十二門論 心要連讀
序Preface
全文五層 →Full five layers →誰
卷首的品目與這篇序,出自同一枝筆,那人在末尾自己說了:「并目品義題之於首」。名字只留一個字:「叡以鄙倍之淺識」。同軸《中論》卷首那篇署名〈釋僧叡序〉的收尾與此同句。序者非論主,讀時須分開。
憂
「若一理之不盡,則眾異紛然」,「一源之不窮,則眾塗扶疏」——缺口在原路上,岔路才長得出來。故曰「殊致之不夷、乖趣之不泯,大士之憂也」。所憂在路不平,於是「是以龍樹菩薩,開出者之由路」。
名
三字逐一交代:十二是「總眾枝之大數」,論是「窮其源、盡其理」,而門是「開通無滯之稱也」。十二門名下的小字,收尾也總是「故以為門」。與論主所說相合:「當以十二門入於空義。」
暢
「正之以十二,則有無兼暢」——是兩邊一齊通,不是壓一邊立一邊。隨後對舉:「事盡於有無,則忘功於造化」,「理極於虛位,則喪我於二際」。
忘
「喪我在乎落筌,筌忘存乎遺寄。」破法之後會轉執能破之言,忘言之後又會存一個能忘之我,故須「筌我兼忘」。所許只到「始可以幾乎實矣」——是幾,不是得。
歸
「即百化以安歸」:不離萬化而安。末後「整歸駕於道場、畢趣心於佛地」,是回來,不是出去。
序者自問「豈其能益也?」,只認一句:「庶以此心開疾進之路耳。」
Who
The table of gates and this preface at the head of the fascicle came from the same brush. At the end, its writer says, “and I inscribed the titles and meanings of the chapters at the beginning.” His name leaves only one character: “Rui, with my shallow and contrary understanding.” The preface at the head of the Treatise on the Middle along the same axis is signed “Preface by the Monk Seng Rui” and ends with the same sentence. The preface writer is not the treatise author; a reader must keep them separate.
Concern
“If one principle is not exhausted, the many divergent claims arise in confusion”; “if one source is not traced to its end, the many paths branch and spread.” A gap in the original road lets side roads grow. Thus, “That distinct destinations are not leveled and divergent tendencies are not extinguished is the great being’s concern.” The concern is that the road is uneven, and therefore “Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva opened a path by which those who go forth might pass.”
Name
The three terms are each explained: twelve is “the great number gathering the many branches”; treatise means “exhausting its source and taking its principle to the end”; and gate is “a name for opening passage without obstruction.” The small line beneath each gate’s title likewise ends, “therefore it is made a gate.” This agrees with the treatise author’s statement: “one should enter the meaning of emptiness through the Twelve Gates.”
Passage
“Corrected through the twelve, existence and nonexistence both pass freely.” Both sides pass together; one is not suppressed to establish the other. The next pair follows: “When matters are exhausted within existence and nonexistence, accomplishment is forgotten within transformation”; “when principle reaches the utmost empty position, self is lost at the two limits.”
Forgetting
“Losing self lies in dropping the fish trap; forgetting the trap consists in abandoning what was entrusted to it.” After refuting dharmas, one may grasp the words that refuted them; after forgetting words, one may retain a self that did the forgetting. Therefore “trap and self must both be forgotten.” What is permitted goes only as far as “then one may begin to draw near the real”—near, not attained.
Return
“At one with the hundred transformations, one rests in return.” One does not leave transformation in order to rest. At the end, “set the returning carriage in order at the place of awakening, and bring the mind’s orientation to completion in the ground of buddhahood.” It is a return, not an exit.
The preface writer asks himself, “Could this truly add anything?” He accepts only one sentence: “I merely hope that through this intention I may open a road of rapid progress.”
