十二門論 觀性門第八

〔T30 0165a09〕
心要Essence

這一扇門審的是「性」字。凡要領這個名的,先過兩關。

第一關:你改不改?

改了就出局。「諸法若有性,則不應變異」——而放眼一切法,無一不在變。頌立得直:

  「見有變異相,諸法無有性;
  無性法亦無,諸法皆空故。」

後兩句是回身補的一刀:別把「無性」領回去當新名牌。

第二關:你等不等人?

要等眾緣才有的,是被造出來的,不是性。論主給定義:「不作法不因待他名為性」。緣起法兩關皆不過,所以空。

有人喊:你把四諦拆了

苦集滅道、沙門果、佛法僧,說是隨空一齊倒。論主先分二諦:「因世諦得說第一義諦」,再點病根——「汝今聞說世諦,謂是第一義諦」。空不在因緣法之外:「是因緣法無自性,故我說是空。」

然後把那一串原樣還他。五陰有定性便無生滅,無生滅便無無常,無無常便無苦;「諸法若有定性,則無苦滅聖諦。何以故?性無變異故。」——苦滅不了,道也修不成。拆四諦的從來不是空。

推到世間亦然:定性之下無罪無福,「世間常是一相」。

最後一處落腳

改口說他性?「他性即是他自性故」——搬了位置,還是那個性。自他俱不成,離二亦無法可得。也別掉頭去立一個無:「若有不成,無亦不成。」

「有為、無為尚空,何況我耶?」

This gate examines the word nature. Anything claiming that name must first pass two gates.

First Gate: Do You Change?

If it changes, it is disqualified. “If dharmas possessed intrinsic nature, they should not alter”—yet wherever one looks, every dharma changes. The verse states it directly:

“Seeing that dharmas bear the mark of alteration, one knows that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature; even a dharma of no intrinsic nature does not exist, because all dharmas are empty.”

The latter two lines turn back for one more cut: do not reclaim “absence of intrinsic nature” as a new nameplate.

Second Gate: Do You Wait for Others?

Whatever waits for conditions in order to exist is made, not nature. The treatise author gives a definition: “What is not made and does not depend upon another is called nature.” Dependently arisen dharmas fail both gates and therefore are empty.

Someone Shouts: You Have Dismantled the Four Truths

Suffering, origin, cessation, path, the fruits of recluseship, and Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha are said to fall together with emptiness. The author first distinguishes the two truths: “Through the conventional truth one can state the truth of the ultimate meaning.” He then identifies the illness: “You now hear a teaching of conventional truth and take it to be the truth of the ultimate meaning.” Emptiness is not outside conditioned dharmas: “These conditioned dharmas have no intrinsic nature; therefore I call them empty.”

He then returns the entire chain unchanged. If the five aggregates had fixed nature, they would neither arise nor cease; without arising and ceasing there would be no impermanence, and without impermanence no suffering. “If dharmas had fixed nature, there would be no noble truth of the cessation of suffering. Why? Because nature does not alter.” Suffering could not cease, and the path could not be cultivated. It was never emptiness that dismantled the four truths.

The same inference reaches the world: under fixed nature there would be neither demerit nor merit, and “the world would always have a single mark.”

The Final Place to Stand

Change the claim to other-nature? “Other-nature is precisely the other’s own self-nature.” Its position has moved, but it remains the same nature. When self and other both fail, no dharma can be found apart from them. Nor may one turn around and establish nonexistence: “If existence is not established, nonexistence is not established either.”

“Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?”

原典Canonical · verbatim

龍樹菩薩造,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《十二門論》卷一〈觀性門第八〉· 大正藏 T30n1568〔起 T30 0165a09〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。

〔T30 0165a09〕復次,一切法空。何以故?諸法無性故。如說:   見有變異相,諸法無有性;
  無性法亦無,諸法皆空故。
諸法若有性,則不應變異;而見一切法皆變異,是故當知諸法無性。復次,若諸法有定性,則不應從眾緣生;若性從眾緣生者,性即是作法;不作法不因待他名為性,是故一切法空。 問曰:「若一切法空,則無生無滅;若無生滅,則無苦諦;若無苦諦,則無集諦;若無苦、集諦,則無滅諦;若無苦滅,則無至苦滅道。若諸法空無性,則無四聖諦;無四聖諦故,亦無四沙門果;無四沙門果故,則無賢聖。是事無故,佛、法、僧亦無,世間法皆亦無。是事不然,是故諸法不應盡空。」 答曰:「有二諦:一、世諦,二、第一義諦。因世諦得說第一義諦,若不因世諦,則不得說第一義諦;若不得第一義諦,則不得涅槃。若人不知二諦,則不知自利、他利、共利。如是若知世諦,則知第一義諦;知第一義諦,則知世諦。汝今聞說世諦,謂是第一義諦,是故墮在失處。諸佛因緣法,名為甚深第一義,是因緣法無自性,故我說是空。 「若諸法不從眾緣生,則應各有定性,五陰不應有生滅相;五陰不生不滅,即無無常;若無無常,則無苦聖諦。若無苦聖諦,則無因緣生法集聖諦。諸法若有定性,則無苦滅聖諦。何以故?性無變異故。若無苦滅聖諦,則無至苦滅道。是故若人不受空,則無四聖諦;若無四聖諦,則無得四聖諦;若無得四聖諦,則無知苦、斷集、證滅、修道,是事無故則無四沙門果;無四沙門果故,則無得、向者。若無得、向者,則無佛;破因緣法故,則無法;以無果故,則無僧;若無佛、法、僧,則無三寶。若無三寶,則壞世俗法。此則不然,是故一切法空。 「復次,若諸法有定性,則無生無滅、無罪無福;無罪福果報,世間常是一相。是故當知諸法無性。 「若謂諸法無自性、從他性有者,是亦不然。何以故?若無自性,云何從他性有?因自性有他性故。又他性即亦是自性。何以故?他性即是他自性故。若自性不成,他性亦不成;若自性、他性不成,離自性、他性何處更有法?若有不成,無亦不成。是故今推求無自性、無他性,無有、無無故,一切有為法空。有為法空故,無為法亦空;有為、無為尚空,何況我耶?」

