俱舍論 白話全本 · 冊4Abhidharmakośabhāṣya · Complete Vernacular · Vol. 4

〔Root 1〕Who Made the Manifold Differences of the World — Action

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): It has already been said above that the world of sentient beings and the receptacle world each have very many differences. Now it must next be asked: by what, after all, are these differences produced? The stanza says:

Stanza: The manifold differences of the world are produced by action. Action is volition, together with what volition brings about. Volition is mental action; what volition brings about refers to bodily action and verbal action.

Treatise: These differences do not arise from a single lord who first conceived them; they arise only because the actions of sentient beings severally differ.

Question: If that is so, then since both alike arise from action, why are outward things such as saffron and sandalwood so lovely and delightful, while the bodily form within a sentient being himself is the opposite of them (impure and repugnant)?

Answer: Because the class of actions of sentient beings is just so. If mixed actions are done (actions in which wholesome and unwholesome are mingled), what is obtained thereby is the bodily form within — from the nine sores (the two eyes, the two ears, the two nostrils, the mouth, and the passages of excretion) impurity constantly runs out. And in order to counteract just this portion of impurity, the same set of actions further obtains outward goods whose color, scent, taste, and touch are all most lovely and delightful. As for the hosts of gods, what they do is purely pure action, and so the two things they draw to themselves — the inner body and the outer goods — are both of them excellent.

Question: What, then, is the entity of this action that can produce the differences of the world?

Answer: It is the “volition” that arises in the mind, together with what volition brings about. Hence the sūtra says: there are two kinds of action, first the action that is volition, second the action of having willed; and the action of having willed refers to just what volition brings about.

Question: These two kinds of action are further divided into three, namely the bodily action, the verbal action, and the mental action of a sentient being. But on what ground are these three to be established? Are they established from their “support” (by what body one acts)? From their “own nature” (their own entity)? Or from what “raises” them (by what mind they are set going)?

Question (countering): Even granting you whichever of them you please, what obstacle is there?

Answer: The obstacle is this — if they were established from their support, there should be only one action, since all action arises in dependence upon the body. If they were established from their own nature, then only speech would be called action, since among the three, body, speech, and mind, speech alone is of itself an act of doing. If they were established from what raises them, there should likewise be only one action, since all action is raised by mind.

Treatise (the position of the Vaibhāṣikas): The Vaibhāṣika masters say: that the three actions can be established as three is by taking the three principles above, in that same order, each one for one — bodily action is established from its support, verbal action from its own nature, mental action from what raises it.

Treatise (what the author takes): This then makes it clear: the volition that arises in the mind is mental action; and the action that volition brings about divides into the two, bodily action and verbal action, since these are raised by volition.

Question: And what is the entity of these two, bodily action and verbal action? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 2〕Bodily and Verbal Action Both Extend to the Manifest and the Nonmanifest

Stanza: These two, bodily action and verbal action, both alike have the two natures of the “manifest” and the “nonmanifest.”

Treatise: It should be known that among the actions spoken of above, the two, bodily action and verbal action, both extend to manifest action and to nonmanifest action. (The manifest is that portion which can be displayed outwardly and is visible to others; the nonmanifest is that portion which arises along with it, is not displayed outwardly, and continues on.)

Question: Let us speak first of bodily manifest action and verbal manifest action: what are their characteristics? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 2 · Root 3 · Root 4〕Bodily Manifest Action Is Shape, Not Motion — the Two Great Disputes of Momentariness and of the Real Existence of Shape

Stanza: Bodily manifest action is granted to have a further kind of shape (long, short, square, round, and the other shape-forms) for its entity, and not to have motion for its entity. For all conditioned dharmas have moments and must come to perish. (Were cessation to await a cause,) then there should be no cessation without a cause — just as arising all awaits a cause and there is nothing that arises without a cause; and yet a thought, a flame, and a sound are plainly seen to cease of themselves, awaiting no cause. (Further, if cessation truly awaited a cause,) then the productive cause would be at once the extinguishing cause. (And further still,) shape is in fact not really existent, since if it were really existent it would incur the fault of one form being apprehended by two faculties, and since shape has no atoms of its own besides. As for verbal manifest action, it is granted to have vocal sound for its entity.

Treatise (the position of the Sarvāstivādins’ own school): By the force of volition, such and such a shape further arises in the body, and this is called bodily manifest action.

Treatise (recording a divergent account): Some other school says: it is “motion” that is called bodily manifest action, since when the body moves it is by action that it moves.

Treatise (the author refutes): It is in order to refute this account that the stanza says “not motion for its entity” — for all conditioned dharmas have moments (and since they cease as soon as they occur, there is no “motion” of shifting from here to there).

Question (from the school that holds motion to be bodily manifest action): What is called a moment?

Answer (the author): Having obtained its own entity, it perishes with not one thought-instant intervening; a dharma that has this nature is called “having a moment” — just as a man with a staff in his hand is called “having a staff.” Every conditioned dharma, as soon as it has obtained its own entity, must from that point, with not one thought-instant intervening, perish into nonexistence. And if it arises in this place it ceases in this place, and has no opportunity at all to shift from here to some other place — therefore one may not say that “motion” is called bodily manifest action.

Treatise (the school retreats a step to save its position): If it be said that all conditioned dharmas have moments, then of course the sense that “they cannot shift elsewhere” can be established (but on what ground do you say that all conditioned dharmas have moments?).

Treatise (the author answers): That all conditioned dharmas have moments is in principle thoroughly established — because they must in the end come to perish. That is to say: the “cessation” of a conditioned dharma awaits no cause. Why so? What awaits a cause is a “result”; and cessation is a kind of “nonexistence,” and a nonexistence is not a result, and so it awaits no cause. And since cessation awaits no cause, a thing ceases as soon as it has arisen. If the first thought-instant just arisen did not cease, the thought-instant that came after ought likewise not to cease — since the later and the first are equal in this nature of “existing.” And since there truly is a perishing later on, one may know that the earlier one too was ceasing all along. And if it be said that it may cease only once it has altered later on, then it should not still be this same thing and be said to “have altered”; for one and the same thing to be said to differ from itself must in principle be untenable.

Treatise (the school presses again with direct perception): Is it not plainly seen in the world that firewood and the like come to cessation and nonexistence because of their conjunction with fire? No means of knowledge surpasses direct perception, and so one cannot say that the cessation of all dharmas awaits no cause.

Treatise (the author questions back): How do you know that firewood and the like cease because of their conjunction with fire?

Treatise (the school answers): Because after the firewood is conjoined with fire, it is no longer seen.

Treatise (the author): Let us examine this carefully together: is it that this firewood ceases because of its conjunction with fire, and so is not seen? Or is it that the firewood before, having arisen, ceased of itself, and what follows does not go on arising, so that, there being nothing there, it is not seen — just as the lamp flame and the bell’s sound no longer continue after the conjunction of wind and of a hand with them? Therefore this matter can be made out only by inference.

Question: By what inference?

Answer: By the one stated above — cessation is a nonexistence, a nonexistence is not a result, and so it awaits no cause. Moreover, if firewood ceased only upon awaiting a cause, then there should be no cessation at all that does not await a cause, just as “arising” awaits a cause and there is nothing that arises without a cause. Yet it is plainly seen in the world that a thought, a flame, and a sound all cease of themselves in a moment, awaiting no other cause. Therefore the cessation of firewood and the like too awaits no cause.

Treatise (the first divergent reckoning, of the Vaiśeṣika lineage): Some hold that a thought and a sound are extinguished by the earlier one as cause and the later one as their cessation (the earlier thought-instant acting as cause, the later one causing the earlier to cease).

Treatise (the author refutes): This too is unreasonable, since the two cannot be simultaneous. Take doubt and knowledge, or pain and pleasure, or greed and hatred: their own characteristics are mutually opposed, and in principle there is no possibility of their standing together at one time. Again, suppose there were a stage in which an unclear thought and sound arose immediately after a clear one: how could the unclear member of one and the same class extinguish the clear member of that same class? And by whom, moreover, is that very last thought and sound extinguished?

Treatise (the second and third divergent reckonings): Some hold that the cessation of a lamp flame has “abiding” (the mark of abiding) for its cause. Others again hold that when a flame ceases it is by the power of dharma and non-dharma.

Treatise (the author refutes): Both of these accounts are unreasonable — because that “nonexistence” (the nonexistence of the mark of abiding) is itself a thing without entity, and what has no entity cannot act as a cause (like a hare’s horn). Nor can dharma and non-dharma serve as productive cause and extinguishing cause: moment by moment, dharma is favorable and non-dharma is adverse, and the two are exactly opposed (one and the same moment cannot be both productive cause and extinguishing cause). Or else one may say that among all conditioned dharmas whatever, one may at will reckon such a sense of causality into them (and then anyone may say anything and there is no settled standard). And if that is so, the original dispute ought to be laid to rest — since both parties must then grant that, without awaiting any other cause, all dharmas do have moments.

Treatise (the author refutes that school’s obstinacy by the three grades of cooking-change): Moreover, if it be said that the cessation of firewood and the like has conjunction with fire for its cause, then within the arising of “cooking-change” (the gradual alteration wrought by being cooked with fire) there are the three grades of low, middle, and high; and in that case the entity of the productive cause would at the same time be the extinguishing cause. Why so? Because through conjunction with fire, cooking-change is made to arise in firewood and the like: at the very moment when the middle and high grades of cooking arise, the low and middle grades of cooking are ceasing. That which is either this very thing or resembles it, and can produce the high and middle grades, is at the same moment able to act as the cause of the ceasing of the low and middle grades of cooking — and so the entity of the productive cause would be just the extinguishing cause. Or else one would have to say that the extinguishing cause and the productive cause are indistinguishable in character; yet it ought not to be that by this same thing, or by what resembles this thing, that other thing both exists and at the same time does not exist. And even granting that, in the arising where the flames differ, one might still contrive to reckon the productive and the extinguishing causes as two different things, yet where ash, snow, vinegar, sun, water, and earth are conjoined and can make cooking-change arise in firewood and the like, how will you contrive to reckon productive cause and extinguishing cause as two different things?

Treatise (the school asks): If that is so, then when it is plainly seen that water boiled with fire gradually dwindles away, what exactly does the conjunction of fire with the water accomplish here?

Treatise (the author answers): Through the conjunction of the burning fire with the water, the fire element (the force of the great element fire) is strengthened; and through the strengthening of the fire element, this mass of water is made, in each successive stage after stage, to arise slighter and slighter, until at the slightest of all it no longer continues thereafter — this is what the conjunction of fire with water accomplishes here (fire attends only to “making what arises afterward ever less,” and not at all to “extinguishing”).

Treatise (conclusion): Therefore there is no cause that makes dharmas cease; dharmas cease of their own accord, since their very nature is such as to perish. And since they cease of their own accord, they cease as soon as they arise. And since they cease as soon as they arise, the principle of momentary cessation is established. And having moments, there is definitely no motion to speak of. As for that continuity in which, with not one thought-instant intervening, a thing arises in another direction (as when the flame of burning grass spreads on and on), a man merely gives rise to a conceit of superiority that “it is traveling.” And since by this principle motion is definitely nonexistent, the matter that “bodily manifest action is shape” is thereby established in principle.

Treatise (the author restates the Sautrāntika position in order to refute the Sarvāstivādins): Yet the Sautrāntikas say: shape is not really existent. What is called a long form is a case where visible color (the blue, yellow, red, and white that can be seen) arises abundantly on one side of a mass, and just therein a “long” is conventionally established; over against this long form, where it arises sparsely on one side of another mass of form, a “short” is conventionally established; where it arises abundantly on all four sides, a “square” is conventionally established; where it arises pervading everywhere, a “round” is conventionally established. The remaining shape-forms (high, low, even, uneven, and the rest) are to be understood by the same method. It is like seeing a torch moved swiftly in one direction with not one thought-instant intervening, and saying that it is “long”; or seeing it whirled about in a circle, and saying that it is “round.” Therefore shape has no real form-entity of a further kind of its own.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas’ first objection): If it be said that there really exists a further kind of shape-form, then there should be a form apprehended by two faculties — that is to say, in the difference of long, short, and so forth upon a mass of form, the eye can see it and the body can touch it, and both alike can know it, and so the fault of “apprehension by two faculties” results. Yet in principle a form-sphere is not apprehended by two faculties.

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins save their position): But just as long and the rest are apprehended in dependence upon touch, so too shape may be apprehended in dependence upon visible color — are touch and shape not proceeding together in one mass? Therefore it is because touch is apprehended that shape can be recollected, and not that shape-form is directly apprehended within touch. It is like seeing the color of fire and thereupon recollecting the warmth of fire, or smelling the scent of a flower and thereby being able to recollect the flower’s color; the two dharmas here are definitely inseparable, and so by apprehending one of them the other can be recollected.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas object): But touch and shape are not definitely inseparable; how then can shape be recollected with certainty by apprehending touch?

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas object further): If it be said that touch and shape are not definitely in one mass and yet shape can still be recollected by apprehending touch, then visible color too ought to be recollected with certainty by apprehending touch; or, conversely, shape-form too ought to be as indefinite as visible color is (so that on apprehending touch one need not recollect shape), and then at the time of apprehending touch one ought not to know shape. But in fact it is not so. Therefore it should not be said that it is by apprehending touch that shape can be recollected. Furthermore, many shapes are seen upon such things as brocade, and in that case there ought to be many real shapes in one place. In principle it should not be so — just as with those many visible colors (which do not on that account each become a real thing). Therefore shape-form is not a really existent entity.

Treatise (a further Sautrāntika objection): Again, whatever is a real form with resistance must have real atoms of a further kind of its own. Yet there is no atom that is called “long” or the rest. Therefore it is only within the differing marks of many things arrayed (arranged) in such and such a way that a long, short, square, or round is conventionally established.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas cite and refute the Sarvāstivādins’ rescue): If it be said that it is just the atoms of shape-form arrayed in this way that are called long and the rest — this is merely partisanship for one’s own school, and is not something the two parties thoroughly grant. For if shape-form had atoms of its own besides, whose own characteristic both parties thoroughly granted, then they might be assembled and arrayed in this way so as to become long and the rest; but shape-form has no atom whose own characteristic is thoroughly granted, as visible color has, and so whence should the assembling and arraying come?

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins save their position): Is it not plainly seen that various earthen vessels and the like have their visible color alike while their shapes differ (from which it appears that shape has an entity of its own)?

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas refute again): Has this not already been made out — that a long and the rest are merely conventionally established upon the differences of array among many things? It is like many ants, each of which is no different in appearance from another, and yet when they are arrayed in a line or in a ring the shape arrayed differs. That shape is conventionally established in dependence upon visible color and the rest ought in principle to be just so.

Treatise (an objection posed): Is it not the case that when one looks in the dark, or from afar, at a tree stump and the like, one knows its shape and does not know its visible color (from which it appears that shape exists independently of visible color)?

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas explain it through): How can it be said that it is just the array of visible color and the rest that becomes shape? — Precisely because in the dark and at a distance one cannot see visible color clearly, one gives rise only to the discrimination of long, short, and the like (whereas what is in fact known is still the general mark of that mass of visible color). It is like looking at a stretch of woodland or a crowd of people from afar or in the dark: one knows only that it is a marching army, and does not know the several particular marks within it. In principle it must be so: because at times one cannot know the fine marks of visible color and of shape, and knows only a general mass.

Treatise (the author closes with a question to the two foregoing schools): Since both “motion” and “a really existent shape” have now been set aside, what then do you of the Sautrāntika school establish as bodily manifest action?

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas answer): We establish “shape” as bodily manifest action, but as a convention only and not as a real thing.

Treatise (a question posed): Since you hold that a merely conventional dharma serves as bodily manifest action, what dharma then do you establish as bodily action?

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas answer): If it is said that what is established in dependence upon the body is called bodily action, then — the “volition” that is able to make the body perform its various movements, because it proceeds in dependence upon the gate that is the body, is called bodily action. Verbal action and mental action likewise, each according to what applies, are given their several names of distinction; it should be known that it is the same with them.

Treatise (a question posed): If that is so, why does the sūtra say that there are two kinds of action, first the action that is volition and second the action of having willed? And what is the difference between these two?

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas explain it through): What is called the action that is volition refers to the “deliberating volition” that arises at the stage of preliminary effort — I should do such and such a thing that is to be done. And having deliberated, one gives rise to the “volition that does the deed,” and in accordance with what was deliberated before does the deed to be done, moving the body and issuing speech — and this is called the action of having willed.

Treatise (a challenge): If that is so, then manifest action is definitely nonexistent; and manifest action being nonexistent, the nonmanifest action of the desire realm ought not to exist either (since the nonmanifest arises in dependence upon the manifest), and this becomes a great fault.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas answer): Such a great fault we have a principle by which to fend off: namely, from the two spoken of above, bodily manifest action and verbal manifest action, there arises by a superior volition a certain difference of volition — and this is called the nonmanifest.

Treatise (a further challenge): What fault is there in this? This ought rather to be called “action that turns along with the mind,” just as the nonmanifest produced by absorption turns together with the mind.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas answer): There is no such fault, since it is produced by the “superior volition that resolves” and the “superior volition that sets in motion” (and is not of that class which turns together with the mind at the same time). And even granting that there is manifest action, manifest action too must rely upon the force of the volition spoken of above, since its own nature is dull.

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣikas conclude by reverting to their own school): The Vaibhāṣika masters say: shape is really existent, and so bodily manifest action has shape-form for its entity, while the entity of verbal manifest action is just vocal sound; the characteristics of nonmanifest action have been stated above already (in the Chapter on the Elements).

Treatise (the author again restates the Sautrāntikas): The Sautrāntikas also say: this (the nonmanifest) is not really existent, since it is merely a “not doing” by force of a limit vowed beforehand. And besides, they (the Sarvāstivādins) would have to posit the nonmanifest in dependence upon past great elements, and yet past great elements are not real in entity; and further, no nonmanifest has any characteristic of form at all (so how can it count as form?).

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣikas’ position): The Vaibhāṣika masters say: this (the nonmanifest) too is really existent.

Question: How is this known to be so? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 5〕Is the Nonmanifest Really Existent — the Vaibhāṣikas’ Eight Proofs and the Sautrāntikas’ Refutation of Each

Stanza: Because (the sūtra) says (that form is of) three (kinds), and says that there is form without outflows, and (says that merit) increases, and (says that one who has another do a deed and) does not do it himself (still completes a path of action), and so on.

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣika masters adduce the first proof · the three kinds of form): Because the sūtra says that form is of three kinds, and these three exhaust all form: first, form that is visible and resistant; second, form that is invisible and resistant; third, form that is invisible and unresistant. (If nonmanifest form be removed, what is the third kind?)

Treatise (the second proof · form without outflows): Again, the sūtra says that there is form without outflows, as when the sūtra says: what is called a dharma without outflows? Toward all form whatever, past, future, and present, one gives rise to no craving and no hatred, and so on down to consciousness likewise, and this is called a dharma without outflows. If nonmanifest form be removed, what dharma remains that may be called invisible and unresistant and also called form without outflows?

Treatise (the third proof · the increase of merit): Again, the sūtra says that meritorious action increases, as when the sūtra says: any faithful son or daughter of good family who has accomplished the seven bases of meritorious action “that have a support,” whether walking or standing, sleeping or waking, has merit continuing at all times, meritorious action gradually increasing and meritorious action arising on and on; and the bases of meritorious action “without a support” are likewise. If nonmanifest action be removed, then at times when another mind has arisen or when there is no mind at all, in dependence upon what dharma is meritorious action said to be increasing?

Treatise (the fourth proof · having another do a deed): Again, one does not do the deed oneself but merely dispatches another to do it; if there were no nonmanifest action, no path of action ought to be accomplished. For the manifest action of dispatching another is not itself gathered under a path of action — at that time the deed has not yet been properly accomplished; and by the time the messenger has accomplished the deed to be done, there is no alteration in the nature of the dispatcher’s side (no new dharma having arisen, how should a path of action be accomplished?).

Treatise (the fifth proof · form in the sphere of dharmas): Again, the sūtra says: a monk should know that what is called dharma is the outer sphere. This “dharma” not gathered under the eleven spheres is invisible and unresistant, and the sūtra does not say of it that it is “without form” (from which it appears that there is form within the dharma sphere, and that is nonmanifest form). If no weight be given to the form gathered under the dharma sphere, this one sentence becomes defective and altogether useless.

Treatise (the sixth proof · the eight limbs of the path): Again, if there were no nonmanifest, there ought to be no eight limbs of the noble path — for at the time of being in absorption, speech and the rest (right speech, right action, right livelihood) do not exist.

Question: If that is so, why does the sūtra say: he knowing thus and seeing thus, right view, right intention, right effort, right mindfulness, and right absorption are all cultivated to fullness, while right speech, right action, and right livelihood have been obtained already beforehand as pure and clean (from which it appears that the limbs of the path need not be present in absorption)?

Answer: This is said with regard to the mundane path of separation from defilement obtained beforehand, and there is no fault of contradiction.

Treatise (the seventh proof · the discipline of individual liberation): Again, if nonmanifest form be denied outright, then there ought to be no discipline of individual liberation either — for after the precepts have been received there is no entity of discipline continuing on, and then, though a mind of another object has arisen, he is still called a monk and the rest (on what ground?).

Treatise (the eighth proof · the discipline that is a dyke): Again, the sūtra says that the discipline of abstaining from killing and the rest is called “the discipline that is a dyke,” since it can for a long time continuously dam and hold back the fault of transgressing the discipline. And a thing without entity cannot be called a dyke.

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣikas conclude): By these proofs it can be known that nonmanifest form really exists.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas deny the whole): The Sautrāntika masters say: these proofs, though many and of all kinds of marvelousness, are nevertheless unreasonable.

Question: Why are they unreasonable?

Treatise (refuting the first proof): Among the proofs adduced, take first that passage of sūtra which says that form is of three kinds. (We may explain it through thus): the yogins who cultivate absorption say that when one cultivates the meditative absorptions, the form in the object-field of absorption produced by the force of absorption is called invisible because it is not the object-field of the eye faculty, and is called unresistant because it does not obstruct a place (the third kind of form is this, and need not be the nonmanifest).

Question (the Sarvāstivādins challenge the yogins): If it be so (invisible and unresistant), on what ground is it still called “form”?

Answer: The explaining through of this difficulty is the same as (your Sarvāstivādins’) explaining why the nonmanifest is called form (we are under one difficulty together, and it does not touch me).

Treatise (refuting the second proof): Again, as to the form without outflows spoken of in the sūtra, the yogins say: within the form produced by the force of absorption, that which is produced in dependence upon an absorption without outflows is said to be without outflows.

Treatise (a divergent explanation of another lineage): Another master says: the form upon the body of one beyond training (an arhat), and all form outside the body, are without outflows — since they are not what the outflows depend upon for their increase, they obtain the name without outflows.

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins object to the masters of similes): Why then does the sūtra, when it speaks of “dharmas with outflows,” say that they are all the eye whatever, and so on at length (all form being spoken of as with outflows — how then is outer form called without outflows)?

Treatise (the masters of similes answer): That is because it is not the counteragent of the outflows, and so obtains the name with outflows (while from the side of “not being what the outflows depend upon for their increase” it is said to be without outflows, and the two names do not obstruct each other).

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins press further): In that case one and the same thing would have to be called both with outflows and without outflows.

Treatise (the masters of similes answer): If it were so, what fault is there?

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins): There is the fault of “mixture.”

Treatise (the masters of similes answer): If it is called with outflows with regard to this principle, it was not with regard to this principle called without outflows; and it is the same in calling it without outflows (each is said with regard to one sense, and the two do not touch) — what mixture is there to speak of?

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins object again): If the form sphere and the rest are with outflows throughout, why does this sūtra make a distinction in speaking of them (setting with outflows and without outflows apart)?

Treatise (the masters of similes answer): It is as the sūtra says, “forms that are with outflows and appropriated are the thorns and the coverings of the mind,” and likewise with sound and the rest (there being from the first a form of speaking that makes distinctions according to the sense intended).

Treatise (refuting the third proof · the explanation of the earlier masters of the norm): Again, as to that sentence of the sūtra about “the increase of merit,” the masters of the norm of former times explained it thus: by the force of the very nature of things, meritorious action increases. Just as the goods given by a donor are enjoyed by the recipients in such and such a way; and because there are differences in the measure of the merit gathered and benefited by the recipients’ enjoying what was given, therefore afterward, although the donor’s mind takes some other thing for its object, the subtle continuum perfumed by that earlier volition which took the giving for its object goes on gradually transforming and differentiating as it arises, and by this it can in time to come draw forth many fruits of retribution. Therefore the sūtra says with a hidden intent, “continuing at all times, meritorious action gradually increasing, meritorious action arising on and on.”

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas cite the difficulty and question it back): If it be asked how the differences of merit and benefit in another continuum (the recipient’s) should make the mind of another continuum (the donor’s), which takes some other thing for its object, nevertheless undergo transformation — the explaining through of this difficulty is the same as (your explaining of) the nonmanifest (we are under one difficulty together). And to turn it around: how should he (the Sarvāstivādin) make the differences of merit and benefit in another continuum cause a really existent nonmanifest dharma to arise besides within another continuum (this difficulty of mine is the one you will truly find hard to answer)?

Treatise (a question posed): If among the bases of meritorious action “without a support” (there being no recipient to depend upon), how then does the meritorious action within the continuum increase?

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas answer): That too is by reason of the volition that repeatedly practices taking that object-field for its object, so that even in dreams it turns along at all times.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas object in return to the Sarvāstivāda proponents of the nonmanifest): You who maintain the nonmanifest — since in merit without a support you have no manifest action (there being no bodily or verbal movement), whence should you have a nonmanifest?

Treatise (another account): Some say: the bases of meritorious action that have a support are likewise by reason of the volition that repeatedly practices taking that object-field for its object, and so are said to continue and increase at all times (so that not even merit with a support requires the nonmanifest).

Treatise (the author cites a sūtra to refute this divergent master): If that were so, then, as the sūtra says: whenever a monk complete in pure moral conduct and accomplished in tamed and good dharmas has received the various foods and drinks given by another, and enters the immeasurable states of mind and abides having realized them bodily and completely; by this cause and condition it should be known that the donor has immeasurable merit and goodness moistening his continuum, and immeasurable ease and pleasure streaming into his body — the donor’s merit at that time is increasing at all times, but is there necessarily always a superior volition taking that matter for its object (from which it appears that this cannot all be reduced to a volition repeatedly practiced)? Therefore what was said above, that “the subtle continuum perfumed by volition goes on gradually transforming and differentiating as it arises,” is decidedly the reasonable account.

Treatise (refuting the fourth proof · the path of action in having another do a deed): Again, on the question “how, when one does not do the deed oneself but merely dispatches another to do it, does the path of action come to be completed,” it should be said thus: by reason of the original preparatory effort, when the messenger has done the deed as instructed, by the very nature of things the subtle continuum on the instructor’s side is made to arise transforming and differentiating, and by this it can in time to come draw forth many fruits of retribution. And whenever one does the deed oneself and the matter is brought to completion, it should be known that it is by this same principle. It should be known that just this subtle continuum transforming and differentiating is what is called the “path of action” — this being a conventional establishing of the name of the cause upon the result, since it is the result drawn forth by bodily and verbal action. Just as you who hold that there is a nonmanifest besides also call the nonmanifest a path of bodily and verbal action in your own school (a borrowing of the name likewise).

Treatise (setting out the divergent account of the Venerable): Yet the Venerable says: within the appropriated aggregates, by giving rise to volition at the three times — before, during, and after — one is touched by the sin of killing; that is, at the three times of “I shall kill,” “I am killing,” and “I have killed.”

Treatise (the author refutes and then partly accepts): It is not that merely by giving rise to volition at these three times the path of action comes to completion; otherwise, when one’s own mother and the like has in fact not been harmed, merely because one supposed oneself to have harmed her, a deed of immediate retribution would be accomplished (which is plainly wrong). Yet if, in a matter of one’s own doing that is not a killing by mistake, one gives rise to volition in this way, the sin of killing does touch him — if it is said in this way, it is after all not unreasonable.

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins complain): Why is it that you bear a grudge against the “nonmanifest” in particular and definitely deny it as nonexistent, while granting a “subtle continuum perfumed and transforming and differentiating” (both being equally invisible — why favor the one and slight the other)?

Treatise (the author states his own mind): Yet this one (the nonmanifest) and that one (the transformation of seeds) are alike hard to know, and I bear here no grudge whatever. It is only this — you grant that a path of action is of the class of mind, and yet you say that at the time when, by bodily preparatory effort, the matter is brought to completion, apart from mind and from body a further nonmanifest dharma arises within the body of the one who instructed: a tenet such as this cannot make one glad. Whereas if it be said that by that preparatory effort drawn forth by this (earlier volition), at the time when the matter is brought to completion, it is just this (continuum of mind) that arises continuing on, transforming and differentiating by force of that: a tenet such as this can make one glad. For by the transforming and differentiating of the continuum of mind and the rest alone, a future fruit can be produced.

Treatise (referring back to what was said above): Moreover, it has already been said above.

Question: What was said above?

Answer: Just this — manifest action being nonexistent, whence should there be a nonmanifest, and so on (as was said above in refuting the real existence of shape-form).

Treatise (refuting the fifth proof · form in the dharma sphere): Again, as to the sentence that “of the dharma sphere it is not said to be without form,” that is because there is the invisible and unresistant form gathered under the dharma sphere in the object-field of absorption spoken of above (and so it is not said to be without form; it is not for the sake of the nonmanifest).

Treatise (refuting the sixth proof · the eight limbs of the path): Again, as to “the limbs of the path ought to fall short of eight”: let them (the Sarvāstivādins) first tell us — at the time of being in the path, how can there be right speech, right action, and right livelihood? Is there at that stage truly the raising of right words, the doing of right deeds, the begging for robes, and so forth?

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins answer): There is not.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas press): How then does it stand?

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins answer): Because at that time a nonmanifest of this class without outflows is obtained, therefore after emerging from contemplation one is able, by the force of what went before, to give rise to the three right ones (speech, action, livelihood) and not to give rise to the three wrong ones. Because the name of the result is conventionally established upon the cause, the names of speech, action, and livelihood are conventionally established upon the nonmanifest.

Treatise (the Sautrāntika masters say): If that is so, why do you not accept this sense of ours? — Although there is no nonmanifest, yet at the time of being in the path a “resolve and support” of this kind is obtained, and so after emerging from contemplation one is able, by the force of what went before, to give rise to the three right ones and not to give rise to the three wrong ones; and because the name of the result is conventionally established upon the cause, the eight limbs of the noble path can just as well be established complete.

Treatise (setting out a divergent account among the Sautrāntikas): Another master says: it is merely a matter of saying “the not doing of wrong speech and the rest” and taking that as a limb of the path — that is, at the time of being in absorption, by the force of the noble path one obtains a definite not-doing; and this definite not-doing is established in dependence upon the path without outflows, and so is called without outflows. It is not that everywhere one must depend upon a really existing further dharma-entity before a name and a number can be established. It is like the eight worldly dharmas — gain and loss, blame and praise, esteem and derision, pain and pleasure — where the “not gaining robes and food and the like” is not a further real entity; and this (not-doing) ought to be just so.

Treatise (refuting the seventh proof · the discipline of individual liberation): The discipline of individual liberation should also be inferred in the same way: that is, by the force of a resolve of intention one first sets up a limit undertaken, and is able definitely to hold off the unwholesome actions of body and speech; and by reason of this the discipline of individual liberation is established.

Treatise (citing the Sarvāstivādins’ earlier objection and explaining it through): As to their saying that “if a mind of another object arises there ought to be no discipline” — this objection is unreasonable, since by the force of perfuming, at the time when a fault is about to arise, a single act of recollection stops it.

Treatise (refuting the eighth proof · the discipline that is a dyke): The sense of “discipline as a dyke” should also be inferred in the same way: that is, one first sets up a vowed limit definitely not to do what is unwholesome, and afterward, by repeatedly recollecting it and by conscience and shame being present, one is able of oneself to restrain and uphold oneself so as not to transgress the discipline. Therefore the sense of a dyke is upheld by the mind.

Treatise (the author reproaches the Sarvāstivādins): If it were by a nonmanifest that transgression of the discipline is held off, there ought to be nobody who transgresses the discipline through loss of mindfulness (yet in fact there are such).

Treatise (the author lays the dispute to rest): Let these many disputes rest here for now.

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣika masters conclude by reverting to their own school): The Vaibhāṣika masters say: there is a real thing called nonmanifest form, and this is the tenet of my school.

Question: It was said above that the nonmanifest is by nature produced from the great elements; is it then produced from the very great elements upon which manifest action depends, or is it produced from other and different great elements? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 5〕The Great Elements That Produce the Nonmanifest Differ from Those upon Which the Manifest Depends

Stanza: These great elements that produce it (the nonmanifest) differ from the great elements upon which manifest action depends.

Treatise: The nonmanifest arises from great elements different from those of the manifest. Why so? Because for one and the same combination of the (four) great elements to produce at once a subtle result (the nonmanifest) and a coarse result (the manifest) is unreasonable.

Question: Just as manifest action and the great elements must arise at the same time, is it so with the nonmanifest as well? Or is there a difference?

Answer: All derived form for the most part arises at the same time as the great elements; yet among present and future derived forms there is also a small portion that depends upon past great elements.

Question: What is meant by “a small portion”? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 6〕The Nonmanifest of the Desire Realm from the Second Thought-Instant On Arises in Dependence upon Past Great Elements

Stanza: In the desire realm, the nonmanifest from the second thought-instant on arises in dependence upon past great elements.

Treatise: Only for the nonmanifest affiliated to the desire realm, from after the first moment, do all the nonmanifests arise from past great elements — with these (past great elements) as their support the nonmanifest is able to arise. As for the great elements upon the present body, these can serve only as a “support,” and serve as the cause that raises and the cause that raises concurrently, each in its own order (the great elements of the first thought-instant are the raising cause, those thereafter the concurrently raising cause). It is like a wheel running upon the ground, where the hand and the ground serve as its support (the force of the hand that pushes being like the raising cause, and the force of the ground that bears it like the concurrently raising cause).

Question: The bodily and verbal action of which level is produced by the great elements of which level? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 6〕Action with Outflows Depends on the Great Elements of Its Own Level · Action without Outflows Follows the Place of Birth

Stanza: Bodily and verbal action with outflows depends on the great elements of its own level; bodily and verbal action without outflows follows the place where one is presently born.

Treatise: Bodily and verbal action affiliated to the desire realm is produced only by great elements affiliated to the desire realm. And so on in this way up to the bodily and verbal action of the fourth meditative absorption, which too is produced only by the great elements of that level. If the bodily and verbal action belongs to what is without outflows, then it is produced by the great elements of whatever level one is born in and in which it is to become present and operate. There are three reasons: because dharmas without outflows do not fall within the three realms (so that one cannot say they have great elements of their own level); because there are definitely no great elements that are without outflows; and because it is by the force of their support that what is without outflows is able to arise.

Question: These manifest and nonmanifest actions — what is their class, and by great elements of which class are they produced? The stanza says:

〔Root 7 · Root 8〕The Class of the Nonmanifest and the Manifest — Appropriated, Outflowing, of the Class of Sentient Beings, and the Distinction of the Unconcentrated and the Concentrated

Stanza: The nonmanifest is unappropriated, and is also of homogeneous nature and of the class of sentient beings. The nonmanifest of the unconcentrated levels arises from great elements that are homogeneous, appropriated, and different; the nonmanifest produced in absorption depends upon what is nourished, is unappropriated, and is not from different great elements. The manifest is of homogeneous nature alone; and insofar as it belongs to the body, it is appropriated.

Treatise: Now within this stanza it is first made out that the nonmanifest is unappropriated, since it has no alterability and resistance. It is also of homogeneous nature; and the word “also” in the stanza shows that a portion of it is momentary (and not homogeneous), namely the first without outflows (nonmanifest); the rest are all of homogeneous nature, that is, produced by a homogeneous cause. It belongs to sentient beings alone, since it arises in dependence upon the inner body.

Herein, all the nonmanifest of the desire realm is of homogeneous nature, appropriated, and produced from different great elements. What is called “arising from different great elements” shows that the seven limbs — three of body and four of speech — are each one of them produced by a separate set of great elements.

The nonmanifest produced in absorption is of two kinds in its difference — namely the discipline of the meditative absorptions and the discipline without outflows. Both of these depend upon great elements nourished by absorption, are unappropriated, and are not produced from different great elements. What is called “not from different great elements” shows that this nonmanifest has its seven limbs produced from one and the same set of four great elements. Why so? Because the great elements on which it depends are, like the mind, but one, and admit of no difference.

It should be known that manifest action is of homogeneous nature alone; and insofar as it belongs to the body it is appropriated; in every other sense it is the same as the nonmanifest of the unconcentrated levels.

Question: When manifest action arises, must it destroy the original bodily measure, or need it not?

Question (countering): If it were so (that it need not), what fault is there?

Answer: If it be said that it must destroy it, then the maturational form already cut off ought to be able to be continued anew, and this transgresses the tenet of the Vaibhāṣikas. If it be said that it does not destroy it, then how should two bodily measures be established in one and the same place of the body?

Answer: (It need not destroy it, nor do two measures result) — there are further newly arisen homogeneous great elements which produce manifest action without destroying the original body.

Question: If that is so, then wherever upon a part of the body manifest action arises, that place ought to become larger than it originally was, since the newly arisen great elements have augmented it throughout. And if it be said that they do not augment it throughout, how then should the manifest arise throughout?

Answer: There are interstices in the body, and so they can be contained within it (without its becoming larger).

Treatise (transition): It has now been made out that action, by the gates through which it is considered, has the difference of two (manifest and nonmanifest), of three (body, speech, mind), and of five (volition and the four actions).

Question: And what is its difference as regards the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate) and as regards realm and level? The stanza says:

〔Root 9 · First Half of Root 10〕The Three Natures and Realm and Level — the Nonmanifest Extends to Two Natures · the Manifest to Three

Stanza: The nonmanifest extends to the wholesome and the unwholesome alone and not to the indeterminate; the rest (the manifest and volition) extend to all three natures. Unwholesome nonmanifest is in the desire realm alone. The nonmanifest pervades the desire and form realms, while the manifest is only in the two levels that have sustained thought. In the desire realm there is no obscured-indeterminate manifest, since there is no mind that can raise it.

Treatise: The nonmanifest extends only to the two natures, wholesome and unwholesome, and there is no nonmanifest of indeterminate nature. Why so? Because the force of an indeterminate mind is feeble and inferior and cannot draw forth a strong action and make it arise, such that after the cause has ceased the result still continues to arise (and the nonmanifest is precisely such a dharma, whose cause has ceased while its result continues).

What is called “the rest” refers to the manifest and to volition. What is called “three” means that these extend to all three natures, wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate.

Herein, the unwholesome (nonmanifest) is in the desire realm alone and not in the other two, since (in the two higher realms) the unwholesome roots and non-conscience and shamelessness have already been cut off. As for the wholesome and the indeterminate, they are found in all the levels, since the stanza sets down no particular prohibition.

Both realms, the desire realm and the form realm, have the nonmanifest, since within the formless realm there are no great elements. Wherever bodily and verbal action operates, there and there alone is there discipline of body and speech.

Question (an objection posed): If that is so, then one whose body is born in the desire or form realm and who has entered a formless absorption ought to have discipline — just as, when a mind without outflows arises, there is a nonmanifest without outflows.

Treatise (the author answers): It is not so, since that (which is gathered under a formless absorption) does not fall within the (desire and form) realms. Moreover, if there were a nonmanifest within the formless realm, then there ought to be a nonmanifest that is not produced from great elements. Nor may it be said that a nonmanifest with outflows may take the great elements of another realm and level for its support. Furthermore, it is by turning away from and abandoning the forms that one enters a formless absorption, and so within that absorption form cannot be produced, since that absorption has the function of suppressing the perception of form.