觀因緣門第一Examination of Causes and Conditions
全文五層 →Full five layers →論主要講空,選的字不是道理,是門:「當以十二門入於空義。」
門為誰而開
不為利根人開——他們聽的是「十方三世諸佛甚深法藏」;這門開給「末世眾生薄福鈍根,雖尋經文不能通達」者。論主說:「我愍此等欲令開悟」——是愍,不是要立說。
有人嫌門太小:佛語尚不可盡,何況演散?答:「以是義故,我初言略解。」門不必和屋子一樣大。
門楣先寫一個大字
大乘之大,七義:上二乘、能至佛地、大人所乘、滅大苦與大利益、諸大士所乘、盡諸法邊底、佛自說無量無邊——無一說它自身有個叫作大的性質,通通就關係而說;命名如此,門裡的道理亦如此。論主點題:「大分深義,所謂空也。」
門上刻著四句
「眾緣所生法,是即無自性;
若無自性者,云何有是法?」
要待眾緣才生,成立便不在自己手上。末句所問不是瓶子存不存在,是那個「有」字怎麼講。
進門先看兩排
一排在外:泥團輪繩陶師而有瓶,乃至種子地水火風虛空時節人功而有芽——最像自己長的芽,條件數得最長。一排在內:十二支,「各各先因而後生」。論主一句反問:內外諸法既皆從眾緣生,「即非是無性耶!」
兩條繞門的小路
一條說:不憑自性,憑他性。那便成了「牛以馬性有,馬以牛性有」。論主四字堵住:「而實不然。」
一條說:不用他性,只是因他而有,如因蒲有席。說一體,蒲不成其為他;說是他,席不憑蒲而有。何況「蒲亦從眾緣出,故無自性」——作根據的那頭自己也缺根據。
那個「先」要安放在哪裡
論主引《七十論》偈:
「緣法實無生;若謂為有生,
為在一心中;為在多心中?」
同在一心,因果便一時共生,而「凡物先因後果」;分在多心,前心已滅,「滅法無所有,何得為因?」被問倒的不是相續,是「若先有者」。
門後還有落腳地嗎
先空緣,再空果:「緣空故,從緣生法亦空」——果那頭無處可退。
我依陰入界而說,「如因可然故說有然」;所依既空,「如無可然不可說然」。經給的是依待線索:「因我故有我所,若無我則無我所。」
末後轉向涅槃:五陰本來自空,滅的是什麼?我亦空,得的是誰?無生之名對生而立——「若生法不成,無生法云何成?」落腳地收完,論主只寫一句:「是故有為、無為及我皆空。」
門在此闔上;進去了的人,不必回頭抱著門。
The treatise author means to teach emptiness, yet the word he chooses is not principle but gate: “One must enter the meaning of emptiness through twelve gates.”
For Whom the Gate Opens
It does not open for those of sharp faculties—they hear “the exceedingly profound treasury of Dharma belonging to all buddhas of the ten directions and three times.” This gate opens for “sentient beings in the final age who have little merit and dull faculties and, although they seek the scriptures, cannot penetrate them.” The author says, “Out of compassion for such people, I wish to enable them to awaken.” The motive is compassion, not the founding of a doctrine.
Someone objects that the gate is too small: the Buddha’s own words cannot exhaust the subject, much less an unfolding explanation. The reply: “Precisely for this reason, at the outset I said ‘briefly explain.’” A gate need not be as large as the house.
On the Lintel, One Word: Great
The greatness of the Great Vehicle has seven meanings: it is above the two vehicles, can reach buddhahood, is ridden by great persons, extinguishes great suffering and gives great benefit, is ridden by the great beings, reaches the utmost limit of all dharmas, and is itself called measureless and boundless by the Buddha. Not one meaning says that the vehicle possesses some quality called greatness in itself. Each is stated through a relation. The name works this way, and so does the teaching inside the gate. The author reveals the theme: “Its deep meaning, broadly distinguished, is what is called emptiness.”
Four Lines Carved upon the Gate
“Dharmas arising from a multitude of conditions are thereby without intrinsic nature;
if they lack intrinsic nature, how can one say that these dharmas exist?”
What must await a multitude of conditions in order to arise does not hold its establishment in its own hands. The last line does not ask whether a jar exists; it asks what one means by the word “exists.”
