十二門論 白話全本

Translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: the “Table of Gates” and “Preface” at the beginning of the Twelve Gate Treatise, Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

A. Table of Gates—A Gate-by-Gate Synopsis of the Twelve Gates

The fascicle begins by listing the names of the Twelve Gates. Beneath each name, a short line explains what that gate investigates and why it is called a gate.

Gate One: Examination of Causes and Conditions

〔T30 0159a05〕 The causes upon which the myriad dharmas depend appear each to possess their own intrinsic nature. Investigated and brought into communication, they in fact possess no intrinsic nature of themselves. Because this can be penetrated without obstruction, it is called a gate.

Gate Two: Examination of an Existing or Nonexisting Effect

The dharma lacking intrinsic nature is investigated again: does it arise after previously existing, or arise after previously not existing? Whether existent or nonexistent, no arising can be obtained. This is therefore made a gate.

Gate Three: Examination of Conditions

The preceding gate investigates the cause; this gate investigates conditions. Whether the four conditions are treated broadly or in summary, no effect can be obtained. This is therefore made a gate.

Gate Four: Examination of Marks

The preceding three gates investigate causes and conditions and thereby know the absence of arising. This gate investigates the three marks. Since the three marks do not exist, this is therefore made a gate.

Gate Five: Examination of What Has Marks and What Lacks Marks

This gate investigates the actuality of the three marks: does a mark mark what already has marks, or mark what originally lacks them? A mark does not mark either what has or what lacks marks. This is therefore made a gate.

Gate Six: Examination of Identity and Difference

Taking what has and lacks marks further, are mark and what is marked found within the same dharma or in different dharmas? They are neither identical nor different. This is therefore made a gate.

Gate Seven: Examination of Existence and Nonexistence

The preceding gate investigates and knows that the three marks are not marks. This gate shows that the four marks are likewise not. Do arising and abiding possess alteration or lack alteration? They cannot exist in one place, nor do they exist in different places. This is therefore made a gate.

Gate Eight: Examination of Nature

Having known existence and nonexistence, one next investigates the nature of dharmas. Whatever changes, is impermanent, and exists through conditions is not nature. This is therefore made a gate.

Gate Nine: Examination of Cause and Effect

Since dharmas lacking intrinsic nature possess no cause or effect, one seeks within alteration and finds no obtainable principle. This is therefore made a gate.

Gate Ten: Examination of the Agent

No cause and no effect means no action. Since the four places have all been searched without finding anything, this is therefore made a gate.

Gate Eleven: Examination of the Three Times

Having investigated and known the absence of action, one must exhaustively examine its cause. Thus, no action can be obtained when sought within the three times. This is therefore made a gate.

Gate Twelve: Examination of Arising

Action is what performs; arising is what emerges. Since neither exists within the three times, who could be the producer? This is therefore made a gate.

B. Preface

1. The Meaning of the Title

Broadly speaking, the work called the Twelve Gate Treatise is the centered balance of the real mark and an essential rule for the place of awakening.

The twelve gates are the great number gathering the many branches. A gate is a name for opening passage without obstruction. To treatise upon them is to exhaust their source and take their principle to its end.

2. What Follows If One Principle Is Not Exhausted and One Source Is Not Traced to Its End?

If one principle is not exhausted, the many divergent claims arise in confusion and lead to opposed orientations. If one source is not traced to its end, the many paths branch and spread and leave traces of different destinations.

That different destinations cannot be leveled and divergent orientations cannot be extinguished—this is precisely the great being’s concern.

3. The Occasion for Composing the Treatise

Therefore Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva opened the path by which those going forth might pass and composed the Twelve Gates to set it right.

Set right through the twelve, both existence and nonexistence pass freely and no matter remains unexhausted.

4. From the Exhaustion of Matters to Losing Self

When matters are exhausted within existence and nonexistence, accomplishment is forgotten within transformation. When principle reaches the utmost empty position, self is lost at the two limits of existence and nonexistence.

Thus, losing self lies in dropping the fish trap; forgetting the trap consists in abandoning what was entrusted to it. Only when trap and self are both forgotten can one be said to draw near the real.

Drawing near the real, empty and real merge in obscurity, and gain and loss possess no boundary. Merged without boundary, one can forget haste between the two mysteries and dissolve distress into unity, set the returning carriage in order at the place of awakening, and bring the mind’s orientation to completion in the ground of buddhahood.

5. Praise for the Treatise’s Function

Vast indeed! It can truly be said to wield a blade without thickness where no gap exists and sound a rare music within the cosmos; to rescue those drowning and lost at the mysterious ford and carry existence and nonexistence beyond their bounds.

Later students have truly met a fortunate time. The level road already lies open and the hidden path is already cleared. They can sound the carriage bells in the northern darkness, drive the white-ox cart southward in return, awaken to great awakening within a dream, and rest in return amid the hundred transformations.

One able to do this possesses wisdom and will also know that the sunlight stands at full brilliance and the mysterious earth has never grown faint.

6. The Preface Writer’s Own Account

Rui, with my shallow and contrary understanding, nevertheless dare with sincere intent to knock at the gate of the empty and mysterious and inwardly aspire to the ultimate aim. I only hope that my daily application may be fitting and that the work accumulated through the years may grow. How much more so those of beautiful ability! My reverence truly cannot contain itself.

Therefore I venture with dull words, straining to search my thoughts, to compose a preface that unfolds this treatise; and I have inscribed the titles and meanings of its gates at the beginning of the fascicle. Could this truly add anything? I merely hope that through this intention I may open for others a road of rapid progress.

Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “First Gate: Examination of Causes and Conditions,” composed by the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1568. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. Why the Treatise Was Composed

〔T30 0159c06〕The treatise author begins: I shall now briefly explain the meaning of the Mahāyāna—the Great Vehicle.

The questioner asks: What benefit is there in explaining the Mahāyāna?

The respondent says: The Mahāyāna is the exceedingly profound treasury of Dharma belonging to all buddhas of the ten directions and three times. It is taught for those of great merit and sharp faculties. Sentient beings in the final age have little merit and dull faculties. Although they seek out and read the scriptures, they cannot penetrate their meaning. Out of compassion for such people, I wish to enable them to understand and awaken. I also wish to spread and illuminate the Tathāgata’s unsurpassed great Dharma. I therefore explain the meaning of the Mahāyāna in brief.

The questioner asks: The Mahāyāna is measureless and boundless, beyond all calculation. The Buddha’s own words alone cannot exhaust it; how much less can one explain it and unfold its meaning at length?

The respondent says: Precisely for this reason, at the outset I said “briefly explain”—I offer only a concise explanation.

2. Why It Is Called Mahāyāna

The questioner asks: Why is it called Mahāyāna?

The respondent says: The Mahāyāna is above the two vehicles and is therefore called the Great Vehicle.

Again, the buddhas are greatest, and this vehicle can reach them; therefore it is called great.

Again, great persons—the buddhas—ride this vehicle; therefore it is called great.

Again, this vehicle can extinguish the great suffering of sentient beings and bestow great benefit upon them; therefore it is called great.

Again, great beings such as the bodhisattvas Avalokiteśvara, Mahāsthāmaprāpta, Mañjuśrī, and Maitreya all ride this vehicle; therefore it is called great.

Again, because this vehicle can reach the utmost limit and depth of all dharmas, it is called great.

Again, as the Buddha himself says in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, the meaning of the Mahāyāna is measureless and boundless. For these reasons, it is called great.

3. Its Deep Meaning, Broadly Distinguished, Is Emptiness

Broadly distinguished, its deep meaning is what is called emptiness. One who can penetrate this meaning penetrates the Mahāyāna, completes the six pāramitās, and meets no obstruction. Therefore I shall now explain only this emptiness.

To explain emptiness, one must enter its meaning through twelve gates.

4. The First Gate: Causes and Conditions

The first is the Gate of Causes and Conditions. It states:

　　Dharmas arising from a multitude of conditions are thereby without intrinsic nature;
　　if they lack intrinsic nature, how can one say that these dharmas exist?

5. Inner and Outer Causes and Conditions

Dharmas arising from a multitude of conditions are of two kinds: inner and outer. The multitude of conditions is likewise of two kinds: inner and outer.

Outer causes and conditions are such as these: a lump of clay, wheel, cord, potter, and other factors come together, and so a jar arises; threads, cord, loom, weaver, and other factors come together, and so cloth arises; leveling the ground, setting foundation and beams, and adding rafters, mud, thatch, human labor, and other factors together produce a house; a vessel holding curds, a drill and its turning, human labor, and other factors together produce clarified butter; seed, earth, water, fire, wind, space, season, human labor, and other factors together produce a sprout. One should understand that every other dharma arising from outer conditions is the same.

Inner causes and conditions are the twelve links: ignorance, volitional formations, consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense bases, contact, feeling, craving, clinging, existence, birth, and aging-and-death. Each first has its cause and only afterward arises.

Thus inner and outer dharmas alike arise from a multitude of conditions. Since they arise from a multitude of conditions, are they not thereby without intrinsic nature?

6. Intrinsic Nature, Other-Nature, and Both Together Cannot Be Obtained

〔T30 0160a09〕If a dharma has no intrinsic nature, neither does it have other-nature, nor a nature consisting of self and other together. Why? Because what is called other-nature is spoken of in dependence on an other, yet that other itself has no intrinsic nature.

If one says that a thing exists by virtue of other-nature, then a cow should exist through the nature of a horse, a horse through the nature of a cow, a pear through the nature of a crabapple, and a crabapple through the nature of a pear; everything else should be the same. Yet this plainly is not so.

