十二門論 觀作者門第十

When people suffer, their first thought is usually to find someone. Did I bring it on myself? Did someone else impose it? Did heaven give it? Or did it simply happen? This gate receives all four thoughts together.

Four Cells

“Produced by oneself, produced by another, produced by both, or produced without a cause—when sought in these ways, suffering is not found.”

Self, other, both, or neither—once the question “Who produced it?” is asked, the answer can fall only into these four places. When all four are empty, the question itself has nowhere to land.

Two Ready Examples

Self-production requires suffering to create its own entity, yet “consciousness cannot cognize itself, and a finger cannot touch itself.” When subject and object are squeezed into one end, activity cannot begin. As for production by another, the master initially returns only one sentence: “How can another produce suffering?”

The Many Conditions Are Not an Agent

Someone finds a good refuge for production by another: are not the many conditions precisely other? The master answers adroitly. Since suffering arises from the many conditions, suffering is the shape those conditions take. Where is a separate other? “Clay cannot be called other”; “gold cannot be called other.” A jar does not treat clay as an outsider, nor a bracelet gold.

Moreover, the conditions cannot themselves govern:

“A result arises from many conditions, yet these conditions cannot govern themselves; since the conditions cannot govern themselves, how could they produce a result?”

A group that cannot govern itself cannot assemble a sovereign. Conditioned arising speaks of conditions, not commands.

The Buddha’s Four Silences

The naked ascetic Kāśyapa asks the same four cells in order. At the first question, “the Buddha remained silent and did not answer”; for the remaining three, “again the Buddha did not answer.”

It is not that he cannot choose among four answers. The questioner has already placed a permanent and pure spirit in his mind: it creates fine and ugly, suffering and pleasure, then itself goes on to receive a body. The four questions ask about the same being in four postures. To answer within any cell would be to nod assent.

The Spirit Taken Apart

Someone argues that this is a father teaching children to recognize pleasure. The master keeps asking: if he would teach pleasure, why not give pleasure rather than suffering? If worshiping one being could end suffering, why does each person plainly receive that person’s own results? If he needs something, he is constrained by the need. If he needs nothing, is creating all things not a child’s game? Who created him? Where did he stand while creating? Why must he practice austerities to seek another’s favor?

Then look at the world he created. Once created and fixed, “a horse should always be a horse and a person always a person,” yet the world changes with karma. If he created everything, there could be no demerit and merit, yet the world plainly has both. If all are his children, everyone should love him, yet there is hatred and love. If observing precepts and cultivating the holy life were useless, conventional dharmas would collapse entirely. The master returns only three words: “Yet this is not so.”

Even the creator in their own scripture must practice austerities again and again before producing creatures, birds, humans, and gods. This is a sequence of karma; they do not arise from austerities.

The Sentence That Remains

After dismantling all four cells, the master does not add another agent. He leaves only “arises from many causes and conditions.” This sentence is emptiness: “What arises from many causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature. Absence of intrinsic nature is emptiness.”

Suffering has no agent, yet it has conditions. Ask “Who gave it?” and nothing is found. Ask “Upon what does it continue?” and the path opens.

Nāgārjuna composed and the Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva translated the Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of the Agent, Gate Ten,” in the Later Qin · Taishō T30n1568. Paragraph openings marked 〔T30 …〕 give page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

1. The Four Kinds of Production Cannot Be Found

〔T30 0165c08〕Next, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because when sought, the four possibilities—self-production, production by another, production by both, and production without a cause—cannot be found. As the verse says:

Produced by oneself, produced by another, produced by both, or produced without a cause—when sought in each of these ways, suffering is not found.

2. Suffering Cannot Produce Itself

To say that suffering produces itself is untenable. Why? If it produced itself, it would make its own entity; yet this very thing cannot be used to produce this very thing. For example, consciousness cannot cognize itself, and a finger cannot touch itself. Therefore suffering cannot be called self-produced.

3. Suffering Cannot Be Produced by Another Either

The claim that suffering is produced by another is likewise untenable—for how could that other produce suffering?