Two Rows Just Inside
One row is outside: clay, wheel, cord, and potter give rise to a jar; seed, earth, water, fire, wind, space, season, and human labor give rise to a sprout. The sprout that seems most to grow by itself receives the longest list of conditions. One row is inside: the twelve links, “each first having its cause and only afterward arising.” The author asks in a single sentence: since inner and outer dharmas alike arise from a multitude of conditions, “are they not thereby without intrinsic nature?”
Two Paths That Try to Go Around the Gate
One says: things do not depend on intrinsic nature but on other-nature. Then “a cow would exist through a horse’s nature, and a horse through a cow’s nature.” The author blocks the way with four characters: “Yet in truth it is not so.”
The other says: not through other-nature, only because of another—as a mat exists because of rushes. If they are one body, the rushes cannot be other; if they are other, the mat cannot exist by virtue of them. Moreover, “the rushes too arise from a multitude of conditions and therefore lack intrinsic nature.” The thing pressed into service as a foundation itself lacks a foundation.
Where Can That “Already” Be Placed?
The author cites a verse from the Seventy Treatise:
“Dharmas of dependent arising are in truth non-arising; if one says they do arise,
do they exist in a single mind, or do they exist in many minds?”
Placed together in one mind, cause and effect arise simultaneously, although “in every case the cause comes first and the effect afterward.” Distributed among many minds, the earlier mind has ceased, and “a ceased dharma is utterly nonexistent; how could it serve as a cause?” What the question overturns is not continuity, but the premise that the links “already existed beforehand.”
Is There Still Ground Beyond the Gate?
First empty the conditions, then the effect: “Since conditions are empty, dharmas arising from conditions are empty as well.” The effect has nowhere left to retreat.
The self is spoken of in dependence on the aggregates, sense bases, and elements, “just as burning is spoken of because there is something combustible.” When the basis is empty, “without anything combustible, burning cannot be spoken of.” The scripture supplies the clue of dependence: “Because of self there is what belongs to self; without self, there is nothing belonging to self.”
At the end the measure turns toward nirvāṇa. The five aggregates were empty from the beginning—what is extinguished? The self too is empty—who attains? The name non-arising is established in relation to arising: “If arisen dharmas are not established, how can non-arising be established?” Every place to stand has been withdrawn, and the author writes only one sentence: “Therefore conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, and the self are all empty.”
Here the gate closes. One who has entered need not turn back and cling to the gate.
觀有果無果門第二Examination of an Existing or Nonexisting Effect
全文五層 →Full five layers →一頌只問一句:「誰當有生者?」問的人已經把答案數盡了——先有、先無、亦有亦無。
你說果先有
那它「有已先成,何用更生」?何況因中既常有,生了還有,於是「是則無窮」。你改口說生已不生,論主答:「是中無有生理」。
你說只是看不見
論主要相狀:「以何相知言泥中先有瓶?」瓶相沒有,牛相馬相也沒有。你搬出八種不可知——眼中藥、飛鳥、盲聾、心在色、壁障、黑上墨點、鍾鼓掩拂聲、微塵——論主一條也不否認,只把每條的出路指出來:近了看不見就「小遠應可得」,被蓋住就「勝止應可得」,太細就麁時可得。八條都有解除的辦法,泥中之瓶沒有。你再說「未生時細,生已轉麁」,那便是自認「因中無麁」。
你說縷是疊的因
若疊本在縷中,縷就只是它的住處:「如疊在縷,如果在器,但是住處,不名為因。」因這一頭空了,果也跟著空。而藏著的東西總露消息——「見烟知有火」;果卻是體不可得、相亦不可得。
你說果先無
那麼「應有第二頭、第三手生」。你說瓶有因緣而頭手沒有,論主只問:泥中無瓶,石中亦無瓶,「何故名泥團為瓶因,不名石為瓶因?」同樣是無,就該「一一物應生一切物」,指端也出車馬。你舉往例說曾見麻出油——論主說那「則墮同疑因」:你拿有生作證,正是所諍之事。
你說兩者都是
「有、無性相違故」,明闇苦樂去住縛解,不同處。兩個已破的說法,合起來不成第三個。
那麼
論主亮出自己的立場:「我說作、作者及因果皆空」——你破作、破作者,反倒替他說了話。
三案盡,「理極於此」。果既畢竟不生,一切有為法皆是因是果,故皆空;有為空故無為亦空。至於那個我——不必再問一遍。
One verse asks only a single question: “Who, then, could be something that arises?” The questioner has already exhausted the answers—previously existent, previously nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent.