If one says that it does not exist by virtue of other-nature but exists merely because of another, that too is incorrect. Why? If a mat exists because of rushes, then rushes and mat are one body and the rushes cannot be called other. But if the rushes are other in relation to the mat, then one cannot say the mat exists because of the rushes.

Moreover, the rushes themselves have no intrinsic nature. Why? Because the rushes too arise from a multitude of conditions and therefore lack intrinsic nature. Since they have no intrinsic nature, one cannot say the mat exists by virtue of the nature of the rushes. The mat therefore should not take the rushes as its own substance.

The same is true of jars, clarified butter, and every other dharma arising from outer causes and conditions: sought in this way, they cannot be obtained.

7. Inner Causes and Conditions Are Likewise Unobtainable: The Challenge from the Seventy Treatise

Dharmas arising from inner causes and conditions are likewise unobtainable when sought in this way. The treatise author cites the Seventy Treatise as evidence:

　　Dharmas of dependent arising are in truth non-arising; if one says they do arise,
　　do they exist in a single mind, or do they exist in many minds?

The dharmas of the twelve links of dependent origination are in truth themselves non-arising. If one says they arise, do they exist within a single mind or within many minds?

If they exist within a single mind, cause and effect arise together at the same time. But cause and effect existing simultaneously is untenable. Why? Because in every case a cause comes first and its effect afterward.

If they exist within many minds, the dharmas of the twelve links become individually separate and mutually different. Once the mind shared by the earlier group of links has ceased, what serves as the cause and condition for the later links? A ceased dharma is utterly nonexistent; how could it serve as a cause?

If one says that the dharmas of the twelve links already existed beforehand, neither placing them in one mind nor placing them in many minds is tenable.

8. Because the Multitude of Conditions Is Empty, All Conditioned Dharmas Are Empty

Therefore the multitude of conditions is empty. Since conditions are empty, dharmas arising from conditions are empty as well. One should therefore know that all conditioned dharmas are empty.

9. If Even Conditioned Dharmas Are Empty, How Much More the Self

Even conditioned dharmas are empty; how much more so the self?

It is only because there are such conditioned dharmas as the five aggregates, twelve sense bases, and eighteen elements that a self is spoken of—just as burning is spoken of because there is something combustible.

If the aggregates, sense bases, and elements are empty, no other dharma remains that could be called a self—just as without anything combustible, burning cannot be spoken of.

As a scripture says: “The Buddha told the bhikṣus, ‘Because of self there is what belongs to self; without self, there is nothing belonging to self.’”

10. Because Conditioned Dharmas Are Empty, the Unconditioned Dharma of Nirvāṇa Is Also Empty

Thus, because conditioned dharmas are empty, one should know that the unconditioned dharma of nirvāṇa is also empty.

Why? When these five aggregates cease and no further five aggregates arise, this is called nirvāṇa. Yet the five aggregates are originally empty in themselves. What, then, is extinguished such that it is called nirvāṇa?

Moreover, the self is empty as well. Who, then, attains nirvāṇa?

Furthermore, the non-arising dharma is called nirvāṇa. If arisen dharmas could be established, the non-arising dharma should thereby be established. Yet arisen dharmas are not established—the reasons have already been explained and will be explained again below. Therefore arisen dharmas are not established.

It is in dependence on arisen dharmas that non-arising is named. If arisen dharmas are not established, how can the non-arising dharma be established?

11. Conclusion

Therefore conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and the self are all empty.

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of an Existing or Nonexisting Effect, Gate Two,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. The Opening Verse

〔T30 0160b17〕 Next, every dharma is unarisen. Why?

  If the effect already exists in the cause, it does not arise; if previously absent in the cause, it does not arise;   if said to be both existent and nonexistent, it likewise does not arise—who, then, could be something that arises?

If the effect already exists in the cause, one should not say it arises. If it was previously absent in the cause, one likewise should not say it arises. If it is said both to exist and not exist in the cause, one still should not say it arises.

2. The First Difficulty for Prior Existence and Arising: An Endless Process

Why? If the effect already exists in the cause and is nevertheless said to arise, the process becomes endless.

For example, suppose this effect was previously unarisen and has now arisen. Now that it has arisen, it should arise again. Why? Because on your account the effect is permanently present in the cause. Since that existent aspect remains, it should arise again. After it arises again, the existent aspect still remains and it should arise yet again. There would be no end.

If you revise your claim and say that what has already arisen does not arise again, while only the unarisen arises, then no coherent principle of arising can be stated here. Therefore the claim that what already exists arises is untenable.

3. One Effect Cannot Be Half Arising and Half Not Arising

Furthermore, suppose you say the effect already exists in the cause, yet claim that the part not yet arisen must arise while the part already arisen does not. This too is wrong. On your account, both parts equally exist beforehand. Though equally existent, one would arise and the other not; there is no such principle.

4. Arisen and Unarisen Are Opposed

Furthermore, if you say that while unarisen it determinately exists, then after arising it should be nonexistent. Why? Arisen and unarisen contradict one another; because they contradict one another, the active marks they bear also contradict one another.

Furthermore, existence contradicts nonexistence and nonexistence contradicts existence. If it exists both after arising and while still unarisen, arisen and unarisen should not differ. Why? If arising truly exists, yet what has arisen exists and what has not arisen also exists, what difference remains between arisen and unarisen? The claim that they do not differ is untenable. Therefore what already exists does not arise.

5. Already Existent and Accomplished—What Use Is Further Arising?

Furthermore, what previously exists is already accomplished. Why should it arise again? What has been done should not be done again, and what has been accomplished should not be accomplished again. Therefore an existent dharma should not be said to arise.

6. The Jar in the Clay Should Be Visible

Furthermore, if that existent thing can arise, then before it arises the effect should be visible in the cause; in fact, it is not. A jar in a lump of clay or a mat in reeds should be visible, yet in fact neither is. Therefore what already exists does not arise.

7. The Challenge “It Is Unseen Because It Has Not Changed,” and Its Refutation

The questioner says: The effect already exists, but it cannot be seen because it has not yet undergone transformation.

The answerer says:

If you say that before the jar arises its entity has not yet changed and therefore cannot be seen, then by what mark do you know and say that a jar already exists in the clay? Do you say the jar exists on the basis of a jar’s mark, or on the basis of the mark of a cow or horse? If the clay has no mark of a jar, it equally has no mark of a cow or horse. When there is no mark at all, is that not called nonexistence? Thus the claim that an effect already exists in the cause and then arises is untenable.

Furthermore, if the transformation itself is the effect, then that transformation should already exist in the cause. Why? Because in your teaching the effect already exists in the cause. Since jars and the rest already exist, their transformation already exists too and should be visible; in fact, it cannot be found. Therefore the claim that it is unseen because it has not yet changed is untenable.

If you say that before transformation it is not called an effect, then the effect can never be found. Why? Since this transformation was previously absent, it should also be absent afterward; therefore such effects as jars can never be found.

If you say that it becomes the effect only after transformation, then the effect was previously absent in the cause. Your claim is thereby unstable: at one time you say the effect already exists in the cause, at another that it was previously absent.

8. Eight Ways Something May Exist Yet Remain Unknown

The questioner says: Transformation already exists but simply cannot be seen. Things may indeed exist yet remain unfindable to a person.

Some are unknowable because too near, some because too far, some because a faculty is damaged, some because the mind does not attend, some because an obstruction intervenes, some because they are the same as their location, some because a stronger thing overwhelms them, and some because they are too minute.

What is too near and unknowable is like medicine placed in the eye. What is too far is like a bird soaring high in the sky and disappearing into the distance. Damage to a faculty is like a blind person unable to see color, a deaf person unable to hear sound, one with a blocked nose unable to smell, one with an impaired tongue unable to taste, one with a numb body unable to feel touch, or one with a deranged mind unable to know reality. Inattention is like a mind fixed on form and therefore not knowing sound. Obstruction is like earth covering the great waters beneath it or a wall blocking objects beyond it. Sameness is like a dot of ink upon black. Being overwhelmed by something stronger is like failing to hear a faint brushing sound while bells and drums are sounding. Minuteness is like motes that do not appear.

In these ways, dharmas may exist yet remain unknown because of eight conditions. Therefore your claim that transformation in the cause cannot be found and jars and the rest cannot be found is untenable. Why? These things exist but are unapprehended only because of the eight conditions.

9. Each of the Eight Is Turned Back

〔T30 0161a10〕 The answerer says:

Transformation and such effects as jars are not unapprehended in the same manner as the eight conditions. Why?

If transformation and such effects as jars are unapprehended because extremely near, they should be apprehended from slightly farther away. If because extremely far, they should be apprehended from slightly nearer. If because a faculty is damaged, they should be apprehended by one whose faculties are sound. If because the mind does not attend, they should be apprehended when it attends. If because of obstruction, transformation and the jar should be apprehended when unobstructed. If because they are the same as their location, they should be apprehended at another time. If because a stronger thing overwhelms them, they should be apprehended when the stronger thing ceases. If because too minute, such effects as jars are coarse and should be apprehended.

Moreover, if the jar is unapprehended because minute, it should remain unapprehended after arising. Why? In your teaching, it has the same minute mark before and after arising, and it determinately exists both before and after arising.

10. Revising the Claim to “Minute before Arising, Coarse after Arising” Also Fails

The questioner says: Before arising it is minute; after arising it becomes coarse. Therefore it can be apprehended after arising but not before.