4. The Many Conditions Cannot Be Called Other

The objector says: the many conditions are precisely what is called other. The many conditions produce suffering, so this is called production by another. How can you say that suffering is not produced by another?

The respondent says: if the many conditions are called other, then suffering is produced by those conditions. Yet because this suffering arises from the many conditions, it is the nature of those conditions. Since it is the nature of the conditions, how can the conditions be called other?

For example, clay cannot be called other than the jar made from clay, and gold cannot be called other than the bracelet made from gold. Suffering is the same: because it arises from many conditions, those conditions cannot be called other.

5. The Many Conditions Themselves Are Not Autonomous

Further, these many conditions do not exist through intrinsic natures and therefore cannot govern. Thus one cannot say that a result is produced from the many conditions. As the Treatise on the Middle says:

A result arises from many conditions, yet these conditions cannot govern themselves; since the conditions cannot govern themselves, how could they produce a result?

In this way, suffering cannot be produced by another.

6. Production by Both and Production without a Cause

Combining self-production and production by another is equally untenable, because it carries both faults. To say that suffering is self-produced and also produced by another entails both the fault of self-production and the fault of production by another. Thus production of suffering by both is untenable.

To say that suffering arises without a cause is also untenable, because it entails immeasurable faults.

7. Scriptural Evidence: Four Questions from the Naked Ascetic Kāśyapa

As a scripture records, the naked ascetic Kāśyapa asked the Buddha: is suffering self-produced? The Buddha remained silent and did not answer. World-Honored One, if suffering is not self-produced, is it produced by another? Again the Buddha did not answer. World-Honored One, if so, is suffering produced by both self and other? Again the Buddha did not answer. World-Honored One, if so, is suffering produced without causes or conditions? Again the Buddha did not answer.

The Buddha did not answer any of these four questions. One should know that suffering is empty.

8. Objection: The Buddha Did Not Say That Suffering Is Empty

〔T30 0166a05〕The objector says: when the Buddha taught this scripture, he did not say that suffering is empty.

The respondent says: he spoke in that way in accord with the beings who could be liberated.

This naked ascetic Kāśyapa regarded the person as the cause of suffering. Proponents of a self say that whatever is fine or ugly is created by the spirit; the spirit is eternally pure and free of distress; everything known and understood is the spirit. The spirit creates the fine and ugly, suffering and pleasure, and then itself receives various bodies. Holding this wrong view, he asked the Buddha whether suffering is self-produced. Therefore the Buddha did not answer.

9. The Self Cannot Produce Suffering: If the Self Were a Cause, It Would Be Impermanent

Suffering is in fact not produced by the self.

If the self were the cause of suffering and suffering arose because of the self, the self would be impermanent. Why? Every dharma that acts as a cause and every dharma arising from a cause is impermanent.

If the self were impermanent, the karmic results of demerit and merit would all be annihilated, and the meritorious results attained by cultivating the holy life would also come to nothing.

10. If the Self Produced Suffering, There Would Be No Liberation

If the self were the cause of suffering, there could be no liberation. Why? If the self produces suffering, then apart from suffering there would be no self capable of producing suffering, because it would have no body.

If it is said that suffering can be produced without a body, then those who have attained liberation should still suffer. There would consequently be no liberation. Yet liberation does exist. Thus the claim that suffering is self-produced is untenable.

11. Production of Suffering by Another Is Likewise Untenable

The claim that suffering is produced by another is also untenable. Apart from suffering, where is there a person producing suffering to give to another?

12. Production by Another Means Production by Maheśvara

Further, to say that suffering is produced by another amounts to saying that it is produced by Maheśvara. Because the question concerned precisely this wrong view, the Buddha did not answer it.

In fact, suffering does not come from Maheśvara. Why? Because the natures and marks contradict one another. For example, the calf born from a cow is still a cow. If all things were born from Maheśvara, they should all resemble Maheśvara, because all would be his children.

Further, if Maheśvara created beings, he should not give suffering to his own children. Thus one should not say that Maheśvara created suffering.

13. Objection: They Are Given Suffering Because They Do Not Recognize the Cause of Pleasure

The objector says: beings are born from Maheśvara, and suffering and pleasure are likewise produced by Maheśvara. Because beings fail to recognize the cause of pleasure, he gives them suffering.