Treatise (the explanation of the Vaibhāṣika masters): The Vaibhāṣika masters put it thus: moral conduct (discipline) arises in order to counteract bad conduct; and bad conduct exists only within the desire realm. The formless realm has toward the desire realm the four kinds of “remoteness” — first remoteness of support, second remoteness of mode of activity, third remoteness of object, fourth remoteness of counteragent — and so within the formless realm there is no nonmanifest form.

Manifest form is only in the two levels that have sustained thought, namely the desire realm and the first meditative absorption; of the levels above these it cannot be said that there is manifest form.

Obscured-indeterminate manifest form is definitely absent in the desire realm, and can be said to exist only in the Brahmā world. It was once heard that Mahābrahmā uttered words of deceit and flattery — that is, within his own assembly, in order to evade the challenging questions of the monk Aśvajit, he dissembled and praised himself, and so forth.

Question: Since the higher levels have no speech, how should there be a sound sphere?

Answer: There are outer great elements which serve as cause and give rise to sound.

Treatise (the account of another master): Another master says: the upper three meditative absorptions also have unobscured-indeterminate manifest action, only there is none that is wholesome and none that is defiled. Why so? Because it is not that one born in an upper level can give rise to the wholesome or defiled mind of a lower level and thereby set going bodily or verbal manifest action — (if it be said that a lower-level mind sets the manifest going, then) a lower-level mind is feeble, and moreover (when one is born in an upper level) the lower-level mind has already been cut off.

Treatise (the author’s adjudication): The former account (that the upper levels have no manifest action) is the good one.

Question (one question raising two matters): And what is the cause and condition by which the second meditative absorption and above have no manifest action at all, and by which within the desire realm there is no obscured-indeterminate manifest action?

Answer (answering both questions together): Because there is no raising mind able to set action going.

(Speaking of them separately:) Only a mind with applied and sustained thought can set manifest action going, and the second meditative absorption and above have no such mind — and so there is no manifest action at all in the three upper levels (this concludes that the three upper levels have no manifest action of any kind). Further, a mind that can set the manifest going is only such as is abandoned by cultivation, since the afflictions abandoned by seeing turn toward the inner gate (and do not issue in bodily and verbal action by the outer gate); and within the desire realm there is definitely no obscured-indeterminate affliction that is abandoned by cultivation (the obscured-indeterminate of the desire realm being abandoned by seeing alone) —

Treatise (transition raising a question): — and so within the desire realm there is no obscured-indeterminate manifest. Is it then by what raises them alone that dharmas are made to be of wholesome nature, unwholesome nature, and so forth?

Answer: It is not.

Question: How then?

Answer: It is by four kinds of cause that they come to be of wholesome nature and the rest: first by the ultimate, second by their own nature, third by association, fourth by what raises them.

Question: Which dharma, of which nature, comes to be so by which cause? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 10 · Root 11〕The Four Wholesome · the Four Unwholesome · the Two Constant Indeterminates

Stanza: The ultimate wholesome is liberation; the intrinsically wholesome are conscience, shame, and the three wholesome roots (non-greed and the rest); the associated wholesome are those associated with them (the mind and mental factors); the wholesome by what raises them are the forms, actions, and the rest (raised by them). Reverse these four, and they are called the four kinds of unwholesome. The ultimate indeterminate is the two constants (the two unconditioned).

Treatise: What is called the ultimate wholesome refers to true liberation — since within nirvāṇa there is the utmost security and all sufferings are forever stilled, as when one is free of illness (it is itself wholesome without awaiting anything else).

What is called the intrinsically wholesome refers to conscience, shame, and the (three) wholesome roots — since among conditioned dharmas, only conscience and shame and the three wholesome roots beginning with non-greed need not await being associated with anything, nor await anything else to raise them, but are in their very nature wholesome, like a good medicine (which is itself good).

What is called the associated wholesome refers to those associated with them (the mind and mental factors) — since mind and mental factors must be associated with conscience, shame, and the wholesome roots in order to become wholesome in nature; and if they are not associated with that conscience, shame, and the rest, wholesome nature is not established — like water mixed with medicine (water is not itself medicine, but is called medicinal water because medicine is mixed into it).

What is called the wholesome by what raises them refers to bodily and verbal action and the formations dissociated (from mind) — since these are raised by the intrinsically wholesome and by the associated wholesome, like the milk drawn forth by the juice of a good medicine (milk is not itself medicine, but is sweet in taste because of the medicine).

Question (an objection posed): And if it be a case of obtainment and the rest (the dissociated formations) raised by a mind of a class other than (the wholesome), how then does it become wholesome?

Answer: This sense should be pondered further (the author passes no settled judgment here).

Treatise: Just as wholesome nature has been said to have four distinctions, so also the unwholesome has four, the reverse of these four.

Question: In what way the reverse?

Answer: What is called the ultimate unwholesome refers to the dharmas of birth and death — since within birth and death all dharmas have suffering for their own nature and are utterly insecure, like a chronic disease.

What is called the intrinsically unwholesome refers to non-conscience, shamelessness, and the three unwholesome roots — since among dharmas with outflows, only non-conscience and shamelessness and the three unwholesome roots beginning with greed and hatred need not await association, nor await anything else to raise them, but are in their very nature unwholesome, like a poison.

What is called the associated unwholesome refers to those associated with them (the mind and mental factors) — since mind and mental factors must be associated with non-conscience, shamelessness, and the unwholesome roots in order to become unwholesome in nature; otherwise they are not so — like water mixed with poison.

What is called the unwholesome by what raises them refers to bodily and verbal action and the formations dissociated (from mind) — since these are raised by the intrinsically unwholesome and by the associated unwholesome, like the milk drawn forth by the juice of a poison.

Question (an objection posed): If that is so, then there would be no dharma with outflows at all that is indeterminate or wholesome, since (dharmas with outflows) are all gathered under birth and death (and so are all ultimate unwholesome).

Answer: If the matter be argued from the ultimate, it is indeed as you say; yet here it is spoken of with regard to “maturation.” Of dharmas with outflows whatever, those that cannot record (draw forth) a maturational result are given the name “indeterminate”; and among them, those that can record a lovely maturation are said to be wholesome — and so there is no fault.

What is called the ultimate indeterminate refers to the two unconditioned — since empty space and cessation independent of discernment are of indeterminate nature alone, and there is no other gate through which they may be spoken of.

Question (a place calling for pondering): If the force of what raises them can make bodily and verbal action wholesome and unwholesome, then the great elements (which are raised in the same way) ought by the same rule to be so as well (to become wholesome and unwholesome).

Answer: Because what the mind of the doer originally intends to raise is “action” and not the four great elements, and so the rule cannot be extended to them.

Question: If that is so, then as for the nonmanifest that turns along with the mind in absorption, since it is neither drawn forth by an act of attention while one is in absorption (it turns along and does not draw forth), nor set going by the preparatory effort of an unconcentrated mind (being of another class), how then does it become wholesome? Or else the divine eye and the divine ear (which are of indeterminate nature) too ought to become wholesome in nature.

Answer: Upon a sense such as this one should expend a further measure of labor (the author passes no settled judgment here).

Treatise (transition raising a question): As was said above, the afflictions abandoned by seeing turn toward the inner gate, and so cannot set manifest action going.

Question: If that is so, why does the sūtra say that by reason of wrong view there arise wrong intention, wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood, and so forth (from which it appears that what is abandoned by seeing can also set the manifest going)?

Answer: There is no contradiction in this.

Question: Why so? The stanza says:

〔Roots 12–14〕What Raises Action Is of Two Kinds — the Raising and the Concurrent Raising

Stanza: What raises action is of two kinds, namely the “cause” and “the moment of that action”; in order it should be known that the former is called the “raising” and the latter the “concurrent raising.” A consciousness abandoned by seeing can be the raising only; what can be the concurrent raising only are the five consciousnesses; a mental consciousness abandoned by cultivation extends to both; minds without outflows and maturation-born minds are neither of the two. Whatever nature, wholesome and so forth, is found in the “raising,” the “concurrent raising” may in each case admit all three natures; only in the Sage (the Buddha) are the raising and the concurrent raising necessarily of one nature, and where he is indeterminate (in the raising) the concurrent raising may (still be indeterminate, or) be wholesome.

Treatise: What raises manifest and nonmanifest action is of two kinds, namely the causal raising and the momentary raising — since the former is prior and serves as cause, and the latter is present together with that same moment. In order, the first is called the “raising” and the second the “concurrent raising.” That is to say: the causal raising, at the time when the action is about to be done, is able to draw it forth, and so is called the “raising”; the momentary raising, at the time when the action is being done, is inseparable from the action, and so is called the “concurrent raising.”

Question: And what function has the concurrent raising with regard to action?

Answer: Though there be a prior cause able to draw it forth, yet if there were no concurrent raising (mind and mental factors), then it would be like a dead man, and action ought not to be established at all.

Question (an objection posed): If that is so, how can one who is without mind (having entered the absorption of cessation and the like) generate discipline?

Answer: Whoever has a mind, his action arises distinctly (from which it appears that the concurrently raising mind does have a function with regard to action; the mindless stages are a separate matter).

Treatise: A consciousness abandoned by seeing, in the setting going of manifest action, can be the “raising” only — since it serves as the provision within the arising of the applied and sustained thought that are able to produce manifest action, and does not act as the concurrent raising; at the very time when action is being raised by the outer gate, such a (seeing-abandoned) mind is absent.

Treatise (the Sautrāntika masters ask): Again, if a mind abandoned by seeing can set going manifest form, that form ought to be abandoned by seeing. And if it be granted to be abandoned by seeing, what fault is there?

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins answer): That would transgress the Abhidharma; and moreover, “knowledge” and “ignorance” are not mutually opposed (if form that is abandoned by seeing were abandoned by the path of seeing, this would contradict the sense of knowledge and ignorance). Form with outflows that is action is not abandoned by seeing — this principle should be further established.

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins object in return to the Sautrāntikas): If it were so (on your account), then the great elements too ought to be abandoned by seeing, since they likewise are set going by the force of a mind abandoned by seeing.

Treatise (the Sautrāntikas answer): There is no such fault, just as (the great elements) are neither wholesome nor unwholesome (though raised by a wholesome mind, their nature is indeterminate). Or else it may even be granted to be so, and there is in principle no contradiction.

Treatise (the Sarvāstivādins): It should not be granted to be so, since undefiled dharmas of every class are not opposed to knowledge or to ignorance, and so the great elements are definitely neither abandoned by seeing nor of the not-to-be-abandoned.

Treatise (concluding the objection posed above): That sūtra speaks so only with regard to the causal raising spoken of above, and so there is no contradiction (wrong view being the causal raising, it is said that from wrong view there arise wrong speech and the rest).

Treatise: As for the group of five consciousnesses, they are the concurrent raising only, since they are without discrimination and arise by the outer gate. The mental consciousness abandoned by cultivation extends to both, since it has discrimination and arises by the outer gate. All minds without outflows and maturation-born minds are neither the raising nor the concurrent raising, since (what is without outflows) is only in absorption and (the maturation-born) turns spontaneously without preparatory effort.

Thus the fourfold distinction is formed: there is what is the raising and not the concurrent raising, namely a mind abandoned by seeing; there is what is the concurrent raising and not the raising, namely the five consciousnesses beginning with the eye; there is what is both the raising and the concurrent raising, namely the mental consciousness abandoned by cultivation in all three natures; there is what is neither the raising nor the concurrent raising, namely all minds without outflows and maturation-born minds.

Question: Are the raising mind and the concurrently raising mind necessarily of one and the same nature?

Answer: This is not settled.

Question: How does it stand, then?

Answer: That is to say, if the prior raising mind is of wholesome nature, the concurrently raising consciousness that follows may extend to all three natures, wholesome and the rest; and when the raising mind is unwholesome or indeterminate, the concurrent raising is likewise (extending in each case to all three).

Only in the Sage, the World-Honored One, are the raising mind and the concurrently raising consciousness for the most part of one nature, with only a small portion not so — that is to say, if the raising mind is wholesome the concurrent raising too is wholesome, and if the raising mind is indeterminate the concurrent raising too is indeterminate. Yet at times there is “a wholesome concurrent raising following upon an indeterminate raising mind,” while there has never been “an indeterminate concurrent raising following upon a wholesome raising mind” — because the Buddha, the World-Honored One, in expounding the Dharma and the like, has a mind that may increase and has never flagged (and so he does not fall from a wholesome raising into an indeterminate concurrent raising).

Treatise (recording the account of another school): Some other school says: since the Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, are always in absorption, their minds are wholesome alone and they have no indeterminate mind. Hence the sūtra says:

〔Quoted Stanza〕The Nāga Is Always in Absorption in the Four Postures

Quoted stanza: The nāga (the great dragon · here the Buddha) when he walks is in absorption; the nāga when he stands is in absorption; the nāga when he sits is in absorption; the nāga when he lies down is in absorption.

Treatise (the explanation of the Vaibhāṣika masters): The Vaibhāṣika masters explain it thus: this shows the Buddha’s intent — if he takes no delight in an unconcentrated mind, then in all four postures he is able to be always in absorption; yet at the remaining stages it is not that there arise no mind of the modes of deportment, no maturation-born mind, and no mind of penetrative effect (and so it cannot be said that the Buddha has no indeterminate mind at all).

Treatise (an objection posed): When the several manifest actions come to be of wholesome nature and the rest, is it after the manner of the “raising” mind, or after the manner of the “concurrent raising”?

Question (countering): Granting you whichever you please, what fault is there?

Answer: If it be said to be after the manner of the raising mind, then within the desire realm there ought to be obscured-indeterminate manifest action — since the view of self and the extreme views (which are obscured-indeterminate and abandoned by seeing) can act as its raising. Or else a distinction would have to be drawn: not every class of mind abandoned by seeing can act as the raising. And if it be said to be after the manner of the concurrent raising, then the manifest of individual liberation that arises together with an unwholesome or indeterminate mind ought not to be of wholesome nature.

Treatise (the author’s correct explanation): Upon a challenge such as this one should expend a measure of labor (drawing the distinctions finely). It should be said: manifest action comes to be of wholesome nature and the rest after the manner of the raising mind; yet not after the manner of that raising mind abandoned by seeing, since a raising mind abandoned by cultivation intervenes between them. If it be said that manifest action does not come to be wholesome and the rest by the force of the concurrently raising mind, then one should not say “that sūtra speaks only with regard to the prior causal raising and not with regard to the momentary raising, and so within the desire realm there is definitely no obscured-indeterminate manifest action”; but one should say only this: that sūtra speaks only with regard to the causal raising that is separated off by other minds — and so, although a mind abandoned by seeing can act as the raising, yet within the desire realm there is definitely no obscured-indeterminate manifest action.

〔First Half of Root 15〕The Nonmanifest Is of Three Kinds — Discipline · Non-Discipline · Neither of the Two

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): The subsidiary discussion set out above is now finished, and we should now turn back and go on to make out the marks of the manifest and nonmanifest action spoken of before. The stanza says:

Stanza: The nonmanifest is of three kinds, namely discipline, non-discipline, and that class which is neither discipline nor non-discipline.

Treatise: The nonmanifest spoken of here (that portion of the entity of action which is not displayed outwardly and yet really exists), stated in brief, is of three kinds: first discipline, second non-discipline, third “neither of the two” — that is, the class which is neither discipline nor non-discipline.

Why is that portion called discipline? Because it can block the continuum of evil discipline and can extinguish the continuum of evil discipline, and so it is called discipline. (Evil discipline is that portion of the nonmanifest which is the contrary of discipline; five separate names for it will be set up in the text below.)

How many kinds of difference, then, has discipline? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 15〕The Three Disciplines — Individual Liberation · Produced by Meditative Absorption · Produced by the Path

Stanza: Discipline divides into three kinds: first the discipline of individual liberation, second the discipline produced by meditative absorption, third the discipline produced by the noble path.

Treatise: The differences of discipline, stated in brief, are of three kinds. The first is called the discipline of individual liberation, that is, the discipline bound to the desire realm (“bound” has the sense of being tied and affiliated; the discipline bound to desire is the discipline affiliated to the desire realm). The second is called the discipline produced by meditative absorption, that is, the discipline bound to the form realm — it is had along with entering absorption. The third is called the discipline produced by the path, that is, the discipline without outflows — it is had along with the noble path.

What, then, are the differences in the mark of the first discipline (the discipline of individual liberation)? The stanza says:

〔Root 16〕The Discipline of Individual Liberation Has Eight Names but Only Four Entities

Stanza: The first discipline has eight names, while its real entities are four only; and the reason the names are eight is that the shape and mark of male and female turn about, whereupon the names differ accordingly. These four are severally distinct and yet are not contrary to one another.

Treatise: The mark of the discipline of individual liberation has eight kinds of difference: first the discipline of the bhikṣu (the men who have received full ordination), second the discipline of the bhikṣuṇī (the women who have received full ordination), third the discipline of the probationer (the woman training in the dharma before receiving full ordination), fourth the discipline of the novice (the śrāmaṇera), fifth the discipline of the female novice (the śrāmaṇerī), sixth the discipline of the lay follower (the five precepts undertaken by a layman at home), seventh the discipline of the female lay follower (the five precepts undertaken by a laywoman at home), eighth the discipline of the one-day observance (the discipline of eight limbs undertaken for a day and a night). These eight differences in the mark of discipline are together named the first kind — the discipline of individual liberation.

Although there are eight names, the real entities are four only: first the discipline of the bhikṣu, second the discipline of the novice, third the discipline of the lay follower, fourth the discipline of the one-day observance. Only these four disciplines of individual liberation truly have separate entities, since their marks are severally unlike.

Why is this said? Because apart from the discipline of the bhikṣu there is no further discipline of the bhikṣuṇī; apart from the discipline of the novice there are no further disciplines of the probationer and of the female novice; apart from the discipline of the lay follower there is no further discipline of the female lay follower.

How is this known to be so? Because merely by the changing of the shape and mark the entity of the discipline is neither relinquished nor further obtained, and yet the name is different. What is called “shape” is the shape and mark, that is, the male and female faculties. By the difference of these two faculties the shapes of male and female differ; and merely by the exchange of the shape one and the same discipline comes to be called that of the bhikṣu, of the bhikṣuṇī, and so forth.

For example: at the time of the turning of the faculty, the discipline of a bhikṣu is renamed the discipline of a bhikṣuṇī, or the discipline of a bhikṣuṇī is renamed the discipline of a bhikṣu; the discipline of a novice is renamed the discipline of a female novice, or the disciplines of a female novice and of a probationer are renamed the discipline of a novice; the discipline of a lay follower is renamed the discipline of a female lay follower, or the discipline of a female lay follower is renamed the discipline of a lay follower. At that stage of the turning of the faculty there is no occasion of “relinquishing the discipline obtained before” or of “obtaining a discipline not obtained before,” and so the four disciplines are not further separate entities outside those three.

(The author sets himself a question) Suppose a man first undertakes the discipline of the lay follower, then from being a lay follower goes on to undertake the discipline of a novice, and then from being a novice goes on to undertake the discipline of a bhikṣu — are these three disciplines given separate names only because the abstentions undertaken are successively increased and the means successively enlarged, as a gold coin may be single or double and the number may be fifty or twenty, and a single coin with one added is called a double, so that the names mount up upon one and the same entity? or are the three entities each their own, so that upon undertaking each arises complete and all at once?

(The author answers himself) The entities of these three disciplines are not mixed with one another; their marks are severally distinct, and they arise complete and all at once. Among the three disciplines, each has in it the portion “abstention from killing,” and so on down to the portion “abstention from liquor”; and as for how many of the remaining articles there are, that is settled according to what belongs to each.

That being so, then, taking abstention from killing and its like, what difference is there among the three when set side by side? Answer: because the conditions differ, there is a difference between them when set side by side. How is this? That is, the more training articles you seek to undertake, the more occasions of self-intoxication you are able to abstain from, and at that point the occasions of killing and the rest that you abstain from are the more numerous too. Since every “abstention” is raised in dependence upon conditions, where the conditions differ the abstention differs.

Were this not so (were the three disciplines not separate entities), then as soon as the discipline of the bhikṣu was relinquished all three disciplines ought to be relinquished together — the former two being gathered into the latter. And since such a thing is not allowed, one may see that the three are each their own entity.

Yet these three are not contrary to one another, and can turn at the same time in one and the same body; it is not that undertaking the latter requires relinquishing the former discipline — otherwise a man who has relinquished the discipline of a bhikṣu would not even be a lay follower, and there is no such principle.

How, then, are the four disciplines of lay follower, one-day observance, novice, and bhikṣu established? The stanza says:

〔Root 17〕Undertaking Abstention from Five, Eight, Ten, and All Establishes the Four Disciplines

Stanza: Undertaking abstention from five articles, from eight, from ten, and from all that ought to be abstained from establishes, in that order, the four disciplines of the lay follower, the one-day observance, the novice, and the bhikṣu.

Treatise: It should be known that here, following the order of the numbers, four disciplines are established in reliance upon four “abstentions.”

First, undertaking abstention from five things that ought to be abstained from establishes the first, the discipline of the lay follower. Which five are the things that ought to be abstained from? First killing, second taking what is not given (taking what has not been given, that is, theft), third sexual misconduct (improper relations between man and woman), fourth false speech (lying), fifth drinking the various liquors.

Second, if one undertakes abstention from eight things that ought to be abstained from, this establishes the second, the discipline of the one-day observance. Which eight are the things that ought to be abstained from? First killing, second taking what is not given, third unchastity (all matters of man and woman, not restricted to misconduct), fourth false speech, fifth drinking the various liquors, sixth anointing with scents and wearing garlands and watching and listening to dancing and singing, seventh sleeping and sitting upon high, broad, ornate, and splendid seats, eighth eating at the improper time (after noon).

Third, if one undertakes abstention from ten things that ought to be abstained from, this establishes the third, the discipline of the novice. Which ten are the things that ought to be abstained from? Within the former eight, “anointing with scents and wearing garlands” and “watching and listening to dancing and singing” are opened out into two articles, and there is added “receiving and hoarding gold, silver, and other treasures” as the tenth.

Fourth, if one undertakes abstention from all the bodily and verbal actions that ought to be abstained from, this establishes the fourth, the discipline of the bhikṣu.

What, then, are the various differences in the names of the discipline of individual liberation? The stanza says:

〔Root 18〕Śīla · Excellent Conduct · Action · Discipline · Individual Liberation · Path of Action — One Entity, Several Names

Stanza: This portion of discipline may all be called śīla, excellent conduct, action, and discipline; and only the manifest and nonmanifest of the first thought-instant further obtain the names individual liberation and path of action.

Treatise: It can level rugged and uneven action, and so it is called śīla (śīla is the transcription for discipline). If glossed by the sense of the word, it has the sense of “cooling” — just as a stanza says: one who upholds the discipline is at ease in mind and has no fever in his body, and therefore it is called śīla.

Those who have discernment praise it and extol it, and so it is called excellent conduct. It is the very self of what is done, and so it is called action.

Here the author sets himself a difficulty: is the nonmanifest not also called “not doing”? And being called not doing, how can it now be said to be the very self of “what is done”? (The question to himself) The author answers himself: one who has conscience and shame, by the force of the nonmanifest he has undertaken, no longer commits the manifold evils, and therefore on that side it is named not doing; and it is also brought about by the volition of manifest action, and therefore on that side it obtains the name of what is done — the two names have their eyes on different things and do not conflict. There is besides another explanation which says: it is the cause of doing and also the result of doing, and so there is no fault in calling it “doing” either.

It can guard body and speech, and so it is called discipline.

Thus it should be known that the name “discipline” of individual liberation extends without difference to the first and to every stage that follows; and only the manifest action and nonmanifest action of the first thought-instant further obtain the names individual liberation and path of action.

Why so? Because at the time of undertaking the discipline, the manifest and nonmanifest of that first thought-instant relinquish the manifold evil dharmas severally, one article at a time. In reliance upon this sense of “a first relinquishing severally,” the name “individual liberation” is established. And at that same time what is done is brought to its utmost completion, and in reliance upon this sense of “action being brought through,” the name “path of action” is established. Hence the first thought-instant is called individual liberation, and may also be called the discipline of individual liberation, and may also be called the root path of action.

From the second thought on, until the discipline has not yet been relinquished, it is no longer called individual liberation but only the discipline of individual liberation; nor is it any longer called a path of action, but is called instead “what arises afterward.”

Who, then, possesses which discipline? The stanza says:

〔Root 19〕The Eight Companies Possess Individual Liberation · Those Who Obtain Absorption and the Noble Ones Possess the Other Two

Stanza: The eight companies all possess the discipline of individual liberation; one who obtains meditative absorption possesses the discipline produced by absorption, and the noble one possesses the discipline produced by the path. These latter two turn along with the mind.

Treatise: The eight companies all possess the discipline of individual liberation, that is, the eight classes of person from the bhikṣu on down to the one-day observance.

(The author sets himself a question) Have the non-Buddhists then no discipline that they undertake? (The author answers himself) They have, and yet it is not called the discipline of individual liberation. For what they undertake has no power to liberate one from evils forever — their undertaking is raised in reliance upon a grasping at “existence.”

What is called produced by meditative absorption means that this discipline is produced from meditative absorption, or is had in dependence upon meditative absorption. Whoever obtains meditative absorption certainly possesses this discipline. The border stages of the meditative absorptions (the preliminary absorptions) are also called meditative absorption, just as a place near a village also obtains the name of the village. And some say: because there are rice fields and the like in the neighborhood of the village, even the fields are given the name of the village — and the principle here should be taken likewise.

The discipline produced by the path is possessed by the noble ones. This divides again into two, namely the learner and the one beyond learning.

Above, in analyzing the coexistent cause, it was said that two disciplines turn along with the mind. Among these three disciplines, which two are they? They are the two produced by meditative absorption and produced by the path, and not the discipline of individual liberation. Why so? Because the discipline of individual liberation turns constantly even at the time when another mind has been raised, or when there is no mind at all (whence one may see that it does not follow the mind).

These two disciplines, produced by absorption and without outflows, are also called the discipline of cutting off. In reliance upon what stage is this established? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 20〕The Discipline of Cutting Off — Arising Together with the Nine Uninterrupted Paths of Access Concentration

Stanza: The nine uninterrupted paths within access concentration, and the two disciplines arising together with them, are called the discipline of cutting off.

Treatise: Within access concentration (the preliminary absorption before the first meditative absorption) there are nine uninterrupted paths; and the discipline of absorption and the discipline without outflows that arise at the same time as these nine uninterrupted paths, because they can cut off forever the evil discipline bound to the desire realm and also the afflictions that can raise evil discipline, are called the discipline of cutting off.

For this reason there is the case of “being a discipline of absorption and not being a discipline of cutting off,” and four statements should be made to analyze it. The first statement (being a discipline of absorption and not a discipline of cutting off): all the remaining disciplines of absorption with outflows, apart from those with outflows of the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration. The second statement (being a discipline of cutting off and not a discipline of absorption): the discipline without outflows raised in reliance upon the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration. The third statement (being both): the discipline with outflows raised in reliance upon the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration. The fourth statement (being neither): all the remaining disciplines without outflows, apart from those without outflows of the nine uninterrupted paths of access concentration.

In the same way there is also the case of “being a discipline without outflows and not being a discipline of cutting off,” and four statements should likewise be made, to be understood correspondingly by the pattern of the four statements above.

(The author sets himself a difficulty) If that is so, how is one to construe that stanza of the abbreviated discipline spoken by the World-Honored One —

Quoted stanza: The discipline of body, how excellent; excellent too the discipline of speech; the discipline of mind, how excellent; excellent too the universal discipline.

Treatise: And there is a sūtra that says: one should well guard and should well abide in the discipline of the eye faculty. What, then, does this “discipline of the mind faculty” take for its own nature? (The author asks himself) — the nature of these two (the discipline of mind and the discipline of the faculties) is not nonmanifest form. Then, if it is not nonmanifest form, what after all is it? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 20〕The Discipline of Mind and of the Faculties Has Correct Knowing and Correct Mindfulness for Its Entity

Stanza: Correct knowing and correct mindfulness joined together are called the discipline of mind and of the faculties.

Treatise: In order to show that both these disciplines (the discipline of mind and the discipline of the faculties) have correct knowing and correct mindfulness for their entity, the stanza first sets out the two names and then says the one word “joined” — the meaning being that the discipline of mind has discernment (correct knowing) and mindfulness (correct mindfulness) for its entity, and that these two joined together are likewise the discipline of the faculties. The reason, then, that they are sometimes stated separately and sometimes jointly is to show that one may not pair them off woodenly one by one in the order of the letters.

Now it should be considered: manifest action and nonmanifest action — who possesses which? and up to what portion of time? First we make out the discipline and the non-discipline that are possessed as nonmanifest. The stanza says:

〔Root 21 · Root 22〕Abiding in Discipline · Abiding in Non-Discipline · Obtaining Meditative Absorption · The Noble Ones — the Time-Portions of Possessing the Nonmanifest

Stanza: One who abides in the nonmanifest of individual liberation, so long as he has not relinquished the discipline, constantly possesses that portion which is present; after the first thought-instant he possesses that portion which is past as well. One who abides in non-discipline is likewise. One who obtains the discipline of absorption constantly possesses the two times, past and future; the noble one at the first thought-instant excepts that portion which is past; and only when one is presently abiding in absorption or in the path does one possess that portion which is present.

Treatise: A pudgala (a sentient being, a person) who abides in the discipline of individual liberation, so long as he has not relinquished the discipline, constantly possesses the nonmanifest of the discipline of individual liberation of this present time. After the first thought-instant he then possesses that portion which is past as well — the phrase “so long as he has not relinquished it,” said above, running on through what follows. As for that portion which is future, no one possesses the nonmanifest at an unconcentrated stage — because it is form that does not follow the mind, and is feeble in force.

Just as with abiding in the discipline of individual liberation as stated above, so it should be known of abiding in non-discipline: that is, so long as the evil discipline has not been relinquished, he constantly possesses this present time; and after the first thought-instant the nonmanifest of evil discipline is possessed in that portion which is past as well.

Whoever obtains the discipline of absorption, so long as he has not relinquished it, constantly possesses the two times, past and future. (Why is even the past possessed?) Because the past discipline of absorption that was lost in another life is now, at this first thought-instant, certainly regained.

The discipline without outflows of all the noble ones is constantly possessed in past and future as well. What differs is this: at that first thought-instant the future portion is certainly possessed and the past portion is not — because this class of noble path has not arisen before.

If one is presently abiding in meditative absorption or in the noble path, then one possesses, in order, the present discipline of absorption and discipline of the path; and at the time of emerging from absorption there is no one who possesses that portion which is present.

Having made out the case of abiding in wholesome discipline and in evil discipline, what of one who abides “in the middle” (neither in discipline nor in non-discipline)? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 23〕The Time-Portions in Which One Abiding in the Middle Possesses the Nonmanifest

Stanza: If one who abides in the middle has a nonmanifest, at the first thought-instant he possesses that which is present, and thereafter possesses the two portions, past and present.

Treatise: What is called “abiding in the middle” is that class of person who is neither in discipline nor in non-discipline. The actions they raise need not every one of them have a nonmanifest. If there is a nonmanifest, then it is gathered under the class of wholesome discipline or of evil discipline.

At the first thought-instant they possess that portion alone which is present. Now the present time stands just in the middle of past and future, and so to say “possesses the middle” is to say “possesses the present.” After the first thought-instant, so long as it has not been relinquished, they constantly possess the nonmanifest of the two times, past and present.

Will one who abides in discipline or in non-discipline, then, also possess an evil or a wholesome nonmanifest? And if he does possess one, for how long a time? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 23 · First Half of Root 24〕One Abiding in Discipline Raises the Defiled · One Abiding in Non-Discipline Raises the Pure

Stanza: One who abides in discipline or in non-discipline, if he raises a defiled or a pure nonmanifest, possesses at the first thought-instant that which is present, and thereafter the two portions, past and present, until the force of that defilement or purity is spent.

Treatise: If one who abides in discipline, by a strong and abounding affliction, does unwholesome actions of killing, binding, and the like, then by that cause an unwholesome nonmanifest is raised; and if one who abides in non-discipline, by a thick and pure faith, does superior wholesome actions such as paying homage to the Buddha, then by that cause a wholesome nonmanifest is raised as well.

So long as these two minds have not been cut off, the nonmanifest raised continues constantly. Yet that first thought possesses that portion alone which is present, and from then on it extends to the two portions, past and present.

Having made out the nonmanifest, what of the possessing of manifest action? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 24 · First Half of Root 25〕The Time-Portions of Possessing Manifest Action · The Two Indeterminate Manifests Possess the Present Alone

Stanza: Manifest action, while it is presently being done, is possessed as present, and thereafter is possessed as past and not as future; and the two indeterminate manifest actions, the obscured and the unobscured, are possessed as present alone.

Treatise: Whoever abides in discipline, in non-discipline, or in the middle, so long as he is presently doing the various manifest actions, constantly possesses the present manifest action. After the first thought-instant, so long as it has not been relinquished, he constantly possesses the past manifest action; and there is certainly no one who possesses the future manifest action — in this it is as was said above in explaining the nonmanifest.

Of the two indeterminate manifest actions, the obscured-indeterminate and the unobscured-indeterminate, there is certainly no one who can possess their past and future. For since the force of the dharma is already inferior, the force of acquisition is feeble too, and so there is no power to possess the future forward or to possess the past backward.

(The author asks himself) This dharma being inferior in force, by what is it made so? (The author answers himself) It is made so by the mind.

(The author raises a difficulty against himself) If that is so, then the obscured-indeterminate minds and the rest ought likewise not to be possessed as past and future.

(The author explains himself) To reproach it thus is unreasonable. For manifest action is dull and slow, and arises in dependence upon another (the mind); minds and the rest are not so. Indeterminate manifest action arises from an inferior mind, and its force is once again more inferior than the mind that can raise it, and so manifest action and mind differ in respect of possession.

Of the “non-discipline” in which one abides, spoken of above, what are the various differences in its name? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 25〕The Five Alternative Names of Non-Discipline

Stanza: Evil conduct, evil discipline, action, path of action, non-discipline.

Treatise: These five alternative names, evil conduct and the rest, are all differences of the name “non-discipline.”

Because it is what all who have discernment reproach and loathe, and because its result is not lovely, the name “evil conduct” is established. Because it obstructs pure śīla, it is called evil discipline. Because it is produced by body and speech, it is called action. Because it is gathered under the root (the time of doing it proper), it is called a path of action. Because it does not restrain body and speech, it is called non-discipline.

Yet this name “path of action” refers to the first thought alone; what extend to the first and to every stage that follows are the other four names.

Will there be, then, such a case as “possessing manifest action but not the nonmanifest,” and so forth? Four statements should be made. How is this? The stanza says:

〔Root 26〕Possessing the Manifest but Not the Nonmanifest · Possessing the Nonmanifest but Not the Manifest — Four Statements of Analysis

Stanza: Possessing the manifest alone and not the nonmanifest is one who abides in the middle doing a deed with feeble volition; a noble one who has relinquished manifest action or in whom manifest action has not yet arisen possesses the nonmanifest alone and not the manifest.

Treatise: Possessing manifest action alone and not the nonmanifest is one who abides in neither discipline nor non-discipline (in the middle), doing a wholesome or an unwholesome deed with feeble volition, raising manifest action alone. Since there is no nonmanifest even then, how much less will there be one in the manifest action raised by an indeterminate volition. Yet one must set aside “meritorious deeds with a basis” (that is, the seven meritorious actions with a basis — giving to a guest, to a traveler, to the sick, to one who tends the sick, giving a garden grove, giving constant food, and giving in season; because merit grows in dependence upon these seven matters, they are called “with a basis”) and those cases in which a path of action has already been completed (these do have a nonmanifest).

Possessing the nonmanifest alone and not manifest action is those noble pudgalas who “change their birth” — “changing birth” means being reborn and exchanging the body one depends upon: in the new body manifest action has not yet been produced (as at the stage of being in the womb and the like), or the manifest action produced before has been relinquished along with the body.

As for the two statements “possessing both” and “possessing neither,” they may be understood correspondingly by the principle set out above.

The above has stated the possessing of manifest and nonmanifest action by those who abide in discipline, in non-discipline, and so forth; by what conditions, then, are these disciplines obtained? The stanza says:

〔Root 27〕The Conditions by Which the Three Disciplines Are Obtained · The Ten Ways of Obtaining Full Ordination

Stanza: The discipline produced by absorption is obtained by obtaining the mind of that stage of absorption; the noble one obtains the discipline produced by the path by obtaining the noble path; and the discipline of individual liberation is obtained through the instruction of another and the rest.

Treatise: The discipline of absorption is obtained by obtaining the mind of a stage of fundamental or preliminary meditative absorption with outflows, and it is obtained at that time — because it arises together with the mind. The discipline without outflows is obtained by obtaining the mind of a stage of fundamental or preliminary meditative absorption without outflows, and it is obtained at that time — also because it arises together with the mind.

The word “that” in the stanza is to show the mind of meditative absorption spoken of above; and the further word “noble” is to distinguish and take what is without outflows. Six stages of meditative absorption have minds without outflows, namely access concentration, the intermediate absorption, and the four fundamental absorptions; not including those three preliminary stages (the preliminaries of the second, third, and fourth meditative absorptions), a point left to be made out later.

The discipline of individual liberation is obtained through the instruction of another and the rest. One who can instruct another is called “another”; the entity of the discipline is raised by the force of such instruction from another, and so this discipline is said to be obtained through the instruction of another.

This divides again into two, namely the difference between what is obtained from the Saṅgha and what is obtained from a pudgala (a person). Obtained from the Saṅgha are the three disciplines of the bhikṣu, the bhikṣuṇī, and the probationer. Obtained from a pudgala are the remaining five disciplines.

The Vaibhāṣika masters who uphold the Vinaya (the discipline) say that there are besides ten ways of obtaining full ordination; and in order to gather these in, the stanza adds the further word “and the rest.”

Which ten? The first is obtaining it spontaneously, namely the Buddha and the pratyekabuddhas. The second is obtaining it by entering the certainty of the noble path (the path of seeing), namely the first five bhikṣus. The third is obtaining it by the Buddha’s calling out “come well, bhikṣu,” namely Yaśas and the rest. The fourth is obtaining it by receiving in faith the Buddha as the great master, namely Mahākāśyapa. The fifth is obtaining it by answering skillfully what was asked, namely Sudāyin. The sixth is obtaining it by receiving with reverence the eight weighty dharmas, namely Mahāprajāpatī (the Buddha’s maternal aunt). The seventh is obtaining it by sending a messenger to receive it in one’s stead, namely the nun Dharmadinnā. The eighth is obtaining it by an upholder of the Vinaya as the fifth man, this being the case in the border countries. The ninth is obtaining it by ten of the Saṅgha, this being the case in central India. The tenth is obtaining it by saying three times the going for refuge to the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, namely the sixty of the worthy company who assembled together and received full ordination.

The discipline of individual liberation so obtained is not necessarily raised in dependence upon manifest action.

Again, for how long a term should this discipline of individual liberation spoken of here be undertaken? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 28〕The Discipline of Individual Liberation — Undertaken for Life or for a Day and a Night

Stanza: The discipline of individual liberation is undertaken either for the whole of one’s life or for a day and a night.

Treatise: The discipline of individual liberation upheld by the seven companies should be undertaken for the whole of one’s life alone. The discipline of individual liberation upheld for the one-day observance is undertaken for one day and night alone.