The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.

白話Plain reading

龍樹菩薩造,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《十二門論》卷一〈觀性門第八〉·大正藏 T30n1568。段首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。

一、一切法空,因為諸法無性

〔T30 0165a09〕其次,一切法都是空的。為什麼?因為諸法沒有自性的緣故。如所說的偈:

  見到諸法都帶著變異之相,可知諸法並沒有自性;
  而那個無性之法也同樣不可立,因為諸法全都是空的。

二、會變異,就不是有性

諸法若真有自性,就不應當有變異;然而現見一切法都在變異,因此應當知道諸法沒有自性。

再說,若諸法有固定的自性,就不應當從眾緣而生。若說這個性是從眾緣生出來的,那麼這個性就成了被造作之法;而唯有不是被造作、也不因待他物的,才名為性。因此一切法都是空的。

三、問難:一切法空,四諦三寶就都沒有了

問的一方說:若一切法都是空的,那就沒有生、也沒有滅;若沒有生滅,就沒有苦諦;若沒有苦諦,就沒有集諦;若既沒有苦諦也沒有集諦,就沒有滅諦;若沒有苦的息滅,也就沒有通向苦滅的道。

若諸法空而無性,就沒有四聖諦;沒有四聖諦的緣故,也就沒有四種沙門果;沒有四沙門果的緣故,就沒有賢聖之人。這些既然都沒有,佛、法、僧也就沒有了,世間之法也全都沒有了。這是說不通的,所以諸法不應當全都是空。

四、答:有世諦與第一義諦

答的一方說:有二諦——一是世諦,二是第一義諦。

因著世諦,才得以說第一義諦;若不因著世諦,就不能說第一義諦;若不能得到第一義諦,就不能得涅槃。人若不知這二諦,就不知道自利、他利與共利。

像這樣:若知道世諦,就能知道第一義諦;知道第一義諦,就能知道世諦。你如今所聽見的說法本是世諦,卻以為那就是第一義諦,因此墮在錯失之處。

諸佛所說的因緣之法,名為甚深的第一義;這因緣之法沒有自性,所以我說它是空。

五、真正破壞四諦的,是定性

若諸法不從眾緣而生,就應當各自有固定的自性,五陰便不應當有生滅之相;五陰不生不滅,就沒有無常;若沒有無常,就沒有苦聖諦。

若沒有苦聖諦,就沒有那從因緣生法而說的集聖諦。諸法若有定性,就沒有苦滅聖諦。為什麼?因為性沒有變異的緣故。若沒有苦滅聖諦,就沒有通向苦滅的道。

因此,人若不接受空,就沒有四聖諦;若沒有四聖諦,就沒有證得四聖諦這件事;若沒有證得四聖諦,就沒有知苦、斷集、證滅、修道。

這些既然都沒有,就沒有四種沙門果;沒有四沙門果的緣故,就沒有得果的人、也沒有向果的人。若沒有得者與向者,就沒有佛;破壞了因緣之法的緣故,就沒有法;因為沒有果的緣故,就沒有僧。若沒有佛、法、僧,就沒有三寶。若沒有三寶,世俗之法也就壞了。這是說不通的,所以一切法都是空的。

六、若有定性,世間永遠只是一個相

其次,若諸法有固定的自性,就沒有生、沒有滅,也沒有罪、沒有福;既沒有罪福的果報,世間就永遠只是一個相。因此應當知道,諸法沒有自性。

七、自性、他性、有、無都不成立

若說諸法雖沒有自性,卻是從他性而有的,這也不對。為什麼?若沒有自性,怎麼會從他性而有?因為正是憑著自性才說得上他性的緣故。

再說,他性其實也就是自性。為什麼?因為他性就是那個他自己的自性的緣故。

若自性不能成立,他性也就不能成立;若自性、他性都不能成立,那麼離開自性與他性,還有什麼地方另外有法?

