十二門論 觀有無門第七

The seventh gate examines only one sentence. The opponent says that impermanence is already within a dharma: “When existence arises, impermanence is already present but not yet active”; only at cessation does it act.

The author does not ask whether impermanence is present. He asks one thing: can it produce destruction now?

The question seems light, but it falls exactly where the opponent labors hardest. Through the words “not yet active,” he tries to retain within the dharma something unable to do anything.

It cannot. For “when things arise they do not have the mark of destruction, and while they abide they do not have the mark of destruction either.” The word mark is spoken precisely in terms of what can perform its work. “Because it can cognize, it is called consciousness; if it cannot cognize, it lacks the mark of consciousness.” Capacity to receive is the mark of feeling; capacity to remember is the mark of mindfulness; capacity to sustain is the mark of abiding; capacity to change is the mark of aging. Impermanence is the same: “Destruction is the mark of impermanence; apart from destruction there is no mark of impermanence.”

If it cannot perform, co-arising is an empty attachment. The author asks to the end: “What use is there in co-arising?”

Both panels of the gate close at the outset: “Existence and nonexistence cannot be obtained at one time; nor can they be obtained at different times.” If together, the dharma should perish when arising and arise when perishing. If existence is separated from nonexistence, one member is removed from the opponent’s own seven co-arisen dharmas: “therefore, apart from nonexistence, existence does not arise.”

One immediately evident fact blocks the other side for the author: “yet abiding does in fact exist.” A dharma does remain for an interval, so existence is not eternally nonexistent from the moment it arises.

Only one sentence remains: “Impermanence should exist only when existence is destroyed.” The name follows destruction; it is not stored within the thing. Until destruction arrives, the name points to nothing.

The conclusion therefore reaches far: existence and nonexistence are empty, conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty, and “sentient beings are empty too.”

At the seventh of the Twelve Gates, what is dismantled is no longer a thing but the claim that its time “has not yet come.”

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Existence and Nonexistence, Gate Seven,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. Opening: Unobtainable at One Time and Unobtainable at Different Times

〔T30 0164b25〕 Next, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because existence and nonexistence cannot be obtained when said to occur at the same time, and cannot be obtained when said not to occur at the same time either. As the verse states:

Existence and nonexistence do not occur at one time; existence apart from nonexistence does not exist either; if this existence exists without separating from nonexistence, then existence should always be nonexistent.

2. Existence and Nonexistence Oppose One Another and Should Not Coexist in One Dharma

The natures of existence and nonexistence oppose one another and should not coexist within a single dharma. It is like there being no death at the time of arising and no arising at the time of death. This has already been explained in the Treatise on the Middle.

3. Separating from Nonexistence Cannot Produce Existence Either

Suppose someone says: if this existence exists apart from nonexistence, there is no fault. This too is incorrect. Why? Apart from nonexistence, how could existence exist?

As explained before, when one dharma arises, seven dharmas arise together, counting its own entity. As stated in the Abhidharma, existence and impermanence arise together. Impermanence is the mark of cessation and destruction and is therefore called nonexistence. Thus, apart from nonexistence, existence cannot arise.

4. Without Separating from Impermanence, Existence Is Always Nonexistent; Separated from Impermanence, It Does Not Arise

If one says that existence arises without separating from impermanence, then this existence would always be nonexistent. If it were always nonexistent, it would have no initial phase of abiding, for it would always be perishing. Yet abiding does in fact exist. Therefore existence is not always nonexistent.

If one says that existence arises apart from impermanence, this too is incorrect. Why? Apart from impermanence, existence in fact does not arise.

5. Objection: All Marks Wait until Their Time to Become Active

The questioner says: When existence arises, impermanence is already present but not yet active. Only at cessation does it become active and destroy this existence.

In this way, arising, abiding, cessation, aging, and acquisition all wait until their time to become active. When existence begins, arising functions and makes existence arise; between arising and cessation, abiding functions and sustains this existence; at cessation, impermanence functions and destroys this existence; aging changes arising into abiding and abiding into cessation; impermanence destroys; and acquisition constantly brings the preceding four to completion.

Therefore, although a dharma arises together with impermanence, this existence is not always nonexistent.

6. First Answer: If They Co-arise, Existence Should Perish When Arising and Arise When Perishing

The respondent says: You claim that impermanence is the mark of cessation and arises together with existence. Then when it arises, this existence should perish; and when it perishes, this existence should arise.

7. Second Answer: Neither Arising nor Cessation Is Established

Furthermore, neither arising nor cessation is established. Why? At the time of cessation there should be no arising, and at the time of arising there should be no cessation, because arising and cessation oppose one another.