This limit of time is settled thus. Why so? Because the bounds of time for discipline are two only: first the bound of the life span, second the bound of a day and a night; and a half-month and the rest are no more than the day and night said over again.

(A question in passing) What dharma is “time”? It is a designation upon the formations (the continuum of conditioned dharmas). In the four great continents, the stretch of light and the stretch of darkness are established in order as the names of day and night.

Of these two bounds, the one for life may be as stated. But after the end of life, although there was an engagement made before, the discipline of individual liberation cannot be raised again — because the body one depends upon is now different; and in a different supporting body there is no preliminary effort and no recollection.

(The Sautrāntikas ask) After one day and night, or within five days and nights, or ten, and so forth, when the discipline of the one-day observance is undertaken, what dharma acts as an obstruction, so that those many disciplines of the one-day observance cannot arise as well?

(The Sarvāstivādins answer) There must certainly be some dharma that can act as an obstruction, because the Bhagavat says in the sūtra that the discipline of the one-day observance is for a day and a night alone.

(The Sautrāntikas say again) Upon this matter we should consider together: was it that the Buddha rightly observed that after one day and night there is in principle no room for the discipline of the one-day observance to arise, and therefore said “one day and night” in the sūtra? or was it that, observing that those he was to train were hard to tame in their faculties, he provisionally taught them to undertake a discipline of one day and night at dawn (so that if the faculties were easy to tame, undertaking it for several days would also be permitted)?

(The Sarvāstivādins ask) Upon what principle and what holy teaching do you speak thus?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) That the discipline should arise beyond this limit is not contrary to principle.

(The Sarvāstivādins raise a further difficulty and close back upon their own school) The Vaibhāṣikas say thus: there has never been a sūtra saying that “beyond a day and a night there is a separate undertaking and obtaining of the discipline of the one-day observance,” and therefore our school does not allow this position.

In reliance upon what bound, then, is non-discipline obtained? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 28〕Evil Discipline Has No Term of a Day and a Night

Stanza: Evil discipline has no undertaking for a day and a night, because it is not undertaken as wholesome discipline is.

Treatise: Doing the various evil actions with the whole of one’s life for the term, one obtains non-discipline; and there is no undertaking of it for a day and a night alone as with the discipline of the one-day observance.

Why so? Because this kind is not undertaken as wholesome discipline is. That is: there will certainly be no one who sets a limit and undertakes non-discipline before a master, saying, as in undertaking the discipline of the one-day observance, “for one day and night I definitely undertake non-discipline” — because that is a thing which those who have discernment reproach and loathe.

(The author raises a difficulty against himself) If that is so, then neither will anyone set a limit and say before a master “until the end of my life I definitely undertake evil discipline”; and then non-discipline ought not to be obtained even for the whole of one’s life.

(The author answers himself) Although no limit is set before a master, so long as one does the various evil actions for the whole of one’s life, then by raising the inclination to “destroy the wholesome once and for all,” non-discipline is obtained; whereas it is not that one who raises an inclination to destroy the wholesome temporarily, and has no master besides, can be made to obtain non-discipline — and so non-discipline has no term of a day and a night.

As for the discipline of the one-day observance, it is by the force of undertaking it before a present master with a limit set: though there be no inclination to “destroy the evil once and for all,” the discipline is obtained all the same. (Conversely) Supposing there truly were a man who set a limit before a master and undertook non-discipline for a time, he too would certainly obtain it; yet such a thing has never been seen, and so this article is not established.

(The Sautrāntika masters say) Just as wholesome discipline has no further real thing called the nonmanifest, so this non-discipline too ought not to be really existent. What is called non-discipline is that unwholesome inclination which wishes to do evil continuing on and not relinquished; and for this reason, though a wholesome mind arise later, he is still called “one who possesses non-discipline” — because he has not yet relinquished that inclination (āśaya is the transcription for inclination).

Above has been stated the discipline of the one-day observance of a day and a night; how, then, should it be undertaken at the time of undertaking it? The stanza says:

〔Root 29〕How the Discipline of the One-Day Observance Is Undertaken — At Dawn · A Low Seat · From a Master · After the Instruction · Complete in the Limbs · Leaving Off Ornaments · A Day and a Night

Stanza: The discipline of the one-day observance is to be undertaken at early dawn, seated low, undertaking it from a master, speaking after the master’s instruction, complete in the eight limbs, leaving off splendid ornaments, with a day and a night for its term.

Treatise: The discipline of the one-day observance is to be undertaken at early dawn — that is, this discipline is to be undertaken at the time of sunrise, because this discipline must run through a day and a night.

If a man has made this engagement beforehand, saying that on the eighth day of every month and the like he will certainly undertake this discipline of the one-day observance, then if in the morning there is a hindering condition, he may still undertake it at the time when “the fast is done” (after the matter of the fast is already finished — everything before the fast being together named early dawn).

What is called “seated low” means being seated on a humble and lowly seat before the master, or squatting, or kneeling, the body bent and the palms joined — only one who is sick may be excepted. If one is not reverent, the discipline is not raised.

This discipline must certainly be undertaken from a master, and one is not permitted to undertake it oneself. For if afterwards one meets the various conditions of transgressing the discipline, then out of shame before the master who gave the discipline one will be able not to transgress.

One who undertakes this discipline should, following the master’s instruction, speak after the master has finished speaking; he may not speak before him, nor speak together with him. Only thus does it count as undertaking it through the master’s instruction. If it is not so, then both sides, the giving and the undertaking, fail.

One must receive all eight limbs completely for the one-day observance to be completed; if any limb whatever is lacking, the one-day observance is not completed.

In undertaking this discipline one must certainly leave off splendid ornaments, because they are an occasion of self-intoxication. As for the ornaments one is accustomed to wear ordinarily, they need not necessarily be laid aside — because taking those ordinary things for object one will not raise a great self-intoxication as one would with what is novel.

In undertaking this discipline one must run through a day and a night, that is, until the first rising of the sun at dawn the next day. If it is not undertaken according to the rule in this way, only excellent conduct is produced and the discipline is not obtained.

Again, if it is thus undertaken for the whole of a day and a night, it amounts to prohibiting altogether, within that day and night, all slaughter, hunting, lechery, and theft toward all sentient beings — seen thus, the discipline of the one-day observance is truly of great use.

What is called “the one-day observance” means that this discipline abides near the arhat, because one who undertakes it trains after the arhat. And some say: it abides near the discipline undertaken for life (whence its name).

Such a discipline is also called “the nourishing,” because it nourishes those sentient beings whose wholesome roots are thin and few and makes those roots increase by degrees. Just as a stanza says:

Quoted stanza: By this one can nourish the pure and wholesome mind of oneself and of others, and therefore the Bhagavat said that this is called the nourishing.

Treatise: Why must one be complete in the eight limbs in undertaking this discipline? The stanza says:

〔Root 30〕The Division of the Eight Limbs — Four Limbs of Śīla · One Limb of Heedfulness · Three Limbs of Restraint

Stanza: The limbs of śīla, the limb of heedfulness, and the limbs of restraint are, in that order, four, one, and three, and are for guarding respectively against the various intrinsic offences, against lost mindfulness, and against self-intoxication.

Treatise: Of the eight limbs, the first four are the limbs of śīla, namely the four articles from abstaining from killing to abstaining from false speech, because by these four the intrinsic offences are abstained from (things which are of themselves offences).

Next there is one limb which is the limb of heedfulness, namely abstaining from drinking the various liquors — liquor being an occasion that can produce heedlessness. Though one has undertaken śīla, if one drinks liquor the mind becomes heedless, and thereupon śīla is transgressed.

The last three are the limbs of restraint, namely abstaining from anointing with scents and wearing garlands and so on down to eating at the improper time, because these three can conduce to a mind of disgust and turning away.

Why must one receive all three classes of limbs completely? Because if they are not complete, one cannot abstain from the three faults of intrinsic offence, lost mindfulness, and self-intoxication.

That is: the first four articles, from abstaining from killing to abstaining from false speech, can guard against intrinsic offences — because they abstain from the evil actions of killing and the rest that are raised by greed, hatred, and delusion. Next, abstaining from drinking liquor can guard against lost mindfulness — because at the time of drinking liquor a man forgets the various matters of “what should be done and what should not be done.” Last, abstaining from those three can guard against self-intoxication — because if one makes use of the various scents and garlands and of high and broad seats, and frequents song and dance, the mind will be elated and forthwith the discipline is ruined; and it is by abstaining from those that the mind departs from self-intoxication.

If one can keep the article of “eating at the proper time,” then because it blocks the habit of eating at all hours, one will recollect the discipline of the one-day observance one has undertaken, and will be able to generate deep in the world a mind of disgust and turning away.

If one eats at the improper time, then both these things (recollecting the discipline and disgust) are absent; and moreover frequent eating can make a man’s mind loose and dissolute.

(Some other masters say) Abstention from eating at the improper time alone is called the entity of the fast, and the remaining eight are called the limbs of the fast — they split anointing with scents and wearing garlands from watching and listening to dancing and singing into two articles, and so make eight.

(The Sautrāntikas adduce the sūtra in refutation) To hold this is to contravene the sūtra. For the sūtra, having finished with abstention from eating at the improper time, goes straight on to say: this eighth limb I now train in after the noble arhats, doing as they do and acting as they act. (Which shows that abstention from eating at the improper time is itself the eighth limb and not an entity outside the limbs.)

(The other masters ask) If that is so, what other “entity of the fast” is there, that these eight are called limbs of the fast?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) “Fast” is the name of the whole, and “limb” is stated by division; because it is by the several constituting the whole that the several obtain the name of limb. Just as a chariot is made up of many parts, and as with the fourfold army (elephant troops, horse troops, chariot troops, foot troops) and the five-ingredient powder (a powder compounded of five medicinal flavors) — so also should the eight limbs of the fast be understood.

(The Vaibhāṣikas establish their own school) The Vaibhāṣikas say thus: abstention from eating at the improper time is both the fast and a limb of the fast; the remaining seven limbs are limbs of the fast and not the fast. Just as right view is both the path and a limb of the path, while the remaining seven limbs are limbs of the path and not the path; as the awakening-factor of discernment of dharmas is both awakening and an awakening-factor, while the remaining six limbs are awakening-factors and not awakening; and as concentration is both meditative absorption and a limb of meditative absorption, while the remaining limbs are limbs of meditative absorption and not meditative absorption.

(The Sautrāntikas raise a difficulty) To speak thus is not reasonable. For one may not say that right view and the rest are the “limbs” of right view and the rest themselves — “limb” means a branch, and is always said with respect to another. And if the right view and the rest arisen in an earlier thought be said to be the limbs of the right view and the rest arisen in a later thought, then the noble path and the rest at the first thought-instant ought not to be complete in the eight limbs.

Is it, then, only a lay follower who can undertake the one-day observance, or do others too undertake the one-day observance? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 31〕Others Than Lay Followers May Undertake the One-Day Observance · but Without Undertaking the Three Refuges There Is None

Stanza: The one-day observance may be had by others too, but without undertaking the three refuges there is none.

Treatise: Whoever has not yet undertaken the discipline of the lay follower, if within a day and a night he takes refuge in the Three Jewels and, having said the three refuges, undertakes the discipline of the one-day observance, he too undertakes and obtains the discipline of the one-day observance. If it is not so (if the three refuges have not been said first) there is none — excepting those who do not know that the three refuges must first be undertaken.

Just as the sūtra says: the Buddha told Mahānāman that any white-robed layman of the household, his male faculty complete, who takes refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, raising a mind earnest and pure and uttering words sincere and true, declaring of himself “I am an upāsaka (a lay follower); may the venerable one bear me in mind and guard me with compassion” — at this point he is named an upāsaka.

(Asking in reliance upon the sūtra) Is one made a lay follower, then, merely by undertaking the three refuges?

(The masters abroad answer) By this alone he is made one.

(The treatise masters of the country of Kaśmīra say) Apart from the discipline of the lay follower there is no lay follower — one must have the five precepts to be named a lay follower.

(The masters abroad raise a difficulty) If that is so, it ought to contravene this sūtra (the sūtra says only that at the point of self-declaration he is named a lay follower, and does not say that the discipline must be raised).

(Kaśmīra answers) This does not contravene it, because the discipline has already been raised at that time.

(The masters abroad ask) At what time, then, is the discipline raised? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 31〕The Discipline Is Raised at the Time of Declaring Oneself a Lay Follower

Stanza: At declaring oneself a lay follower the discipline is raised, just as is said of the bhikṣu and the rest.

Treatise: Raising a mind earnest and pure and uttering words sincere and true, one declares of oneself “I am an upāsaka; may the venerable one bear me in mind and guard me with compassion” — and at that very time the discipline of the lay follower is raised. Because the words declaring oneself a lay follower and the rest are the very condition that raises the discipline.

And further because the sūtra goes on to say, “from this time forward, until the end of my life, I renounce living beings.” The sense of this sūtra sentence is the renouncing of killing and the rest; the words “killing” and so forth are omitted in the text and only the one word “living” is said — whence at the earlier time the five precepts had already been obtained.

Though he has already obtained the discipline of the lay follower, in order that he may know the training articles he ought to train in, the five marks of discipline, abstention from killing and the rest, are set out for him again, teaching him to know them and hold them firmly. Just as, having obtained the full ordination of a bhikṣu, the training articles are set out for him again, teaching him to know them and hold them firmly; and it is so with the novice as well. Here too it should be the same — and so a lay follower is certainly complete in the discipline.

The stanza says:

〔Root 32〔Lines 1–3〕〕The Four Lay Followers, “One Part” and the Rest — Said with Regard to “What Can Be Kept”

Stanza: If all lay followers are complete in the discipline, why is it said that there is “training in one part” and the rest? Answer: that is said with regard to what can be kept.

Treatise: (The Sautrāntikas adduce the sūtra as a difficulty) If all lay followers are complete in the discipline, why does the World-Honored One say that there are four lay followers: first one able to train in one part, second one able to train in a small part, third one able to train in a large part, fourth one able to train in the full part?

(The Sarvāstivādins construe the sūtra) That is said with regard to “what can be kept.” What they are able to keep is what they undertook beforehand, and so the word “train” is used; were it not so, the sūtra ought to have said “undertakes one part” and the rest. In the real principle, it is with regard to “what has been undertaken” that they are complete in the discipline; and because they are complete in the discipline they are called lay followers.

(The Sautrāntikas object) To hold this contravenes the sūtra.

(The Sarvāstivādins probe) How does it contravene the sūtra?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) Because no sūtra says that “the words declaring oneself a lay follower and the rest raise the five precepts”; and moreover this sūtra does not say “from this time forward, until the end of my life, I renounce living beings.”

(The Sarvāstivādins ask) How, then, does the sūtra say it?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) As the Mahānāman Sūtra says. In that sūtra alone are the marks of a lay follower stated, and other sūtras do not say it thus — so that you contravene the sūtra.

(The Sautrāntikas adduce another sūtra and construe the former) Yet another sūtra says: from this time forward, until the end of my life, I renounce living beings and turn to the pure — this being taking refuge in the Three Jewels and uttering words of faith and sincerity. This passage shows that one who has already seen the truths, having obtained the pure faith, stakes his own life in an oath, showing that he cherishes the true Dharma deeply, so that even to save his own life he will in the end not abandon the Tathāgata’s true Dharma. It is not that these words about “renouncing life” are said in order to state the marks of a lay follower; and even were they truly stating the marks of a lay follower, they are still no clear principle and teaching. Who could, upon such unclear phrases, believe that the five precepts had already been raised beforehand?

(The Sautrāntikas refute the construal offered before) Again, if “training in one part” and the rest were said with regard to keeping the discipline and transgressing it, then that man undertaking the discipline ought not to have asked the Buddha at all, much less should the Buddha have answered him. Why so? Whoever has understood that “the discipline of a lay follower is certainly complete in five limbs” — would he then fail to understand that “to keep one article among the training articles to be trained in and not the others, and so on up to keeping them all completely, is what is called one part and the rest”?

(The Sautrāntikas explain the text of the sūtra for themselves) It is precisely because that man had not yet understood how much the discipline of a lay follower comprises that he ought to have asked: how many upāsakas are there who are able to train in the training articles? The answer was: there are four upāsakas, namely those able to train in one part and the rest. Still he could not understand, and so he asked again: what is called being able to train in one part? and so on at length.

(The Sarvāstivādins raise a difficulty) If one who lacks the discipline can still be called a lay follower, then a bhikṣu and a novice who lack the discipline ought to be established as such too. Since those two are not established, this one likewise ought not to be.

(The Sautrāntikas retort) Why, then, is it settled thus that the lay follower and so on up to the bhikṣu undertake just so many limbs of discipline?

(The Sarvāstivādins answer) It is so instituted by the force of the Buddha’s teaching.

(The Sautrāntikas answer by the same parallel) If that is so, why then is it not allowed that “by the force of the Buddha’s teaching it is instituted that, though one lacks the discipline, one is called a lay follower, and is not called a bhikṣu and the rest”?

(Kaśmīra closes back upon its own school) The Vaibhāṣika masters of the country of Kaśmīra do not allow that one who lacks the discipline can become a lay follower.

By what, then, do all these disciplines of the lay follower and the rest become of the low, the middle, and the high grade? The stanza says:

〔Root 32〔Line 4〕〕The Three Grades, Low, Middle, and High, Are Settled by the Mind

Stanza: Low, middle, and high are settled by the mind.

Treatise: The discipline of individual liberation undertaken by the eight companies all has the three grades, low, middle, and high, according to the mind at the time of undertaking it. By this principle, some arhats may possess a discipline of the low grade, while some ordinary beings may on the contrary possess one of the high grade.

(A question in passing) Is there one who becomes a lay follower by undertaking the discipline of the lay follower alone without undertaking the three refuges? Answer: he does not become a lay follower — save those who do not know.

In whom, then, do all those who take refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha after all take refuge? The stanza says:

〔Root 33〕The Entity of the Three Refuges — the Dharmas beyond Learning That Can Make a Buddha · the Two Kinds of Dharma That Can Make a Saṅgha · Nirvāṇa, Cessation through Discernment

Stanza: What is taken refuge in is the dharmas that can make a Buddha and can make a Saṅgha, the dharmas beyond learning and the two kinds, together with nirvāṇa, cessation through discernment — to say it thus is to be complete in the three refuges.

Treatise: One who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge only in those dharmas beyond learning that can accomplish a Buddha. Because those dharmas are superior, the Buddha’s body obtains the name “Buddha”; or because he obtains those dharmas, the Buddha can awaken to all.

Which are called the Buddha’s dharmas beyond learning? They are the knowledge of exhaustion and the rest, together with the dharmas that accompany them. They are not the body of form and the rest, because that body is the same before and after his becoming a Buddha (it does not change through his becoming a Buddha).

(A question to himself) Does one take refuge in one Buddha, or in all Buddhas? In the real principle one should say that one takes refuge in all Buddhas, because the mark of the path of all Buddhas is without difference.

One who takes refuge in the Saṅgha takes refuge generally in those dharmas of the learner and beyond learning that can accomplish a Saṅgha. Because they obtain those dharmas, the Saṅgha becomes the eight pudgalas (the four approaches and four fruits), and is besides indestructible.

(A question to himself) Does one take refuge in the Saṅgha of one Buddha, or in the Saṅgha of all Buddhas? In the real principle one takes refuge generally in the Saṅgha of all Buddhas, because the mark of the path of all Saṅghas is without difference.

Yet the sūtra says, “there will be a Saṅgha in time to come, in which you should take refuge” — that sūtra is only showing the Jewel of the Saṅgha that will be present and visible in time to come.

One who takes refuge in the Dharma takes refuge in nirvāṇa. The nirvāṇa spoken of here displays cessation through discernment alone; the afflictions and suffering within one’s own and others’ continua are of one and the same mark in their stilling, and so the refuge is general.

(The author objects · or it is a setting out of the Sautrāntikas’ objection) If the dharmas beyond learning alone are the Buddha, then why is it that one who with an evil mind draws blood from the Buddha’s body has injured the born body only and yet accomplishes a deed of immediate retribution?

(The Vaibhāṣikas answer) They explain it thus: the body upon which those dharmas depend having been ruined, those dharmas are ruined along with it.

(The author objects again · or it is a setting out of the Sautrāntikas’ objection) Yet searching this treatise, it is nowhere seen to say that “the dharmas beyond learning alone are what is called Buddha,” but only that “the dharmas beyond learning can accomplish a Buddha.” Since it does not exclude the entity of a Buddha from gathering in the body he depends upon, there is here no room for the former objection.

Were it not so (were the entity of a Buddha the dharmas beyond learning alone), then when the Buddha and the Saṅgha abide in a conventional mind they would be neither Saṅgha nor Buddha. And one ought likewise to hold that “only accomplishing the discipline of a bhikṣu is the bhikṣu” — yet were that truly so, then a man who wished to make offerings to a bhikṣu would be making offerings only to that “śīla which can accomplish a bhikṣu” (whereas it is plainly seen in the world that the four requisites are offered to the body upon which the discipline depends, which shows that the body one depends upon is also the bhikṣu); and in the same way a man who wished to take refuge in the Buddha ought to take refuge only in those dharmas beyond learning that can accomplish a Buddha (whereas it is plainly seen that what the multitude takes refuge in and pays homage to is just the Buddha’s born body).

(Some other masters say) One who takes refuge in the Buddha takes refuge generally in the eighteen dharmas exclusive to the Tathāgata.

What, then, does this “refuge-taking” have for its entity? Answer: verbal manifest action for its entity. And what does such a taking of refuge mean? Answer: it has the sense of rescue and relief. For by making it one’s support one can be liberated forever from all suffering. Just as the World-Honored One says:

Quoted stanza: The multitudes, pressed by dread, mostly go for refuge to those mountains, go for refuge to gardens and groves, thickets, lone trees, caityas (shrines), and the like. Such a refuge is not the most excellent, such a refuge is not the most honorable; it is not by such a refuge that one can be liberated from the manifold sufferings. But whoever takes refuge in the Buddha and takes refuge in the Dharma and the Saṅgha, upon the four noble truths constantly contemplating with discernment: knowing suffering, knowing the arising of suffering, knowing the transcending of the manifold sufferings forever (cessation), knowing the eightfold noble path, and going toward the security of nirvāṇa — such a refuge is the most excellent, such a refuge is the most honorable; it is certainly by such a refuge that one can be liberated from the manifold sufferings.

Treatise: Therefore taking refuge is universally the gateway of means at every place where a discipline is undertaken.

Why, then, does the World-Honored One establish abstention from unchastity as a training article at every other place of discipline, and yet, in the one discipline of the lay follower alone, institute for him only abstention from sexual misconduct? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 34〕Sexual Misconduct Is the Most Reproachable · Is Easy to Abstain From · and the Noble Ones Obtain the Discipline of Not Doing

Stanza: Sexual misconduct is the most to be reproached, is easy besides to abstain from, and the noble ones obtain with regard to it the discipline of not doing.

Treatise: Sexual misconduct alone is what the world reproaches to the utmost, because it can violate and injure the wives and the rest of others, and because it draws on the evil destinies — whereas unchastity is not so.

Again, sexual misconduct is easy to abstain from. Householders are attached to the pleasures of desire, and abstention from unchastity is hard for them to hold; observing that they cannot train in it for a long time, abstention from unchastity is not instituted for them.

Again, the noble ones with regard to sexual misconduct all certainly obtain the “discipline of not doing”; for even a noble one who passes through birth and death will not do it. With abstention from unchastity it is not so. Therefore, within the discipline undertaken by the lay follower, only abstention from sexual misconduct is instituted for them — lest a noble one passing through birth and death should on the contrary transgress the discipline of the lay follower.

What is called the discipline of not doing is that one will certainly not do it.

(The author asks himself) Those who first undertook the discipline of the lay follower and only afterwards took wives and concubines — with regard to those wives and concubines, was the discipline obtained at the earlier time of undertaking it?

(The author answers himself) In the real principle it should have been obtained — otherwise it would come to this, that the discipline of individual liberation is obtained only with regard to a part of sentient beings.

(The author raises a difficulty against himself) If that is so, why then is taking wives and concubines afterwards not a transgression of the discipline? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 34〕The Discipline Is Obtained in Accordance with the Vow · Not with Regard to the Whole of the Continua

Stanza: The discipline is obtained in accordance with the vow originally undertaken, and not with regard to the whole of the continua.

Treatise: The discipline is obtained in accordance with the vow originally undertaken. And what was the vow originally undertaken? It was abstention from sexual misconduct. It was not said with regard to the continua of all sentient beings, “from all of them I shall abstain from unchastity.” For this reason, universally upon the continua of all sentient beings, one obtains only the discipline “abstention from sexual misconduct,” and does not obtain the discipline of “abstention from unchastity” — and so taking wives and concubines afterwards is no violation of the earlier discipline.

Why, then, is only abstention from false speech instituted, and divisive speech and the rest not established as part of the discipline of the lay follower? This too is by the three reasons stated above: namely that false speech is the most to be reproached, that householders find it easy to abstain from, and that all noble ones obtain with regard to it the discipline of not doing.

There is besides one further reason; the stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 35〕Once the Door of Lying Is Open · Every Training Article Will Be Transgressed

Stanza: Because opening the door of false speech leads to transgressing every training article.

Treatise: At the time of being examined for having transgressed the various training articles, if the door of false speech has been opened, he will say “I did not do it,” and thereby he will transgress much in the discipline. And so the Buddha, in order to make them hold firmly, instituted abstention from false speech in every discipline — only thus can it make him, if he transgresses the discipline, disclose it himself and so be able to guard against transgressing again.

(The author asks himself) Why, then, is the discipline of the lay follower not established upon “abstaining from prohibited offences” (a prohibited offence being a thing prohibited by the Buddha which is not of itself an offence)?

(The author answers himself) Who says that there is no abstaining from a prohibited offence here? From which prohibited offence? Namely from drinking liquor.

(Asking again) Why, then, among those prohibited offences, is no other instituted and only drinking liquor prohibited? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 35〕Among Prohibited Offences, Liquor Alone Is Abstained From — In Order to Guard the Remaining Disciplines

Stanza: Among the prohibited, liquor alone is abstained from, in order to guard the remaining disciplines.

Treatise: Those who drink liquor are for the most part loose and dissolute in mind and cannot guard the remaining disciplines; and so, in order to guard the remaining disciplines, they are taught to abstain from drinking liquor.

(The author asks himself) How is it known that drinking liquor is gathered under prohibited offences?

(The author answers himself) Because there is no mark of an intrinsic offence in it. For the various intrinsic offences proceed only in a defiled mind; whereas when one drinks for the curing of illness it is not for intoxication, and one can be without a defiled mind.

(The author raises a difficulty against himself) Is it not that one plainly knows beforehand that liquor can intoxicate and yet deliberately wishes to drink it — and is this not a defiled mind?

(The author answers himself) This is not a defiled mind. Because he knows his own measure and drinks within a limit for the curing of illness, not letting himself be intoxicated; and so it is not a defiled mind.

(Those who uphold the Vinaya say) Those who uphold the Vinaya say: drinking liquor is an intrinsic offence. Just as the venerable Upāli asked: how should I supply one who is sick? and the World-Honored One told him: excepting only intrinsic offences, everything else may be supplied as is fitting. Yet there was a sick man of the Śākya clan who needed liquor, and the World-Honored One would not permit liquor to be supplied to him. And the sūtra says: whatever bhikṣu calls me his master should not drink liquor, and not even the measure of liquor that would wet the tip of a reed should be drunk. Hence it is known that drinking liquor is gathered under intrinsic offences. Again, the noble ones do not transgress it though they pass through many births, just as with killing and the rest. And again, because the sūtra says that it is a bodily evil conduct.

(The Abhidharma masters say) The Abhidharma masters say: drinking liquor is not an intrinsic offence; the not permitting it at that time was because the prohibitory disciplines were opened as a whole for the sick (and since it was a general opening, one cannot single out the one item of liquor and infer that it is an intrinsic offence).

As for the prohibiting of drinking liquor at other times, it is in order to guard against transgressing an intrinsic offence thereby. And because the measure of intoxication has no fixed limit, even the measure that would wet the tip of a reed is prohibited along with the rest.

Again, that all the noble ones do not drink liquor is because the noble ones have conscience and shame, and because drinking liquor can make one lose correct mindfulness. That they do not drink even the smallest portion is because it is like a poison, whose measure is not fixed.

Again, that the sūtra says it is a bodily evil conduct is because liquor is the occasion of all heedlessness. For this reason it alone obtains the name “occasion of heedlessness”; the others (killing and the rest) do not have this name established for them, because they are all intrinsic offences.

As for the sūtra’s saying that “frequent habituation leads to falling into the evil destinies,” that shows that frequent drinking of liquor can make the various unwholesome dharmas within the body continue on and turn, and can draw forth actions leading to the evil destinies, or can make those actions grow yet stronger.

Just as the sūtra says: surā, maireya, and madya are occasions of heedlessness. In what sense is this said? Liquor fermented from grain foods is called surā; what is made by fermenting other things is called maireya liquor. When these first two liquors are not yet ripened, or are already spoiled, and cannot make one intoxicated, they are not called madya; only when they can make one intoxicated are they called madya liquor — and in order to distinguish that stage in which they are of no use, this further name is established.

Yet betel nut and barnyard millet and the like can also make one intoxicated; and in order to distinguish those, it is necessary to say surā and maireya liquor (only these two classes of fermentation are counted).

Liquor, though it is a prohibited offence, can make a man heedless and commit the manifold evils at large; and in order to make men cut it off in earnest, the Buddha spoke thus. As for the words “occasion of heedlessness,” it is because liquor is the place upon which heedlessness depends.

〔Root 36〕From What Place Is Each of the Three Disciplines Obtained — from All, from Two, from the Present, from All Times

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Of these three disciplines, that of individual liberation, that of the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows, if from some one place one of them has been obtained, are the remaining two obtained along with it? Answer: they are not. How then is it? The stanza says:

Stanza: The discipline of the desire realm is obtained from all, from the two kinds, and from the present; the discipline of the meditative absorptions and the discipline without outflows are obtained from the root path of action, and from all three times, past, present, and future.

Treatise: The discipline of the desire realm is the discipline of individual liberation (the discipline severally undertaken and severally liberating from evil conduct by the seven classes, householder and renunciant). It is obtained from every root path of action, and also from the preparatory effort (the preliminary movements before one sets hand to it) and from the subsequent arising (the residual momentum after the deed is done).

What is called ‘obtained from the two’ means obtained from two kinds: one kind is the distinction of sentient and non-sentient (the sin committed against a sentient being and the sin committed against what is not sentient), and one kind is the distinction of the offense by its own nature and the offense by prohibition (an offense by its own nature is evil in itself; an offense by prohibition is what the Buddha has prohibited).

What is called ‘obtained from the present’ means obtained from the aggregates, sense fields, and elements of the present, not from those of the past and the future. Why? Because this kind of discipline turns with regard to ‘the place where sentient beings are,’ and the past and the future are not places where sentient beings are.

As for obtaining the discipline of the meditative absorptions and the discipline without outflows, it should be known that these are obtained from the root path of action alone. Even the preparatory effort and the subsequent arising do not yield this discipline from there — how much less the offenses by prohibition.

What is called ‘from all times’ means obtained from the aggregates, sense fields, and elements of all three times, past, present, and future.

Because of these several distinctions above, four alternatives should be made to sort them out: there are aggregates, sense fields, and elements from which only the discipline of individual liberation is obtained and not the remaining two disciplines, and so on. The first alternative (only individual liberation obtained) is from the preparatory effort, the subsequent arising, and the offenses by prohibition of the present. The second alternative (only the disciplines of absorption and without outflows obtained, and not individual liberation) is from the root paths of action of the past and the future. The third alternative (both obtained) is from the root path of action of the present. The fourth alternative (neither obtained) is from the preparatory effort and the subsequent arising of the past and the future.

(Here the author adds a sentence going to the heart of the matter.) At the very moment when a wholesome discipline is being obtained, it is impossible that present evil paths of action and the rest should exist at the same time; therefore one should say ‘obtained from a place that is present.’ As regards principle, one should say only ‘guarding against the future,’ and one should definitely not say ‘guarding against the past and the present.’

Treatise (taking up the question at the turn): For all who obtain discipline or non-discipline, is there any difference among them as regards these three sides, ‘all sentient beings,’ ‘limbs,’ and ‘causes’? Answer: here there certainly is a difference. What is the mark of that difference? The stanza says:

〔Root 37〕Discipline Is Obtained from All Sentient Beings — the Limbs Unsettled, the Causes Unsettled; Non-Discipline Is Obtained from All Sentient Beings and from All Limbs, but the Causes Unsettled

Stanza: Discipline is obtained from all sentient beings, while as to limbs and causes it is said to be unsettled; non-discipline too is obtained from all sentient beings, and from all limbs, only the causes being unsettled.

Treatise: Discipline is certainly obtained from all sentient beings; there is no principle of ‘obtained only from a portion of sentient beings.’ As to limbs and causes, they are said to be unsettled.

‘The limbs unsettled’ means: some obtain it from all limbs, that is, the discipline of a bhikṣu (one who receives the full ordination, abstaining from all seven limbs). Some obtain it from four limbs, that is, the remaining kinds of discipline (the lay follower, the one-day observance, the novice, and so on) — because only the root path of action is called a limb of the discipline.

‘The causes unsettled’ means: from one point of view it is obtained from all causes, and from another point of view it is allowed to be obtained from one cause only. What is called ‘from all causes’ means obtained from the three wholesome roots, non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion — because these three necessarily arise together. What is called ‘from one cause only’ means obtained from some one among a mind of the low grade, a mind of the middle grade, and a mind of the high grade — because these three grades of mind cannot arise together. Here it is with regard to these latter three grades of mind that ‘cause’ is spoken of.

Thereupon four classes of person may be distinguished. The first class: one who abides in the discipline, who obtains discipline with regard to all sentient beings and yet not from all limbs nor from all causes — that is, one who takes the lay follower’s discipline or the novice’s discipline with a low, or a middle, or a high grade of mind. The second class: one who obtains discipline with regard to all sentient beings, by all limbs but not by all causes — that is, one who takes the bhikṣu’s discipline with a low, or a middle, or a high grade of mind. The third class: one who obtains discipline with regard to all sentient beings, both by all limbs and by all causes — that is, one who takes the lay follower’s, the novice’s, and the bhikṣu’s discipline with the low, the middle, and the high grade of mind respectively. The fourth class: one who obtains discipline with regard to all sentient beings, by all causes and not by all limbs — that is, one who takes the lay follower’s, the one-day, and the novice’s discipline with the three grades of mind respectively.

In sum, there is no one who obtains discipline without its ‘extending to all sentient beings.’ For it is only by abiding in a wholesome disposition toward all sentient beings that discipline can be obtained; if it be not so, it will not do, because the unwholesome disposition has not wholly ceased.

A man must make none of five stipulations if he is to be able to take on the discipline of individual liberation. These five stipulations are: the stipulation of sentient beings, of limbs, of places, of times, and of circumstances. What is called ‘the stipulation of sentient beings’ is thinking in the mind: I shall abstain from killing and the rest only toward a certain class of sentient beings. What is called ‘the stipulation of limbs’ is thinking in the mind: I shall keep without transgression only some one limb of the discipline. What is called ‘the stipulation of places’ is thinking in the mind: I shall abstain from killing and the rest only while dwelling in a certain class of region. What is called ‘the stipulation of times’ is thinking in the mind: I am able to abstain from killing and the rest only within a stretch of time such as a month. What is called ‘the stipulation of circumstances’ is thinking in the mind: I am able to abstain from killing and the rest only apart from such circumstances as being at war. One who takes it up with a condition attached in this way does not obtain discipline; he obtains only an excellent conduct resembling discipline.

Treatise (exchange one · how discipline is obtained toward objects beyond one’s power): (General question) As for those objects that one’s own strength cannot reach at all (sentient beings far off, for instance, or in the future), how can discipline be obtained with regard to them? (Answer) It is because a dominant disposition of ‘not harming their lives’ has been raised toward all sentient beings universally that discipline is obtained.

(One house of the Vibhāṣā masters, that of separate raising, sets out an account of its own) If it be said that one may take on the discipline of individual liberation only with regard to ‘objects that one’s power can reach,’ then this discipline would come to have increase and decrease — for these two classes of sentient beings, ‘within one’s power’ and ‘beyond one’s power,’ change places with each other; and in that case the discipline of individual liberation would have the fault of being obtained and relinquished apart from the causes and conditions of obtaining and relinquishing the discipline.

(The author objects) It is not so as you say. Just as with green grass and the like, which formerly was not and afterwards arises, or having arisen withers away, and yet there is neither increase nor decrease as regards the discipline; so with the discipline obtained upon the two objects, ‘within one’s power’ and ‘beyond one’s power,’ when those objects change places the instance ought to run the same way (since the increase and decrease of grasses and trees does not make the discipline increase or decrease, how should the changing places of sentient beings make it increase or decrease?).

(The house of separate raising defends itself) The two cases cannot be spoken of alike. Why? Because the nature of sentient beings before and after is equal, whereas the nature of grass and the like before and after is not the same.

(The author objects again) If that be so, then after a sentient being has reached parinirvāṇa, since a nature of the same class as before is now no longer there, how should there be no decrease in the discipline raised toward him? Therefore that explanation is not so in principle; the reason given before (raising the disposition with all sentient beings universally as its object) is the better in principle.

(Someone turns and objects against the house of total raising) If that be so, then the former buddhas and the beings whom the former buddhas led across have all reached nirvāṇa; and since the later buddhas can raise no discipline of individual liberation toward them, would not the moral discipline of the later buddhas be less than that of the former?

(The house of total raising answers) Because the discipline of individual liberation of all buddhas is obtained from all sentient beings. Supposing those sentient beings were still present now, the later buddhas would obtain discipline from them just the same; hence the moral discipline of the later buddhas has no fault of being less than that of the former.

Treatise (passing over to non-discipline): The principle of obtaining the disciplines from sentient beings has now been said out. As for non-discipline, it too is certainly obtained from all sentient beings and from all paths of action; there is no one of non-discipline who has only ‘a portion of the objects’ or whose limbs are incomplete. Such a person certainly does not exist. As for causes, one cannot say ‘from all causes,’ because the three kinds of mind, of low grade and the rest, cannot arise together.

Suppose a man has obtained non-discipline by a mind of the low grade, and afterwards at another time cuts off the life of a living being with a mind of the high grade; then what he accomplishes is still the non-discipline of the low grade, while at the same time he accomplishes besides a manifest action of killing of the high grade and the rest. The cases of the middle and the high grade are to be known on this model.

Who are they that are here called ‘those of non-discipline’? They are those who slaughter sheep, slaughter fowl, slaughter swine, catch birds, catch fish, hunt beasts, rob and steal, do execution, keep prisons, bind nāgas, boil dogs, and set nets and snares, and the like. What is further adduced under the word ‘and the like’ includes as well the officers of punishment appointed by the king, and the rest who hear pleas and decide on crimes — because their minds constantly harbor a harming mind.

The reason they are called ‘those of non-discipline’ is that that class of person abides in non-discipline; or else it may be said that because there is this dharma ‘non-discipline,’ that person is called one of non-discipline. What is called ‘one who slaughters sheep’ means that for the sake of a livelihood he has set up a term to last as long as his body lasts, and constantly wishes to harm sheep. Of the remaining kinds, each according to its own case, it should be known that they are so likewise.

Treatise (exchange two · the objection of the near kinsman and the sheep): (The Sautrāntikas ask) That the disciplines should be obtained toward the whole realm of sentient beings is a principle that will pass, since they are taken on by a superior disposition of wishing to benefit and gladden all universally; but those of non-discipline, who slaughter sheep and the like, have no thought of harm toward their own near kinsmen, and would not be willing to kill them even to save their own lives — how then can it be said that they obtain non-discipline toward all sentient beings universally?