The answerer says:

If so, the effect is absent in the cause. Why? Because the coarse is absent from the cause.

Furthermore, since the coarse was previously absent from the cause—if the coarse already existed there, one should not call it minute and say it is unapprehended because minute. The present effect is coarse, but you say it was unapprehended because minute; then this coarse thing is not called the effect. Consequently the present effect should never be apprehended, yet in fact the effect is apprehended. Therefore it is not unapprehended because minute.

Thus the claim that an effect already exists in the cause but is unapprehended because of the eight conditions is untenable.

11. The Marks of Both Cause and Effect Collapse

Furthermore, if an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises, the cause loses the mark of cause and the effect loses the mark of effect. Why? If cloth is in threads or fruit in a vessel, that is merely a place of residence and cannot be called a cause. Why? Threads are not cloth and a vessel is not the cause of fruit.

If the cause collapses, the effect collapses as well. Therefore threads and the rest are not the causes of cloth and the rest. Because there is no cause, there is no effect. Why? An effect is established precisely because there is a cause. If the cause is not established, how could the effect be established?

12. What Is Not Made Is Not Called an Effect

Furthermore, what has not been produced is not called an effect, yet threads and other causes cannot produce cloth and other effects. Why? Threads do not produce cloth merely because cloth resides upon them. Thus there would be neither cause nor effect.

If cause and effect are both absent, one need not continue asking whether the effect previously exists or is previously absent in the cause.

13. What Exists Must Show a Mark

Furthermore, if the effect exists in the cause but cannot be apprehended, some mark should at least appear. Smelling fragrance, one knows flowers are present; hearing a sound, one knows a bird is present; hearing laughter, one knows a person is present; seeing smoke, one knows fire is present; seeing a swan, one knows a pond is present.

In the same way, if an effect already exists in the cause, some mark should appear. Yet neither the effect’s entity nor its mark can now be found. Thus one should know that the effect was previously absent in the cause.

14. If the Effect Already Exists, One Can No Longer Say Cloth Exists Because of Threads

Furthermore, if the effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises, one should no longer say that cloth exists because of threads or a mat because of reeds.

If this cause did not produce it, nothing else produced it either. If cloth was not made by threads, could it have been made from reeds? If neither threads nor reeds made it, would one not have to say it was made from nothing?

If it was made from nothing, it is not called an effect. Since there is no effect, there is no cause, as already explained. Therefore the claim that an effect already exists in the cause and then arises is untenable.

15. Made from Nothing, It Becomes Permanent

Furthermore, if the effect is made from nothing, it is permanent, like the nature of nirvāṇa.

If the effect is permanent, every conditioned dharma is permanent. Why? Because every conditioned dharma is an effect.

If every dharma is permanent, there is no impermanence. If there is no impermanence, neither is there permanence. Why? Impermanence exists in relation to permanence, and permanence in relation to impermanence. Therefore the claim that both permanence and impermanence are absent is untenable. Consequently one cannot say that an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises.

16. An Effect Does Not Become the Cause of Another Effect

Furthermore, if an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises, this effect should itself become the cause of another distinct effect: cloth the cause of wearing, a mat the cause of covering, and a cart the cause of carrying. Yet in fact it does not become the cause of another distinct effect. Therefore one cannot say that an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises.

Suppose you say: fragrance already exists in the earth but does not emerge until water is sprinkled; an effect is the same and cannot function as a cause before the conditions assemble. This is untenable. Why? On your account it is called an effect only when it can be known; then jars and other objects are not effects. Why? Being made knowable is produced, whereas jars and the rest already exist and are unproduced. You have thereby treated production itself as the effect. Therefore the claim that an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises is untenable.

17. A Revealing Cause Can Only Disclose; It Cannot Produce a Thing

Furthermore, a revealing cause can only disclose something already there; it cannot produce a thing. If a lamp is lit to illuminate a jar in darkness, it also illuminates bedding and other objects. But when conditions combine to make a jar, they do not simultaneously produce bedding and other objects. Therefore know that an effect does not already exist in the cause and afterward arise.

18. The Distinction between Making Now and Making Later

Furthermore, if an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises, there should be no distinction between making now and making later. Yet you accept both making now and making later. Therefore an effect does not already exist in the cause and afterward arise.

19. Refuting Prior Nonexistence: A Second Head and Third Hand

The claim that an effect was previously absent in the cause and then arises is likewise wrong. Why? If what is nonexistent could arise, a second head and a third hand should arise. Why? Because on your account what is nonexistent can arise.

The questioner says: Jars and other things have causes and conditions; a second head and third hand lack them. How could they arise? Therefore your claim is wrong.

The answerer says: A second head, a third hand, and such effects as jars are all equally absent in the cause. A jar is absent from a lump of clay and equally absent from a stone. Why, then, call the lump of clay the cause of a jar but not call the stone its cause? Why call milk the cause of curds and threads the cause of cloth, but not call reeds the cause?

20. Each Thing Should Produce Every Thing

Furthermore, if an effect is previously absent in the cause and nevertheless arises, every single thing should produce every thing. Carts, horses, food, and the rest should arise from a fingertip; threads should not produce only cloth but also carts, horses, food, and every other thing. Why? If what is absent can arise, why should threads produce only cloth and not carts, horses, food, and the rest? All are equally absent.

If an effect previously absent in the cause can arise, causes should not each possess a distinct power to produce their effects. One who needs oil seeks it from sesame and does not press sand. If oil is equally absent from sesame and sand, why seek it in sesame and not press sand?

Suppose you say: Oil has previously been seen to come from sesame and never from sand, so it is sought in sesame rather than sand. This is untenable. Why? Only if the mark of arising were established could you say that at another time oil was seen to come from sesame and not from sand, and therefore one seeks it in sesame rather than sand. Since the mark of arising for every dharma is not established, you cannot say that because oil was formerly seen to come from sesame, it should now be sought in sesame rather than sand.

21. Not One Matter Alone Is Refuted; Every Cause and Effect Is Refuted Together

〔T30 0162a03〕 Furthermore, I am not now refuting this one matter alone; I refute every cause and effect together. The three kinds of arising—an effect already existent in the cause, previously nonexistent there, or both existent and nonexistent there—are all unestablished. Therefore your statement that oil was previously seen to come from sesame falls into a reason identical with what is under doubt.

22. If the Effect Was Previously Absent, the Marks of Causes Cannot Be Established

Furthermore, if an effect is previously absent from the cause and then arises, the marks of causes cannot be established. Why? If causes are absent, by what can this dharma be made? By what can it be accomplished? If there is neither making nor accomplishment, why call anything a cause? Thus an agent cannot produce anything, and one who directs an agent likewise cannot produce anything.

23. Action, Agent, and What Is Made: Neither Side Can Be Found

If the effect already exists in the cause, there should be no distinction among action, agent, and what is made. Why? If the effect already exists, what need is there to make it again? Therefore all the causes you describe—action, agent, and what is made—cannot be found.

The claim that the effect was previously absent in the cause is likewise wrong. Why? Only if someone accepted action and agent and distinctly established cause and effect should this be used to challenge me. I say that action, agent, cause, and effect are all empty. If you refute action, agent, cause, and effect, you thereby establish my Dharma and do not challenge it. Therefore the claim that an effect was previously absent in the cause and then arises is untenable.

Furthermore, only one who accepted that an effect already exists in the cause should be challenged in this way. I do not say it already exists in the cause, so I do not accept this challenge; neither do I accept that it was previously absent in the cause.

24. Both Existent and Nonexistent: Light and Dark Cannot Share One Place

The claim that an effect is both existent and nonexistent in the cause and then arises is likewise wrong. Why? Existence and nonexistence possess mutually contradictory natures and marks. Since their natures and marks conflict, how could they occupy one place? Light and dark, pain and pleasure, going and staying, bondage and release cannot occupy one place. Therefore neither an effect previously existent nor previously nonexistent in the cause arises.

Furthermore, prior existence and prior nonexistence of the effect in the cause have already been refuted above in the discussions of existence and nonexistence.

25. Reason Reaches Its Limit Here

Therefore an effect already existent in the cause does not arise, an effect absent there does not arise, and one both existent and nonexistent does not arise. Reason reaches its limit here.

Inquiry everywhere finds nothing; therefore the effect is ultimately unarisen. Because the effect is ultimately unarisen, every conditioned dharma is empty. Why? Every conditioned dharma is both cause and effect.

Because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty. When conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Conditions, Gate Three,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. The Conditions of Dharmas Cannot Be Established

〔T30 0162b02〕 Next, the conditions of dharmas cannot be established. Why?

Among the multitude of conditions, whether treated broadly or in summary, no effect exists; if no effect exists among conditions, how could it arise from conditions?

Such effects as a jar do not exist within each condition individually and do not exist within the conjunction of the multitude of conditions. If they exist in neither of these two approaches, how can one say that they arise from conditions?

2. What Are Called the Multitude of Conditions?

The questioner says: What are called the multitude of conditions?

The respondent says:

Four kinds of conditions produce all dharmas; beyond them there is no fifth condition: the causal condition, the immediate antecedent condition, the object-condition, and the predominant condition.

The four conditions are the causal condition, immediate antecedent condition, object-condition, and predominant condition.

The causal condition is named according to the dharma that arises from it. If that dharma has arisen from it, is now arising from it, or will arise from it, this dharma is called a causal condition.