有既然不成立,無也就不成立。

因此如今這樣推求下來:沒有自性,沒有他性;既沒有有,也沒有無——所以一切有為法都是空的。有為法既然是空的,無為法也就是空的。有為、無為尚且是空的,何況那個我呢?

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Nature, Gate Eight,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. All Dharmas Are Empty Because They Possess No Intrinsic Nature

〔T30 0165a09〕 Next, all dharmas are empty. Why? Because dharmas possess no intrinsic nature. As the verse states:

Seeing that dharmas bear the mark of alteration, one knows that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature; even a dharma of no intrinsic nature does not exist, because all dharmas are empty.

2. Whatever Alters Does Not Possess Intrinsic Nature

If dharmas truly possessed intrinsic nature, they should not alter. Yet one directly sees all dharmas altering. One should therefore know that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature.

Furthermore, if dharmas possessed fixed intrinsic nature, they should not arise from a multitude of conditions. If one says that this nature is produced from conditions, then this nature becomes a made dharma. Only what is not made and does not depend upon anything else is called nature. Therefore all dharmas are empty.

3. Objection: If All Dharmas Are Empty, the Four Truths and Three Jewels Do Not Exist

The questioner says: If all dharmas are empty, there is no arising and no cessation. If there is no arising or cessation, there is no truth of suffering. If there is no truth of suffering, there is no truth of origin. If neither the truth of suffering nor the truth of origin exists, there is no truth of cessation. If suffering does not cease, there is also no path leading to the cessation of suffering.

If dharmas are empty and possess no intrinsic nature, the four noble truths do not exist. Because the four noble truths do not exist, the four fruits of recluseship do not exist. Because the four fruits do not exist, no noble persons exist. Since none of these exist, Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha do not exist either, and all worldly dharmas likewise do not exist. This is untenable. Therefore dharmas should not all be empty.

4. Answer: There Are the Conventional Truth and the Truth of the Ultimate Meaning

The respondent says: There are two truths—first, the conventional truth; second, the truth of the ultimate meaning.

Through the conventional truth one can state the truth of the ultimate meaning. Without relying on the conventional truth, one cannot state the truth of the ultimate meaning. If one cannot attain the truth of the ultimate meaning, one cannot attain nirvāṇa. If a person does not know these two truths, that person does not know benefit to self, benefit to others, or shared benefit.

Thus, if one knows the conventional truth, one can know the truth of the ultimate meaning; if one knows the truth of the ultimate meaning, one can know the conventional truth. The teaching you now hear belongs to the conventional truth, but you take it to be the truth of the ultimate meaning and thereby fall into error.

The conditioned dharmas taught by the buddhas are called the profound truth of the ultimate meaning. Because these conditioned dharmas possess no intrinsic nature, I call them empty.

5. What Truly Destroys the Four Truths Is Fixed Nature

If dharmas did not arise from a multitude of conditions, each should possess its own fixed intrinsic nature, and the five aggregates should not bear marks of arising and cessation. If the five aggregates neither arose nor ceased, there would be no impermanence. If there were no impermanence, there would be no noble truth of suffering.

If there were no noble truth of suffering, there would be no noble truth of origin taught from dharmas arising through causes and conditions. If dharmas possessed fixed nature, there would be no noble truth of the cessation of suffering. Why? Because nature does not alter. If there were no noble truth of the cessation of suffering, there would be no path leading to the cessation of suffering.

Therefore, if a person does not accept emptiness, the four noble truths do not exist. If the four noble truths do not exist, there is no realization of the four noble truths. If there is no realization of the four noble truths, there is no knowing suffering, abandoning origin, realizing cessation, or cultivating the path.

Since none of these exist, the four fruits of recluseship do not exist. Because the four fruits do not exist, there are no persons who have attained a fruit and no persons proceeding toward a fruit. If there are no attainers and no persons proceeding toward attainment, there is no Buddha. Because conditioned dharmas have been destroyed, there is no Dharma. Because no fruits exist, there is no Saṅgha. If there is no Buddha, Dharma, or Saṅgha, there are no Three Jewels. If there are no Three Jewels, worldly dharmas too are destroyed. This is untenable. Therefore all dharmas are empty.

6. With Fixed Nature, the World Would Forever Have a Single Mark

Next, if dharmas possessed fixed intrinsic nature, there would be no arising, no cessation, no demerit, and no merit. Since there would be no fruits of demerit and merit, the world would forever possess a single mark. One should therefore know that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature.

7. Self-Nature, Other-Nature, Existence, and Nonexistence Are All Unestablished

If one says that although dharmas have no self-nature they exist through other-nature, this too is incorrect. Why? If no self-nature exists, how could something exist through other-nature? For other-nature can be spoken of only on the basis of self-nature.

Moreover, other-nature is in fact self-nature. Why? Because other-nature is precisely that other’s own self-nature.

If self-nature cannot be established, other-nature cannot be established either. If neither self-nature nor other-nature can be established, where apart from self-nature and other-nature could any further dharma exist?

Since existence is not established, nonexistence is not established either.

Thus, when one now investigates in this way, there is no self-nature and no other-nature; there is neither existence nor nonexistence. Therefore all conditioned dharmas are empty. Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too. Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?