(The Sarvāstivādins answer) Because if that near kinsman were to become a sheep or the like, toward him too a harming mind could be had just the same.

(The Sautrāntikas object again) Knowing full well that the near kinsman is not now a sheep or the like, how could a harming mind be had toward him? Still less can there be any principle by which a noble one should become a sheep or the like, so how could non-discipline be obtained toward a noble one? And if it be said that with regard to the future self-body of a sheep or the like non-discipline is obtained upon the present continuum (that is: not that a harming mind is raised toward him as he now is, but toward that status of his of possibly becoming a sheep in time to come) — then sheep and the like will in a future life likewise have the self-body of a near kinsman and of a noble one, and toward such a self-body there will certainly be no harming mind; and so it ought to be said that one may regard only the future self-body and cannot obtain non-discipline in the present.

(The Sarvāstivādins press the point by principle) Since there is a harming intent toward the present body of a sheep and the like, why is non-discipline not obtained upon that very body?

(The Sautrāntikas reproach in return · raising the objection from ‘matters equal such as these’) Since there is no harming intent toward the present body of a mother and the like, why on the contrary is non-discipline obtained upon her body as well? In matters equal such as these another principle should be sought. Furthermore, those of non-discipline who slaughter sheep and the like do not steal all their lives long, and abide in a mind content with their own wives; some of them are even mutes who cannot speak, and so have none of the four faults of speech, false speech and the rest — how then do such men also obtain the non-discipline ‘complete in seven limbs’?

(The Sarvāstivādins answer) Because he has universally damaged the wholesome disposition. Though he is mute and cannot utter a sound, yet his bodily manifest action has expressed the sense he wished to say, and so he obtains the non-discipline complete in its limbs.

(The Sautrāntikas object again) If that be so, then that man may have first taken on two or three items of training (having first taken on a portion of the wholesome discipline) and afterwards taken on the single matter of killing; and as regards the remaining limbs he has not damaged the wholesome disposition, so how should he raise complete the seven limbs of evil discipline?

(The Vibhāṣā masters explain) The Vibhāṣā masters say this: there can certainly be no man ‘with a limb wanting’ or ‘with only a part obtained’ who may still be called one abiding in non-discipline.

(The Sautrāntika masters set out a tenet of their own) The Sautrāntika masters, for their part, say this: according to the term he has set, whether the limbs be complete or incomplete, whether the whole or a part, in every case non-discipline is obtained. It is the same with discipline as well, the eight-limbed observance alone excepted (the one-day discipline must be complete in eight limbs); for according to their several measures the natures of wholesome and evil moral discipline contradict and so debar each other.

Treatise (transition): The principle of obtaining non-discipline from sentient beings has now been said out. As for the way in which non-discipline is obtained, and the way in which the remaining nonmanifests are obtained, that has not yet been said, and should now be said. The stanza says:

〔Root 38〕Two Causes for Obtaining Non-Discipline · Three Causes for Obtaining the Middling Nonmanifest

Stanza: Non-discipline is obtained by the two causes of ‘doing’ and ‘undertaking by vow’; the remaining nonmanifests are obtained by the three of ‘the field,’ ‘undertaking,’ and ‘weighty performance.’

Treatise: The non-disciplines are obtained by two kinds of cause. The first: one born into a family of non-discipline, of butchers or hunters and the like, obtains it as soon as he first performs the preparatory effort of killing and the rest (the first time he sets hand to the work). The second: one born into another family, but who from the outset sets up a term and undertakes the business of killing and the rest — thinking in his mind, by such a trade as this I shall seek goods and support my own life; at that very moment he raises the evil discipline.

The remaining nonmanifest (the ‘middling nonmanifest,’ which is neither discipline nor non-discipline) is obtained by three kinds of cause. The first is ‘by the field’: toward such fields of merit as these one gives a park or grove and the like, and that wholesome nonmanifest arises at the first giving, just as the sūtra speaks of ‘the meritorious deeds that have a support.’ The second is ‘by undertaking’: one sets up a vow of one’s own, saying for instance ‘if I have not yet made obeisance to the Buddha I will not eat first,’ and the rest; or one makes a vow with a term to it, such as constantly giving food on fast days, every month, every half-month, and every year. The third is ‘by weighty performance’: raising an attention weighty in this way, one performs the wholesome or performs the unwholesome. By these three causes the remaining nonmanifests arise.

Treatise (transition): In this way the obtaining of discipline and the rest has been said out; the relinquishing of discipline and the rest has not yet been said, and should now be said. And let it first be asked: how is the discipline of individual liberation relinquished? The stanza says:

〔Roots 39 and 40〕The Four and Five Conditions for Relinquishing the Discipline of Individual Liberation · The Three Accounts of Whether a Grave Transgression Relinquishes the Discipline

Stanza: This taming that is individual liberation is relinquished by deliberate relinquishment (declaring the giving up of the training to another person), by the end of life, by the two sexual characteristics arising together, and by cutting off the wholesome roots; and for the one-day discipline the passing of a night is added. Another account says it is relinquished by a grave transgression, and yet another that it is relinquished by the extinction of the true dharma; while the masters of Kaśmīra say: one who has committed a grave sin is like a man in debt (still a rich man, only that he has one more name besides, that of debtor).

Treatise: What is called ‘taming’ means to show that this discipline can make the faculties tamed, and hence the name is used.

Apart from the one-day discipline, the remaining seven disciplines of individual liberation (bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, probationer, novice, novice woman, male lay follower, female lay follower) are relinquished by four conditions. First, by disposition: raising a manifest action toward a person who can understand, one gives up the training. Second, by casting off the commonality of sentient beings (at the end of life the continuum of this one term of life of the same class is cast off). Third, by the two sexual characteristics arising together (the male and female faculties appearing at once in one body). Fourth, by the wholesome roots that are the support being cut off.

For relinquishing the one-day discipline, besides the four conditions just given there is added ‘the passing of a night’; hence it is said in sum that the discipline of individual liberation is relinquished by five conditions.

Why is the relinquishing of the discipline by these five conditions? Because: a manifest action has arisen that contradicts what was undertaken; the body that is its support has been cast off; the body that is its support has been altered; the wholesome roots it rested upon have been cut off; the term of time has been passed.

(An account of one other school) One school says: among the four gravest sins that can draw one down to an evil destiny, if any one be transgressed, the disciplines of the novice and of the bhikṣu are thereby relinquished.

(An account of yet another school) Yet another school says: by the extinction of the true dharma too a man may be made to relinquish the discipline of individual liberation — because at the time when the dharma is extinguished, all the items of training, the establishing of boundaries, and the formal acts cease.

(The account of the Vibhāṣā masters of the land of Kaśmīra) The Vibhāṣā masters of the land of Kaśmīra say: at the time of transgressing a root sin, the discipline of one gone forth is not relinquished. Why? Because it is not that transgressing on one side requires all the disciplines to be wholly relinquished, nor is it that transgressing the remaining sins involves the cutting off of moral discipline. It is only that he has two names: one is ‘keeper of the discipline’ and one is ‘transgressor of the discipline’ — just as a man of wealth who owes another a debt is called at once a rich man and a debtor. If he confesses and clears away the sin he has committed, he is called ‘complete in moral discipline’ and not called a transgressor of the discipline, just as one who has repaid a debt is called simply a rich man.

Treatise (exchange three · whether one who has gravely transgressed is still called a bhikṣu): (The Sautrāntika masters object) If that be so, why did the Bhagavat say that one who has transgressed the four grave sins is not called a bhikṣu, not called an ascetic, is no son of Śākya, saying that he has broken the entity of a bhikṣu and destroyed the nature of an ascetic, and setting up for him, ruined and fallen, the name of ‘defeat’?

(The Sarvāstivādins answer) That was said with a hidden intent, with regard to the ‘bhikṣu in the ultimate sense’ (the bhikṣu who has cut off the afflictions and realized the true).

(The Sautrāntikas reproach) This saying is violent and overbearing.

(The Sarvāstivādins ask in return) Wherein is it violent and overbearing?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) In this: that the World-Honored One’s saying of definitive meaning is explained by another sense so as to be made non-definitive; and in that it provides those with many afflictions with an occasion for transgressing grave sins.

(The Sarvāstivādins press) How do you know that this saying is of definitive meaning?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) Because the Vinaya itself explains that there are four kinds of bhikṣu: first the bhikṣu in name and notion (having only the name of a bhikṣu), second the self-styled bhikṣu, third the mendicant bhikṣu (one who lives by begging), fourth the bhikṣu who has broken the afflictions (one who has cut off the afflictions). What is here called ‘not a bhikṣu’ refers to the kind of bhikṣu who has not received the full ordination by a formal act of one motion and three announcements. It is not that this man was first a bhikṣu in the ultimate sense and only afterwards, by a grave transgression, became not a bhikṣu; hence it is known that this saying is of definitive meaning.

(The Sautrāntikas cite the Sarvāstivādins’ position and refute it) Furthermore, that saying of yours, ‘it is not that transgressing on one side should require all the disciplines to be wholly relinquished,’ is in fact to call the Great Master to account. For the Great Master set up this simile here: as a palmyra tree, if its head be cut off, can certainly not grow tall and wide again, so it is with bhikṣus and the rest who transgress a grave sin.

(The Sarvāstivādins ask) What principle did the Great Master mean this simile to show?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) The intent is to show that with regard to the discipline, to transgress on one side, in a root grave sin, is to make all the rest of what was undertaken unable to grow tall and wide again. For when he transgresses the grave sins he violates and oversteps the root practice of a bhikṣu, and is joined with an exceedingly fierce absence of conscience and shame. The root of practice having been cut off, all the disciplines ought in principle to be wholly relinquished.

(The Sautrāntika masters further cite a sūtra as proof) Again, toward one who has gravely transgressed, the World-Honored One does not permit him to eat the food of the assembly, not even a single morsel; does not permit him to tread within the monastery so much as a heel’s breadth of ground; and expels him from all the business of the bhikṣus. And with this intent the Great Master spoke thus: one should swiftly pull out the tares and weeds within the rice field, should swiftly select and discard the rotten ridgepoles and beams, should swiftly winnow the chaff and blighted grain among the seed; even so should one swiftly drive out and expel from the assembly those who, being in truth no bhikṣus, are yet styled bhikṣus.

(The Sautrāntikas ask) Then what is the mark of ‘the entity of a bhikṣu’?

(The Sarvāstivādins answer) Whatever the mark may be, the entity certainly exists. For the World-Honored One has said: know, Cunda, that there are four kinds of ascetic, and there is no fifth. The four spoken of are: first the ascetic of the excellent path (one who can awaken by himself and open the path), second the ascetic who shows the path, third the ascetic who lives by the path (one who lives his life in dependence upon the path), fourth the ascetic who defiles the path.

(The Sautrāntikas reconcile this passage of the sūtra) Though the sūtra says so, yet that fourth kind of man has merely the look of an ascetic, and so is still called an ascetic — as with wood that has been burnt, a counterfeit parrot (like in look but not the real thing), a dried-up pool, a spoiled seed, the wheel made by a whirling firebrand, and a dead man, all of which keep a name alone and have no reality.

(The Sarvāstivādins object) If one who has gravely transgressed is thereby not a bhikṣu, then there ought to be no such class of person as the ‘bhikṣu still in training’ (one who, after a grave transgression, is yet given the dharmas of training).

(The Sautrāntikas answer) It should be known that it is not that every man who gravely transgresses commits a sin of defeat; only of one who has committed a sin of defeat is it definitely said that he is not a bhikṣu. That is to say: some are superior in their continuum and, though they have transgressed the gravest discipline, do not commit a sin of defeat, because they have not raised a single thought of concealment. The World-Honored One, the lord of the dharma, made the institution thus: if one commits a defeat, he is not a bhikṣu.

(The Sarvāstivādins object) That being so, why is he not made to go forth and take the discipline afresh?

(The Sautrāntikas answer) Because his continuum has already been enfolded by an exceedingly grave absence of conscience and shame, and he has no strength to raise the discipline of one gone forth, like a seed scorched by fire (which can never sprout again); it is not that he is not made to go forth and take the discipline afresh because one sees that he still has the bhikṣu’s discipline. Why? Because supposing that on some later day he were taken for a bhikṣu and gave up the training once more, even then he would not be permitted to go forth afresh.

(The end of the Sautrāntikas’ answer · turning the Sarvāstivādins’ own words back on them) On this point there is no doctrine left to speak of; why labor so bitterly to rescue him? If such a man still has the nature of a bhikṣu, then one ought to go and make obeisance to bhikṣus of this kind.

(A closing word at the end · refuting the account that ‘the extinction of the true dharma relinquishes the discipline’) At the time when the true dharma is extinguished, although there are none of the establishings of boundaries, the formal acts, and the Vinaya, and those who have not obtained the discipline have no principle by which to obtain it anew, yet those who obtained it beforehand have no principle by which to relinquish it.

Treatise (transition): These two, the discipline of the meditative absorptions and the discipline without outflows, how again are they relinquished? The stanza says:

〔Root 41〕Two Conditions for Relinquishing the Wholesome Dharmas Produced in Absorption · Three Conditions for Relinquishing the Wholesome Dharmas without Outflows

Stanza: The wholesome dharmas produced in absorption are relinquished by changing levels, by falling back, and the like; the wholesome dharmas without outflows are relinquished by obtaining a fruit, by refining the faculties, and by falling back.

Treatise: The wholesome dharmas affiliated to the levels of the meditative absorptions are relinquished by two kinds of condition. The first is ‘by changing levels’: at the time when one is born from a lower level up into a higher, or when one passes away from a higher level and comes to be born in a lower. The second is ‘by falling back’: at the time when one falls back from a superior merit of absorption already acquired.

The word ‘and the like’ in the stanza is there to show that at the time of casting off the commonality of sentient beings (the end of life) a small portion of superior wholesome roots is likewise relinquished. Just as with all the wholesome dharmas within the form realm, which are relinquished by changing levels and by falling back; so it is with the formless realm as well, save only that in the formless realm there is no discipline (since there is no form), and in this it differs from the form realm.

The wholesome dharmas without outflows are relinquished by three kinds of condition. The first is ‘by obtaining a fruit’: at the time of obtaining a fruit one relinquishes the path of approach and the path of the fruit that went before. The second is ‘by refining the faculties’: at the stage of refining the faculties (turning dull faculties into sharp ones), one relinquishes the path of the dull faculties through obtaining the path of the sharp. The third is ‘by falling back’: at the time of falling back one loses the path of the fruit and the path superior to the fruit.

Treatise (transition): In this way the relinquishing of the disciplines has been said out. How again is non-discipline relinquished? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 42〕Three Conditions for Relinquishing Non-Discipline

Stanza: Evil discipline is relinquished by death, by obtaining the discipline, and by the two sexual characteristics arising.

Treatise: The non-disciplines are relinquished by three kinds of condition. The first is by death — because the body that was its support has been cast off. The second is by obtaining the discipline — if one takes on the discipline of individual liberation, or through acquiring the discipline of the meditative absorptions, the evil discipline is thereupon relinquished; for at the time when discipline is obtained by the force of causes and conditions, all non-discipline is wholly cut off. This is because the natures of the wholesome and the evil discipline contradict each other, and the wholesome discipline is the stronger in force among them. The third is by the two sexual characteristics arising together within the continuum — because at that time the body that is its support has been altered.

(A place where it is easy to go wrong) One who abides in evil discipline, though he may at times give rise to the thought of ‘not doing it again’ and lay aside knife and net, yet if he does not take on the wholesome disciplines, those non-disciplines can in no way be cast off. It is as when, though one avoids the causes and conditions of falling ill, yet without taking good medicine the illness is in the end hard to cure.

Treatise (exchange four · what follows when the one-day discipline is relinquished at the passing of the night): (A question the author sets himself) When a man who abides in non-discipline has taken the one-day discipline, and at the passing of a night relinquishes that discipline, does he obtain non-discipline back again, or is he called only a middling man (neither of discipline nor of non-discipline)?

(The former account of some other masters) One master says: he obtains non-discipline again. For that unwholesome disposition has not been relinquished forever, just as when iron heated red is taken off the fire, the red vanishes and the dark comes forth again.

(The latter account of some other masters) Another master says: if he does not do the deed afresh, there is no condition to make him obtain non-discipline; for non-discipline is obtained in dependence upon a manifest action.

Treatise (transition): How again is the middling nonmanifest relinquished? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 42〕Six Conditions for Relinquishing the Middling Nonmanifest

Stanza: The middling nonmanifest is relinquished by the breaking down of the mind of undertaking, of the momentum, of the performance, of the thing, of the life span, and of the wholesome roots.

Treatise: The middling nonmanifest is relinquished by six kinds of condition.

First, relinquished by the breaking down of the mind of undertaking: one gives up what was undertaken before, saying in the mind — from this day on I cast off what I undertook before.

Second, relinquished by the breaking down of the momentum: the nonmanifest raised by a mind of pure faith or by the force of the afflictions — both of these have a limit; when the momentum of that limit is cut off, the nonmanifest is thereupon relinquished. It is like an arrow that has been shot and a potter’s wheel: when the thrust of the bowstring and the rest is spent, they come to a stop.

Third, relinquished by the breaking down of the performance: as with the matter undertaken, one afterwards does it no more.

Fourth, relinquished by the breaking down of the thing. What is meant by ‘thing’? It is the monastery, the bedding, the caitya (stūpa), and the park or grove that were given away, and the nets and snares and the like set up for the doing of evil (these things being destroyed, the nonmanifest that arose in dependence upon them is thereupon relinquished).

Fifth, relinquished by the breaking down of the life span: because the body that is its support has undergone a change.

Sixth, relinquished by the breaking down of the wholesome roots: at the time when the preparatory effort is raised and the wholesome roots are cut off, one thereupon relinquishes the nonmanifest drawn forth by the wholesome roots.

Treatise (transition): The wholesome dharmas of the desire realm that are not form, and all the remaining defiled dharmas that are not form — how again are they relinquished? The stanza says:

〔Root 43〕Two Conditions for Relinquishing the Wholesome Not-Form of the Desire Realm · One Condition for Relinquishing the Defiled Not-Form of the Three Realms

Stanza: The wholesome dharmas of the desire realm that are not form are relinquished by cutting off the wholesome roots and by birth in a higher realm; by the arising of the counteracting path the defiled dharmas that are not form are relinquished.

Treatise: All the wholesome dharmas of the desire realm that are not form are relinquished by two kinds of condition: first, cutting off the wholesome roots; second, being born into a higher realm.

All the defiled dharmas of the three realms that are not form are relinquished by one kind of condition alone: namely, by the arising of the path that counteracts them. If the path that can cut off this category has arisen, one relinquishes all the afflictions within this category together with their attendants; apart from this, no other means can relinquish them.

Treatise (transition): The wholesome discipline and the evil discipline — in which sentient beings are they found? The stanza says:

〔Roots 44 and 45〕In Which Destinies and Which Continents Evil Discipline and Discipline Are Found · Where the Disciplines of the Meditative Absorptions and without Outflows Are Found

Stanza: Evil discipline is found only in the human destiny, and the northern continent must be excepted, and the two kinds of eunuch and those of two sexual characteristics as well; discipline is found among the gods as well as among men, and only the human destiny has all three disciplines complete. Those born among the gods of the desire realm and in the form realm may have the discipline of the meditative absorptions; the discipline without outflows extends even to the formless realm, only the intermediate absorption and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings being excepted.

Treatise: Non-discipline is found only in the human destiny, and there the continent of Uttarakuru must be excepted, so that it is found in the remaining three continents alone. Within these three continents there must further be excepted the ṣaṇḍha (one who is without the male faculty from birth), the paṇḍaka (one whose faculty is damaged later, or who is capable for half a month and incapable for half a month), and those who have the two sexual characteristics. It is the same with discipline: among men those several classes just excepted are excepted, and besides this it is found among the gods as well; hence in the two destinies of men and gods there may be discipline.

(A question raised) And by what is it known that the continuum of the ṣaṇḍha and the rest is not a support for discipline? Answer: because both sūtra and Vinaya have express proof of it. The sūtra says that the Buddha told Mahānāman: any white-clothed layman whose male faculty is complete, who takes refuge in the Buddha, the dharma, and the assembly, who raises a weighty and pure mind and utters a sincere word, calling himself ‘I am an upāsaka (a layman of the male sort)’ and praying the World-Honored One to bear him in mind and guard him with compassion — one such is called an upāsaka. The Vinaya (the basket of the discipline) likewise says: you should put away and reject persons of this sort of form. Hence it is known that discipline is not something possessed by that class of person.

(A further question raised) And by what principle is it said that they have no discipline? Answer: because within their bodies the afflictions raised by the two supports, male and female, are both in full increase within one continuum; and because they have no capacity for correct discernment; and because they have no exceedingly weighty mind of conscience and shame.

(Yet a further question raised) If that be so, why have they no non-discipline either? Answer: because their minds are not settled in evil either. Moreover, wherever there is wholesome discipline, there evil discipline is also to be found — because these two are established as the reverse of one another.

(Its absence in the northern continent) The men of Uttarakuru have no ‘undertaking’ (there is no taking on of the discipline among them) and no absorption, nor have they a superior disposition for doing evil; hence they have neither wholesome discipline nor evil discipline.

(Its absence in the evil destinies) Fierce conscience and shame are absent in the evil destinies, and hence discipline and non-discipline are alike absent there; for it is by being joined with, or by contradicting, a superior conscience and shame that there is discipline and non-discipline.

(The ṣaṇḍha and the rest explained again) Moreover, the ṣaṇḍha and the rest are like a field of salt and alkali, and hence cannot grow wholesome discipline or evil discipline. It is plainly seen in the world that any field of salt and alkali can grow neither good sprouts nor foul weeds.

(An objection from a sūtra, and its answer) If that be so, why does the sūtra say that there are egg-born nāgas who, on the eighth day of each half-month and the rest, come out from the nāga palace to the world of men to ask for the eight-limbed one-day fast discipline? Answer: what they obtain is excellent conduct; it is not the obtaining of discipline.

Hence discipline is found only in the two destinies of men and gods; and only the human destiny has all three disciplines complete, namely individual liberation, the meditative absorptions, and that without outflows.

Those born among the gods of the desire realm and those born in the form realm may all have the discipline of the meditative absorptions; for those born in the formless realm it is certainly absent. The discipline without outflows, however, is found even in the formless realm: that is to say, those born among the gods of the desire realm and those born within the form realm (excepting the intermediate absorption and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings) may all have the discipline without outflows; while those born within the formless realm merely ‘possess’ it, since, there being no form, it certainly cannot be made present.

Treatise (the great turn at the chapter level): Since the natures and marks of the several actions have been made out to differ, the actions set forth in the sūtras should now be explained. And the sūtras say that action is of three kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. What are their marks? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 46〕The Marks of the Three Actions, Wholesome, Unwholesome, and Indeterminate

Stanza: The action that is secure, that which is not secure, and that which is neither of these two are called respectively wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate.

Treatise: What follows are the marks of the three actions, wholesome and the rest. The action that is called secure is named ‘wholesome,’ because it can obtain a lovely maturation and nirvāṇa, and so relieves the sufferings of beings in the two divisions of time, the temporary and the everlasting. The action that is not secure is named ‘unwholesome,’ because it draws on an unlovely maturation and is exactly the contrary in nature to what was called secure. The action that belongs to neither of these two is given the name ‘indeterminate,’ because it cannot be determined as wholesome or as unwholesome.

Treatise (transition): Again the sūtras say that action is of three kinds: meritorious, unmeritorious, and so forth. What are their marks? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 46 · Root 47〕The Three Actions, Meritorious, Unmeritorious, and Immovable

Stanza: The three, meritorious, unmeritorious, and immovable — the wholesome action of the desire realm is called meritorious, the unwholesome unmeritorious, and the wholesome action of the two higher realms immovable; this is said with regard to the place of its own level, because there action and result do not move.

Treatise: The wholesome action of the desire realm is said to be named ‘meritorious,’ because it draws on a lovely result and benefits sentient beings. The unwholesome actions are said to be named ‘unmeritorious,’ because they draw on an unlovely result and harm sentient beings. The wholesome action of the two higher realms (the form realm and the formless realm) is said to be named ‘immovable.’

(An objection from a sūtra) Has not the World-Honored One said that the three lower meditative absorptions are all named ‘having movement’?

(Answer) That is because the noble ones say: within these there are applied thought, sustained thought, and the rest, and hence they are named ‘moving.’ Since within the three lower meditative absorptions there are applied and sustained thought and the rest, the calamities are not yet stilled, and hence the name ‘moving’ is set up. But the ‘immovable’ of which the Sūtra of the Immovable speaks is said with regard to ‘being able to draw on an immovable maturation’ (the two places speak with regard to different things, and there is no contradiction).

(A further objection) How can an absorption that has movement draw on an immovable maturation?

(Answer) Although within such an absorption there is the movement of calamity, yet its action, as regards its result, does not have the shifting that the desire realm has, and hence the name ‘immovable’ is set up. That is to say: within the desire realm an action that was to be experienced in a certain destiny and a certain place will, by the force of other causes and conditions, come instead to be experienced in another destiny and another place. For instance, an action may draw on outward wealth and station, and inward stature, complexion, strength, pleasure, and the rest; properly this action ought to ripen among the gods, and yet, being drawn aside by the force of other causes and conditions, it ripens among men instead. But as for the form realm and the formless realm, an action that was to be experienced in a certain level and a certain place has no way of being turned into being experienced in another level and another place; the place of action and result is settled there, and hence the name ‘immovable’ is set up.

Treatise (transition): Again the sūtras say that action is of three kinds: conducive to pleasant feeling and the rest. What are their marks? The stanza says:

〔Roots 48–50〕The Three Actions Conducive to Pleasant Feeling, to Painful Feeling, and to Feeling Neither Painful nor Pleasant · The Five Kinds of Conduciveness to Feeling

Stanza: The three, conducive to pleasant feeling, to painful feeling, and to feeling that is neither — wholesome action from the desire realm up to the third meditative absorption is conducive to pleasant feeling, the unwholesome actions are conducive to painful feeling, and the wholesome action of the higher levels is conducive to feeling that is neither of the two. Another master says the lower levels too have the third kind, since the action of the intermediate absorption must draw on a maturation. And it is allowed that these three actions ripen not one after another but at the same time. Conduciveness to feeling is said in sum to be of five kinds: conducive by its own nature, by association, as object, as maturation, and as present before one; and it is established by these five distinctions.

Treatise: Among the wholesome actions, those from the desire realm up to and including the third meditative absorption are called actions conducive to pleasant feeling — because pleasant feelings extend only as far as the third meditative absorption. The unwholesome actions are called actions conducive to painful feeling. The wholesome actions of the levels beyond the third meditative absorption are said to be named actions conducive to feeling neither painful nor pleasant — because above that there are no feelings of pain or pleasure at all.

It should be known that these actions do not draw on the single result of ‘feeling’ alone; they draw on the provisions of feeling as well (the remaining dharmas that arise together with feeling); the ‘feeling’ spoken of here means feeling and its provisions taken together.

(The first divergent account) Some other master says: within the lower levels too there is the third kind, action conducive to feeling that is neither, because the action of the intermediate absorption (the absorption between the first and second meditative absorptions) must draw on a maturation. Were it not so, the action of the intermediate absorption ought to have no maturation; or else there ought to be no such action at all, since it has no maturational result of pain or pleasure.

(The second divergent account) Again some other master says: this action can draw on the maturation of the faculty of pleasure within the fundamental levels.

(The third divergent account) And yet another says: this action draws on no result of feeling.

(The author’s express adjudication) The latter two accounts both contradict the root treatise (the Treatise on the Development of Wisdom and the other root treatises). For the root treatise says: Is there an action that draws on a maturation of mental feeling only and not of bodily feeling? Answer: there is, namely wholesome action without applied thought. And the root treatise further says: Are there three actions that experience their maturations not one after another but at the same time? Answer: there are, namely action conducive to pleasant feeling drawing on form, action conducive to painful feeling drawing on mind and mental factors, and action conducive to feeling neither painful nor pleasant drawing on the formations not associated with mind, and so on at length. By these two passages it may be proved that the lower levels too have action conducive to feeling that is neither; for apart from the desire realm these three actions could not ripen at the same time.

(An appended question) Is this action wholesome or unwholesome? Answer: it is wholesome, only inferior.

(A further objection) If that be so, it contradicts what was said before — before it was said that ‘wholesome action up to the third meditative absorption is called conducive to pleasant feeling,’ and it was said that what obtains a lovely result is what is called wholesome action (whereas now it is said that there is an inferior wholesome action drawing on the feeling of equanimity; is this not a contradiction?). Answer: it should be known that the earlier saying was said with regard to the greater part.

(An objection as to their natures) Since the natures of action and of feeling are different, how can an action be said to be ‘conducive to pleasant feeling’ and the rest?

(The first explanation · with regard to benefit) Although the natures of action and of pleasant feeling are different, yet action can act as cause to benefit pleasant feeling (and so is named ‘conducive’). (The second explanation · with regard to what is experienced) Or else it is said that this action is what is experienced by pleasure.

(A further question) And how can pleasure experience an action?

(Answer) Because pleasure is the maturational result of this action (the result experiences the cause, and hence is called experiencing). (The third explanation · with regard to what experiences) Or else it is said that that pleasure is what the action experiences, since the action can experience the maturation of pleasure. Just as with ‘the bath powder conducive to bathing’ (the powder of beans and flour used at bathing, that is, of the sort of bath-meal, so named because it is conducive to bathing), so here too it should be understood. Hence it is named action conducive to pleasant feeling. Of the actions conducive to the remaining two feelings it should be known that it is the same.

(The five kinds of conduciveness to feeling) Conduciveness to feeling is said in sum to be roughly of five kinds. The first is conduciveness by its own nature, namely all feeling itself; as the sūtra says: when experiencing a pleasant feeling, one knows as it really is that one is experiencing a pleasant feeling, and so on at length. The second is conduciveness by association, namely all contact; as the sūtra says: contact conducive to pleasant feeling, and so on at length. The third is conduciveness as object, namely all objects; as the sūtra says: having seen a form with the eye, one experiences the form only and does not experience greed for the form, and so on at length — because form and the rest are the objects of feeling. The fourth is conduciveness as maturation, namely the action that can draw on a maturation; as the sūtra says: action conducive to being experienced in the present, and so on at length. The fifth is conduciveness as present before one, namely the feeling that is now occurring; as the sūtra says: when a pleasant feeling is being experienced, the remaining two feelings cease, and so on at length. It is not that at the time when this pleasant feeling is present there is some further feeling that experiences this pleasant feeling; it is only with regard to the presence of the self-body of the pleasant feeling that one speaks of ‘experiencing a pleasant feeling.’

What is spoken of in this passage is only the fourth kind, ‘conduciveness as maturation’ — because action can draw on the maturation of feeling. Hence, although the natures of action and feeling are distinct, the name ‘conducive to pleasant feeling’ and the rest is still obtained.

Treatise (transition): These three actions have the distinction of settled and unsettled. What are their marks? The stanza says:

〔Root 51〕The Three Settled Actions and the Unsettled Action · Or an Account of Five Kinds · The Masters of Similes’ Four Alternatives

Stanza: These actions are settled and unsettled; the settled are three, namely conducive to being experienced in the present life and the rest; some also say that action is of five kinds; and another master makes an analysis by four alternatives.

Treatise: Of the actions conducive to pleasant feeling and the rest spoken of above, it should be known that each has the difference of ‘settled’ and ‘unsettled’; because they are not certainly to be experienced, the name ‘unsettled’ is set up.

Settled action is further of three kinds: first, conducive to being experienced in the present life (done in this life, ripening in this very life); second, conducive to being experienced in the next birth (done in this life, ripening in the second life); third, conducive to being experienced in a life after the next (done in this life, ripening in order from the third life on). These three kinds of settled action, together with the unsettled action just given, make four kinds in all.

Some also maintain: unsettled action may be further divided into two kinds — as regards maturation there is the settled and the unsettled; and these two, added to the three settled actions above, make five in all.

(A divergent account) Some other master says: action conducive to being experienced in the present life may ripen in other births as well; it is only that the name of the action is established according to the stage at which it first ripens, and so it is called conducive to being experienced in the present and the rest — lest a strong action should on the contrary have little maturational result (if it must be confined to the present life, the result of a strong action becomes a small portion, which is contrary to principle).

(The Vibhāṣā masters do not allow it) The Vibhāṣā masters do not allow this account, because some actions have a result that is near and yet not superior, and some are just the contrary. It is as with outward seeds: the mallow bears fruit after three and a half months, while wheat must pass six months before it bears fruit (early ripening does not necessarily mean small strength).

(The masters of similes’ four alternatives) The masters of similes say that action has four alternatives. The first alternative: some action is settled as to the division of time and unsettled as to maturation — that is, the three actions conducive to being experienced in the present and the rest do not certainly obtain a maturation. The second alternative: some action is settled as to maturation and unsettled as to the division of time — that is, unsettled action does certainly obtain a maturation. The third alternative: some action is settled as to both — that is, the three actions conducive to being experienced in the present and the rest do certainly obtain a maturation. The fourth alternative: some action is unsettled as to both — that is, unsettled action does not certainly obtain a maturation either. On their account, actions come to eight kinds in all: action conducive to being experienced in the present has both a settled and an unsettled kind, and so on down to unsettled action, which likewise has two kinds.

Treatise (transition): Among the differences of action spoken of above, there are several further gates to be made out. The stanza says:

〔Roots 52 and 53〕Four Actions May Be Done at the Same Time · Only Three Draw On the Commonality · All Places Do the Four · In the Hells the Present-Life Kind Is Excepted · What Is Debarred to the “Firm”

Stanza: Four actions may be done at the same time, but only three can draw on the commonality of sentient beings; in all places the four actions may be done, save that in the hells wholesome action must except that conducive to being experienced in the present. Those who do not fall back from their lineage are called “firm,” and on a level whose defilement they have left behind: an ordinary being does not do the action conducive to being experienced in the next birth, and a noble one does not do those conducive to the next birth or to a later one; and it is so likewise for one who has left behind the defilement of the desire realm and of the summit of existence and then falls back.

Treatise: The three actions conducive to being experienced in the present life and the rest are settled action alone, and with the unsettled action they make four. It is put so for convenience; here only the settledness and unsettledness of ‘time’ is shown, because what is to be explained is the mark of the four actions spoken of in the sūtras.

(Question) Are there four actions done at the same time? Answer: it is allowed that there are. How done? For instance, one sends three messengers to do three things (severally accomplishing the three actions conducive to the present, to the next birth, and to a later one), and himself at the same time carries a wrong desire through to its end (accomplishing the unsettled action) — thus the four actions are done at the same time.

(Question) How many kinds of action can draw on the commonality of sentient beings (can draw on the general retribution of one term of life)? Answer: only three can draw on it, the action conducive to being experienced in the present having to be excepted; because the commonality of this present term of life was drawn on by an earlier action.

(Question) In which realm and which destiny can how many kinds of action be done? Answer: in all the realms and all the destinies, whether wholesome or unwholesome, according to what is fitting, all four kinds may be done. This is the general permission; as for the particular debarring, within the hells wholesome action must except that conducive to being experienced in the present, because the hells have no lovely result; the rest may all be done.

(What is debarred to the “firm”) Those who do not fall back from their lineage are called “firm,” and on a level whose defilement they have already left behind: if they are of the class of ordinary beings, the action conducive to being experienced in the next birth is excepted and the remaining three may be done; noble ones except both those conducive to the next birth and to a later one, and may do the remaining two. Why? Because so long as an ordinary being does not fall back, there is no such thing as ‘being born again into a lower level in the next life’; while a noble one who does not fall back will certainly not be born again into the lower levels.

As for doing the action conducive to being experienced in the present according to the level into which one is born, and doing the unsettled action, these are debarred nowhere at all.

Yet if noble ones have obtained the freedom from defilement in the desire realm and at the summit of existence, then even though there be falling back, they still do not do the actions conducive to the next birth or to a later one — because one who falls back from there must fall back from a fruit; and after falling back from a fruit he certainly does not thereupon meet his end, a point which will be made out further later on.

Treatise (transition): Is action done while one abides in the stage of intermediate existence as well? Answer: it is done. How done? The stanza says:

〔Root 54〕Intermediate Existence Can Do Twenty-Two Kinds of Action

Stanza: Intermediate existence in the desire realm can do twenty-two kinds of action, all of them included in what is conducive to being experienced in the present, because the commonality of the class is one.

Treatise: Within the desire realm, while one abides in the stage of intermediate existence, it is allowed that twenty-two kinds of action can be done. That is to say: the stage of intermediate existence, the time within the womb, and the time after leaving the womb have five stages each. The five stages within the womb are: first the kalala (the congealed), second the arbuda (the blister), third the peśī (flesh and blood), fourth the ghana (the firm and thick), fifth the praśākhā (limbs complete). The five stages outside the womb are: first infancy, second childhood, third youth, fourth middle age, fifth old age.

While one abides in the stage of intermediate existence, one can do the settled and unsettled actions of the eleven stages from intermediate existence all the way to old age (two for each of the eleven stages, hence twenty-two).

It should be known that the eleven kinds of settled action thus done in intermediate existence are all included in what is conducive to being experienced in the present; because ‘the commonality of the class’ has no difference — this stage of intermediate existence and the ten stages of its own class are drawn on by one and the same commonality of sentient beings and one and the same action. And it is for this reason too that there is no need to set up a separate ‘action conducive to being experienced in intermediate existence,’ since intermediate existence is itself drawn on by the actions conducive to the next birth and the rest.

Treatise (transition): What are the marks of the actions certainly to be experienced? The stanza says:

〔Root 55〕The Four Marks by Which an Action Certainly Draws On a Maturation · Together with Harming Father and Mother

Stanza: Actions arising from a weighty affliction, from a purely pure mind, from being constantly done, and from being directed toward a field of merit, together with the action of harming father and mother, are all settled.

Treatise: If an action be done from a weighty affliction, or from a purely pure mind, or be constantly done, or arise toward a dominant field of merit — what is called a ‘field of merit’ means the Buddha, the dharma, and the assembly, or a superior person, that is, one who has obtained a superior fruit or a superior absorption; even if an action done toward such a field be without a weighty affliction and without a purely pure mind, and be not something constantly practiced, so long as it is one of the actions raised by the wholesome or the unwholesome; and further, the doing of harm toward father and mother with a mind whether light or weighty — all such as these are included in settled action, and the rest are not certainly to be experienced.

Treatise (transition): What are the marks of action whose result is in the present life? The stanza says:

〔Root 56〕The Three Conditions for Certainly Drawing On a Result in the Present Life

Stanza: An action superior by its field, superior by its intent, and one whose maturation is settled where the level’s defilement is left behind forever, certainly draws on a result in the present life.

Treatise: What is called ‘by the field being superior’: it is heard that there was a bhikṣu who within the assembly spoke the speech of a woman, and who in the present life was turned into a woman; and reports of this class are not one only. What is called ‘by the intent being superior’: it is heard that there was a eunuch who, because he rescued a number of oxen from the eunuch’s business (saving oxen from being gelded), was in the present life turned into a man; and reports of this class too are not one only.

The third kind is this: one may be born in a certain level and forever leave behind the defilement of that level; then, of the wholesome and unwholesome actions done within that level, if the action be one ‘settled as to maturation but unsettled as to stage,’ this action must draw on a result in the present life. If it be an action conducive to being certainly experienced at some other stage, then for such a man there is certainly no principle of leaving defilement behind forever, and he must experience the maturational result at that other stage. And if even the maturation be unsettled, then because he leaves defilement behind forever he does not experience the maturation at all.

