment, and be false superimposition, only these are taken. Perception and mind, following upon the force of view, are likewise called inversions.

Treatise: The entity of the four inversions is set up from three kinds of view. That is to say: within the extreme view only the view of eternity is taken as the inversion of eternity; within the several adherences to views, those that reckon pleasure and reckon purity are taken as the inversions of pleasure and of purity; within the view of a real person only the view of self is taken as the inversion of self.

(A divergent account) Some say: the inversion of self takes in the view of a real person entire.

(A question posed) How can the inversion of self take in the view of what belongs to self? (Asked in return) Why can it not take it in? Because it too is bound by inversion. Those who reckon a self hold that they have a power of mastery over that matter, and this is the view of what belongs to self. This is the view of self turning by two gates — the one ‘this is the self,’ the other ‘this belongs to the self.’ If they were separate views, then the view that arises from ‘self’ and the view that arises from ‘for the self’ ought also to be separate (yet in fact they are not separate).

Treatise (why only these three views are taken · the three causes of an inversion): Why are the remaining afflictions not the entity of an inversion? Because three causes must be complete before the most excellent of them becomes an inversion.

The three causes are: first, being inverted in every part (no portion of it being true); second, being of the nature of deliberative judgment (able to weigh and to settle a verdict); third, being false superimposition (adding something existent upon what is not).

That is to say: adherence to observances and vows is not inverted in every part, since a small portion of what it takes as object is pure (the keeping of observances and vows being not wholly without a portion of purity); the view of annihilation and wrong view are not false superimposition, since they turn by the gate of ‘nonexistence’ (being diminishment and not superimposition); the remaining several afflictions cannot deliberate and judge, since they are not of the nature of view. Because three causes must be complete before the most excellent of them becomes an inversion, the remaining afflictions are not the entity of an inversion.

Treatise (explaining through the inversions of perception and of mind in the sūtra): If it be so, why then does the sūtra say: in reckoning the impermanent eternal there is the inversion of perception, the inversion of mind, and the inversion of view; and with regard to suffering, the impure, and what is without self it is likewise (each having three inversions)?

Answer: in strict principle it should be known that view alone is inversion; perception and mind, following upon view, are likewise given the name of inversion, because they are associated with view and share its mode of apprehension.

(Asked again) If it be so, why are feeling and the rest not spoken of (as likewise taking the name of inversion in the train of view)? Answer: because feeling and the rest are not well established as a usage in the world. That is to say: the inversion of mind and the inversion of perception are recognized by all in the world, and feeling and the rest are not, and so the sūtra does not speak of them.

Such inversions the man who has the fruit of stream-entry has already cut off — because view, and the dharmas associated with view, are all abandoned by seeing.

Treatise (the account of twelve inversions held by another school, and the Vaibhāṣika masters’ not granting it): Some other school says: the inversions are twelve — that is, within the one inversion of ‘reckoning the impermanent eternal’ there are the three inversions of perception, of mind, and of view; and so on down to, within the one inversion of ‘reckoning what is without self a self’ it is likewise (the four inversions each having three, twelve in all). Of these twelve, eight are abandoned by seeing alone, and four extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation, namely the inversions of perception and of mind with respect to pleasure and to purity.

(They infer a step further) If it were not so, then a noble one who has not yet left greed for desire has already left the perception of pleasure and the perception of purity — how then would greed for desire still arise in him?

The Vaibhāṣika masters do not grant this account. (They counter-object) If the perception of pleasure and the perception of purity were active in him, one would have to grant that a noble one still has the inversions of pleasure and of purity; and a noble one also gives rise to the perception and the mind of ‘a sentient being,’ so that by the same token one would have to grant that he has the inversion of self (yet a noble one decidedly has no inversion of self). (They explain in accordance so as to establish their own tenet) It is not that greed for desire arises only when one has left the perception and the mind of ‘a sentient being’ with regard to women and the rest and with regard to one’s own body (the arising of greed for desire needing no prior inverted perception).

(They cite a sūtra to explain it through properly) For the sūtra says: if there be several learned noble disciples who see and know as it really is the noble truth of suffering, then down to that time the inversions of perception, of mind, and of view of ‘reckoning the impermanent eternal’ in that noble disciple are all forever cut off, and so on at length. Hence it is known: perception and mind are inversions only when they arise taking the force of ‘association with the inversion of view,’ and not otherwise.

Yet a noble one may at times, through a momentary confusion, suddenly have greed for desire present toward an object — just as one is confused before a whirling firebrand-wheel or before a painted yakṣa (an image of a yakṣa), knowing plainly that it is unreal and yet for a moment mistaking it.

Treatise (a stanza cited by way of objection): If it be so, why then did the Venerable Ānanda say to that Venerable Sovereign in Eloquence:

Quoted stanza (not a root stanza): Because there is a disordered inversion of ‘perception,’ your mind is scorched; having gone far from that perception, greed is stilled and mind becomes pure.

Treatise (another master’s explaining through): Hence some other master further says thus: the eight inversions of perception and of mind are not entirely cut off by one in training. Eight such afflictions as arise must be forever cut off by knowing as it really is the noble truths; apart from this there is no other means of forever cutting them. Therefore what is said here (that the inversions of perception and mind are only those associated with the inversion of view) does not contradict that sūtra.

Treatise (bringing out the seven prides and the nine classes of pride): Is it view alone among the latent tendencies that has many differences, or have the rest them too? Answer: pride has them too. How is it so? The stanza says:

〔Root 10〕The Seven Prides and the Nine Classes of Pride · the Portion in Which the Noble One Is Not Active

Stanza: Pride has seven kinds, and the nine classes of pride flow out from three among them. They all extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation. The noble one is as with the entanglement of killing and the rest — though he has that portion which is abandoned by cultivation, it is not active in him.

Treatise: Take first the differences of the latent tendency of pride, which are seven — first pride, second excessive pride, third pride beyond excessive pride, fourth the pride of self, fifth the pride of superior attainment, sixth the pride of slight inferiority, seventh wrong pride.

What makes the mind exalt itself is given the one general name of ‘pride’; because the modes in which it operates and turns differ, it is divided into seven kinds.

(One and two) Toward one inferior to oneself and toward one equal to oneself, to hold in order that one is the more excellent and that one is equal, making the mind exalt itself, is spoken of in general as ‘pride.’ (Three) Toward one equal to oneself and toward one more excellent than oneself, to hold in order that one is more excellent and that one is equal, is given the general name of ‘excessive pride.’ (Four) Toward one more excellent than oneself, still to say that one is the more excellent, is called ‘pride beyond excessive pride.’ (Five) Upon the five aggregates of appropriation to hold to a self and to what belongs to self, making the mind exalt itself, is called ‘the pride of self.’ (Six) With regard to excellent qualities not yet attained, to say that one has already attained them, is called ‘the pride of superior attainment.’ (Seven) Toward one who surpasses oneself by much, to say that one falls short only a little, is called ‘the pride of slight inferiority.’ (Eight) Where one has no quality of one’s own, to say that one has quality, is called ‘wrong pride.’

Treatise (the nine classes of pride): Yet the root treatise says that the classes of pride are nine — first the class ‘I am superior,’ second the class ‘I am equal,’ third the class ‘I am inferior,’ fourth the class ‘there is one superior to me,’ fifth the class ‘there is one equal to me,’ sixth the class ‘there is one inferior to me,’ seventh the class ‘there is none superior to me,’ eighth the class ‘there is none equal to me,’ ninth the class ‘there is none inferior to me.’

These nine kinds are drawn out from three among the seven prides above. From which three? From the three above, namely pride, excessive pride, and the pride of slight inferiority. If they arise in dependence upon view, and the order in which they operate differs, they become three sets of three classes.

The first set of three are, in order, excessive pride, pride, and the pride of slight inferiority. The middle set of three are, in order, the pride of slight inferiority, pride, and excessive pride. The last set of three are, in order, pride, excessive pride, and the pride of slight inferiority.

(A question posed) Toward one who surpasses oneself by much, to say that one falls short only a little — the pride of slight inferiority may indeed be established, for there is still a place of exalting; but what is the place of exalting in ‘the pride that there is none inferior to me’? Answer: it is that toward such a host of excellent sentient beings as one loves and delights in, though one knows one’s own person to be utterly inferior, one still holds oneself in esteem (I may fall short, and yet I am of a kind with them).

The above, moreover, follows the gloss of the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom. If one follows the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas in glossing the classes of pride, then ‘the pride I am superior’ comes out of three prides — namely pride, excessive pride, and pride beyond excessive pride — because the objects observed differ as inferior, equal, and superior.

Treatise (what abandons the seven prides, and their not being active in the noble one): By what, then, are these seven prides abandoned? Answer: all of them extend to abandonment by seeing and by cultivation.

(A question posed) Those of them abandoned by cultivation — may they be active in a noble one at a time when they have not yet been wholly cut off? Answer: this is not settled. That is to say: there are things abandoned by cultivation in which a noble one is decidedly not active — as the entanglement of killing is abandoned by cultivation, and yet the several noble ones are necessarily not active in it.

What is called the entanglement of killing displays that by this confusion one deliberately sets about cutting off the life of a sentient being. The word ‘and the rest’ is meant to display the entanglements of stealing, sexual misconduct, and false speech, together with craving for nonexistence entire and one portion of craving for existence.

What is craving for nonexistence? It is that the three realms are all impermanent, and to seek greedily upon this impermanence is called craving for nonexistence. What is ‘one portion of craving for existence’? It is to wish that one may hereafter become such a great nāga king as Airāvaṇa and the like.

These entanglements and cravings all arise taking as object the dharmas abandoned by cultivation, and so they are abandoned by cultivation alone.

Treatise (bringing out why the noble one, not having cut them off, still does not give rise to them): It has been said that the classes of pride and the rest have a portion abandoned by cultivation; why then does the noble one, not having cut them off, still not give rise to them? The stanza says:

〔Root 11〕The Reason They Are in the Noble One and Yet Do Not Arise

Stanza: The classes of pride and the rest, and the pride of self, and that portion of regret (remorse) which is unwholesome — in the person of a noble one they are and yet do not arise, because they are increased by view and doubt.

Treatise: The word ‘and the rest’ is meant to display the several entanglements of killing and the like, together with craving for nonexistence entire and one portion of craving for existence.

These classes of pride and the rest, the pride of self, and unwholesome regret are all increased by view and doubt in person. Though they are abandoned by cultivation, yet because the backbone of view and doubt has already been broken (the noble one having cut off view and doubt at the path of seeing), the noble one cannot give rise to them.

That is to say: the classes of pride and the pride of self are increased by the view of a real person; the entanglements of killing and the rest are increased by wrong view; the several cravings for nonexistence are increased by the view of annihilation; one portion of craving for existence is increased by the view of eternity; unwholesome regret is increased by doubt. Therefore in the person of a noble one all these decidedly do not arise.

Treatise (turning into the distinctions through the several gates · Gate One): Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are all-pervading and how many are not all-pervading? The stanza says:

〔Roots 12 and 13〕Gate One · All-Pervading and Not All-Pervading

Stanza: The several views and doubt abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering and the truth of origination, together with what is associated with them, and further the independent ignorance — these are all-pervading, pervading their own realm and their own level. Among these, setting aside two views, the other nine can further take an upper realm and an upper level as object. Setting aside the ‘acquisition,’ the remaining dharmas that accompany them are likewise gathered into the all-pervading.

Treatise: Only the views and doubt abandoned by seeing the truth of suffering and the truth of origination, together with the independent ignorance associated with them (the ignorance that arises alone, not in common with the other afflictions), have the power to pervade the five categories of their own realm and level, and so these eleven all obtain the name ‘all-pervading.’ These eleven are the seven views, the two doubts, and the two ignorances.

Such eleven can take as object throughout the several dharmas of the five categories of their own realm and level; and as latent tendencies they can further be a cause and produce throughout the defiled dharmas of the five categories. Upon these three senses (taking as object throughout · being a cause · producing the five categories throughout) the name ‘all-pervading’ is set up.

Treatise (pressing whether it takes as object all at once or gradually): This ‘taking the five categories as object throughout’ that is spoken of here — is it taking as object gradually, or taking as object all at once?

If it takes as object gradually, then the other latent tendencies ought to count as all-pervading too (for anyone can take them as object one after another). If it takes as object all at once, then who is able at one time to reckon all the dharmas of the realm of desire at once as most excellent, as able to attain purity, or as the cause of the world?

Answer: it is not said that it takes as object at once everything of its own realm and level; it is said only that it has the power to take the five categories as object at one time.

Treatise (the objector’s objection · whether craving and pride too are all-pervading): Even so, the all-pervading are not these eleven only. For wherever the view of self is active, there the craving for self and the pride of self must arise; and wherever a view of ‘purity’ or of ‘superiority’ is active, there seeking and exalting must arise. This being so, craving and pride ought to be all-pervading too.

(The Vaibhāṣika masters reproach in return) If it be so, then since these arise taking at one time as object the dharmas abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, it must be said by what these two are abandoned.

(The objector answers) It should be said that they are abandoned by cultivation, since they take mixed object-fields as object; or it should also be said that they are abandoned by seeing, since they are drawn forth by the force of view.

(The Vaibhāṣika masters state their own tenet in conclusion) The Vaibhāṣika masters say thus: these two afflictions are afflictions with an individual characteristic and not afflictions with a common characteristic; they have no power of taking as object all at once, and so they are not all-pervading. Therefore the all-pervading are these eleven alone. The rest, which are not all-pervading, are plain of themselves by extension, and so need not be separately stated.

Treatise (the nine that can take an upper realm and an upper level as object): Among these eleven, setting aside the view of a real person and the extreme view, the other nine can further take an upper realm and an upper level as object.

The word ‘upper’ in the stanza properly makes plain the upper realm and the upper level, and at the same time displays besides that there is no latent tendency that takes a lower realm or a lower level as object (the upper does not take the lower as object).

Although these nine can take both their own level and an upper level as object, yet in principle there is no such thing as taking one’s own level and an upper level as object at once.

In this matter of ‘taking an upper as object,’ speaking first with respect to realms: either one realm alone is taken as object, or two are taken as object together. Hence the root treatise says: there are several latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire that take as object what is affiliated to the realm of form; there are several latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire that take as object what is affiliated to the formless realm; there are several latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire that take as object what is affiliated to the realm of form and the formless realm; there are several latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of form that take as object what is affiliated to the formless realm. As for analyzing with respect to levels, one need only ponder it following the way it is said of realms.

Treatise (why the two views of self and of extremes do not take an upper as object): If one born in the realm of desire, taking Mahābrahmā as object, gives rise to a view of ‘a sentient being’ or to a view of ‘eternity,’ why then is it said that the view of self and the extreme view do not take an upper realm or an upper level as object?

Answer: because he does not hold Mahābrahmā to be his own self or what belongs to his self (the view of self must take as object the aggregates affiliated to oneself); and the extreme view must arise from the view of self (the view of self not taking an upper as object, the extreme view naturally does not either).

(Asked again) If it be so, then reckoning Mahābrahmā a sentient being or eternal — into what view is this gathered?

The Abhidharma masters say: these two are not views, but are gathered into wrong cognition.

(Asked again) Why is it a view when the other afflictions take that as object, while these two also take it as object and yet are not views?

Answer: this is said taking our own tenet as the measure (it being so established by the criterion of our own school).

Treatise (whether the entity of the all-pervading is the latent tendencies alone): Is the entity of the all-pervading the latent tendencies alone? Answer: it is not. How is it then? Answer: together with the dharmas that accompany them.

That is to say: the eleven latent tendencies spoken of above, together with the dharmas that accompany them, are all gathered into the all-pervading. Yet their ‘acquisition’ must be set aside — because the acquisition is not of one result with them.

For this reason someone asks thus: are the several all-pervading latent tendencies all all-pervading causes? Answer: to this question a fourfold alternative should be made. The first alternative (being an all-pervading latent tendency and not an all-pervading cause) is the all-pervading latent tendencies of the future. The second alternative (being an all-pervading cause and not an all-pervading latent tendency) is the dharmas coexistent with them in the past and present. The third and fourth alternatives may be analyzed in accordance with the principle.

Treatise (turning into Gate Two): Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many take what has outflows as object and how many take what is without outflows as object? The stanza says:

〔Roots 14 through 16〕Gate Two · Taking as Object What Has Outflows and What Is without Outflows

Stanza: The wrong view and doubt abandoned by seeing the truth of cessation and the truth of the path, together with what is associated with them, and further the independent ignorance — these six can take what is without outflows as object. Among these, those that take cessation as object take only the cessation of their own level as object; those that take the path as object take six levels or nine levels as object, because the counteragents differ and because they are homogeneous causes of one another. Greed, hatred, pride, and the two adherences do not take what is without outflows as object — because what is taken as object should be relinquished, is not enmity and harm, is quiescent, is pure, and is of the most excellent nature.

Treatise: Only the wrong view and doubt abandoned by seeing the truth of cessation and the truth of the path, together with the independent ignorance associated with them, three each making six in all, can take what is without outflows as object. That the rest take what has outflows as object is plain of itself by extension.

Among these six, those that take cessation as object each take the cessation of their own level as object — because the several cessations are not causes and results with respect to one another (the cessation of this level cannot be the cause of the cessation of that level). That is to say: the three latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire take as object only the cessation through discernment of the formations of the realm of desire; and so on down to the three latent tendencies of the level of the summit of existence, which take as object only the cessation through discernment of the formations of the summit of existence.

Those that take the path as object take six levels or nine levels as object. That is to say: the three latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire take as object only the path of the class of the cognition of dharma in six levels — whether it counteracts the realm of desire or is able to counteract the rest, all of it is their object, because it is all of one class. The three latent tendencies in each of the eight levels of the realm of form and the formless realm each can take as object throughout only the path of the class of the subsequent cognition in nine levels — whether it counteracts its own level or is able to counteract the rest, all of it is their object, because it is all of one class.

Treatise (why taking cessation as object does not extend, while taking the path as object does): Why is it that in taking cessation as object one takes only one’s own level and not the rest, while in taking the path as object one can extend to what is of one class in six levels and in nine?

Answer: because the paths of the several levels are causes of one another (the homogeneous being cause to the homogeneous). (Pressed again) Although the class of the cognition of dharma and the class of the subsequent cognition are also causes of one another, yet the class of the subsequent cognition does not counteract the realm of desire, and so the path of the class of the subsequent cognition is not the object of the three latent tendencies of the realm of desire.

(Pressed again) Since the class of the cognition of dharma can counteract the realm of form and the formless realm, it ought to be the object of the three latent tendencies in each of those eight levels. Answer: it is not that the class of the cognition of dharma can counteract the realm of form and the formless realm in every part — for the class of the cognition of dharma concerning suffering and the class concerning origination are not the counteragents of those two realms; nor is it able to counteract the realm of form and the formless realm in the whole part — for it cannot counteract what is abandoned by seeing in those two realms. These two beginning conditions being absent (being neither a universal counteragent nor a counteragent in the whole part), it is not their object.

By this very principle it is displayed besides that there is no barrier to the several levels that the all-pervading confusions take as object under the truths of suffering and origination — because the object-fields taken are causes of one another and are not counteragents (a counteragent has its bounds, while an object-mark as cause has none).

Treatise (why greed and the other four do not take what is without outflows as object): Why is it that greed, hatred, pride, adherence to observances and vows, and adherence to views, which are abandoned by seeing what is without outflows (the two truths of cessation and the path), yet do not take what is without outflows as object?

(1) Because what the latent tendency of greed takes as object should be relinquished; if it took what is without outflows as object, then no fault would follow — as the desire for wholesome dharmas ought not to be relinquished (which shows that a desire taking what is without outflows as object does not count as greed). (2) It is by taking a matter of enmity and harm as object that the latent tendency of hatred arises, and the two truths of cessation and the path are not enmity and harm, and so are not the object-field of hatred. (3) It is by taking a matter of coarse agitation as object that the latent tendency of pride arises, and the two truths of cessation and the path are quiescent, and so are not the object-field of pride. (4) To hold what is impure to be the cause of purity is called adherence to observances and vows, and the two truths of cessation and the path are truly pure, and so ought not to be made the object-field of adherence to observances and vows. (5) To hold what is not superior to be most excellent is called adherence to views, and the two truths of cessation and the path are truly excellent, and so ought not to be made the object-field of adherence to views either.

Therefore greed and the rest do not take what is without outflows as object.

Treatise (turning into Gate Three): Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many increase by attachment through the object and how many increase by attachment through association? The stanza says:

〔Roots 17 and 18〕Gate Three · Increase by Attachment through the Object and through Association

Stanza: An all-pervading latent tendency not yet cut off, upon all the dharmas of its own level (increases by attachment through the object); one not all-pervading increases by attachment through the object only upon the dharmas of its own category. What is not without outflows and not taken from an upper realm (only there is increase by attachment), because what is without outflows and what is of an upper object-field are not appropriated as one’s own and are moreover contrary to it. Following upon the dharmas associated with it, it increases by attachment through association.

Treatise: An all-pervading latent tendency increases by attachment through the object upon the several dharmas of the five categories of its own level throughout, because it can take the dharmas of its own level as object throughout. A latent tendency that is not all-pervading, among the remaining five categories, increases by attachment through the object only upon its own category, because it takes only its own category as object.

This is said in general. If it be said in particular, then the six confusions that take what is without outflows as object and the nine confusions that take an upper realm as object have no sense of increase by attachment upon their object-fields.

Why? Because the object-fields that are without outflows and of an upper level are not appropriated as one’s own, and are moreover contrary to it.

That is to say: if there be a dharma appropriated as its own by the view of self and the craving within this level, then it may have the principle of ‘increase by attachment through the object by the latent tendencies present in this level,’ as when a garment is damp the dust follows and stays upon it. But the several dharmas without outflows and the dharmas of an upper level are not appropriated as their own by the view of self and the craving of the lower levels, and so the confusions of a lower level that take them as object do not increase by attachment through the object.

(A note in passing) To dwell in a mind of a lower level and seek an upper level and the like is the desire for wholesome dharmas, and is not called a latent tendency.

The noble path, nirvāṇa, and the dharmas of an upper level are contrary to the confusions of a lower level that can take them as object, and so those two classes likewise have no principle of increase by attachment through the object — as upon a burning stone the foot does not stay.

(Another account) Some say: ‘latent tendency’ has the sense of ‘following in accord.’ It is only what is not without outflows and not of an upper object-field that follows in accord with the several latent tendencies of the lower levels; and so, though they are its object, there is no principle of increase by attachment — as when one with the wind-sickness takes a dry and astringent medicine, the sickness is not what is increased by attachment upon the medicine.

Treatise (increase by attachment through association): The sense of increase by attachment having been analyzed with respect to the object, increase by attachment through association should now be analyzed. That is to say: whatever latent tendency it be, upon the dharmas associated with itself, by reason of association it increases by attachment upon them.

All statements of increase by attachment refer to the time when it has not yet been cut off; and so the head of the first stanza marks first the two words ‘not yet cut off.’

(A question appended) Is there such a latent tendency as takes neither what is without outflows nor an upper realm as object, and yet whose increase by attachment is through association only and not through the object? Answer: there is. It is the several all-pervading latent tendencies that take an upper level as object.

Treatise (turning into Gate Four): Among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are unwholesome and how many are indeterminate? The stanza says:

〔Root 19〕Gate Four · The Unwholesome and the Indeterminate

Stanza: The latent tendencies of the upper two realms, and the view of self and the extreme view of the realm of desire, and the delusion that arises together with them, are indeterminate; all the rest besides these are unwholesome.

Treatise: All the latent tendencies of the realm of form and the formless realm are of indeterminate quality alone. For if a defiled dharma were unwholesome, it would have a painful maturation; and a painful maturational result the upper two realms do not have — the cause that can vex and afflict others is decidedly absent there.

The two views of self and of extremes, and the delusion associated with them, in so far as they are affiliated to the realm of desire, are likewise of indeterminate quality.

Why? (1) Because these do not go against giving and the rest — it is in order that ‘I’ may obtain happiness hereafter that one now diligently cultivates giving, discipline, and the rest. (2) The extreme view that holds to annihilation can further accord with liberation, and so the World-Honored One said: among the several courses of view of the several non-Buddhists, this view is the best, namely ‘I am not and what belongs to me is not; I shall not be hereafter and what belongs to me shall not be hereafter.’ (3) And these two views are bewildered about one’s own affair alone, and do not seek to vex and injure other sentient beings.

(An objection posed) If it be so, then greedily seeking the pleasures of heaven and giving rise to the pride of self ought by the same rule to be indeterminate too (they also not vexing and injuring others).

(Another master’s account) The preceptors of former times say thus: an innate view of self is of indeterminate quality — as the view of self is active in beasts and the like; if it arises from discrimination (arising from perverse teaching and perverse pondering), it is of unwholesome quality.

All the remaining latent tendencies affiliated to the realm of desire are contrary to what has been said above, and are all of unwholesome quality.

Treatise (turning into Gate Five): Among the unwholesome confusions spoken of above, how many are unwholesome roots and how many are not unwholesome roots? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 20〕Gate Five, Part One · The Three Unwholesome Roots

Stanza: The unwholesome roots are in the realm of desire — namely greed, hatred, and unwholesome delusion.

Treatise: Only all greed and hatred affiliated to the realm of desire, and unwholesome delusion, are gathered into the unwholesome roots. Following the order, the World-Honored One spoke of them as the three unwholesome roots of greed, hatred, and delusion.

(Why they are set up as roots) Only an affliction whose quality is unwholesome alone can serve as the root of unwholesome dharmas and be set up as an unwholesome root. The rest are not so — that the remaining several afflictions are not unwholesome roots is a sense already established by extension from the text above, and so the stanza does not state it.

Treatise (bringing out the indeterminate roots): Among the indeterminate confusions spoken of above, how many are indeterminate roots and how many are not indeterminate roots? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 20 and Root 21〕Gate Five, Part Two · The Three Indeterminate Roots and the Four of the Masters of Other Regions

Stanza: The indeterminate roots are three — indeterminate craving, delusion, and discernment. The rest are not set up, because doubt turns toward two courses and pride turns by exalting. The masters of other regions set up four — among which are craving, view, pride, and delusion, because for those who cultivate the upper absorptions the three all decidedly depend upon delusion.

Treatise: The several Vaibhāṣika masters of the land of Kaśmīra say: the indeterminate roots are likewise three — namely the three of the several indeterminate craving, delusion, and discernment; and even that portion produced by maturation is gathered into the indeterminate roots.

(A question posed) Why are doubt and pride not indeterminate roots? Answer: because doubt turns toward two courses and pride turns by exalting.

The intent of those masters is this: doubt turns to and fro between two roads, and its nature is wavering and unsettled, and so it ought not to be set up as a root; pride turns upon its object with the mark of exalting, and is unlike the dharma of a root, and so it is not set up as a root either. For what is to be a root must abide firmly and turn downward (as a root strikes down), which is commonly understood in the world; and so those two are not roots.

Treatise (the account of the four indeterminate roots of the masters of other regions): The several masters of other regions, however, set up four — namely indeterminate craving, view, pride, and delusion. (The name ‘indeterminate’ is to block both the wholesome and the evil.)

Why are these four set up as indeterminate roots? Because the several foolish men who cultivate the absorptions of the upper realms depend upon nothing beyond the three of craving, view, and pride; and these three all turn by the force of ignorance, and so these four are set up as the indeterminate roots.