The immediate antecedent condition means that after the preceding dharma has ceased, the next dharma immediately arises in sequence. This is called the immediate antecedent condition.

The object-condition follows the dharma recollected. If bodily action, verbal action, or mind and mental factors arise because of it, it is called the object-condition.

The predominant condition means that because this dharma exists, that dharma can arise. This dharma is a predominant condition for that dharma.

3. None of the Four Conditions Contains an Effect within the Cause

In each of these four conditions, the effect is absent within the cause.

If the effect already existed within the cause, it should exist apart from the multitude of conditions; yet in fact no effect exists apart from conditions.

If the effect already existed within the conditions, it should exist apart from the cause; yet in fact no effect exists apart from the cause.

If the effect existed within both conditions and cause, it should be obtainable. Yet sought through reason, it cannot be obtained. Therefore no effect exists in either cause or conditions.

Thus, no effect exists within each condition individually and no effect exists in their conjunction. How can one say that the effect arises from conditions?

4. Since No Effect Exists among Conditions, Why Does It Not Emerge from Nonconditions?

Next:

If the effect originally does not exist among conditions but can emerge from conditions, why does this effect not emerge from nonconditions?

Suppose one says that although the effect originally does not exist among conditions, it arises from them. Why does it not arise from nonconditions? Neither side contains an effect. Therefore no causes and conditions can produce an effect.

5. Because the Effect Does Not Arise, Conditions Do Not Arise; Finally, There Is No Self

Since the effect does not arise, conditions do not arise either. Why? Because conditions precede and the effect follows.

Since neither conditions nor effect exist, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too. Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how could there be a self?

Nāgārjuna composed and the Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva translated the Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Marks, Gate Four,” in the Later Qin · Taishō T30n1568. Paragraph openings marked 〔T30 …〕 give page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

1. Opening Verse of the Gate: Both Conditioned and Unconditioned Dharmas Are Markless

〔T30 0162c02〕Further, all dharmas are empty. Why?

Conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, these two kinds, are both without marks; because they are without marks, both kinds of dharma are empty.

Conditioned dharmas are not established by relying on marks.

2. Question: What Are the Marks of the Conditioned?

The objector asks: what counts as a mark of the conditioned?

The respondent says: every thing has its own conditioned marks. A cow, for example, is marked by horns, the hump on its shoulder, the hanging dewlap beneath its neck, and hair at the end of its tail. A jar is marked by a flat base, broad belly, narrow neck, and thick lip. A cart is marked by its wheels, axle, shaft, and yoke. A person is marked by head, eyes, abdomen, back, shoulders, arms, hands, and feet.

If, in the same way, arising, abiding, and cessation are said to be the marks of conditioned dharmas, one must ask: are they themselves conditioned or unconditioned?

3. If Arising Is Conditioned, the Three Marks Regress Infinitely; If Unconditioned, It Cannot Serve as a Mark

The objector asks: what fault follows if they are conditioned?

The respondent says:

If the mark of arising is itself conditioned, it too should have the three marks; if the mark of arising is itself unconditioned, how could it be called a mark of the conditioned?

If the mark of arising is itself a conditioned dharma, it should also possess the three marks of arising, abiding, and cessation. Since these three marks are themselves conditioned, each should again possess its own three marks. Proceeding recursively in this way produces an infinite regress. The same applies to the marks of abiding and cessation.

If the mark of arising is itself an unconditioned dharma, one must ask: how can the unconditioned serve as a mark for the conditioned? Moreover, apart from arising, abiding, and cessation, who could know that something is the mark of arising?

Further, only because arising, abiding, and cessation can each be distinguished does one speak of an arising. The unconditioned cannot be distinguished, and therefore there is no arising within it. The same applies to abiding and cessation.

Since arising, abiding, and cessation are empty, conditioned dharmas are empty with them. Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty, for it is precisely in reliance on the conditioned that the unconditioned is spoken of. Because both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, all dharmas are empty.

4. The Opponent Establishes Seven Co-Arising Dharmas to Halt the Regress

The objector says: you claim that each of the three marks must possess another three marks and that this produces an infinite regress, and therefore that the mark of arising should not be conditioned. I will now propose an arrangement:

What is called the arising of arising brings its primary arising into arising; and what the primary arising brings into arising, in turn, brings the arising of arising into arising.

When a dharma arises, seven dharmas arise together, including its own entity: first, the dharma itself; second, arising; third, abiding; fourth, cessation; fifth, the arising of arising; sixth, the abiding of abiding; and seventh, the cessation of cessation.

Among these seven dharmas, the primary arising, excluding its own entity, can bring the other six dharmas into arising. The arising of arising can bring the primary arising into arising, and the primary arising in turn brings the arising of arising into arising. Thus, although the three marks of arising, abiding, and cessation remain conditioned, there is no infinite regress. Abiding and cessation are arranged in the same way.

5. Refuting the Seven Dharmas: Arising of Arising and Primary Arising Await Each Other, and Neither Can Come First

The respondent says:

〔T30 0163a01〕

If this arising of arising can in turn bring the primary arising into arising, yet the arising of arising itself comes from the primary arising, how can it bring the primary arising into arising?

If the arising of arising can bring the primary arising into arising, then before the primary arising has brought forth the arising of arising, the arising of arising does not itself exist. By what could it bring the primary arising into arising?

If this primary arising can bring the arising of arising into arising, yet the primary arising itself comes from that arising of arising, how can it bring the arising of arising into arising?

Suppose the primary arising can bring the arising of arising into arising, and after the arising of arising has arisen, it in turn brings the primary arising into arising. This cannot be maintained. Why? The function of what is called the arising of arising is precisely to bring the primary arising into arising, and that is why it is called the arising of arising. Yet when the primary arising has not in fact been brought into arising, how can it bring the arising of arising into arising?

The claim that the arising of arising can bring the primary arising into arising at the very moment it is arising is equally untenable. Why?

You say that while this arising of arising is arising, it may bring the primary arising into arising; yet the arising of arising has not itself arisen, so how can it bring the primary arising into arising?

You say that while the arising of arising is arising, it can bring the primary arising into arising. Yet the entity of this arising of arising has not been produced, and it cannot bring the primary arising into arising.

6. Refuting the Lamp Analogy: There Is No Darkness in the Lamp or Where It Stands

Suppose it is said that while the arising of arising is arising, it can bring itself and others into arising, just as a lamp when lit can illuminate itself and others. This is untenable. Why?

Within the lamp itself there is originally no darkness, nor is there darkness where the lamp stands; only dispelling darkness is called illumination, so what exactly does the lamp illuminate?

The lamp’s own entity has no darkness, and the place where its light abides has no darkness. If there is no darkness within the lamp and none where the lamp stands, how can one say that the lamp illuminates both itself and others? Dispelling darkness is what is called illumination. Since the lamp dispels neither darkness in itself nor darkness elsewhere, it illuminates neither itself nor others.

Thus your earlier claim—“A lamp illuminates itself and others; arising likewise brings itself and others into arising”—is untenable.

7. Can the Lamp Reach Darkness or Dispel Darkness at a Distance?

The objector says: precisely because the lamp dispels darkness when it is lit, there is no darkness within the lamp or where it stands.

The respondent says:

How can one say that a lamp dispels darkness when it is lit? At the moment this lamp is first lit, it has not reached the darkness.

If the lamp does not reach where darkness is when it is lit, then because it has not reached the darkness, it should not be said to have dispelled it.

Further:

If the lamp has not reached the darkness and can nevertheless dispel it, then lighting a lamp here should dispel all darkness everywhere.

If a lamp, although unable to reach darkness, can dispel it through its power, then lighting one lamp here should dispel all darkness throughout the world, for it equally fails to reach darkness whether far or near. Yet in fact lighting a lamp here does not dispel all darkness throughout the world. Thus your claim that a lamp, although unable to reach darkness, can dispel it through its power is untenable.

8. If a Lamp Illuminates Itself and Others, Darkness Should Conceal Itself and Others

Further:

If a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate others, then darkness likewise should conceal both itself and others.

If a lamp illuminates itself and others, then darkness, standing in opposition to the lamp, should likewise conceal both itself and others.

Yet although darkness and the lamp are opposites, darkness neither conceals itself nor conceals others, while it is nevertheless claimed that the lamp illuminates both itself and others. This is untenable. Thus the analogy you adduce is incorrect.

9. Neither What Has Arisen nor What Has Not Arisen Can Bring Itself into Arising

As for your claim that arising brings itself and others into arising, another point must now be made:

If this arising has not yet arisen, how can it bring itself into arising? If it brings itself into arising only once it has arisen, then since it has arisen, what need is there to arise?

Concerning arising before it has arisen, two alternatives must be examined: does it arise only after it has already arisen, or does it arise while it has not yet arisen?

If it arises while it has not yet arisen, then what has not yet arisen does not yet exist. How can it bring itself into arising?

If it is said to arise after it has arisen, then once it has arisen it is already arisen. Why must it arise again? Once it has arisen, there is no second arising; once an act has been done, there is no second doing. Thus arising cannot bring itself into arising.

Since arising cannot bring itself into arising, how could it bring others into arising? Your claim that arising brings itself and others into arising is untenable. The same applies to the marks of abiding and cessation.

Therefore, the claim that arising, abiding, and cessation are the marks of the conditioned is untenable. Since arising, abiding, and cessation cannot be established as marks of the conditioned, conditioned dharmas are empty.

10. Because the Conditioned Is Empty, the Unconditioned Is Also Empty

Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty. Why? Because only the cessation of the conditioned is called unconditioned nirvāṇa; therefore nirvāṇa too is empty.