You Say the Effect Already Exists
Then it “is already existent and accomplished—what use is further arising?” Moreover, if it always exists in the cause and remains after arising, “the process is endless.” You revise the claim and say what has arisen does not arise again. The author answers: “Within this there is no coherent principle of arising.”
You Say It Is Merely Unseen
The author asks for its mark: “By what mark do you know and say that a jar already exists in the clay?” There is no mark of jar, nor mark of cow or horse. You offer eight reasons something may be unknowable—medicine in the eye, a distant bird, damaged faculties, a mind attending to form, a wall’s obstruction, an ink dot on black, a bell or drum masking a faint brushing sound, and a mote. The author denies none of them. He only points to the remedy for each: what is unseen because too near “should be apprehended from slightly farther away”; what is obscured “should be apprehended when the stronger ceases”; what is too subtle should be apprehended when coarse. Every one of the eight has a way for its obstruction to end. The jar in the clay does not. If you next say, “Before arising it is subtle; after arising it becomes coarse,” you have admitted that “the coarse is absent in the cause.”
You Say Threads Are the Cause of Cloth
If cloth already exists in the threads, the threads are merely its place of residence: “It is like cloth in threads or fruit in a vessel—only a dwelling place, not a cause.” Once the cause side is empty, the effect side is empty with it. What lies hidden always gives some sign—“seeing smoke, one knows there is fire”—yet neither the effect’s entity nor its mark can be found.
You Say the Effect Was Previously Absent
Then “a second head and third hand should arise.” You say a jar has conditions while extra heads and hands do not. The author asks only this: the jar is absent from clay and equally absent from stone, so “why call a lump of clay the jar’s cause and not call a stone its cause?” If both are alike in being absent, “each thing should produce every thing,” and carts and horses should issue from a fingertip. You appeal to prior experience: oil has been seen to come from sesame. The author says this “falls into a reason identical with what is doubted”: you invoke arising as evidence when arising is precisely the disputed matter.
You Say It Is Both
“Because the natures of existence and nonexistence contradict one another,” they cannot share one place, just as light and dark, pain and pleasure, going and staying, bondage and release do not. Combining two positions already refuted does not produce a third.
Then What?
The author states his own position: “I say that action, agent, cause, and effect are all empty.” When you refute action and agent, you state his point for him.
The three cases are exhausted: “Reason reaches its limit here.” Since the effect ultimately does not arise and every conditioned dharma is both cause and effect, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Because the conditioned is empty, the unconditioned is empty as well. As for that self—there is no need to ask the question again.
觀緣門第三Examination of Conditions
全文五層 →Full five layers →論主要對面指一指:果在哪裡?
找處
「廣略眾緣法,是中無有果;
緣中若無果,云何從緣生?」
廣是分開一個一個找,略是合起來一團找。瓶不在泥裡、不在輪繩陶師裡,那一堆和合之中也取不出瓶。除此再無第三處可找。
名字
對面問「云何名為諸緣?」,論主答得極死:只此「四緣生諸法」,且「更無第五緣」。數目一說盡,往後便不許臨時添一個來救。四名逐一釋去,因緣指所從生,次第緣指前滅後起,緣緣指所念之境,增上緣指以有此故彼得生——無一名立在自己身上,個個都要指著另一頭才說得成。
撤看
因中有果,撤了緣該還有果;緣中有果,撤了因該還有果;若兩處都有,那果該是取得到的。然而「以理推求而不可得,是故二處俱無」。
無中生有攔不住
「何故不從非緣生?二俱無故。」——就無果這一點說,緣與非緣一般齊。許無中生有,便沒有理由攔住非緣。
掛不上的名字
「果不生故,緣亦不生。何以故?以先緣後果故。」先是對著後說的先。果一落空,緣字無處可掛。於是「緣果無故,一切有為法空」,順下去,無為亦空,末後只剩一問:「云何有我耶?」
問的始終只是那一句:你說有,指出來給我看。
The treatise author asks the opponent to point: where is the effect?