Treatise (bringing out the gate of the four determinations): The fourteen indeterminate matters spoken of in the several sūtras — are these too gathered into the indeterminate spoken of here? Answer: they are not. How is it then? Answer: that sūtra sets up the name ‘indeterminate’ only with respect to a question that ‘should be set aside.’ The gates of question and determination are four in all. Which four? The stanza says:

〔Root 22〕Appendix to Gate Five · The Four Gates of Determination

Stanza: What should be determined categorically, what should be determined by analysis, what should be determined by counter-question, what should be determined by setting aside — as with asking about death, asking about birth, asking about superior and inferior, and asking whether self and aggregates are one or different, and the like.

Treatise: Take first the four kinds of question — first what should be determined categorically, second what should be determined by analysis, third what should be determined by counter-question, fourth what should be determined by setting aside. These four follow the order (matching the four questions below).

As when a questioner asks about death, asks about birth, asks about superior and inferior, and asks whether self and aggregates are one or different, and the like. What is called ‘the determinations are four’ is the answering of these four questions.

(1) If he asks thus: will all sentient beings die? It should be determined categorically — all sentient beings will decidedly die.

(2) If he asks thus: will all who have died be born again? It should be determined by analysis — those who still have afflictions will be born again, and not the rest.

(3) If he asks thus: is a human superior or inferior? It should be determined by counter-question — set against what? If he says set against gods, then it should be determined that a human is inferior; if he says set against the lower destinies (the evil destinies), then it should be determined that a human is superior.

(4) If he asks thus: are the aggregates and a sentient being one or different? It should be determined by setting aside — because a sentient being is not really existent, the natures of oneness and difference are alike not established, as the son of a barren woman cannot be spoken of as having the nature of white or of black.

Treatise (the first objection posed · why setting aside is called a determination): To set aside and yet to set up the name of a ‘determination’ — how is this? Answer: because in determining his question one says ‘this ought not to be determined’ (and to utter this one sentence is itself a kind of determination).

Treatise (an outsider’s objection and the author’s explaining through · the first): Someone says thus: that second question may also be determined categorically — not all who have died will be born again (one may answer so straight out).

(The author explains through) Yet what the questioner said was ‘will all who have died be born again’; in principle it should be determined by analysis. A general answer to what he asks does not do, for though it makes him know a general statement, he is still not resolved (what he asked was ‘all,’ and only by dividing the cases in answering is he resolved).

Treatise (an outsider’s objection and the author’s explaining through · the second): Someone else says thus: that third question may also be determined categorically — a human is both superior and inferior, because what he is set against differs, as consciousness is both result and cause (result with respect to what precedes, cause with respect to what follows).

(The author explains through) Yet that questioner puts a categorical question, and your answer is not a categorical determination, and so it should amount rather to a determination by analysis. But here one should press him as to what his question sets it against, and hence this is called what should be determined by counter-question.

Treatise (an outsider’s objection and the author’s explaining through · the third): Someone else says thus: since that fourth question determines nothing at all as to whether the aggregates and a sentient being are different or one, how can it be called a determination?

(The author explains through) Yet what he asks should in principle be set aside. Having said ‘it should be set aside,’ how is that not counted a determination?

Treatise (the Abhidharma masters explain the four determinations at length according to the four questions): The Abhidharma masters say thus:

(1) As for what is called categorical determination: if someone asks — is the World-Honored One a Tathāgata, an Arhat, a Perfectly Awakened One? Is the Dharma he speaks well spoken? Is what the several communities of disciples practice excellent practice? Are form and so on down to consciousness all impermanent? Are suffering and so on down to the path well set forth? All these should be determined categorically, because they accord with the real sense.

(2) As for what is called determination by analysis: if someone with a straight mind requests, saying — may the Venerable One speak Dharma for me. Then one should analyze for him: the dharmas are many, namely past, future, and present; which do you wish spoken? If he says, speak the past dharmas for me, one should analyze again: among past dharmas too there are many, form and so on down to consciousness. If he requests form to be spoken, one should analyze and say: within form there are three kinds, wholesome, evil, and indeterminate. If he requests the wholesome, one should analyze and say: within the wholesome there are seven, namely abstention from killing and so at length down to abstention from frivolous and defiled speech. If he further requests abstention from killing, one should analyze and say: this has three kinds, namely what is set going by the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion. If he requests what is set going by non-greed, one should analyze and say: this again has two kinds, namely the manifest and the nonmanifest; which do you wish spoken?

(3) As for what is called determination by counter-question: if someone with a fawning mind requests, saying — may the Venerable One speak Dharma for me. Then one should counter-question him: the dharmas are many; which do you wish spoken? One should not analyze for him — down to making him stand silent, or making him state it himself so that he has no occasion to pick a fault.

Treatise (a further objection posed upon this): Is it not that within these two (determination by analysis and determination by counter-question) there is no ‘question’ at all but only a request to be told; and no ‘determination’ either, but only the one counter-question ‘which do you wish spoken?’ — how then can these two count as question and determination?

Answer: as when someone requests, saying ‘speak the path for me,’ is this not asking about the path? And to determine what he asks by counter-questioning, is this not determining the path?

(Objected again) If it be so, then both ought to be determination by counter-question (why divide them into two?). Answer: not so. Because the intent of the question differs as straight or fawning, and what is determined differs as analyzed or unanalyzed (for one of straight mind it is analyzed, for one of fawning mind it is only counter-questioned).

(4) As for what is called determination by setting aside: if someone asks — has the world an end, or has it no end, and the like? This should be set aside, and it ought not to be spoken for him.

Treatise (analyzing the marks of the four determinations according to the sūtra): Now the marks of question and determination are analyzed according to the sūtra. As the sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghikas says: bhikṣus should know that question and determination are of four kinds. Which four? Namely, there are questions that should be determined categorically, and so on down to, there are questions that should only be set aside.

What kind of question should be determined categorically? It is asking — are all the formations impermanent? This question is called one that should be determined categorically.

What kind of question should be determined by analysis? It is if someone asks — the actions performed with deliberate intent having been done, what result is to be experienced? This question is called one that should be determined by analysis.

What kind of question should be determined by counter-question? It is if someone asks — are a man’s ‘perception’ and his ‘self’ one or different? Then one should counter-question him, saying: in dependence upon which self do you ask thus? If he says in dependence upon the coarse self, then it should be determined that ‘it differs from perception.’ This question is called one that should be determined by counter-question.

What kind of question should only be set aside? It is if someone asks — is the world eternal, not eternal, both eternal and not eternal, neither eternal nor not eternal? Has the world an end, no end, both an end and no end, neither an end nor no end? After the Tathāgata’s death does he exist, not exist, both exist and not exist, neither exist nor not exist? Is the life-principle the body, or is the life-principle other than the body? This question is called one that should only be set aside.

惑能繫·三世實有·惑隨增·漏瀑流軛取How the Afflictions Bind · Real Existence in the Three Times · Increase by Attachment · Outflows, Torrents, Yokes, and Appropriations

全文五層 →Full five layers →

白話Vernacular

〔正23·正24〕何等隨眠能繫何事——自相惑與共相惑於三世之繫縛

論（開卷起問）：一切有情，在某一件事（所緣之法）上頭，若有隨眠於其上增其惛滯，就叫作『繫縛這件事』。那麼應當說：過去、現在、未來三世之中，哪一類隨眠能夠繫縛哪一種事？頌說：

頌：如果在這一件事上頭，貪、瞋、慢還沒有斷除，那麼過去世與現在世之中，凡是已經生起過的，都能繫此事；未來世之中，則是意識所相應的那一分，以及一切遍行的隨眠能繫。未來的五識所相應者，若還可能生起，就只繫未來一世；若已注定不生起，那也遍繫三世。其餘的隨眠（見、疑、無明），無論過去未來，只要未斷，一律遍繫三世；至於現在的，正緣著境的時候就能繫。

論：先要知道，隨眠總共分兩類。第一類叫『自相惑』，就是貪、瞋、慢三者。第二類叫『共相惑』，就是見、疑、癡（無明）三者。所繫的事雖然很多，這裡只就『所繫』這一邊來說。凡是還沒有斷的，就一直流貫到後面各門去（後文論隨增、論次第，都是接著這一分講）。

若在這一件事上有貪、瞋、慢，在過去世已經生起而未斷，在現在世已經生起，這兩者都能繫縛這一件事。為什麼只算『已生起的』？因為貪瞋慢是自相惑，並不是一切有情都必定普遍生起（有人於此境起貪，有人不起；所以要看它實際起過沒有）。

若是未來世之中意識所相應的那三者（貪、瞋、慢），這一分遍通於過去現在未來三世，只要還沒有斷，都能夠繫縛。至於未來世之中五識（眼耳鼻舌身識）所相應的貪與瞋，情形又分兩路：若還沒有斷而將來仍可能生起的，它就只繫縛未來這一世；若還沒有斷而已注定不會生起的（那一分永不現行），它反而能夠遍繫三世。

其餘的一切見、疑、無明，不論過去未來，只要未斷，一律普遍繫縛三世。為什麼？因為這三種是共相惑，一切有情都被它普遍繫縛（凡夫於四諦之理一概不了，這是共通的，不像貪瞋要看個別對境）。至於現在世的隨眠，正在緣著境界的時候，就隨其所應而能繫縛這一件事。

論（由此逼出一段傍論）：既然要說『所繫的事』通於過去與未來，那就得先辨明：過去未來的諸事，究竟是實有還是實無？辨明了才談得上『繫』。可是兩邊都有難處——如果過去未來真的是有，那麼一切行法就永遠都在，豈不是應當叫作『常』？如果過去未來真的是無，那又怎麼能說有『能繫的煩惱』、有『所繫的事』、有『離繫』這回事？

毘婆沙師（有部本宗之師）在這裡決定主張：過去未來實有。而他們也不承認因此諸行就成了常——因為諸行始終與生、住、異、滅四種有為相結合著（有生滅相，所以不常）。為了把這個主張說得更明白，以下先簡略地標出宗義、顯示其理路。頌說：

〔正25〕三世實有之立宗——二教證與二理證

頌：三世是有，一由聖教所說故，二由『識必有二緣』及『業必有當果』兩項道理故。正因為主張三世都有，所以才被許為『說一切有部』。

論：（有部之立）三世確實是實有。何以見得？第一，由於契經之中世尊親口說過。

世尊怎麼說？世尊說：比丘們應當知道，假使過去的色是沒有的，那麼多聞的聖弟子眾就不必對過去的色勤修厭離捨棄了（既然佛教人厭捨過去色，可見過去色是有的，才有可厭之物）。正因為過去色是有，所以多聞聖弟子眾應當對過去色勤修厭捨。同樣，假使未來的色是沒有的，那麼多聞聖弟子眾就不必對未來的色勤加斷除、勤加欣求了；正因為未來色是有，所以應當對未來色勤斷勤求。

第二，由於識的生起必須具足兩個緣。契經說：識是由二緣而生。哪兩個？就是眼根與色境（乃至最後一對是意根與諸法）。如果過去未來不是實有，那麼緣著過去未來的那個識，就缺了一個緣（無境可緣），識便生不起來——可是我們明明能憶念過去、逆想未來。

以上是依聖教證明去來二世是有。以下再依正理證明。第三項理由：識生起時必定有它的境。必定有境，識才能生；沒有境，識就不生——這道理是決定的。假使過去未來的境體實在是無，那就會有『沒有所緣的識』；既然所緣是無，識也應當跟著沒有（可是憶念過去之識確實生起了）。

第四項理由：已經謝滅的業有將來的果報。假使過去的體真的沒有，那麼善惡二業將來的果報就應當沒有了——因為果報生起的時候，並沒有一個『現在的因』還擺在那裡（因早已過去了；若過去全無，果從何來）。

由這兩項聖教與兩項正理，毘婆沙師決定主張過去未來二世實有。

論（釋部名之判準）：假使有人自稱是『說一切有』宗，那就決定應當承認去來二世實有；因為主張三世都是決定實有，才許他是說一切有宗。也就是說：若有人主張三世實有，才許他屬於這一部。假使有人只說有現在世、以及過去世中還沒有給出果報的業，而說沒有未來世、也沒有過去世中已經給出果報的業（過去業一給果就沒了），這種人可以許為『分別說部』，不屬於本部所攝。

論（轉問四家）：那麼如今本部之中，建立三世的說法差別有幾種？其中哪一家所立的『世』最為完善而可依？頌說：

〔正26〕建立三世之四家——類、相、位、待，而以『約作用』為最善

頌：這裡有四種說法，分別以類、相、位、待四者之異來立三世。其中第三家是就『作用』而立的，所立之世最為完善。

論：（第一家）尊者法救這樣說：由於『類』的不同，三世才有差別。他的意思是：諸法在三世中運行的時候，只是所屬之類有殊，並不是體有殊異。就好比把一只金器打破了改做別的器物，形狀雖然變了，金體並沒有變。又好比牛乳變成酪的時候，捨掉的是味與勢力等，並沒有捨掉顯色。諸法在三世中運行也是這樣：從未來到現在、從現在入過去，所捨所得的只是『類』，不是體。

（第二家）尊者妙音這樣說：由於『相』的不同，三世才有差別。他的意思是：諸法在三世中運行的時候，過去法正與過去相結合，但不能說它就離了現在相與未來相；未來法正與未來相結合，但不能說它就離了過去相與現在相；現在法正與現在相結合，但不能說它就離了過去相與未來相。好比一個人正在染著某一位妻室的時候，對其餘的姬妾也不能說他已經離染（只是此刻未起而已）。

（第三家）尊者世友這樣說：由於『位』的不同，三世才有差別。他的意思是：諸法在三世中運行的時候，到了哪一個位次就作哪一種說法，只是位有分別，並不是體有殊異。好比撥動一枚算籌：放在個位就叫作一，放在百位就叫作百，放在千位就叫作千（籌還是那一枚，位變則名變）。

（第四家）尊者覺天這樣說：由於『觀待』的不同，三世才有差別。他的意思是：諸法在三世中運行的時候，前後互相觀待而立名有異。好比同一個女人，觀待其女則名為母，觀待其母則名為女。

論（評此四家）：這四家同屬說一切有部之中，然而——第一家（法救）主張法有轉變（體不變而類變），這就應當歸到數論外道那一夥裡去了。第二家（妙音）所立的世相雜亂，因為照他說，三世之法都同時具有三世之相。有人會說：這正如一個人對妻室起現行貪的時候，對其餘的境只是『成就』貪而已，現在並沒有貪起——可是那能算同一回事嗎（成就與相合並不相等）？第四家（覺天）所立的前後觀待，會使一世法之中就有了三世：譬如過去世的前後剎那，前者應叫過去、後者應叫未來，中間的又成了現在；未來與現在，依此類推也一樣（那三世便無定準了）。

所以這四家之中，第三家最為完善——因為它是就『作用』來說位有差別，由於位不同而立三世有異。他的意思是：諸法的作用還沒有起，就叫作未來；正有作用的時候，叫作現在；作用已經滅去，叫作過去；體並沒有殊異。這一層意思，前面已經完全知道了。

論（此下五番往復·經部與有部）：（經部難）那麼他還應當再說一說：假如去來二世的體也是實有的，那不就應當叫作現在嗎？還有什麼可叫作『去』『來』的呢？

（說一切有部答）豈不是前面已經講了，是就『作用』而立的（有作用才叫現在）。

（經部復難）若是這樣，現在有眼等諸根處在『同分』的狀態（有根而不見色，即不起見用），它有什麼作用可言（既無作用，怎麼還算現在）？

（說一切有部答）那個同分眼難道不能『取果』與『與果』嗎（雖不見色，仍有取果與果之用）？

（經部復難）若是這樣，那麼過去的同類因等既然能夠給出果報，它也應當算是有作用了（有作用就該叫現在）。這樣一來，就成了『有一半作用』（過去因唯能與果、現在因唯能取果），三世之相便要互相雜亂了。

以上只是略作推徵，接下來要正式廣破。頌說：

〔正27〕逐句廣破——何礙用、用云何、無異世便壞、有誰未生滅

頌：是什麼障礙了作用？這作用本身又屬哪一世？若說作用與法體無異，三世之義便要崩壞；果真如此，又有誰是『未曾生』、誰是『已經滅』？（有部答曰）這法性甚深，不是尋思所能到的境界。

論（經部難·釋『何礙用』）：應當說：假使法的自體是恒常都有的，那它就應當一切時中都能起作用；究竟是什麼障礙的力量，使得這個法體所起的作用時而有、時而無？

（此處有部設一救，經部隨即斥之）假使說是因為眾緣還沒有和合——這個救法不合道理，因為照你的主張，眾緣自身也是恒常有的（緣既恒有，何時算和合、何時算不和合）。

論（經部難·釋『用云何』）：再者，這個『作用』本身，又怎麼說它屬於過去、未來或現在呢？難道在作用之上還能另立一重作用（那就無窮無盡了）？假使這個作用本身不屬過去未來現在，而你又說作用是有——那它就成了無為法，應當是恒常而不可無的；如此便不該再說什麼『作用已滅（名過去）』、『此法作用未有（名未來）』了。

論（說一切有部救·釋『無異』）：假使承認作用與法體是兩回事，才會有你說的那些過失；然而我們主張作用與體並沒有異，所以不應當說有這些過失。

論（經部破·釋『世便壞』）：若是這樣，你所立的『世』的意義便要崩壞了。因為假使作用就是法體，體既然恒常都有，作用也應當恒常都有，那怎麼還會有時候被叫作過去、未來呢？所以你所立的三世之義不能成立。

論（說一切有部救）：怎麼會不成立？因為有為法還沒有生起就叫未來，已經生起而還沒有滅就叫現在，已經滅了就叫過去（三世自有其界）。

論（經部破·釋『有誰未生滅』）：那麼他還應當說：假使去來之法的體像現在法一樣實有，究竟誰是『還沒有生』的？誰又是『已經滅了』的？也就是說：有為法的體若真是恒常都有，怎麼可能成立『還沒有生』與『已經滅』這兩件事？（追問下去）它先前缺了什麼？——答曰：它還沒有，所以叫作未已生。後來又缺了什麼？——答曰：它已經沒有了，所以叫作已滅。（可見『未生』『已滅』本身就在說『本無』『還無』。）所以，若不承認法是本來沒有而今有、有了以後還歸於無，那麼三世之義，無論用哪一種說法都不能成立。

論（經部續破『有為相合』之救）：至於他所說的『因為恒常與生住異滅諸有為相結合著，所以諸行不算是常』——這只是一句空話罷了，因為（在他那裡）生滅之理根本沒有著落。承認體是恒有，卻又說性不是常，這樣的說法是前所未聞的。依著這個意思，所以有一首頌這樣說：

〔引頌·非本頌〕許法體恒有

頌（論主所引以破之頌·非本論本頌）：承認法體是恒常都有，卻又說它的性不是常；性與體又並沒有分別——這真是『自在天』的手筆了（外道說自在天要作就作、要不作就不作，全憑其意；此說亦然）。

〔引頌後之長行〕經部之總答——曾有、當有

論（答第一項教證）：再者，他所說『因為世尊說過，所以去來二世體是實有』——我們（經部）也說有過去未來世。只是：過去世是『曾經有過』而名之為有，未來世是『將來會有』、因為有能生果的因在，所以名之為有。依著這個意思說有去來，並不是說去來像現在那樣實有。

（有部問）誰說它們像現在世那樣有呢？（經部反詰）不像現在那樣，那它們的『有』又是怎麼個有法？（有部答）它們有的是去來二世的自性。（經部再詰）這就要追問了：如果去來與現在同樣是有，怎麼又能說『因為是去來之性，所以說它有』呢？可見只是就『曾有』『當有』這因果二性而說，並不是體實在有。

世尊之所以這樣說，是為了遮止那種撥無因果的邪見，才依『曾經有』『將來有』的意思說有去來——因為『有』這個字本來就能通指有法與無法。就像世間說『有一盞燈先前是無的』『有一盞燈後來是無的』；又像有人說『有一盞燈已經滅了，不是我現在把它滅的』。說有去來，道理也應當這樣看。若不這樣看，去來之『性』反而立不住了。

論（答杖髻經之難）：（有部難）若是這樣，那為什麼世尊對那位杖髻外道說：業雖然過去、已經盡滅變壞，卻仍然是有？（經部答）難道他不承認業曾經有過這件事嗎（『曾有』即是有）？而今世尊又鄭重為他說『有』，那是依著業所引起的現在相續之中還留有『與果的功能』，隱密地說它為有。若不這樣解，那麼過去的業就成了現在實有之性，還算什麼過去？道理必定應當如此。

論（引勝義空經）：因為薄伽梵在《勝義空契經》中說過：眼根生起的時候，並沒有從哪裡來；眼根滅去的時候，也沒有積聚到哪裡去。本來沒有而今有，有了以後還歸於無。假使去來的眼根真是實有，經上就不該說『本無』等語。假使說這句話是就現在世說的——這個救法不合道理，因為『現在』之性與那眼根之體並沒有分別；若承認現在法是本無今有、有已還無，那麼『去來的眼根沒有體』這個道理就已經成立了。

論（答第二項教證·二緣生識）：再者，他所說『識的生起要具足二緣，所以去來二世體是實有』——這一項應當共同尋思：所謂『意根與法為緣而生意識』，究竟是說『法』像意根那樣作能生之緣呢？還是說『法』只能作所緣之境？

假使說法像意根那樣作能生之緣——那麼未來百千劫以後才會有的那個法（或者將來根本也不會有的那個法），怎麼能作能生之緣而生起今天的識？又如涅槃之性是違背一切生的，把它立為『能生』，也不合正理。

假使說法只能作所緣之境——那我們也說過去未來正是所緣。（有部詰）若是無的，怎麼能成為所緣境？（經部答）我說它有，正是就『能成為所緣』這一分說的。（有部再詰）怎麼個成為所緣法？（經部答）就是『曾經有』與『將來有』。並不是憶念過去的色受等時，像現在這樣分明地觀它為有，只是追憶它曾經有過的那個相；逆想未來將有，也是一樣：就像曾經在現在領納過的色相，如此追憶過去為有；也像將來在現在會領納到的色相，如此逆想未來為有。

假使它像現在那樣有，就該成現在世了；假使它現在體是無的，那就應當承認確有『緣著無境的識』——我們的道理自然成立。

論（破極微散亂之救）：假使說去來之法是極微散亂而住、有而不是現在——這也不對，因為我們取那個相的時候，並不是散亂之相。又假使說那色與現在的色一樣有，只是極微散亂這一點不同，那麼極微色的體就應當是常的了；而且色就只有極微的聚與散，竟然沒有一分可以叫作生滅——那就是尊崇邪命外道的論說，背棄善逝所說的契經了。契經明明說：眼根生起的時候無所從來，乃至廣說。再者，受、想、行等也不是極微所集成的，怎麼能說去來是散亂之極微？然而對於受等，我們一樣可以追憶、可以逆想，就像未滅時、已生時的相貌一樣。若說它像現在那樣有，體就該是常的；若說它現在體是無的，還是得承認有緣無境之識——道理自然成立。

論（第十三處之難）：假使說『體全無的東西也能作所緣』，那麼『第十三處』（十二處之外並無此物，是純粹的無）也應當能作所緣了；而確實有人通達『沒有第十三處』這回事——那麼他這個能緣之識所緣的是什麼？假使說緣的就是『第十三處』這個名，那就等於撥開那個名說它是無了。又假使緣的是先前並不存在的聲音，這能緣之識所緣的又是什麼？假使說緣的就是那個聲為境，那麼想求『聲之無』的人，應當再發一次聲才對（豈不可笑）。假使說那個聲之『無』是住在未來位——未來既然實有，怎麼又說它是無？假使說去來沒有現在世之性，這也不合理，因為體是同一個。若說有一分體的差別，那『本無今有』的道理自然就成立了。所以應當說：識是通緣有境與非有境的。

論（釋菩薩之語）：至於菩薩所說『世間所無的，我知我見，沒有這種事』——那是說：別人懷著增上慢，對於非有之物也現起相貌而說為有；我則只對於『有』方才觀之為有。若不是這樣解，那麼一切覺知就都有所緣了，那又為什麼對於境會有猶豫、會有差別（有時知其無）？道理必定應當如此。因為薄伽梵在別處說過：善來苾芻！你們若能作我弟子，不諂不誑、有信有勤，我早晨教你們，能讓你們晚上就有所獲勝；我晚上教你們，能讓你們早晨就有所獲勝。（獲勝什麼？）便能知道：有的就是有、非有的就是非有、有上的就是有上、無上的就是無上。（可見『知非有』正是佛所印可。）由此可知，他說『識必有境，所以有去來』，這個理由也不成立。

論（答第三項理證·業有當果）：再者，他所說『業有果報，所以有去來』，道理也不對。經部師並不是這樣說的——並不是說『就是那個過去的業能生當來之果』；而是說：業在先前所引起的相續，其轉變差別使得當來之果生起（果從相續之轉變生，不從已滅之業生）。這一層在〈破我品〉中將要廣為顯示。

反過來說，假使執定過去未來實有，那麼一切時中果體都是恒有的，業對於那個果還有什麼功能可言？假使說業能生果，那麼所生之果就是本無今有——這道理自然成立（正是我們所說的）。假使一切法一切時都有，究竟是誰對誰有能生的功能？又這樣主張，還要顯成雨眾外道那一夥的邪論了。他們是這樣說的：有的必定恒有，無的必定恒無；無的必定不生，有的必定不滅。

假使說『業能令果成為現在』——怎麼個令它成現在法？假使說是把果牽引到另一個處所來，那麼所引的果體就該是常的了；又如無色之法（心心所等），要怎麼牽引？又這樣所引的果，其體應當本來是無（那還是本無今有）。假使說只是令體有些差別——『本無今有』的道理自然又成立了。

論（收束此段）：所以說一切有部這樣主張，若說過去未來實有，在聖教之中不算是善說。若要善說『一切有』，應當依照契經所說而說。契經怎麼說？契經說：梵志應當知道，所謂『一切有』者，只是十二處，或者只是三世。（就這樣如其所有而說『有』字，不必說去來如現實有。）

論（回應開頭之難·並以毘婆沙師之結收之）：（有部問）如果去來是無，怎麼還能說有能繫、所繫與離繫？（經部答）因為它們的能生之因、也就是隨眠還在，所以說有去來能繫的煩惱；因為緣那些煩惱的隨眠還在，所以說有去來所繫縛的事。若隨眠斷了，就得到『離繫』之名。

毘婆沙師（有部之結語）這樣說：過去未來就像現在一樣實有。凡是這裡頭不能通釋的地方，愛惜自己的人應當這樣知道：法性甚深，不是尋思所能到的境界；豈能因為自己不能解釋，就把它撥為沒有？（並舉『異門』以會通生滅之疑）約一種說法：此法生、此法滅——就是說色等生、色等滅。約另一種說法：異者生、異者滅——就是說未來世生、現在世滅。約另一種說法：就世本身叫作生——因為正生的時候正被那一世所攝。約另一種說法：說某一世有生——因為未來世中有許多剎那（此滅彼生）。

論（傍論收）：傍論到此已了。現在應當思擇：諸事已經斷了，它就離繫了嗎？反過來說，事離繫了，它就已經斷了嗎？——若事離繫了，它必定已斷；但是有『已斷而不是離繫』的事。斷而不離繫，那是怎麼一回事？頌說：

〔正28〕斷而非離繫

頌：在見苦所斷之事已斷之時，其餘見集所斷的遍行隨眠若未斷，以及修道位中前一品已斷之時，其餘各品緣它的隨眠若未斷——這些事仍然被繫著。

論：先說見道位。在苦智已生、集智還沒有生的時候，見苦所斷的諸事雖然已經斷了，可是見集所斷的遍行隨眠若還沒有永斷，那些能緣此事的隨眠，對這件已斷之事仍舊繫縛著（斷是斷了，繫還在）。