8. Third Answer: Abiding Opposes Destruction, Aging Opposes Abiding; Co-arising Is Confusion

Furthermore, according to your account, impermanence arises together with abiding. Then when this existence perishes there should be no abiding, and if abiding exists there should be no destruction. Why? Because abiding and destruction oppose one another. At the time of aging there is no abiding, and at the time of abiding there is no aging.

Therefore, your claim that arising, abiding, cessation, aging, impermanence, and acquisition originally arise together is confusion.

Why? If this existence arises together with impermanence, and impermanence is the mark of destruction, then ordinary things have no mark of destruction when they arise and no mark of destruction while they abide. At those times, is this not precisely the absence of the mark of impermanence?

For example, because something can cognize it is called consciousness; if it cannot cognize, it lacks the mark of consciousness. Because something can receive, it is called feeling; if it cannot receive, it lacks the mark of feeling. Because something can remember, it is called mindfulness; if it cannot remember, it lacks the mark of mindfulness. Emergence is the mark of arising; if there is no emergence, there is no mark of arising. Sustaining is the mark of abiding; if there is no sustaining, there is no mark of abiding. Transformation is the mark of aging; if there is no transformation, there is no mark of aging. The exhaustion of life is the mark of death; if life is not exhausted, there is no mark of death. In the same way, destruction is the mark of impermanence; apart from destruction, there is no mark of impermanence.

If during arising and abiding impermanence is present but cannot destroy this existence and can destroy it only later, what use is there in co-arising? In that case, impermanence should exist only when this existence is destroyed. Therefore, the claim that impermanence arises together with existence but destroys it only later is untenable.

9. Existence and Nonexistence Are Both Empty, and Even Sentient Beings Are Empty

〔T30 0165a04〕 Thus, existence and nonexistence cannot be established together and cannot be established separately. Therefore, existence and nonexistence are both empty. Because existence and nonexistence are empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty; because all conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too; because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, sentient beings are empty too.

The preceding gates ask about arising, conditions, marks, and identity and difference. At the seventh gate, the author changes to a question closest to ordinary life: when a dharma “exists” and when that dharma eventually “does not exist,” do these occur at the same time or at different times?

The opening remains the same general statement: “Next, all dharmas are empty.” But the reason given by this gate is new: “Existence and nonexistence cannot be obtained at one time; nor can they be obtained at different times.” Placed within the same time, they cannot be found; placed in separate times, they still cannot be found. Both panels of the gate close together. It is not that one side is first refuted and the other later repaired.

1. The Verse’s Four Lines Ask about Conjunction and Separation at Once

“Existence and nonexistence do not occur at one time; existence apart from nonexistence does not exist either; if existence exists without separating from nonexistence, then existence should always be nonexistent.”

The first line closes conjunction: existence and nonexistence do not occur at the same time. The second closes separation: remove nonexistence and leave existence alone, and no such existence exists. The third and fourth turn back and press the side of separation once more. If existence does not separate from nonexistence and still exists, this existence should “always be nonexistent”—it would have been within nonexistence from beginning to end.

Not one of these four lines says that a jar cannot hold water. What is asked is the word exists: when you say that a thing exists, do you mean it possesses an entity standing by itself and having nothing to do with nonexistence?

2. Opposition: No Death at Arising, No Arising at Death

Why does conjunction fail? “The natures of existence and nonexistence oppose one another and should not coexist within a single dharma.” Two opposing matters cannot sit together in the same dharma.

The example lies within one’s own body: “There is no death at the time of arising and no arising at the time of death.” The instant of arising is not the instant of death. The author says little more here, noting only that “this has already been explained in the Treatise on the Middle,” and saves his force for the more difficult side below.

3. Separation: Apart from Nonexistence, How Could Existence Exist?

The opponent therefore changes to separation: “If existence exists apart from nonexistence, there is no fault.” Move nonexistence entirely away and speak only of existence. Surely this avoids the difficulty.

The author says, “This is untenable,” and immediately asks, “Apart from nonexistence, how could existence exist?”

The reason is not added by the author from outside; it already belongs to the opponent’s own account of dharmas. The author first recalls a statement from the preceding gate: “As explained before, when a dharma arises, seven dharmas arise together, counting its own entity.” Among them is this one: “Existence and impermanence always arise together.” What is impermanence? “Impermanence is the mark of cessation and is therefore called nonexistence.”

This point must be seen clearly: “nonexistence” is not something the author has added to the opponent’s view; it is one member of the opponent’s own account of dharmas. You say impermanence arises together with the dharma, impermanence is the mark of cessation, and the mark of cessation is nonexistence. To speak of existence “apart from nonexistence” is therefore to remove one member from your own system. The author concludes: “Thus, apart from nonexistence, existence cannot arise.”