Places to Look
“Among the multitude of conditions, whether treated broadly or in summary, no effect exists; if no effect exists among conditions, how could it arise from conditions?”
Broadly means searching one condition at a time; in summary means searching the combined mass. The jar is not in the clay, wheel, cord, or potter, nor can a jar be extracted from their conjunction. There is no third place to search.
Names
The opponent asks, “What are called the multitude of conditions?” The author answers with finality: only these “four conditions produce all dharmas,” and “there is no fifth condition.” Once the number is exhausted, no extra one can later be added to save the claim. He explains each name: the causal condition refers to that from which something arises; the immediate antecedent condition to the preceding dharma’s ceasing and the next arising; the object-condition to the object recollected; and the predominant condition to the fact that because this exists, that can arise. Not one name stands on itself; each can be spoken only while pointing to another side.
Remove and See
If the effect exists within the cause, remove the conditions and it should remain. If it exists within the conditions, remove the cause and it should remain. If it exists in both places, it should be obtainable. Yet “sought through reason, it cannot be obtained; therefore it is absent in both places.”
Arising from Nothing Cannot Be Contained
“Why does it not arise from nonconditions? Because neither side contains an effect.” In the single respect of containing no effect, conditions and nonconditions are equal. Permit existence to arise from nonexistence and there is no reason to stop nonconditions.
A Name with Nowhere to Hang
“Because the effect does not arise, the conditions do not arise either. Why? Because conditions precede and the effect follows.” The prior is prior only relative to the later. Once the effect falls empty, the word condition has nowhere to hang. Thus, “because conditions and effect do not exist, all conditioned dharmas are empty.” From there unconditioned dharmas are empty too, and only one question remains: “how could a self exist?”
The question throughout is only this: you say it exists—point it out for me.
觀相門第四Examination of Marks
全文五層 →Full five layers →論主立頌,四句都繞著它轉:
「有為及無為,二法俱無相;
以無有相故,二法則皆空。」
長行只補七字:「有為法不以相成。」
世間的相,論主一件也沒有動
牛有角、有峯、有𩑶、有尾毛;瓶「底平、腹大、頸細、脣麁」;車有輪軸轅軛,人有頭目腹脊肩臂手足。這些都留著。論主只把話頭一轉:那麼生、住、滅呢——「為是有為?為是無為?」
論敵的每一條路
說是有為。那它自己也要三相,三相再要三相,「如是展轉則為無窮」。
說是無為。那就「離生、住、滅,誰能知是生?」不可分別的東西,作不成別人的憑證。
說七件事一齊來。本生生六法,生生生本生,本生又生生生,圈就封了。可是問一句:「本生實自未生,云何能生生生?」圈上兩頭都在等對方。
說像燈自照。照是靠破闇掙來的名字;燈裡無闇,燈明所到之處也無闇——「破闇乃名照,燈為何所照?」若說隔遠也破得了,那「燈在於此間,則破一切闇」。若燈能自照,「闇亦應如是,自蔽亦蔽彼」。
說生自己生自己。未生則「未生名未有」,還沒有的東西動不了手;已生則「生已即是生,何須更生?」——「生已更無生,作已更無作」。
最後那件素衣
有為相破盡,人便想退到無為,再退到無相。論主追一句:「以何相故知是無相?」以有相知,便不是無相;以無相知,「無則不可知」。
論敵舉眾衣中一件素的:喊一聲就取得來。論主答:那要旁邊那一堆是確定的。「生、住、滅種種因緣皆空,不得有有為相」——「汝得何有為決定相,知無相處是無為?」
收
「是故有為法皆空;有為法空故,無為法亦空;有為、無為法空故,我亦空。」
門扣的那個字,扣到底就開了。
The treatise master establishes a verse, and all four lines turn upon it:
“Conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, these two kinds, are both without marks; because they are without marks, both kinds of dharma are empty.”