再說修道位。隨著哪一種道生起，九品之事中前面幾品已經斷了，而其餘未斷各品所有的隨眠，凡能緣它的，對這件已斷之事仍舊繫縛著。所謂『斷而非離繫』，就應當這樣了知。

論（轉入隨增之問）：那麼哪一件事有幾種隨眠隨增呢？若要一件一件分別回答，就要費很多言語。所以應當造一部『略毘婆沙』（簡要的分別法）：由這個辦法，雖然只花很少的功力，卻能渡過極大的問題之流。也就是說：法雖然很多，簡略起來只有十六種——就是三界（各分五部）合十五，再加無漏法為第十六。能緣這些法的識，數目也一樣是十六。只要知道哪一法是哪一識的境，那麼『哪一件事有哪一種隨眠隨增』就容易思量了。這裡先應當知道：哪一法是哪一識所緣之境？頌說：

〔正29–31〕十六法為十六識之所緣

頌：見苦所斷、見集所斷、修所斷這三部之法，若是欲界所繫的，是自界三部與色界一部、加上無漏識，共五識所緣。若是色界所繫的，是自界與下界各三部、上界一部，加無漏淨識所緣（共八）。若是無色界所繫的，通於三界各三部，加無漏淨識所緣（共十）。見滅所斷、見道所斷之法，各再加上緣自部的識。無漏之法，則為三界之中後三部之識與無漏識，共十識之境。

論：若是欲界所繫的見苦所斷、見集所斷、修所斷之法，各為五識所緣——就是自界的三部（如前所說之見苦斷、見集斷、修斷），加上色界的一部（即色界修所斷的識，能緣下界），無漏識為第五，都能緣它。

若是色界所繫的，就是前面所說那三部諸法，各為八識所緣——就是自界與下界（欲界）的三部（如前所說），加上上界（無色界）的一部（即無色界修所斷之識），無漏識為第八，都能緣它。

若是無色界所繫的，就是前面所說那三部諸法，各為十識所緣——就是三界各三部（如前所說），無漏識為第十，都能緣它。

至於見滅所斷、見道所斷的諸法，應當知道各自再加一個緣自部的識。這是怎麼說？就是：欲界所繫的見滅所斷之法為六識所緣——五識如前，再加一個見滅所斷的識；見道所斷之法為六識所緣——五識也如前，再加一個見道所斷的識。色界、無色界的見滅所斷與見道所斷，就依此而成為九識、十一識所緣。

若是無漏之法，為十識所緣——就是三界之中各取後三部（即見滅所斷、見道所斷、修所斷的識），共九，無漏識為第十，都能緣它。

為了總攝前面這一段的義理，再說一首頌（此非本論之本頌，只是重述前義）：

〔攝頌·非本頌〕重攝十六法十六識

頌（重攝前義之頌）：見苦所斷、見集所斷、修所斷之法，屬欲界、色界、無色界者，應當知道依次為五識、八識、十識所緣。見滅所斷、見道所斷者，各再加緣自部之識。無漏之法應當知道，能作十識之境。

論（樂根一例·以示方隅）：像這樣已經了知十六種法是十六識所緣之境了，如今應當思量：哪一件事有哪一種隨眠隨增？若一條一條分開列舉，恐怕文字太過繁廣，所以我在這裡只略示一個方隅（舉一隅而使人自反其三）。

且如有人問：所繫之事裡頭，樂根有幾種隨眠隨增？——應當觀察：樂根總共有七種，就是欲界一種（即修所斷的樂根）、色界五部（見苦、見集、見滅、見道、修所斷各一）、無漏的樂根為第七。一切無漏法都不是諸隨眠之所隨增（前文已說過）。所以這裡前六種樂根，隨其所應，有欲界修所斷的隨眠、以及諸遍行隨眠，還有色界的一切隨眠，於其上隨增。

若有人問：緣樂根的識又有幾種隨眠隨增？——應當觀察：這種識總共有十二種，就是欲界四部（除見滅所斷，因見滅所斷之識不緣有漏樂根）、色界五部、無色界二部（即見道所斷與修所斷）、無漏識為第十二，都能緣樂根。這些識隨其所應，有欲界四部的隨眠、色界有為緣的隨眠、無色界二部的隨眠、以及諸遍行隨眠，於其上隨增。

若再有人問：緣『緣樂根之識』的識，又有幾種隨眠隨增？——應當觀察：這種識總共有十四種，就是在前面十二種之上再加二種，即無色界的見苦所斷與見集所斷（此二為遍行，能緣下界之識）。這十四種識能緣『緣樂根的識』；其上隨其所應，欲界、色界如上所說，無色界則是四部的隨眠隨增。

依這個方隅去推，其餘的都應當自己思擇。

論（轉入有隨眠心之問）：若一個心因為某個隨眠而被叫作『有隨眠心』，那個隨眠對這個心就一定隨增嗎？——這並不決定。有的只是『有隨眠』而不隨增：就是與心相應的隨眠、以及緣此心的隨眠，若未斷則隨增，若相應的那一分已斷就不隨增了（雖不隨增，仍名有隨眠）。依這一層意思應當這樣說。頌說：

〔正32〕有隨眠心有二

頌：有隨眠的心有兩種，就是有染心與無染心。有染心通於二義（有隨眠而或隨增或不隨增），無染心則只限於隨增這一義。

論：有隨眠的心總共有兩種，因為有染與無染之心有差別的緣故。其中有染之心，或者也有隨增——就是那與心相應的、以及緣此心的隨眠，若還沒有斷，就是隨增；若相應的那一分已經斷了，就不隨增了，然而仍舊說它『有隨眠』，因為（那已斷的一分）恒常與之相應的緣故。

若是無染之心，就只限於『隨增』這一義。因為緣這無染心的隨眠必定還沒有永斷（若斷了，這心就不叫有隨眠了）；這是專就『隨增』來立『有隨眠』之名的緣故。

論（轉入次第之問）：像上面所說的十種隨眠，依次第生起的時候，誰在前、誰在後？頌說：

〔正33〕十隨眠依次第而生

頌：無明、疑、邪見、身見、邊見、戒禁取、見取、貪、慢、瞋——依這個次第，由前面的引生後面的。

論：且說諸煩惱依次第生起的時候：最先是由無明，對四諦之理不能明了，因而不肯觀察苦諦乃至道諦。

由於不明了，其次就引生了『疑』——就是聽到了兩條路的說法，便懷著猶豫：這究竟是苦、還是不是苦（乃至於集滅道，廣說亦然）。

從這猶豫，引生『邪見』——就是由邪聞邪思而生起邪的決定，撥無苦諦（乃至撥無道諦，廣說亦然）。

由於撥無諦理，引生『身見』——就是在五取蘊之中撥無苦的道理，於是決定執取『這是我』。

從這身見，引生『邊見』——就是依著我執，落到斷、常二邊去。

從這邊見，引生『戒禁取』——就是由於對『我』隨執一邊（執常或執斷），便計著這種執取能得清淨。

從戒禁取，引生『見取』——就是計著它能得清淨之後，必定執它為最殊勝。

從這見取，其次引生『貪』——就是對自己的見解情深愛著。

從這貪之後，其次引生『慢』——就是對自己的見解深愛執著以後，憑恃著它而生高舉，凌蔑他人。

從這慢之後，其次引生『瞋』——就是對自己的見解既深愛又憑恃，於是對他人所起的、違背自己見解的說法，情上不能忍受，必定憎恨嫌惡。

另有一派師說：是在對自己見解取捨的當口上起憎嫌的（不必等到慢後）。

又，見諦所斷的貪等生起的時候，是緣著自己相續中的『見』為境（所以這一鏈都繫在見上）。

以上是且就『依次第起』來說；至於越次而起的，前後就沒有一定了。

論（轉入因緣之問）：諸煩惱生起，要由幾個因緣？頌說：

〔正34〕煩惱生起之三因緣

頌：由於隨眠還沒有斷，以及相應的境現在前，加上非理作意生起——說煩惱是具足因緣而起的。

論：由三個因緣，諸煩惱才生起。且如將要生起欲貪纏的時候：一、欲貪的隨眠還沒有斷、還沒有遍知；二、順欲貪的境正現在前；三、緣著那個境的非理作意生起。由這三種力量，於是便起了欲貪。

這三個因緣依其次第，就是『因力』、『境界力』、『加行力』三種力（隨眠是因力，境現前是境界力，非理作意是加行力）。其餘煩惱的生起，依此類推就知道了。

要留意：這是且就『具足因緣』來說的；也有只憑境界力就生起的，譬如退法種姓的阿羅漢等（隨眠已斷而仍退，那是境力偏強）。

論（轉入漏等四門）：以上所說的隨眠並其纏，經中說它們為漏、瀑流、軛、取。所謂『漏』就是三漏：一是欲漏，二是有漏，三是無明漏。所謂『瀑流』就是四瀑流：一是欲瀑流，二是有瀑流，三是見瀑流，四是無明瀑流。所謂『軛』就是四軛，名目如瀑流所說。所謂『取』就是四取：一是欲取，二是見取，三是戒禁取，四是我語取。這些漏等，它們的體是什麼？頌說：

〔正35–38〕漏、瀑流、軛、取之體與物數

頌：欲界的煩惱連同纏、除去癡，名為欲漏。有漏是上二界的，只取根本煩惱而除去癡。（上二界何以合為一？）因為同是無記性、於內門而轉、依定地而生，三義相同所以合為一。無明是諸有的根本，所以別立為一漏。瀑流與軛的體，跟漏是一樣的，只是其中把『見』別立出來——因為見的性猛利。（何以在漏中不別立見？）因為見不順於『住』，所以在漏之中不獨立為一名。取則是欲、有二軛連同無明，而把見分為二（見取與戒禁取）。無明不別立為取，因為它不是能取。

論：欲界的煩惱連同纏，除去癡，共四十一物，總名欲漏——就是欲界所繫的根本煩惱三十一，並上十纏。

色界與無色界的煩惱除去癡，共五十二物，總名有漏——就是上二界的根本煩惱各二十六。

（設難）難道上二界不是也有惛沈、掉舉二種纏嗎？《品類足論》中也這樣說：什麼叫有漏？就是除了無明以外，其餘色無色二界所繫的結、縛、隨眠、隨煩惱、纏。如今這裡為什麼不說（那二纏）？——迦濕彌羅國的毘婆沙師說：那二界的纏很少，而且不自在（勢用微弱），所以不算進去。

（設難）為什麼把二界的隨眠合說為一個『有漏』？——因為同是無記之性、於內門而轉（不緣外境）、依定地而生：由這三義相同，所以合為一。前面所說『有貪』得名的道理，就是這裡『有漏』得名的道理。

依這三界十五種無明來說，其義既已具足，就別立為『無明漏』。為什麼只有這一項要別立漏名？因為無明能作一切有（生死）的根本。

瀑流與軛的體，和漏是相同的；然而在其中，『見』也被別立出來——就是說：前面的欲漏即是欲瀑流與欲軛，前面的有漏即是有瀑流與有軛，而把諸見析出來作『見瀑流』與『見軛』。（何以在漏中不析出見？）因為所謂『漏』是取其猛利而令有情安住（久住生死）之義，如後文當說；見不順於『住』，因為它性太猛利（來去迅疾，不能久住），由這個緣故，在漏之中不獨立為一名，只能與其餘的合起來立為漏。

這樣就顯出了：二十九物名為欲瀑流——就是貪、瞋、慢各有五種（五部），疑四種，纏十種。二十八物名為有瀑流——就是貪與慢各十（上二界各五），疑八。三十六物名為見瀑流——就是三界之中各有十二見。十五物名為無明瀑流——就是三界的無明各有五。

應當知道四軛與四瀑流相同，四取應當知道體同四軛。然而『欲取』與『我語取』各自併入無明，而『見』則分為二取——與前面的軛有所不同。

也就是說：前面的欲軛併上欲界的無明，共三十四物，總名欲取——就是貪、瞋、慢、無明各五，疑有四，並上十纏。前面的有軛併上上二界的無明，共三十八物，總名我語取——就是貪、慢、無明各十，疑有八。在見軛之中除去戒禁取，其餘三十物總名見取；所除去的六物（三界各二）名為戒禁取。

（設難）為什麼要把戒禁取別立出來？——因為唯獨它是聖道的怨敵，並且雙雙誑惑在家與出家二眾。怎麼說？在家眾被它誑惑，計著自我餓身等苦行為生天之道；出家眾被它誑惑，計著捨棄可愛之境為清淨之道。

（設難）為什麼無明不別立為取？——因為能執取諸有才立『取』名，而諸無明並不是能取。也就是說：不明了法相才叫無明，它不是能取，因為性不猛利，所以只能與其餘的合起來立為取。

論（引經證欲軛之相）：然而契經說：什麼叫欲軛？就是諸欲之中的欲貪、欲欲、欲親、欲愛、欲樂、欲悶、欲耽、欲嗜、欲喜、欲藏、欲隨、欲著，這些纏縛壓住了心，這叫作欲軛。有軛與見軛，應當知道也是這樣。又另一部經說：對欲的貪就叫作取。由此可知：對於欲等四者所生起的欲貪，就叫作欲等四取。

論（轉入訓詞）：像這樣已經辨明了隨眠並其纏，經中說它們為漏、瀑流、軛、取。那麼隨眠等這些名字，各有什麼意思？頌說：

〔正39〕隨眠等名之訓詁

頌：微細、二種隨增、隨逐與隨縛——這是『隨眠』的意思；住、流、漂、合、執——這是漏、瀑流、軛、取等名的意思。

論：根本煩惱正現前的時候，它的行相很難覺知，所以叫作『微細』。

所謂『二隨增』，是說它能在所緣境上、以及在所相應的心心所上，增其惛沈滯礙。

所謂『隨逐』，是說它能引起『得』（成就）而恒常跟隨著有情，常常作它的過患，即使不加造作也能使它生起。

或者說：即使費盡了力氣要遮止它生起，它仍然屢屢現起——所以叫作『隨縛』。

由這些意思，所以叫作『隨眠』。

（以下是漏等之訓）它能稽留有情長久住在生死之中，或者令有情流轉於生死之中，從有頂天一直到無間地獄。由於它在相續之中，從六個瘡口（六根）不斷地漏泄過患，所以叫作『漏』。極能漂沒善品，所以叫作『瀑流』。能把有情和合（繫在苦上），所以叫作『軛』。能作依止與執取，所以叫作『取』。

論（更善之釋）：若要解得更好，應當這樣說：在諸境界之中流注相續、漏泄過患而不斷絕，所以叫作『漏』。就像契經所說：長老應當知道，譬如逆著水流拉一條船往上走，就算用大力氣行去也還是難；若把這條船順著水流放下去，即使捨了力氣，行去也不為難。善心與染心的生起，應當知道也是這樣（染順流而易，善逆流而難）。

依這部經的意思：在境界之中煩惱不斷絕，就叫作『漏』；若其勢力增上，就叫作『瀑流』——就是說諸有情若墜落其中，只能隨順而不能違逆，因為它涌泛漂激、難以違拒的緣故。在現行的時候若不是極其增上，就叫作『軛』——只是令有情與種種類的苦和合而已；或者因為屢屢現行，所以叫作『軛』。因為執取欲等，所以叫作『取』。

〔Root 23 · Root 24〕Which Latent Tendencies Can Bind Which Things — the Binding by Afflictions of Individual and of Common Characteristic across the Three Times

Treatise (the question with which the fascicle opens): When for any class of sentient beings, upon some one thing (the dharma taken as object), there is a latent tendency that increases its torpor and clogging thereupon, that is called “binding this thing.” It must then be said: among the three times, past, present, and future, which class of latent tendency is able to bind which kind of thing? The stanza says:

Stanza: If upon this one thing greed, hatred, and pride have not yet been abandoned, then in the past and in the present whatever has already arisen can bind this thing; while in the future it is that portion associated with the mental consciousness, together with all the all-pervading latent tendencies, that binds. Of those in the future associated with the five consciousnesses, if they may still arise they bind the one future time alone; if they are settled not to arise, they too bind all three times throughout. The remaining latent tendencies (view, doubt, and ignorance), whether past or future, so long as they are unabandoned, bind all three times throughout without exception; and as for the present ones, they bind at the very time when they take their object.

Treatise: It must first be known that latent tendencies fall into two classes in all. The first class is called the afflictions of individual characteristic, namely the three, greed, hatred, and pride. The second class is called the afflictions of common characteristic, namely the three, view, doubt, and delusion (ignorance). The things bound are very many, but here the matter is stated only from the side of “what is bound.” Whatever has not yet been abandoned runs straight on into all the gates that follow (the treatment of increase by attachment below, and of the order of arising, take up just this portion and continue it).

If upon this one thing there are greed, hatred, and pride, and in the past time they have already arisen and are unabandoned, and in the present time they have already arisen, then both alike are able to bind this one thing. Why are only “those that have already arisen” reckoned? Because greed, hatred, and pride are afflictions of individual characteristic, and it is not that all sentient beings must arouse them universally (one person arouses greed toward this object, another does not; hence one must see whether it has in fact arisen).

As for those three (greed, hatred, and pride) in the future time that are associated with the mental consciousness, this portion extends throughout all three times, past, present, and future: so long as they are unabandoned they are able to bind. As for the greed and hatred in the future time that are associated with the five consciousnesses (the consciousnesses of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body), the case divides into two roads: if they are unabandoned and may still arise hereafter, they bind the one future time alone; if they are unabandoned but are settled never to arise (that portion never coming into activity at all), they are on the contrary able to bind all three times throughout.

All the remaining views, doubt, and ignorance, whether past or future, so long as they are unabandoned, universally bind all three times without exception. Why? Because these three are afflictions of common characteristic, and all sentient beings are bound by them universally (ordinary beings fail altogether to understand the principle of the four truths, and this is common to them, unlike greed and hatred, which depend upon the particular object). As for the latent tendencies of the present time, at the very moment when they are taking their object-field, they bind this one thing, each according to what it fits.

Treatise (an incidental discussion forced out at this point): Since it is to be said that “the things bound” extend to past and future, one must first make out this much: are the things of the past and the future really existent or really nonexistent? Only when that is made out can one speak of “binding” at all. Yet either side has its difficulty — if the past and the future are really existent, then all conditioned dharmas exist forever, and ought they not to be called “permanent”? And if the past and the future are really nonexistent, then how can there be an afflication that binds, a thing that is bound, and a release from bondage?

The Vaibhāṣika masters (the masters of the Sarvāstivādins’ own school) here decide for this position: the past and the future are really existent. Nor do they grant that conditioned dharmas thereby become permanent — because conditioned dharmas are all along conjoined with the four conditioned marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation (having the marks of arising and ceasing, they are not permanent). In order to state this position more plainly, what follows first sets out the tenet in brief and displays the line of its reasoning. The stanza says:

〔Root 25〕The Establishing of Real Existence in the Three Times — Two Proofs from Teaching and Two from Principle

Stanza: The three times exist, first because the noble teaching says so, and second by the two principles that “a consciousness must have two conditions” and that “an action must have a coming result.” It is precisely because they hold that all three times exist that they are allowed the name of the school that says all exists.

Treatise: (The Sarvāstivādins’ position) The three times are indeed really existent. How is this to be seen? First, because within the sūtras the World-Honored One said so with his own mouth.

How did the World-Honored One say it? The World-Honored One said: monks should know that if past form did not exist, then the community of learned noble disciples would have no need to strive to cultivate disgust with and abandonment of past form (since the Buddha teaches men to feel disgust with and to abandon past form, it may be seen that past form exists, and only so is there something to be disgusted with). It is precisely because past form exists that the community of learned noble disciples ought to strive to cultivate disgust with and abandonment of past form. Just so, if future form did not exist, then the community of learned noble disciples would have no need to strive to sever it and strive to seek it; and it is precisely because future form exists that they ought to strive to sever and to seek future form.

Second, because the arising of a consciousness must be complete in two conditions. The sūtra says: consciousness arises from two conditions. Which two? The eye faculty and the object-field of form (and so on down to the last pair, the mental faculty and dharmas). If the past and the future were not really existent, then the consciousness that takes past and future as object would lack one of its conditions (having no object-field to take), and consciousness could not arise — yet we plainly can remember the past and think forward to the future.

The above proves by the noble teaching that the two times of past and future exist. What follows proves it further by correct principle. The third reason: when a consciousness arises it must have its object-field. Only if there is definitely an object-field can consciousness arise; without an object-field, consciousness does not arise — this principle is settled. If the entities of past and future object-fields were really nonexistent, there would then be “a consciousness without an object taken” — and since what is taken as object is nonexistent, the consciousness too ought to be nonexistent along with it (yet the consciousness that remembers the past does in fact arise).

The fourth reason: an action that has already perished has a coming result of maturation. If the entity of the past were really nonexistent, then the coming results of maturation of wholesome and unwholesome actions ought to be nonexistent — because at the time when the result of maturation arises there is no “present cause” still standing there (the cause having long since gone by; and if the past were altogether nonexistent, whence would the result come?).

By these two proofs from the noble teaching and these two from correct principle, the Vaibhāṣika masters decide for the position that the two times of past and future are really existent.

Treatise (the criterion for the school’s name): If anyone calls himself a follower of the school that says all exists, he must decidedly grant that the two times of past and future are really existent; for it is only by holding that all three times are decidedly really existent that one is allowed to be of the school that says all exists. That is to say: only if one holds that the three times are really existent is one allowed to belong to this school. If someone says only that the present exists, together with those past actions that have not yet given their result, but says that there is no future time and no past action that has already given its result (a past action being gone once it has given its result), such a one may be allowed to be of the Vibhajyavādins, and is not gathered into this school.

Treatise (turning to ask about four masters): How many different accounts, then, are there within this school for establishing the three times? And among them, whose established “time” is the most complete and to be relied upon? The stanza says:

〔Root 26〕The Four Masters Who Establish the Three Times — Class, Mark, Position, and Relation, with “by Function” the Best

Stanza: Here there are four accounts, which establish the three times respectively by difference of class, of mark, of position, and of relation. Among them the third establishes them upon “function,” and the time so established is the most complete.

Treatise: (The first master) The Venerable Dharmatrāta says thus: it is by the difference of “class” that the three times come to differ. His meaning is: when dharmas run through the three times, it is only the class to which they belong that is distinct, and it is not that their entity is distinct. It is as when a vessel of gold is broken up and remade into some other vessel: the shape is altered, but the entity that is gold is unaltered. It is again as when cow’s milk turns into curds: what is given up is the taste and the potency and the rest, and the visible color is not given up. So too when dharmas run through the three times: from future into present, from present into past, what is given up and what is obtained is only the “class,” and not the entity.

(The second master) The Venerable Ghoṣa says thus: it is by the difference of “mark” that the three times come to differ. His meaning is: when dharmas run through the three times, a past dharma is at that time conjoined with the past mark, yet it cannot be said to have left the present and future marks; a future dharma is conjoined with the future mark, yet it cannot be said to have left the past and present marks; a present dharma is conjoined with the present mark, yet it cannot be said to have left the past and future marks. It is as when a man is at the moment enamored of one wife: of his remaining consorts it cannot be said that he has left off desire (it is only that at this moment it has not arisen).

(The third master) The Venerable Vasumitra says thus: it is by the difference of “position” that the three times come to differ. His meaning is: when dharmas run through the three times, whichever position they reach, that is the account given of them; it is only the position that is distinguished, and it is not that their entity is distinct. It is as with the moving of a single counting-rod: set in the units place it is called one, set in the hundreds place it is called a hundred, set in the thousands place it is called a thousand (the rod is still that one rod; the position changes and the name changes).

(The fourth master) The Venerable Buddhadeva says thus: it is by the difference of “relation” that the three times come to differ. His meaning is: when dharmas run through the three times, earlier and later are established by mutual relation and so differ in name. It is as with one and the same woman: related to her daughter she is named mother, related to her mother she is named daughter.

Treatise (assessing these four masters): These four alike belong within the school that says all exists; yet — the first master (Dharmatrāta) holds that dharmas undergo transformation (the entity unaltered while the class alters), and this ought to be placed within the party of the Sāṃkhya non-Buddhists. The marks of time established by the second master (Ghoṣa) are jumbled, for on his account the dharmas of all three times possess the marks of all three times at once. Someone may say: this is just as when a man arouses actual greed toward his wife, and toward the remaining objects merely “possesses” greed, no greed being now aroused — but can that be reckoned the same thing (possession and conjunction not being equal)? The relation of earlier and later established by the fourth master (Buddhadeva) would make there be three times within the dharmas of one single time: for instance, of the earlier and later moments of the past time, the earlier ought to be called past and the later future, and the middle one becomes the present; and with future and present, reasoning in the same way, it is likewise (so that the three times would have no fixed standard at all).

Therefore among these four the third is the most complete — because it states the difference of position upon “function,” and by the difference of position establishes the difference of the three times. His meaning is: when the function of a dharma has not yet arisen it is called future; at the time when it has function it is called present; when its function has ceased it is called past; and the entity is not distinct. This point has already been fully known above.

Treatise (five exchanges below · the Sautrāntikas and the Sarvāstivādins): (The Sautrāntikas object) Then he ought further to say: if the entities of the two times of past and future are also really existent, ought they not to be called present? And what is left to be called “gone” and “to come”?

(The Sarvāstivādins answer) Was it not already said above that it is established upon “function” (only what has function is called present)?

(The Sautrāntikas object again) If that is so, then when the present eye and the other faculties stand in the condition of “participating” (having the faculty yet not seeing form, that is, not arousing the function of seeing), what function have they to speak of (having no function, how are they still reckoned present)?

(The Sarvāstivādins answer) Can that participating eye not “take a result” and “give a result” (though it does not see form, it still has the function of taking and giving a result)?

(The Sautrāntikas object again) If that is so, then since the past homogeneous cause and the rest are able to give their result, they too ought to be reckoned as having function (and having function they ought to be called present). And thus there comes to be “half a function” (a past cause being able only to give a result, a present cause only to take one), and the marks of the three times would be jumbled together.

The above is only a brief probing; what comes next is the refutation at length, properly so called. The stanza says:

〔Root 27〕The Refutation at Length, Line by Line — What Obstructs the Function, What Time the Function Is, If There Is No Distinction Time Collapses, and Who Is Unarisen or Ceased

Stanza: What is it that obstructs the function? And to which time does this function itself belong? If it be said that function and the entity of the dharma are not distinct, then the sense of the three times must collapse; and if that is so, who then is “not yet arisen” and who “already ceased”? (The Sarvāstivādins answer:) The nature of this dharma is profound and is not the object-field that pondering can reach.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas object · explaining “what obstructs the function”): It should be said: if the own-entity of a dharma exists constantly, then it ought to be able to arouse its function at all times; what force of obstruction is it, after all, that makes the function aroused by this entity of a dharma be now present and now absent?

(Here the Sarvāstivādins set up a defense, and the Sautrāntikas at once reject it) If it be said that it is because the several conditions have not yet come together — this defense is unreasonable, for on your own position the conditions themselves also exist constantly (the conditions existing constantly, when is it that they have come together and when that they have not?).

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas object · explaining “what time the function is”): Again, this “function” itself — how is it to be said to belong to past, future, or present? Can a further function be established upon a function (that would be without end)? And if this function itself belongs to neither past nor future nor present, while you yet say that the function exists — then it becomes an unconditioned dharma, and ought to be constant and incapable of being nonexistent; and in that case it ought no longer to be said that “the function has ceased (which is called past)” or that “this dharma’s function is not yet present (which is called future).”