Further, nonarising, nonabiding, and nonceasing are said to be the marks of the unconditioned. Yet nonarising, nonabiding, and nonceasing mean that the dharma is absent, and what is absent should not be made into a mark.

11. Can Marklessness Serve as a Mark?

If it is said that marklessness is the mark of nirvāṇa, this is untenable.

If marklessness is the mark of nirvāṇa, one must ask: by relying on what mark is this known to be markless?

If it is known as markless by relying on a mark, how can it still be called markless?

If it is known as markless by relying on marklessness, marklessness is absence; because it is absent, it cannot be known.

12. The Analogy of the Unpatterned Robe and Its Refutation

Suppose it is said: among many robes bearing floral patterns, one alone bears no floral pattern. Its lack of pattern is precisely taken as its pattern. Thus when someone says, “Go fetch that markless robe,” the markless robe can be recognized and retrieved. In the same way, if arising, abiding, and cessation are marks of the conditioned, wherever arising, abiding, and cessation are absent should be known as marked by the unconditioned.

To say on this basis that marklessness is nirvāṇa is untenable. Why?

Because when arising, abiding, and cessation are sought through many causes and conditions, they are all empty; fundamentally no mark of the conditioned can be found. How, then, could it be used to know the unconditioned? Which fixed and certain mark of the conditioned have you obtained, such that by means of it you can know a markless place as the unconditioned?

Thus your claim that among many patterned robes the unpatterned robe can serve as an analogy for the marklessness of nirvāṇa is untenable.

The analogy of the robe will be discussed in detail in the fifth gate below.

13. Conclusion: Because the Three Things Are Empty, All Dharmas Are Empty

Therefore all conditioned dharmas are empty. Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty. Because both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, the self is also empty.

Because these three things are empty, all dharmas are empty.

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of What Has Marks and What Lacks Marks, Gate Five,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. Opening Verse

〔T30 0163c15〕 Next it should be said that all dharmas are empty. Why?

A mark does not mark what already has marks; nor does it mark what lacks marks; apart from what has marks and what lacks marks, what could a mark possibly mark?

2. A Mark Has Nothing to Mark in What Already Has Marks

A mark does not mark what already has marks. Why? If a dharma already possessed a mark, what further use would there be for a mark?

Furthermore, if a mark could mark what already has marks, there would be the fault of two layers of marks. The first would be the mark it already possessed; the second would be the later mark that came to mark it and make it something having a mark. Therefore, among things already having marks, a mark has nothing it can mark.

3. A Mark Likewise Has Nothing to Mark in What Lacks Marks

A mark likewise has nothing it can mark in what lacks marks. What dharma is called markless such that what has a mark could be used to mark it?

For example, an elephant has a pair of tusks, a hanging trunk, three swellings on its head, ears like winnowing baskets, a spine like a bent bow, a large hanging belly, hair at the tip of its tail, and four thick round feet. These are the marks of an elephant. Apart from these marks, no further elephant exists for a mark to mark.

Again, a horse has upright ears, a hanging mane, four hooved feet, and hair along the whole tail. Apart from these marks, no further horse exists for a mark to mark.

4. Outside the Two Positions There Is No Third

Thus, among what has marks, a mark has nothing to mark; among what lacks marks, a mark likewise has nothing to mark. Apart from what has marks and what lacks marks, no third kind of dharma exists for a mark to mark. Therefore, a mark has nothing to mark.

5. Mark and What Is Marked Are Both Empty

Since a mark has nothing to mark, the dharma called what is marked—the side indicated by the mark—cannot be established either. Why? It is precisely through a mark that one knows this matter is called what is marked.

Through this conditioned relation, both mark and what is marked are empty. Since mark and what is marked are empty, the myriad things are empty. Why? Apart from mark and what is marked, no thing can be spoken of.

6. Thing and No Thing

Since no thing exists, nonthing does not exist either. It is because a thing ceases that one speaks of no thing. If there is fundamentally no thing, what has ceased such that it is called no thing?

7. Conditioned, Unconditioned, and Self Are All Empty

Since thing and no thing are both empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too. Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, the self is empty too.

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Identity and Difference, Gate Six,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. Opening Verse: Mark and What Is Marked Cannot Be Obtained as Identical or Different

〔T30 0164a09〕 Next, all dharmas are empty. Why?

Mark and what is marked cannot be obtained as identical or different; if neither identity nor difference exists, how could these two be established?

The mark and what is marked cannot be obtained when said to be one, and cannot be obtained when said to be two different things. Since neither identity nor difference can be obtained, the two cannot be established. Thus mark and what is marked are both empty. Since mark and what is marked are empty, all dharmas are empty.

2. Objection: They Are Either the Same, Different, or Partial

The questioner says: Mark and what is marked have always been established. Why say that they are not? You say they cannot be obtained as one or as different. I now say that among things, sometimes the mark is precisely what is marked, sometimes the mark differs from what is marked, and sometimes one part is taken as the mark while the remainder is what is marked.

For example, the mark of consciousness is consciousness. Apart from the consciousness being used, there is no other consciousness. The mark of feeling is likewise feeling; apart from the feeling being used, there is no other feeling. Cases like these are ones in which the mark is precisely what is marked.

As the Buddha taught, the cessation of craving is called nirvāṇa. Craving is a conditioned and contaminated dharma, while cessation is an unconditioned and uncontaminated dharma. Again, a person of faith has three marks: delight in approaching good people, delight in wishing to hear the Dharma, and delight in practicing giving. Because these three are bodily and verbal activities, they belong to the form aggregate; because faith is a mental factor, it belongs to the formations aggregate. These are cases in which the mark differs from what is marked.

Right view is the mark of the path, yet it is only one part within the entire path. Arising, abiding, and cessation are marks of conditioned dharmas, yet these three are also only one part within conditioned dharmas. In such cases, one part of what is marked is taken and called the mark.

Thus, the mark is either precisely what is marked, differs from what is marked, or is one part of what is marked. Your claim that neither identity nor difference is established and therefore mark and what is marked are unestablished is incorrect.

3. Answer Refuting “The Mark Is Precisely What Is Marked”

The respondent says: Your claim that in some cases the mark is precisely what is marked, as with consciousness and the rest, is incorrect. Why? Because it is knowable through a mark, it is called what is marked; that which is used in order to know it is called the mark. No thing can know itself, just as a finger cannot touch itself and an eye cannot see itself. Therefore your claim that consciousness is both mark and what is marked is incorrect.

Furthermore, if the mark were precisely what is marked, one should not distinguish and say, “this is the mark, and this is what is marked.” Once one distinguishes and says, “this is the mark, and this is what is marked,” one should not say that the mark is precisely what is marked.

Furthermore, if the mark were precisely what is marked, cause and effect would become one. Why? The mark is the cause and what is marked is the effect, so the two would become one. Yet in fact they are not one. Therefore the claim that the mark is precisely what is marked is incorrect.

4. Answer Refuting “The Mark Differs from What Is Marked”

Your claim that the mark differs from what is marked is also incorrect. You say that the cessation of craving is the mark of nirvāṇa; you do not say that craving is the mark of nirvāṇa. If you said craving was the mark of nirvāṇa, then one could say that mark and what is marked differ. Since you say the cessation of craving is nirvāṇa’s mark, you cannot say that mark and what is marked differ.

Again, you say that a person of faith has three marks, but those three marks do not differ from faith. If faith on the side of faith did not exist, these three acts would not exist. Therefore one cannot say that mark and what is marked differ.

Again, if mark and what is marked differed, the mark itself would require another mark, and this would continue in turn to infinite regress. This is incorrect. Therefore mark and what is marked cannot be different.

5. The Question and Answer concerning the Lamp Simile

The questioner says: A lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things. A mark is likewise able to be its own mark and the mark of another dharma.

The respondent says: Your lamp simile was already refuted under the three conditioned marks. Moreover, you contradict your earlier statement. Above, you said that mark and what is marked differ; now you say that a mark can mark itself and also another dharma. This is incorrect.

Again, you say that one part of what is marked serves as its mark. This is incorrect. Why? This meaning must fall either within identity or within difference; since identity and difference have already been refuted, one should know that the account of a partial mark is refuted as well.

6. Conclusion: Mark and What Is Marked Are Both Empty; All Dharmas Are Empty

Thus, through various conditioned relations one knows that mark and what is marked cannot be obtained as one or as different. No third dharma exists that can establish mark and what is marked. Therefore mark and what is marked are both empty. Since these two are empty, all dharmas are empty.

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Existence and Nonexistence, Gate Seven,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. Opening: Unobtainable at One Time and Unobtainable at Different Times

〔T30 0164b25〕 Next, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because existence and nonexistence cannot be obtained when said to occur at the same time, and cannot be obtained when said not to occur at the same time either. As the verse states:

Existence and nonexistence do not occur at one time; existence apart from nonexistence does not exist either; if this existence exists without separating from nonexistence, then existence should always be nonexistent.

2. Existence and Nonexistence Oppose One Another and Should Not Coexist in One Dharma

The natures of existence and nonexistence oppose one another and should not coexist within a single dharma. It is like there being no death at the time of arising and no arising at the time of death. This has already been explained in the Treatise on the Middle.

3. Separating from Nonexistence Cannot Produce Existence Either

Suppose someone says: if this existence exists apart from nonexistence, there is no fault. This too is incorrect. Why? Apart from nonexistence, how could existence exist?