義疏Exposition

前面幾門一路破因緣、破緣、破相、破一異、破有無;到這第八門,論主把刀口收到一個字上:性。

門名叫作觀性。所觀的不是某一個法,是「性」這個東西本身——人以為每個法背後有一個自己站得住、不待別的、也不會變的底子。這一門只做一件事:把這個底子照一照,看它禁不禁得起「變」與「待」這兩件事。

一、開口便給理由:「一切法空。何以故?諸法無性故。」

論主起手一句:「一切法空。何以故?諸法無性故。」

要留意這一句的次序。不是先說空,再去找無性作註腳;是以無性作理由,推出空。空是結論,無性是所以然。這一門底下所有的話,都是在把「諸法無性」這四個字證住。

證的憑據,論主先立一頌:

  「見有變異相,諸法無有性;
  無性法亦無,諸法皆空故。」

上二句是一條看得見的路:現前見到諸法都帶著變異之相,由此可知諸法沒有性。下二句立刻回身:那個「無性」也不是另一個可立的法——因為諸法全都是空的。

這下二句最容易被讀漏。人破掉自性之後,往往順手把「無性」立成萬法共有的一種底質,那便是換了名字的自性。論主在頌裡就先把這條退路封了。

二、第一證:「諸法若有性,則不應變異」

論主把上二句講開:「諸法若有性,則不應變異;而見一切法皆變異,是故當知諸法無性。」

這一證是從現量走的。所謂性,若真是它自己本來就有、不從別處得的,那它就沒有理由改;改了,就表示那個『本來就有』原來作不了主。而現前所見,一切法沒有一個不在變。既然全在變,就沒有一個是有性的。

論主用來作證的不是道理,是眼前。「而見一切法皆變異」——這五個字是全門的第一個著力點。

三、第二證:性一旦從緣生,就成了作法

第二證換一個角度:「若諸法有定性,則不應從眾緣生」。

有定性的東西不必等緣;要等緣才有的,就不是有定性。對面若退一步說:那我承認這個性也是從緣生的呢?論主答:「若性從眾緣生者,性即是作法」——從緣生就是被造作出來的,被造作出來的東西怎麼還叫作性?

然後給出性之為性的定義:「不作法不因待他名為性」。不是被造作、也不因待別的東西——這兩條缺一,性這個名字就掛不住。而緣起法恰恰兩條都缺。所以論主收:「是故一切法空。」

第一證從變異說,第二證從待緣說。變與待是同一件事的兩面:不能自主,所以會變;會變,正因為不能自主。

四、對面的大反難:你把四諦三寶都說沒了

到這裡,對面提出這一門裡最重的一難,也是全論最重的一難:「若一切法空,則無生無滅」——沒有生滅,苦諦就沒有;苦諦沒有,集諦沒有;苦集沒有,滅諦沒有;苦滅沒有,道也沒有。

「若諸法空無性,則無四聖諦」;四聖諦沒有,四沙門果沒有;沙門果沒有,賢聖沒有;賢聖沒有,佛、法、僧沒有,世間法也一併沒有。所以他說:「是事不然,是故諸法不應盡空。」

這一難不是強詞。它把空與修證放在對立面上:你若說一切皆空,那我修的是什麼、證的是什麼?論主的回答不是縮小空的範圍,是指出對面把兩個層次混在一處了。

五、答的第一步:先分二諦

論主答:「有二諦:一、世諦,二、第一義諦。」

接著說二諦之間的次第:「因世諦得說第一義諦,若不因世諦,則不得說第一義諦」——第一義諦不是離開世諦另有一處可到;它要憑著世諦的言說才說得出來。再往下一步是果地:「若不得第一義諦,則不得涅槃。」

於是三段連成一條路:世諦是說第一義諦的憑藉,第一義諦是得涅槃的憑藉。中間任何一節抽掉,後面都無從說起。

不知二諦的人會怎樣?「若人不知二諦,則不知自利、他利、共利。」——三種利益都在二諦上安立:不知世諦,便無因果次第可行,利不起來;不知第一義諦,便把行門執成實有,利也究竟不了。

而知了以後,二諦是互通的:「若知世諦,則知第一義諦;知第一義諦,則知世諦。」不是先知一頭再知另一頭,是知任一頭即知另一頭。

六、「汝今聞說世諦,謂是第一義諦」

論主接著把對面的病根一句點破:「汝今聞說世諦,謂是第一義諦,是故墮在失處。」

對面聽見的生滅、四諦、沙門果,本是就世諦而說的;他卻把這些當作第一義諦上的自性之有。所以一聽說第一義諦是空,就以為那些全被取消。病不在他信四諦,在他把四諦讀成了有自性的四諦。

論主隨即把自己的空義正面說出:「諸佛因緣法,名為甚深第一義,是因緣法無自性,故我說是空。」

甚深第一義不是別的,就是因緣法;因緣法無自性,所以說空。空不是在因緣法之外另立一義,空就是因緣法本身這件事被說清楚。

七、翻轉:真正破壞四諦的,是定性

答的後半,論主把對面的難整個翻過來:破四諦的不是空,是定性。

「若諸法不從眾緣生,則應各有定性,五陰不應有生滅相」——五陰若各有定性,就沒有生滅;「五陰不生不滅,即無無常;若無無常,則無苦聖諦。」苦之所以是苦,正在無常;無常之所以有,正在生滅;生滅之所以有,正在從緣。定性一立,這條線從頭斷起。