Treatise (transition): Toward what kind of field must an action arise whose retribution is experienced at once? The stanza says:

〔Root 57〕Actions of Harm or Benefit Raised toward the Five Fields of Merit Are Experienced at Once

Stanza: Toward the assembly headed by the Buddha, and toward those risen from the absorption of cessation, from the absorption of non-contention, from the absorption of loving-kindness, from the path of seeing, and from the path of cultivation, the actions done of harm or of benefit have their retribution experienced at once.

Treatise: Toward a field of merit of this class, the wholesome and unwholesome actions done certainly experience their result at once. What is called a ‘field of merit’ means the assembly headed by the Buddha; and by the distinction of persons there are five.

First, one risen from the absorption of cessation: because within this absorption the stillness of mind is obtained, and the stillness of this absorption resembles nirvāṇa; and when the mind first arises upon rising from this absorption, it is as though one had entered nirvāṇa and come out again.

Second, one risen from the absorption of non-contention: because within this absorption boundless sentient beings are taken as its object, and a dominant disposition of benefiting attends upon it; and at the time of rising from this absorption, the continuum of his body is one perfumed and cultivated by boundless and most excellent merits.

Third, one risen from the absorption of loving-kindness: because within this absorption boundless sentient beings are taken as its object, and a dominant disposition of gladdening attends upon it; and at the time of rising from this absorption, the continuum of his body too is one perfumed and cultivated by boundless and most excellent merits.

Fourth, one risen from the path of seeing: because within this path all the afflictions abandoned through seeing are cut off forever and a superior transformation of the support is obtained, so that upon rising from it a pure bodily continuum arises.

Fifth, one risen from the path of cultivation: because within this path all the afflictions abandoned through cultivation are cut off forever and a superior transformation of the support is obtained, so that upon rising from it a pure bodily continuum arises.

Hence these five are said to be named fields of merit. If anyone does an action of harm or of benefit toward them, this action must draw on its result at once. As for the time of rising from the remaining absorptions and the remaining fruits, since the absorption cultivated beforehand is not especially superior, and the afflictions abandoned through cultivation are not yet utterly cut off, that continuum is not a superior field of merit.

Treatise (transition): Among maturational results feeling is the most excellent, and it should now be considered: among the actions, is there any that draws on a maturation of mental feeling only, or that draws on bodily feeling only and not mental feeling? Answer: there is. How so? The stanza says:

〔Root 58〕Wholesome Action without Applied Thought Draws On Mental Feeling Alone · Unwholesome Action Draws On Bodily Feeling Alone

Stanza: The wholesome actions without applied thought are allowed to draw on mental feeling alone; unwholesome action draws on bodily feeling alone — this is the difference of the feeling drawn on.

Treatise: What is called ‘wholesome action without applied thought’ refers to all the wholesome action from the intermediate absorption up to the summit of existence. Of these actions, those that can draw on a maturation of feeling should be known to draw on mental feeling alone and not bodily feeling; because bodily feeling must arise together with applied and sustained thought (and the levels where these actions are have no applied or sustained thought).

Of the unwholesome actions, those that can draw on feeling should be known to draw on bodily feeling alone and not mental feeling; because an unwholesome cause has painful feeling for its result, and a painful feeling arising together with mind is certainly named ‘melancholy,’ and melancholy is not a maturation — a point already made out above.

Treatise (transition): A sentient being’s madness of mind — in which consciousness is it, by what causes, and in what places? The stanza says:

〔Root 59〕Madness of Mind Is in the Mental Consciousness Alone · Five Causes · In the Desire Realm Apart from the Northern Continent

Stanza: Madness of mind is in the mental consciousness alone; it is produced by the maturation of action, and by terror, injury, discord, and sorrow; it is within the desire realm, the northern continent excepted.

Treatise: A sentient being’s madness of mind is in the mental consciousness alone; in the five consciousnesses there is certainly no madness of mind, because the five bodies of consciousness have no discrimination.

By five kinds of cause sentient beings have madness of mind.

First, it arises from the sentient being’s own maturation of action: for instance, he has used drugs or spells to make another’s mind mad; or has made a man drink what he did not wish to drink, whether poison or liquor; or has displayed a terrible aspect to frighten birds and beasts and the like; or has set fierce fires to burn mountains and marshes; or has made pits and traps to bring beings down into them; or has done other work to make others lose mindfulness — by such causes in action he draws on a distinct maturation in a future life that can make his own mind mad.

Second, by terror: non-human beings and the rest display a terrifying form and press upon him, and the sentient being on seeing it becomes mad of mind.

Third, by injury: because by what he has done he has vexed non-human beings and the rest, they out of hatred injure the limbs and joints of this man, and thus his mind is made mad.

Fourth, by discord: because within the body the three elements of wind, heat, and phlegm contradict one another, and the great elements are out of accord, his mind is thus made mad.

Fifth, by sorrow: because he has lost those dear to him and the like, the poison of grief winds about his breast, and his mind thereupon goes mad — as with Vasiṣṭhā and the rest (the woman who went mad at losing her son).

(A doubt that easily arises) If it be said that madness of mind is only in the mental consciousness, and it is also allowed that madness of mind arises from the maturation of action, then how is this to be squared with the fact that mental feeling is not a maturation (the previous stanza having just said that melancholy is not a maturation)? Answer: it was not said that madness of mind is the maturation of action, but only that it is ‘produced by the maturation of action.’ That is to say: an unwholesome cause in action draws on a maturation of great elements that are out of balance, and in dependence upon these great elements the mind loses mindfulness, and hence it is spoken of as ‘madness.’

(The four alternatives of madness and distraction) In this way, setting madness of mind against distraction of mind, four alternatives should be made. The first alternative: mad and not distracted — that is, the undefiled minds of one who is mad. The second alternative: distracted and not mad — that is, the defiled minds of one who is not mad. The third alternative: both mad and distracted — that is, the defiled minds of one who is mad. The fourth alternative: neither mad nor distracted — that is, the undefiled minds of one who is not mad.

(The limit as to place) Excepting the continent of Uttarakuru, all the remaining classes of sentient beings of the desire realm may have madness of mind. Since even the gods of the desire realm have madness, how much more shall men and the evil destinies escape madness of mind? The hells are constantly mad, because they are pressed by much suffering — for in the hells the vital points (the places of death) are constantly injured by all manner of instruments of suffering, fierce and hard to bear; and being pressed by painful feelings, they do not even know themselves, much less discriminate right from wrong. Hence within the hells there is resentment of mind and lamentation, and a wild running and crying out, of which there are texts in what the world hands down.

(The limit as to noble ones) Among the noble ones of the desire realm, the buddhas alone excepted, the rest of the noble ones may have madness of mind through the great elements being out of accord, but they have no madness of mind produced by the maturation of action. For if the action be settled, it must be experienced first before sanctity can be obtained; and if the action be not settled, then by the obtaining of sanctity it can be made without result. Nor have they terror, since they have passed beyond the five fears; nor injury, since the noble ones have nothing that would draw the dislike of non-human beings and the rest; nor sorrow, since they have realized the nature of dharmas.

Treatise (transition): Again the sūtras say that action is of three kinds, namely the crooked, the foul, and the turbid. What are their marks? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 60〕The Three Actions, Crooked, Foul, and Turbid, Arise in Dependence upon Flattery, Hatred, and Greed

Stanza: The actions spoken of as crooked, foul, and turbid arise in dependence upon flattery, hatred, and greed.

Treatise: The three actions of body, speech, and mind have each three kinds, namely the crooked, the foul, and the turbid; and in that same order it should be known that they arise in dependence upon flattery, upon hatred, and upon greed. That is to say: the bodily, verbal, and mental actions that arise in dependence upon flattery are called ‘crooked action,’ since they are of the class of the crookedness of flattery; the bodily, verbal, and mental actions that arise in dependence upon hatred are called ‘foul action,’ since they are of the class of the foulness of hatred; and the bodily, verbal, and mental actions that arise in dependence upon greed are called ‘turbid action,’ since they are of the class of the turbidity of greed.

〔Second Half of Root 60 · Root 61〕The Four Actions Black and White — The Four Kinds of Action and Their Maturations

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): (Above, the three actions of the crooked, the foul, and the turbid have just been finished.) Again the sūtra says that action is of four kinds: there is action that is black and has a black maturation (“maturation” being the retribution that action draws upon one), there is action that is white and has a white maturation, there is action that is black-and-white and has a black-and-white maturation, and there is action that is neither black nor white, has no maturation to draw, and is able to exhaust the former three kinds of action. What are the marks of these four? The stanza says:

Stanza: In accordance with the differences of black-and-black and the rest, action is said to be of four kinds. Unwholesome action, wholesome action of the form realm, wholesome action of the desire realm, and the action without outflows that is able to exhaust them — these, it should be known, are called in order black, white, both (black and white), and neither (neither black nor white).

Treatise: It is in accordance with the difference of two matters that the Buddha spoke of the four actions black-and-black and the rest: first, the difference in the kind of result that the action draws; second, the difference between what is to be counteracted and what counteracts (what counteracts being the side that can counteract and cut off, and what is to be counteracted being the side that is cut off).

All unwholesome action is called black without exception, because its nature is defiled; and the maturation it draws is likewise called black, because it is a result that is not agreeable. Wholesome action of the form realm is called white without exception, because it is not mingled with evil action; and the maturation it draws is likewise called white, because it is a result that is agreeable.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Why then is wholesome action of the formless realm not also said to be white action? Answer: it is transmitted thus — wherever there are two maturations complete (that is, the two bodies of intermediate existence and of the existence of birth) and the three actions of body, speech, and mind complete, there it is spoken of here; elsewhere it is not spoken of. (The formless realm has no intermediate existence, nor the two actions of body and speech, and so it is not listed here.)

Treatise (a separate account quoted from a sūtra): Yet there is a place in the sūtras where it is also said thus: wholesome action of the desire realm is called black-and-white action, because it is mingled with evil action; and the maturation it draws is likewise called black-and-white, because its unlovely results are mingled therein.

It is to be noted: this name “black-and-white” is established with respect to a continuum (a stretch of life flowing on before and after), and not with respect to the intrinsic nature of the action. Why so? Because there is no single action and no single maturation that is itself both black and white — black and white are mutually opposed, and cannot be one entity.

Treatise (an objection raised against itself, with the answer): (The author raises an objection against himself.) The objector says: is the result of evil action not likewise mingled with the result of wholesome action? That being so, ought not evil action too be called “white-black”? (The sense being: if the wholesome mingled with the evil is called black-and-white, then the evil mingled with the wholesome ought likewise to be called white-black.)

Answer: the result of unwholesome action is not necessarily mingled with the result of wholesome action (as with the several evils done by one who has cut off the wholesome roots, and the places in the hells where a black maturation alone is undergone, where there is no wholesome result to mingle with it); whereas the result of wholesome action of the desire realm is necessarily mingled with the result of evil action. Why so? Because within the desire realm the force of the evil prevails over the force of the wholesome. (Hence only wholesome action of the desire realm is said to be black-and-white, and evil action is not said to be white-black.)

Treatise (the fourth action): All action without outflows is able forever to cut off and exhaust the former three kinds of action, and so is called “not black,” because it is not of a defiled nature; and it is also called “not white,” because it cannot draw a white maturation.

This word “not white” is spoken with a hidden intent (that is, it is spoken with a further purpose and is not to be taken in its literal sense). How is this known? Because the Buddha, in the Sūtra of the Great Emptiness, told Ānanda: all the dharmas of one beyond learning are purely wholesome, purely white, and wholly without blame. (Whence it appears that the dharmas without outflows are themselves purely white, and that in saying “not white” here he takes only the one sense of “not drawing a white maturation.”) The root treatise (that is, the root treatise of Abhidharma) also says: what is called white dharma? It is the wholesome dharmas together with the unobscured-indeterminate dharmas (both of these being undefiled, and so alike named white). As for why among these the dharmas without outflows have no maturation, it is because they do not fall within the three realms, and are besides opposed in dharma-nature to those dharmas that fall within the flowing on of the three realms (and so cannot draw a maturational result).

〔Root 62 · Root 63〕The Volition without Outflows That Can Exhaust the Actions — Twelve Volitions, One, and Four

Treatise (transition raising a question): Is then all action without outflows able to exhaust the former three kinds of action? Answer: it is not. Question: how then is it? The stanza says:

Stanza: The four receptivities of dharma in the path of seeing, together with the first eight uninterrupted paths at the stage of becoming free from the defilement of desire — these two places make twelve volitions without outflows, which exhaust the purely black action alone. The volition of the ninth uninterrupted path for becoming free from the defilement of the desire realm exhausts both the black-and-white action and the purely black action together. Of the freedom from the defilement of the four meditative absorptions, the volition of the ninth uninterrupted path in each — these four volitions make the purely white action alone come to an end.

Treatise: Within the path of seeing there are four receptivities to the cognition of dharma (“receptivity” being the cognition that cuts off the afflictions at the stage of an uninterrupted path, the four receptivities of dharma being those under the four truths of suffering, origin, cessation, and path); and within the path of cultivation, at the stage of becoming free from the defilement of desire, the volitions that accompany the first eight uninterrupted paths (an “uninterrupted path” being the very thought-moment that cuts off the affliction, upon which the path of liberation immediately follows) — these together make twelve volitions in all, and they exhaust the purely black action alone.

The one volition without outflows that accompanies the ninth uninterrupted path for becoming free from the defilement of the desire realm is able to make both the black-and-white action and the purely black action come to an end at once. Why does this one thought-moment exhaust the two actions together? Because at this thought-moment the wholesome dharmas of the desire realm are cut off altogether (the black-and-white action being wholesome action of the desire realm, and so ending along with them), and at the same time the unwholesome action of the ninth grade is cut off as well (the remainder of the purely black action ending here).

Of the freedom from the defilement of the four meditative absorptions, one level each, the volitions without outflows that accompany the ninth uninterrupted path in each — these four volitions make the purely white action alone come to an end (the purely white action being wholesome action of the form realm, of which the four absorptions each exhaust one level).

Treatise (a question raised against itself): For what reason can the wholesome dharmas with outflows of the several levels be cut off by the last uninterrupted path alone, and not by the rest? Answer: because the wholesome dharmas are not “cut off in their intrinsic nature” (they are not directly cut off in their own entity), and once cut off they may still come to be present; it is only when the afflictions that take them as object are exhausted that one speaks of those wholesome dharmas as cut off — because at that time the wholesome dharmas obtain release from bondage (release from the binding of the afflictions). By this principle, so long as even one grade remains of the afflictions that take them as object, the sense of “cut off” is not established, because at that time the wholesome dharmas have not yet obtained release from bondage.

〔Root 64〕Two Further Accounts — Experienced in the Hells, and Abandoned by Seeing

Treatise (transition): The stanza says: (What follows are the divergent accounts of other parties, both of which the treatise records without choosing between them.)

Stanza: One party says: action to be experienced in the hells and the remaining action of the desire realm are black action and mingled black-and-white action. Another party says: action of the desire realm abandoned by seeing and the remaining action of the desire realm are purely black action and action that is both.

Treatise (the first party · some other master): Some other master says: action to be experienced in the hells, and action within the desire realm to be experienced in the remaining destinies, are called in order purely black action and mingled action. Because the maturation of the hells is drawn by unwholesome action alone, action to be experienced there is called purely black action; and apart from the hells, the maturations within the remaining parts of the desire realm are all drawn by the two, wholesome and evil action, and so action to be experienced there is called black-and-white action.

Treatise (the second party · some other master): Again some other master says: action of the desire realm abandoned by seeing (that portion which is cut off by the path of seeing), and all the remaining action within the desire realm, are called in order purely black action and action that is both. Because action abandoned by seeing has no wholesome action mingled with it, it is called purely black action; while action of the desire realm abandoned by cultivation is partly wholesome and partly unwholesome, and so is called action that is both.

(In this passage the two parties stand side by side; the treatise records the two accounts only and adds no judgment.)

〔Root 65〕The Three Munis and the Three Purities

Treatise (transition raising a question): Again the sūtra speaks of three munis, and again the sūtra speaks of three purities, and both of these extend to the three of body, speech, and mind. What are the marks of each? The stanza says:

Stanza: The bodily action and the verbal action of one beyond learning, together with the mind of one beyond learning — these are the three munis. The three purities, it should be known, are the three kinds of good conduct of body, speech, and mind.

Treatise: The bodily action and the verbal action of one beyond learning are called the muni of body and the muni of speech; as for the muni of mind, what is meant is the “mind” itself of one beyond learning, and not mental action. (“Muni” has the sense of silent stillness — that is, the speech of all the afflictions has forever been stilled.)

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Why so (why does the muni of mind take mind and not action)? Answer: because the muni in the ultimate sense has mind alone for its entity. The mark of mind is hard to display directly, and is obtained by inference from the two actions of body and speech. Moreover, bodily action and verbal action are entities of “keeping away” (they can keep away from evil conduct), whereas mental action is not so, because mental action has no nonmanifest. It is from the sense of “keeping away” that the name muni is established, and so it is just this mind which, through the two actions of body and speech, is able to keep away from something, and is therefore called a muni.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Why is a muni found only at the stage beyond learning? Answer: because it is the arhat who is the true muni — the speech of all the afflictions is here forever stilled.

Treatise (the three purities): The three kinds of good conduct of body, speech, and mind are called the three purities of body, speech, and mind. Because they keep away, whether for a time or forever, from all evil conduct and from the grime of the afflictions, they are called purities.

Treatise (why these two are spoken of): These two, the munis and the purities, are spoken of in order to put a stop to the false munis and false purities reckoned upon in the minds of sentient beings (the non-Buddhists taking their own silence and their own pure practice to be muni-hood and purity).

〔Root 66〕The Three Kinds of Evil Conduct and the Three Kinds of Good Conduct

Treatise (transition raising a question): Again the sūtra speaks of three kinds of evil conduct, and again the sūtra speaks of three kinds of good conduct, both extending to body, speech, and mind. What are the marks of each? The stanza says:

Stanza: Unwholesome bodily action, verbal action, and mental action are called the three kinds of evil conduct; and adding greed, hatred, and wrong view, these too are mental evil conduct. The three kinds of good conduct are the reverse of these.

Treatise: All unwholesome bodily action, verbal action, and mental action are called in order bodily evil conduct, verbal evil conduct, and mental evil conduct.

Yet mental evil conduct has besides three further kinds, namely greed, hatred, and wrong view, which do not belong to mental action. (Why are they not reckoned as mental action?) Because greed and the rest have an entity of their own apart from “volition” (mental action having volition for its entity, while greed, hatred, and wrong view are afflictions and have an intrinsic nature of their own).

Treatise (the masters of similes state their tenet): The masters of similes say: greed, hatred, and wrong view are just mental action, since the Sūtra on Volition speaks of these three as mental action.

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣikas object): If that were so, then action and affliction would be combined into one entity.

Treatise (the masters of similes answer): To grant that an affliction is just mental action — what fault is there in this?

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣikas refute them): The Vaibhāṣika masters say that they speak thus without reason. If this were allowed, it would be at odds with many principles and many teachings, and would become a great fault. As for why the sūtra speaks of these three as mental action, that is in order to display that “volition” turns with greed and the rest for its gate (volition being set going with these three for its gate), and that it can thereby draw an unlovely result, and is besides what the discerning reproach and abhor.

Conduct such as this is evil, and so it is called evil conduct.

Treatise (the three kinds of good conduct): The three kinds of good conduct are to be known as the reverse of these: they are all the wholesome action of body, speech, and mind; and the three that do not belong to action are non-greed, non-hatred, and right view.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Since right view and wrong view have no deliberate volition “to benefit another or to harm another,” how can they come to be wholesome or evil? Answer: because they can serve as the root of harm and of benefit (all conduct of harm and of benefit having view for its root).

〔Root 67〕The Ten Paths of Action — Taking Only the Coarse and Evident within Evil and Good Conduct

Treatise (transition raising a question): Again the sūtra speaks of ten paths of action, some wholesome and some evil. What are their marks? The stanza says:

Stanza: The ten paths of action that are spoken of take, from within evil conduct and good conduct, the coarse and evident portion for their nature; and, as is fitting to each, they become the wholesome paths of action and the evil paths of action.

Treatise: Within the evil conduct and good conduct spoken of above, whatever is coarse, evident, and easily known is gathered in as the ten paths of action. As is fitting to each: on the wholesome side they gather in the good conduct spoken of above, and the unwholesome paths of action gather in the evil conduct spoken of above.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Which then are the evil conduct and good conduct that are not gathered in?

Answer: let the unwholesome side be spoken of first. The bodily evil paths of action, as regards bodily evil conduct, do not gather in one portion of it, namely the preparatory stage, the consequent stage, and the remaining unwholesome bodily actions — such as drinking liquor, seizing, beating, and binding; because the preparatory stage and the rest are not coarse and evident. (Which bodily evil conduct, then, is established as a path of action?) If bodily evil conduct makes another sentient being lose his life, lose his goods, or lose his wife — that is spoken of as a path of action, because men are to be made to keep away from it.

The verbal evil paths of action, as regards verbal evil conduct, do not gather in the preparatory stage, the consequent stage, or the slight portion. The mental evil paths of action, as regards mental evil conduct, do not gather in evil volitions or slight greed and the rest.

Now let the wholesome side be spoken of. The bodily wholesome paths of action, as regards bodily good conduct, do not gather in one portion of it, namely the preparatory stage, the consequent stage, and the remaining wholesome bodily actions — such as abstaining from liquor and making offerings. The verbal wholesome paths of action, as regards verbal good conduct, do not gather in one portion, namely kindly speech and the like. The mental wholesome paths of action, as regards mental good conduct, do not gather in one portion, namely the wholesome volitions.

〔Root 68〕The Manifest and the Nonmanifest in the First Seven Paths of Action

Treatise (transition raising a question): Among the ten paths of action, do the first seven (three of body and four of speech) all necessarily have both the manifest and the nonmanifest? (The “manifest” is the bodily or verbal act that can be displayed to another; the “nonmanifest” is the portion that arises along with it, cannot be displayed to another, and continues on unbroken.) Answer: they do not. Question: how then is it? The stanza says:

Stanza: Six of the evil ones necessarily have the nonmanifest; and if those six are done by oneself, then both the manifest and the nonmanifest are present; sexual misconduct necessarily has both. Seven of the wholesome ones, if they arise from taking up the precepts, have both; if they are produced in absorption, they have the nonmanifest alone.

Treatise: Among the seven evil paths of action, six necessarily have the nonmanifest, namely killing, taking what is not given, false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, and frivolous speech. If these six are done by dispatching another, then at the time when the root path of action is completed there is no manifest action in oneself (the act being another’s), and so there is the nonmanifest alone.

If they are done by oneself in person, then these six paths of action have both the manifest and the nonmanifest — that is, when one sets going the manifest act oneself (laying hand to it) the other dies then and there; whereas if he dies only some time after the hand was laid to it, then it is the same as dispatching a messenger, and at the time when the root path of action is completed there is the nonmanifest alone.

Sexual misconduct alone necessarily has both the manifest and the nonmanifest complete, because it must be brought to completion by one’s own body and cannot be done by dispatching another in one’s stead — just as one’s own delight cannot be produced by deputing another.

If the seven wholesome paths of action arise from taking up the precepts, they necessarily have both the manifest and the nonmanifest complete; for the śīla born of taking them up (the entity of the precepts produced by taking them up) must arise in dependence upon the manifest act (the formal procedure of taking up the precepts). As for those gathered in by the discipline of meditative absorption and the discipline without outflows, which are called “produced in absorption,” this kind has the nonmanifest alone, because it arises in dependence upon the force of mind alone.

〔Root 69〔Lines 1–3〕〕Preparatory, Root, and Consequent — How the Three Stages Are Divided

Treatise (transition raising a question): Are the preparatory stage and the consequent stage the same as the root path of action? Answer: they are not. Question: how then is it? The stanza says:

Stanza: The preparatory stage necessarily has the manifest, while the nonmanifest may or may not be present; the consequent stage is the reverse of this.

Treatise: The preparatory stage of a path of action necessarily has manifest action; the nonmanifest at this stage may or may not be present — if it is set going by a violent entanglement (an intense affliction) or by a mind of pure sincerity, then the nonmanifest is present; otherwise it is not. The consequent stage is the reverse of the foregoing: it necessarily has the nonmanifest, while the manifest action at this stage may or may not be present — if there afterwards arise acts that follow upon the former action, then manifest action is present; otherwise it is not.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Within this principle, how are the preparatory stage, the root stage, and the consequent stage established?

Answer: let the unwholesome side be spoken of first, taking the first of them, the act of killing, as the example. As with a butcher of sheep about to do the killing: he first raises the thought of killing and rises from his bed, takes money and goes to the market where sheep are sold, feels the body of the sheep, pays the price and takes hold of it, leads it back and feeds it, drives it into the slaughterhouse, and taking staff or knife in hand beats or stabs it, once and again, up to the point where its life is not yet cut off — all this is called the preparatory stage of killing.

Following upon this manifest act, that sheep just then ends its life; the manifest and nonmanifest action within that single moment — this and this alone is called the root path of action of killing. By two conditions are sentient beings touched by the offense of killing that belongs to the root path of action: first by the preparatory stage, second by the fullness of the result (the other having in fact died).

After this single moment, the nonmanifest action of killing continues on unbroken and turns along with it, and this is called the consequent stage of killing. And the flaying, cutting up, dressing, and washing that come afterwards, or the weighing, or the selling, or the cooking, or the eating, or the praising of its savor — the moments of these manifest acts are all likewise called the consequent stage of killing.

For the remaining six paths of action, as is fitting to each, the three divisions (preparatory, root, and consequent) differ, but may be set forth on the model of this example.

As for greed, hatred, and wrong view, they are called the root path of action as soon as they are present, and so they have no distinction of a preparatory or a consequent stage.

Treatise (an objection raised against itself · the two horns): Here it should be asked: when the sentient being who is killed is abiding at the very moment of the existence of death, does the manifest and nonmanifest action of the killer at that moment become the path of action, or must one wait until after his death?

Question: if it be so, what fault is there? Answer: both accounts have a fault.

If it be said that the killer’s path of action is completed while the sentient being killed is abiding in the existence of death, then in the case where the killer and the one killed end their lives at the same moment the path of action ought likewise to be completed — yet our own school does not allow that a path of action is completed in that case.

If it be said that the killer’s path of action is completed only after the sentient being killed has ended his life, then what was said above ought not to have been said: “following upon this manifest act, that sheep just then ends its life; the manifest and nonmanifest action within that single moment is the root path of action of killing.” (The earlier and later statements would contradict each other.) And this would besides do violence to the Vaibhāṣika masters’ explanation of the words “the preparatory stage is not yet stilled” in the root treatise — the root treatise says: is there a case of “having already harmed a living being while the killing is not yet extinguished”? Answer: there is, as when one has already cut off his life while the preparatory stage is not yet stilled. The Vaibhāṣika masters explain this sentence by saying: this is a case of using the words “preparatory stage” with regard to the consequent stage.

Treatise (the author answers for himself): It should be said: this is a case of using the words “preparatory stage” with regard to the root stage, for our own school allows that after the ending of life the root path of action is not yet stilled. Said thus, there is no fault.

Question: what is meant here by “there is no fault”? Answer: it is the using of the words “preparatory stage” with regard to the root stage (in which case the earlier and later statements do not contradict each other).

Treatise (a question raised against itself): If it be so, how can all the manifest action at that time still become the root path of action? Answer: why can it not? Question: because it has no function any longer. Answer: and what function has the nonmanifest here? Therefore the completion of a path of action is not by reason of having a function, but only because, at the time when the preparation and the fullness of the result are present, the two, the manifest and the nonmanifest, become the root path of action together.

Treatise (the paths of action serve one another as preparatory and consequent): Again, the several paths of action, regarded with respect to one another, may serve one another as preparatory and as consequent. Let it be said for the present that the path of action of killing has the ten paths of action for its preparatory stage: as when a man wishes to kill an enemy and lays all sorts of plans and gathers the conditions for the killing — whether he kills living beings to petition for aid (killing), or steals another’s goods to fund the killing (taking what is not given), or fornicates with his wife so that she may kill her husband (sexual misconduct), or, in order to divide him from his kin and friends, sets going the four faults of speech so as to make them suspect and be estranged from one another (false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, frivolous speech), so that even if there be those with power enough to protect him they no longer have the mind to protect him; or he conceives greedy attachment for his goods (greed), or conceives hatred toward him (hatred), or raises a wrong view to nourish the act of killing (wrong view), and only then kills — this is what is called having the ten paths of action for the preparatory stage of killing.

After the enemy has been killed, he afterwards puts to death his kin, takes his goods, fornicates with the woman he loved, and so on to raising greed, hatred, and wrong view one after another as they come to be present — these ten are called the consequent stage of killing. The remaining paths of action are to be understood in the same way.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Ought not the three, greed and the rest, be able to serve as a preparatory stage? Answer: they cannot. Because the thought is merely raised in the mind and the preparatory stage is not thereby completed — at the time of raising the thought the deed has not yet been done.

Treatise (transition raising a question): Again the sūtra says: a bhikṣu should know that killing is of three kinds — first that arising from greed, second that arising from hatred, third that arising from delusion; and so on down to wrong view, which is likewise of three kinds. Here it should be asked: killing of what mark is called that which arises from greed? And the rest are to be asked in the same way.

(The general answer:) It is not that all the paths of action are brought to completion by the three roots in every case, whereas their preparatory stages are otherwise than this. Question: how are they otherwise? The stanza says:

〔Root 69〔Line 4〕· First Half of Root 70〕The Preparation Arises from the Three Unwholesome Roots

Stanza: The preparatory stage arises from the three roots; as for the root stage, because it is produced from the three roots without interval, it is said that the three, greed and the rest, also arise from the three roots.

Treatise: When the preparatory stage of an unwholesome path of action arises, in every case it arises from the three unwholesome roots — this is said with respect to the “prior raising” (the thought that draws it forth beforehand).

The preparation for killing. That which arises from greed is, for instance, killing set going by greed for the sake of obtaining parts of the other’s body (skin, flesh, sinew, bone, and the like), or for the sake of obtaining goods, or for sport, or for the sake of rescuing kin, friends, and oneself. That which arises from hatred is, for instance, the preparation for killing set going by raising a mind of wrath in order to be rid of an enemy. That which arises from delusion is, for instance, the preparation for killing set going within a sacrifice in the belief that this accords with the Dharma; or again as when kings and the like put enemies to death and root out the villainous according to the laws of the world, in the belief that great merit is accomplished thereby, and so set going the preparation for killing. Again the people of Persia speak thus: if one’s parents are old and ill, then to have them end their lives early frees them from distress and produces great merit instead. Again there are non-Buddhists who speak thus: snakes, scorpions, wasps, and the like are venomous things that harm men, and to be able to kill them produces excellent merit instead; sheep, deer, buffalo, and the other birds and beasts were from the first prepared to serve men for food, and so to kill them is without offense. And there is killing living beings by reason of wrong view — all these preparations arise from delusion.

The preparation for stealing. That which arises from greed is the preparation for stealing set going according to one’s own needs, or for the sake of other gain, honor, or repute, or for the sake of rescuing oneself, one’s kin, or one’s friends: the preparation for stealing set going by greed. That which arises from hatred is the preparation for stealing set going by raising a mind of wrath in order to be rid of an enemy. That which arises from delusion is, for instance, when kings and the like confiscate the goods of evil men according to the laws of the world, in the belief that the law is so and that there is no offense of stealing; or again as when brahmins speak thus: the goods of the world at the beginning of the aeon were bestowed by the great Brahmā king upon the brahmin seers, and only later, when the power of the seers waned, were they seized and enjoyed by the base clans; today, when the brahmin seers take by force or by stealth the goods of other men in the world and use them for clothing or for food or for other purposes or bestow them upon others, they are all the while using their own goods and are without offense of stealing — and yet at the time of the taking there is plainly in their minds the perception “this is another’s.” And there is taking another’s goods by reason of wrong view — these are all called preparations for stealing arising from delusion.

The preparation for sexual misconduct. That which arises from greed is when, conceiving a defiled attachment toward another’s wife and the like, or for the sake of seeking another’s goods, station, or honor, or for the sake of rescuing oneself or another, one sets going the preparation for fornication out of a mind of greedy attachment. That which is produced from hatred is the preparation for fornication set going by raising a mind of wrath in order to be rid of an enemy. That which is produced from delusion is, for instance, the people of Persia praising the practice of what is not the pure life with one’s mother and the like; or again as when the brahmin seers praise those men and women within the cow-sacrifice who keep the cow-observance (taking on the behavior of cattle as an austerity), drinking water and cropping grass, standing or walking, coupling as they meet without distinction of near kin or stranger; or again as when non-Buddhists speak thus: all women are like a mortar, like a flower or fruit, like cooked food, like a stair, like a road, like a bridge, like a boat, and the multitude of the world ought to enjoy them in common — these preparations are all produced from delusion.

The preparations for the four verbal paths of action beginning with false speech, when they are produced from greed and from hatred, may be stated on the model of the foregoing. As for the preparation for false speech that is produced from delusion, it is as is said in a treatise of the non-Buddhists:

Quoted Stanza (the words of a non-Buddhist treatise): If a man, by reason of jest, by reason of marriage, by reason of facing a woman or a king, or for the sake of saving life or saving goods, speaks false speech, that is without offense.

Treatise: And all the preparations for false speech, divisive speech, and the rest that arise by reason of wrong view are, it should be known, wholly produced from delusion. Moreover the several Vedas and the other false treatises are all gathered in by frivolous speech, and their preparations are produced from delusion.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Since the three, greed, hatred, and wrong view, have no preparatory stage, how can it be said that they arise from greed and the rest? Answer: because they are produced from the three roots without interval, and so it may be said that the three, greed and the rest, arise from the three roots. That is to say: sometimes the path of action of greed is produced from greed without interval, and it is the same with its being produced from hatred and from delusion without interval; and it is likewise with hatred and wrong view arising from the three roots.

〔Second Half of Root 70〕All Three Stages of the Wholesome Paths of Action Arise from the Three Wholesome Roots

Treatise (transition raising a question): It has been said how the unwholesome paths of action arise from the three roots. How is it then with the wholesome? The stanza says:

Stanza: The wholesome paths of action, in all three stages, arise from the three wholesome roots.

Treatise: All the preparatory, root, and consequent stages of the wholesome paths of action arise from the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion. For these three wholesome stages are all raised by a wholesome mind, and a wholesome mind is necessarily associated with the three wholesome roots.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): What are the marks of these three wholesome stages? Answer: they are the keeping away from the three unwholesome stages above — keeping away from the evil preparatory stage is the wholesome preparatory stage, keeping away from the evil root is the wholesome root, keeping away from the evil consequent stage is the wholesome consequent stage.

For instance, when a diligent trainee (a śrāmaṇera) receives the full precepts: entering the ordination platform, paying homage to the assembly of bhikṣus, uttering with all sincerity the request to his preceptor, and so on to the one motion and two announcements of karman and the rest — all these are called the preparatory stage of the wholesome path of action. Within the single moment at which the third announcement of karman is completed, the manifest and nonmanifest action then set going is called the root path of action. From that point on, down to the declaring to him of the four resorts, together with the manifest and nonmanifest action that continues on and turns along in dependence upon what went before, all is called the consequent stage.

〔Root 71 · First Half of Root 72〕By Which Root a Path of Action Is Completed

Treatise (transition raising a question): As was said above, it is not that all the paths of action are brought to completion by the three roots in every case. Which root, then, brings which path of action to completion? The stanza says:

Stanza: Killing, harsh speech, and hatred are all completed by hatred; taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and greed are all completed by greed; wrong view is completed by delusion; and the rest are granted completion by all three roots.

Treatise: Among the evil paths of action, the three paths of action of killing, harsh speech, and hatred are completed by hatred — for these three are completed only when a “supremely coarse and evil mind that spares nothing” is present.

The three paths of action of taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and greed are completed by greed — for these three are completed only when a “supremely defiled mind that clings to something” is present.

The completion of wrong view is necessarily by delusion, for it is completed only when delusion of the highest grade is present.

The three of false speech, divisive speech, and frivolous speech are granted completion by all three roots, each by each; for when greed, hatred, and the rest are present, each of them can bring these three to completion.

〔Second Half of Root 72〕In What Place a Path of Action Arises

Treatise (transition raising a question): In what place do the evil paths of action arise? The stanza says:

Stanza: They arise in the four places of sentient beings, goods, name-and-form, and the name-bodies and the rest.

Treatise: The four sections of paths of action spoken of above (the three of body, the four of speech, and the three of mind being divided into four classes) arise, in the order of three, three, one, and three, in the four places of sentient beings and the rest: the three of killing and the rest arise in the place of sentient beings; the three of stealing and the rest arise in the place of goods (the requisites of livelihood); wrong view alone arises in the place of name-and-form; and the three of false speech and the rest arise in the place of the name-bodies and the rest (the name-body, the phrase-body, and the syllable-body, which are what speech depends upon).

〔First Half of Root 73〕Dying Together and Dying First — Why the Root Path of Action Is Not Completed

Treatise (transition raising a question): If a man has set going the preparation and is resolved to kill another, and he and the sentient being killed die at the same time, or he himself dies first, does he still incur the offense of the root path of action? The stanza says:

Stanza: Those who die together and those who die first do not complete the root path of action, because there is no “root” and because the support has become other.

Treatise: If the killer and the sentient being killed end their lives at the same time, or if he himself dies first, he assuredly does not obtain the root path of action.

Hence there is this question posed: is there a case in which the killer has set going the preparation for killing and has made the result full (the other having in fact died), and yet is not touched by the offense of killing? Answer: there is. Question: how so? Answer: it is the case where the killer and the one killed die together, or where the killer dies first.

Question: for what reason is it so? Answer: because at the moment when the killer dies, the life of the sentient being killed still remains, and it is impossible to make that killer complete the offense of killing (the offense being completed only when the other’s life is cut off); nor can it be said that the killer may obtain the offense of killing after his own life has ended, because the support has become other — that is, the body upon which he relied when he set going the preparation for killing has now been cut off; and though there arises another body of the same commonality (the body of the next life), that is not the support of the offense, for that body never set going the preparation for killing, and to say that it completes the path of action of killing is in principle not to be allowed.

〔Second Half of Root 73〕Acting as One in an Army — One Kills and All Incur the Offense

Treatise (transition raising a question): If many men gather into an army and would kill an enemy, or go hunting and the like, and at the time when any one among them does the killing, who is it that completes the path of action of killing? The stanza says:

Stanza: Within an army and the like, if they act as one, all complete the path of action, as does the one who does it in person.

Treatise: Within an army and the like, if any one man does the deed of killing, then, just as with the man who does it in person, all of them complete the path of action of killing; because they have consented together to one undertaking. It is like teaching one another in turn for the sake of one undertaking, and so, one man killing, all the rest incur the offense.

If a man has been forced by the power of others into this army, then so long as he thereby also shares that mind, he likewise completes the offense of killing. One kind of man alone is excepted: if he has vowed of himself — that not even to save his own life will he kill — then although he is forced by the power of others to be among them, he has no mind of killing, and so has no offense of killing.

〔First Half of Root 74〕The Marks of Killing — Deliberate Volition, the Perception of Another, and Not by Mistake

Treatise (transition raising a question): Now the marks by which a path of action is completed should be made out: to what degree is it called killing, and so on down to what degree is it called wrong view? Let the marks of killing be analyzed first. The stanza says:

Stanza: Killing requires deliberate volition, the perception of another sentient being with respect to another sentient being, and killing not by mistake.

Treatise: One must first set going the deliberate volition “I would kill,” and with respect to another sentient being raise the perception of another sentient being, and set going the preparation for killing and kill not by mistake — that is, killing only the very one he meant to kill, and not killing another indiscriminately; to this degree it is called the path of action of killing.