4. It Cannot Be Removed, but It Cannot Remain Either

Separation fails, so let them remain unseparated. Yet nonseparation also exacts a price: “If existence arises without separating from impermanence, existence would always be nonexistent.” If impermanence arises and remains together with existence, existence bears destruction from the very moment of its birth and so remains in nonexistence from start to finish.

Once within nonexistence, one thing immediately loses its place: “at the beginning it would have no abiding, because it would always be perishing.” There would be no initial interval of abiding, for the dharma would always be in destruction.

Here the author uses no remote principle. He simply points to a presently evident fact: “yet abiding does in fact exist; therefore existence is not always nonexistent.” Dharmas do possess an interval of abiding, something the opponent himself acknowledges by establishing a mark called abiding. This very abiding blocks the claim of perpetual nonexistence.

Thus both ends are blocked: “If existence arises apart from impermanence, this too is incorrect. Why? Apart from impermanence, existence in fact does not arise.” Apart from impermanence, existence cannot arise; not apart from impermanence, existence is always nonexistent. The two words existence and nonexistence cannot cohere together or separately.

5. The Opponent’s Strongest Move: Impermanence Is Present but Has Not Yet Acted

At this point the opponent offers the gate’s strongest solution: “When existence arises, impermanence is already present but not yet active; at cessation it becomes active and destroys this existence.” Impermanence is indeed there, but simply has not acted. Only at the time of cessation does it act.

Unfolded, this is an entire system: “arising, abiding, cessation, aging, and acquisition all await their time to become active.” When existence begins, arising functions and makes it arise; in the interval between arising and cessation, abiding functions and holds it; at cessation, impermanence functions and destroys it; aging “changes arising into abiding and abiding into cessation”; impermanence destroys; and acquisition “constantly brings the four matters to completion.” Six factors coexist within one dharma, each doing its work at its appointed time. The conclusion is: “Therefore, although a dharma arises together with impermanence, existence is not always nonexistent.”

This solution is difficult to refute because it divides being present from functioning: the thing has long been there, but its function is not yet manifest. The author’s three following “furthermores” all enter precisely through this seam.

6. First Answer: If They Are Together, They Must Remain Together throughout

The author’s first sentence simply recites the opponent’s rule in the opponent’s own terms: “You say that impermanence is the mark of cessation and arises together with existence. Then when it arises, this existence should perish; and when it perishes, this existence should arise.”

Co-arising means being present together. Since the mark of cessation is already present at arising, the dharma should perish as it arises. By the same token, because the mark of arising remains present at destruction, it should arise as it is destroyed. To be half together and half in a queue is not co-arising.

7. Second Answer: Neither Arising nor Cessation

Next comes the shortest cut: “Furthermore, neither arising nor cessation is established.” Why? “At the time of cessation there should be no arising, and at the time of arising there should be no cessation, because arising and cessation oppose one another.”

This turns the rule of opposition from the second section back upon the marks of arising and cessation themselves. Opposites do not coexist. The opponent used this rule to say that existence and nonexistence do not share a time; the author establishes no new rule, but only requires consistency.

Not one new premise enters this cut. Since the opponent uses opposition to establish that existence and nonexistence are not simultaneous, the author uses the same measure upon arising and cessation: these two marks likewise oppose one another and cannot share a place. The instrument that refutes the opponent’s system is taken from the opponent’s own rule. This is the shared method of all three answers and why the gate reads without digression.

8. Third Answer: Abiding Opposes Destruction, Aging Opposes Abiding—“This Is Confusion”

The third answer applies opposition across the entire set of marks: “In your account, impermanence arises together with abiding. When existence perishes there should be no abiding, and if abiding exists there should be no destruction. Why? Because abiding and destruction oppose one another.” There is no abiding at the time of destruction and no destruction at the time of abiding. Another pair follows: “at the time of aging there is no abiding, and at the time of abiding there is no aging.”

The conclusion is severe: “Therefore, your claim that arising, abiding, cessation, aging, impermanence, and acquisition originally arise together is confusion.” The six do not each occupy their place; they obstruct one another.

9. Seven Examples: A Mark Is Spoken in Terms of What Can Actually Be Done

Where is the root of the confusion? The author asks: “If existence arises together with impermanence, and impermanence is the mark of destruction, then ordinary things have no mark of destruction when they arise and no mark of destruction while they abide. At those times, is this not precisely the absence of the mark of impermanence?”

You say impermanence is now present, but now no mark of destruction exists. When there is no mark of destruction, to what do the words mark of impermanence point?