14. Reply: If He Were Autonomous, It Should Not Be So

The respondent says: if beings were the children of Maheśvara, he should give them only pleasure to ward off suffering and should not give them suffering. Moreover, merely worshiping Maheśvara should extinguish suffering and bring pleasure. Yet this is not so. Each person independently creates the causes and conditions of suffering and pleasure and personally receives the karmic results; these are not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were truly autonomous, he should have no needs. One who has a need and sets about producing something cannot be called autonomous. If he needed nothing, why would he magically create all things like a child at play?

Next, if Maheśvara created beings, who created this Maheśvara? If Maheśvara created himself, this is untenable, just as one thing cannot create itself. If another created him, he would no longer be called autonomous.

Next, if Maheśvara were an effective agent, he would meet no obstruction in creating and would accomplish whatever he conceived. Yet the Maheśvara Scripture says: “Maheśvara wished to create all things and practiced many austerities; crawling creatures were then born. He again practiced austerities, and birds were born. He again practiced austerities, and humans and gods were born.” If he still had to practice austerities, producing venomous creatures first, birds next, and humans and gods only last, one should know that beings arise through the causes and conditions of karma, not through austerities.

Next, if Maheśvara created all things, where did he abide while creating them? Was this abode created by Maheśvara himself or by another? If Maheśvara created it, where did he abide while doing so? If he created it while abiding elsewhere, who created that other place? This produces an infinite regress. If another created it, there would be two autonomous lords. This is untenable. Therefore the world’s myriad things are not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were an effective agent, why would he practice austerities and make offerings to another, hoping to please that being and obtain what he wished? If he had to seek from another through austerities, one should know that he was not autonomous.

Next, if Maheśvara created all things, they should have been fixed upon their initial creation and should never change: a horse should always be a horse and a person always a person. Yet things now change in accordance with karma. One should know that they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if everything were created by Maheśvara, there could be no demerit or merit, good or evil, fine or ugly, because all would be created by Maheśvara. Yet demerit and merit do exist. Therefore they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if beings were all born from Maheśvara, they should all revere and love him as children love a father. Yet this is not so: some hate him and some cherish him. One should therefore know that they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were an effective agent, why did he not create only happy people or only suffering people? Why are some afflicted and others pleased? One should know that this arises from hatred and love and that he is therefore not autonomous. Since he is not autonomous, these things were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were an effective agent, beings should do nothing. Yet beings each devise means and undertake actions. One should therefore know that they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if he were an effective agent, good and evil, suffering and pleasure would arrive by themselves without being produced. This would destroy conventional dharmas: observing precepts and cultivating the holy life would be entirely useless. Yet this is not so. One should therefore know that they were not created by Maheśvara.

Next, if it is said that through the causes and conditions of meritorious karma he became great among beings, then other beings who cultivate meritorious karma should likewise become great. Why honor Maheśvara alone? If he is called autonomous without relying on causes and conditions, all beings likewise should be autonomous. Yet this is not so. One should know that things were not created by Maheśvara. If it is said that he received this autonomy from another, that other would in turn have to receive it from another, producing an infinite regress. An infinite regress is equivalent to having no cause.

15. Why the Buddha Did Not Answer

Through causes and reasons such as these, one should know that the myriad things are not born from Maheśvara and that no Maheśvara exists. Because the question concerned this wrong view and production by another, the Buddha did not answer.

Production by both is likewise untenable because it carries both faults. And because myriad things arise from the conjunction of many causes and conditions, they are not born without a cause. The Buddha did not answer this question either.

16. Objection: This Scripture Refutes Only Wrong Views; It Does Not Say Suffering Is Empty

Thus this scripture merely refutes those four wrong views and does not say that suffering is empty.

17. Reply: To Refute the Four Wrong Views Is Precisely to Teach Emptiness

The respondent says: although the Buddha spoke in this way—saying that suffering arises from many causes and conditions—refuting those four wrong views is precisely to teach emptiness. To say that suffering arises from many causes and conditions is to teach the meaning of emptiness.