苦諦既無,集諦亦無;再往下:「諸法若有定性,則無苦滅聖諦。何以故?性無變異故。」這一句是全門的樞紐——苦若有定性,它就永遠是它,滅不掉。滅諦既無,道諦亦無,因為無處可去。

於是四諦全數落空。論主據此下判:「若人不受空,則無四聖諦」。四聖諦沒有,證得四聖諦這件事也沒有;證得沒有,「則無知苦、斷集、證滅、修道」。四種行沒有,四沙門果沒有;果沒有,得者向者沒有——沒有得者向者,就沒有佛;破了因緣法,就沒有法;沒有果,就沒有僧。「若無佛、法、僧,則無三寶。若無三寶,則壞世俗法。」

對面拿來責難空的那一整串,論主原樣還了回去,只換掉一個前提。同一串推論,掛在空上不成立,掛在定性上句句成立。

八、若有定性,世間常是一相

翻轉之後,論主再補一段,把話從聖法推到世間:「若諸法有定性,則無生無滅、無罪無福;無罪福果報,世間常是一相。」

定性之下,沒有生滅,也就沒有造作;沒有造作,罪福無從成立;罪福不成,果報無從成立。那麼世間會是什麼樣子?——永遠只是一個相,不增不減,不善不惡,誰也不會變成別的樣子。

而現前的世間不是這樣。所以論主收:「是故當知諸法無性。」

九、他性也救不了

最後一段回到「性」字上作總收。對面最後一退:自性我不說了,說他性——「若謂諸法無自性、從他性有者,是亦不然。」

理由有二。其一:「若無自性,云何從他性有?因自性有他性故。」他這個名字是對著自立的;自那一頭既然無性,他這一頭就沒有可對之處。

其二更利:「他性即是他自性故。」你所謂的他性,站在那個他自己的立場上看,正是他的自性。換一個角度並不能造出一個新的性來——他性不過是搬了位置的自性。所以「若自性不成,他性亦不成」。

二者都不成,還有第三處嗎?「離自性、他性何處更有法?」——沒有。

十、有不成,無亦不成

論主末後把「有」與「無」一併收掉:「若有不成,無亦不成。」

這一句要讀準。破了自性、他性,是把「有」破掉了;人這時很容易轉身去立一個「無」。可是無是對著有而立的名——有既然立不住,無也就沒有所對,同樣立不住。不是破有以成無,是有無一時俱遣。

於是全門收在一句上:「有為法空故,無為法亦空;有為、無為尚空,何況我耶?」

從有為推到無為,再推到我。這與第一門末後的次第是同一副心腸:不許人在最後留一個安全的地方。

讀這一門的人可以帶走什麼

一是把「變」當作現成的證據。不必等到玄遠處去求無自性,眼前一切法都在變異,這就是論主的第一證。

二是記得無性不能被立成一個性。頌的下二句「無性法亦無」,是這一門對讀者最要緊的一句話。

三是認清空與四諦的關係是相成不是相破。四諦要能運轉,就得有生滅、有無常、有可斷可證;而這些只在無自性中才成立。

四是知道二諦不是兩個真理,是一條路的兩段。「因世諦得說第一義諦」——離了世諦的言說,第一義諦連說都說不出來。

承衍:同軸之照

以上是本門自身之義。此下就三論同軸的一處旁照——照非本論,只是同一義理在別處的說法,並錄不判。

《中論》〈觀有無品第十五〉所觀與此門最近,也是從性從緣出說起:

  「眾緣中有性,是事則不然;
  性從眾緣出,即名為作法。」

又立性之定義:

  「性名為無作,不待異法成。」

不作、不待異法——與本門「不作法不因待他名為性」是同一條界線。那一品又說:

  「若法實有性,後則不應異;
  性若有異相,是事終不然。」

亦即本門的第一證。所異者在取徑:那一品順著有無二見一路遮到斷常,末後歸在「不應著有無」;本門則以四諦三寶之難為軸,先受對面之責,再原樣翻轉還之。所觀之性相同,所對之機有別。

同軸互照,各還其位;本門的義理仍以本門長行為準。

The preceding gates successively refuted causes and conditions, conditions, marks, unity and difference, and existence and nonexistence. At the eighth gate, the treatise author brings the blade to rest upon a single word: nature.

The gate is called “Examination of Nature.” What it examines is not the nature of any one dharma, but the very thing called nature—the foundation people imagine behind each dharma, standing on its own, depending on nothing else, and never changing. This gate does only one thing: it holds that foundation to the light and asks whether it can withstand alteration and dependence.

1. The Opening Gives Its Reason: “All Dharmas Are Empty. Why? Because Dharmas Possess No Intrinsic Nature.”

The author begins with one sentence: “All dharmas are empty. Why? Because dharmas possess no intrinsic nature.”