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins defend · explaining “no distinction”): If it were granted that function and the entity of the dharma are two things, then there would be the faults you state; but we hold that function and entity are not distinct, and so it ought not to be said that there are these faults.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas refute · explaining “time collapses”): If that is so, then the sense of “time” that you have established must collapse. For if function is just the entity of the dharma, then since the entity exists constantly the function ought to exist constantly as well, and how could there ever be a time at which it is called past or future? Therefore the sense of the three times that you have established cannot be made out.

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins defend): How can it not be made out? Because a conditioned dharma not yet arisen is called future, one already arisen and not yet ceased is called present, and one already ceased is called past (the three times having their own bounds).

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas refute · explaining “who is unarisen or ceased”): Then he ought further to say: if the entities of the dharmas of past and future are really existent as present dharmas are, who then is it that is “not yet arisen”? And who is it that is “already ceased”? That is to say: if the entity of a conditioned dharma truly exists constantly, how can the two matters “not yet arisen” and “already ceased” be made out at all? (Pressing further) What did it lack before? — The answer: it was not yet, and so it is called not yet arisen. And what did it lack afterward? — The answer: it is already gone, and so it is called already ceased. (It is plain that “unarisen” and “already ceased” are themselves saying “not being before” and “being no more.”) Therefore, unless one grants that a dharma was not before and is now, and having been returns to nonexistence, the sense of the three times cannot be made out on any account whatsoever.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas continue, refuting the defense from conjunction with the conditioned marks): As for what he said, that “because they are constantly conjoined with the conditioned marks of arising, abiding, change, and cessation, conditioned dharmas are not reckoned permanent” — this is no more than an empty phrase, since (on his account) the principle of arising and ceasing has nowhere to come down. To grant that the entity exists constantly and yet to say that its nature is not permanent — such an account has never been heard before. Following out this sense, there is accordingly a stanza that says thus:

〔Quoted Stanza · Not a Root Stanza〕Granting That the Entity of a Dharma Exists Constantly

Stanza (a stanza the author adduces in refutation · not a root stanza of this treatise): To grant that the entity of a dharma exists constantly and yet to say that its nature is not permanent, while nature and entity are further not distinct — this is truly the handiwork of Īśvara (the non-Buddhists say that Īśvara makes when he would make and refrains when he would refrain, all at his own will; and so it is with this account too).

〔Prose Following the Quoted Stanza〕The Sautrāntikas’ Comprehensive Answer — Having Once Been, and Being to Be

Treatise (answering the first proof from teaching): Again, as to what he said, that “because the World-Honored One said so, the entities of the two times of past and future are really existent” — we (the Sautrāntikas) also say that the past and future times exist. Only thus: the past time is named existent as “having once existed,” and the future time as “being to exist,” there being a cause able to produce the result; and it is named existent accordingly. It is following out this sense that we say past and future exist; it is not that past and future are really existent as the present is.

(The Sarvāstivādins ask) Who said that they exist as the present time does? (The Sautrāntikas ask in return) If they are not as the present is, then what sort of existence is their “existence”? (The Sarvāstivādins answer) What they have is the own-nature of the two times of past and future. (The Sautrāntikas press again) Then this must be asked: if past and future exist in the same way as the present, how can it further be said that “because they are of the nature of past and future, they are said to exist”? It is plain that this is spoken only upon the two natures of “having once been” and “being to be,” which are of cause and result, and not that the entity really exists.

The reason the World-Honored One spoke thus was in order to block the wrong view that denies cause and result; and so he said that past and future exist upon the sense of “having once existed” and “being to exist” — for the word “exists” can of itself point to both existent and nonexistent dharmas. It is as when the world says, “there is a lamp that was not there before,” or “there is a lamp that is not there afterward”; or again as when someone says, “there is a lamp that has already gone out, and it was not I who put it out just now.” The saying that past and future exist ought to be viewed in this same way. Were it not viewed so, the “nature” of past and future could not be established at all.

Treatise (answering the objection from the sūtra of the staff-and-topknot non-Buddhist): (The Sarvāstivādins object) If that is so, then why did the World-Honored One say to that staff-and-topknot non-Buddhist that an action, though past and already exhausted, perished, and altered, is nevertheless existent? (The Sautrāntikas answer) Does he not grant that the action once existed (and “having once been” is just existing)? And when the World-Honored One there solemnly said “exists” to him, that was said with reference to the “capability of giving a result” that still remains within the present continuum drawn forth by that action, saying covertly that it exists. Unless it be so explained, past action would become of a really existent present nature, and what past would be left? The principle must decidedly be so.

Treatise (adducing the Sūtra of Ultimate Emptiness): For the Bhagavat said in the Sūtra of Ultimate Emptiness: when the eye faculty arises, it comes from nowhere; when the eye faculty ceases, it is gathered up nowhere. It was not before and is now; having been, it returns to nonexistence. If the eye faculty of past and future were really existent, the sūtra ought not to have said “not before” and the rest. And if it be said that this sentence is spoken with reference to the present time — this defense is unreasonable, since the nature of “the present” and the entity of that eye faculty are not distinct; and if it be granted that a present dharma was not before and is now, and having been returns to nonexistence, then the principle that “the eye faculty of past and future has no entity” is already made out.

Treatise (answering the second proof from teaching · consciousness arising from two conditions): Again, as to what he said, that “the arising of a consciousness must be complete in two conditions, and therefore the entities of the two times of past and future are really existent” — this item ought to be pondered together: as for “the mental faculty and dharmas being the conditions from which a mental consciousness arises,” is it being said that the “dharma” acts as a producing condition in the way the mental faculty does? Or is it being said that the “dharma” can act only as the object-field taken as object?

If it be said that the dharma acts as a producing condition in the way the mental faculty does — then the dharma that will exist only after a hundred thousand aeons in the future (or that hereafter will not exist at all), how can it act as a producing condition and produce today’s consciousness? Again, the nature of nirvāṇa is contrary to all arising, and to establish it as “producing” is likewise not in accord with correct principle.

If it be said that the dharma can act only as the object-field taken as object — then we too say that past and future are precisely what is taken as object. (The Sarvāstivādins press) If they are nonexistent, how can they become an object-field taken as object? (The Sautrāntikas answer) When I say they exist, it is precisely upon this portion, that they can become what is taken as object. (The Sarvāstivādins press again) In what manner do they become the dharma taken as object? (The Sautrāntikas answer) Just as “having once been” and “being to be.” It is not that in remembering past form, feeling, and the rest one contemplates them as existing distinctly in the way the present is contemplated; it is only that one recalls the mark that they once had. And thinking forward to what the future will have is likewise: just as one recalls the mark of form once received in the present, and so recalls the past as existing; and just as one thinks forward to the mark of form that will hereafter be received in the present, and so thinks forward to the future as existing.

If they existed as the present does, they would become the present time; and if their entity is now nonexistent, then it must be granted that there really is “a consciousness that takes a nonexistent object-field” — and our principle stands of itself.

Treatise (refuting the defense from scattered atoms): If it be said that the dharmas of past and future abide as ultimate atoms scattered apart, existing yet not present — this too is wrong, for when we apprehend that mark, it is not a scattered mark. And further, if it be said that that form exists just as present form does, differing only in this, that its ultimate atoms are scattered, then the entity of atomic form would have to be permanent; and moreover form would have only the gathering and scattering of ultimate atoms and no portion whatever that could be called arising and ceasing — which is to honor the doctrine of the non-Buddhists of wrong livelihood and to turn one’s back on the sūtras spoken by the Well-Gone One. The sūtra says plainly: when the eye faculty arises it comes from nowhere, and so on at length. Furthermore, feeling, perception, the formations, and the rest are not assembled out of ultimate atoms either; how then can past and future be said to be scattered ultimate atoms? Yet with regard to feeling and the rest we can equally recall and equally think forward, just as with the appearance they had when unceased and when already arisen. If they be said to exist as the present does, their entity would have to be permanent; and if their entity be now nonexistent, one must still grant a consciousness that takes a nonexistent object-field — and the principle stands of itself.

Treatise (the objection of the thirteenth sense field): If it be said that “what is wholly without entity can also be taken as object,” then “the thirteenth sense field” (there being no such thing beyond the twelve sense fields, it is a pure nonexistent) ought also to be capable of being taken as object; and there certainly are those who penetrate the matter that “there is no thirteenth sense field” — what then does this consciousness that takes an object take as its object? If it be said that what it takes is just the name “thirteenth sense field,” that is as much as to set the name aside and call it nonexistent. And again, if what it takes is a sound that did not exist before, what then does this consciousness that takes an object take? If it be said that what it takes is that sound as its object-field, then one who wishes to seek “the nonexistence of the sound” ought to utter the sound over again (which is surely absurd). If it be said that the “nonexistence” of that sound abides in the future position — then since the future is really existent, how is it further said to be nonexistent? And if it be said that past and future do not have the nature of the present time, this too is unreasonable, since the entity is one and the same. And if it be said that there is a distinction in one portion of the entity, then the principle that a thing “was not before and is now” is made out of itself. Therefore it should be said: consciousness extends to taking as object both an existent and a nonexistent object-field.

Treatise (explaining the bodhisattva’s words): As for the bodhisattva’s saying that “of what the world does not have, that I know and see it — there is no such thing” — that means: others, harboring overweening pride, arouse an appearance even of what is not existent and call it existent; whereas I contemplate as existent only what is existent. Were it not so explained, then every act of awareness would have something taken as object, and why then would there be hesitation and difference with regard to an object-field (one sometimes knowing that it is not there)? The principle must decidedly be so. For the Bhagavat said elsewhere: welcome, bhikṣus! If you can be my disciples, without flattery and without deceit, having confidence and having diligence, then if I teach you in the morning I can make you gain the excellent by evening, and if I teach you in the evening I can make you gain the excellent by morning. (Gain the excellent in what?) You will be able to know: what is existent is existent, what is nonexistent is nonexistent, what has something above it has something above it, and what has nothing above it has nothing above it. (It is plain that “knowing the nonexistent” is precisely what the Buddha approves.) From this it may be known that his reason, that “a consciousness must have an object-field, and therefore past and future exist,” likewise does not hold.

Treatise (answering the third proof from principle · an action has a coming result): Again, as to what he said, that “an action has a result of maturation, and therefore past and future exist,” the principle is likewise wrong. The Sautrāntika masters do not speak thus — it is not said that “that very past action produces the coming result”; what is said is that the continuum drawn forth earlier by the action, by its transformation and differentiation, makes the coming result arise (the result arising from the transformation of the continuum, not from the action already ceased). This layer will be displayed at length in the chapter refuting the self.

Conversely, if one holds fixedly that past and future are really existent, then at all times the entity of the result exists constantly, and what capability has the action with regard to that result at all? If it be said that the action can produce the result, then the result produced was not before and is now — and the principle stands of itself (which is just what we say). And if all dharmas exist at all times, who, after all, has the capability of producing what? And to hold thus would further make out the wrong doctrine of the party of the non-Buddhists of the Rain Host. They say thus: what exists must exist constantly, what does not exist must be constantly nonexistent; what does not exist must not arise, and what exists must not cease.

If it be said that “the action can make the result become present” — in what manner does it make it present? If it be said that it draws the result along into another place, then the entity of the result drawn would have to be permanent; and moreover how are dharmas without form (mind and mental factors and the rest) to be drawn along at all? And further, the result so drawn ought to be one whose entity was originally nonexistent (which is still “not before and now”). And if it be said that it merely makes some distinction in the entity — then the principle “not before and now” is made out once more.

Treatise (closing this passage): Therefore, when the school that says all exists holds thus, saying that past and future are really existent, this is not to be reckoned a good statement within the noble teaching. If one would state “all exists” well, one ought to state it as the sūtra states it. How does the sūtra state it? The sūtra says: the brahmin should know that what is called “all exists” is only the twelve sense fields, or only the three times. (Saying “exists” just as it stands, without saying that past and future are really existent as the present is.)

Treatise (answering the objection raised at the outset · closing with the words of the Vaibhāṣika masters): (The Sarvāstivādins ask) If past and future are nonexistent, how can there still be said to be one that binds, one that is bound, and release from bondage? (The Sautrāntikas answer) Because their producing cause, that is, the latent tendency, is still present, one speaks of past and future afflictions that bind; and because the latent tendencies that take those afflictions as object are still present, one speaks of past and future things that are bound. When the latent tendency is abandoned, the name “release from bondage” is obtained.

The Vaibhāṣika masters (the Sarvāstivādins’ closing words) say thus: past and future are really existent just as the present is. Wherever within this there is something that cannot be explained through, one who cherishes himself ought to know thus: the nature of dharmas is profound and is not the object-field that pondering can reach; how can one deny a thing as nonexistent merely because one cannot oneself explain it? (And they adduce “different gates” to reconcile the doubt about arising and ceasing.) By one account: this dharma arises and this dharma ceases — that is, form and the rest arise, form and the rest cease. By another account: what is different arises and what is different ceases — that is, the future time arises and the present time ceases. By another account: the time itself is called arising — because at the very moment of arising it is gathered into that time. By another account: within a given time there is arising — because within the future time there are many moments (this one ceasing while that one arises).

Treatise (closing the incidental discussion): The incidental discussion is here finished. Now it should be pondered: when things have already been abandoned, are they thereby released from bondage? And conversely, when things are released from bondage, have they thereby already been abandoned? — If things are released from bondage, they have decidedly been abandoned; but there are things “already abandoned and yet not released from bondage.” Abandoned and yet not released — what sort of matter is that? The stanza says:

〔Root 28〕Abandoned and Yet Not Released from Bondage

Stanza: At the time when things abandoned through the seeing of suffering have been abandoned, if the remaining all-pervading latent tendencies abandoned through the seeing of origin are unabandoned; and at the time when the earlier grades on the path of cultivation have been abandoned, if the latent tendencies of the remaining grades that take them as object are unabandoned — these things are still bound.

Treatise: Take first the position on the path of seeing. At the time when the knowledge of suffering has arisen and the knowledge of origin has not yet arisen, the several things abandoned through the seeing of suffering have indeed already been abandoned; yet if the all-pervading latent tendencies abandoned through the seeing of origin have not yet been forever abandoned, then those latent tendencies that can take this thing as object still bind this already abandoned thing (abandoned it is, but the binding remains).

Take next the position on the path of cultivation. According as one or another path arises, the earlier grades among the nine grades of things have been abandoned; and the latent tendencies belonging to the remaining unabandoned grades, whichever can take them as object, still bind this already abandoned thing. What is called “abandoned and yet not released from bondage” ought to be understood thus.

Treatise (turning to the question of increase by attachment): How many kinds of latent tendency, then, increase by attachment upon a given thing? If one were to answer thing by thing separately, it would cost a great many words. Therefore one ought to compose a “brief Vibhāṣā” (a summary manner of analysis): by this device, though very little effort is spent, one is yet able to cross the very great flood of questions. That is to say: dharmas, though very many, are in brief only sixteen kinds — namely the three realms (each divided into five categories), fifteen in all, plus the dharmas without outflows as the sixteenth. The consciousnesses that can take these dharmas as object are likewise sixteen in number. Once one knows which dharma is the object-field of which consciousness, then “how many kinds of latent tendency increase by attachment upon a given thing” is easy to ponder. Here one ought first to know: which dharma is the object-field taken by which consciousness? The stanza says:

〔Roots 29–31〕The Sixteen Dharmas as the Objects of the Sixteen Consciousnesses

Stanza: The dharmas of the three categories abandoned through the seeing of suffering, through the seeing of origin, and through cultivation, if affiliated to the desire realm, are the objects of five consciousnesses — the three categories of their own realm, one category of the form realm, and the consciousness without outflows. If affiliated to the form realm, they are the objects of the three categories of their own realm and of the lower realm, one category of the upper realm, and the pure consciousness without outflows (eight in all). If affiliated to the formless realm, they extend to the three categories of each of the three realms, plus the pure consciousness without outflows (ten in all). To the dharmas abandoned through the seeing of cessation and through the seeing of the path, there is added in each case the consciousness that takes its own category as object. The dharmas without outflows are the object-fields of ten consciousnesses, namely the consciousnesses of the last three categories in each of the three realms together with the consciousness without outflows.

Treatise: If the dharmas abandoned through the seeing of suffering, through the seeing of origin, and through cultivation are affiliated to the desire realm, each is the object of five consciousnesses — namely the three categories of their own realm (that abandoned through the seeing of suffering, that abandoned through the seeing of origin, and that abandoned through cultivation, as stated above), plus one category of the form realm (that is, the consciousness of the form realm abandoned through cultivation, which can take the lower realm as object), with the consciousness without outflows as the fifth: all these can take them as object.

If they are affiliated to the form realm, then those same three categories of dharmas stated above are each the object of eight consciousnesses — namely the three categories of their own realm and of the lower realm (the desire realm), as stated above, plus one category of the upper realm (that is, the consciousness of the formless realm abandoned through cultivation), with the consciousness without outflows as the eighth: all these can take them as object.

If they are affiliated to the formless realm, then those same three categories of dharmas stated above are each the object of ten consciousnesses — namely the three categories of each of the three realms, as stated above, with the consciousness without outflows as the tenth: all these can take them as object.

As for the dharmas abandoned through the seeing of cessation and through the seeing of the path, it should be known that to each there is further added one consciousness that takes its own category as object. How is this stated? Thus: the dharmas of the desire realm abandoned through the seeing of cessation are the objects of six consciousnesses — the five as above, plus one consciousness abandoned through the seeing of cessation; and the dharmas abandoned through the seeing of the path are the objects of six consciousnesses — the five likewise as above, plus one consciousness abandoned through the seeing of the path. Those of the form realm and the formless realm abandoned through the seeing of cessation and through the seeing of the path accordingly become the objects of nine and of eleven consciousnesses.

If they are dharmas without outflows, they are the objects of ten consciousnesses — namely the last three categories taken in each of the three realms (that is, the consciousnesses abandoned through the seeing of cessation, through the seeing of the path, and through cultivation), nine in all, with the consciousness without outflows as the tenth: all these can take them as object.

In order to gather up the sense of the passage above, a further stanza is spoken (this being not a root stanza of the treatise, but only a restatement of the preceding sense):

〔Summary Stanza · Not a Root Stanza〕Gathering Again the Sixteen Dharmas and the Sixteen Consciousnesses

Stanza (a stanza gathering again the preceding sense): The dharmas abandoned through the seeing of suffering, through the seeing of origin, and through cultivation, belonging to the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm, should be known to be the objects of five, of eight, and of ten consciousnesses respectively. To those abandoned through the seeing of cessation and through the seeing of the path there is added in each case the consciousness that takes its own category as object. The dharmas without outflows should be known to be the object-fields of ten consciousnesses.

Treatise (the single instance of the faculty of pleasure · to show one corner): Since it has thus been understood that the sixteen kinds of dharma are the object-fields of the sixteen consciousnesses, it should now be pondered: how many kinds of latent tendency increase by attachment upon a given thing? Were they to be listed one by one separately, the words would be too many and too broad; and so I here indicate only one corner (holding up one corner so that a man may of himself turn back the other three).

Suppose someone asks: among the things bound, how many kinds of latent tendency increase by attachment upon the faculty of pleasure? — It ought to be observed: the faculty of pleasure has seven kinds in all, namely one of the desire realm (that is, the faculty of pleasure abandoned through cultivation), five categories of the form realm (one each for the seeing of suffering, the seeing of origin, the seeing of cessation, the seeing of the path, and cultivation), and the faculty of pleasure without outflows as the seventh. All dharmas without outflows are not such as the latent tendencies increase by attachment upon (as was said above). Therefore upon the first six kinds of faculty of pleasure here, each according to what it fits, there increase by attachment the latent tendencies of the desire realm abandoned through cultivation, the several all-pervading latent tendencies, and all the latent tendencies of the form realm.

Suppose someone asks: how many kinds of latent tendency increase by attachment upon the consciousness that takes the faculty of pleasure as object? — It ought to be observed: this consciousness has twelve kinds in all, namely four categories of the desire realm (excepting that abandoned through the seeing of cessation, since the consciousness abandoned through the seeing of cessation does not take the faculty of pleasure with outflows as object), five categories of the form realm, two categories of the formless realm (that is, those abandoned through the seeing of the path and through cultivation), and the consciousness without outflows as the twelfth: all these can take the faculty of pleasure as object. Upon these consciousnesses, each according to what it fits, there increase by attachment the latent tendencies of the four categories of the desire realm, the latent tendencies of the form realm that take the conditioned as object, the latent tendencies of the two categories of the formless realm, and the several all-pervading latent tendencies.

Suppose someone asks further: how many kinds of latent tendency increase by attachment upon the consciousness that takes as object “the consciousness that takes the faculty of pleasure as object”? — It ought to be observed: this consciousness has fourteen kinds in all, namely two kinds added to the preceding twelve, that is, those of the formless realm abandoned through the seeing of suffering and through the seeing of origin (these two being all-pervading and able to take the consciousness of the lower realms as object). These fourteen kinds of consciousness can take as object “the consciousness that takes the faculty of pleasure as object”; and upon them, each according to what it fits, the desire realm and the form realm are as stated above, while in the formless realm the latent tendencies of four categories increase by attachment.

Reasoning from this one corner, all the rest ought to be pondered out for oneself.

Treatise (turning to the question of a mind possessed of latent tendencies): If a mind is called “a mind possessed of latent tendencies” by reason of some latent tendency, does that latent tendency necessarily increase by attachment upon this mind? — This is not settled. Some are merely “possessed of a latent tendency” and do not increase by attachment: namely the latent tendencies associated with the mind and those that take this mind as object, which increase by attachment if unabandoned, but do not increase by attachment if that associated portion has already been abandoned (and though they do not increase by attachment, it is still named as possessed of latent tendencies). Following out this sense it ought to be stated thus. The stanza says:

〔Root 32〕A Mind Possessed of Latent Tendencies Is of Two Kinds

Stanza: A mind possessed of latent tendencies is of two kinds, namely the defiled mind and the undefiled mind. The defiled mind extends to both senses (possessed of a latent tendency, and either increasing by attachment or not), while the undefiled mind is confined to the one sense of increasing by attachment.

Treatise: A mind possessed of latent tendencies has two kinds in all, because there is a difference between the defiled and the undefiled mind. Among them, the defiled mind may also have increase by attachment — namely the latent tendencies associated with the mind and those that take this mind as object, which, if not yet abandoned, are increasing by attachment; and if that associated portion has already been abandoned, they do not increase by attachment, and yet it is still said to be “possessed of latent tendencies,” because (that abandoned portion) is constantly associated with it.

If it is an undefiled mind, it is confined to the one sense of “increasing by attachment.” For the latent tendencies that take this undefiled mind as object are decidedly not yet forever abandoned (were they abandoned, this mind would not be called possessed of latent tendencies); and this is because the name “possessed of latent tendencies” is here established upon “increase by attachment” alone.

Treatise (turning to the question of the order of arising): When the ten latent tendencies stated above arise in due order, which comes before and which after? The stanza says:

〔Root 33〕The Ten Latent Tendencies Arise in Due Order

Stanza: Ignorance, doubt, wrong view, the view of self, the extreme view, the grasping of rules and observances, the grasping of views, greed, pride, and hatred — in this order the earlier draws forth the later.

Treatise: Take the afflictions as arising in due order: first, through ignorance, one fails to understand the principle of the four truths, and hence is unwilling to observe the truth of suffering and so on down to the truth of the path.

Because of failing to understand, there is next drawn forth “doubt” — that is, having heard the accounts of two roads, one harbors hesitation: is this suffering or is it not suffering (and so on with origin, cessation, and the path, as may be stated at length)?

From this hesitation is drawn forth “wrong view” — that is, through wrong hearing and wrong reflection a wrong determination arises, denying the truth of suffering (and so on down to denying the truth of the path, as may be stated at length).

Because of denying the principle of the truths, there is drawn forth “the view of self” — that is, within the five aggregates of appropriation one denies the principle of suffering, and thereupon determinedly grasps “this is I.”

From this view of self is drawn forth “the extreme view” — that is, in dependence upon the grasping of a self, one falls into the two extremes of annihilation and permanence.

From this extreme view is drawn forth “the grasping of rules and observances” — that is, because one grasps at one extreme with regard to the “self” (grasping permanence or grasping annihilation), one reckons that this grasping can obtain purity.

From the grasping of rules and observances is drawn forth “the grasping of views” — that is, having reckoned that it can obtain purity, one must grasp it as the most excellent.

From this grasping of views there is next drawn forth “greed” — that is, one is deeply attached in feeling to one’s own view.

After this greed there is next drawn forth “pride” — that is, having been deeply attached to one’s own view, one relies upon it and arouses self-exaltation, disdaining others.

After this pride there is next drawn forth “hatred” — that is, being both deeply attached to and reliant upon one’s own view, one cannot bear in feeling the accounts aroused by others that go against one’s own view, and must hate and detest them.

There is another master who says: it is at the very juncture of taking up or setting aside one’s own view that hatred and detestation arise (not necessarily waiting until after pride).

Again, when greed and the rest, which are abandoned through the seeing of the truths, arise, they take as their object-field the “view” within one’s own continuum (and so this whole chain is fastened upon view).

The above is stated with reference to arising “in due order”; as for those that arise out of order, there is nothing fixed about before and after.

Treatise (turning to the question of causes and conditions): By how many causes and conditions do the afflictions arise? The stanza says:

〔Root 34〕The Three Causes and Conditions of the Arising of an Affliction

Stanza: Because the latent tendency is not yet abandoned, and because the corresponding object-field is present before one, and with the arising of improper attention — an affliction is said to arise complete in its causes and conditions.

Treatise: By three causes and conditions the afflictions arise. Take, for instance, the time when the entanglement of desire-greed is about to arise: first, the latent tendency of desire-greed is not yet abandoned and not yet fully understood; second, the object-field conformable to desire-greed is present before one; third, the improper attention that takes that object-field as object arises. By these three forces, desire-greed thereupon arises.

These three causes and conditions in their order are the three forces of “the force of cause,” “the force of the object-field,” and “the force of preparatory effort” (the latent tendency being the force of cause, the object-field’s being present the force of the object-field, and improper attention the force of preparatory effort). The arising of the remaining afflictions is known by reasoning in the same way.

It is to be noted: this is stated with reference to being “complete in causes and conditions”; there are also those that arise by the force of the object-field alone, as for instance in an arhat of the lineage liable to falling back and the like (the latent tendency being abandoned and yet there being a falling back, that is a case where the force of the object-field preponderates).

Treatise (turning to the four gates of the outflows and the rest): The latent tendencies together with their entanglements, of which the above has spoken, are called in the sūtras outflows, torrents, yokes, and appropriations. What are called “outflows” are the three outflows: first the outflow of desire, second the outflow of existence, third the outflow of ignorance. What are called “torrents” are the four torrents: first the torrent of desire, second the torrent of existence, third the torrent of views, fourth the torrent of ignorance. What are called “yokes” are the four yokes, whose names are as stated for the torrents. What are called “appropriations” are the four appropriations: first the appropriation of desire, second the appropriation of views, third the appropriation of rules and observances, fourth the appropriation of assertions of self. What is the entity of these outflows and the rest? The stanza says:

〔Roots 35–38〕The Entity and the Number of Items of the Outflows, Torrents, Yokes, and Appropriations

Stanza: The afflictions of the desire realm together with their entanglements, delusion excepted, are named the outflow of desire. The outflow of existence belongs to the two upper realms, taking the root afflictions alone and excepting delusion. (Why are the two upper realms joined into one?) Because they are alike indeterminate in nature, turn by the inner gate, and arise in dependence upon the levels of absorption: these three senses being the same, they are joined into one. Ignorance is the root of all existences, and so is established separately as one outflow. The entity of the torrents and the yokes is the same as that of the outflows, save that within them “view” is established separately — because the nature of view is fierce and sharp. (Why is view not established separately among the outflows?) Because view does not conform to “abiding,” and so among the outflows it is not made a name of its own. The appropriations are the two yokes of desire and of existence together with ignorance, with view divided into two (the grasping of views and the grasping of rules and observances). Ignorance is not established separately as an appropriation, because it is not that which appropriates.