Why? What arises from many causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature. Absence of intrinsic nature is emptiness.

Just as suffering is empty, one should know that conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and beings are all empty.

The architecture of this gate is easy to see. It establishes one verse, divides the origin of suffering into four cells, and empties them one by one. Yet halfway through, the treatise master suddenly stops arguing on his own and introduces a scripture. The naked ascetic Kāśyapa asks the Buddha the same four possibilities, and the scripture records only four words: “The Buddha remained silent and did not answer.”

A book devoted to argument cites silence as evidence at a crucial point. That fact itself deserves a pause.

1. The Gate’s Opening Verse: If Suffering Has an Agent, It Must Come from One of Four Places

〔T30 0165c08〕The master states his conclusion in the opening sentence: “Next, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because self-production, production by another, production by both, and production without a cause cannot be found.” He then establishes a verse:

“Produced by oneself, produced by another, produced by both, or produced without a cause—when sought in these ways, suffering is not found.”

The four cells divide as follows. If the power producing suffering lies in suffering itself, this is self-production. If it lies in something outside suffering, this is production by another. If each side contributes a part, this is production by both. If neither side counts, this is production without a cause. Every answer to the question “Who produced suffering?” must fall into one of these four cells. The treatise master has not merely summarized outsiders’ positions; the shape of the question itself determines them. Once one asks “Who produced it?”, the answer can only be self, other, both, or neither.

Thus the last line is decisive. If none of the four cells can stand, then suffering bearing an agent does not exist.

2. Self-Production Fails: Consciousness Cannot Cognize Itself, a Finger Cannot Touch Itself

The first cell is shortest and hardest. The master says: “If it produced itself, it would produce its own entity; yet this very thing cannot be used to produce this very thing.”

Self-production means suffering creates suffering’s own entity. But maker and made must occupy two ends. If both ends are the same thing, the word “produce” has nowhere to land. The master gives two ready examples: “Consciousness cannot cognize itself, and a finger cannot touch itself.”

Consciousness is capable of discrimination, but it cannot discriminate the very consciousness now discriminating. A finger can touch, but it cannot touch the same finger as an object. For contact, something other must stand opposite it. When subject and object collapse into one end, activity cannot be established.

3. Production by Another Fails: Clay Is Not Other than the Jar, Gold Is Not Other than the Bracelet

For the second cell, the master first passes over it in one sentence: “Production by another is likewise untenable. How can another produce suffering?”

It is so brief that it seems to say nothing. But someone immediately takes up the point, and this question is the most important in the gate:

“The many conditions are called other. Because the many conditions produce suffering, it is called production by another. How can you say that it is not produced by another?”

The questioner is astute. You yourselves teach that suffering arises from many conditions. Are the many conditions not things outside suffering? Is that not production by another? He wants to fit dependent arising itself into the second cell.

The master’s answer has two parts. First: “If the many conditions are called other, suffering is produced by the many conditions. Yet since this suffering arises from the many conditions, it is the nature of the many conditions. If it is precisely the nature of the many conditions, how can they be called other?”

Because suffering arises from the many conditions, suffering is the form made from those conditions. What is called other would have to be something entirely separate. Between what arises from the many conditions and the conditions from which it arises, precisely this total separation is absent. The master names two objects: “Clay cannot be called other than a clay jar; gold cannot be called other than a gold bracelet.”

Clay is not an outsider to the jar made from clay. Gold is not an outsider to the bracelet fashioned from gold. Point at clay and say, “This is something wholly other than the jar,” and the sentence cannot be completed. Suffering and its many conditions are just like this.

4. The Conditions Themselves Cannot Govern

The second part goes deeper: “Further, these many conditions do not exist through intrinsic natures and therefore cannot be autonomous. Thus one cannot say that a result is produced from the many conditions.”

Even if we provisionally permit the many conditions to be called an agent, we must ask whether this agent qualifies. To create, an agent must first stand on its own. Yet each condition exists only in dependence on others; not one exists through intrinsic nature. A group of things that cannot govern themselves cannot be assembled into a governing creator. The master cites the Treatise on the Middle:

“A result arises from many conditions, yet these conditions cannot govern themselves; since the conditions cannot govern themselves, how could they produce a result?”