Notice the order. He does not first declare emptiness and then find absence of intrinsic nature as a gloss. Absence of intrinsic nature is the reason from which emptiness follows. Emptiness is the conclusion; absence of intrinsic nature is its ground. Everything said below in this gate establishes the four words “dharmas possess no nature.”

As evidence, the author first sets down a verse:

“Seeing that dharmas bear the mark of alteration, one knows that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature; even a dharma of no intrinsic nature does not exist, because all dharmas are empty.”

The first two lines follow a visible path: one presently sees that dharmas all bear the mark of alteration, and therefore knows that they possess no intrinsic nature. The final two immediately turn back: even “absence of intrinsic nature” is not another dharma that can be established, because all dharmas are empty.

These last two lines are easily overlooked. After refuting intrinsic nature, people often turn the absence of intrinsic nature into a common substrate shared by all dharmas. That would merely be intrinsic nature under a changed name. The author closes that escape route within the verse itself.

2. First Demonstration: “If Dharmas Possessed Intrinsic Nature, They Should Not Alter”

The author unfolds the first two lines: “If dharmas possessed intrinsic nature, they should not alter; yet one sees all dharmas altering. Therefore one should know that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature.”

This demonstration proceeds from what is immediately evident. If nature truly belonged to a thing of itself and were not acquired elsewhere, that thing would have no reason to change. If it changes, then what was supposedly “already there in itself” never governed it. Yet all that is presently seen is changing; not one dharma fails to alter. Since everything changes, nothing possesses intrinsic nature.

The author’s evidence is not an abstraction but what stands before the eyes. “Yet one sees all dharmas altering”—these words are the first point at which the whole gate applies its weight.

3. Second Demonstration: Once Nature Arises from Conditions, It Becomes Something Made

The second demonstration changes angle: “If dharmas possessed fixed intrinsic nature, they should not arise from a multitude of conditions.”

Something with fixed nature need not wait for conditions. Whatever waits for conditions in order to exist does not possess fixed nature. Suppose the opponent retreats and says: what if I concede that nature itself arises from conditions? The author answers: “If nature arose from a multitude of conditions, nature would be a made dharma.” What arises from conditions is produced; how can something produced still be called nature?

He then defines what it means to be nature: “What is not made and does not depend upon another is called nature.” Not produced, and not dependent on anything else: if either condition is absent, the name nature cannot hold. Dependently arisen dharmas lack both. The author therefore concludes, “Thus all dharmas are empty.”

The first demonstration speaks from alteration; the second from dependence on conditions. Alteration and dependence are two faces of one matter: because something cannot govern itself, it changes; it changes precisely because it cannot govern itself.

4. The Great Counterobjection: You Have Said Away the Four Truths and Three Jewels

At this point the opponent raises the weightiest objection in this gate, and indeed in the entire treatise: “If all dharmas are empty, there is no arising and no cessation.” Without arising and cessation, the truth of suffering does not exist; without the truth of suffering, the truth of origin does not exist; without suffering and origin, the truth of cessation does not exist; without the cessation of suffering, there is no path.

“If dharmas are empty and possess no intrinsic nature, the four noble truths do not exist.” Without the four noble truths there are no four fruits of recluseship; without those fruits there are no noble persons; without noble persons there is no Buddha, Dharma, or Saṅgha, and worldly dharmas too disappear. The opponent therefore says, “This is untenable. Thus dharmas should not all be empty.”

This is no forced argument. It places emptiness and cultivation-realization on opposite sides: if you say that everything is empty, what do I cultivate, and what do I realize? The treatise author does not answer by shrinking the scope of emptiness. He points out that the opponent has mixed two levels together.

5. The First Step of the Answer: Distinguish the Two Truths

The author answers: “There are two truths: first, the conventional truth; second, the truth of the ultimate meaning.”

He then states their order: “Through the conventional truth one can state the truth of the ultimate meaning; without relying on the conventional truth, one cannot state the truth of the ultimate meaning.” The truth of the ultimate meaning is not a separate place reached by leaving conventional truth behind; only through the language of conventional truth can it be spoken. The next step concerns the fruit: “If one cannot attain the truth of the ultimate meaning, one cannot attain nirvāṇa.”

Three segments thus form a single road. Conventional truth is the reliance for stating the truth of the ultimate meaning, and the truth of the ultimate meaning is the reliance for attaining nirvāṇa. Remove any segment in the middle and what follows cannot begin.

What happens to those who do not know the two truths? “If a person does not know the two truths, that person does not know benefit to self, benefit to others, or shared benefit.” All three forms of benefit are established through the two truths. Without knowing conventional truth, no sequence of cause and effect can be practiced, and benefit cannot arise. Without knowing the truth of the ultimate meaning, the path of practice is grasped as truly existent, and benefit cannot reach completion.

Once known, the two truths communicate in both directions: “If one knows the conventional truth, one knows the truth of the ultimate meaning; if one knows the truth of the ultimate meaning, one knows the conventional truth.” It is not that one first knows one end and then learns the other. To know either end is to know the other.