The prose adds only seven words: “Conditioned dharmas are not established by relying on marks.”
The Treatise Master Leaves Every Conventional Mark Untouched
A cow has horns, a hump, a dewlap, and tail hair; a jar has “a flat base, broad belly, narrow neck, and thick lip”; a cart has wheels, axle, shaft, and yoke; a person has head, eyes, abdomen, back, shoulders, arms, hands, and feet. All of these remain. The treatise master turns only the question: what, then, of arising, abiding, and cessation—“are they conditioned or unconditioned?”
Every Route Open to the Opponent
Call them conditioned. Then they themselves need the three marks, and those marks need another three: “proceeding recursively in this way produces an infinite regress.”
Call them unconditioned. Then “apart from arising, abiding, and cessation, who could know that this is arising?” What cannot be distinguished cannot serve as another thing’s credential.
Say that seven things arrive together. The primary arising produces six dharmas, the arising of arising produces the primary arising, and the primary arising in turn produces the arising of arising, closing the circle. But ask one question: “The primary arising has not in fact arisen; how can it bring the arising of arising into arising?” Both ends of the circle await the other.
Say it is like a lamp illuminating itself. Illumination earns its name by dispelling darkness; there is no darkness in the lamp or where its light reaches—“only dispelling darkness is called illumination, so what exactly does the lamp illuminate?” If it can dispel darkness across a distance, then “lighting a lamp here should dispel all darkness everywhere.” If the lamp illuminates itself, “darkness likewise should conceal both itself and others.”
Say arising brings itself into arising. What has not arisen “does not yet exist,” so it cannot set to work. What has arisen “is already arisen; why must it arise again?”—“Once it has arisen, there is no further arising; once an act has been done, there is no further doing.”
The Final Plain Robe
Once marks of the conditioned are exhausted, one tries to retreat to the unconditioned, and then to marklessness. The master pursues with one question: “By relying on what mark is this known to be markless?” If known by a mark, it is not markless. If known by marklessness, “what is absent cannot be known.”
The opponent points to one plain robe among a pile of patterned robes: call for it and someone can retrieve it. The master replies that the surrounding pile must first be definite. “When arising, abiding, and cessation are sought through many causes and conditions, they are all empty; no mark of the conditioned can be found”—so “which fixed and determinate mark of the conditioned have you obtained, such that by it you know a markless place to be unconditioned?”
Close
“Therefore all conditioned dharmas are empty. Because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are also empty. Because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, the self is also empty.”
Fasten the gate’s single word all the way through, and the gate opens.
觀有相無相門第五Examination of What Has Marks and What Lacks Marks
全文五層 →Full five layers →象身上找不到一頭無相的象
「如象有雙牙,垂一鼻,頭有三隆,耳如箕,脊如彎弓,腹大而垂,尾端有毛,四脚麁圓,是為象相。」數到第八件,象就數完了。論主接一句:「若離是相,更無有象可以相相。」
馬也一樣:豎耳、垂鬃、同蹄、通尾有毛,「若離是相,更無有馬可以相相。」
那就問相要往哪裡落
「有相相不相,無相亦不相;
離彼相不相,相為何所相?」
已有相的,「更何用相為?」——工具無事可做。 硬說做成了,便有兩個相搶同一件差事:「一者先有相,二者相來相是相。」 無相的,論主只回問一句:「何法名無相而以有相相?」你指得出的已是相,指不出的並不在那裡等。 中間也沒有地方:「離有相、無相,更無第三法可以相相」。
名字是誰給的
「以相故知是事名可相。」可相的身分是相給的;相既無所落,可相無從立。故「相、可相俱空」。萬物即是這一對,「離相、可相,更無有物」。
往『無』那頭退也一樣
退到無物也不成:「以物滅故名無物,若無物者,何所滅故名為無物?」
收
「物、無物空故,一切有為法皆空;有為法空故,無為法亦空;有為、無為空故,我亦空。」
象仍是象,牙、鼻、耳一件不少;只是那八件事之外,並沒有一個承受它們的東西。
No Markless Elephant Can Be Found upon the Elephant’s Body
“An elephant has two tusks, a single hanging trunk, three swellings on its head, ears like winnowing baskets, a spine like a bent bow, a large hanging belly, hair at the tip of its tail, and four thick round feet. These are the elephant’s marks.” At the eighth item the elephant has been exhausted. The author adds: “Apart from these marks, there is no further elephant for a mark to mark.”