As explained before, when one dharma arises, seven dharmas arise together, counting its own entity. As stated in the Abhidharma, existence and impermanence arise together. Impermanence is the mark of cessation and destruction and is therefore called nonexistence. Thus, apart from nonexistence, existence cannot arise.

4. Without Separating from Impermanence, Existence Is Always Nonexistent; Separated from Impermanence, It Does Not Arise

If one says that existence arises without separating from impermanence, then this existence would always be nonexistent. If it were always nonexistent, it would have no initial phase of abiding, for it would always be perishing. Yet abiding does in fact exist. Therefore existence is not always nonexistent.

If one says that existence arises apart from impermanence, this too is incorrect. Why? Apart from impermanence, existence in fact does not arise.

5. Objection: All Marks Wait until Their Time to Become Active

The questioner says: When existence arises, impermanence is already present but not yet active. Only at cessation does it become active and destroy this existence.

In this way, arising, abiding, cessation, aging, and acquisition all wait until their time to become active. When existence begins, arising functions and makes existence arise; between arising and cessation, abiding functions and sustains this existence; at cessation, impermanence functions and destroys this existence; aging changes arising into abiding and abiding into cessation; impermanence destroys; and acquisition constantly brings the preceding four to completion.

Therefore, although a dharma arises together with impermanence, this existence is not always nonexistent.

6. First Answer: If They Co-arise, Existence Should Perish When Arising and Arise When Perishing

The respondent says: You claim that impermanence is the mark of cessation and arises together with existence. Then when it arises, this existence should perish; and when it perishes, this existence should arise.

7. Second Answer: Neither Arising nor Cessation Is Established

Furthermore, neither arising nor cessation is established. Why? At the time of cessation there should be no arising, and at the time of arising there should be no cessation, because arising and cessation oppose one another.

8. Third Answer: Abiding Opposes Destruction, Aging Opposes Abiding; Co-arising Is Confusion

Furthermore, according to your account, impermanence arises together with abiding. Then when this existence perishes there should be no abiding, and if abiding exists there should be no destruction. Why? Because abiding and destruction oppose one another. At the time of aging there is no abiding, and at the time of abiding there is no aging.

Therefore, your claim that arising, abiding, cessation, aging, impermanence, and acquisition originally arise together is confusion.

Why? If this existence arises together with impermanence, and impermanence is the mark of destruction, then ordinary things have no mark of destruction when they arise and no mark of destruction while they abide. At those times, is this not precisely the absence of the mark of impermanence?

For example, because something can cognize it is called consciousness; if it cannot cognize, it lacks the mark of consciousness. Because something can receive, it is called feeling; if it cannot receive, it lacks the mark of feeling. Because something can remember, it is called mindfulness; if it cannot remember, it lacks the mark of mindfulness. Emergence is the mark of arising; if there is no emergence, there is no mark of arising. Sustaining is the mark of abiding; if there is no sustaining, there is no mark of abiding. Transformation is the mark of aging; if there is no transformation, there is no mark of aging. The exhaustion of life is the mark of death; if life is not exhausted, there is no mark of death. In the same way, destruction is the mark of impermanence; apart from destruction, there is no mark of impermanence.

If during arising and abiding impermanence is present but cannot destroy this existence and can destroy it only later, what use is there in co-arising? In that case, impermanence should exist only when this existence is destroyed. Therefore, the claim that impermanence arises together with existence but destroys it only later is untenable.

9. Existence and Nonexistence Are Both Empty, and Even Sentient Beings Are Empty

〔T30 0165a04〕 Thus, existence and nonexistence cannot be established together and cannot be established separately. Therefore, existence and nonexistence are both empty. Because existence and nonexistence are empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty; because all conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too; because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, sentient beings are empty too.

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Nature, Gate Eight,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. All Dharmas Are Empty Because They Possess No Intrinsic Nature

〔T30 0165a09〕 Next, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because dharmas possess no intrinsic nature. As the verse states:

Seeing that dharmas bear the mark of alteration, one knows that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature; even a dharma of no intrinsic nature does not exist, because all dharmas are empty.

2. Whatever Alters Does Not Possess Intrinsic Nature

If dharmas truly possessed intrinsic nature, they should not alter. Yet one directly sees all dharmas altering. One should therefore know that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature.

Furthermore, if dharmas possessed fixed intrinsic nature, they should not arise from a multitude of conditions. If one says that this nature is produced from conditions, then this nature becomes a made dharma. Only what is not made and does not depend upon anything else is called nature. Therefore all dharmas are empty.

3. Objection: If All Dharmas Are Empty, the Four Truths and Three Jewels Do Not Exist

The questioner says: If all dharmas are empty, there is no arising and no cessation. If there is no arising or cessation, there is no truth of suffering. If there is no truth of suffering, there is no truth of origin. If neither the truth of suffering nor the truth of origin exists, there is no truth of cessation. If suffering does not cease, there is also no path leading to the cessation of suffering.

If dharmas are empty and possess no intrinsic nature, the four noble truths do not exist. Because the four noble truths do not exist, the four fruits of recluseship do not exist. Because the four fruits do not exist, no noble persons exist. Since none of these exist, Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha do not exist either, and all worldly dharmas likewise do not exist. This is untenable. Therefore dharmas should not all be empty.

4. Answer: There Are the Conventional Truth and the Truth of the Ultimate Meaning

The respondent says: There are two truths—first, the conventional truth; second, the truth of the ultimate meaning.

Through the conventional truth one can state the truth of the ultimate meaning. Without relying on the conventional truth, one cannot state the truth of the ultimate meaning. If one cannot attain the truth of the ultimate meaning, one cannot attain nirvāṇa. If a person does not know these two truths, that person does not know benefit to self, benefit to others, or shared benefit.

Thus, if one knows the conventional truth, one can know the truth of the ultimate meaning; if one knows the truth of the ultimate meaning, one can know the conventional truth. The teaching you now hear belongs to the conventional truth, but you take it to be the truth of the ultimate meaning and thereby fall into error.

The conditioned dharmas taught by the buddhas are called the profound truth of the ultimate meaning. Because these conditioned dharmas possess no intrinsic nature, I call them empty.

5. What Truly Destroys the Four Truths Is Fixed Nature

If dharmas did not arise from a multitude of conditions, each should possess its own fixed intrinsic nature, and the five aggregates should not bear marks of arising and cessation. If the five aggregates neither arose nor ceased, there would be no impermanence. If there were no impermanence, there would be no noble truth of suffering.

If there were no noble truth of suffering, there would be no noble truth of origin taught from dharmas arising through causes and conditions. If dharmas possessed fixed nature, there would be no noble truth of the cessation of suffering. Why? Because nature does not alter. If there were no noble truth of the cessation of suffering, there would be no path leading to the cessation of suffering.

Therefore, if a person does not accept emptiness, the four noble truths do not exist. If the four noble truths do not exist, there is no realization of the four noble truths. If there is no realization of the four noble truths, there is no knowing suffering, abandoning origin, realizing cessation, or cultivating the path.

Since none of these exist, the four fruits of recluseship do not exist. Because the four fruits do not exist, there are no persons who have attained a fruit and no persons proceeding toward a fruit. If there are no attainers and no persons proceeding toward attainment, there is no Buddha. Because conditioned dharmas have been destroyed, there is no Dharma. Because no fruits exist, there is no Saṅgha. If there is no Buddha, Dharma, or Saṅgha, there are no Three Jewels. If there are no Three Jewels, worldly dharmas too are destroyed. This is untenable. Therefore all dharmas are empty.

6. With Fixed Nature, the World Would Forever Have a Single Mark

Next, if dharmas possessed fixed intrinsic nature, there would be no arising, no cessation, no demerit, and no merit. Since there would be no fruits of demerit and merit, the world would forever possess a single mark. One should therefore know that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature.

7. Self-Nature, Other-Nature, Existence, and Nonexistence Are All Unestablished

If one says that although dharmas have no self-nature they exist through other-nature, this too is incorrect. Why? If no self-nature exists, how could something exist through other-nature? For other-nature can be spoken of only on the basis of self-nature.

Moreover, other-nature is in fact self-nature. Why? Because other-nature is precisely that other’s own self-nature.

If self-nature cannot be established, other-nature cannot be established either. If neither self-nature nor other-nature can be established, where apart from self-nature and other-nature could any further dharma exist?

Since existence is not established, nonexistence is not established either.

Thus, when one now investigates in this way, there is no self-nature and no other-nature; there is neither existence nor nonexistence. Therefore all conditioned dharmas are empty. Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too. Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Cause and Effect, Gate Nine,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. Statement of the Principle and Verse

〔T30 0165b26〕 The treatise author next says: again, all dharmas are empty.

Why is this said? Because dharmas themselves possess no intrinsic nature and do not come from anywhere else. As the verse states:

Among the multitude of conditions, the effect is ultimately unobtainable; nor does it come from elsewhere—how, then, could an effect exist?

2. First Test: No Effect Exists among the Multitude of Conditions

Whether one considers each condition individually or the conjunction of the multitude of conditions, no effect exists in either. This has already been explained.

3. Second Test: The Effect Does Not Come from Elsewhere Either

Moreover, this effect does not come from any other place.

If it came from elsewhere, it would not be produced from causes and conditions, and the conjunction of the multitude of conditions would have no efficacy.

4. When Both Tests Are Exhausted, This Is Emptiness

If the effect is absent among the multitude of conditions and does not come from elsewhere, then it is empty.