Treatise: The afflictions of the desire realm together with their entanglements, delusion excepted, are forty-one items in all, named in sum the outflow of desire — namely the thirty-one root afflictions affiliated to the desire realm, together with the ten entanglements.

The afflictions of the form realm and the formless realm, delusion excepted, are fifty-two items in all, named in sum the outflow of existence — namely the twenty-six root afflictions of each of the two upper realms.

(An objection is raised) Do the two upper realms not also have the two entanglements of torpor and restlessness? The Treatise on Categories of Dharmas also says thus: what is called the outflow of existence? It is, ignorance excepted, the remaining fetters, bonds, latent tendencies, secondary afflictions, and entanglements affiliated to the two realms of form and formlessness. Why then are they not spoken of here? — The Vaibhāṣika masters of the land of Kaśmīra say: the entanglements of those two realms are few, and moreover not free in operation (their potency being feeble), and so they are not reckoned in.

(An objection is raised) Why are the latent tendencies of the two realms spoken of together as one “outflow of existence”? — Because they are alike indeterminate in nature, turn by the inner gate (not taking outer object-fields as object), and arise in dependence upon the levels of absorption: by these three senses being the same, they are joined into one. The principle by which “existence-greed” obtained its name, as stated above, is just the principle by which “the outflow of existence” obtains its name here.

Taking the fifteen kinds of ignorance of the three realms, since their sense is already complete, they are separately established as “the outflow of ignorance.” Why is this one item alone to be established separately? Because ignorance is able to be the root of all existences (of birth and death).

The entity of the torrents and the yokes is the same as that of the outflows; yet within them “view” is also established separately — that is to say: the outflow of desire above is just the torrent of desire and the yoke of desire, and the outflow of existence above is just the torrent of existence and the yoke of existence, while the several views are drawn out to form “the torrent of views” and “the yoke of views.” (Why is view not drawn out among the outflows?) Because what is called an “outflow” takes the sense of being fierce and sharp and causing sentient beings to abide (to dwell long in birth and death), as will be stated below; and view does not conform to “abiding,” its nature being too fierce and sharp (coming and going swiftly, unable to abide long). For this reason it is not made a name of its own among the outflows, and can only be established as an outflow together with the rest.

Thus it is displayed that twenty-nine items are named the torrent of desire — namely greed, hatred, and pride, each having five kinds (the five categories), doubt four kinds, and the entanglements ten. Twenty-eight items are named the torrent of existence — namely greed and pride, each ten (five in each of the two upper realms), and doubt eight. Thirty-six items are named the torrent of views — namely the twelve views in each of the three realms. Fifteen items are named the torrent of ignorance — namely the ignorance of each of the three realms, having five kinds each.

It should be known that the four yokes are the same as the four torrents, and the four appropriations should be known to be the same in entity as the four yokes. Yet “the appropriation of desire” and “the appropriation of assertions of self” each take ignorance into themselves, while “view” is divided into two appropriations — herein differing from the yokes stated above.

That is to say: the yoke of desire above, together with the ignorance of the desire realm, is thirty-four items in all, named in sum the appropriation of desire — namely greed, hatred, pride, and ignorance, five each, doubt four, together with the ten entanglements. The yoke of existence above, together with the ignorance of the two upper realms, is thirty-eight items in all, named in sum the appropriation of assertions of self — namely greed, pride, and ignorance, ten each, and doubt eight. Within the yoke of views, the grasping of rules and observances being excepted, the remaining thirty items are named in sum the appropriation of views; and the six items excepted (two in each of the three realms) are named the appropriation of rules and observances.

(An objection is raised) Why must the grasping of rules and observances be established separately? — Because it alone is the enemy of the noble path, and because it deludes both assemblies, the householders and those gone forth. How so? The householders are deluded by it into reckoning that self-starvation and other austerities are the road to heaven; those gone forth are deluded by it into reckoning that abandoning agreeable object-fields is the road to purity.

(An objection is raised) Why is ignorance not established separately as an appropriation? — Because the name “appropriation” is established for what can appropriate the existences, and the ignorances are not that which appropriates. That is to say: not understanding the marks of dharmas is what is called ignorance; it is not that which appropriates, its nature not being fierce and sharp, and so it can only be established as an appropriation together with the rest.

Treatise (adducing a sūtra in proof of the mark of the yoke of desire): Yet the sūtra says: what is called the yoke of desire? It is, among the desires, desire-greed, desire-longing, desire-intimacy, desire-craving, desire-delight, desire-oppression, desire-absorption, desire-relish, desire-joy, desire-hoarding, desire-attendance, and desire-attachment; these bonds and entanglements press down the mind, and this is called the yoke of desire. Of the yoke of existence and the yoke of views it should be known that it is likewise so. And another sūtra says: greed for desire is called appropriation. From this it may be known: the desire-greed aroused with regard to desire and the other three is called the four appropriations of desire and the rest.

Treatise (turning to the glosses on the names): Since it has thus been made out that the latent tendencies together with their entanglements are called in the sūtras outflows, torrents, yokes, and appropriations, what sense has each of these names, “latent tendency” and the rest? The stanza says:

〔Root 39〕The Glosses on the Names “Latent Tendency” and the Rest

Stanza: Subtle, twofold increase by attachment, following after and binding along — these are the senses of “latent tendency”; abiding, flowing, sweeping away, joining, and appropriating — these are the senses of the names outflow, torrent, yoke, and appropriation.

Treatise: At the very time when a root affliction is present before one, its mode of apprehension is hard to be aware of, and so it is called “subtle.”

What is called “twofold increase by attachment” means that it is able to increase torpor and clogging upon the object-field taken as object and upon the mind and mental factors with which it is associated.

What is called “following after” means that it is able to draw forth the “acquisition” (accomplishment) and constantly to follow after a sentient being, constantly working its harm upon him, and to be made to arise even without any doing.

Or again: even if one exhausts one’s strength to block its arising, it still appears again and again — and so it is called “binding along.”

By these senses it is called “latent tendency.”

(What follows are the glosses on the outflows and the rest.) It can detain sentient beings so that they long abide in birth and death, or make sentient beings turn round within birth and death from the heaven at the summit of existence all the way down to the Unremitting Hell. Since within the continuum it leaks out harm without end from the six sores (the six faculties), it is called “outflow.” Since it is utterly able to sweep away and sink the wholesome, it is called “torrent.” Since it is able to join sentient beings together (binding them to suffering), it is called “yoke.” Since it is able to act as support and appropriation, it is called “appropriation.”

Treatise (a better explanation): If one would explain it better, one ought to say thus: within the several object-fields it flows on in a continuous stream and leaks out harm without ceasing, and so it is called “outflow.” It is as the sūtra says: the elder should know that it is as when a boat is drawn upstream against the current: even with great strength expended, the going is still hard; but if this boat be let go downstream with the current, then even with strength given up the going is not hard. The arising of a wholesome mind and of a defiled mind should be known to be likewise (the defiled goes with the current and is easy, the wholesome against it and is hard).

Following the sense of this sūtra: within the object-fields, the afflictions’ not ceasing is what is called “outflow”; and if their potency preponderates, it is called “torrent” — that is to say, if sentient beings sink down into it they can only follow along and cannot go against it, because it surges and floods and sweeps and dashes and is hard to withstand. When at the time of activity it is not utterly preponderant, it is called “yoke” — it merely joins sentient beings together with the sufferings of every kind; or else it is called “yoke” because it is active again and again. Because it appropriates desire and the rest, it is called “appropriation.”

結縛纏垢·五蓋·斷惑遍知Fetters, Bonds, Entanglements, and Grime · The Five Hindrances · Abandoning the Afflictions and Full Comprehension

全文五層 →Full five layers →

白話Vernacular

〔正40前半〕為什麼同一批煩惱還要再換五個名目

論（承前起問）：前面已經把隨眠（潛伏而隨逐有情、隨眠增長的根本煩惱）連同纏（現起纏縛心的煩惱）一併辨明過了；世尊又把它們說成漏、瀑流、軛、取等名目。那麼煩惱的名目就只有這麼多呢，還是另外還有？頌說：

頌：由於結等等的差別不同，所以另外又說有五種。

論：就是同樣那一批煩惱，因為結、縛、隨眠、隨煩惱、纏這五個名義各有差別的緣故，所以另外又說成五種。那麼先說：什麼叫作結？頌說：

〔正40後半·正41·正42〕九結，以及嫉慳兩個為什麼被抬進結裡

頌：結有九種，而三見與二取所執取的『物』數相等，所以把三見立為見結、二取立為取結。由於嫉與慳這兩個唯是不善、又能自在而起的緣故，十纏之中只有嫉、慳被建立為結；或者是因為這兩個現行的次數最多，因為它們分別是招來卑賤與貧窮的因，因為它們遍能顯出憂慼與歡喜兩類隨煩惱，也因為它們惱亂出家與在家兩眾。

論：結有九種——一是愛結，二是恚結，三是慢結，四是無明結，五是見結，六是取結，七是疑結，八是嫉結，九是慳結。

這裡面所說的愛結，指的是三界的貪；其餘各結，隨其所應，該怎麼定它的相貌，前面已經辨過。見結指的是三見（有身見、邊執見、邪見）；取結指的是二取（見取、戒禁取）。

依著這個道理，所以有這樣一種說法：有沒有這樣一種法，它與見相應，卻只被愛結所繫而不被見結所繫，而且並非沒有見隨眠在它上面隨增？答：有。是哪一種？就是在集智已經生起、滅智還沒有生起的那一段位次上，見滅諦與見道諦所斷的二取相應之法。這些法被愛結當作所緣而繫住，卻不被見結所繫——因為遍行的見結（能通緣他部的見）到那時已經永斷了；而不遍行的見結，對它們既不能作所緣、又不能作相應，兩條路都沒有。可是見隨眠在它們上面確實還在隨增，因為那二取的見隨眠正在它們上面隨增。

那麼憑什麼把三見另立為見結，卻把二取另立為取結呢？答：因為三見與二取所執取的『物』數相等。所謂物，就是一一分開來算的體數：三見合計有十八物（三見各在三界五部之中分別開列而成），二取也同樣是十八物，所以叫作『物等』。再者，三見是所取的一邊、二取是能取的一邊，所以叫作『取等』。既然所取與能取有這樣的差別，就分別立為兩個結。

又問：為什麼在纏之中，只有嫉、慳這兩個被建立為結，其餘的纏不是？答：因為只有這兩個是純粹不善的，而且是能自在而起的。也就是說，只有這兩個把『唯不善』與『自在起』兩個條件都湊足了，其餘的都不然，所以只立這兩個。

不過這裡有一個限制：如果纏只算八個，這個解釋還說得通；如果承認纏有十個，這個解釋就不合理了——因為忿與覆這兩個也同樣具足那兩個條件。因此，若是承認有十纏，就應當改說：嫉與慳的過失特別重——因為這兩個現行的次數最多。

另外還有幾層理由：其一，這兩個能成為卑賤與貧窮的因（嫉招卑賤，慳招貧窮）；其二，這兩個遍能顯示憂慼與歡喜兩類隨煩惱（嫉屬慼、慳屬歡）；其三，這兩個惱亂出家與在家兩部；或者說，惱亂天與阿素洛兩類；或者說，惱亂人與天兩個勝趣；或者說，惱亂他人與自己這一部。

佛在別的地方，又依著另一種差別的門，同樣用『結』這個字說有五種。頌說：

〔正43·正44〕五順下分結：兩個把你留住，三個把你拉回來

頌：另有五個順下分結。由後面兩個的緣故，有情不能超出欲界；由前面三個的緣故，即使超出了也還要回到下界來。若問為何預流只說斷三，那是由於類門與根門的攝屬只有三之故；或者說，是不想發足前往、迷失正道、以及對正道猶豫這三種障礙——它們能障礙人趣向解脫，所以只說斷這三個。

論：哪五個？就是有身見、戒禁取、疑、欲貪、瞋恚。

為什麼這五個叫作順下分？因為這五個對『下分界』有順益的作用。所謂下分，唯有欲界得這個名；這五個對欲界能作順益。由後面兩個（欲貪、瞋恚）的緣故，人不能超出欲界；就算有能超出的，由前面三個（有身見、戒禁取、疑）的緣故還要退回下界來——就像看守牢獄的獄卒與沿路巡邏的人一樣，一個把你關住、一個把你抓回。

另有一種師說：所謂『下分』，指的是下等的有情，也就是諸凡夫；以及下界，也就是欲界。前三個能障礙人超出下等有情這一類（斷了它就成聖者，不再是凡夫），後兩個能使人不超出下界，所以這五個都得順下分之名。

又問：證得預流果的人，所斷的煩惱有六個（三結之外還有邊執見、見取、邪見一類），為什麼經中只說斷三結呢？答：按實而論應當說斷六種煩惱；只因為攝屬的門與根只有三個，所以只說斷三。

先說『門』：所斷的六個之中，種類有三種——有的只通一部，有的通兩部，有的通四部。說斷這三種，就把那三個門都攝進去了。

再說『根』：所斷的六個之中，有三個是隨著另外三個而轉起的——邊執見隨著有身見轉，見取隨著戒禁取轉，邪見隨著疑轉。說斷這三種，就把那三個根都攝進去了。所以說斷三，其實已經說了斷六。

還有人這樣解釋：凡是要前往異地的人，會有三種障礙——一是不想動身，二是迷了正路而依著邪路走，三是對正路心存懷疑。趣向解脫的人也有這樣相似的三種障礙：由於有身見，怕解脫（怕『我』沒了）而不肯發足前往；由於戒禁取，執著邪道而迷失正路；由於疑，對正道深深地猶豫不決。佛要顯示預流已經永斷這三種趣解脫的障礙，所以說斷三。

佛又在另一部經中，像說順下分那樣，說順上分也有五種。頌說：

〔正45〕五順上分結：留在上二界的五條線

頌：順上分結也是五個——色界的貪、無色界的貪這兩個貪，加上掉舉、慢、無明，因為它們使有情不能超出上界的緣故。

論：這五種若還沒有斷除，就能使有情不能超出上界；它們對上界有順益的作用，所以叫作順上分結。

結已經辨完了。那麼縛是什麼？頌說：

〔正46·一句〕三縛：為什麼縛只立三個

頌：縛有三個，是依著三種受而立的。

論：縛有三種——一是貪縛，指一切的貪；二是瞋縛，指一切的瞋；三是癡縛，指一切的癡。

為什麼只說這三個為縛？答：因為是隨著三種受而說縛有三個。也就是說：對於樂受，是貪縛在上面隨增——作為所緣而隨增、作為相應而隨增，兩種隨增都俱足。對於苦受是瞋、對於捨受是癡，也應當知道同樣如此。

雖然對於捨受也有貪與瞋，但那不像癡那樣（癡於捨受最為相稱），所以不立。這是就自身相續這一邊，以樂等三受作為縛的所緣來作的決定之說。

縛已經分別完了。那麼隨眠是什麼？頌說：

〔正46·二句〕隨眠：前面已經說過了

頌：隨眠前面已經說過。

論：隨眠有六個、或七個、或十個、或九十八個，都像前面所說的那樣（六隨眠開為七、再開為十、再依三界五部開為九十八）。

隨眠既然已經說了。那麼隨煩惱是什麼？頌說：

〔正46後半〕隨煩惱：一個通名與一個別名

頌：隨煩惱就是這些根本煩惱之外的其餘染污心所，屬於行蘊所攝。

論：這些根本煩惱本身也叫作隨煩惱，因為它們都隨逐著心而作惱亂的事。

除此之外，另外還有一批不同於根本煩惱的法，是染污的心所、為行蘊所攝，因為它們隨著煩惱而起，所以也叫作隨煩惱；但不叫作煩惱，因為它們不是根本。

它們的相貌，在《雜事》（本論後文的雜事一章）中會廣為列出，往後再略說。

至於纏與煩惱垢所攝的那一批，應當先辨纏的相貌是怎樣。頌說：

〔正47·正48·正49前半〕十纏，以及每一個纏從哪裡流出來

頌：纏有八個——無慚、無愧、嫉、慳、悔、眠、掉舉、惛沈；或者算十個，再加上忿與覆。無慚、慳、掉舉都是從貪所生；無愧、眠、惛沈是從無明所起；嫉、忿是從瞋而起；悔是從疑而起；至於覆，則有異說。

論：根本煩惱本身也叫作纏，因為經中說過『欲貪纏』是作緣的緣故。

不過在數目上有兩宗：《品類足》說纏有八個；毘婆沙宗說纏有十個，就是在前八個之上再加忿與覆。

逐一釋名：無慚、無愧兩個，前面已經解釋過了。嫉，是對他人種種興盛之事使自己心裡不喜。慳，是與『財施、法施、巧施』相違，使心慳吝執著。悔就是惡作（對已作或未作之事追悔），前面已經辨過。眠，是使心昧略（昏昧而不明利）為它的體性，沒有力量執持這個身體。要注意：悔與眠這兩個纏，只取染污的那一分（善性的追悔與睡眠不算）。掉舉與惛沈，也像前面所解釋的那樣。除了瞋與害之外，對於有情與非有情使心憤發起來，這叫作忿。把自己的罪隱藏起來，這叫作覆。

在所說的這十種纏之中，等流（從某一根本煩惱流出的同類）的歸屬是：無慚、慳、掉舉是貪的等流；無愧、眠、惛沈是無明的等流；嫉、忿是瞋的等流；悔是疑的等流。至於覆，有三家異說：有的說覆是貪的等流；有的說是無明的等流；有的說是貪與無明二者共同的等流。這三家分別對應『有知』與『無知』兩邊——把覆歸貪的，是就他心中有所知（知道自己的罪而故意藏）而說；歸無明的，是就他無所知而說；歸二者的，則兩邊都取。如其次第，各有各的著眼點。

其餘的煩惱垢，它們的相貌又是怎樣？頌說：

〔正49後半·正50〕六種煩惱垢與它們的出處

頌：煩惱垢有六個——惱、害、恨、諂、誑、憍。誑與憍從貪而生，害與恨從瞋而起，惱從見取而起，諂從諸見而生。

論：惱，是堅執著自己那些有罪之事，因為這樣，所以聽不進如理的勸諫教誨。害，是對他人能作逼迫，因為這樣，所以能行打罵等事。恨，是對於忿所緣的那件事上，一次又一次地反覆尋思，結成怨懟而不肯放下。諂，是心的彎曲，因為這樣，所以不能如實地把自己顯露出來；或者用歪曲的方式否認，或者設下種種方便使人不能明白。誑，是欺惑他人。憍，前面已經解釋過了（對自己的盛事染著而心高）。

這六種都是從煩惱生出來的，它們穢污的相貌粗顯，所以叫作煩惱垢。

在這六種煩惱垢之中，等流的歸屬是：誑與憍是貪的等流，害與恨是瞋的等流，惱是見取的等流，諂是諸見的等流。這最後一條有經證——正如經中說『什麼叫作曲？就是諸惡見』，所以諂決定是諸見的等流。

這一批煩惱垢連同前面的纏，都是從根本煩惱而起的，所以都立『隨煩惱』之名。

那麼這一批垢與纏，是見道所斷還是修道所斷？頌說：

〔正51〕纏垢的斷門：五個通見修二斷，其餘唯修所斷

頌：十纏之中的無慚、無愧、眠、惛沈、掉舉這五個，通於見所斷與修所斷；其餘的（以及六個煩惱垢），因為是自在而起的緣故，唯是修所斷。

論：在十纏之中，無慚等五個通於見所斷與修所斷，因為這五個能與見所斷、修所斷兩部的煩惱相應而起。它隨著跟哪一諦所斷的煩惱相應，就說它是見那一諦所斷的。

其餘的嫉、慳、悔、忿、覆，連同六個煩惱垢，因為是自在而起的緣故，唯是修所斷。所謂自在起，是說它們只與修所斷的『他力無明』（不與根本煩惱相應而別起的獨頭無明）共同相應，不靠見所斷的根本煩惱作伴，所以叫作自在起。

這一批隨煩惱，各自通於哪一種善惡無記之性？頌說：

〔正52前半〕三性門：欲界三個通二性，上界一律無記

頌：欲界所繫的三個通不善與無記二性，其餘的唯是惡；上二界的一律是無記。

論：欲界所繫的眠、惛沈、掉舉這三個，都通於不善與無記兩種性；其餘的一切都唯是不善。上二界之中，隨其所應而有的那些，一切唯是無記性所攝（上界沒有不善）。

這一批隨煩惱，各自繫屬於哪一界？頌說：

〔正52後半〕界繫門：諂誑通到初靜慮，三個通三界

頌：諂與誑通於欲界與初靜慮，惛、掉、憍三個通三界，其餘的唯在欲界。

論：諂與誑只在欲界與初靜慮。怎麼知道梵世（初靜慮）也有諂誑呢？因為大梵王曾把自己的實情藏起來，現出一種形相去誑惑馬勝苾芻。這兩個在前面雖然已經分別過了，因為義理相關的緣故，這裡再辨一次。

惛沈、掉舉、憍這三個通在三界。其餘的一切都唯在欲界——就是說，十六個（十纏加六垢）之中，前面已辨的五個如上所說，其餘十一個唯繫屬欲界。

隨眠與隨煩惱都已辨完。那麼在它們之中，有幾個唯在意地（只依意識而起）？有幾個通依六識地而起？頌說：

〔正53〕識地門：哪些只在意識，哪些通六識

頌：見所斷的一切、慢、眠、以及自在起的隨煩惱，都唯依意地而起；其餘的通依六識。

論：略而言之，應當知道：一切見所斷的煩惱與修所斷的煩惱之中，凡是慢、眠，以及隨煩惱之中自在起的那些——這一切都依意識而起，因為依五識身沒有辦法生起（五識不能作分別，見所斷之惑必依分別而起）。

其餘的一切通依六識，就是修所斷的貪、瞋、無明，以及與它們相應的那些隨煩惱——也就是無慚、無愧、惛沈、掉舉，以及其餘大煩惱地法所攝的隨煩惱——依六識身都能生起。

前面所辨的樂等五受根，與現在所說的煩惱、隨煩惱，哪一個煩惱與哪一個根相應？在這裡應當先辨諸根本煩惱。頌說：

〔正54·正55〕本惑的受相應：歡行、慼行與捨受

頌：欲界所繫的諸煩惱之中，貪與喜受、樂受相應；瞋與憂受、苦受相應；癡遍與前四種受相應；邪見與憂受及喜受相應；疑與憂受相應；其餘五個（慢與四見）與喜受相應。而一切煩惱都與捨受相應。上地的煩惱，各隨所應，遍與自地自識的諸受相應。

論：欲界所繫的諸煩惱之中——

貪與喜、樂相應，因為它是以歡的行相轉起，而且遍在六識之中。瞋與憂、苦相應，因為它是以慼的行相轉起，而且遍在六識之中。無明遍與前面四受相應，因為它歡、慼兩種行相都轉，而且遍在六識之中。

邪見通與憂、喜相應，因為它歡、慼兩種行相都轉，但只在意地。為什麼邪見歡、慼兩種行相都轉？因為他從前造的是罪業或是福業，次第不同——先造罪的人起邪見時心中歡喜（以為無罪報），先造福的人起邪見時心中憂慼（以為福報落空）。

疑與憂相應，因為它以慼的行相轉起，而且只在意地——心裡懷著猶豫的人，一心想求個決定的知見，所以心中愁慼。其餘的四見與慢，與喜相應，因為它們以歡的行相轉起，而且只在意地。

以上是就個別的相貌說受相應。若就通相說受相應，那麼一切煩惱都與捨受相應——因為諸隨眠在相續將斷的那個位次上，勢力已經衰歇，必定住在捨受。

欲界既然如此，上地又如何？答：都隨其所應，遍與自地、自識所俱起的諸受相應。也就是說：若某一地之中具有四識（初靜慮有眼、耳、身、意四識），那麼它一一識所起的煩惱，各自遍與自識的諸受相應；若某些地之中唯有意識（二靜慮以上），那麼那個意識所起的煩惱，就遍與意識所有的受相應。上面諸地之中識與受的多少，前面已經辨過，所以這裡不另外說。

煩惱與諸受的相應已經辨完，接著應當辨隨煩惱。頌說：

〔正56·正57〕隨惑的受相應：憂、喜、樂與遍相應的四個

頌：諸隨煩惱之中，嫉、悔、忿、惱、害、恨這六個與憂受俱起；慳與喜受相應；諂、誑、眠、覆這四個通於憂喜俱起；憍與喜、樂相應，而以上這些又都通捨受；其餘四個（無慚、無愧、惛沈、掉舉）遍與五受相應。

論：隨煩惱之中，嫉等六種，一切都與憂根相應，因為它們以慼的行相轉起，而且只在意地。

慳與喜相應，因為它以歡的行相轉起，而且只在意地。為什麼慳是歡行？因為慳的相貌與貪極為相似。

諂、誑、眠、覆與憂、喜相應，因為它們歡、慼兩種行相都轉，而且只在意地。所謂歡慼兩行，是說：或者有時候是以歡喜心去行諂等，或者有時候是以憂慼心去行。

憍與喜、樂相應，是歡行而且只在意地。在第三靜慮之中與樂相應，若在下面諸地則與喜相應。

以上所說的這些隨煩惱，一切都與捨受相應——因為相續將斷之時都住在捨受，又因為有些是通行於唯有捨受之地的。捨受對於一切法的相應沒有遮止，就像無明遍與一切相應那樣。

其餘的無慚、無愧、惛沈、掉舉這四個，都遍與五受相應——前兩個是大不善地法所攝（遍一切不善心），後兩個是大煩惱地法所攝（遍一切染污心）。

在所說的煩惱與隨煩惱之中，另有依著別的門而說的：佛把它們說成蓋。接著應當辨：蓋的相貌是怎樣？頌說：

〔正58〕五蓋：唯在欲界·二體合為一蓋·障蘊故唯五

頌：蓋有五個，唯在欲界。因為食、治、用三者相同的緣故，所以雖然是兩個體卻立為一個蓋。因為能障蘊的緣故，所以蓋只有五個。

論：佛在經中說蓋有五個——一是欲貪蓋，二是瞋恚蓋，三是惛眠蓋，四是掉悔蓋，五是疑蓋。

這裡先問一個界繫的問題：這裡面所說的惛沈、掉舉與疑，是像欲貪、瞋恚、眠、悔那樣只在欲界呢，還是通於三界？答：應當知道這三個也唯在欲界。因為契經說這五種純粹是圓滿的不善聚。色界與無色界沒有不善，而這五種既然純粹是不善，所以唯在欲界，不在色界與無色界。