The author gives seven examples in succession, all drawn from mind and life without borrowing a single external object: “Because something can cognize, it is called consciousness; if it cannot cognize, it lacks the mark of consciousness. Because something can receive, it is called feeling; if it cannot receive, it lacks the mark of feeling. Because something can remember, it is called mindfulness; if it cannot remember, it lacks the mark of mindfulness.” One must be able to cognize to be called consciousness, receive to be called feeling, and remember to be called mindfulness. Then come the four marks: “Emergence is the mark of arising; without emergence there is no mark of arising. Sustaining is the mark of abiding; without sustaining there is no mark of abiding. Transformation is the mark of aging; without transformation there is no mark of aging. The exhaustion of life is the mark of death; without the exhaustion of life there is no mark of death.”

All seven examples speak in one voice: a mark is not something hidden inside; it is spoken in terms of the work it can perform. When the work can be performed, the mark exists. When it cannot, the mark is absent.

The final sentence now follows naturally: “In the same way, destruction is the mark of impermanence; apart from destruction there is no mark of impermanence.” Destruction is the mark of impermanence. Apart from destruction, the word impermanence points nowhere. The phrase “already present but not yet active” has lost its footing: when it is not active, its mark is precisely absent.

10. What Use Is There in Co-arising?

The author therefore asks directly: “If during arising and abiding impermanence is present but cannot destroy existence, and only later can destroy it, what use is there in co-arising?”

It does not destroy at arising and does not destroy during abiding. What does it do by co-arising now? If co-arising performs no work, the words are an empty attachment.

The author carries the opponent’s claim to its end for him: “Impermanence should exist only when existence is destroyed.” Then simply speak of impermanence when destruction occurs. This is exactly what the author establishes: impermanence is not a thing hidden in advance awaiting activation, but a name spoken upon destruction. He therefore concludes, “Thus, the claim that impermanence co-arises but destroys existence only later is untenable.”

11. Empty All the Way to Sentient Beings

〔T30 0165a04〕 Both ends exhausted, the author concludes: “Thus, existence and nonexistence cannot be established together and cannot be established separately. Therefore, existence and nonexistence are empty.”

What follows is a line reaching farther with every clause: “Because existence and nonexistence are empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty; because all conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too; because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, sentient beings are empty too.”

Conditioned dharmas are called conditioned precisely through such marks as arising, abiding, and cessation. Since the marks cannot stand independently, the conditioned are empty. The unconditioned is named in contrast to the conditioned; when the conditioned are empty, the unconditioned have nothing against which to stand. Sentient being is a name spoken upon conditioned and unconditioned dharmas; when both sides are empty, this name too points to no intrinsic nature.

The gate’s weight lies in refusing to let anything remain within an object under the guise of “not yet active.” Destruction is not a thing buried in advance within the object, but a name established when the object reaches that point. A dharma abides for a time and also perishes; destruction is absent while it abides and abiding is absent while it perishes. This is precisely the appearance of dependence on conditions, not six intrinsically existent marks first installed within one dharma and then arranged in an order of activation.

Carried Forward: Illumination along the Same Axis

The preceding is the meaning of this gate itself. What follows is one cross-light along the same axis. The illumination is not this treatise; it simply records without deciding how the same doctrinal meaning is stated elsewhere.

Chapter fifteen of the Treatise on the Middle, “Examination of Existence and Nonexistence,” shares this gate’s name and edge but enters elsewhere. That chapter first gives a verse:

“If existence is not established, how could nonexistence be established? Because an existent dharma exists, its destruction is called nonexistence.”

The extended prose explains: “Because an existent dharma is destroyed, it is called nonexistence; this nonexistence exists in dependence upon the destruction of existence.” The name nonexistence is established through the “destruction of existence.” This follows the same road as the present gate’s conclusion that “impermanence should exist only when existence is destroyed.” Neither nonexistence nor impermanence exists beforehand; each receives its name upon destruction.

That chapter gives another verse:

“Fixed existence is clinging to permanence; fixed nonexistence is clinging to annihilation; therefore the wise should not cling to existence or nonexistence.”

Clinging to fixed existence falls into eternalism; clinging to fixed nonexistence falls into annihilationism. This gate does not enter through these two views. It directly tests, mark by mark, the opponent’s own account of seven co-arisen dharmas and functions awaiting their time. What both obstruct is the twofold attachment to existence and nonexistence; the roads by which they do so differ.

Read together along one axis, each remains in its own place. The meaning of this gate is still governed by this gate’s own extended prose.

Jizang wrote a specialized commentary on this gate in Taishō T42n1825. Its text was not extracted and checked word for word in this round, so its location alone is recorded without paraphrase.