Treatise (a case set apart): Killing with hesitation also completes killing. That is, he beforehand harbored hesitation about the object he meant to kill: is this a living thing or not? and granting it is a living thing, is it he or not? Afterwards he raised a settled resolve: be it he or not, I shall assuredly kill. Since his mind spares nothing, if he does kill a sentient being he likewise completes the path of action.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Upon five aggregates that arise and cease moment by moment, how can killing be completed (since they are themselves ceasing thought by thought)?

There are two explanations in answer. The first says: the “breath-wind” is called life, and it turns in dependence upon body and mind; if a man makes it be cut off so that it no longer continues to arise, that is like extinguishing the light of a lamp or extinguishing the sound of a bell, and this is called killing. The second says: or else what is called “life” is just the life faculty; if a man makes it be cut off so that it does not continue, that is called killing. That is to say: with an evil mind one severs another’s life, so that even a single thought-moment which ought to arise cannot arise — this alone is touched by the offense of killing, and nothing else.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Whose is this life that is cut off? Answer: as is said, “if life be gone, he is dead” — since the sixth case-ending has been marked out (the possessive “whose”), what can it be but a “self”? (This objection comes from those who grasp a self.) The author answers: this will be pondered at length in the chapter refuting the self. (Here he first quotes a sūtra to prove that life is a dharma.) Hence the stanza spoken by the Bhagavat:

Quoted Stanza (spoken by the Bhagavat): When the three dharmas of lifespan, warmth, and consciousness leave the body, then the body that is left falls stiff to the ground, without thought and without sensation, like a log.

Treatise: Therefore a body endowed with faculties is called a living being, and one without faculties is called dead — this principle is settled.

Treatise (the reckoning of the Nirgrantha non-Buddhists): The Nirgranthas say: killing without deliberation also incurs the offense of killing, just as with touching fire, where even without deliberating beforehand one is burned all the same.

Treatise (the author refutes with six objections in succession): If it were so, then when you meet another man’s wife, or unintentionally touch her body by mistake, you ought likewise to have an offense. Again, as when a man of wholesome mind pulls out the hair and beard for a Nirgrantha (an act of austerity), or a teacher out of a mind of loving-kindness urges him to cultivate austerities, or food kept overnight given by a donor does not digest and thereby causes a man to suffer — all these ought to incur the offense of “causing another to suffer.” Again, the child in the womb and the mother are causes of suffering to each other, and so the mother too ought to have the offense of causing the child to suffer. Again, since the one killed is himself conjoined with the killing, he too, like fire that can burn its own support, ought to bear it himself, and it ought not to be the killer alone who incurs the offense. Again, if it were so, then in dispatching another to kill there ought to be no offense of killing — just as fire does not burn the man who taught another to touch fire. Again, timber and stones and the like ought also to be touched by the offense, since houses and the like, when they collapse, likewise harm life. And besides, it is not merely that your analogy fails: the position we ourselves set up can be established.

〔Second Half of Root 74〕The Marks of Taking What Is Not Given

Treatise (transition): Killing having been analyzed, taking what is not given should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: Taking what is not given is making another’s goods belong to oneself, by force or by stealth.

Treatise: The “not by mistake” and the rest spoken of above run on into each of the gates that follow, as is fitting to each, and so are not spoken of again. That is to say: one must first set going the deliberate volition “I would steal,” and with respect to another’s goods raise the perception of another’s goods, and by force (seizing openly) or by stealth (taking in secret) set going the preparation for stealing, and take not by mistake, making it belong to oneself; to this degree it is called the offense of taking what is not given.

Treatise (three separate questions): If a man steals the goods of a stūpa, he incurs the offense of stealing with respect to the Tathāgata — for when the Buddha was about to enter nirvāṇa he took pity on the world and accepted in sum all that was given. (Some other master says: the offense is incurred with respect to those who guard it.)

If a man digs up an ownerless hidden treasure, he incurs the offense of stealing on the side of the ruler of the country.

If a man steals the goods that revert (the effects of a deceased bhikṣu, which may revert to the remaining bhikṣus, and so are called goods that revert): if the karman has already been performed, the offense is incurred with respect to the saṅgha within the boundary; if the karman is not yet completed, the offense of stealing is incurred with respect to the disciples of the Buddha at large.

The remaining cases may be pondered on this model.

〔First Half of Root 75〕The Marks of Sexual Misconduct — Four Kinds of Going Where One Ought Not

Treatise (transition): Taking what is not given having been made out, sexual misconduct should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: Sexual misconduct is of four kinds, all of them going where one ought not to go.

Treatise: There are in all four kinds of “going where one ought not to go,” and all of them get the name of the offense of sexual misconduct.

The first is going where one ought not with respect to a forbidden object: that is, going to a wife held by another, or to one’s mother, or one’s father, or a kinswoman of one’s parents, and so on to one who is guarded by the king.

The second is going where one ought not by a forbidden way: that is, by the mouth of one’s own wife and by the other ways that are not the way.

The third is going where one ought not in a forbidden place: that is, within a monastery, in the place of a caitya (a shrine), or in a remote place.

The fourth is going where one ought not at a forbidden time. What is meant by a forbidden time? It is the time of carrying a child, the time of nursing an infant, and the time of undertaking the fast-day precepts — even with one’s own wife, at these times one transgresses by misconduct. (There is another account: only if the husband has allowed her to undertake the fast-day precepts and there is afterwards a transgression is it called a forbidden time.)

The word “not by mistake” spoken of above runs on into this gate too. If with respect to another’s wife one supposes her to be one’s own, or with respect to one’s own wife supposes her to be another’s, and so on with the way and what is not the way, then so long as there is mistake in the mind, though something be done it does not complete a path of action.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): If with respect to this wife of another one raises the perception of a different wife of another, does the practice of what is not the pure life complete a path of action?

(Here two accounts stand side by side.) One account says: it does complete it, since after all he raised the preparation for fornication with respect to another’s wife and enjoyed her. Another account says: it does not complete it, just as with the path of action of killing when one raises the preparation with respect to this one and brings it to completion upon another (in which case the root path of action is not completed).

Treatise (a question raised against itself): In practicing what is not the pure life with a bhikṣuṇī, from what place is the path of action incurred? Answer: the offense is incurred from the place of the king, because the king does not allow such a thing. (And by arguing from the lighter to the heavier:) even with one’s own wife at the time when she is undertaking the fast-day precepts one ought not to go; how much less with one who has gone forth.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): If one practices what is not the pure life with a maiden, from what place is the path of action incurred? Answer: if she has already been promised to another, the offense is incurred at the place of the one to whom she is promised; if she is not promised to a man, then at the place of those who are able to guard her. These and the remaining cases all incur the offense from the place of the king.

〔Second Half of Root 75〕The Marks of False Speech — Defiled Mind, a Divergent Perception, Uttering, and Understanding the Sense

Treatise (transition): Sexual misconduct having been made out, false speech should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: To utter, with a defiled mind, a divergent perception of the sense one speaks, the other understanding that sense, completes false speech.

Treatise: To raise a divergent perception with respect to the sense one speaks and to utter it, the one deceived understanding the sense spoken, with a defiled mind and not by mistake, completes false speech.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): If the one deceived does not understand the sense of what is spoken, what is that stretch of speech to be reckoned as? Answer: it is frivolous speech.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Since false speech is just the utterance set going, and an utterance is composed of many words, at what point is the path of action completed? Answer: the manifest sound and the nonmanifest action that arise together with the last word complete this path of action; or else, at whatever point the one deceived understands the sense, the manifest and nonmanifest action at that time complete this path of action. What accompanies the several words before that is all its preparatory stage.

Treatise (two objections raised against itself): Upon what point does the “understanding of the sense” that is spoken of depend? Does it depend upon “having finished hearing and rightly understanding” for the understanding, or upon “being in the act of hearing and being able to understand” for the understanding?

Question: if it be so, what fault is there? Answer: if it depend upon “having finished hearing and rightly understanding” for the understanding, then the sense conveyed by the utterance is what mental consciousness knows, whereas verbal manifest action has already passed away together with auditory consciousness, and so this path of action ought to be completed by the nonmanifest alone (the manifest having already ceased). If it depend upon “being in the act of hearing and being able to understand” for the understanding, then although this fault is absent, yet at that time there is not yet any knowing, so how can it be said that being in the act of hearing is being able to understand?

Treatise (the author takes one as his tenet): For one who well knows the sense of words and has no condition of confusion, auditory consciousness having arisen is called being able to understand — and since thus there is no fault, this account should be taken as the tenet.

Treatise (transition raising a question): The sūtra says that utterances are in brief of sixteen kinds: with respect to what is not seen, not heard, not sensed, not known, to say “I truly saw it” and the like; or with respect to what is seen, heard, sensed, and known, to say “I did not see it” and the like — these eight are called ignoble utterances. If with respect to what is not seen, and so on to what is not known, one says “I did not see it” and the like, or with respect to what is seen, and so on to what is known, one says “I truly saw it” and the like — these eight are called noble utterances. What then are the marks of “what is seen” and the rest? The stanza says:

〔Root 76〕Seen, Heard, Sensed, Known — The Marks of the Four Bases of Speech

Stanza: What is attested by eye consciousness, by ear consciousness, by mental consciousness, and by the remaining three consciousnesses is called in order what is seen, what is heard, what is known, and what is sensed.

Treatise (the account of the Vaibhāṣika masters): The Vaibhāṣika masters speak thus: if an object is attested by eye consciousness it is called what is seen; what is attested by ear consciousness is called what is heard; what is attested by mental consciousness is called what is known; and what is attested by nose, tongue, and body consciousness is called what is sensed.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): Why so (why are the latter three consciousnesses gathered under one name)? Answer: because the three of scent, taste, and touch are of indeterminate nature, and like a dead man have no sensing; and so on the side of what attests them the name “sensing” is established for them in particular.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): How is it known that it is indeed so? Answer: by the two proofs of scripture and principle.

As for the proof from scripture, the sūtra says: the Buddha told the Great Mother: what do you think? As for those forms that are not seen by your eye, that you have not seen, that you will not see, and that you do not even wish to see — will you thereupon raise desire, raise greed, raise intimacy, raise craving, raise ālaya (grasping and storing), raise niyandi (grasping and holding), raise infatuation? (The Great Mother answered:) I will not, Venerable Sir. As for those sounds that are not heard by your ear, and so at length, as for those dharmas that are not known by your mind, and so at length — I will not, Venerable Sir. The Buddha further told the Great Mother: herein, with respect to what is seen you should know that there is only what is seen, and with respect to what is heard, what is sensed, and what is known you should know that there is only what is heard, what is sensed, and what is known.

Since this sūtra speaks of the three objects of form, sound, and dharma as what is seen, what is heard, and what is known, one may by parity of reasoning assuredly establish, for the three objects of scent and the rest gathered together, the single name “what is sensed.” If this be not allowed, what then is called what is sensed? Moreover, scent, taste, and touch would fall outside what is seen and the rest, and so it would be impossible to set going speech about those three objects. This is what is called the proof from principle.

Treatise (the author refutes this proof): This proof does not hold. Let it be said first that the sūtra is no proof, for the sense of the sūtra lies elsewhere — in this sūtra the World-Honored One is not adjudicating the marks of the four bases of speech beginning with what is seen. Looking to the sense that this sūtra speaks, the Buddha is urging her that, with respect to the six objects and with respect to the four matters spoken of beginning with what is seen, she should know that there is only the speech of what is seen and the rest, and should not add on the marks of the lovely and the unlovely.

Treatise (the Vaibhāṣikas ask): If it be so, what marks then are called what is seen and the rest?

Treatise (the account of some other master): Some other master says: whatever object is attested by direct perception through the five faculties is called what is seen; whatever is obtained from the report of another is called what is heard; whatever is allowed by applying one’s own mind and inferring by all manner of reasoning is called what is sensed; whatever is directly attested by mind is called what is known. Thus with respect to the five objects one may in each case set going all four kinds of speech, that of seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing; and with respect to the sixth object (the object that is dharma) there are three apart from seeing. Hence it may be known that the name “sensing” is not without a referent, and that the three objects of scent and the rest are not beyond speaking of; and so their (the Vaibhāṣikas’) words of “principle” are likewise without principle.

Treatise (the account of the earlier preceptors): The earlier preceptors speak thus: what the eye directly sees is called what is seen; what is heard from the report of another is called what is heard; whatever one’s own mind constructs by thought of every kind is called what is sensed; what is received within oneself and what is attested by oneself is called what is known.

Treatise (closing): Let the incidental discussion rest, and let the proper discussion be set forth.

Treatise (a set of questions and answers quoted from the root treatise): Is there a case in which, by bodily manifest action, one raises a divergent perception of the sense and, without uttering speech, completes false speech? Answer: there is. Hence the root treatise says: is there a case of being touched by the offense of killing without moving the body? Answer: there is, namely uttering speech (bidding another kill). Is there a case of being touched by the offense of false speech without uttering speech? Answer: there is, namely moving the body (indicating by bodily gesture). Is there a case of being touched by these two offenses while neither moving the body nor uttering speech? Answer: there is, namely at the time when a seer is wrathful in mind (harming by mental thought), and at the time of the poṣadha (falsely displaying purity by keeping silent).

Treatise (an objection raised against itself): If there be neither movement of body nor utterance of speech, and the desire realm besides has no nonmanifest that arises apart from the manifest, how then can these two come to be paths of action? Answer: upon a difficulty such as this one should expend some labor (here the author leaves it undecided and leaves it for later men to labor over).

〔Root 77 · First Half of Root 78〕Divisive Speech · Harsh Speech · Frivolous Speech

Treatise (transition): False speech having been made out, the remaining three of speech should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: To set going with a defiled mind an utterance that would break another is called divisive speech; an unlovely utterance is called harsh speech; and all utterances set going by a defiled mind are frivolous speech. There is another account: only what is other than the three defiled utterances above (such as flattery, singing, and false treatises) is called frivolous speech.

Treatise (divisive speech): If with a defiled mind one sets going an utterance that would break another (break the concord of others), then whether or not the other is in fact broken, divisive speech is completed in either case. The two matters of “understanding the sense” and “not by mistake” run on into this (that is, the other must understand, and there must be no mistake).

Treatise (harsh speech): If with a defiled mind one sets going an unlovely utterance abusing another, that is called harsh speech. The word “defiled mind” above runs on into this, and “understanding the sense” and “not by mistake” are likewise as above — that is to say, the path of action is completed only when the very man he intended in his mind to abuse understands the sense spoken.

Treatise (frivolous speech): All utterances set going by a defiled mind are called frivolous speech. Why so? Because all speech set going by a defiled mind is frivolous. Only the word “utterance” above runs on into this (the remaining conditions need not be complete).

Treatise (a divergent account of some other master): Some other master says: only what is other than the former three utterances beginning with false speech, all speech set going by a defiled mind, is called frivolous speech; and this refers to flattery, singing, false treatises, and the like. “Flattery” is fawning speech, as when a bhikṣu harbors a wrong livelihood in his heart and sets going fawning words. “Singing” is chanting, as when men in the world with a defiled mind chant and sing in mutual dalliance, and as when performers, in order to please the feelings of others, make all manner of songs with a defiled mind. What is called a “false treatise” is the extended argument of words held by the several incorrect views. What the word “and the like” gathers in are lamentations set going by a defiled mind and the words of the several worldly frivolities. So long as it is other than the former three and is set going by a defiled mind, all of it is gathered into frivolous speech.

Treatise (a question raised against itself): At the time when a wheel-turning monarch appears in the world there is singing too; how is it not gathered in by frivolous speech? Answer: because those songs are set going from a mind of renunciation and are able to draw forth renunciation, and are not a mind defiled beforehand.

Treatise (the account of yet another master): Again some other master says: at that time there are also defiled utterances set going in accomplishing marriages and the like, only their fault is slight and so they do not complete a path of action.

〔Second Half of Root 78 · First Half of Root 79〕Greed · Hatred · Wrong View, the Three Mental Paths of Action

Treatise (transition): The three verbal paths of action having been made out, the three of mind should now be made out. The stanza says:

Stanza: Evil desire toward another’s goods is greed; hostility toward sentient beings is hatred; and the view that denies outright the wholesome and the evil and the rest is called the path of action of wrong view.

Treatise (the path of action of greed): Evil desire toward another’s goods is called greed. That is to say: to raise desire contrary to reason toward another’s wealth — thinking “how may that thing come to belong to me and not to him,” and raising a mind of seizing openly and taking in secret and so hankering after another’s goods; evil desire such as this is called the path of action of greed.

Treatise (the account of some other master): Some other master says: all craving of the desire realm is the path of action of greed. Why so? Because in the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances, with respect to the hindrance of sensual desire, the Buddha said that this greed for the world should be cut off; whence it may be known that the name “greed” is said in general of the craving of the desire realm.

Treatise (yet another account): Again there is another account: though the craving of the desire realm may all be called greed, it may not be said that they all complete a path of action, for this path of action of greed gathers in only the coarse and evident portion within evil conduct. (Were it not so,) would not the sensual greed set going at the time when a wheel-turning monarch appears in the world, and by the men of Uttarakuru, also become the path of action of greed?

Treatise (the path of action of hatred): To raise hostility toward the class of sentient beings is called hatred. That is to say: to wish to do harm to another sentient being; hostility such as this is called the path of action of hatred.

Treatise (the path of action of wrong view): To deny outright with an evil view, with respect to the wholesome and the evil and the rest (denying that they are), this view is called the path of action of wrong view.

As the sūtra says: there is no giving, there is no delighting, there is no sacrifice; there is no good conduct, there is no evil conduct; there is no result and maturation drawn by the action of good conduct and evil conduct; there is no this world, there is no other world; there is no mother, there is no father; there are no sentient beings born by transformation; there is in the world no śramaṇa or brahmin who is an arhat.

That sūtra displays in full the three classes of wrong view, slandering action, slandering results, and slandering the noble ones; the present stanza raises only the first item and by the one word “and the rest” gathers in all the rest.

〔Second Half of Root 79〕How the Name “Path of Action” Was Established

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): The marks of the ten kinds of path of action have all been made out one by one above. In what sense, then, are they called ‘paths of action’? The stanza says:

Stanza: Of these ten, the last three are ‘path’ alone; the first seven are both ‘action’ and at the same time ‘path’ — since they too are the road along which action travels.

Treatise: Among the ten paths of action, the last three (greed, hatred, wrong view) can count only as ‘path,’ since they are the road along which ‘action’ travels, and so they take ‘path of action’ for their name. The ‘volition’ that arises in association with these three is what is called ‘action’; that volition turns along with greed, hatred, and wrong view, proceeds along with them, and does its doing in accordance with their force.

The first seven (killing, taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, and frivolous speech) are themselves ‘action,’ since they are bodily action and verbal action; and they are at the same time ‘the road of action,’ since volition roams by way of them — the volition able to set going the two actions of body and speech arises with bodily and verbal action for its object-field.

The two senses of ‘action’ and of ‘the road of action’ taken together thus establish the single name ‘path of action.’ Hence when this treatise here says ‘path of action,’ it is bringing out both layers of sense at once: one layer being ‘the action that is itself the path’ (the first seven), the other ‘the path along which action travels’ (the last three).

Although the entities of these two classes are not of one kind, yet to name all the rest by the name of one of them is a usage commonly allowed both in the world and in the treatises. As for the establishing of abstaining from killing and the other seven, and of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion, as paths of action, they are to be explained in just this same way.

Treatise (a question posed and three answers): Here the author poses a question of his own (this being a question the author sets for himself): why are the preparatory stage (the stretch of getting ready to set to work) and the consequent stage (the stretch in which, after the deed is done, the momentum has not yet spent itself) not counted as paths of action?

The author answers for himself, and there are three grounds within the answer. First: the preparatory stage turns ‘for the sake of’ the basic stage, and the consequent stage turns ‘in dependence upon’ the basic stage — the former turns as heading toward the basic, the latter turns as relying upon the basic; and since both alike stand only by looking to the basic, they cannot in turn serve as the basic themselves. Second: it was said above that what a path of action gathers is the portion that is ‘coarse and weighty,’ and the preparatory and consequent stages are not the portion that is coarse and weighty. Third: to be established as a path of action means that by it the things within and without the body suffer some decrease and some increase — it is by the working of this stretch that things within and without have their increase and decrease; apart from this stretch there is no such working, and so they are not established as paths of action.

Treatise (the position of another lineage and the author’s response): The masters of similes hold as their lineage’s position that greed, hatred, and the rest are themselves mental action (they do not admit that greed and hatred have any entity apart). In what sense, then, is ‘that greed and hatred of which they speak’ to be explained as named path of action?

The author answers: this should be asked of them themselves. Yet one may also say something on their behalf: those greeds and hatreds, being mental action and being also the road that leads to the evil destinies, are therefore called paths of action; or else greed, hatred, and the rest mount one upon another (hatred arising from greed, greed from hatred), the earlier making a road for the later, and so all are named paths of action.

The ten unwholesome paths of action spoken of above are, every one of them, contrary to the arising of the wholesome dharmas.

〔Root 80 · Root 81〕Wrong View Cuts Off the Wholesome Roots

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): This being so, then by which path of action are what are called ‘the wholesome roots’ cut off? And once cut off, how are they restored again? Wherein do the marks of the cutting off and of the restoring differ? The stanza says:

Stanza: Only wrong view cuts off the wholesome roots. What is cut off is the wholesome root of the desire realm acquired by birth. This wrong view denies cause and denies result, and denies them all. The manner of the cutting off is by degrees, and discipline and the wholesome roots are relinquished together. What can cut off the wholesome roots is the body of a man or of a woman in the three continents of the human destiny, in a person who walks by views; the entity of what is cut off is ‘non-acquisition.’ The wholesome roots are restored by doubt or by right view; the restoring is all at once, and it may be restored even in the present body, save only for one who has committed a deed of immediate retribution.

Treatise: Among the ten unwholesome paths of action, only a wrong view that is ‘of the high grade and complete’ can cut off the wholesome roots.

Treatise (an objection raised by citing the text of the root treatise): This being so, why then does the root treatise say, ‘what are called the unwholesome roots of the high grade? They are those unwholesome roots that can cut off the wholesome roots, or else that portion first removed at the stage of separation from desire’ (this objection is raised by citing the text of the root treatise, and is a question the author sets for himself; the clause ‘or else that portion first removed at the stage of separation from desire’ is still within the text of the root treatise cited, and, like the clause before it, is a mark the root treatise gives for ‘the unwholesome roots of the high grade’ — the objector’s point being that if what cuts off the wholesome roots is wrong view, why does the root treatise fasten the cutting off of the wholesome upon the unwholesome roots)?

Answer: because the unwholesome roots are able to draw forth wrong view, the matter of ‘cutting off the wholesome’ is therefore pushed off and spoken of as belonging to the unwholesome roots. It is as when fire burns a village and the fire was set by a thief, whereupon people of the world say, ‘that thief burned the village’ — what burned the village was in fact the fire, yet the speaker assigns it to the thief.

Treatise (asking which wholesome is cut off): Which class of wholesome roots is cut off by this wrong view (this being a question the author sets for himself)?

Answer: only the ‘wholesome roots acquired by birth’ of the desire realm (that portion which is had from birth and requires no applied effort), since the wholesome roots of the form realm and the formless realm were never accomplished to begin with.

Treatise (an objection raised by citing the text of another treatise): How, then, is that sentence of the Treatise of Designations to be reconciled (this objection being raised by citing the text of another treatise)? That treatise says: ‘by just this much it is said that this person has cut off the wholesome roots of the three realms.’

Answer: that is said with regard to ‘the wholesome roots of the upper realms becoming thereby yet more remote’ — it is not that the wholesome of the upper realms is really cut off, but that this continuum is no longer a vessel for the wholesome dharmas of the upper realms.

Treatise (asking why only what is acquired by birth is cut off): Why is it only the wholesome roots acquired by birth that are cut off (this being a further question the author sets for himself)?

Answer: because the wholesome roots acquired through preparation (that portion of the wholesome which arises only by applied cultivation) had already fallen away long before this.

Treatise (asking what the wrong view takes as its object): What does the wrong view that can cut off the wholesome roots take for its object (this being a question the author sets for himself)?

Answer: it is that wrong view which decisively denies cause and result. To deny cause is decisively to refuse that there are good conduct and evil conduct; to deny result is decisively to refuse that there are maturational results felt from those deeds.

Treatise (another master’s divergent account, one): There is another master who says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): these two wrong views, the denial of cause and the denial of result, are like the uninterrupted path and the path of liberation in having a before and an after.

Treatise (another master’s divergent account, two): And there is yet another master who says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): the wrong view that can cut off the wholesome takes only what has outflows for its object, not what is without outflows; and takes only its own realm for its object, not the other realms. The ground is this: that wrong view, with regard to its object-field, only ‘increases by attachment in association’ (lying latent only in the mind associated with it), and does not increase upon the object-field, and so its force is feeble.

Treatise (the correct sense): Yet by the correct sense the author takes (this being the correct sense the author takes): this wrong view takes all things whatever for its object, and increases along the side of ‘cause’ as well, and so it has a mighty force.

Treatise (another master’s divergent account, three · cutting off all at once): There is another master who says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): the wholesome roots of the nine grades are cut off all at once by a wrong view of a single instant, as at the stage of the path of seeing the afflictions abandoned through seeing are exhausted all at once.

Treatise (the correct sense · cutting off by degrees): Yet by the correct sense the author takes (this being the correct sense the author takes): the wholesome roots are cut off by degrees. The wholesome roots of the nine grades are cut off grade by grade by wrong views of the nine grades matched against them in reverse order, as at the stage of the path of cultivation the afflictions abandoned through cultivation are cut off grade by grade — the lowest of the low grade of wrong view cutting off the highest of the high grade of wholesome root, and so on down to the lowest of the low grade of wholesome root being cut off by the highest of the high grade of wrong view.

Stated thus, it agrees with the wording of the root treatise. The root treatise says: ‘what are called the wholesome roots that occur together with feebleness? They are that portion last relinquished at the time of cutting off the wholesome roots.’ It is precisely because that last portion is relinquished that it is called cutting off the wholesome roots.

Treatise (an objection again raised by citing the root treatise): This being so, why then does the root treatise say in another place, ‘what are called the unwholesome roots of the high grade? They are those unwholesome roots that can cut off the wholesome roots’ (this objection being raised again by citing the text of the root treatise)?

Answer: that sentence is a statement of hidden intent made with regard to ‘the ultimate point’ — because it is at that instant that the wholesome roots are cut off without remainder. That is to say: so long as one grade of wholesome root is still left, the wholesome roots of the remaining grades may be raised again through it, and then one cannot yet say that this person has cut off the wholesome; only when the cutting off is thorough is it called cutting off the wholesome. This is why the root treatise speaks solely of the unwholesome roots of ‘the high grade’ as able to cut off the wholesome roots.

Treatise (another master’s divergent account, four): There is another master who says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): once the wholesome roots of the nine grades begin to be cut off, the cutting off goes to the end, and there is never a stopping midway, just as at the path of seeing one goes forward without turning back.

Treatise (the correct sense): Yet by the correct sense the author takes (this being the correct sense the author takes): both cases occur, stopping midway and not stopping.

Treatise (another master’s divergent account, five): There is another master who says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): discipline is relinquished first and only then are the wholesome roots cut off, since discipline is not so easily relinquished.

Treatise (the correct sense): Yet by the correct sense the author takes (this being the correct sense the author takes): since that discipline is the result raised by the mind of this grade, then when the mind of this grade is cut off, that discipline is relinquished at the same moment — for result and cause are of one and the same grade.

Treatise (asking about the place): In what place can the wholesome roots be cut off (this being a question the author sets for himself)?

Answer: in the three continents of the human destiny, not in the evil destinies, and not in the destiny of the gods either. Why so? Because in the evil destinies neither defiled nor undefiled discernment is firm enough; and because in the destiny of the gods the results of wholesome and unwholesome actions are seen directly before one (so that one could not deny cause and result even if one wished).

By ‘the three continents’ is meant that Uttarakuru is excluded — the people there have no exceedingly evil ‘āśaya’ (inclination of mind, that is, the leaning of the heart).

Treatise (another master’s divergent account, six): There is another master who says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): only in Jambudvīpa can the wholesome roots be cut off.

Treatise (refuting this divergent account): If it were so, it would contradict what the root treatise says (this is the author refuting directly by citing the text of the root treatise, and is not the establishing of a further account). The root treatise says: ‘the people of Jambudvīpa possess at fewest eight faculties, and it is the same for the eastern and western continents.’ (That the faculties possessed are down to eight is precisely a sign that the wholesome roots have been cut off; and since the eastern and western continents are the same in this, it appears that they too can cut off the wholesome.)

Treatise (asking about the body upon which it depends): Upon what sort of body does such a cutting off of the wholesome depend?

Answer: only upon the body of a man or of a woman, since the will and intent of these two bodies are decisive.

Treatise (another master’s divergent account, seven): There is another master who says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): a woman’s body too cannot cut off the wholesome, since a woman’s desire, diligence, discernment, and the rest are all comparatively dull.

Treatise (refuting this divergent account): If it were so, this too would contradict what the root treatise says (this is the author refuting directly by citing the text of the root treatise). The root treatise says: ‘if one possesses the female faculty, one decidedly possesses eight faculties; and it is the same for the male faculty.’

Treatise (asking what class of conduct can cut it off): A person of what class of conduct can cut off the wholesome roots?

Answer: only a person who ‘walks by views,’ not one who walks by craving. For a person who walks by craving has an evil inclination too unsettled (wavering and unstable, striking no deep root); whereas a person who walks by views has an evil inclination exceedingly firm and deep. By this same principle the ṣaṇḍha and the rest (those who lack the bodily marks of man or woman) also cannot cut off the wholesome roots, since they belong to the class that walks by craving; and moreover the condition of this class of persons approaches that of the evil destinies.

Treatise (asking the entity of the cutting off of the wholesome): This ‘cutting off of the wholesome roots’ — what is its entity?

Answer: it should be known that the cutting off of the wholesome has ‘non-acquisition’ for its entity. For at the stage of cutting off the wholesome, the ‘acquisition’ of the wholesome dharmas no longer arises and ‘non-acquisition’ arises in succession; the stage at which non-acquisition has arisen in place of the acquisition of the wholesome roots is what is called cutting off the wholesome roots. Hence the cutting off of the wholesome roots has non-acquisition for its entity.

Treatise (asking the condition for restoring the wholesome): Once the wholesome roots have been cut off, by what are they restored again?

Answer: by ‘doubt’ or by ‘right view.’ That is to say: with regard to cause and result there sometimes arises in the mind a doubt — ‘perhaps there is such a thing after all?’; or else right view arises outright — ‘cause and result decidedly are, and are not nonexistent.’ At that time the ‘acquisition’ of the wholesome roots is restored again; and because the acquisition of the wholesome arises once more, it is called restoring the wholesome roots.

Treatise (another master’s divergent account, eight): There is another master who says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): the wholesome roots are restored by degrees in nine grades.

Treatise (the correct sense): Yet by the correct sense the author takes (this being the correct sense the author takes): the wholesome roots are restored all at once, and only after being restored do they come to be in act little by little, portion by portion — as when an illness is cured all at once while strength returns by degrees.

Treatise (asking whether they can be restored in the present body): Can the wholesome be restored in the body of this present life (this being a question the author sets for himself)?

Answer: it too can be restored, save only for one who has committed a deed of immediate retribution. It is with regard to such a person that the sūtra says: ‘he decidedly cannot restore the wholesome roots within the present dharma.’ Such a person can restore the wholesome roots only when he is about to end his life from the hells, or else there when he is about to take birth, and at no other stage. The stage of ‘being about to be born’ means within the intermediate existence; the time of ‘being about to pass away’ means when he is on the point of death.

If the wholesome was cut off by the force of a cause, it is restored when he is about to die; if the wholesome was cut off by the force of a condition, it is restored when he is about to be born. For those who cut it off by their own force or by the force of another, the case is to be known by inference in the same way.

Further, one who cut off the wholesome with only his inclination spoiled and his preparatory conduct unspoiled can restore the wholesome in this very life; but one who cut it off with his inclination spoiled and his preparatory conduct spoiled as well must wait until his body is destroyed and his life ended before he can restore the wholesome. As for those who cut it off with their views spoiled but their precepts unspoiled, and with both their views and their precepts spoiled, the case is to be known by inference in the same way.

Treatise (analysis by four alternatives): There are those who cut off the wholesome roots without falling into the class fixed in wrongness, and here an analysis by four alternatives should be made. The first alternative (cutting off the wholesome without falling into the class fixed in wrongness): as with Pūraṇa and his sort. The second alternative (falling into the class fixed in wrongness without cutting off the wholesome): as with Ajātaśatru and his sort. The third alternative (both cutting off the wholesome and falling into the class fixed in wrongness): as with Devadatta and his sort. The fourth alternative (neither of the two): namely all persons apart from the three marks above.

Having taken the sense as it conveniently allowed and made out the cutting off of the wholesome roots, we should now return and speak again of the sense of the paths of action proper.

〔Root 82〕How Many Paths of Action Turn Together with Volition in a Single Mind

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Among the two classes of path of action, wholesome and unwholesome, of which we have spoken, how many can arise together and turn along with ‘volition’? The stanza says:

Stanza: The paths of action turning together with volition: of the unwholesome, from one up to eight; of the wholesome, spoken of generally, they may open out to ten; but if the matter be taken separately with regard to what is displayed, then the three numbers one, eight, and five are to be blocked out.

Treatise: On the matter of the several paths of action turning together with volition, take first the unwholesome — unwholesome paths of action turning together with volition run from one kind up to eight.

Only one turning together: namely when, apart from all the rest, any one of the three, greed, hatred, and wrong view, arises singly; or when the preparatory work of a bodily or verbal evil action was done beforehand, and at a time of undefiled mind any one of them is brought to its completion.

Two turning together: as when in a moment of hatred the action of killing is brought to completion; or when, at the stage of greed arising, one accomplishes taking what is not given, or sexual misconduct, or frivolous speech.

Three turning together: as when with a mind of hatred, toward a sentient being belonging to another, one accomplishes at once the two matters of killing and of stealing.

Treatise (an objection and the answer): If it be so, then the general rule stated above, that ‘the path of action of theft is brought to completion by greed,’ does not stand in principle (this being an objection the author sets for himself).

Answer: that was said with regard to the point that it is ‘not brought to completion by a further mind’s doing,’ and so it should be known that a distinction of this sort is drawn in this way. And again, as when the preparatory work of a bodily or verbal evil action was done beforehand, and at the time when greed and the rest arise any two of them are brought to completion, this too is three turning together.

Four turning together: as when, wishing to do damage to another, one utters false speech or harsh speech — one path of mental action and three of verbal action. And again as when the preparatory work of a bodily or verbal evil action was done beforehand, and when greed and the rest are present any three of them are brought to completion.

The cases of five, six, and seven turning together may all in like manner be known by inference.

Eight turning together: as when the preparatory work of the other six bodily and verbal evil actions was done beforehand, and one at the same time practices wrong desire oneself, so that all are completed at one moment. As for the last three (greed, hatred, wrong view), when they are present by their own force they decidedly cannot run side by side, and so there is no case of nine or ten turning together.

The several numbers of unwholesome paths of action turning together with volition have now been stated.

Treatise: Wholesome paths of action turning together with volition, spoken of generally, may open out to ten kinds. But if the matter be taken separately with regard to ‘what is displayed’ (that portion which is plainly displayed), then the three numbers one, eight, and five are to be blocked out.

Two turning together: as when the wholesome five consciousnesses are present, and when in dependence upon the formless realm the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising are present — at these times there is no wholesome of the seven limbs of form issued by an unconcentrated mind.

Three turning together: as when the mental consciousness associated with right view is present — at this time there is no wholesome of the seven limbs of form.

Four turning together: as when, at the stage where an evil or an indeterminate mind is present, one obtains the discipline of the one-day observance, of the lay follower, or of the novice.

Six turning together: as when the wholesome five consciousnesses are present and one obtains the three disciplines above.

Seven turning together: as when the wholesome mental consciousness, without form turning along with it, associated with right view, is present and one obtains the three disciplines above; or when an evil or an indeterminate mind is present and one obtains the discipline of a bhikṣu.

Nine turning together: as when the wholesome five consciousnesses are present and one obtains the discipline of a bhikṣu; or when in dependence upon the formless realm the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising are present and one obtains the discipline of a bhikṣu; or when the mental consciousness associated with the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising gathered under meditative absorption is present.

Ten turning together: as when the wholesome mental consciousness, without form turning along with it, associated with right view, is present and one obtains the discipline of a bhikṣu; or at the stage when any other mind whatever, bearing form that turns along with it and associated with right view, is properly arising.

The above are the three numbers blocked out when the matter is taken with regard to ‘what is displayed.’ If the matter be taken generally with regard to both sides, the hidden and the displayed, then there is nothing to be blocked out — for apart from discipline there are the three cases of one, eight, and five. One turning together: as when an evil or an indeterminate mind is present and one obtains the abstaining of a single limb. Five turning together: as when the wholesome mental consciousness without form turning along with it and associated with right view is present and one obtains two limbs and the like. Eight turning together: as when this mental consciousness is present and one obtains five limbs and the like.

〔Roots 83–85〕In Which Realms, Destinies, and Places the Ten Paths of Action Are Possessed, and Which of Them Can Also Be in Act

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): In which realm, which destiny, and which place are the wholesome and unwholesome paths of action? Of them, how many are only possessed without being in act, and how many can also be in act? The stanza says:

Stanza: Of the unwholesome, in the hells the three of harsh speech, frivolous speech, and hatred extend to both possession and being in act; greed and wrong view are only possessed and are not in act. Uttarakuru possesses the last three; frivolous speech there extends to both being in act and possession. In the remaining places of the desire realm, all ten extend to these two.

Of the wholesome, in all places the last three (non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion) extend to both being in act and possession; in the formless realm and in the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings the first seven limbs can only be possessed and decidedly are not in act; in the remaining places they extend to both being in act and possession, save only in the hells and in Uttarakuru.

Treatise: Take first the ten unwholesome paths of action. Among the nārakas (the denizens of hell) there are three that extend to both, namely harsh speech, frivolous speech, and hatred — these three are both in act and possessed. Because the beings of hell rail at one another, there is harsh speech; because they wail and cry out, there is frivolous speech; because they are coarse and hard and violent in body and mind, perverse and untamed, and because they hate one another, there is hatred.

Greed and wrong view are only possessed and are not in act — because there is there no lovable object-field (greed having nothing to be greedy for), and because the results of action are seen directly before them (so that they could not deny cause and result even if they wished).

The beings of hell die when their action is spent, and so there is no path of action of killing there; there is nothing they can take as their own possessions and there are no women, and so there is no taking what is not given and no sexual misconduct; because lying is of no use, there is no false speech; and just for that reason, and because they are constantly in a state of estrangement to begin with, there is no divisive speech either.

The people of Uttarakuru decidedly possess greed, hatred, and wrong view without their being in act — because they do not take things as their own, are soft in body and mind, have no matters of vexation and harm, and have no evil inclination. Only frivolous speech extends to both being in act and possession, since they sometimes sing and chant with a defiled mind, though they have no evil inclination.

There are there no paths of action of killing and the rest, since the measure of life is fixed (and none is killed and cut off untimely), since there are no possessions to be taken and no women, since body and mind are soft, and since lying is of no use — each said according as it applies.

How then do the people of Uttarakuru practice what is not the pure life? When a man and a woman have given rise to a defiled mind toward each other, they take hands and walk to a tree: if the branches droop and cover them, they know that it is permitted; if the branches do not droop, the two are ashamed together and each departs.