We must see which side is refuted here. The master does not retract the statement “suffering arises from many conditions.” He will use that very statement to close the gate. What he refutes is reading “arises from many conditions” as “the agent called many conditions manufactured suffering.” Conditioned arising concerns conditions, not a sovereign. When conditions come together, the result is present; no one between them issues commands.

Thus the second cell closes: “In this way, suffering cannot be produced by another.”

5. Production by Both and without a Cause: One Doubles the Fault, the Other Makes It Measureless

The third cell hardly needs a separate refutation: “Self-production and production by another are both untenable because they have two faults. To say suffering is self-produced and produced by another carries the faults of both; therefore production of suffering by both is likewise untenable.”

Production by both adds self-production to production by another. Since each of the first two cells fails on its own, combining them merely brings both faults home.

The fourth cell takes the opposite route: “If suffering arises without a cause, this too is untenable because it entails immeasurable faults.” The master does not elaborate here, for uncaused arising entails not one or two but measureless faults. If suffering can exist without a cause, nothing determines when it exists, in whom, or how much. The world’s reasoning disintegrates with it.

All four cells are now empty.

6. Scriptural Evidence: Four Questions, Four Nonanswers

After the refutation, the master cites scripture: the naked ascetic Kāśyapa comes to question the Buddha.

First question: “Is suffering self-produced?”—“The Buddha remained silent and did not answer.” The second question changes to production by another; “again the Buddha did not answer.” The third asks production by both self and other; “again the Buddha did not answer.” The fourth asks production without causes or conditions; “again the Buddha did not answer.”

All four possibilities have been exhausted, and the Buddha has not spoken once. The master therefore judges: “The Buddha did not answer any of these four questions. One should know that suffering is empty.”

The four cells are exhaustive, yet the Buddha accepts none. There is only one explanation: what the Buddha rejects is not one cell but the premise shared by all four.

7. The Buddha Did Not Answer Because a Spirit Was Already Hidden in the Question

Someone immediately objects to this judgment: “When the Buddha taught this scripture, he did not say that suffering is empty.” The Buddha plainly said nothing in the scripture. How can one make emptiness speak for him?

The master’s reply first states a principle: “He spoke in that way in accord with the beings who could be liberated.” The Buddha speaks while looking at the person before him. To understand why he did not answer, we must first see who asked.

The master therefore gives Kāśyapa’s background: “This naked ascetic Kāśyapa regarded the person as the cause of suffering.” The doctrine of self behind him said: “The fine and ugly are all created by the spirit. The spirit is eternally pure and free of distress. Everything known and understood is the spirit. The spirit creates the fine and ugly, suffering and pleasure, and then itself receives various bodies.”

There is a spirit: permanent, pure, and itself free of distress. Everything known and understood is that spirit. It creates fine and ugly, suffering and pleasure, and after creating them goes on to receive various bodies.

Once this doctrine is seen, the four questions change shape. When Kāśyapa asks, “Is suffering self-produced?”, the “self” in his mind is not suffering itself but that spirit. When he asks about production by another, the “other” is the same spirit standing in a different place. All four questions ask about the same thing, arranged in four ways. If the Buddha answered within any cell, he would concede that permanent self. Therefore, “the Buddha did not answer.”

8. If the Self Were the Cause of Suffering, It Would Already Be Impermanent

After explaining the silence, the master supplies the reasons himself. The first follows impermanence: “Suffering is in fact not produced by the self. If the self were the cause of suffering and suffering arose from the self, the self would be impermanent. Why? Every dharma that acts as a cause and every dharma arising from a cause is impermanent.”

Whatever acts as a cause must move and meet its result; whatever moves is impermanent. By establishing the self as the cause of suffering, one has already pulled it into arising and cessation—yet permanence was the very reason for positing it.

The result collapses on both sides: “If the self were impermanent, the karmic results of demerit and merit would all be annihilated, and the meritorious results of cultivating the holy life would also come to nothing.”