5. From the Emptiness of the Effect to the Emptiness of Self

Since the effect is empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too.

Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?

Nāgārjuna composed and the Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva translated the Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of the Agent, Gate Ten,” in the Later Qin · Taishō T30n1568. Paragraph openings marked 〔T30 …〕 give page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

1. The Four Kinds of Production Cannot Be Found

〔T30 0165c08〕Next, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because when sought, the four possibilities—self-production, production by another, production by both, and production without a cause—cannot be found. As the verse says:

Produced by oneself, produced by another, produced by both, or produced without a cause—when sought in each of these ways, suffering is not found.

2. Suffering Cannot Produce Itself

To say that suffering produces itself is untenable. Why? If it produced itself, it would make its own entity; yet this very thing cannot be used to produce this very thing. For example, consciousness cannot cognize itself, and a finger cannot touch itself. Therefore suffering cannot be called self-produced.

3. Suffering Cannot Be Produced by Another Either

The claim that suffering is produced by another is likewise untenable—for how could that other produce suffering?

4. The Many Conditions Cannot Be Called Other

The objector says: the many conditions are precisely what is called other. The many conditions produce suffering, so this is called production by another. How can you say that suffering is not produced by another?

The respondent says: if the many conditions are called other, then suffering is produced by those conditions. Yet because this suffering arises from the many conditions, it is the nature of those conditions. Since it is the nature of the conditions, how can the conditions be called other?

For example, clay cannot be called other than the jar made from clay, and gold cannot be called other than the bracelet made from gold. Suffering is the same: because it arises from many conditions, those conditions cannot be called other.

5. The Many Conditions Themselves Are Not Autonomous

Further, these many conditions do not exist through intrinsic natures and therefore cannot govern. Thus one cannot say that a result is produced from the many conditions. As the Treatise on the Middle says:

A result arises from many conditions, yet these conditions cannot govern themselves; since the conditions cannot govern themselves, how could they produce a result?

In this way, suffering cannot be produced by another.

6. Production by Both and Production without a Cause

Combining self-production and production by another is equally untenable, because it carries both faults. To say that suffering is self-produced and also produced by another entails both the fault of self-production and the fault of production by another. Thus production of suffering by both is untenable.

To say that suffering arises without a cause is also untenable, because it entails immeasurable faults.

7. Scriptural Evidence: Four Questions from the Naked Ascetic Kāśyapa

As a scripture records, the naked ascetic Kāśyapa asked the Buddha: is suffering self-produced? The Buddha remained silent and did not answer. World-Honored One, if suffering is not self-produced, is it produced by another? Again the Buddha did not answer. World-Honored One, if so, is suffering produced by both self and other? Again the Buddha did not answer. World-Honored One, if so, is suffering produced without causes or conditions? Again the Buddha did not answer.

The Buddha did not answer any of these four questions. One should know that suffering is empty.

8. Objection: The Buddha Did Not Say That Suffering Is Empty

〔T30 0166a05〕The objector says: when the Buddha taught this scripture, he did not say that suffering is empty.

The respondent says: he spoke in that way in accord with the beings who could be liberated.

This naked ascetic Kāśyapa regarded the person as the cause of suffering. Proponents of a self say that whatever is fine or ugly is created by the spirit; the spirit is eternally pure and free of distress; everything known and understood is the spirit. The spirit creates the fine and ugly, suffering and pleasure, and then itself receives various bodies. Holding this wrong view, he asked the Buddha whether suffering is self-produced. Therefore the Buddha did not answer.

9. The Self Cannot Produce Suffering: If the Self Were a Cause, It Would Be Impermanent

Suffering is in fact not produced by the self.

If the self were the cause of suffering and suffering arose because of the self, the self would be impermanent. Why? Every dharma that acts as a cause and every dharma arising from a cause is impermanent.

If the self were impermanent, the karmic results of demerit and merit would all be annihilated, and the meritorious results attained by cultivating the holy life would also come to nothing.

10. If the Self Produced Suffering, There Would Be No Liberation

If the self were the cause of suffering, there could be no liberation. Why? If the self produces suffering, then apart from suffering there would be no self capable of producing suffering, because it would have no body.

If it is said that suffering can be produced without a body, then those who have attained liberation should still suffer. There would consequently be no liberation. Yet liberation does exist. Thus the claim that suffering is self-produced is untenable.

11. Production of Suffering by Another Is Likewise Untenable

The claim that suffering is produced by another is also untenable. Apart from suffering, where is there a person producing suffering to give to another?

12. Production by Another Means Production by Maheśvara

Further, to say that suffering is produced by another amounts to saying that it is produced by Maheśvara. Because the question concerned precisely this wrong view, the Buddha did not answer it.

In fact, suffering does not come from Maheśvara. Why? Because the natures and marks contradict one another. For example, the calf born from a cow is still a cow. If all things were born from Maheśvara, they should all resemble Maheśvara, because all would be his children.

Further, if Maheśvara created beings, he should not give suffering to his own children. Thus one should not say that Maheśvara created suffering.

13. Objection: They Are Given Suffering Because They Do Not Recognize the Cause of Pleasure

The objector says: beings are born from Maheśvara, and suffering and pleasure are likewise produced by Maheśvara. Because beings fail to recognize the cause of pleasure, he gives them suffering.

14. Reply: If He Were Autonomous, It Should Not Be So

The respondent says: if beings were the children of Maheśvara, he should give them only pleasure to ward off suffering and should not give them suffering. Moreover, merely worshiping Maheśvara should extinguish suffering and bring pleasure. Yet this is not so. Each person independently creates the causes and conditions of suffering and pleasure and personally receives the karmic results; these are not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were truly autonomous, he should have no needs. One who has a need and sets about producing something cannot be called autonomous. If he needed nothing, why would he magically create all things like a child at play?

Next, if Maheśvara created beings, who created this Maheśvara? If Maheśvara created himself, this is untenable, just as one thing cannot create itself. If another created him, he would no longer be called autonomous.

Next, if Maheśvara were an effective agent, he would meet no obstruction in creating and would accomplish whatever he conceived. Yet the Maheśvara Scripture says: “Maheśvara wished to create all things and practiced many austerities; crawling creatures were then born. He again practiced austerities, and birds were born. He again practiced austerities, and humans and gods were born.” If he still had to practice austerities, producing venomous creatures first, birds next, and humans and gods only last, one should know that beings arise through the causes and conditions of karma, not through austerities.

Next, if Maheśvara created all things, where did he abide while creating them? Was this abode created by Maheśvara himself or by another? If Maheśvara created it, where did he abide while doing so? If he created it while abiding elsewhere, who created that other place? This produces an infinite regress. If another created it, there would be two autonomous lords. This is untenable. Therefore the world’s myriad things are not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were an effective agent, why would he practice austerities and make offerings to another, hoping to please that being and obtain what he wished? If he had to seek from another through austerities, one should know that he was not autonomous.

Next, if Maheśvara created all things, they should have been fixed upon their initial creation and should never change: a horse should always be a horse and a person always a person. Yet things now change in accordance with karma. One should know that they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if everything were created by Maheśvara, there could be no demerit or merit, good or evil, fine or ugly, because all would be created by Maheśvara. Yet demerit and merit do exist. Therefore they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if beings were all born from Maheśvara, they should all revere and love him as children love a father. Yet this is not so: some hate him and some cherish him. One should therefore know that they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were an effective agent, why did he not create only happy people or only suffering people? Why are some afflicted and others pleased? One should know that this arises from hatred and love and that he is therefore not autonomous. Since he is not autonomous, these things were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were an effective agent, beings should do nothing. Yet beings each devise means and undertake actions. One should therefore know that they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were an effective agent, good and evil, suffering and pleasure would arrive by themselves without being produced. This would destroy conventional dharmas: observing precepts and cultivating the holy life would be entirely useless. Yet this is not so. One should therefore know that they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if it is said that through the causes and conditions of meritorious karma he became great among beings, then other beings who cultivate meritorious karma should likewise become great. Why honor Maheśvara alone? If he is called autonomous without relying on causes and conditions, all beings likewise should be autonomous. Yet this is not so. One should know that things were not created by Maheśvara. If it is said that he received this autonomy from another, that other would in turn have to receive it from another, producing an infinite regress. An infinite regress is equivalent to having no cause.

15. Why the Buddha Did Not Answer

Through causes and reasons such as these, one should know that the myriad things are not born from Maheśvara and that no Maheśvara exists. Because the question concerned this wrong view and production by another, the Buddha did not answer.

Production by both is likewise untenable because it carries both faults. And because myriad things arise from the conjunction of many causes and conditions, they are not born without a cause. The Buddha did not answer this question either.

16. Objection: This Scripture Refutes Only Wrong Views; It Does Not Say Suffering Is Empty

Thus this scripture merely refutes those four wrong views and does not say that suffering is empty.

17. Reply: To Refute the Four Wrong Views Is Precisely to Teach Emptiness

The respondent says: although the Buddha spoke in this way—saying that suffering arises from many causes and conditions—refuting those four wrong views is precisely to teach emptiness. To say that suffering arises from many causes and conditions is to teach the meaning of emptiness.

Why? What arises from many causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature. Absence of intrinsic nature is emptiness.

Just as suffering is empty, one should know that conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and beings are all empty.

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of the Three Times, Gate Eleven,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. A Further Meaning: Every Dharma Is Empty

〔T30 0166c19〕 Next, every dharma is empty.