Apart from the hells and Uttarakuru spoken of above, in the rest of the desire realm all ten extend to both possession and being in act. That is to say: among the gods of the desire realm, the hungry ghosts, the animals, and the humans of the three continents, the ten unwholesome paths of action all extend to both possession and being in act; yet there is still a difference within this — among the three classes of gods, ghosts, and animals, the first seven paths of action have only the portion gathered under ‘the intermediate’ and there is no non-discipline; among the humans of the three continents both kinds are found, the intermediate and non-discipline.

Again, though among the gods there is no killing of a god, yet they sometimes do harm to sentient beings of other destinies.

Treatise (another master’s divergent account): There is another master who says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): a god too can kill a god — his head being severed or his waist cut through, his life is then cut off.

Treatise: The unwholesome has now been stated. As for the wholesome paths of action, the three of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion extend to both possession and being in act throughout the three realms and the five destinies.

The seven limbs of body and speech can only be possessed and decidedly are not in act in the formless realm and in the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings. That is to say: a noble sentient being born in the formless realm possesses the past and future discipline without outflows; and a non-percipient sentient being decidedly possesses the past and future discipline of meditative absorption gathered under the fourth meditative absorption.

Upon which level, then, and upon what discipline without outflows once arisen and once ceased does the noble one depend? When born into the formless realm he possesses that past portion; and as regards the future, the discipline without outflows can be possessed in dependence upon a body of any of the five levels.

In the remaining realms, destinies, and places, apart from the hells and Uttarakuru, the seven wholesome paths of action all extend to both being in act and possession; yet there is still a difference within this — ghosts and animals have paths of action gathered under the intermediate apart from discipline; in the form realm there is discipline alone; in the three continents and among the gods of the desire realm both kinds are found.

〔Root 86〕What Sort of Result Each of the Ten Paths of Action Summons

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): What are the results obtained by the unwholesome and the wholesome paths of action? The stanza says:

Stanza: All ten paths of action summon the three results of maturation, homogeneous outflow, and dominance. It is so because they make another suffer, cut off another’s life, and spoil another’s splendor.

Treatise: We shall first analyze how each of the ten evil paths of action summons three results. What are these three? They are the several difference of maturation, homogeneous outflow, and dominance.

That is to say: as to these ten, if one practices them, cultivates them, or does them much, by that force one is born among the nārakas — this is the maturation result.

After coming forth from the hells and being born again among humans, one experiences within the human commonality the homogeneous outflow result — that is to say: one who kills is short in the measure of life; one who takes what is not given is destitute of goods; one who commits sexual misconduct has a wife who is not chaste; one who speaks falsely meets with much slander; one who speaks divisively is estranged from kin and friends; one who speaks harshly is forever hearing words unpleasant to hear; one who speaks frivolously has speech that carries no weight or gravity. One who is greedy grows the more greedy, one who hates has his hatred the more increased, and one of wrong view has his delusion the more increased — because the delusion of that grade was weighty to begin with. This is called the several difference of the homogeneous outflow result of the paths of action.

Treatise (an objection and the answer): The span of life among humans is itself a result summoned by wholesome action; how then can it be said to be a homogeneous outflow of killing (this being an objection the author sets for himself)?

Answer: it is not said that a human being’s span of life is the result of the action of killing; it is only said that ‘because of killing, the measure of a person’s life becomes short.’ It should be known that the action of killing is a cause that makes an obstruction to another’s life faculty, so that it cannot abide long.

Treatise: The dominance result obtained by these ten refers to all the goods of livelihood outside the body — by killing, outward things have little luster; by taking what is not given, there is much frost and hail; by sexual misconduct, there is much dust; by false speech, there is much foul stench; by divisive speech, the place where one dwells is steep and crooked; by harsh speech, the fields have many brambles and are stony, thin, and salt so that they are unfit for tillage; by frivolous speech, the seasons and the weather change and go awry. By greed, the fruits are few; by hatred, the fruits are acrid; by wrong view, the fruits are few or even wanting. This is called the several difference of the dominance result of the paths of action.

Treatise (a question posed and two answers set side by side): Is it one and the same action of killing that first summons the maturation result of the nārakas and afterward makes the measure of life in the human destiny short? Or is there something further (this being a question the author sets for himself)?

Answer one (what follows records one master’s account): it is just that same action of killing that first summons the maturation there and afterward the homogeneous outflow here.

Answer two (what follows records another master’s account): the causes of the two results are not the same — the former means the preparatory stage, the latter the basic stage; and though one speaks generally of a single ‘killing,’ in truth it is spoken of as gathering in both the basic and its retinue. The two accounts stand side by side, and the treatise makes no choice between them.

The term ‘homogeneous outflow result’ used here does not mean that beyond the maturation result and the dominance result there is a further result; it is only that, there being some small portion of likeness within them, it is conventionally named homogeneous outflow.

Treatise (asking why there are the three results): Why do these ten each summon three results?

Answer: take first the action of killing. At the stage of harming another, one makes him suffer, cuts off his life, and spoils and destroys his splendor — because one makes him suffer at the time of killing, one falls oneself into the hells and experiences the maturation result of suffering; because one has cut off his life, one comes to birth among humans and receives a short span of life as the homogeneous outflow result; because one has spoiled his splendor, one summons the little luster of the things outside the body as the dominance result. As for the remaining evil paths of action, one has only to ponder them on this same principle.

From this, too, one may know by the same standard the three results of the wholesome paths of action: namely that abstaining from killing and the rest, if practiced, cultivated, or done much, by that force one is born among the gods and experiences the maturation result; and after passing away from among the gods and being born again among humans, one experiences within the human commonality the homogeneous outflow result — namely that one who abstains from killing obtains long life. The rest, being the reverse of the above, may be stated by inference in the same way.

〔Root 87〕Why Wrong Livelihood Must Be Established as a Limb Apart from Wrong Speech and Wrong Action

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Again, the sūtra says that among the eight wrong limbs the actions that are form (the two actions of body and speech) are divided into three limbs, namely wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood. What, then, is wrong livelihood apart from wrong speech and wrong action? Since apart from those two there is nothing further, why should a further limb be established and spoken of? The stanza says:

Stanza: The two actions of body and speech that arise from greed are, because they are hard to be rid of, separately established as wrong livelihood. To hold fast that only what arises from a greed that takes the requisites of life for its object is called wrong livelihood contradicts the text of the sūtra, and so does not stand in principle.

Treatise: The verbal action and the bodily action that arise from hatred and delusion are called, in that order, wrong speech and wrong action. The two actions of body and speech that arise from greed are, because they are hard to be rid of, separately given a name and called wrong livelihood.

That is to say: greed can rob a sentient being of his mind, and the action raised by greed is hard to restrain and guard against; and so that people may cultivate earnestly in this portion that is ‘right livelihood,’ the Buddha divided it off from the two former limbs and spoke of it separately as one limb. Just as there is a stanza that says —

〔Quoted Stanza · Not a Root Stanza〕The Wrong Views of the Worldly Are Hard to Be Rid Of; the Wrong Livelihood of Those Gone Forth Is Hard to Guard

Stanza: The wrong views of the householder are hard to be rid of, since he constantly grasps at manifold divergent views; the wrong livelihood of one gone forth upon the path is hard to guard, since the requisites of life belong to others (they must be supplied by others).

Treatise (another master’s divergent account): There is another master who holds fast and says (what follows records another master’s divergent account): only the two actions of body and speech arising from a greed that takes ‘the requisites of life’ for its object are called wrong livelihood, not those arising from any other greed. Why? Because to perform song and dance and the like for one’s own sport and delight is not for the sustaining of life.

Treatise (refuting the position by citing a sūtra): This contradicts the text of the sūtra, and so decidedly does not stand in principle (this is the author refuting directly by citing a sūtra, and is not the establishing of a further account). In the Sūtra on the Aggregate of Precepts the World-Honored One establishes even the watching of elephant fights and the like within wrong livelihood — since that is a wrong taking in of outward object-fields whereby life is spent in vain.

As for the three limbs of right speech, right action, and right livelihood, they may be known as the reverse of this.

〔Root 88 · Root 89〕How Many Results the Path That Cuts Off and the Several Classes of Action Each Have

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): As was said above, results are of five kinds. Which action here, then, has how many results? The stanza says:

Stanza: Among the paths that cut off, action with outflows has the full five results. Action without outflows has four results, namely all but the maturation result. The remaining wholesome and unwholesome actions with outflows likewise have four, save the result of release from bondage. The remaining actions without outflows and the indeterminate actions have three, save the two just excluded.

Treatise: What is called a ‘path’ is that which is able both to realize the ‘cutting off’ (cessation through discernment) and to cut off the afflictions, and so obtains the name ‘path that cuts off,’ that is, the uninterrupted path. This path is of two kinds, namely the path with outflows and the path without outflows.

Action of the path that cuts off with outflows has the five results. The maturation result means the lovable maturation summoned within its own level by the path that cuts off. The homogeneous outflow result means the manifold like dharmas arising afterward within its own level, equal to what went before or increased upon it. The result of release from bondage means the unconditioned cessation through discernment realized by cutting off the afflictions through the force of this path. The result of human effort means the coexistent dharmas drawn along by this path, the path of liberation, the merits cultivated, and what is cut off. The dominance result means the remaining conditioned dharmas apart from its own entity — excepting only those already arisen beforehand.

Within the path that cuts off itself, action of the path without outflows has four results only, namely all but the maturation result.

The remaining wholesome and unwholesome actions with outflows likewise have four results, namely all but the result of release from bondage. Because they are unlike the path that cuts off spoken of above, they are called ‘the remaining.’ The word ‘remaining’ where it occurs again below is to be explained in this same way.

That is to say: the remaining actions without outflows and the indeterminate actions have three results only — all but those already excluded, that is, all but the maturation result and the result of release from bondage.

〔Root 90〕How Many Results the Three Actions, Wholesome, Unwholesome, and Indeterminate, Have When Set Against One Another

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): The having of results by the several actions has now been analyzed in general; next the marks of the having of results by action are to be made out from the several different gates, and among these the three actions, wholesome and the rest, are made out first. The stanza says:

Stanza: The three actions, wholesome and the rest, set against the three dharmas, wholesome and the rest: the first (wholesome action) has four, two, three; the middle (unwholesome action) has two, three, four; the last (indeterminate action) has two, three, three results.

Treatise: The words ‘all in their order’ of the last line show the sense that this runs through the several gates above according as it applies.

Let us take, then, the three actions, wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate, each in turn as cause, and make out how many results each has as set in order against the three dharmas, wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; and the several gates below are to be known by inference in this same way.

That is to say: the first, wholesome action — with a wholesome dharma for its result it has four results, all but maturation; with an unwholesome dharma for its result it has two results, namely the result of human effort and the dominance result; with an indeterminate dharma for its result it has three results, all but homogeneous outflow and release from bondage.

The middle, unwholesome action — with a wholesome dharma for its result it has two results, namely human effort and dominance; with an unwholesome dharma for its result it has three results, all but maturation and release from bondage; with an indeterminate dharma for its result it has four results, all but release from bondage.

How is the homogeneous outflow result spoken of here? It is that the all-pervading unwholesome dharmas and the remaining unwholesome actions abandoned through the seeing of suffering have for their homogeneous outflow the indeterminate dharmas of the grade of the view of a real person and the extreme view.

The last, indeterminate action — with a wholesome dharma for its result it has two results, namely human effort and dominance; with an unwholesome dharma for its result it has three results, all but maturation and release from bondage. And how again is the homogeneous outflow result spoken of here? It is that the indeterminate actions of the grade of the view of a real person and the extreme view have the unwholesome dharmas for their homogeneous outflow. With an indeterminate dharma for its result it has three results, all but maturation and release from bondage.

〔Root 91〕The Three Actions of Past, Present, and Future Set Against One Another

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): The three natures having been made out, the three times are to be made out next. The stanza says:

Stanza: Past action has four results with respect to the dharmas of each of the three times; present action with respect to future dharmas is likewise; present action with respect to present dharmas has two results; future action with respect to future dharmas has three.

Treatise: The three actions, past, present, and future, each in turn as cause, have the past and the rest for their results according as it applies, and their several difference is thus —

Past action has four results with respect to the dharmas of each of the three times, excepting only release from bondage. Present action has four results with respect to future dharmas (as stated above); with respect to present dharmas it has two results, namely human effort and dominance. Future action has three results with respect to future dharmas, all but homogeneous outflow and release from bondage.

The reason it is not said that ‘a later action has an earlier result’ is that a dharma that is before decidedly cannot be the result of an action that is after.

〔First Half of Root 92〕The Same Level and a Different Level Set Against Each Other

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): The three times having been made out, the several levels are to be made out next. The stanza says:

Stanza: Within the same level there are four results; in a different level there are two results or three.

Treatise: Among the several levels, the action of any level whatever has four results with respect to the dharmas of the same level, all but release from bondage.

If this action is with outflows, it has two results with respect to the dharmas of a different level, namely human effort and dominance. If this action is without outflows, it has three results with respect to the dharmas of a different level, all but maturation and release from bondage — for what is without outflows does not fall under affiliation to a realm, and so here the homogeneous outflow result is not blocked out.

〔Second Half of Root 92 · First Half of Root 93〕The Three Actions of the Learner, the One beyond Learning, and Neither Learner nor beyond Learning Set Against One Another

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): The several levels having been made out, the learner and the rest are to be made out next. The stanza says:

Stanza: The action of a learner has three results with respect to each of the three; the action of one beyond learning is one, three, two; the action of neither learner nor beyond learning is two, two, five results.

Treatise: The three actions of the learner, of one beyond learning, and of neither learner nor beyond learning, each in turn as cause, have the three dharmas in order for their results, and their several difference is thus —

The action of a learner has three results with respect to the dharmas of a learner, all but maturation and release from bondage; with respect to the dharmas of one beyond learning it likewise has three; with respect to the dharmas of neither learner nor beyond learning it has three results, all but maturation and homogeneous outflow.

The action of one beyond learning has one result with respect to the dharmas of a learner, namely dominance; with respect to the dharmas of one beyond learning it has three results, all but maturation and release from bondage; with respect to the dharmas of neither learner nor beyond learning it has two results, namely human effort and dominance.

The action of neither learner nor beyond learning has two results with respect to the dharmas of a learner, namely human effort and dominance; with respect to the dharmas of one beyond learning it likewise has two; with respect to the dharmas of neither learner nor beyond learning it has five results (the five results in full).

〔Second Half of Root 93 · Root 94〕The Three Actions Abandoned through Seeing, Abandoned through Cultivation, and Not Subject to Abandonment Set Against One Another

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): The learner and the rest having been made out, those abandoned through seeing and the rest are to be made out next. The stanza says:

Stanza: The three actions abandoned through seeing and the rest, each set against the three dharmas: the first has three, four, one; the middle has two, four, three results; the last has one, two, four. All are to be known in their order.

Treatise: The three actions abandoned through seeing, abandoned through cultivation, and not subject to abandonment, each in turn as cause, have the three dharmas in order for their results, and their several difference is thus —

The first, action abandoned through seeing, has three results with respect to dharmas abandoned through seeing, all but maturation and release from bondage; with respect to dharmas abandoned through cultivation it has four results, all but release from bondage; with respect to dharmas not subject to abandonment it has one result, namely the dominance result.

Action abandoned through cultivation has two results with respect to dharmas abandoned through seeing, namely human effort and dominance; with respect to dharmas abandoned through cultivation it has four results, all but release from bondage; with respect to dharmas not subject to abandonment it has three results, all but maturation and homogeneous outflow.

The last, action not subject to abandonment, has one result with respect to dharmas abandoned through seeing, namely dominance; with respect to dharmas abandoned through cultivation it has two results, namely human effort and dominance; with respect to dharmas not subject to abandonment it has four results, all but maturation.

The words ‘all in their order’ mean that this runs through the several gates above according as it applies; the practice of abridgment is of its own nature just so.

〔Root 95〕Action That Ought to Be Done, Action That Ought Not to Be Done, and the Third Class

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Since we have come to make out the several actions, one further question should be asked: as for the three actions spoken of in the root treatise, namely action that ought to be done, action that ought not to be done, and action that neither ought nor ought not to be done, what are their marks? The stanza says:

Stanza: Defiled action is called what ought not to be done; there is a further account that what damages the norms is also what ought not to be done. Action that ought to be done is the reverse of this; what is contrary to both is the third class.

Treatise (the first master’s account): There is one master who says (what follows records one master’s account): defiled action is called what ought not to be done, since it arises from improper attention.

Treatise (another master’s account): And there is another master who says (what follows records another master’s account): whatever bodily, verbal, or mental action damages the norms is also called what ought not to be done. That is to say: one ought properly to walk thus, to stand thus, to speak thus, to wear one’s robes thus, to eat and drink thus, and so on; and if one does not do accordingly, it is called what ought not to be done — since these do not accord with the ceremonial usages of the world.

The reverse of this is called action that ought to be done.

Treatise (the first master’s account): There is one master who says (this being still the account of the former master): wholesome action is called what ought to be done, since it arises from proper attention.

Treatise (another master’s account): And there is another master who says (this being still the account of the latter master): whatever bodily, verbal, or mental action accords with the norms is also called what ought to be done.

As for what is contrary to both of the foregoing, it is called the third class. This differs in the two accounts according as each applies (the two accounts standing side by side, the treatise making no choice between them).

〔First Half of Root 96〕One Action Projects One Birth, and Many Actions Fill That Birth Out

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Does one action project one birth only, or does it project many births? And again, is one birth projected by one action only, or is it projected by many actions? The stanza says:

Stanza: One action projects one birth; many actions can complete it.

Treatise: According to the position of my own school it should be said thus: by one action alone is one birth projected. The ‘one birth’ spoken of here shows one ‘commonality of sentient beings’ — since it is upon obtaining a commonality that one is said to be ‘born.’

Treatise (an objection raised by citing a sūtra as proof): If it be so, why then does the Venerable Aniruddha say of himself: ‘I recall that once, long ago, I made an offering of a single meal upon an eminent field of merit, and the maturation of it caused me seven times to be born in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three and seven times to be born among humans as a wheel-turning noble emperor, and in the last birth to be born in the great house of the Śākyas, abounding in treasure and enjoying much pleasure’ (what follows raises an objection, using the Venerable’s own account in the sūtra to object to the general rule that ‘one action projects one birth only’)?

Treatise (answer one): Answer (this being the first explanation): he obtained by one action great wealth and abundant goods within a single birth, together with the knowledge of former lives, and mounting upon that force he did further actions able to summon the merits of the remaining births, and so on and on until in the last body he was born into a house of wealth and rank and obtained the ultimate result — he spoke as he did with regard to the point that ‘it came of that first force.’ It is as when a man takes a single gold coin and by trading back and forth obtains a thousand gold coins, and then says, ‘it was because I originally had one gold coin that I gained such great wealth and pleasure.’

Treatise (answer two): And there is another master who says (this being the latter explanation, standing beside the former): at that former time, taking the one offering of a meal as his support, he gave rise to many eminent volitions and aspirations, some summoning birth among the gods, some birth among humans, differing instant by instant and ripening earlier and later; and so it is not that one action can project many births, nor is there any birth projected by many actions — otherwise the commonality of sentient beings would have to differ portion by portion.

Treatise: Though it is but one action that projects one commonality, yet the completing of this commonality is allowed to be by many actions. It is as when a painter first draws the shape with a single color and afterward fills it in with many hues. Hence, though men receive the human body alike, some are complete in every point of limb, faculty, figure, measure, color, strength, and adornment, while others are much diminished in these — for it is not action alone that can project and complete this birth.

All unwholesome dharmas and the wholesome dharmas with outflows, since they have maturation, may all alike extend to projecting and to completing; it is only because the force of action is the most eminent that the single word ‘action’ is set up alone to stand for them. Yet of these, that portion which is coexistent with action can both project and complete, and this is said according to the eminence of action; whereas what is not coexistent with action can only complete and cannot project, its force being feeble.

〔Second Half of Root 96〕The Two Absorptions without Mind and ‘Acquisition’ Cannot Project

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): This being said, what then are the entities of those two classes (that which can both project and complete, and that which can only complete and cannot project)? The stanza says:

Stanza: The two absorptions without mind and ‘acquisition’ cannot project; all the rest extend to both projecting and completing.

Treatise: The two absorptions without mind (the absorption without perception and the absorption of cessation), though they have maturation, yet have no force to project the commonality of sentient beings, since they are not coexistent with the several actions. ‘Acquisition’ too has no force to project the commonality of sentient beings, since it does not share one result with the several actions. All the rest extend alike to projecting and completing.

The Bhagavat said: grave obstructions are of three kinds, namely the obstruction of action, the obstruction of the afflictions, and the obstruction of maturation.

〔Root 97〕What the Entities of the Three Obstructions Are

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): What are the entities of these three obstructions? The stanza says:

Stanza: The three obstructions are the deeds of immediate retribution, and the afflictions of frequent occurrence, together with all the evil destinies, Uttarakuru, and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings.

Treatise: What are called the deeds of immediate retribution are the five deeds of immediate retribution. What are these five? The first is harming one’s mother, the second harming one’s father, the third harming an arhat, the fourth splitting a harmonious Saṅgha, the fifth drawing blood from the Buddha’s body with an evil mind. These five are called the obstruction of action.

Afflictions are of two classes: the first is ‘of frequent occurrence,’ that is, afflictions that arise constantly; the second is ‘fierce,’ that is, afflictions of the high grade. It should be known that here only those of frequent occurrence are named the obstruction of the afflictions. As with the ṣaṇḍha and the rest, the afflictions occur again and again and are hard to subdue and remove, and so they are called an obstruction. The afflictions of the high grade, though fierce, are easily subdued and removed because they do not arise constantly. As for the afflictions of frequent occurrence among those of the low grade, though they are not fierce they are hard to subdue and remove — because their constant occurrence makes an opening hard to come by. That is to say: with the low grade as condition the middle grade arises, and with the middle grade as condition the high grade arises in turn, so that the path able to subdue and remove them has no chance to arise. Hence among the afflictions, whatever the grade high or low, only those of frequent occurrence are named the obstruction of the afflictions.

The whole of the three evil destinies, together with Uttarakuru within the human destiny and the Heaven of Non-Percipient Beings, are called the obstruction of maturation.

Treatise (asking what dharmas are obstructed): What dharmas does this obstruction obstruct?

Answer: it obstructs the noble path, and obstructs the wholesome roots that are the preparatory practice for the noble path.

Treatise (asking how wide or narrow the obstruction of action is): Again, within the obstruction of action the other determinate actions ought in principle to be spoken of as well — namely all the other actions that decidedly summon birth in an evil destiny, birth from the egg, birth from moisture, the body of a woman, an eighth existence, and the like.

Answer: yet if there is a kind of action that by five causes and conditions is easily seen and easily known, then it is of that kind in particular that we speak here. These five are: the place, the destiny, the birth, the result, and the person. Among the several actions, only the five deeds of immediate retribution are complete in these five and are easily seen and easily known; the other actions are not so, and therefore are not spoken of here. Whether the other obstructions are established or not established is likewise to be known according as it applies.

Treatise (asking the gravity of the three obstructions): Among these three obstructions, the obstruction of the afflictions and the obstruction of action are both grave, since one who has these two obstructions is still not to be treated within a second birth.

The Vaibhāṣika masters explain it thus (this being an explanation of the Vaibhāṣika lineage): since the former can draw forth the latter, the latter is lighter than the former.

Treatise (asking the sense of the name ‘immediate’): What sense does this name ‘immediate’ point to?

Answer: it is said with regard to the fixedness of the maturation result — no other action and no other birth can be interposed between; and so ‘immediate’ here points only to the one sense of ‘nothing intervening.’ Or else it is said that the person who has done this action decidedly falls into the hells after ending his life here, with nothing intervening between, and so it is called immediate. Since that sentient being possesses this matter of ‘nothing intervening,’ he obtains the name of the immediate; being joined with the dharma of ‘the immediate,’ he is therefore called one of the immediate — just as being joined with the dharma of an ascetic one is therefore called an ascetic.

〔Root 98〕In Which Destiny Each of the Three Obstructions Is Found

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): In which destiny should these three obstructions be known to be found? The stanza says:

Stanza: The three continents of the human destiny have the deeds of immediate retribution; the rest have them not; the ṣaṇḍha and the rest have them not either, since there is little kindness toward them and little sense of shame in them. The other two obstructions extend to all five destinies.

Treatise: Take first the deeds of immediate retribution: they are only in the three continents of the human destiny, not in Uttarakuru, nor in the other destinies or the other realms.

Within the three continents, moreover, only a woman and a man can commit a deed of immediate retribution, and the ṣaṇḍha and the rest cannot. Why? It is that same principle spoken of above — since they have no cause of cutting off the wholesome roots and of taking on non-discipline, that is here the reason why they commit no deed of immediate retribution.

Further, their parents and they themselves are, in that order, ‘of little kindness’ and ‘of little sense of shame.’ That is to say: their parents’ kindness toward them is comparatively little, since they gave them only the dominant condition of a body that is defective, and since their loving thought toward them is comparatively little; and their own conscience and shame toward their parents is likewise slight, since there is no present dominant conscience and shame that can be said to have been spoiled, and so they do not touch the sin of the immediate.

By this same principle it is also explained that ghosts and animals, though they harm their mothers and the rest, do not accomplish the sin of the immediate.

Treatise (another master’s divergent account): Yet the Venerable says (what follows records the divergent account of a Venerable): if its awareness is distinct, it too accomplishes the sin of the immediate, as with that intelligent horse.

Treatise: If someone harms the parents of a non-human, he does not accomplish a deed of immediate retribution, since both mind and object-field are inferior.

It has now been made out that the obstruction of action is only in the three continents of the human destiny; the other two obstructions should be known to be found in all five destinies. Yet within the human destiny it is only in Uttarakuru, and within the destiny of the gods only in the place of non-perception.

〔Root 99〕What the Entity of the Five Deeds of Immediate Retribution Is

Treatise (taking up the question from what precedes): Among the three grave obstructions adjudged above (the obstruction of action, the obstruction of the afflictions, and the obstruction of maturation), it has already been said that the five deeds of immediate retribution are the entity of “the obstruction of action.” What then, after all, is the entity of the five deeds of immediate retribution? The stanza says:

Stanza: Among these five deeds of immediate retribution, four are bodily action and one is verbal action; three are killing, one is false speech (speaking what is untrue), and one further is only the preparation for killing (the stretch of readying that comes just before the hand is set to it, and does not count as killing itself).

Treatise: Among the five deeds of immediate retribution, four are bodily action (killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arhat, and drawing blood from the body of a Buddha), and one is verbal action (splitting the Saṅgha); three are killing (killing one’s mother, killing one’s father, killing an arhat), one is the root path of action of false speech (splitting the Saṅgha), and one further is only the preparation for the path of action of killing — for since the body of a Tathāgata cannot possibly be killed, “drawing blood from the body of a Buddha with an evil mind” can count only as the stretch that comes before killing, and cannot count as killing itself.

Of this one deed of immediate retribution, the splitting of the Saṅgha, the entity is false speech.

Treatise (posing a question to himself · answering himself): Since its entity is false speech, why then is it called “splitting the Saṅgha”? Answer: because the cause is named from the result (the split in the Saṅgha being the result, the lie that can raise that result takes its name from the result); or else because this lie is indeed able to split the Saṅgha.

Treatise (posing a turning question · the stanza answers): If that is so, then as for that very matter, “the split in the Saṅgha,” what is its entity? Between the one who splits and those who are split, in whom, after all, is this “split in the Saṅgha” possessed? The stanza says:

〔Root 100〕The Entity of the Split in the Saṅgha, and in Whom It Is Possessed

Stanza: The entity of the split in the Saṅgha is just “non-concord”; it is a formation not associated with mind (neither a form-dharma, nor mind and mental factors, but a class of formations set up apart from mind); its quality is unobscured-indeterminate (neither wholesome nor unwholesome, nor obscuring the noble path); and this split in the Saṅgha is possessed on the side that is split — in the body of monks themselves.

Treatise: The entity of the split in the Saṅgha is just the nature of “non-concord”; it belongs to the unobscured-indeterminate formations not associated with mind, and is gathered under “the aggregate of formations.”

Treatise (posing a difficulty to himself · answering himself): Since it is unobscured-indeterminate, how can it become a deed of immediate retribution (an offense of the utmost weight)? Answer: such a split in the Saṅgha arises from a lie, and so the splitting of the Saṅgha is said to be a “result” of immediate retribution.

As for this split in the Saṅgha, it is not possessed in the person of the one who splits, but is possessed only in the body of monks who are split.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): What then is possessed in the person of this one who splits? Where does the maturation retribution drawn down by splitting the Saṅgha fall, and for how long must it be undergone? The stanza says:

〔Root 101〕The Offense Possessed by the One Who Splits, and the Retribution of an Aeon

Stanza: The one who splits possesses this one thing only — the offense of false speech; the maturation of this offense matures in the hell without interval over one aeon; and as the deeds of immediate retribution done are the more, so the suffering undergone increases with them.

Treatise: The man who is able to split the Saṅgha possesses “the offense of splitting the Saṅgha.” This offense of splitting the Saṅgha has a lie for its nature, that is, the “manifest verbal action” and the “nonmanifest verbal action” that arise together with the split in the Saṅgha (that portion which is spoken out, and the formless force left behind after it is spoken).

This offense must, in the great hell without interval, undergo through one intermediate aeon the most extreme and heavy suffering.

As for the other four deeds of immediate retribution, they are not necessarily born in the hell without interval.

Treatise (posing a difficulty to himself · answering himself): If one has done several deeds of immediate retribution, and these offenses all mature in the next birth, how can several deeds of immediate retribution draw down one birth together (how can one birth hold five portions of retribution)? Answer: as the deeds of immediate retribution done increase, so the suffering undergone increases in severity — that is to say, because several deeds of immediate retribution have been done, one obtains in the hell a body vast and soft (the softer, the more it can bear suffering), together with many keen instruments of suffering, and so the suffering undergone is doubled, tripled, quadrupled, quintupled in its weight.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): Who, then, and in what place, is able to split which sort of person? At what time does the splitting of the Saṅgha occur? And how long must pass before it counts as accomplished? The stanza says:

〔Root 102〕The One Who Splits, Those Who Are Split, the Place, and the Term of Time

Stanza: The one who splits must be a bhikṣu (a monk who has received full ordination), and moreover one whose conduct is of views and who abides in pure conduct; those who are split must be ordinary beings in another place; it is only when they give their acceptance to another master and another path that it is called “splitting”; and this splitting does not last through a night.

Treatise: The man who is able to split the Saṅgha must be a “full bhikṣu” (a monk who has received full ordination); he is certainly not a householder, and not a bhikṣuṇī or the like.

He must be “one whose conduct is of views” (that class of man who leans toward views and is fond of reckoning things out), and not “one whose conduct is of craving” (that class who leans toward affection and greedy attachment).

He must be one abiding in pure conduct, and not one who has broken discipline — for one who has broken discipline speaks without prestige and cannot carry others with him.

He must split in another place, and cannot split in the presence of the Great Master (the Buddha) — for the Buddhas may not be lightly pressed upon; the Buddha’s words are majestic and grave, and face to face with him no one has the power for it.

Those who are split can only be ordinary beings, and not noble ones — for the noble ones have already realized the nature of dharmas for themselves.

Treatise (recording another account): And there is one account: one who has already gained the stage of “receptivity” (the third of the four stages of the factors conducive to penetration) also cannot be split. (The stanza uses the word “the foolish” precisely in order to cover both these layers — ordinary beings, and those who have not gained the stage of receptivity.)

What is called “splitting” must be that the body of monks who are split give their acceptance to a master different from the Buddha, and give their acceptance to a noble path apart from what the Buddha has taught.

It should be said that the split in the Saṅgha occurs at just such a moment; and moreover that within that one night concord must return, and it does not last past the night.

In this way it is called “splitting the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma” — for it can obstruct the wheel of the noble path, and it also destroys the concord of the Saṅgha.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): The men of which continent, and how many of them, are able to split the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma? And for splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts, which continent again, and how many men? The stanza says:

〔Root 103〕Splitting the Wheel of Dharma Is Limited to the Southern Continent and Nine Men · Splitting Formal Acts Extends to Three Continents and Eight Men

Stanza: In Jambudvīpa, at the least nine men and upward are able to split the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma; as for splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts, it extends to three continents, at the least eight men and upward.

Treatise: Only men of Jambudvīpa, at the least nine or more, are able to split the wheel of Dharma. The other continents will not do, for there no Buddha appears in the world — only where a World-Honored One is present is there any talk of setting up another “different master.”

There must be eight bhikṣus divided into two assemblies as the party that is split; the man who splits is the ninth, and so the number of men must at the least be nine. The word “and upward” in the stanza is to make plain that there is no upper limit beyond this number.

As for splitting the Saṅgha in its formal acts, it may be done throughout the three continents, at the least by eight men and at the most without limit. That it extends to three continents has the holy teaching for its ground. It must be that within one and the same boundary the body of monks divides into two parties and performs formal acts separately (each holding the lawful proceedings of the Saṅgha for itself), and so eight men are required; and since nothing bars a number beyond this, the stanza here too uses the word “and upward.”

Treatise (taking up and asking again): At what times is there no splitting of the wheel of Dharma? The stanza says:

〔Root 104〕Six Occasions on Which There Is No Splitting of the Saṅgha of the Wheel of Dharma

Stanza: The first, the last, when the blisters have not yet arisen, when the first pair is not yet established, when the Buddha has passed away, and when a boundary has not yet been established — on these six occasions there is no splitting of the Saṅgha of the wheel of Dharma.

Treatise: What is called “the first” means the time when the World-Honored One has not long turned the wheel of Dharma; what is called “the last” means the time when the Well-Gone One is about to enter parinirvāṇa — in these two stretches of time the body of monks is of one taste and in concord.

What is called “the blisters have not yet arisen” means the time when upon right discipline and right view no “blister” has yet been produced (a blister is a swelling newly raised, borrowed here as a figure for the fissures just budding upon discipline and view) — two blisters must be produced before a splitting is possible.

What is called “the first pair is not yet established” means the time when the first pair of chief disciples, of calm and of insight, has not yet been established — it being the very nature of things that, because they are present, the body of monks swiftly returns to concord.

After the Buddha has passed away, because there is no true Great Master to be set against (no object such that “setting up another master” could be pitted against him).

When a boundary has not yet been established, because within one and the same boundary there is no way of dividing into two parties.

On these six occasions there is no splitting of the wheel of Dharma.

Treatise (adding a sentence): It is not that every Buddha meets with this matter of the splitting of the wheel of Dharma; it must depend upon action of a former life for such a thing to occur.

Let this stretch of incidental discussion rest here for now; next the conditions that make a deed one of immediate retribution should be adjudged. The stanza says:

〔Root 105 · First Half of Root 106〕Why Killing One’s Mother and the Rest Are Deeds of Immediate Retribution · Change of Sex · Killing by Mistake · Drawing the Buddha’s Blood

Stanza: Because one forsakes the field of kindness and destroys the field of virtue (therefore they become deeds of immediate retribution); and even if the sex has changed it is a deed of immediate retribution just the same. What is called “mother” means her by whose blood this body came to be. In cases such as killing by mistake there is no offense of immediate retribution; and there is one case in which there is. If it is with a mind only to strike that one draws the Buddha’s blood, there is no immediate retribution; and in killing one who becomes an arhat only afterwards, there is likewise no offense of immediate retribution.

Treatise (posing a question to himself · answering himself): For what reason do killing one’s mother and the rest become deeds of immediate retribution, while killing others does not? Answer: because one forsakes the field of kindness and destroys the field of virtue.

To kill one’s father or mother is to forsake the field of kindness.

Treatise (probing himself · answering himself): In what way is it said that they have kindness? Answer: because they are the root from which this body arose.

Treatise (asking himself · answering himself): And in what way is it said that one “forsakes” them? Answer: it is that one forsakes their kindness.

What is called the field of virtue means the remaining arhats and the like, who are furnished with all sorts of excellent virtues and are also able to produce them (able to nourish the Dharma body and the life of wisdom in others). One destroys the person in whom virtue is supported, and so it becomes a deed of immediate retribution.

Treatise (posing a question to himself · answering himself): If one’s father or mother has changed sex, does killing them still make a deed of immediate retribution? Answer: the deed of immediate retribution is established just the same, because the body that supports them is one and the same.

By this principle, someone has posed the question: is there a case in which a man loses his life faculty who is neither a father nor an arhat, and yet a deed of immediate retribution is committed? Answer: there is — namely when a mother has changed into a male form. And again: is there a case in which a woman loses her life faculty who is neither a mother nor an arhat, and yet a deed of immediate retribution is committed? Answer: there is — namely when a father has changed into a female form.

Treatise (posing a further difficulty · answering himself): Suppose there were a woman whose kalala at the first conceiving (the coagulate embryonic matter of the first seven days after conception) fell out, and another woman took it up and placed it in her own birth passage and bore the child; which of the two must one kill for it to count as the deed of immediate retribution of killing one’s mother? Answer: the stanza says “‘mother’ means her by whose blood,” for she who supplied the portion of blood and was the root from which this body arose is the mother. As for the one who afterwards received and reared him, whatever is to be done should be asked of this later mother — for she is able to feed him, able to nourish him, able to bring the child to manhood.

Treatise (the four alternatives of killing by mistake): If one raises a preparation to kill toward one’s father or mother and yet by mistake kills another, there is no offense of immediate retribution. If one raises a preparation to kill toward one who is not a father or mother and yet by mistake kills a father or mother, this likewise does not make a deed of immediate retribution. For example, a son takes a stick to strike a mosquito upon his father’s body (his intent not being to kill a man), and his mother is lying hidden upon the bed, and he kills her taking her for another — this too does not make a deed of immediate retribution.

If within one and the same preparation he harms his mother and another at once, then two nonmanifests arise, while the “manifest action” counts only as that one portion which is the deed of immediate retribution — because the force of a deed of immediate retribution is the stronger (the strong portion gathering the weak into itself).

Treatise (recording the divergent account of a named ancient master): The Venerable Ghoṣa, however, says that there are two manifest actions, because manifest action is formed by the massing of atoms (the atoms that fall upon the two persons being distinct, and so the manifest actions too are distinct).

Treatise (the distinction as to the notion of an arhat): If in killing an arhat one has no notion “he is an arhat,” and yet toward that body one has raised a settled mind to kill, then because there was no distinction made (no picking and choosing such as “I will kill only such a one and will not kill an arhat”), it too becomes a deed of immediate retribution.

If a man kills his father, and this father happens to be an arhat, he obtains only one portion of the offense of immediate retribution, because there is only one body that supports them.

Treatise (an outsider cites a sūtra as a difficulty · the author answers): If that is so, how is the simile in the sūtra to be reconciled? The Buddha told Shiqianchi: you have already done two deeds of immediate retribution, namely killing your father and killing an arhat. Answer: that passage of sūtra displays that “one portion of a deed of immediate retribution is constituted by two conditions,” or else it reproaches his offense from the two sides of the field of kindness and the field of virtue; it is not that there really are two portions of the deed of immediate retribution.

Treatise (the distinction as to drawing the Buddha’s blood): If one raises an evil mind in the place where the Buddha is and thereby draws the Buddha’s blood, does one in every case obtain the offense of immediate retribution? Answer: it must be with a mind to kill that it becomes a deed of immediate retribution; if with a mind only to strike one draws the Buddha’s blood, there is no immediate retribution.