Read this sentence slowly. Those who posit a self generally do so to preserve a bearer: something must carry demerit and merit through the path. Yet the moment the self is made a cause of suffering, it becomes impermanent. With impermanence, continuity between before and after is cut; the karmic results of demerit and merit are destroyed, and even the merit of cultivating the holy life collapses. The self posited to preserve a bearer is precisely what causes the bearer to be lost.

9. If the Self Can Produce Suffering, No One Can Get Out

The second reason follows liberation: “If the self were the cause of suffering, there would be no liberation. Why? If the self produces suffering, apart from suffering there is no self capable of producing suffering, because it has no body.”

To produce suffering requires somewhere for production to occur. Apart from suffering—apart from this body and mind of the five aggregates—the self has no body. By what could it produce?

Only one route remains: say it can produce without a body. The master has been waiting for precisely this: “If suffering could be produced without a body, one who has attained liberation should still suffer.”

If producing suffering does not require a body, then one who has relinquished the body and attained liberation still meets the conditions for producing suffering, and suffering should still fall upon that person. “There would then be no liberation. Yet liberation does exist. Therefore the claim that suffering is self-produced is untenable.”

Liberation exists—this is the side the master refuses to surrender. Any inference ending in “there is no liberation” proves the inference mistaken.

Production by another receives the same single sentence: “The claim that suffering is produced by another is also untenable. Apart from suffering, where is there a person producing suffering to give to another?” Apart from suffering, no person stands there carrying suffering over to someone else.

10. Production by Another Ultimately Means Production by Maheśvara

The master next reveals the true identity of the second cell: “Further, if suffering is produced by another, it is produced by Maheśvara.”

Follow the outsider’s “other” to its end and only one remains: Maheśvara, creator of all things. “Because the question concerned this wrong view, the Buddha did not answer.”

The master then begins his own work: “In fact, suffering is not produced by Maheśvara. Why? Because their natures and marks contradict one another, just as a calf born from a cow is still a cow.”

Like produces like and the offspring follows the kind: what a cow bears is still a cow. “If all things were born from Maheśvara, they should all resemble Maheśvara, because they are his children.” If all things are his children, they should resemble him. Yet he is said to be eternally pure and free of distress, while the myriad things are filled with suffering. Their natures do not correspond.

The point advances: “Further, if Maheśvara created beings, he should not give suffering to his children.” What father would personally hand suffering to his own children?

11. The Defense “They Do Not Recognize the Cause of Pleasure” Cannot Restore Autonomy

The outsider immediately supplies an explanation. Beings are Maheśvara’s children and both suffering and pleasure are produced by him. Because beings fail to recognize the cause of pleasure, he gives them suffering—as a father punishes a child in order to teach.

The master answers from the nearest point: “If beings were the children of Maheśvara, he should give them only pleasure to ward off suffering and should not give them suffering.” To teach children to recognize pleasure, give them pleasure; why create suffering? “Moreover, merely worshiping Maheśvara should extinguish suffering and bring pleasure.” If suffering and pleasure lie entirely in his hands, worshiping him alone should solve everything. “Yet this is not so. Each person independently creates the causes and conditions of suffering and pleasure and personally receives the karmic results; these are not created by Maheśvara.”

In fact, people each create the causes of their own suffering and pleasure and each receive their own results. Anyone can verify this personally; no one need wait for another’s judgment.

12. A Chain of “Further”s: Dismantling Autonomy until It Has Nowhere to Stand

From here, the master follows one “further” with another and dismantles the doctrine of Maheśvara item by item. The items may look miscellaneous, but their arrangement is deliberate: first autonomy is dismantled, then agency, and finally the world supposedly created.

First dismantle autonomy. “If he were autonomous, he should have no needs. One who has a need and sets about producing something cannot be called autonomous. If he needed nothing, why would he magically create all things like a child at play?” If he wants something, he is constrained by what he wants. If he wants nothing, creating all things is merely play without a reason. Neither resembles an autonomous lord.

Next ask where he himself came from: “If Maheśvara created himself, this is untenable, just as one thing cannot create itself. If another created him, he is not called autonomous.” Self-creation was already refuted in the first cell. If another created him, the place of autonomy belongs to that other.