On what basis is this said? Cause and the dharma that exists through a cause cannot be found to arise at a prior time, at a later time, or at the same time. Therefore it is said:

2. The Verse of This Gate

  If a dharma is said to be before, after, or together with its cause, and none of these can be established,   how could this dharma be established as arising from a cause?

3. The First Time: The Cause Exists First, Then the Dharma That Has a Cause

The claim that a cause exists first and only afterward the dharma that has a cause cannot be sustained.

Why? If the cause exists first and something later arises from it, then while the cause is present beforehand, the dharma that has a cause does not yet exist. Since it does not yet exist, for what is this a cause?

4. The Second Time: The Dharma That Has a Cause Exists First, Then the Cause

If the dharma that has a cause exists before the cause, then while the cause is absent, that dharma is already established. Since it is already established, what use is the cause?

5. The Third Time: Cause and the Dharma That Has a Cause Are Simultaneous

If cause and the dharma that has a cause are simultaneous, there is still no cause.

It is like a bull’s two horns, which grow at the same time: the left and right horns are not causes of one another.

In the same way, the cause is not the cause of the effect and the effect is not the effect of the cause—precisely because they arise at the same time.

Therefore, neither cause nor effect can be found in any of the three times.

6. The Counterchallenge: Your Refutation Cannot Pass the Three Times Either

The questioner says: “Your refutation of cause and effect likewise cannot be established in any of the three times. If refutation exists first and what can be refuted afterward, then what can be refuted does not yet exist—what does this refutation refute? If what can be refuted exists first and refutation afterward, what can be refuted is already established—what use is refutation? If refutation and what can be refuted are simultaneous, there is likewise no causation, as with a bull’s two horns arising at the same time, left and right not causing one another. Thus refutation does not depend on what can be refuted, and what can be refuted does not depend on refutation.”

To unpack this sentence by sentence: the three-time examination you use to refute cause and effect likewise fails when applied to your own act of refutation.

If the refuting argument exists first and the proposition to be refuted only afterward, then while the refutation stands first, the proposition to be refuted does not yet exist. Whom does this refutation refute?

If the proposition to be refuted exists first and the refuting argument only afterward, then the proposition has already been established. What use is the refutation?

If refutation and what can be refuted are simultaneous, there is likewise no causation, just as a bull’s horns arise together and left and right do not cause one another.

Thus refutation does not stand by depending on what can be refuted, nor what can be refuted by depending on refutation.

7. Answer: I Never Said That Refutation and What Can Be Refuted Determinately Exist

〔T30 0167a04〕 The answerer says: “The same fault occurs in the refutation and what can be refuted that you posit. If dharmas are empty, there is neither refutation nor what can be refuted. I now teach emptiness, so you establish what I teach. If I said that refutation and what can be refuted determinately exist, you should raise this challenge; because I do not say that they determinately exist, you should not raise it.”

To unpack this sentence by sentence: the refutation and what can be refuted that you posit contain the very fault you have just described.

If every dharma is empty, there is neither a refuting act nor something refuted. What I now teach is precisely emptiness; therefore, your challenge instead establishes what I teach.

Only if I said that refutation and what can be refuted determinately exist should you make this objection. I do not say they determinately exist, so you should not make it.

8. The Questioner Offers Three Things Seen before One’s Eyes

The questioner says: “One directly sees a prior cause, as when a potter makes a jar. There is also a later cause, as when a teacher exists because of a disciple: only after teaching the disciple does one later recognize that this is the disciple. There is also a simultaneous cause, as with a lamp and its illumination. Therefore the claim that prior, later, and simultaneous causes cannot be found is untenable.”

To unpack this sentence by sentence: one sees a prior cause with one’s own eyes, as when a potter produces a jar.

There is also a later cause, as a teacher exists because of a disciple. After the disciple has been taught, people only later recognize this one as the disciple.

There is also a simultaneous cause, as with a lamp and its illumination.

Your claim that a prior, later, or simultaneous cause cannot be found is untenable.

9. Answer: Not One of the Three Examples Can Stand

The answerer says: “The analogy of a potter making a jar is untenable. Why? Before a jar exists, for what is the potter a cause? As with the potter, no prior cause can be found. A later cause likewise cannot be found: before there is a disciple, who is the teacher? Therefore a later cause cannot be found. If a simultaneous cause is said to be like lamp and illumination, this too is a cause identical with what is doubted. Since lamp and illumination arise at the same time, how could they cause one another? Because conditions are empty in this way, know that every conditioned dharma, every unconditioned dharma, and every sentient being is empty.”

To unpack this sentence by sentence: the analogy of a potter making a jar cannot be established.

Why? Before there is a jar, for what is the potter a cause?

Since the case of the potter is so, every prior cause likewise cannot be found.

A later cause is equally unfindable. Before there is a disciple, who is this disciple’s teacher? Therefore a later cause cannot be found.

If a simultaneous cause is said to resemble lamp and illumination, that is the very cause identical with what is under doubt. Since lamp and illumination arise at the same time, how could they cause one another?

10. Concluding Sentence

Because conditions are empty in this way, know that every conditioned dharma, every unconditioned dharma, and every sentient being is empty.

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Arising, Gate Twelve,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. Arising Cannot Be Obtained in Any of Three Positions

〔T30 0167a20〕 Next, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because arising cannot be obtained among the three positions of arising, not arising, and the time of arising. What has now already arisen does not arise again, what has not yet arisen does not arise, and the time of arising does not arise either. As the verse states:

An arisen effect does not arise; what has not arisen does not arise either; apart from the arisen and not arisen, the time of arising too does not arise.

2. Defining the Three Terms

Arising means that the effect has already emerged. Not arisen means not yet begun, not yet emerged, and not yet existent. The time of arising means just beginning to emerge but not yet complete.

3. An Effect That Has Already Arisen Does Not Arise Again

To say that an arisen effect does not arise again means that once this arising has arisen, it does not arise once more. Why? First, there is the fault of infinite regress; second, there is the fault that what has already been done must be done again.

If one arising, after it has arisen, must further produce a second arising, and after the second arising has arisen it must produce a third, and after the third a fourth, then by following the claim that after the first arising there is a second, arising will have no end. This is untenable. Therefore arising does not arise again.

Again, suppose you say that both the arising that produces and the arising used by an already arisen dharma to produce can produce while they themselves have not yet arisen. This too is incorrect. Why? If the first arising can produce while itself not arisen, there would be two kinds of arising: one that arises after having arisen, and one able to arise while not yet arisen. What you earlier stated with certainty has now become uncertain.

Just as what has already been done should not be done again, what has already been burned should not be burned again, and what has already been realized should not be realized again, so too what has already arisen should not arise again. Therefore the dharma of arising does not arise.

4. A Dharma Not Yet Arisen Does Not Arise Either

A dharma not yet arisen does not arise either. Why? First, it does not conjoin with arising; second, there is a fault, because then everything not yet arisen would have to arise—which is absurd.

If a dharma not yet arisen could arise, there would be an arising apart from arising, and the so-called arising would still be not arising. If arising existed apart from arising, there would be doing apart from doing, going apart from going, and eating apart from eating, and worldly dharmas would be destroyed. This is untenable. Therefore a dharma not yet arisen does not arise.

Again, if a dharma not yet arisen could arise, then every not-yet-arisen dharma should arise. The unsurpassed complete awakening not yet arisen in ordinary people should arise; afflictions that no longer arise in an arhat of the irreversible dharma should arise while not arisen; and such things as the horns of rabbits and horses should arise while not arisen. This is untenable. Therefore one should not say that what has not arisen can arise.

5. Question and Answer: Arising When All Conditions Are Complete

The questioner says: To say that something not arisen arises means that when causes and conditions conjoin, the time is right, an agent is present, and facilitating conditions are complete, then the not-arisen arises. It does not mean that everything not arisen arises. Therefore one should not object that everything not arisen must arise.

The respondent says: Suppose that when a dharma arises, it does so through the conjunction of an agent, facilitating conditions, and the multitude of conditions. Within these, if it is first determinately existent, it does not arise; if it is first nonexistent, it does not arise; and if it is both existent and nonexistent, it likewise does not arise. Arising cannot be obtained through any of these three ways of seeking it, as already explained. Therefore a dharma not yet arisen does not arise.

6. The Time of Arising Does Not Arise Either

The time of arising does not arise either. Why? It has both the fault of arising again after having arisen and the fault of being able to arise without having arisen. Within the dharma called the time of arising, the portion already arisen does not arise, as explained before; the portion not yet arisen does not arise either, also as explained before.

Again, only if there were a time of arising apart from arising could one say that something arises within the time of arising. Yet in fact no time of arising exists apart from arising. Therefore the time of arising does not arise.

Again, if someone maintains that the time of arising can arise, there will be two arisings: one takes the time of arising itself as arising, while the other arises within the time of arising. Since there are not two dharmas, how can one speak of two arisings? Therefore the time of arising does not arise.

Again, before arising exists there is no time of arising. Where, then, would arising travel? If arising has no place in which to travel, there is no arising within the time of arising. Therefore the time of arising does not arise.

7. General Conclusion: All Dharmas Are Non-Arising

In this way, arising, not arising, and the time of arising are all unestablished, and therefore the dharma of arising is unestablished. Since arising is unestablished, abiding and cessation are the same.

Since arising, abiding, and cessation are unestablished, conditioned dharmas are unestablished. Since conditioned dharmas are unestablished, unconditioned dharmas are unestablished. Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are both unestablished, sentient beings are unestablished.

One should therefore know that all dharmas are non-arising because they are ultimately empty and quiescent.