再問一個開合的問題：為什麼惛眠蓋、掉悔蓋各有兩個體，卻合起來立為一個？答：因為食、治、用三者相同，所以合立為一。

先解釋這三個字：食，就是所食（能滋養它的東西），也叫作資糧。治，就是能治（能對治它的東西），也叫作非食。用，就是事用（它實際起的作用），也叫作功能。

由於這個道理，經中作這樣的說法——

惛與眠雖然是兩個，食與非食相同。什麼叫作惛眠蓋的食？就是五種法：一是𧄼瞢（心神昏蒙），二是不樂，三是頻申（打呵欠伸懶腰），四是食不平性（飲食不調），五是心昧劣性。什麼叫作這個蓋的非食（能治）？就是光明想。這兩個的事用也相同——都能使心的體性沈沒昏昧。

掉與悔雖然是兩個，食與非食相同。什麼叫作掉悔蓋的食？就是四種法：一是親里尋（想念親屬），二是國土尋（想念鄉土），三是不死尋（想著自己不會死而作長遠打算），四是隨念過去種種所經歷的戲笑、歡娛、承奉等事。什麼叫作這個蓋的非食？就是奢摩他（止）。這兩個的事用也相同——都能使心不寂靜。

由於食、治、用三者相同的緣故，所以惛眠、掉悔兩兩合為一個。

第三問：諸煩惱等都有覆蓋的意義，為什麼如來只說這五個？答：因為只有這五個對五蘊（戒蘊、定蘊、慧蘊、解脫蘊、解脫智見蘊這無漏五蘊）能作殊勝的障礙。也就是說：貪蓋與恚蓋能障戒蘊；惛沈睡眠能障慧蘊；掉舉惡作能障定蘊；定與慧既然沒有了，就對四諦起疑；因為疑的緣故，能使乃至解脫、解脫智見都不得生起。所以只有這五個被建立為蓋。

〔次第之諍〕若照這樣解釋經的意思，那麼掉悔按理應當放在惛眠前面說——因為必定要依著定才有慧生起，障定的當然也應當先於障慧的。

依著這個道理，另有一家師說：這五蓋之中，惛眠與掉悔，如其次第，是能障定蘊與慧蘊（把配屬倒過來，惛眠障定、掉悔障慧，如此則現有的次第不必更動）。由於這個道理，契經作這樣的說法——修等持（修定）的人怕惛眠，修擇法（修慧）的人怕掉悔。

又另有一家別立一說：只立這五個，另有五種原因。他們的說法是怎樣？就是說：在『行位』（尚未入定、六根對境而行的位次）之中，先對色等種種境界取了可愛、可憎兩種相；後來在『住位』之中，由前面所取的相作因，便起了欲貪與瞋恚兩蓋。這兩個能障礙將要入定的心。由於這樣，後來正入定的位次上，對止與觀就不能好好修習，於是便起了惛眠與掉悔，如其次第障礙奢摩他（止）與毘鉢舍那（觀），使它們不得生起。由於這樣，往後出定的位次上思擇法義之時，疑又來作障礙。所以建立蓋只有這五個。

〔品級大科界〕從這裡起，全品轉入『惑滅』

論（承轉）：現在應當思擇一件事：他界遍行的惑，以及見滅諦、見道諦所斷之中緣有漏的那些惑——這些惑在斷的那個位次上，還不知道它們的所緣；而知道它們所緣的時候，它們卻早就斷了。像這樣的一批惑，斷是由於什麼原因？可見並不是一定要遍知所緣才斷。

那麼，斷惑總共由幾個原因？答：由四種原因。哪四種？頌說：

〔正59〕斷惑四因

頌：一由遍知所緣而斷，二由斷它的能緣而斷，三由斷它的所緣而斷，四由對治生起而斷。

論：先說見所斷的惑，斷是由前面三個原因——

第一，由遍知所緣故斷：就是見苦諦、見集諦所斷之中緣自界的那些惑，以及見滅諦、見道諦所斷之中緣無漏的那些惑（這些惑的所緣正是所遍知的境，境被遍知，惑即斷）。

第二，由斷它的能緣故斷：就是見苦諦、見集諦所斷之中緣他界的那些惑。因為緣自界的惑能夠緣到它們（緣他界的惑本身又被緣自界的惑所緣），能緣的一斷，被緣的也就跟著斷了。

第三，由斷它的所緣故斷：就是見滅諦、見道諦所斷之中緣有漏的那些惑。因為緣無漏的惑能夠作它們的境（這一批惑本身又是緣無漏之惑的所緣），所緣的一斷，能緣的也就跟著斷了。

若是修所斷的惑，斷是由後面一個原因——就是只由第四『對治起故斷』。因為只要這一品的對治道一生起，這一品之中的諸惑就頓時斷盡。

那麼哪一品的惑由誰作對治？答：上上品的那些惑，由下下品的道作對治；一直到下下品的那些惑，由上上品的道作對治（惑愈粗重愈先斷，用的道反而愈弱；惑愈細微愈後斷，用的道反而愈強）。像這樣的義門，後面還會廣為辨明。

所說的對治，總共有幾種？頌說：

〔正60前半〕四種對治，與一個更好的排法

頌：對治有四種——斷對治、持對治、遠分對治、厭患對治。

論：對治這一門總共有四種——

一是斷對治，就是無間道（正在斷惑的那一剎那之道）。二是持對治，就是無間道之後的道，因為它能執持住這個『斷』所得的得（使已斷不再失）。三是遠分對治，就是解脫道之後所有的道，因為那個道能使這個所斷的惑之得更加遠離。另有一家師說：解脫道本身也算遠分對治，因為解脫道同樣能使這個所斷的惑之得更加遠離。四是厭患對治，就是若有一種道，見到這一界的過失而深深生起厭患。

不過這四種對治，若要說得妥當，按理實在應當是這樣的次第：一是厭患對治，就是緣苦、集而起的加行道；二是斷對治，就是緣一切（四諦）而起的無間道；三是持對治，就是緣一切而起的解脫道；四是遠分對治，就是緣一切而起的勝進道。

諸惑的永斷，究竟決定是從哪一邊來的？頌說：

〔正60後半〕斷惑是從『所緣』那一邊斷的

頌：應當知道，是從所緣這一邊，才能使諸惑斷。

論：應當知道，諸惑在得到永斷的時候，不可能使它離開與它相應的法（相應法是同時俱有的，拆不開）；只能使它遠離所緣，使它對那個所緣不再生起。

『斷未來的惑』這個道理姑且說得通，因為可以使它對境不再生起。那麼過去的諸惑，怎麼說它斷呢？

若說頌中『從所緣』一句的意思，是要顯示『由遍知所緣故斷』，那也不合理，因為那並不決定（前面已說，有三種惑不是由遍知所緣而斷的）。

由此應當這樣說：煩惱等的斷，決定是從哪裡來的呢？自身相續之中的煩惱等之斷，是由於『得』被斷了（惑之得斷，惑即不屬於此身）。至於他身相續之中的諸煩惱等，以及一切色法、不染污法的斷，則是由於能緣它們的、在自身相續之中的那些惑究竟斷盡的緣故（他人的惑不由我斷，我只斷我緣他之惑）。

所說的遠分，遠性有幾種？頌說：

〔正61〕遠性四種，與四個譬喻

頌：遠性有四種——相遠性、治遠性、處遠性、時遠性；分別像四大種、像持戒與犯戒、像東西二海、像過去未來二世等。

論：傳說遠性總共有四種——

一是相遠性，就像四大種：雖然一同在一個聚（一個極微聚）之中生起，但因為相貌互異，也叫作遠。二是治遠性，就像持戒與犯戒：雖然一同在一個身之中行，但因為互相對治，也叫作遠。三是處遠性，就像東海與西海：雖然一同在一個世界之中，但因為方所相隔，也叫作遠。四是時遠性，就像過去世與未來世：雖然一同依著一個法上而立，但因為時分相隔，也叫作遠。

〔往復四輪〕問：是對著什麼說遠？答：是對著現在世說。

難：無間已滅的（剛剛過去的那一剎那）以及正生的（即將生起的），與現在緊緊相鄰，怎麼能叫作遠？答：因為『世』的體性有別的緣故而得遠名，並不是要隔得很久、很遠才叫作遠。

復難：若是這樣，現在也應當得遠名，因為對著過去、未來說，世的體性同樣有別。

若說去、來二世沒有作用，離了作用所以叫作遠——那麼諸無為法，作用是說它沒有的，怎麼反而叫作近？

若說是由於現在能普遍得到無為，所以無為叫作近——那麼過去、未來二世也應當一樣（現在也能得到過去未來之法）。何況虛空無為根本無所謂得，它又怎麼叫作近？

若說過去與未來互相對望，因為隔著一個現在的緣故叫作遠；現在對望二世都極為相鄰，無為沒有間隔所以都叫作近——那麼去、來二世對現在世來說是相鄰的，互相對望又是有隔的，就應當同時具有遠、近兩個名，不應當一向只說它是遠。

〔收束〕若要依著正理，應當這樣說：去、來二世離了法的自相，所以叫作遠——未來是還沒有得到法的自相，過去是已經捨了法的自相。

至於頌中的『等』字，是要表明所舉的事例還沒有舉盡。

前面說過惑的斷是由對治道生起；那麼在道向上勝進的時候，所斷的諸惑會不會再斷一次？已經得到的離繫，會不會重新再得？頌說：

〔正62〕惑不再斷，離繫卻有重得——重得的六個時候

頌：諸惑沒有再斷一次的事，離繫則有重得。就是對治道生起時、得果時、練根時，總在六個時候之中。

論：諸惑若是遇上了能斷它的那個道，就由那個道把這個惑頓時斷盡，必定沒有後來再斷一次的道理。

至於所得的離繫，雖然沒有『隨著道漸漸勝進而離繫也跟著變好』的道理（離繫本身是無為，不增不減），但道在勝進的時候，容許有重新生起那個殊勝之『得』的意義（得是有為，可以更勝）。

所說的重得，總共有幾個時候？總共六個時候。哪六個？就是對治道起、得果、練根三類。對治道起的時候，指的是解脫道。得果的時候，指的是得預流果、一來果、不還果、阿羅漢果這四個。練根的時候，指的是轉根之時（由鈍根轉為利根）。這六個時候之中，諸惑的離繫隨著道的勝進而重新生起殊勝的得。

不過諸離繫也要隨其所應而知：有具足六個時候都起勝得的，乃至也有只具足兩個時候的。

具六時的：欲界所繫見四諦所斷的離繫，以及色、無色界見前三諦所斷的離繫，都具六時而得。

具五時的：色、無色界見道諦所斷的離繫，只有五時而得——因為對治道生起的時候就同時得果了（見道最後一剎那即得預流果），不應當在這裡分成兩個時候。欲界修所斷前五品的離繫也是五時而得，因為要除去預流果那一個（斷欲界修惑五品時預流果早已得過）。

具四時的：第六品的離繫只有四時而得——就是在前面五時之上又除一個，因為得果（一來果）與對治道生起是同一個時候，沒有分別。第七、第八品也是四時而得，因為得果的四個之中要除去前兩個（預流、一來已得過）。

具三時的：第九品的離繫只有三時而得——就是在前面四個之上又除一個，也因為對治道生起之時就同時得果（不還果）。色、無色界修所斷之中，除了有頂第九品以外，其餘的離繫也是三時而得，因為得果的四個之中要除去前三個。

具二時的：有頂第九品只有二時而得——就是在前面三個之內又除一個，也因為對治道生起之時就同時得果（阿羅漢果）。

以上這樣說，只是就『容有』這一邊而作的說法。因為利根的人在前面諸位之中，一一都要除去練根所得的那一時（利根本來不練根）；而諸有超越而入聖道的人（超越證），也隨其所應要除去預流果等那一時。

就是這些離繫，在那一位一位之中，得到『遍知』之名。遍知有兩種：一是智遍知，二是斷遍知。智遍知，指的是無漏智（能遍知之智）。斷遍知，指的就是那些『斷』本身——這是在果上安立因的名字（斷是智的果，卻用智的『遍知』來稱呼它）。

那麼是不是把一切斷總立為一個遍知？答：不是。那麼是怎樣？頌說：

〔正63·正64前半〕九種斷遍知是怎麼數出來的

頌：斷遍知有九個。欲界的初二部斷立一個，次二部各立一個，合成三個；上界也同樣是三個。其餘的是五順下分結盡、色愛盡、一切結盡這三個。

論：諸斷總立為九種遍知——就是三界所繫見諦所斷的煩惱等之斷，立六個遍知；其餘三界修道所斷的煩惱等之斷，立三個遍知。

先說：三界所繫見諦所斷的煩惱等之斷，立六個是怎麼立的？就是欲界所繫初二部之斷立一個遍知——『初二部』就是顯示見苦諦、見集諦所斷；次二部之斷各立一個遍知——『次二部』就是顯示見滅諦、見道諦所斷。這樣，欲界見諦所斷的煩惱等之斷就立了三個遍知。

像欲界的三個一樣，上界也同樣如此——就是色界、無色界二界所繫，也是初二部之斷立一個、次二部各立一個而合成三個，這是把見苦集、見滅、見道所斷之法的斷合起來立為三個的意思（上二界合算，不分兩界）。這樣就叫作三界見諦所斷之法的斷，共六種遍知。

再說：其餘三界所繫修道所斷的煩惱等之斷立三個是怎麼立的？就是欲界所繫修道所斷的煩惱等之斷立一個遍知——應當知道這就是『五順下分結盡遍知』，因為它是連同前面（欲界見諦所斷三個）合起來立的。色界所繫修道所斷的煩惱等之斷立一個遍知——應當知道這就是『色愛盡遍知』。無色界所繫修道所斷的煩惱等之斷立一個遍知，就是『一切結永盡遍知』；這一個也是連同前面合起來立的。這樣就叫作三界修道所斷之法的斷，共三種遍知。

問：什麼緣故色界、無色界修道所斷的煩惱等之斷要各別立遍知，而見所斷的卻不各別立（見所斷是上二界合為三個）？答：因為修所斷的對治不相同（色界修惑與無色界修惑各有各的對治道，見所斷則上二界共一對治）。

這樣所立的九種遍知，應當辨一辨其中哪幾個是哪一種道的果？頌說：

〔正64後半·正65·正66〕九遍知分別是誰的果

頌：這九個之中，忍果有六個，其餘三個是智果。未至定的果具有九個，根本靜慮的果是五個或八個。無色邊地的果只有一個，前三根本無色地也同樣只有一個。世俗道的果是二個，聖道的果是九個。法智的果是三個，類智的果是二個。法智品的果是六個，類智品的果是五個。

論：在這九個之中，先應當辨它們與忍道、智道作果的差別。

忍果有六個，就是三界所繫見所斷之法的斷這六種遍知。智果有三個，就是順下分盡、色愛盡、一切結盡這三個遍知，因為這三個遍知是修道的果。

問：忍果怎麼可以稱為遍知（遍知本應是智的果）？答：因為諸忍都是智的眷屬，就像王的眷屬也假立王的名字一樣；或者說，因為忍與智同得一個果。

接著應當辨它們與靜慮地的眷屬（近分）、根本作果的差別。

未至靜慮的果具足九個——因為依著未至定能斷三界見所斷、修所斷的煩惱等。根本靜慮的果是五個或八個。

所說的『五個』，是毘婆沙師說的：根本靜慮地只能永斷色界、無色界所攝的煩惱等，至於欲界所繫的煩惱等之斷，他們只承認那是未至定的果。

所說的『八個』，是尊者妙音說的：根本靜慮地也能與欲界的諸煩惱等作斷對治。因為凡是先離了欲界染的人，依著根本地入見諦（見道）的時候，對於欲界所繫見所斷之法的斷，承認另外有道引來無漏的得，由此那也是他見道的果。不過要除去『順下分結盡遍知』，因為那一個唯是未至定的果，根本地沒有辦法修它的斷對治。至於中間靜慮，就照根本靜慮這樣說。

接著應當辨它們與無色地的眷屬、根本作果的差別。

無色的邊地（空無邊處近分）之果只有一個，就是依著空處近分地的道而得色愛盡遍知這個果。前三個根本無色地之果也只有一個，就是依著無色前三根本地而得一切結盡遍知這個果。

接著應當辨它們與世俗道及諸聖道作果的差別。世俗道的果是二個，因為世俗道的力量只能獲得順下分盡與色愛盡這兩個遍知果。聖道的果是九個，因為聖道的力量遍能永斷三界之法。

接著應當辨它們與法智、類智作果的差別。法智的果是三個，因為法智的力量能斷三界修所斷的惑，得後面三個果。類智的果是二個，因為類智的力量只能永斷色界、無色界修所斷的惑，得後面二個果。

接著應當辨它們與法智、類智同品的諸道作果的差別。法智品的果是六個，就是前面法智、法忍所得的六個果。類智品的果是五個，就是前面類智、類忍所得的五個果。所謂『品』字，是通攝智與忍兩者的意思。

那麼為什麼不是一一之斷各別立一個遍知，只就前面那九個位次來建立？頌說：

〔正67〕立九不立多的四個緣

頌：由得無漏的斷得、缺了第一有、滅了雙因、越了界這四個緣，所以立九種遍知。

論：有漏法的斷雖然有很多體位（一一品之斷各是一體），但由於四個緣的緣故只立九種遍知。

先說由三個緣立六個忍果——就是得無漏的離繫得、缺有頂、滅雙因。諸斷必須具足這三個緣才立遍知之名，缺一個就不立。

逐位驗證：如在異生位，有滅雙因（世俗道也能滅遍行因），卻沒有無漏的斷得，也還沒有缺有頂，所以雖然也得了斷，卻不叫遍知。若在聖位之中，從入見諦起到苦類忍現行以前，雖然已經得了無漏的斷得，卻還沒有缺有頂、還沒有滅雙因。到了苦類智、集法忍的位次，雖然也缺了有頂，卻還沒有滅雙因——因為還沒有斷見集所斷的那些遍行因。到了後面法智、類智的位次之中所得的那些斷，三個緣具足了，所以在一一位上建立遍知。

再說由四個緣立三個智果——就是在前面三個之上再加『越界』。所謂越界，是說這一界之中的煩惱等法都完全離了。

另有一說：『離俱繫』也算一個緣，這樣立遍知的緣總共有五種。所謂離俱繫，是說這個斷雖然已經斷了卻還沒有立遍知，必須把其餘緣這個境的惑也離了，才可以建立。

本論的取捨是：這個離俱繫與滅雙因、越界兩個緣，作用上沒有差別，所以雖然義上有異卻不另立。

最後補一個分辨：雖然凡是越界的位次都同時滅了雙因，但滅雙因的時候並不都是越界，所以要在滅雙因之外另立越界這個緣——因為滅了三地的雙因時還沒有立遍知（見集所斷之遍行因雖滅，未越界故不立）。

那麼誰成就幾個遍知？頌說：

〔正68〕誰成就幾個遍知

頌：住在見諦位的沒有，或者成就一個乃至五個；修道位成就六個、一個或二個；無學位只成就一個。

論：異生決定沒有成就遍知的道理。

若是諸聖者住在見諦位（見道十五心）：從最初一直到苦集法忍的時候，對諸遍知也還沒有成就。到了集法智、集類忍時，只成就一個。到了集類智、滅法忍時，便成就二個。到了滅法智、滅類忍時，便成就三個。到了滅類智、道法忍時，便成就四個。到了道法智、道類忍時，便成就五個。

住在修道位：以道類智為最初，一直到還沒有全離欲界染，以及從離欲退了的，都成就六個。

到了全離欲界染而色愛還沒有盡，或者先離了欲而從道類智起、還沒有起色愛盡的勝果道以前，都只成就一個遍知，就是順下分盡。從色愛盡以及無學位起色纏退的，也是成就一個，與前面所說相同。

有色愛的人從色愛永盡起，以及先離了色的人從起色愛盡道起，到還沒有全離無色愛以前，成就下分盡、色愛盡兩個。從無學位起無色纏退的，也成就二個遍知，名字如前所說。

住在無學位的只成就一個，就是一切結永盡遍知。

那麼為什麼不還果與阿羅漢果，要把諸斷總集起來立為一個遍知？頌說：

〔正69前半〕總集為一個遍知的兩個緣

頌：因為越界與得果的緣故，這兩處要把諸斷總集為一個遍知。

論：因為具足兩個緣的緣故，才在一切斷上總集起來建立為一個遍知：一是越界，二是得果。只有那兩個位次（不還果與阿羅漢果）具足這兩個緣，所以那兩處的遍知總集為一個。

那麼誰捨、誰得，各是幾種遍知？頌說：

〔正69後半〕捨與得，以及全品的收束

頌：捨的是一個、二個、五個、六個；得的也照這樣，只除去『得五』沒有。

論：說『捨一個』的，是指從無學位以及色愛盡位，完全離欲而退的人。

說『捨二個』的，是指諸不還者從色愛盡位起欲纏而退的時候，以及他獲得阿羅漢果的時候。

說『捨五個』的，是指先離了欲界染而後入見諦、到道類智的時候——那時得下分盡這一個遍知，而把前面五個捨掉。

說『捨六個』的，是指還沒有離欲的所有聖者得離欲的時候。

『得也照這樣』，是說有得一個、得二個、得六個，只除去得五個沒有。

說『得一個』的，是指得那還沒有得過的，以及從無學位起色纏而退的人。

說『得二個』的，是指從無學位起無色界諸纏而退的時候。

說『得六個』的，是指從不還位退的人。

因為辨隨眠而附帶分別的『斷』，到這裡說完了。

〔First Half of Root 40〕Why Five More Names Are Given to One and the Same Set of Afflictions

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): The latent tendencies (the root afflictions that lie dormant, follow along after sentient beings, and increase by attachment) have already been adjudged above, together with the entanglements (the afflictions that arise and enwrap the mind); and the World-Honored One further spoke of them under the names of outflow, torrent, yoke, and appropriation. Are the names of the afflictions then only so many, or are there others besides? The stanza says:

Stanza: Because the senses of fetter and the rest differ, five kinds are further spoken of.

Treatise: It is just that same set of afflictions that, because the five senses of fetter, bond, latent tendency, secondary affliction, and entanglement each differ, are further spoken of as five kinds. Then first: what is called a fetter? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 40 · Root 41 · Root 42〕The Nine Fetters, and Why Envy and Avarice Are Raised into the Fetters

Stanza: There are nine kinds of fetter; and since the “things” grasped by the three views and by the two graspings are equal in number, the three views are set up as the fetter of views and the two graspings as the fetter of grasping. Because the two of envy and avarice alone are unwholesome and can arise of themselves, of the ten entanglements only envy and avarice are established as fetters; or else it is because these two occur most often of all, because they are severally the causes that draw down lowliness and poverty, because they universally display the two classes of secondary affliction, the dejected and the glad, and because they harass the two assemblies of those gone forth and those at home.

Treatise: There are nine kinds of fetter — first the fetter of craving, second the fetter of ill will, third the fetter of pride, fourth the fetter of ignorance, fifth the fetter of views, sixth the fetter of grasping, seventh the fetter of doubt, eighth the fetter of envy, ninth the fetter of avarice.

The fetter of craving spoken of here refers to greed in the three realms; as for the remaining fetters, how their marks are to be fixed, as is fitting to each, has been adjudged above. The fetter of views refers to the three views (the view of a real person, the extreme view, and wrong view); the fetter of grasping refers to the two graspings (the grasping at views and the grasping at rules and observances).

Following this principle, there is accordingly an account of this kind: is there a dharma that is associated with views and yet is bound only by the fetter of craving and not bound by the fetter of views, while it is not the case that no latent tendency of views increases by attachment upon it? Answer: there is. Which is it? It is, at that stage where the cognition of origination has already arisen and the cognition of cessation has not yet arisen, the dharmas associated with the two graspings that are abandoned through seeing the truth of cessation and seeing the truth of the path. These dharmas are bound by the fetter of craving as its object, and are not bound by the fetter of views — because the all-pervading fetter of views (the view that can take another category as its object) has by then been forever abandoned; while the fetter of views that is not all-pervading can neither be their object nor be associated with them, and both roads are wanting. Yet the latent tendency of views is indeed still increasing by attachment upon them, because the latent tendency of views belonging to those two graspings is increasing by attachment upon them.

Then on what ground are the three views set up separately as the fetter of views while the two graspings are set up separately as the fetter of grasping? Answer: because the “things” grasped by the three views and by the two graspings are equal in number. “Thing” means the count of entities reckoned one by one apart: the three views come in all to eighteen things (the three views being severally laid out among the five categories in the three realms), and the two graspings are likewise eighteen things, and so they are said to be “equal in things.” Further, the three views are the side of what is grasped and the two graspings the side of what grasps, and so they are said to be “equal in grasping.” Since what is grasped and what grasps have such a difference, they are set up separately as two fetters.

It is asked again: why is it that among the entanglements only these two, envy and avarice, are established as fetters, and the remaining entanglements are not? Answer: because these two alone are purely unwholesome, and are able to arise of themselves. That is to say, only these two have both conditions, “unwholesome alone” and “arising of themselves,” fully present; the rest are not so, and therefore only these two are established.

There is, however, a limitation here: if the entanglements are reckoned as eight only, this explanation still passes; if one grants that the entanglements are ten, then this explanation is unreasonable — because rage and concealment likewise have both those conditions fully present. Therefore, if one grants that there are ten entanglements, one ought to say instead: the faults of envy and of avarice are especially grave — because these two occur most often of all.

There are besides several further layers of reason: first, these two can be the causes of lowliness and of poverty (envy drawing lowliness, avarice drawing poverty); second, these two can universally display the two classes of secondary affliction, the dejected and the glad (envy belonging to the dejected, avarice to the glad); third, these two harass the two divisions of those gone forth and those at home; or else, they harass the two classes of gods and asuras; or else, they harass the two eminent destinies of humans and gods; or else, they harass others and one’s own party.

The Buddha, in another place, again following another gate of distinction, likewise uses this word “fetter” and speaks of five kinds. The stanza says:

〔Root 43 · Root 44〕The Five Fetters of the Lower Part: Two Keep You In, Three Drag You Back

Stanza: There are five further fetters favoring the lower part. Because of the latter two, sentient beings cannot pass beyond the desire realm; because of the former three, even one who has passed beyond comes down again to the lower realm. If it be asked why the stream-enterer is said to abandon three only, that is because the gathering of the gate of class and the gate of root is threefold only; or else it is that not wishing to set out, losing the right road, and being irresolute about the right road are three obstructions — they can obstruct a man from going toward liberation, and so only the abandoning of these three is spoken of.

Treatise: Which five? They are the view of a real person, the grasping at rules and observances, doubt, greed for the objects of desire, and ill will.

Why are these five called “favoring the lower part”? Because these five have the function of favoring and benefiting “the realm that is the lower part.” As for the lower part, the desire realm alone obtains this name; and these five can favor and benefit the desire realm. Because of the latter two (greed for the objects of desire, ill will) a man cannot pass beyond the desire realm; and even if there be one able to pass beyond, because of the former three (the view of a real person, the grasping at rules and observances, doubt) he must fall back to the lower realm — just like the jailer who keeps watch over a prison and the man who patrols the roads, the one shutting you in and the other catching you back.

There is another master’s account: what is called “the lower part” refers to sentient beings of the lower sort, that is, the ordinary beings; and to the lower realm, that is, the desire realm. The former three can obstruct a man from passing beyond the class of lower sentient beings (abandon them and he becomes a noble one, no longer an ordinary being), and the latter two can make him not pass beyond the lower realm; and so all five obtain the name of favoring the lower part.

It is asked again: for one who realizes the fruit of stream-entry, the afflictions abandoned are six (besides the three fetters there is the class of the extreme view, the grasping at views, and wrong view); why does the sūtra speak only of abandoning three fetters? Answer: in truth one ought to say that six afflictions are abandoned; it is only because the gate and the root that gather them in are three that it speaks only of abandoning three.