6. “You Now Hear a Teaching of Conventional Truth and Take It to Be the Truth of the Ultimate Meaning”

The author next identifies the opponent’s illness in one sentence: “You now hear a teaching of conventional truth and take it to be the truth of the ultimate meaning; therefore you fall into error.”

The arising and cessation, four truths, and fruits of recluseship heard by the opponent are spoken at the level of conventional truth. He instead takes them to exist by intrinsic nature at the level of the ultimate meaning. Consequently, when he hears that the ultimate meaning is empty, he thinks they have all been canceled. His illness is not that he trusts the four truths, but that he reads them as four truths possessing intrinsic nature.

The author immediately states his own meaning of emptiness positively: “The conditioned dharmas taught by the buddhas are called the profound truth of the ultimate meaning. Because these conditioned dharmas possess no intrinsic nature, I call them empty.”

The profound truth of the ultimate meaning is nothing other than conditioned dharmas. Conditioned dharmas possess no intrinsic nature and therefore are called empty. Emptiness is not a separate meaning established outside conditioned dharmas; emptiness is the fact of conditioned dharmas themselves made clear.

7. The Reversal: What Truly Destroys the Four Truths Is Fixed Nature

In the latter half of his answer, the author turns the opponent’s entire objection around: what destroys the four truths is not emptiness but fixed nature.

“If dharmas did not arise from a multitude of conditions, each should possess fixed intrinsic nature, and the five aggregates should not bear marks of arising and cessation.” If the five aggregates each possessed fixed nature, they would neither arise nor cease. “If the five aggregates neither arose nor ceased, there would be no impermanence; if there were no impermanence, there would be no noble truth of suffering.” Suffering is suffering precisely because of impermanence; impermanence exists precisely because there is arising and cessation; arising and cessation exist precisely because things come from conditions. Establish fixed nature and the chain breaks at its beginning.

Without the truth of suffering, there is no truth of origin. Then comes the next step: “If dharmas possessed fixed nature, there would be no noble truth of the cessation of suffering. Why? Because nature does not alter.” This sentence is the hinge of the entire gate. If suffering possessed fixed nature, it would forever remain itself and could not cease. Without the truth of cessation there is no truth of the path, because there is nowhere for the path to lead.

All four truths have thus fallen away. On this basis the author judges: “If a person does not accept emptiness, the four noble truths do not exist.” Without the four noble truths there is no realization of them; without realization, “there is no knowing suffering, abandoning origin, realizing cessation, or cultivating the path.” Without these four practices there are no four fruits of recluseship; without fruits there are no attainers and no persons proceeding toward attainment. Without attainers or those proceeding, there is no Buddha; because conditioned dharmas have been destroyed, there is no Dharma; because no fruits exist, there is no Saṅgha. “If there is no Buddha, Dharma, or Saṅgha, there are no Three Jewels. If there are no Three Jewels, worldly dharmas are destroyed.”

The author returns unchanged the entire chain the opponent used to accuse emptiness, replacing only one premise. Attached to emptiness, that chain of inference does not hold; attached to fixed nature, every link holds.

8. With Fixed Nature, the World Would Always Possess a Single Mark

After the reversal, the author adds one passage, extending the argument from the noble Dharma to the world: “If dharmas possessed fixed intrinsic nature, there would be no arising, no cessation, no demerit, and no merit. Without the fruits of demerit and merit, the world would always possess a single mark.”

Under fixed nature there is no arising or cessation and therefore no activity. Without activity, demerit and merit cannot be established; without demerit and merit, their fruits cannot be established. What, then, would the world be? It would forever possess only one mark, neither increasing nor diminishing, neither wholesome nor unwholesome, with no one ever becoming otherwise.

The world presently before us is not like this. The author therefore concludes, “Thus one should know that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature.”

9. Other-Nature Cannot Save the Claim

The final passage returns to the word nature for its general conclusion. The opponent’s last retreat is to abandon self-nature and propose other-nature: “If one says that dharmas possess no self-nature but exist through other-nature, this too is incorrect.”

There are two reasons. First: “If no self-nature exists, how could something exist through other-nature? Other-nature exists on the basis of self-nature.” The name other is established in opposition to self. If the self-side possesses no nature, the other-side has nothing against which to stand.

The second reason cuts more sharply: “Other-nature is precisely the other’s own self-nature.” What you call other-nature is, from that other’s own position, exactly its self-nature. Changing the angle cannot produce a new nature. Other-nature is only self-nature moved elsewhere. Therefore, “if self-nature is not established, other-nature is not established either.”

If neither is established, is there a third place? “Apart from self-nature and other-nature, where could any further dharma exist?” There is none.

10. If Existence Is Not Established, Nonexistence Is Not Established Either

At the end, the author gathers existence and nonexistence together: “If existence is not established, nonexistence is not established either.”

This sentence must be read precisely. Refuting self-nature and other-nature refutes existence. At that moment, one easily turns around and establishes a nonexistence. Yet nonexistence is a name posited against existence. Since existence cannot stand, nonexistence has nothing against which to stand and cannot stand either. Existence is not refuted in order to establish nonexistence; existence and nonexistence are dismissed together.