The horse is the same: upright ears, a hanging mane, four hooved feet, and hair along the whole tail. “Apart from these marks, there is no further horse for a mark to mark.”
Then Ask Where the Mark Is to Fall
“A mark does not mark what has marks; nor does it mark what lacks marks; apart from what has and lacks marks, what could a mark possibly mark?”
What already has a mark “has no further use for a mark”—the instrument has no work to do. Insist that the work is done and two marks compete for the same job: “first, the mark already present; second, the mark that comes and marks it as having a mark.” For what lacks marks, the author asks only, “What dharma is called markless such that what has a mark could mark it?” What you can point out already has a mark; what you cannot point out is not waiting there. Nor is there a place between: “apart from what has marks and what lacks marks, there is no third dharma for a mark to mark.”
Who Gives the Name?
“Through a mark one knows that this matter is called what is marked.” The identity of what is marked is supplied by the mark. Since the mark has nowhere to fall, what is marked cannot be established. Thus “mark and what is marked are both empty.” The myriad things are precisely this pair: “apart from mark and what is marked, no thing exists.”
Retreating toward “Nothing” Is the Same
Retreat to no thing also fails: “Because a thing ceases, it is called no thing. If no thing exists, what ceased such that it is called no thing?”
Conclusion
“Because thing and no thing are empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty; because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too; because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, self is empty too.”
The elephant remains an elephant, with tusks, trunk, and ears all intact. Only beyond those eight things there is nothing further that receives them.
觀一異門第六Examination of Identity and Difference
全文五層 →Full five layers →門上四句:
「相及與可相,一、異不可得;
若無有一、異,是二云何成?」
對面把話說滿了
「凡物,或相即是可相,或相異可相,或少分是相餘是可相。」同、異、部分,三案一齊擺上,並各有實例:識與受、涅槃與信、正見與生住滅。
一那一頭
名字先分兩位:「以相故可知,名可相,所用者名為相。」一頭在用,一頭被用,怎麼會是一件。「凡物不能自知,如指不能自觸,如眼不能自見」。
還有兩刀。既然開口說「是相、是可相」,二已在句中;「相是因,可相是果」,說一則因果同體,而「而實不一」。
異那一頭
還他自己的話:「汝說滅愛是涅槃相,不說愛是涅槃相」——所立之相原在可相之內。信亦然:「信若無信則無此三事」,三事離了信便什麼也標不成。再加一刀通殺:「相更復應有相,則為無窮。」
一盞燈與一少分
對面請出燈:「如燈能自照亦能照彼」。論主兩句便了:「三有為相中已破」,且「自違先說」——說異的人,如今說相能自相。
少分像是第三條路,其實「此義或在一中、或在異中」,切小了仍是一與異。
閂
三案既盡,論主下閂:「更無第三法成相可相」。安身處既無,「是二空故,一切法皆空」。
空的不是認得,是自性。憑煙知火、憑三事知信,一如往常;所改者,唯在能認的與被認的這兩頭,都不再各有一個自己站得住的體。門到此闔上。
The four lines on the gate read:
“Mark and what is marked cannot be obtained as identical or different; if neither identity nor difference exists, how could these two be established?”
The Opponent States the Whole Case
“Among things, sometimes the mark is precisely what is marked; sometimes the mark differs from what is marked; sometimes one part is the mark and the remainder what is marked.” Identity, difference, and part are set out together, each with concrete examples: consciousness and feeling; nirvāṇa and faith; right view and arising, abiding, and cessation.
The Side of Identity
The two positions are first named separately: “Because it is knowable through a mark, it is called what is marked; that which is used is called the mark.” One side is used and one is what the use reaches. How could they be one? “No thing can know itself, just as a finger cannot touch itself and an eye cannot see itself.”