Next dismantle his production. “If Maheśvara were an effective agent, he would meet no obstruction in creating and would accomplish whatever he conceived.” A true creator accomplishes merely by conceiving and need not labor. Yet what does their own Maheśvara Scripture say? “Maheśvara wished to create all things and practiced many austerities; crawling creatures were then born. He again practiced austerities, and birds were born. He again practiced austerities, and humans and gods were born.”

He must first practice austerities to produce crawling creatures, practice again to produce birds, and practice once more to produce humans and gods. Following this sequence, the master sees not an autonomous lord but a sequence of karma: “If through austerities venomous creatures were born first, birds next, and humans and gods afterward, one should know that beings arise through the causes and conditions of karma, not through austerities.” Their own scripture records a process of karmic maturation.

Next ask where he stands while creating: “If Maheśvara created all things, where did he abide while creating them?” If he also created this abode, where did he stand when creating it? “If he created it while abiding elsewhere, who created that other place? This produces an infinite regress. If another created it, there would be two autonomous lords.”

Next ask from whom he seeks: “Why would he practice austerities and make offerings to another, hoping to please that being and obtain what he wished? If he had to seek from another through austerities, one should know that he was not autonomous.” One who must offer to another and seek that being’s favor is no autonomous lord.

13. The World He Created Does Not Look as Though He Created It Either

Having dismantled the creator, the master turns to the world. If such a determinate creator truly existed, what should the world look like?

It should be unchanging: “Upon initial creation it should have been fixed and should not change: a horse should always be a horse and a person always a person. Yet things now change in accordance with karma.” Once created and fixed, a horse should remain a horse forever, yet what stands before us plainly changes with karma.

It should have no demerit and merit: “There would be no demerit or merit, good or evil, fine or ugly, because all would be created by Maheśvara. Yet demerit and merit do exist.” If he created everything, beings could bear no responsibility. Yet the world plainly has demerit and merit.

Everyone should love him: “All should revere and love him as children love a father. Yet this is not so; there is hatred and there is love.”

Suffering and pleasure should be uniform: “Why did he not create only happy people or only suffering people? Why are some afflicted and others pleased?” Whence comes the distinction between suffering and pleasure? “One should know this arises from hatred and love, and therefore he is not autonomous.” What is moved by hatred and love cannot be autonomous.

Beings should do nothing: “If Maheśvara were the agent, beings should do nothing.” Yet in fact “beings each devise means and undertake actions”; everyone makes plans and sets to work.

Practice should be useless: “Good and evil, suffering and pleasure would arrive without being produced, and this would destroy conventional dharmas. Observing precepts and cultivating the holy life would be entirely useless.” This is the weightiest point. If everything arrives by itself without action, observing precepts and cultivating the holy life are wasted, and every effort in the world is canceled. The master returns only three words: “Yet this is not so.”

Finally, even his greatness is dismantled: “If through the causes and conditions of meritorious karma he became great among beings, then other beings who cultivate meritorious karma should likewise become great. Why honor Maheśvara alone?” If merit made him great, others can become great by cultivating merit, and he is not unique. “If he is autonomous without causes and conditions, all beings likewise should be autonomous.” “If Maheśvara received autonomy from another, that other would again have received it from another, producing an infinite regress; an infinite regress is equivalent to having no cause.”

The master concludes: “One should know that the myriad things are not born from Maheśvara and that no Maheśvara exists. Because the question concerning production by another involved this wrong view, the Buddha did not answer.”

Not only do the myriad things he supposedly created not exist as his products; neither does he. The second cell is now entirely empty. The third and fourth close in passing: “Production by both is likewise untenable because it has two faults. Because myriad things arise from the conjunction of many causes and conditions, they do not arise without a cause; the Buddha did not answer.”

14. To Refute Wrong Views Is to Teach Emptiness

The objector has one final sentence: “Thus this scripture merely refutes the four wrong views and does not say that suffering is empty.” After all this, the argument only proves that the Buddha refuted four outsider views; it has not reached emptiness.