First as to “gate”: among the six abandoned there are three kinds of class — some extending to one category alone, some to two categories, some to four categories. Speaking of abandoning these three kinds gathers in all three of those gates.

Next as to “root”: among the six abandoned there are three that turn along with the other three — the extreme view turns along with the view of a real person, the grasping at views turns along with the grasping at rules and observances, wrong view turns along with doubt. Speaking of abandoning these three kinds gathers in all three of those roots. Hence in saying that three are abandoned it has in fact already said that six are abandoned.

There are also those who explain it thus: whoever would go to another region has three obstructions — first, not wishing to set out; second, losing the right road and going by a wrong road; third, harboring doubt about the right road. One who goes toward liberation likewise has three similar obstructions: because of the view of a real person he dreads liberation (dreading that the “I” will be gone) and will not set out; because of the grasping at rules and observances he clings to a wrong path and loses the right road; because of doubt he is deeply irresolute about the right path. The Buddha would show that the stream-enterer has forever abandoned these three obstructions to going toward liberation, and so he speaks of abandoning three.

The Buddha again, in another sūtra, as he spoke of favoring the lower part, speaks also of five kinds favoring the upper part. The stanza says:

〔Root 45〕The Five Fetters of the Upper Part: Five Cords That Keep One in the Upper Two Realms

Stanza: The fetters favoring the upper part are also five — the greed of the form realm and the greed of the formless realm, these two greeds, together with restlessness, pride, and ignorance, because they make sentient beings unable to pass beyond the upper realms.

Treatise: If these five kinds are not yet abandoned, they can make sentient beings unable to pass beyond the upper realms; they have the function of favoring and benefiting the upper realms, and so are called the fetters favoring the upper part.

The fetters have now been adjudged. What then is a bond? The stanza says:

〔Root 46 · First Line〕The Three Bonds: Why Only Three Bonds Are Established

Stanza: There are three bonds, established in accordance with the three feelings.

Treatise: There are three kinds of bond — first the bond of greed, meaning all greed; second the bond of hatred, meaning all hatred; third the bond of delusion, meaning all delusion.

Why are only these three spoken of as bonds? Answer: because it is in accordance with the three feelings that bonds are said to be three. That is to say: with regard to pleasant feeling it is the bond of greed that increases by attachment upon it — increasing by attachment as its object and increasing by attachment as associated with it, both kinds of increase by attachment being present. With regard to painful feeling it is hatred, and with regard to neutral feeling delusion, and these should be known to be likewise.

Although with regard to neutral feeling there are greed and hatred as well, they are not as delusion is (delusion being the most fitting with regard to neutral feeling), and so they are not established. This is a settled statement made from the side of one’s own continuum, taking the three feelings, pleasant and the rest, as the object of the bonds.

The bonds have now been analyzed. What then is a latent tendency? The stanza says:

〔Root 46 · Second Line〕The Latent Tendencies: They Have Been Spoken of Above

Stanza: The latent tendencies have been spoken of above.

Treatise: The latent tendencies are six, or seven, or ten, or ninety-eight, all as was said above (the six latent tendencies opened out into seven, opened out again into ten, and opened out again by the five categories in the three realms into ninety-eight).

The latent tendencies having thus been spoken of, what then is a secondary affliction? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 46〕Secondary Afflictions: One General Name and One Particular Name

Stanza: The secondary afflictions are the remaining defiled mental factors besides these root afflictions, gathered under the aggregate of formations.

Treatise: These root afflictions themselves are also called secondary afflictions, because they all follow along after mind and do the work of harassing it.

Besides these there is another set of dharmas different from the root afflictions, which are defiled mental factors gathered under the aggregate of formations; because they arise along with the afflictions they too are called secondary afflictions, but they are not called afflictions, since they are not roots.

Their marks will be laid out at length in the Miscellaneous Matters (the chapter on miscellaneous matters later in this treatise), and will be spoken of summarily further on.

As for the set gathered under the entanglements and the grimes of affliction, one ought first to adjudge what the marks of the entanglements are. The stanza says:

〔Root 47 · Root 48 · First Half of Root 49〕The Ten Entanglements, and from Where Each Entanglement Flows Out

Stanza: There are eight entanglements — non-conscience, shamelessness, envy, avarice, regret, sleep, restlessness, and torpor; or they are reckoned as ten, with rage and concealment added. Non-conscience, avarice, and restlessness are all produced from greed; shamelessness, sleep, and torpor arise from ignorance; envy and rage arise from hatred; regret arises from doubt; and as for concealment, there are divergent accounts.

Treatise: The root afflictions themselves are also called entanglements, because the sūtra has spoken of “the entanglement of greed for the objects of desire” as serving as a condition.

In point of number, however, there are two schools: the Treatise on Categories of Dharmas says there are eight entanglements; the Vaibhāṣika school says there are ten entanglements, that is, upon the eight above are added rage and concealment.

The names glossed one by one: the two of non-conscience and shamelessness have been explained above. Envy is that which, at the various flourishing affairs of others, makes one’s own mind unglad. Avarice is that which, being contrary to “the giving of goods, the giving of dharma, and the giving of skill,” makes the mind grudge and cling. Regret is just the regret over the evil deed done (remorse over what has been done or not done), which has been adjudged above. Sleep is that which has for its nature the making of the mind murky and slight (dim and not keen), having no force to sustain this body. Note that these two entanglements, regret and sleep, take only the defiled portion (wholesome remorse and wholesome sleep do not count). Restlessness and torpor are also as explained above. That which, apart from hatred and harmfulness, makes the mind flare up toward the sentient and the insentient is called rage. The hiding away of one’s own sin is called concealment.

Among these ten entanglements spoken of, the assignment of homogeneous outflow (the same class flowing out from a given root affliction) is: non-conscience, avarice, and restlessness are the homogeneous outflow of greed; shamelessness, sleep, and torpor are the homogeneous outflow of ignorance; envy and rage are the homogeneous outflow of hatred; regret is the homogeneous outflow of doubt. As for concealment, there are three houses with divergent accounts: some say concealment is the homogeneous outflow of greed; some say it is the homogeneous outflow of ignorance; some say it is the homogeneous outflow of both greed and ignorance together. These three houses answer severally to the two sides of “knowing” and “not knowing” — assigning concealment to greed is said from the side of his having knowledge in his heart (knowing his sin and hiding it deliberately); assigning it to ignorance is said from the side of his having no knowledge; assigning it to both takes both sides. Each in its own order has its own point of view.

As for the remaining grimes of affliction, what again are their marks? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 49 · Root 50〕The Six Grimes of Affliction and Where They Come From

Stanza: There are six grimes of affliction — vexation, harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deception, and self-intoxication. Deception and self-intoxication are produced from greed, harmfulness and resentment arise from hatred, vexation arises from the grasping at views, and flattery is produced from the views.

Treatise: Vexation is the stubborn holding fast to those sinful matters of one’s own; and because of this one cannot take in reasonable admonition and instruction. Harmfulness is the being able to press hard upon others; and because of this one is able to perform beating and reviling and the like. Resentment is, upon the matter that was the object of rage, pondering it over and over again, binding up enmity and not being willing to let it go. Flattery is the crookedness of the mind; and because of this one cannot display oneself as one truly is — either denying by twisted means, or laying down various devices so that another cannot understand. Deception is the deluding of others. Self-intoxication has been explained above (being defiled by attachment to one’s own flourishing affairs, so that the mind is lifted up).

These six kinds are all produced from the afflictions, and the mark of their defilement is coarse and manifest, and so they are called grimes of affliction.

Among these six grimes of affliction, the assignment of homogeneous outflow is: deception and self-intoxication are the homogeneous outflow of greed; harmfulness and resentment are the homogeneous outflow of hatred; vexation is the homogeneous outflow of the grasping at views; flattery is the homogeneous outflow of the views. This last item has a proof from a sūtra — just as the sūtra says, “what is called crookedness? It is the evil views”; and so flattery is decidedly the homogeneous outflow of the views.

This set of grimes of affliction, together with the entanglements above, all arise from the root afflictions, and so all are given the name of “secondary affliction.”

Then this set of grimes and entanglements — are they abandoned through the path of seeing or through the path of cultivation? The stanza says:

〔Root 51〕The Gate of Abandonment for the Entanglements and Grimes: Five Extend to Both, the Rest Are Abandoned through Cultivation Alone

Stanza: Of the ten entanglements, the five of non-conscience, shamelessness, sleep, torpor, and restlessness extend to what is abandoned through seeing and to what is abandoned through cultivation; the rest (and the six grimes of affliction), because they arise of themselves, are abandoned through cultivation alone.

Treatise: Among the ten entanglements, the five of non-conscience and the rest extend to what is abandoned through seeing and to what is abandoned through cultivation, because these five can arise in association with the afflictions of both categories, that abandoned through seeing and that abandoned through cultivation. According to whichever truth’s abandoned affliction it is associated with, it is said to be abandoned through seeing that truth.

The rest — envy, avarice, regret, rage, concealment, together with the six grimes of affliction — because they arise of themselves, are abandoned through cultivation alone. What is called arising of themselves means that they are associated only with the “ignorance dependent on another” that is abandoned through cultivation (the solitary ignorance that arises apart, not in association with a root affliction), and do not rely upon a root affliction abandoned through seeing for company; and so they are called arising of themselves.

This set of secondary afflictions — to which of the qualities, wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate, does each extend? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 52〕The Gate of the Three Ethical Qualities: Three in the Desire Realm Extend to Two, the Upper Realms Are Indeterminate Throughout

Stanza: The three affiliated to the desire realm extend to the two qualities of unwholesome and indeterminate; the rest are evil alone; those of the upper two realms are indeterminate throughout.

Treatise: The three affiliated to the desire realm — sleep, torpor, and restlessness — all extend to the two qualities of unwholesome and indeterminate; all the rest are unwholesome alone. Within the upper two realms, those that are present as is fitting are all gathered under the indeterminate quality alone (the upper realms having nothing unwholesome).

This set of secondary afflictions — to which realm is each affiliated? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 52〕The Gate of Realm-Affiliation: Flattery and Deception Extend to the First Meditative Absorption, Three Extend to the Three Realms

Stanza: Flattery and deception extend to the desire realm and the first meditative absorption; the three of torpor, restlessness, and self-intoxication extend to the three realms; the rest are in the desire realm alone.

Treatise: Flattery and deception are only in the desire realm and the first meditative absorption. How is it known that the Brahmā world (the first meditative absorption) also has flattery and deception? Because the great Brahmā king once concealed the facts of his own condition, and put forth an appearance in order to delude the monk Aśvajit. These two, although they were analyzed above, are adjudged over again here because the sense is connected.

The three of torpor, restlessness, and self-intoxication extend to the three realms. All the rest are in the desire realm alone — that is, of the sixteen (the ten entanglements plus the six grimes), the five already adjudged are as stated above, and the remaining eleven are affiliated to the desire realm alone.

The latent tendencies and the secondary afflictions have all been adjudged. Then among them, how many belong to the mental ground alone (arising in dependence upon the mental consciousness only)? How many extend to arising in dependence upon the ground of the six consciousnesses? The stanza says:

〔Root 53〕The Gate of the Ground of Consciousness: Which Are in the Mental Consciousness Alone, Which Extend to the Six

Stanza: All that is abandoned through seeing, pride, sleep, and the secondary afflictions that arise of themselves all arise in dependence upon the mental ground; the rest extend to a dependence upon the six consciousnesses.

Treatise: Speaking summarily, it should be known: among all the afflictions abandoned through seeing and the afflictions abandoned through cultivation, whatever is pride or sleep, and among the secondary afflictions those that arise of themselves — all these arise in dependence upon the mental consciousness, because in dependence upon the group of five consciousnesses there is no way for them to arise (the five consciousnesses cannot discriminate, and an affliction abandoned through seeing must arise in dependence upon discrimination).

All the rest extend to a dependence upon the six consciousnesses, that is, greed, hatred, and ignorance abandoned through cultivation, together with the secondary afflictions associated with them — namely non-conscience, shamelessness, torpor, restlessness, and the remaining secondary afflictions gathered under the factors of the great defiled ground — all of which can arise in dependence upon the group of six consciousnesses.

Of the five faculties of feeling, pleasure and the rest, adjudged above, and the afflictions and secondary afflictions now spoken of, which affliction is associated with which faculty? Here one ought first to adjudge the root afflictions. The stanza says:

〔Root 54 · Root 55〕The Feelings Associated with the Root Afflictions: The Glad Mode, the Dejected Mode, and Neutral Feeling

Stanza: Among the afflictions affiliated to the desire realm, greed is associated with the feeling of joy and the feeling of pleasure; hatred is associated with the feeling of sorrow and the feeling of pain; delusion is associated universally with the four foregoing feelings; wrong view is associated with the feeling of sorrow and the feeling of joy; doubt is associated with the feeling of sorrow; the remaining five (pride and the four views) are associated with the feeling of joy. And all the afflictions are associated with neutral feeling. The afflictions of the upper grounds, each as is fitting, are associated universally with the feelings of their own ground and their own consciousness.

Treatise: Among the afflictions affiliated to the desire realm —

Greed is associated with joy and pleasure, because it turns in the glad mode of apprehension and pervades the six consciousnesses. Hatred is associated with sorrow and pain, because it turns in the dejected mode of apprehension and pervades the six consciousnesses. Ignorance is associated universally with the four foregoing feelings, because it turns in both the glad and the dejected modes and pervades the six consciousnesses.

Wrong view extends to association with sorrow and joy, because it turns in both the glad and the dejected modes, but belongs to the mental ground alone. Why does wrong view turn in both the glad and the dejected modes? Because what he had formerly done was sinful action or meritorious action, and their order differs — one who had formerly done sin is glad in mind when wrong view arises (supposing that there is no retribution for sin), while one who had formerly done merit is dejected in mind when wrong view arises (supposing that the fruit of merit comes to nothing).

Doubt is associated with sorrow, because it turns in the dejected mode of apprehension and belongs to the mental ground alone — one who harbors irresolution in his heart is bent with all his mind upon seeking a settled knowing, and so his mind is downcast. The remaining four views and pride are associated with joy, because they turn in the glad mode of apprehension and belong to the mental ground alone.

The above states the association with feelings from the side of the particular mark. If association with feelings be stated from the side of the general mark, then all the afflictions are associated with neutral feeling — because the latent tendencies, at that stage where the continuum is about to be abandoned, have their force already spent and must abide in neutral feeling.

The desire realm being so, what of the upper grounds? Answer: all of them, as is fitting, are associated universally with the feelings that arise together with their own ground and their own consciousness. That is to say: if a given ground has four consciousnesses (the first meditative absorption having the four consciousnesses of eye, ear, body, and mind), then the afflictions arising from each of its consciousnesses are severally associated universally with the feelings of their own consciousness; and if certain grounds have the mental consciousness alone (the second meditative absorption and above), then the afflictions arising from that mental consciousness are associated universally with all the feelings the mental consciousness has. How many consciousnesses and feelings there are in the several grounds above has been adjudged already, and so it is not separately stated here.

The association of the afflictions with the feelings having been adjudged, one ought next to adjudge the secondary afflictions. The stanza says:

〔Root 56 · Root 57〕The Feelings Associated with the Secondary Afflictions: Sorrow, Joy, Pleasure, and the Four That Are Universally Associated

Stanza: Among the secondary afflictions, the six of envy, regret, rage, vexation, harmfulness, and resentment arise together with the feeling of sorrow; avarice is associated with the feeling of joy; the four of flattery, deception, sleep, and concealment extend to arising together with sorrow and joy; self-intoxication is associated with joy and pleasure; and all the above extend to neutral feeling besides; the remaining four (non-conscience, shamelessness, torpor, restlessness) are associated universally with the five feelings.

Treatise: Among the secondary afflictions, the six kinds of envy and the rest are all associated with the faculty of sorrow, because they turn in the dejected mode of apprehension and belong to the mental ground alone.

Avarice is associated with joy, because it turns in the glad mode of apprehension and belongs to the mental ground alone. Why is avarice of the glad mode? Because the mark of avarice is extremely like that of greed.

Flattery, deception, sleep, and concealment are associated with sorrow and joy, because they turn in both the glad and the dejected modes of apprehension, and belong to the mental ground alone. As for turning in both the glad and the dejected modes, this means: sometimes one performs flattery and the rest with a glad mind, and sometimes one performs them with a dejected mind.

Self-intoxication is associated with joy and pleasure, being of the glad mode and belonging to the mental ground alone. Within the third meditative absorption it is associated with pleasure, and in the grounds below with joy.

All the secondary afflictions spoken of above are associated with neutral feeling — because at the time when the continuum is about to be abandoned they all abide in neutral feeling, and because some of them extend to grounds having neutral feeling alone. Neutral feeling puts no bar upon association with any dharma, just as ignorance is associated universally with all.

The remaining four, non-conscience, shamelessness, torpor, and restlessness, are all associated universally with the five feelings — the first two being gathered under the factors of the great unwholesome ground (pervading every unwholesome mind), the latter two under the factors of the great defiled ground (pervading every defiled mind).

Among the afflictions and secondary afflictions spoken of, there is a further account given by another gate: the Buddha spoke of them as hindrances. One ought next to adjudge: what are the marks of a hindrance? The stanza says:

〔Root 58〕The Five Hindrances: In the Desire Realm Alone · Two Entities Gathered into One Hindrance · Five Because They Obstruct the Aggregates

Stanza: There are five hindrances, in the desire realm alone. Because food, counteragent, and function are the same, two entities are nevertheless established as one hindrance. Because they can obstruct the aggregates, the hindrances are five only.

Treatise: The Buddha in a sūtra says that there are five hindrances — first the hindrance of greed for the objects of desire, second the hindrance of ill will, third the hindrance of torpor-and-sleep, fourth the hindrance of restlessness-and-regret, fifth the hindrance of doubt.

Here a question of realm-affiliation is first asked: are the torpor, restlessness, and doubt spoken of here, like greed for the objects of desire, ill will, sleep, and regret, in the desire realm alone, or do they extend to the three realms? Answer: it should be known that these three too are in the desire realm alone. Because the sūtra says that these five kinds are purely and entirely an unwholesome heap. The form and formless realms have nothing unwholesome; and these five kinds being purely unwholesome, they are in the desire realm alone and not in the form or formless realms.

Next a question of opening and gathering is asked: why is it that the hindrance of torpor-and-sleep and the hindrance of restlessness-and-regret each have two entities, and yet are gathered together and established as one? Answer: because food, counteragent, and function are the same, they are gathered together and established as one.

First the three words are explained: food is what is eaten (that which can nourish it), also called provision. Counteragent is what counteracts (that which can counteract it), also called non-food. Function is the activity performed (the work it actually does), also called capability.

By this principle the sūtra makes an account of this kind —

Torpor and sleep, though they are two, have the same food and non-food. What is called the food of the hindrance of torpor-and-sleep? It is five dharmas: first murkiness (a dimness and dullness of spirit), second dissatisfaction, third yawning and stretching, fourth unevenness of diet (irregularity of food and drink), fifth dullness and inferiority of mind. What is called the non-food (the counteragent) of this hindrance? It is the ideation of light. The function of these two is likewise the same — both can make the nature of the mind sink and grow murky.

Restlessness and regret, though they are two, have the same food and non-food. What is called the food of the hindrance of restlessness-and-regret? It is four dharmas: first thought of kinsfolk (longing after relatives), second thought of one’s native land (longing after home country), third thought of not dying (supposing that one will not die and making long plans), fourth recollection of the various sport, mirth, merrymaking, and being waited upon formerly undergone. What is called the non-food of this hindrance? It is calm abiding. The function of these two is likewise the same — both can make the mind unquiet.

Because food, counteragent, and function are the same in the three, torpor-and-sleep and restlessness-and-regret are gathered two by two into one.

A third question: all the afflictions and the rest have the sense of covering over; why does the Tathāgata speak of these five only? Answer: because these five alone can be an eminent obstruction to the five aggregates (the aggregates of discipline, concentration, discernment, liberation, and the knowledge and vision of liberation, the five aggregates without outflows). That is to say: the hindrance of greed and the hindrance of ill will can obstruct the aggregate of discipline; torpor and sleep can obstruct the aggregate of discernment; restlessness and regret can obstruct the aggregate of concentration; and concentration and discernment being gone, doubt arises with regard to the four truths; and because of doubt they can make it that even liberation and the knowledge and vision of liberation do not arise. Therefore only these five are established as hindrances.

〔The Dispute over the Order〕If the sense of the sūtra be explained in this way, then restlessness-and-regret ought in principle to be spoken of before torpor-and-sleep — for it is necessarily in dependence upon concentration that discernment arises, and what obstructs concentration ought of course to come before what obstructs discernment.

Following this principle, there is another master’s account: among these five hindrances, torpor-and-sleep and restlessness-and-regret, in that order, are what obstruct the aggregate of concentration and the aggregate of discernment (the assignments being reversed, torpor-and-sleep obstructing concentration and restlessness-and-regret discernment, so that on this reading the existing order need not be altered). By this principle the sūtra makes an account of this kind — one who cultivates meditative poise (cultivating concentration) dreads torpor and sleep; one who cultivates the discernment of dharmas (cultivating discernment) dreads restlessness and regret.

There is besides another house that sets up a different account: these five only are established, for five further causes. What is their account? It is this: at the “stage of moving about” (the stage where one has not yet entered absorption and the six faculties move about among their objects), one first takes up, toward form and the other objects, the two marks of the lovable and the detestable; afterward, at the “stage of dwelling,” with the marks formerly taken up as cause, there arise the two hindrances of greed for the objects of desire and ill will. These two can obstruct the mind that is about to enter absorption. By this, at the stage where one is actually entering absorption, calm and insight cannot be well practiced, and so torpor-and-sleep and restlessness-and-regret arise, in that order obstructing calm abiding and insight so that they do not arise. By this, at the stage of emerging from absorption thereafter, when one considers the sense of the dharmas, doubt comes in its turn to be an obstruction. Therefore the hindrances established are these five only.

〔Chapter-Level Main Division〕From Here the Whole Chapter Turns to the Cessation of the Afflictions

Treatise (the transition): Now one thing should be considered: the all-pervading afflictions of another realm, and among those abandoned through seeing the truth of cessation and seeing the truth of the path the ones that take what has outflows for their object — at the stage where these afflictions are abandoned their object is not yet known, and when their object is known they were long since abandoned. For a set of afflictions such as these, by what cause is the abandoning? Whence it appears that it is not necessarily by fully comprehending the object that they are abandoned.

Then by how many causes in all are the afflictions abandoned? Answer: by four kinds of cause. Which four? The stanza says:

〔Root 59〕The Four Causes of Abandoning the Afflictions

Stanza: First, abandoned through fully comprehending their object; second, abandoned through abandoning what takes them as object; third, abandoned through abandoning their object; fourth, abandoned because the counteragent arises.

Treatise: First, the afflictions abandoned through seeing are abandoned by the three foregoing causes —

First, abandoned through fully comprehending their object: that is, among those abandoned through seeing the truth of suffering and seeing the truth of origination, the afflictions that take their own realm for their object, and among those abandoned through seeing the truth of cessation and seeing the truth of the path, the afflictions that take what is without outflows for their object (the object of these afflictions being just the field that is fully comprehended; the field being fully comprehended, the affliction is abandoned).

Second, abandoned through abandoning what takes them as object: that is, among those abandoned through seeing the truth of suffering and seeing the truth of origination, the afflictions that take another realm for their object. Because the afflictions that take their own realm as object are able to take them as object (the afflictions taking another realm as object being themselves taken as object by the afflictions that take their own realm as object), when what takes them as object is abandoned, what is taken as object is abandoned along with it.

Third, abandoned through abandoning their object: that is, among those abandoned through seeing the truth of cessation and seeing the truth of the path, the afflictions that take what has outflows for their object. Because the afflictions that take what is without outflows as object are able to be their field (this set of afflictions being themselves the object of the afflictions that take the outflowless as object), when their object is abandoned, what takes it as object is abandoned along with it.

As for the afflictions abandoned through cultivation, the abandoning is by the one remaining cause — that is, only by the fourth, “abandoned because the counteragent arises.” Because as soon as the counteracting path of a given grade arises, the afflictions within that grade are all at once wholly abandoned.

Then which grade of affliction has which as its counteragent? Answer: the afflictions of the highest of the high grades have the path of the lowest of the low grades for their counteragent; and so on down to the afflictions of the lowest of the low grades, which have the path of the highest of the high grades for their counteragent (the coarser and heavier the affliction, the earlier it is abandoned and the weaker the path used; the subtler the affliction, the later it is abandoned and the stronger the path used). Gates of sense such as this will be adjudged at length further on.

Of the counteragents spoken of, how many kinds are there in all? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 60〕The Four Kinds of Counteragent, and a Better Arrangement

Stanza: There are four kinds of counteragent — the counteragent of abandoning, the counteragent of upholding, the counteragent of distancing, and the counteragent of disgust.

Treatise: This gate of counteragents has four kinds in all —

First is the counteragent of abandoning, that is, the path of no interval (the path of the very moment when the affliction is being abandoned). Second is the counteragent of upholding, that is, the path after the path of no interval, since it can uphold the acquisition obtained by this abandonment (so that what has been abandoned is not lost again). Third is the counteragent of distancing, that is, all the paths after the path of liberation, since those paths can make the acquisition of the affliction abandoned here more distant still. There is another master’s account: the path of liberation itself also counts as a counteragent of distancing, since the path of liberation likewise can make the acquisition of the affliction abandoned here more distant. Fourth is the counteragent of disgust, that is, where there is a path that sees the faults of this realm and deeply gives rise to disgust.

These four kinds of counteragent, however, if they are to be well stated, ought in principle to stand in this order: first the counteragent of disgust, that is, the path of preparation arising with suffering and origination for its object; second the counteragent of abandoning, that is, the path of no interval arising with all (the four truths) for its object; third the counteragent of upholding, that is, the path of liberation arising with all for its object; fourth the counteragent of distancing, that is, the path of distinguished progress arising with all for its object.

The everlasting abandonment of the afflictions — from which side, in the end, is it decidedly to be had? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 60〕The Afflictions Are Abandoned from the Side of the Object

Stanza: It should be known that it is from the side of the object that the afflictions can be made to be abandoned.

Treatise: It should be known that when the afflictions come to their everlasting abandonment, they cannot be made to leave the dharmas associated with them (the associated dharmas being simultaneous and coexistent and not to be pried apart); they can only be made to depart from their object, so that they no longer arise toward that object.

“Abandoning future afflictions” — this principle passes well enough for the present, since they can be made not to arise toward their field again. But as for the past afflictions, how is their abandonment to be spoken of?

If it be said that the sense of the stanza’s line “from the side of the object” is to display “abandoned through fully comprehending the object,” that too is unreasonable, since it is not settled (as was said above, there are three kinds of affliction not abandoned through fully comprehending their object).

Hence it ought to be said thus: from what, decidedly, is the abandonment of the afflictions and the rest to be had? The abandonment of the afflictions and the rest within one’s own continuum is because the “acquisition” of them has been abandoned (the acquisition of the affliction being abandoned, the affliction no longer belongs to this body). As for the abandonment of the afflictions and the rest within another’s continuum, and of all form and all undefiled dharmas, it is because the afflictions within one’s own continuum that can take them as object have at last been completely abandoned (another’s afflictions are not abandoned by me; I abandon only that portion of mine which takes him as object).