The whole gate therefore closes with one line: “Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too. Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?”

From conditioned to unconditioned, and then to self: this is the same intent as the order at the end of the first gate. No safe place is permitted to remain at the end.

What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Gate?

First, take alteration as evidence already at hand. One need not search in remote abstractions for the absence of intrinsic nature. All dharmas before the eyes are altering; this is the author’s first demonstration.

Second, remember that absence of intrinsic nature cannot itself be made into a nature. The latter half of the verse—“even a dharma of no intrinsic nature does not exist”—is the gate’s most important sentence for its reader.

Third, recognize that emptiness and the four truths establish rather than destroy one another. For the four truths to operate, there must be arising and cessation, impermanence, and something that can be abandoned and realized. These are possible only in the absence of intrinsic nature.

Fourth, know that the two truths are not two truths standing apart, but two segments of one path. “Through the conventional truth one can state the truth of the ultimate meaning.” Apart from the language of conventional truth, the truth of the ultimate meaning cannot even be spoken.

Carried Forward: Illumination along the Same Axis

The preceding is the meaning of this gate itself. What follows is a single cross-light from the same axis of the Three Treatises. The illumination is not this treatise; it simply records without deciding how the same doctrinal meaning is stated elsewhere.

Chapter fifteen of the Treatise on the Middle, “Examination of Existence and Nonexistence,” is the closest parallel to this gate. It too begins from nature and conditions:

“That nature exists among conditions is not so; nature arising from conditions is thereby called something made.”

It then defines nature:

“Nature is called unmade, not dependent on another dharma for its completion.”

Unmade and not dependent on another dharma: this is the same boundary as this gate’s “what is not made and does not depend upon another is called nature.” That chapter further states:

“If a dharma truly possessed nature, it should not become different afterward; that nature could bear a mark of difference is ultimately untenable.”

This is precisely the first demonstration in the present gate. Their routes differ. That chapter follows the two views of existence and nonexistence until it obstructs annihilationism and eternalism, ending at “one should not cling to existence or nonexistence.” This gate instead takes the objection from the four truths and Three Jewels as its axis: it first receives the opponent’s accusation, then reverses and returns it unchanged. The nature examined is the same; the faculties addressed are different.

Read together along one axis, each remains in its own place. The meaning of this gate is still governed by this gate’s own extended prose.

考據Apparatus

一、校勘

底本 T30n1568〔0165a09–0165b25〕;二諦與四諦反證依原次第。

二、異釋對勘

本帙無另一漢譯異釋本;與《中論》第二十四品同題但非異本。

三、諸家異釋(吉藏專疏)

吉藏 T1825 同門以變異、二諦及三寶反證無性。

四、名相

  • :不作、不待他之固定本性。
  • 二諦:世諦與第一義諦。
  • 自他共利:由正知二諦而成的三種利益。

五、科判

四段:變異破性;四諦難;定性反破三寶;自他性俱遣。

六、關中舊學·譯史

本門濃縮《中論》四諦品二諦論證,形成十二門內部轉折。

七、唯識軸互讀(空有)

依他而有不能被改名為他性;依緣性須與固定自性嚴格區分。

八、系內餘論互讀

承第七門變異,直通《中論》第二十四品空故法成。

九、校本定位

主底本 T30n1568〔0165a09–0165b25〕;吉藏 T1825 同門疏。

Textual Collation

The base text is T30n1568〔0165a09–0165b25〕; the reductio through the two truths and the four truths follows the transmitted sequence.

Comparative Readings

There is no second Chinese translation of this treatise for comparison. Although its topic matches chapter twenty-four of the Treatise on the Middle, it is not a variant recension of that chapter.

Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)

Jizang’s commentary on the same gate in T1825 demonstrates the absence of intrinsic nature through alteration, the two truths, and the Three Jewels.

Terminology

  • Nature: a fixed intrinsic nature that is neither produced nor dependent on anything else.
  • Two truths: the conventional truth and the truth of the ultimate meaning.
  • Benefit to self, benefit to others, and shared benefit: three forms of benefit made possible through correct knowledge of the two truths.

Doctrinal Outline

Four movements: alteration refutes intrinsic nature; the objection from the four truths; fixed nature turned back to refute the Three Jewels; and the joint dismissal of self-nature and other-nature.

Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History

This gate condenses the two-truths argument of the Treatise on the Middle, “Examination of the Four Truths,” and thereby forms an internal turn within the Twelve Gates.

Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)

Existence dependent on another must not be renamed other-nature; the nature of dependence on conditions must be strictly distinguished from fixed intrinsic nature.

Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage

Continuing the seventh gate’s examination of alteration, this gate leads directly to the Treatise on the Middle, chapter twenty-four, where dharmas are established precisely because they are empty.

Position of the Editions

The principal base text is T30n1568〔0165a09–0165b25〕; Jizang’s commentary on the same gate is in T1825.

Translator · 釋慧鏡 Shi Huijing — with AI-assisted consistency checking

License · CC BY-NC-SA 4.0