Treatise (the distinction as to one who becomes beyond learning afterward): If at the time of raising the preparation to kill the other is not yet an arhat, and only when he is about to die does he realize the fruit of arhatship, has the one who kills him an offense of immediate retribution? Answer: he has not — because toward a “body beyond learning” he never raised a preparation to kill.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): If the preparation for a deed of immediate retribution has already been done and cannot be turned back, is it still possible in the interval to be freed from defilement, still possible to gain a noble fruit? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 106〕Once the Preparation for a Deed of Immediate Retribution Is Fixed, There Is No Freeing from Defilement or Gaining of a Fruit in the Interval

Stanza: The preparation for a deed of immediate retribution being already fixed, in the interval there is no freeing from defilement and no gaining of a fruit.

Treatise: If the preparation for a deed of immediate retribution is bound to be completed, then in the interval it is settled that there will be no freeing from defilement and no gaining of a noble fruit.

As for the preparations of the other paths of unwholesome action, if in the interval the noble path arises, the path of action will not be completed — because the body and mind that support it are definitely opposed to that path of action.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): Among the several evil practices and deeds of immediate retribution, which offense is heaviest? Among the several good practices and worldly wholesome actions, which draws down the greatest result? The stanza says:

〔Root 107〕The Offense of the Lie That Splits the Saṅgha Is Heaviest · The Volition That Draws Down the Foremost Existence Has the Greatest Result

Stanza: The lie that splits the Saṅgha is the greatest among offenses; the volition able to draw down “the foremost existence” (the summit of existence) has the greatest result among worldly wholesome things.

Treatise: Although one knows perfectly well what is Dharma and what is not Dharma, yet for the sake of splitting the Saṅgha one raises a lie and proclaims things invertedly — this is the greatest offense among the five deeds of immediate retribution. For it wounds and destroys the Dharma body of the Buddha, and it obstructs the road of the world to birth in heaven and to liberation.

That is to say: once the Saṅgha has been split, until concord has returned, all men of the world are blocked from entering the noble stages, from gaining the fruits, from being freed of defilement, and from exhausting the outflows; the works of practicing absorption, of reciting over, of reflecting, and the rest all cease; in the great thousandfold world the wheel of Dharma no longer turns; and gods, men, nāgas, and the rest are disturbed in body and mind. Therefore it draws down a maturation of one aeon in the hell without interval.

From this it may be known that the offense of splitting the Saṅgha is heaviest. The other offenses of immediate retribution follow in order — the fifth (drawing blood from the body of a Buddha), the third (killing an arhat), the first (killing one’s mother) — each in turn lighter than the last. The second (killing one’s father) is lightest, because the kindness and virtue are less.

Treatise (an outsider challenges · the author answers): If that is so, why does the Buddha say, among the three “punitive actions” of body, speech, and mind, that the punishment of mind is the greatest offense? And why does a sūtra say that among the several offenses wrong view is the greatest? Answer: these are said with regard to different aspects — with regard to the five deeds of immediate retribution, splitting the Saṅgha is heaviest; with regard to the three punitive actions, the offense of mental action is greatest; with regard to the five deviant views, wrong view is heaviest. Or else it is said that they are called heavy, in that same order, with regard to the three sides of “drawing down a great result,” “injuring many sentient beings,” and “cutting off the wholesome roots.”

Treatise (the great result among worldly wholesome things): The volition able to draw down the maturation result of the foremost existence has the greatest result among worldly wholesome things, because what it draws down is a maturation utterly still, of eighty thousand great aeons. This is said with regard to the result of maturation.

If it be said with regard to the result of release from bondage, then it is the volition associated with the vajra-like concentration that can gain the great result, because by it the fetters are forever cut off. It is to mark off this layer that the stanza says the two words “worldly wholesome.”

Treatise (posing a question to himself · recording a divergent account): Is it only the offenses of immediate retribution that are certainly born in the hells, or are those of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution likewise certainly born there? There is another master who says: those of the same class are not “born without interval” (not born in the hells immediately upon death). What then are those called “of the same class”? The stanza says:

〔Root 108 · First Half of Root 109〕The Five of the Same Class as the Deeds of Immediate Retribution

Stanza: Defiling one’s mother who is an arhat nun (this line has been read in two ways since ancient times: or read as two persons, “mother” and “arhat nun”), killing a bodhisattva abiding in certainty, killing a noble one who is a learner, seizing away the requisites of the Saṅgha’s concord, and destroying a stūpa (a shrine of the Buddha) — these five are of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution.

Treatise: These five, in that same order, are the entities of the actions of the same class as the deeds of immediate retribution. That is to say: one commits an act of extreme defilement toward one’s mother who is an arhat nun (that is, what is not the pure life) — this line may also be read as “toward one’s mother, and toward an arhat nun,” two persons and two objects, and both readings have stood side by side since ancient times, and here both are recorded and neither is chosen; or one kills a bodhisattva abiding in certainty; or one kills a noble one who is a learner; or one seizes away the conditions of the Saṅgha’s concord; or one destroys a stūpa of the Buddha — these five are of the same class as the five deeds of immediate retribution.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): There is a class of action of maturation which at three times is especially able to obstruct. What are the three times so called? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 109〕On Three Occasions Action Is Most Able to Obstruct

Stanza: About to gain the stage of receptivity, about to gain the fruit of non-return, about to gain the fruit beyond learning — at these three times action is most able to obstruct.

Treatise: If from the stage of the summit one is about to gain the stage of receptivity, all actions able to draw down the evil destinies are the greatest obstruction, because the stage of receptivity has already passed beyond the levels upon which the maturation of those evil destinies depends. It is like a man about to leave the country where he has lived, whom all his creditors strive to their utmost to bar.

If a man is about to gain the fruit of non-return, all actions bound to the desire realm are the greatest obstruction, excepting only action that conforms to being experienced in the present life (that class which is undergone in the present life itself).

If a man is about to gain the fruit beyond learning, the actions of the form and formless realms are the greatest obstruction, again excepting action to be experienced in the present life. The similes in these two places are as before (both like creditors barring a man’s way).

Treatise (taking up and asking again): From what stage does the “bodhisattva abiding in certainty” spoken of above first obtain the name “abiding in certainty”? And with regard to what is his “certainty” said? The stanza says:

〔Root 110〕The Name of the Bodhisattva Abiding in Certainty Begins from Cultivating the Action Producing the Excellent Marks

Stanza: From cultivating the action producing the excellent marks the bodhisattva first obtains the name “abiding in certainty”; because from then on he is always born in a good destiny, always born into a noble house, always has the body of a man, and is firm in recollection.

Treatise: From the cultivating of that action which draws down as its maturation result the thirty-two marks of a great person, the bodhisattva first is able to be given the name “abiding in certainty” — because from this time onward until he becomes a Buddha, he is always born in the good destinies and into noble houses and the rest.

What is called being born in a good destiny means being born in the destiny of men and the destiny of gods, these two destinies being excellent and worthy to be named, and so they are called good destinies.

Within the good destinies he is moreover always born into a noble house, that is, of brahmans or kṣatriyas, or into families of wealthy elders and great brahmans.

Within noble houses the faculties of men may be complete or defective; yet that bodhisattva is always furnished with excellent faculties, always receives the body of a man, and does not even take the body of a woman, how much less that of one born deficient in the organs and the like.

Birth after birth he is able to recollect his former lives, and in the good he does he never draws back. That is to say: in matters that benefit and gladden sentient beings, though the several sufferings press upon his body he can bear them all; and though the various evil deeds of others go against him, in that bodhisattva’s mind there is no weariness.

It is as the world hands down that there is a priceless tuosuo (the name of a priceless treasure); one should know that this saying points at that bodhisattva. For although that great being has already accomplished all the excellent and complete virtues, yet because he has long practiced “the great compassion without object,” he is spontaneously and at all times bound to others; among all sentient beings he gathers them all in as his own equals with a mind free of pride, or else always regards himself as their servant. Therefore in all matters hard to seek he can be patient, and in all matters toilsome and pressing he can bear the burden.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): As for cultivating the action producing the excellent marks, what is the character of it? The stanza says:

〔Root 111〕The Five Conditions for Cultivating the Action Producing the Excellent Marks

Stanza: In Jambudvīpa, in the body of a man, facing a Buddha, the volition raised with a Buddha for its object, belonging to the discernment formed through reflection; a remaining hundred aeons are still needed to complete the cultivation; and each mark is adorned with a hundred merits.

Treatise: The bodhisattva must be within Jambudvīpa to be able to cultivate the action that draws forth the excellent marks, because in this continent the awakened discernment is the keenest and clearest.

It can only be a man, and not the body of a woman and the rest, because by that time he has already passed beyond the stage of a woman and the rest.

Only the volition raised in the direct presence of a Buddha, with a Buddha for its object, and this belongs to “what is formed through reflection,” not to the classes of what is formed through hearing or through cultivation.

Only a remaining hundred aeons of cultivating are needed, and no more; among Buddhas at the stage of cause the norm is such.

Only the Bhagavat Śākyamuni, blazing in vigor, was able to leap over nine aeons, and completed the cultivation of the action producing the excellent marks within ninety-one aeons. Therefore the Tathāgata told the village headman: I recollect that in ninety-one aeons I have not seen one household suffer the least loss by giving me food, but only accomplish great benefit. From that time onward his own nature was always to recollect his former births, and so he speaks only of ninety-one aeons.

Treatise (recording one master’s account): The masters of old say: from the time the bodhisattva came forth from the first incalculable aeon, he was parted from four faults and gained two virtues. (This account is as adjudged above.)

Treatise (posing a question to himself · setting out three accounts together): Each of the excellent marks is adorned with a hundred merits; what then is called the measure of “one merit”?

There is an account: apart from the bodhisattvas who are near to Buddhahood, the actions cultivated by all other sentient beings that result in wealth and pleasure, taken together, are called one measure of merit.

There is an account: when a world is about to be established, the dominant force of the action by which all sentient beings draw down the great thousandfold land is called one measure of merit.

There is an account: this measure is known to a Buddha alone.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): Our Great Master, in the past when he was at the stage of a bodhisattva, made offerings to how many Buddhas within the three great incalculable aeons? The stanza says:

〔Root 112〕The Number of Buddhas Served through the Three Incalculable Aeons

Stanza: Within the three great incalculable aeons he made offerings to seventy thousand each; and further, in that same order, to five thousand, six thousand, and seven thousand Buddhas.

Treatise: In the first incalculable aeon he made offerings to seventy-five thousand Buddhas; in the second incalculable aeon to seventy-six thousand Buddhas; in the third incalculable aeon to seventy-seven thousand Buddhas.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): At the fulfillment of each of the three great incalculable aeons, and at the first raising of the aspiration, which Buddha did he meet with in each case? The stanza says:

〔Root 113〕The Four Buddhas Met with in Reverse Order

Stanza: At the fulfillment of the three incalculable aeons, in reverse order they are the Buddha Excellent Insight, the Buddha Burning Lamp, and the Buddha Jewel-Topknot; and at the first raising of the aspiration the one he met was the Buddha Śākyamuni.

Treatise: What is called “reverse order” is speaking from the later toward the earlier. That is to say: at the fulfillment of the third incalculable aeon the Buddha he met and served was named Excellent Insight; at the fulfillment of the second aeon the Buddha he met and served was named Burning Lamp; at the fulfillment of the first aeon the Buddha he met and served was named Jewel-Topknot; and at the stage of first raising the aspiration the one he met was Śākyamuni.

That is to say, our World-Honored One in the past, when at the stage of a bodhisattva, first met with a Buddha whose name was likewise Śākyamuni, and thereupon before that Buddha made the great and vast vow: may I in time to come become a Buddha, in all things just as this World-Honored One is now. That Buddha too appeared in a final aeon, and after his passing his true Dharma likewise abode in the world a thousand years. Therefore the Tathāgata of today is in every point the same as that Buddha.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): At which stage did I, the Śākya bodhisattva, complete the cultivation of which pāramitā? The stanza says:

〔Root 114 · Root 115〕The Six Pāramitās Are Fulfilled at Four Stages

Stanza: Giving universally by compassion alone; the body cut apart without resentment; praising the Buddha Tiṣya; and next, just before unsurpassed awakening — the six pāramitās are completed in cultivation at these four stages, in that same order one, two, then one, two.

Treatise: When the bodhisattva is universally able to give away all things to all men, down to his eyes and marrow, and the relinquishing he practices proceeds from compassion alone, and not from seeking for himself an excellent birth to come — at this point the pāramitā of giving is completed in cultivation.

When the bodhisattva has the limbs of his body cut apart, and though he is not yet free of the greed of desire yet in his mind there is not the least resentment — at this point the two pāramitās of discipline and of patience are completed in cultivation.

When the bodhisattva was practicing with heroic vigor, he came upon the Tathāgata Tiṣya seated within a jeweled niche in the absorption of the fire element, his majestic radiance blazing beyond the ordinary; he gazed with single-hearted devotion and forgot even to set down his other foot, and thus for seven days and nights, without the least slackening, with a purified mind he praised that Buddha in an excellent gāthā, saying:

Quoted stanza: In heaven above and on earth below, in the hall of much hearing of this world, and in the palaces of the departed, the abodes of the gods, and all places of the ten directions, there is none that can compare; great man, bull among men, great śramaṇa — searching through the whole earth and the mountain forests, there is none that can be your equal.

Treatise: Having praised him thus, he thereupon leapt over nine aeons — at this point the pāramitā of vigor is completed in cultivation.

When the bodhisattva was upon the seat of vajra, about to mount to unsurpassed perfect awakening, and abode before unsurpassed awakening in the vajra-like concentration — at this point the two pāramitās of absorption and of discernment are completed in cultivation.

Because they are able to reach the far shore of the fullness of virtue toward which they go, these six are called “pāramitā” (gone to the far shore).

Treatise (taking up · citing a sūtra and raising a question): The sūtras say that there are three bases of meritorious action: first the basis of meritorious action of the class of giving, second the basis of meritorious action of the class of discipline, third the basis of meritorious action of the class of cultivation. Why are these three given the name “basis of meritorious action”? The stanza says:

〔Root 116〕Why the Three Classes of Giving, Discipline, and Cultivation Are Called Bases of Meritorious Action

Stanza: The three classes of giving, discipline, and cultivation receive the names “merit,” “action,” and “basis” each according to what fits it, and the differences among them are as with the ten paths of action.

Treatise: These three classes are all “merit”; among them some are “action” and some are “basis,” each according to what fits it, as was said of the ten paths of action.

That is to say: just as in analyzing the ten paths of action some are both action and path while some are path and not action, so it is here as well — some are merit and action and basis; some are merit and action but not basis; some are merit and basis but not action; and some are merit alone, neither action nor basis.

Now with regard to the class of giving: the two actions of body and speech are furnished with all three senses of the names “merit, action, basis”; the volition that can raise them is called only “merit and action”; and the remaining dharmas arising together with that volition receive only the name of “merit.”

The class of discipline, being of the nature of bodily and verbal action alone, is in all its parts furnished with the three names “merit, action, basis.”

Within the class of cultivation, loving-kindness is called only “merit and basis,” for it is the basis upon which action depends. The volition associated with loving-kindness is done with loving-kindness as its gate; the volition arising together with loving-kindness and the discipline arising together with loving-kindness — these two are called only “merit and action”; and the remaining coexistent dharmas receive only the name of “merit.”

Treatise (another way of reading): Or else it is said that the name “meritorious action” displays the sense of “doing merit” — that is, the preparation for merit; while “basis” displays the support, that is, that giving, discipline, and cultivation are the basis upon which meritorious action depends, and it is in order to accomplish these three that the preparation for merit is raised.

Treatise (recording another account): And there is an account: only “volition” is truly meritorious action; and what is called the “basis” of meritorious action is giving, discipline, and cultivation, because meritorious action proceeds by way of these three as its gate.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): What dharma is called “giving”? And what result does giving draw down? The stanza says:

〔Root 117〕What the Entity of Giving Is · What Result It Draws Down

Stanza: By this is the name “giving” established; that is, for the sake of offering and for the sake of benefit; it is the two actions of body and speech together with that which can raise them; and this draws down the result of great wealth.

Treatise: Although the goods relinquished may also be called “giving,” yet here it is “the equipment by which one is able to relinquish” that is named giving — for it is by this equipment that the act of relinquishing is accomplished, and so “that by which one relinquishes” is the true entity of giving.

Treatise (a distinction): Or else, out of fear, out of hope, out of greed and the like, the act of relinquishing is accomplished just the same (that too is relinquishing, and yet it is not the giving spoken of here); what is meant here is not those, and it is in order to mark them off that it says “for the sake of offering, for the sake of benefit.”

That is to say: it is when there is a relinquishing for the sake of offering to and benefiting others that this equipment is named giving.

Treatise (asking himself · answering himself): What is called the “equipment”? Answer: it is bodily action and verbal action, together with that which can raise this bodily and verbal action.

Treatise (asking himself · answering himself): And what is called “that which can raise”? Answer: it is that mind and mental factor which, associated with non-greed, is able to give rise to this collection. As there is a stanza that says:

Quoted stanza: If a man with a purified mind stints himself and practices giving, the wholesome aggregates of this one moment, taken together, are established under the name of “giving.”

Treatise: It should be known that a basis of meritorious action of the class of giving such as this can draw down as its result great wealth in the life to come and in the present. What is called “the merit of the class of giving” displays the sense of having giving for its entity, just as one says “a vessel of the class of leaves” (a vessel made of leaves) or “a hut of the class of grass” (a hut thatched with grass). The manner of speaking of the class of discipline and the class of cultivation may be understood on the same pattern.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): For whose benefit is giving practiced? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 118〕The Four Alternatives of for Oneself · for Another · for Both · for Neither

Stanza: For the benefit of oneself, for the benefit of another, for the benefit of both, and not for the benefit of either — such are the four kinds of practicing giving.

Treatise: Here, when all those classes of ordinary beings, whether not yet free of the greed of desire or already free of it, take what is their own and make an offering to a caitya (a stūpa of the Buddha), this giving is called “only for one’s own benefit,” because others do not thereby obtain any benefit.

If the noble ones who are already free of the greed of desire give to sentient beings (excepting action to be experienced in the present life), this giving is called “only for the benefit of another,” because others obtain benefit thereby, while he himself does not gain benefit from it — for he has already passed beyond that stage of fruition.

If all those classes of ordinary beings, whether not yet free of the greed of desire or already free of it, take what is their own and give it to sentient beings, this giving is called “for the benefit of both.”

If those noble ones already free of the greed of desire make an offering to a caitya (excepting action to be experienced in the present life), this giving is called “not for the benefit of either,” because this is only out of reverence and requital of kindness.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): Above it has been said in general that giving draws down great wealth; now the particular causes of the differences in the result of giving should next be adjudged. The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 118〕The Three Causes of the Differences in the Result of Giving

Stanza: By differences in the donor, in the goods given, and in the field given to, the result of giving has differences.

Treatise: That giving has differences is by three causes, namely that the donor, the goods, and the field have differences; and giving having differences, the result therefore has differences.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): Now what is the difference by way of the donor? The stanza says:

〔Root 119〕The Donor’s Four Virtues and Four Results

Stanza: The donor’s difference lies in the virtues of faith and the rest; practicing the four kinds of giving, with reverence and the rest, he obtains the four results of being honored, of wide affection, of timeliness, and of what is hard to take away.

Treatise: Because the donor is accomplished in the several distinguishing virtues of faith, discipline, learning, and the rest, he is called “differing as donor”; the donor differing, the giving becomes different; the giving differing, the result drawn down likewise differs.

Whenever a donor is furnished with such virtues and can lawfully practice the four kinds of giving, with reverence and the rest, he obtains in that same order the four results of being honored and the rest.

That is to say: if a donor practices giving with reverence (giving most reverently), he obtains being constantly honored by others.

If he gives with his own hand, he obtains delight in the use of vast wealth.

If he gives in due season (giving just when a man is in need), he obtains wealth in due season, so that what he needs arrives in due season and does not come too late.

If he gives without injury (giving without troubling others), he obtains resources not encroached upon by others and not destroyed by water, fire, and the rest.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): What is the difference by way of the goods given? The stanza says:

〔Root 120〕The Goods Given and the Four Results Drawn Down

Stanza: The difference of the goods lies in the four sense-objects, visible form and the rest; thereby one obtains excellent form, a good name, being loved by the multitude, and a supple body, together with touches that give rise to pleasure in due season.

Treatise: According as the goods given lack or are complete in the four, visible form, scent, taste, and touch, one accordingly obtains, in that same order, results lacking or complete in excellent form and the rest.

That is to say: the visible form of the goods given being complete, one obtains excellent form.

Scent being complete, one obtains a good name — as fragrance spreads its perfume through all quarters.

Taste being complete, one obtains being loved by the multitude — as a fine savor is loved by all.

Touch being complete, one obtains a supple body, and touches that give rise to pleasant feeling in due season — as with the jewel of women and the rest.

That the result is diminished is because the cause was lacking. In this way too, according as visible form, scent, and the rest are complete or not complete, it is called “differing as goods”; the goods differing, both the entity of the giving and its result have differences.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): What is the difference by way of the field given to? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 121〕The Four Differences of the Field Given To

Stanza: The difference of the field lies in the differences of destiny, suffering, kindness, and virtue.

Treatise: Because the field given to has differences in destiny, suffering, kindness, and virtue, it is called “differing as field”; the field differing, the result of giving is distinguished.

With regard to the difference of destiny: as the World-Honored One said, if one gives to an animal, one obtains a hundredfold result; if one gives to a man who has broken discipline, one obtains a thousandfold result.

With regard to the difference of suffering: as among the seven bases of meritorious action that have a support, it is first said that one should give to travelers, to the sick and their nurses, and give groves, regular food, and further food in due season as needed against cold, wind, and heat; and afterwards it is said that if there be men and women furnished with pure faith who accomplish these seven bases of meritorious action that have a support as here set out, the merit they obtain is beyond all measuring.

With regard to the difference of kindness: such as father and mother, teachers and elders, and others who have shown one kindness. Such as bears, deer, and the like — the birth stories speak of the several kinds that have shown kindness.

With regard to the difference of virtue: as a sūtra says, if one gives to a man who keeps discipline, one obtains a hundred-millionfold result, and so on.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): Among the several merits of giving, which is most excellent? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 121〕The Most Excellent Giving

Stanza: One free of defilement giving to one free of defilement is excellent; the giving of a bodhisattva is also excellent; and among the eight kinds of giving the eighth is most excellent.

Treatise: The Bhagavat said: if one free of defilement gives the several resources to one free of defilement, this is the most excellent among gifts of goods.

As for the giving practiced by the bodhisattvas, it is the cause of universally benefiting and gladdening the several sentient beings; though it is not called “the freed giving to the freed,” yet among merits of giving it too is most excellent.

Besides these, among the eight kinds of giving the merit of the eighth kind of giving is likewise most excellent.

What are the eight kinds of giving? First, giving to whoever comes; second, giving out of fear; third, giving in return for kindness; fourth, giving in hope of return; fifth, giving after the custom of forebears; sixth, giving in hope of heaven; seventh, giving to secure a name; and eighth, the giving practiced in order to adorn one’s own mind, in order to support one’s own mind, in order to further the practice of yoga, and in order to gain the higher sense.

As for giving to whoever comes, the masters of old say: it is giving to one who has drawn near to oneself (giving to whoever arrives before one).

As for giving out of fear, it means that seeing before one the marks of this wealth’s destruction, one would rather give it out than lose it for nothing.

As for giving after the custom of forebears, it means practicing giving in continuation of the household usage of one’s fathers and ancestors.

The remaining several kinds are easy to understand, and so they are not separately explained.

Treatise (citing a sūtra and raising a question): As a sūtra says: giving to one on the way to the fruit of stream-entry, the retribution is measureless; giving to one who has the fruit of stream-entry, the measure of the result increases further; and so on at length. Is there then a case in which the one given to is not a noble one and yet the retribution is likewise measureless? The stanza says:

〔Root 122〕Five Fields Where, Though They Are Not Noble Ones, the Result of Giving Is Measureless

Stanza: Father, mother, the sick, one who preaches the Dharma, and a bodhisattva of the last birth — even if they are not men who have realized the noble fruits, giving to them the retribution is measureless.

Treatise: These five, even if they are ordinary beings, yet by giving to them one can draw down a measureless result.

One who abides in his final existence is called “of the last birth.”

Treatise (posing a question to himself · answering himself): To which of the four fields does one who preaches the Dharma belong? Answer: he is gathered under the field of kindness.

Treatise (asking himself · answering himself): Why so? Answer: because he is the great good friend of the several worlds; because he can give the eye of discernment to those blinded by ignorance; because he opens out for the world what is safe and what is perilous; because he can cause sentient beings to give rise to the Dharma body without outflows. In brief, a Dharma master who preaches well can do even what a Buddha does, and so giving to him draws down a measureless result.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): One who wishes to know the marks of lightness and heaviness in the several actions should know that lightness and heaviness are broadly by six causes. What are these six? The stanza says:

〔Root 123〕The Lightness or Heaviness of an Action Is by Six Causes

Stanza: The after-effect, the field, the root, the preparation, the volition, and the intent — by these six being lower or higher, an action becomes of the lower or the higher grade.

Treatise: What is called the after-effect means that having done it one goes on to do it again.

What is called the field means doing harm or doing benefit to that object.

What is called the root means the root path of action itself.

What is called the preparation means the portion that raises that bodily or verbal act.

What is called the volition means that by which the path of action reaches its end.

What is called the intent means whatever inclination of purpose there is — “I ought to do such and such,” “I shall do such and such.”

Some actions become of the heavy grade only by the after-effect taking hold of them, because the after-effect settles and establishes their maturation result.

Some actions become heavy by the field.

Some actions, upon one and the same field, become heavy by the force of the root and not by the rest. As killing upon the field of one’s father or mother is a heavy offense (constituting a deed of immediate retribution); whereas stealing and the like committed against one’s father or mother do not constitute such a heavy offense. As for those that become heavy by the rest (the preparation, the volition, and the intent), reason them out on this same principle.

If all six causes are of the higher grade, this action is heaviest; the reverse of this is lightest; and what lies between these is neither the lightest nor the heaviest.

Treatise (citing a sūtra and raising a question): As a sūtra says: there are two kinds of action, first action that is done, second action that is increased. For what cause is one kind of action called “increased”? By five causes. What are the five? The stanza says:

〔Root 124〕The Five Causes of Increased Action

Stanza: By deliberation, by completeness, by the absence of regret and of counteraction, by having companions, and by maturation — this action is called increased.

Treatise: What is called “by deliberation” means that the action he does is neither done wholly without prior thought, nor done upon a sudden thought.

What is called “by completeness” means that among sentient beings some fall into an evil destiny by one evil practice and some only by three; some fall into an evil destiny by one path of action and some only by ten. Here, if a man’s action done is already of this measure such that he should fall into an evil destiny, then so long as it is not yet complete it is called only “done” and is not called “increased”; and only when it is already complete does it also obtain the name “increased.”

What is called “by the absence of regret and of counteraction” means that there is no remorse, and no act that counteracts this action.

What is called “by having companions” means that in doing an unwholesome action there are further unwholesome dharmas as its helpers.

What is called “by maturation” means that it is fixed to give a maturation result. As for wholesome actions, the reverse may be known in the same way.

The several actions that differ from these are called only “done,” as was explained above.

Treatise (taking up what precedes · posing a question to himself): When those not yet free of desire and the rest take what is their own and make an offering to a caitya, this giving is called “only for one’s own benefit.” Since there is no recipient, how is the merit accomplished? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 125〕Giving to a Caitya Is Merit of the Class of Relinquishing

Stanza: What is practiced toward a caitya is merit of the class of relinquishing; as with cultivating loving-kindness and the rest, where there is no recipient it becomes merit just the same.

Treatise: Merit is of two classes, first the class of relinquishing, second the class of enjoyment.

What is called merit of the class of relinquishing means that with a wholesome mind one need only relinquish resources, and the merit of giving arises at once.

What is called merit of the class of enjoyment means that the field given to must make use of the thing given, and only then does the merit of giving arise.

In the offerings presented at the place of a caitya, although there is no merit of the class of enjoyment, yet there is merit of the class of relinquishing.

Treatise (the outsider asks · the author asks back · the outsider answers · the author refutes): (The outsider asks:) Since he does not receive it, from what does the merit arise? (The author asks back:) And on what ground do you know that “the arising of merit must be by his receiving, and where there is no receiving it does not arise”? (The outsider answers:) Because not being received by another, there is no function of gathering in benefit for another. (The author refutes:) This is no decisive proof — if merit must be accomplished by the gathering in of benefit for another, then cultivating loving-kindness and the rest, or cultivating right view and the rest, ought not to give rise to merit.

Therefore it should be granted that in making offerings to a caitya much merit arises, as in cultivating loving-kindness and the rest. That is to say: suppose a man cultivates the absorption of loving-kindness and the rest; although there is no recipient and no gathering in of benefit for another, yet from his own mind measureless merit arises.

In this same way, though a man of virtue has passed away and is gone by, yet in recalling him and extending reverence and offerings, merit arises from one’s own mind.

Treatise (an outsider challenges · the author answers): Is it not then the case that the goods given and the act of reverence in body and speech are thrown away for nothing? Answer: it is not so — for the mind that raises this act is what is excellent. That is to say: suppose a man wishes to harm an enemy; though that enemy’s life has already ended, yet in his mind he still bears the thought of enmity and raises the several evil actions of body and speech, producing much demerit, and not merely raising a thought of mind. In the same way, though the Great Master has already gone by, yet in recalling him and extending reverence and offerings one raises bodily and verbal action, and only so does much merit arise, and not merely by raising a thought of mind.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): If one sows the seed of the act of giving in a good field, one may draw down a lovely result; but if it be in a bad field, then though one gives one ought to draw down only an unlovely result. Answer: this ought not to be so. Why? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 125〕Even a Bad Field Has a Lovely Result

Stanza: Even a bad field has a lovely result, because between seed and fruit there is no inversion.

Treatise: It may plainly be seen that in a field seed and fruit are not inverted — from the seed of the madhuka arises the fruit of the madhuka, and its taste is exceedingly sweet; from the seed of the nimba arises the fruit of the nimba, and its taste is exceedingly bitter. It is not by the power of the field that seed and fruit are inverted.

In this same way, though the donor be in a bad field, yet sowing the several seeds of giving with a mind to benefit others, he draws down only a lovely result and does not draw down an unlovely one. Yet by the fault of the field, the seed sown may bear little fruit or no fruit at all.

Treatise (taking up): The incidental discussion of the basis of meritorious action of the class of giving is finished; now the basis of meritorious action of the class of discipline should next be adjudged. The stanza says:

〔Root 126〕The Entity of Discipline and the Four Virtues of Purity

Stanza: Keeping away from the breaking of discipline and from what is prohibited is called discipline, and each is of two kinds; not being destroyed by the breaking of discipline or by its causes, being founded on counteraction and founded on cessation, is called purity and the rest.

Treatise: The several unwholesome forms are called “breaking discipline,” and among them the offenses by nature (those that are evil in themselves) are given the name “breaking discipline.”

What is called “what is prohibited” means eating at the wrong time and the rest that are prohibited; these, though not offenses by nature, yet were prohibited by the Buddha with a further purpose, for the protection of the Dharma and of sentient beings; and one who has taken the precepts and transgresses them is also called one who breaks discipline. It is in order to mark them off from the offenses by nature that they are given only the name “prohibited.”

Keeping away from the offenses by nature and from the offenses by prohibition is in both cases called “discipline.” Each of these is of two kinds, namely manifest action and nonmanifest action, since both have bodily and verbal action for their own nature.

The above has briefly adjudged the differences in the own-nature of discipline.

If it is furnished with four virtues, it obtains the name “pure”; what is contrary to this is called not pure.

The four virtues so called are: first, not being destroyed by the breaking of discipline — the breaking of discipline being the several unwholesome forms spoken of above. Second, not being destroyed by the causes of the breaking of discipline — those causes being greed and the rest, the afflictions and the secondary afflictions. Third, being founded on counteraction — that is, founded on the foundations of mindfulness and the rest, which can counteract the breaking of discipline and its causes. Fourth, being founded on cessation — that is, founded on nirvāṇa and turned toward nirvāṇa, and not for the sake of an excellent birth to come.

The word “and the rest” in the stanza is to display that there are further divergent accounts.

Treatise (the first divergent account): There is an account: the purity of discipline is by five causes — first purity of the root, second purity of the retinue, third not being injured by applied thought, fourth being taken up by right mindfulness, fifth being turned toward the quiescent.

Treatise (the second divergent account): There is another master who says: discipline is of four kinds — first, discipline out of fear, that is, fearing that one cannot keep alive, fearing an evil name, fearing punishment, fearing the evil destinies, and therefore taking up and guarding śīla. Second, discipline out of hope, that is, coveting an excellent station among the several existences, abundant goods, reverence, and praise, and therefore taking up pure discipline. Third, discipline conducive to the factors of awakening, that is, taking up pure discipline for the sake of seeking liberation and right view and the rest. Fourth, pure discipline, that is, discipline without outflows, which is able forever to part one from the grime of action and affliction.

Treatise (taking up): The class of discipline having been adjudged, the class of cultivation should next be adjudged. The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 127〕The Wholesome of Equipoise Is Called “Cultivation”

Stanza: The wholesome at the stage of equipoise is called “cultivation,” because it is supremely able to perfume the mind.

Treatise (asking himself · answering himself): As for what is called “the wholesome of equipoise,” what is its entity? Answer: it is the own-nature of concentration together with the dharmas coexistent with it.

Treatise (asking himself · answering himself): What does the name “cultivation” mean? Answer: it means perfuming the mind — since the wholesome of the concentrated stage is supremely able to perfume within the continuum of mind and to make it a thing of virtue, as flowers perfume sesame (set flowers and sesame together, and the sesame takes on the fragrance of the flowers). Therefore this alone is named “cultivation.”

Treatise (taking up and asking again): Above it was adjudged that the merit of giving can draw down great wealth; what then do the two classes of discipline and cultivation draw down? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 127〕Discipline Draws Down Birth in Heaven · Cultivation Draws Down Liberation

Stanza: Discipline and cultivation are spoken of with regard to what is more excellent in each, in that same order drawing down birth in heaven and liberation.

Treatise: Discipline draws down birth in heaven; cultivation draws down liberation.

That the stanza says the word “excellent” is to display that this is said with regard to the more excellent side — for giving too can draw down the result of birth in heaven, and it is only with regard to the more excellent that discipline is spoken of; and keeping discipline too can draw down the result of release from bondage, and it is only with regard to the more excellent that cultivation is spoken of.

Treatise (citing a sūtra and raising a question): A sūtra says that four men are able to produce the merit of Brahmā: first, one who, in order to make offerings to the relics of a Tathāgata, erects a stūpa in a place where none has been before; second, one who, in order to make offerings to the Saṅgha of the four quarters, builds a monastery, gives a garden, and supplies the four requisites; third, a disciple of the Buddha who brings back into concord a body of monks that has been split; and fourth, one who universally cultivates loving-kindness and the rest toward sentient beings. What then is the measure of this merit of Brahmā? The stanza says:

〔First Half of Root 128〕Two Accounts of the Measure of the Merit of Brahmā

Stanza: The merit able to draw down one aeon of birth in heaven and the rest is one measure of the merit of Brahmā.

Treatise (the first account): The preceptors of former times say thus: the merit that can draw down one aeon of birth in heaven and the enjoyment of every pleasure — this is one measure of merit; because the time of enjoying pleasure that he draws down is as long as the aeon-lifespan of the Brahmapurohita gods. Therefore among another school there is a gāthā that says:

Quoted stanza: A man of faith and furnished with right view, if he cultivates the ten excellent practices, thereby produces the merit of Brahmā and can draw down one aeon of heavenly pleasure.

Treatise (the second account): The Vibhāṣā masters say thus: it is the same as the measure of merit adjudged above in the analysis of the action producing the excellent marks.

The word “and the rest” in the stanza is precisely to display divergent accounts such as these.

Treatise (taking up): The giving of goods has been spoken of; what then of the giving of Dharma? The stanza says:

〔Second Half of Root 128〕The Giving of Dharma

Stanza: The giving of Dharma means expounding the sūtras and the rest in accordance with the real and with an undefiled mind.

Treatise: If one is able, in accordance with the real, to expound the sūtras and the rest for the several sentient beings with an undefiled mind so that they give rise to right understanding, this is named the giving of Dharma. Therefore those who expound invertedly, or with a defiled mind for the sake of gain, reputation, and reverence — such men on the contrary injure the great merit of themselves and of others.

Treatise (taking up): The three bases of meritorious action have been separately explained above; now the “three conducive wholesome things” spoken of in the sūtras are explained. The stanza says:

〔Root 129〕Conducive to Merit · Conducive to Liberation · Conducive to Penetration

Stanza: The three, conducive to merit, conducive to liberation, and conducive to penetration, draw down in that same order the wholesome of lovely results, of nirvāṇa, and of the noble path.

Treatise: What is called conducive to merit means the wholesome that can draw down the lovely retribution of the world.

What is called conducive to liberation means the wholesome that is fixed to draw down the result that is nirvāṇa. Once this wholesome has arisen, it makes that sentient being one who is called a man “having the dharma of nirvāṇa within his body.” If a man, on hearing that birth and death have fault, that dharmas are without self, that nirvāṇa has virtue, has the hairs of his body stand up and weeps and sheds tears, it should be known that he has already sown the wholesome conducive to liberation — as when one sees a sprout come up in a rain-soaked field, one knows that in the ground there was a seed before.

What is called conducive to penetration means the wholesome that nearly draws down the retribution that is the result of the noble path, that is, the four stages of warmth and the rest (warmth, the summit, receptivity, and the highest worldly dharma), which will be explained at length further on.

Treatise (taking up and asking again): As for the writing, seals, calculation, letters, and numbers spoken of in the world, how should the own-entity of these five be understood? The stanza says:

〔Root 130〕The Own-Entity of Writing, Seals, Calculation, Letters, and Numbers

Stanza: Whatever three actions are raised in accordance with principle, together with that which raises them, are in that same order the own-entity of writing, seals, calculation, letters, and numbers.

Treatise: What is called “raised in accordance with principle” means arising from a right preparation.

What are called the three actions should be known to be bodily action, verbal action, and mental action.

What is called “that which raises” is that which can give rise to these three actions, namely feeling, perception, and the rest according to what fits each.

Here writing and seals have the bodily action spoken of above together with the five aggregates that raise it for their entity; next calculation and letters have the verbal action spoken of above together with the five aggregates that raise it for their entity; and last, numbers should be known to have the mental action spoken of above together with the four aggregates that raise it for their entity, because it is by mental volition alone that dharmas can be counted.

Treatise (taking up): Now the divergent names of dharmas should be briefly adjudged. The stanza says:

〔Root 131〕The Divergent Names of Dharmas — Excellent · Inferior · To Be Practiced · Unsurpassed

Stanza: What is wholesome and without outflows is named “excellent”; what is defiled is named “blameworthy,” “obscured,” and “inferior”; what is wholesome and conditioned is named “to be practiced”; and liberation is named “unsurpassed.”

Treatise: Wholesome dharmas without outflows are also named “excellent.”

The several defiled dharmas are also named “blameworthy,” “obscured,” and “inferior.” By comparison with this “excellent” and this “inferior,” the remaining middle class is established of itself, and so the stanza does not adjudge it again.

The several conditioned wholesome dharmas are also named “to be practiced”; and that the rest are not to be practiced is established of itself by inference from the sense.

Treatise (posing a question to himself · answering himself): Why are unconditioned dharmas not named “to be practiced”? Answer: because they cannot be practiced again and again so as to be increased. And further, because “practice” is for the sake of seeking a result, and unconditioned dharmas have no result.

Liberation, nirvāṇa, is also named “unsurpassed,” because there is no single dharma that can surpass nirvāṇa — it being wholesome and permanent and passing beyond the host of dharmas. All the remaining dharmas have something above them, which is established of itself by inference from the sense.