Of the distancing spoken of, how many kinds of distance are there? The stanza says:

〔Root 61〕The Four Kinds of Distance, and Four Similes

Stanza: There are four kinds of distance — distance of mark, distance of counteragent, distance of place, and distance of time; like the four great elements, like keeping and breaking the discipline, like the eastern and western seas, and like the past and future ages, and the rest.

Treatise: It is transmitted that there are four kinds of distance in all —

First is distance of mark, like the four great elements: though they arise together within one mass (one mass of ultimate atoms), yet because their marks differ from one another they too are called distant. Second is distance of counteragent, like keeping and breaking the discipline: though they proceed together within one body, yet because they counteract one another they too are called distant. Third is distance of place, like the eastern sea and the western sea: though they are together within one world, yet because their quarters are separated they too are called distant. Fourth is distance of time, like the past age and the future age: though they are alike established upon one dharma, yet because their divisions of time are separated they too are called distant.

〔Four Rounds of Exchange〕Question: relative to what is distance spoken of? Answer: it is spoken of relative to the present age.

Objection: what has ceased with nothing intervening (the moment just gone by) and what is in the very act of arising (the moment about to arise) are closely adjacent to the present; how can they be called distant? Answer: because the natures of the “ages” differ, they obtain the name of distant; it is not that they must be separated by a long while and a great space to be called distant.

Further objection: if that is so, the present too ought to obtain the name of distant, since relative to the past and the future the nature of the age equally differs.

If it be said that the past and future ages have no activity, and are called distant because they are apart from activity — then as for the unconditioned dharmas, activity is said to be absent from them, and how is it that on the contrary they are called near?

If it be said that it is because the present can universally obtain the unconditioned that the unconditioned is called near — then the past and future ages ought to be alike (the present being able to obtain past and future dharmas as well). How much more so with the unconditioned that is empty space, of which there is no obtaining at all; how then is it called near?

If it be said that the past and the future, set against one another, are called distant because a present intervenes, while the present set against the two ages is closely adjacent to both, the unconditioned having no interval and so being all called near — then the past and future ages, being adjacent to the present age and yet separated when set against one another, ought to have both names, distant and near, and it ought not to be said flatly that they are distant alone.

〔The Close〕If one would go by correct principle, it ought to be said thus: the past and future ages are apart from the intrinsic mark of a dharma, and so are called distant — the future because it has not yet obtained the intrinsic mark of a dharma, the past because it has already cast off the intrinsic mark of a dharma.

As for the word “and the rest” in the stanza, it is to show that the instances raised are not yet exhausted.

It was said above that the abandonment of the afflictions is by the arising of the counteracting path; then when the path advances upward in distinguished progress, will the afflictions already abandoned be abandoned once again? And will the release from bondage already obtained be obtained anew? The stanza says:

〔Root 62〕The Afflictions Are Not Abandoned Again, but Release from Bondage Is Obtained Again — the Six Occasions of Obtaining Again

Stanza: There is no abandoning the afflictions a second time; release from bondage does have a repeated obtaining. That is, at the arising of the counteracting path, at the obtaining of a fruit, and at the sharpening of the faculties — within six occasions in all.

Treatise: If the afflictions meet with the path that can abandon them, then by that path these afflictions are all at once wholly abandoned, and there can decidedly be no principle of abandoning them again at a later time.

As for the release from bondage obtained, although there is no principle that “as the path gradually advances in distinguished progress the release from bondage improves along with it” (release from bondage being itself unconditioned, neither increasing nor decreasing), yet when the path is advancing in distinguished progress there may be the sense of arousing anew that eminent “acquisition” (the acquisition being conditioned and capable of becoming more eminent).

Of the repeated obtaining spoken of, how many occasions are there in all? Six occasions in all. Which six? They are the three classes of the arising of the counteracting path, the obtaining of a fruit, and the sharpening of the faculties. The occasion of the arising of the counteracting path refers to the path of liberation. The occasions of the obtaining of a fruit refer to the four, obtaining the fruit of stream-entry, the fruit of once-returning, the fruit of non-returning, and the fruit of arhatship. The occasion of the sharpening of the faculties refers to the time of turning the faculties (turning from dull faculties to sharp). Within these six occasions the release from bondage of the afflictions, as the path advances in distinguished progress, arouses anew an eminent acquisition.

The several releases from bondage, however, are also to be known as is fitting to each: there are those that have all six occasions arousing an eminent acquisition, and so on down to those that have two occasions only.

Having six occasions: the release from bondage of what is abandoned through seeing the four truths as affiliated to the desire realm, and of what is abandoned through seeing the first three truths in the form and formless realms — all these are obtained with six occasions.

Having five occasions: the release from bondage of what is abandoned through seeing the truth of the path in the form and formless realms is obtained with five occasions only — because at the time when the counteracting path arises a fruit is obtained at the same moment (the last moment of the path of seeing being itself the obtaining of the fruit of stream-entry), and it ought not to be divided here into two occasions. The release from bondage of the first five grades abandoned through cultivation in the desire realm is likewise obtained with five occasions, since the one, the fruit of stream-entry, must be deducted (that fruit having long since been obtained when the five grades of the afflictions of cultivation in the desire realm are abandoned).

Having four occasions: the release from bondage of the sixth grade is obtained with four occasions only — that is, one more is deducted from the five above, because the obtaining of a fruit (the fruit of once-returning) and the arising of the counteracting path are one and the same occasion, without division. The seventh and eighth grades are likewise obtained with four occasions, since of the four obtainings of a fruit the first two must be deducted (stream-entry and once-returning having been obtained already).

Having three occasions: the release from bondage of the ninth grade is obtained with three occasions only — that is, one more is deducted from the four above, likewise because at the time when the counteracting path arises a fruit is obtained at the same moment (the fruit of non-returning). Among what is abandoned through cultivation in the form and formless realms, apart from the ninth grade of the summit of existence, the remaining releases from bondage are likewise obtained with three occasions, since of the four obtainings of a fruit the first three must be deducted.

Having two occasions: the ninth grade of the summit of existence is obtained with two occasions only — that is, one more is deducted from within the three above, likewise because at the time when the counteracting path arises a fruit is obtained at the same moment (the fruit of arhatship).

What is said above is only an account made from the side of “what may be.” For a man of sharp faculties must, at each of the several stages above, deduct that one occasion obtained by sharpening the faculties (one of sharp faculties not sharpening them at all); and those who enter the noble path by leaping (realization by leaping) must likewise, as is fitting, deduct the occasion of the fruit of stream-entry and the rest.

It is just these releases from bondage that, at each several stage, obtain the name of “full comprehension.” Full comprehension is of two kinds: first the full comprehension that is cognition, second the full comprehension that is abandonment. The full comprehension that is cognition refers to the cognition without outflows (the cognition that can fully comprehend). The full comprehension that is abandonment refers to those very “abandonments” — this being the establishing of the name of the cause upon the result (abandonment being the result of cognition, and yet called by the cognition’s name of “full comprehension”).

Then are all the abandonments established together as one full comprehension? Answer: they are not. How then? The stanza says:

〔Root 63 · First Half of Root 64〕How the Nine Full Comprehensions That Are Abandonment Are Counted Out

Stanza: There are nine full comprehensions that are abandonment. In the desire realm the abandonment of the first two categories establishes one, and the next two categories each establish one, making three together; in the upper realms it is likewise three. The rest are the three of the exhaustion of the five fetters of the lower part, the exhaustion of craving for form, and the exhaustion of all fetters.

Treatise: The abandonments are established together as nine kinds of full comprehension — that is, the abandonment of the afflictions and the rest that are abandoned through seeing the truths as affiliated to the three realms establishes six full comprehensions; and the abandonment of the remaining afflictions and the rest that are abandoned through the path of cultivation in the three realms establishes three full comprehensions.

First: how is it that the abandonment of the afflictions and the rest abandoned through seeing the truths as affiliated to the three realms establishes six? That is, the abandonment of the first two categories as affiliated to the desire realm establishes one full comprehension — “the first two categories” displays what is abandoned through seeing the truth of suffering and seeing the truth of origination; and the abandonment of the next two categories each establishes one full comprehension — “the next two categories” displays what is abandoned through seeing the truth of cessation and seeing the truth of the path. Thus the abandonment of the afflictions and the rest abandoned through seeing the truths in the desire realm establishes three full comprehensions.

As with the three of the desire realm, so likewise with the upper realms — that is, for what is affiliated to the two realms of form and the formless, likewise the abandonment of the first two categories establishes one and the next two each establish one, making three together; which is to say that the abandonments of the dharmas abandoned through seeing suffering and origination, through seeing cessation, and through seeing the path are gathered together and established as three (the upper two realms being reckoned together and not divided into two realms). This is called the six kinds of full comprehension of the abandonment of the dharmas abandoned through seeing the truths in the three realms.

Next: how is it that the abandonment of the remaining afflictions and the rest abandoned through the path of cultivation as affiliated to the three realms establishes three? That is, the abandonment of the afflictions and the rest abandoned through the path of cultivation as affiliated to the desire realm establishes one full comprehension — it should be known that this is “the full comprehension of the exhaustion of the five fetters of the lower part,” since it is established together with the foregoing (the three abandoned through seeing the truths in the desire realm). The abandonment of the afflictions and the rest abandoned through the path of cultivation as affiliated to the form realm establishes one full comprehension — it should be known that this is “the full comprehension of the exhaustion of craving for form.” The abandonment of the afflictions and the rest abandoned through the path of cultivation as affiliated to the formless realm establishes one full comprehension, namely “the full comprehension of the everlasting exhaustion of all fetters”; and this one too is established together with the foregoing. This is called the three kinds of full comprehension of the abandonment of the dharmas abandoned through the path of cultivation in the three realms.

Question: for what cause must the abandonment of the afflictions and the rest abandoned through the path of cultivation in the form realm and the formless realm establish full comprehensions separately, while that of what is abandoned through seeing does not do so separately (what is abandoned through seeing in the upper two realms being gathered into three)? Answer: because the counteragents of what is abandoned through cultivation are not the same (the afflictions of cultivation in the form realm and in the formless realm having each their own counteracting path, while for what is abandoned through seeing the upper two realms share one counteragent).

Of the nine kinds of full comprehension thus established, one ought to adjudge which of them are the result of which path. The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 64 · Root 65 · Root 66〕Whose Result Each of the Nine Full Comprehensions Is

Stanza: Among these nine, six are the result of receptivity and the remaining three are the result of cognition. The result of access concentration is all nine; the result of the fundamental meditative absorptions is five or eight. The result of the marginal ground of the formless is one alone, and the first three fundamental formless grounds likewise one alone. The result of the mundane path is two, the result of the noble path is nine. The result of the cognition of dharma is three, the result of subsequent cognition is two. The result of the class of the cognition of dharma is six, the result of the class of subsequent cognition is five.

Treatise: Among these nine, one ought first to adjudge the difference of their being the result of the path of receptivity or of the path of cognition.

Six are the result of receptivity, namely the six full comprehensions that are the abandonment of the dharmas abandoned through seeing as affiliated to the three realms. Three are the result of cognition, namely the three full comprehensions of the exhaustion of the lower part, the exhaustion of craving for form, and the exhaustion of all fetters, since these three full comprehensions are the result of the path of cultivation.

Question: how can the result of receptivity be called full comprehension (full comprehension being properly the result of cognition)? Answer: because all the receptivities are the retinue of cognition, just as the retinue of a king is likewise conventionally given the name of the king; or else, because receptivity and cognition obtain one and the same result.

One ought next to adjudge the difference of their being the result of the retinue (the access) or of the fundamental of the grounds of meditative absorption.

The result of access to the meditative absorptions is all nine — because in dependence upon access concentration one can abandon the afflictions and the rest abandoned through seeing and through cultivation in the three realms. The result of the fundamental meditative absorptions is five or eight.

As for what is called “five,” that is what the Vaibhāṣika masters say: the fundamental grounds of meditative absorption can only forever abandon the afflictions and the rest gathered under the form and formless realms, while as for the abandonment of the afflictions and the rest affiliated to the desire realm, they grant that to be the result of access concentration alone.

As for what is called “eight,” that is what the Venerable Ghoṣa says: the fundamental grounds of meditative absorption can also serve as counteragents of abandonment for the afflictions and the rest of the desire realm. For whoever has first become free of defilement in the desire realm, when he enters upon the seeing of the truths (the path of seeing) in dependence upon a fundamental ground, in respect of the abandonment of the dharmas abandoned through seeing as affiliated to the desire realm, it is granted that a separate path draws forth the acquisition without outflows, and by this that too is the result of his path of seeing. Only the “full comprehension of the exhaustion of the five fetters of the lower part” must be deducted, since that one is the result of access concentration alone, the fundamental grounds having no way to cultivate the counteragent of its abandonment. As for the intermediate meditative absorption, it is to be spoken of as the fundamental meditative absorptions are.

One ought next to adjudge the difference of their being the result of the retinue or of the fundamental of the formless grounds.

The result of the marginal ground of the formless (the access of the sphere of boundless space) is one alone, namely the obtaining, in dependence upon the path of the access ground of the sphere of space, of the result that is the full comprehension of the exhaustion of craving for form. The result of the first three fundamental formless grounds is likewise one alone, namely the obtaining, in dependence upon the first three fundamental formless grounds, of the result that is the full comprehension of the exhaustion of all fetters.

One ought next to adjudge the difference of their being the result of the mundane path or of the noble paths. The result of the mundane path is two, because the force of the mundane path can obtain only the two resultant full comprehensions of the exhaustion of the lower part and the exhaustion of craving for form. The result of the noble path is nine, because the force of the noble path can forever abandon the dharmas of all three realms.

One ought next to adjudge the difference of their being the result of the cognition of dharma or of subsequent cognition. The result of the cognition of dharma is three, because the force of the cognition of dharma can abandon the afflictions abandoned through cultivation in the three realms and obtain the latter three results. The result of subsequent cognition is two, because the force of subsequent cognition can forever abandon only the afflictions abandoned through cultivation in the form and formless realms and obtain the latter two results.

One ought next to adjudge the difference of their being the result of the paths of the same class as the cognition of dharma and as subsequent cognition. The result of the class of the cognition of dharma is six, namely the six results obtained by the foregoing cognition of dharma and receptivity of dharma. The result of the class of subsequent cognition is five, namely the five results obtained by the foregoing subsequent cognition and subsequent receptivity. The word “class” has the sense of gathering in both cognition and receptivity.

Then why is it that a full comprehension is not established separately for each several abandonment, but they are established only upon those nine stages above? The stanza says:

〔Root 67〕The Four Conditions for Establishing Nine and Not More

Stanza: By obtaining the acquisition of abandonment without outflows, by being deficient in the first existence, by the removal of the twofold cause, and by crossing the realm — by these four conditions the nine kinds of full comprehension are established.

Treatise: Although the abandonment of dharmas with outflows has many entities and stages (the abandonment of each several grade being an entity of its own), yet by reason of four conditions only nine kinds of full comprehension are established.

First, the six that are the result of receptivity are established by three conditions — that is, obtaining the acquisition of release from bondage without outflows, being deficient in the summit of existence, and the removal of the twofold cause. The abandonments must have these three conditions fully present to be given the name of full comprehension, and where one is wanting they are not so established.

Verifying stage by stage: as at the stage of an ordinary being, there is the removal of the twofold cause (the mundane path too being able to remove the all-pervading causes), and yet there is no acquisition of abandonment without outflows, nor yet any deficiency in the summit of existence; and so although abandonment too is obtained, it is not called full comprehension. If one be at the stage of a noble one, then from entering upon the seeing of the truths up to before the receptivity of the subsequent kind concerning suffering becomes active, although the acquisition of abandonment without outflows has been obtained, yet there is no deficiency in the summit of existence and no removal of the twofold cause. At the stage of the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning suffering and the receptivity of the dharma kind concerning origination, although the summit of existence is deficient, yet the twofold cause has not been removed — because the all-pervading causes abandoned through seeing origination have not yet been abandoned. At the stages of the cognition of dharma and subsequent cognition that follow, the abandonments there obtained have the three conditions fully present, and so at each several stage a full comprehension is established.

Next, the three that are the result of cognition are established by four conditions — that is, upon the three above is added “crossing the realm.” What is called crossing the realm means that the afflictions and the other dharmas within this realm have all been wholly departed from.

There is another account: “departure from what is bound together with it” also counts as a condition, so that the conditions for establishing a full comprehension are five in all. What is called departure from what is bound together with it means that although this abandonment has been made it is not yet established as a full comprehension: the remaining afflictions that take this field as object must also be departed from before it can be established.

The choice of this treatise is: this departure from what is bound together with it does not differ in function from the two conditions of the removal of the twofold cause and of crossing the realm, and so, although it differs in sense, it is not separately established.

At the last a distinction is added: although every stage of crossing the realm has at the same time removed the twofold cause, yet at the time of removing the twofold cause it is not always a crossing of the realm; and so crossing the realm must be established as a condition apart from the removal of the twofold cause — because when the twofold cause of three grounds is removed a full comprehension is still not established (the all-pervading causes abandoned through seeing origination being removed and yet, the realm not being crossed, no full comprehension established).

Then who possesses how many full comprehensions? The stanza says:

〔Root 68〕Who Possesses How Many Full Comprehensions

Stanza: One abiding at the stage of the seeing of the truths possesses none, or possesses one up to five; at the stage of the path of cultivation he possesses six, or one, or two; at the stage beyond training he possesses one alone.

Treatise: An ordinary being decidedly has no principle of possessing a full comprehension.

If a noble one abides at the stage of the seeing of the truths (the fifteen minds of the path of seeing): from the very beginning up to the time of the receptivity of the dharma kind concerning suffering and origination, he does not yet possess any of the full comprehensions. At the cognition of the dharma kind concerning origination and the receptivity of the subsequent kind concerning origination, he possesses one only. At the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning origination and the receptivity of the dharma kind concerning cessation, he thereupon possesses two. At the cognition of the dharma kind concerning cessation and the receptivity of the subsequent kind concerning cessation, he thereupon possesses three. At the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning cessation and the receptivity of the dharma kind concerning the path, he thereupon possesses four. At the cognition of the dharma kind concerning the path and the receptivity of the subsequent kind concerning the path, he thereupon possesses five.

Abiding at the stage of the path of cultivation: taking the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning the path as the first, up to one not yet wholly free of defilement in the desire realm, and one who has fallen back from freedom from desire — all these possess six.

One who has become wholly free of defilement in the desire realm while his craving for form is not yet exhausted, or one previously free of desire who from the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning the path has not yet aroused the path of the distinguished fruit that exhausts craving for form — all these possess one full comprehension only, namely the exhaustion of the lower part. One who from the exhaustion of craving for form or from the stage beyond training falls back and arouses the entanglements of form likewise possesses one, the same as was said above.

One who has craving for form, from the everlasting exhaustion of craving for form, and one previously free of form, from the arousing of the path exhausting craving for form, up to before he is wholly free of craving for the formless, possesses two, the exhaustion of the lower part and the exhaustion of craving for form. One who falls back from the stage beyond training and arouses the entanglements of the formless realm likewise possesses two full comprehensions, whose names are as stated above.

One abiding at the stage beyond training possesses one alone, namely the full comprehension of the everlasting exhaustion of all fetters.

Then why is it that at the fruit of non-returning and the fruit of arhatship the abandonments are gathered together and established as one full comprehension? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 69〕The Two Conditions for Gathering Together into One Full Comprehension

Stanza: Because of crossing the realm and because of obtaining a fruit, at these two places the abandonments are gathered together into one full comprehension.

Treatise: It is because two conditions are fully present that at all the abandonments they are gathered together and established as one full comprehension: first crossing the realm, second obtaining a fruit. Only those two stages (the fruit of non-returning and the fruit of arhatship) have these two conditions fully present, and so the full comprehensions at those two places are gathered together into one.

Then who loses and who obtains, and how many kinds of full comprehension in each case? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 69〕Losing and Obtaining, and the Close of the Whole Chapter

Stanza: What is lost is one, two, five, or six; what is obtained is likewise so, only “obtaining five” being excepted.

Treatise: What is called “losing one” refers to one who, from the stage beyond training or from the stage of the exhaustion of craving for form, falls back from complete freedom from desire.

What is called “losing two” refers to the time when a non-returner, from the stage of the exhaustion of craving for form, arouses the entanglements of the desire realm and falls back, and also the time when he attains the fruit of arhatship.

What is called “losing five” refers to one previously free of defilement in the desire realm who afterward enters upon the seeing of the truths, at the time of the cognition of the subsequent kind concerning the path — at that time he obtains the one full comprehension of the exhaustion of the lower part and loses the five before it.

What is called “losing six” refers to the time when any noble one not yet free of desire obtains freedom from desire.

“What is obtained is likewise so” means that there is obtaining one, obtaining two, and obtaining six, only obtaining five being excepted.

What is called “obtaining one” refers to obtaining what was not obtained before, and to one who from the stage beyond training arouses the entanglements of form and falls back.

What is called “obtaining two” refers to the time when one from the stage beyond training arouses the entanglements of the formless realm and falls back.

What is called “obtaining six” refers to one who falls back from the stage of non-returning.

The “abandonment” analyzed incidentally for the sake of adjudging the latent tendencies is here brought to an end.

俱舍論 白話全本 · 冊5Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Complete Vernacular · Vol. 5

隨眠體·諸門分別（前五門）The Nature of the Latent Tendencies · Distinctions through the Several Gates (the First Five Gates)

〔正1〕隨眠是諸有的根本——六種隨眠

〔正2〕六開為七——有貪之名為什麼只安在上二界

〔正3〕六開為十——五見與五非見

〔正4·正5〕十開為九十八——行·部·界三重差別

〔正6〕見斷修斷不是死板的——有頂與八地的分別

〔正7〕五見各自的體

〔正8〕非因計因為什麼唯是見苦所斷

〔正9〕四顛倒的體：從三見而立

〔正10〕七慢與九慢類·聖者不現行的那一分

〔正11〕聖者身中有而不起的理由

〔正12·正13〕門一·遍行與非遍行

〔正14至正16〕門二·緣有漏與緣無漏

〔正17·正18〕門三·所緣隨增與相應隨增

〔正19〕門四·不善與無記

〔正20前半〕門五之一·三不善根

〔正20後半·正21〕門五之二·無記根三與外方之四

〔正22〕門五之附·四種記門

〔Root 1〕The Latent Tendencies Are the Root of the Several Existences — the Six Latent Tendencies

〔Root 2〕Six Opened into Seven — Why the Name “Craving for Existence” Is Fixed Only upon the Upper Two Realms

〔Root 3〕Six Opened into Ten — the Five Views and the Five That Are Not Views

〔Roots 4 and 5〕Ten Opened into Ninety-Eight — the Threefold Difference of Mode · Category · Realm

〔Root 6〕Abandonment by Seeing and by Cultivation Is Not Rigid — the Distinction of the Summit of Existence and the Eight Levels

〔Root 7〕The Entity of Each of the Five Views

〔Root 8〕Why Holding What Is Not a Cause to Be a Cause Is Abandoned by Seeing Suffering Alone

〔Root 9〕The Entity of the Four Inversions: Set Up from Three Views

〔Root 10〕The Seven Prides and the Nine Classes of Pride · the Portion in Which the Noble One Is Not Active

〔Root 11〕The Reason They Are in the Noble One and Yet Do Not Arise

〔Roots 12 and 13〕Gate One · All-Pervading and Not All-Pervading

〔Roots 14 through 16〕Gate Two · Taking as Object What Has Outflows and What Is without Outflows

〔Roots 17 and 18〕Gate Three · Increase by Attachment through the Object and through Association

〔Root 19〕Gate Four · The Unwholesome and the Indeterminate

〔First Half of Root 20〕Gate Five, Part One · The Three Unwholesome Roots

〔Second Half of Root 20 and Root 21〕Gate Five, Part Two · The Three Indeterminate Roots and the Four of the Masters of Other Regions

〔Root 22〕Appendix to Gate Five · The Four Gates of Determination

惑能繫·三世實有·惑隨增·漏瀑流軛取How the Afflictions Bind · Real Existence in the Three Times · Increase by Attachment · Outflows, Torrents, Yokes, and Appropriations

〔正23·正24〕何等隨眠能繫何事——自相惑與共相惑於三世之繫縛

〔正25〕三世實有之立宗——二教證與二理證

〔正26〕建立三世之四家——類、相、位、待，而以『約作用』為最善

〔正27〕逐句廣破——何礙用、用云何、無異世便壞、有誰未生滅

〔引頌·非本頌〕許法體恒有

〔引頌後之長行〕經部之總答——曾有、當有

〔正28〕斷而非離繫

〔正29–31〕十六法為十六識之所緣

〔攝頌·非本頌〕重攝十六法十六識

〔正32〕有隨眠心有二

〔正33〕十隨眠依次第而生

〔正34〕煩惱生起之三因緣

〔正35–38〕漏、瀑流、軛、取之體與物數

〔正39〕隨眠等名之訓詁

〔Root 23 · Root 24〕Which Latent Tendencies Can Bind Which Things — the Binding by Afflictions of Individual and of Common Characteristic across the Three Times

〔Root 25〕The Establishing of Real Existence in the Three Times — Two Proofs from Teaching and Two from Principle

〔Root 26〕The Four Masters Who Establish the Three Times — Class, Mark, Position, and Relation, with “by Function” the Best

〔Root 27〕The Refutation at Length, Line by Line — What Obstructs the Function, What Time the Function Is, If There Is No Distinction Time Collapses, and Who Is Unarisen or Ceased

〔Quoted Stanza · Not a Root Stanza〕Granting That the Entity of a Dharma Exists Constantly

〔Prose Following the Quoted Stanza〕The Sautrāntikas’ Comprehensive Answer — Having Once Been, and Being to Be

〔Root 28〕Abandoned and Yet Not Released from Bondage

〔Roots 29–31〕The Sixteen Dharmas as the Objects of the Sixteen Consciousnesses

〔Summary Stanza · Not a Root Stanza〕Gathering Again the Sixteen Dharmas and the Sixteen Consciousnesses

〔Root 32〕A Mind Possessed of Latent Tendencies Is of Two Kinds

〔Root 33〕The Ten Latent Tendencies Arise in Due Order

〔Root 34〕The Three Causes and Conditions of the Arising of an Affliction

〔Roots 35–38〕The Entity and the Number of Items of the Outflows, Torrents, Yokes, and Appropriations

〔Root 39〕The Glosses on the Names “Latent Tendency” and the Rest

結縛纏垢·五蓋·斷惑遍知Fetters, Bonds, Entanglements, and Grime · The Five Hindrances · Abandoning the Afflictions and Full Comprehension

〔正40前半〕為什麼同一批煩惱還要再換五個名目

〔正40後半·正41·正42〕九結，以及嫉慳兩個為什麼被抬進結裡

〔正43·正44〕五順下分結：兩個把你留住，三個把你拉回來

〔正45〕五順上分結：留在上二界的五條線

〔正46·一句〕三縛：為什麼縛只立三個

〔正46·二句〕隨眠：前面已經說過了

〔正46後半〕隨煩惱：一個通名與一個別名

〔正47·正48·正49前半〕十纏，以及每一個纏從哪裡流出來

〔正49後半·正50〕六種煩惱垢與它們的出處

〔正51〕纏垢的斷門：五個通見修二斷，其餘唯修所斷

〔正52前半〕三性門：欲界三個通二性，上界一律無記

〔正52後半〕界繫門：諂誑通到初靜慮，三個通三界

〔正53〕識地門：哪些只在意識，哪些通六識

〔正54·正55〕本惑的受相應：歡行、慼行與捨受

俱舍論白話全本 · 冊5Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Complete Vernacular · Vol. 5