The master’s reply is the gate’s landing point: “Although the Buddha spoke in this way—saying that suffering arises from many causes and conditions—refuting the four wrong views is precisely to teach emptiness. To say that suffering arises from many causes and conditions is to teach the meaning of emptiness. Why? What arises from many causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature. Absence of intrinsic nature is emptiness.”

Read these sentences layer by layer. Refuting the four wrong views refutes the claim that suffering has an agent. When the agent is refuted, the remaining statement is “it arises from many causes and conditions.” Whatever arises from many causes and conditions does not hold its own establishment in its own hands and thus has no intrinsic nature. Absence of intrinsic nature is emptiness.

Emptiness is therefore not a fifth cell added outside the four. Emptiness is precisely the remaining sentence, “arises from many causes and conditions,” after all four cells have emptied together. The master does not posit another agent after completing the refutation. He removes the question “Who produced it?” at its root and replaces it with the conditions upon which it exists.

The final sentence expands this gate to the width of the whole treatise: “Just as suffering is empty, one should know that conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and beings are all empty.”

Suffering is only one specimen. The same ruler measures conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and beings, and passes through them all.

What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Gate?

First, see clearly that the four cells are produced by the question. Self, other, both, and no cause are not four truths of the world but the four answers permitted by the question “Who produced it?” If none can stand, the question itself must be relinquished.

Second, distinguish conditioned arising from production by conditions. The master never denies that suffering arises from many conditions. He denies reading the conditions as an agent. “Clay cannot be called other.” Clay forms a jar, but it is not an other standing opposite the jar.

Third, remember what the two arguments preserve. In refuting the self, the master refuses to surrender two things: karmic results of demerit and merit must continue, and liberation must truly allow someone to leave suffering. Any thesis that makes either collapse is itself mistaken.

Fourth, know that silence too can answer. “The Buddha did not answer any of these four questions.” When a question is built upon something nonexistent, the most honest response is not to select one of four wrong answers.

Carried Forward: Illumination from Treatises along the Same Axis

Everything above belongs to this gate’s own meaning. What follows looks alongside it through treatises on the same axis within the Three Treatises corpus. This illumination is not the present treatise, but another formulation of the same principle elsewhere. Record without adjudicating.

The opening verse of the “Examination of Suffering, Chapter Twelve” in the Treatise on the Middle has first two lines identical to this gate and different final two lines:

“Produced by oneself, produced by another, produced by both, or without a cause— to speak of sufferings in these ways is untenable with regard to the result.”

This gate says, “When sought in these ways, suffering is not found,” and closes on suffering’s absence. That chapter says, “To speak of sufferings in these ways is untenable with regard to the result,” and closes on the failure of the assertion. The same four cells: one concludes from suffering, the other from the statement.

That chapter refutes self-production with another analogy: “Suffering is not called self-produced; a dharma does not produce itself.” Its commentary uses the example of a blade unable to cut itself; this gate uses consciousness unable to cognize itself and a finger unable to touch itself. The analogies differ, but what they block is the same.

That chapter also has a verse: “If a person produced suffering himself, apart from suffering where would there be a person?” Its force resembles this gate’s “Apart from suffering, where is there a person producing suffering to give to another?” Both challenge the existence of a person apart from suffering. In refuting production without a cause, that chapter notes “Uncaused production has many faults, as explained in the ‘Examination of Action and Agent’”; this gate says only that it “entails immeasurable faults” and does not elaborate.

As for extension, that chapter’s closing verse says: “Not only can suffering not be explained through the four alternatives; for all external things, the four alternatives likewise cannot be established.” It extends to external things. This gate says, “Just as suffering is empty, one should know that conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and beings are all empty.” It extends to the conditioned, the unconditioned, and beings. The directions differ in breadth, while the principle on which they rely is one.

What belongs uniquely to this gate and not to that chapter is the long passage on Maheśvara: from contradiction of natures and marks, absence of needs, and the regress of abodes, to demerit and merit, hatred and love, and the uselessness of precepts and the holy life. Its weight lies precisely in refusing to remain at the level of terminology; point after point returns to what a person can verify directly.

Let parallel axes illuminate one another while each remains in its own place. This gate’s meaning is still governed by the prose of this gate.