Two cuts remain. Once one says “this is the mark and this what is marked,” two are already present within the sentence. And “the mark is the cause while what is marked is the effect”; to call them one makes cause and effect a single entity, yet “in fact they are not one.”
The Side of Difference
The author returns the opponent’s own words: “You say that the cessation of craving is the mark of nirvāṇa; you do not say that craving is the mark of nirvāṇa.” The posited mark was already within what is marked. Faith is the same: “If faith lacked faith, these three things would not exist.” Apart from faith, the three acts mark nothing. One further cut reaches every case: “the mark would itself require another mark, leading to infinite regress.”
One Lamp and One Part
The opponent calls upon a lamp: “A lamp can illuminate itself and also another.” The author disposes of it in two sentences: “it was already refuted under the three conditioned marks,” and “it contradicts your prior statement.” The person who claimed difference now claims that the mark can mark itself.
A partial mark seems a third road, but “this meaning falls either within identity or within difference.” Cutting smaller still leaves identity and difference.
The Bar
Once the three proposals are exhausted, the author drops the bar: “there is no third dharma that establishes mark and what is marked.” With nowhere for them to rest, “because these two are empty, all dharmas are empty.”
What is empty is not recognition but intrinsic nature. We still know fire from smoke and faith from three acts. Only the two ends, recognizing and recognized, no longer possess separate entities standing by themselves. Here the gate closes.
觀有無門第七Examination of Existence and Nonexistence
全文五層 →Full five layers →第七扇門只審一句話。對面說:無常早就在法裡了,「有生時,已有無常而未發」,等到滅時才動手。
論主不問無常在不在,只問一件事:此刻它作得出壞來嗎?
這一問看似輕,卻正落在對面最吃力的地方——他要靠「未發」二字,把一個作不出事來的東西留在法裡。
作不出。因為「凡物生時無壞相,住時亦無壞相」。而相這個字,本來就是就作得出而說的——「能識故名識,不能識則無識相」;能領納才有受相,能記憶才有念相,能攝持才有住相,能轉變才有老相。於是無常也一樣:「壞是無常相,離壞非無常相。」
既然作不出,共生便是空掛。論主一句問到底:「何用共生為?」
門的兩扇,開頭就一起關了:「有、無一時不可得,非一時亦不可得。」同在一時,則生時該壞、壞時該生;離無而說有,又抽掉了對面自家七法裡的一員——「是故離無,有則不生。」
有一件現前的事,替論主擋住了另一邊:「而實有住」——法確有停留的一段,所以有不是一生就常無。
末後只剩一句可說:「應隨有壞時乃有無常。」名隨壞立,不隨物藏;壞未到,這個名便無所指。
於是收得極遠:有無空,有為空,無為空,「眾生亦空」。
十二扇門走到第七扇,所拆的不再是物,是那個『還沒到時候』的說法。
The seventh gate examines only one sentence. The opponent says that impermanence is already within a dharma: “When existence arises, impermanence is already present but not yet active”; only at cessation does it act.
The author does not ask whether impermanence is present. He asks one thing: can it produce destruction now?
The question seems light, but it falls exactly where the opponent labors hardest. Through the words “not yet active,” he tries to retain within the dharma something unable to do anything.
It cannot. For “when things arise they do not have the mark of destruction, and while they abide they do not have the mark of destruction either.” The word mark is spoken precisely in terms of what can perform its work. “Because it can cognize, it is called consciousness; if it cannot cognize, it lacks the mark of consciousness.” Capacity to receive is the mark of feeling; capacity to remember is the mark of mindfulness; capacity to sustain is the mark of abiding; capacity to change is the mark of aging. Impermanence is the same: “Destruction is the mark of impermanence; apart from destruction there is no mark of impermanence.”
If it cannot perform, co-arising is an empty attachment. The author asks to the end: “What use is there in co-arising?”
Both panels of the gate close at the outset: “Existence and nonexistence cannot be obtained at one time; nor can they be obtained at different times.” If together, the dharma should perish when arising and arise when perishing. If existence is separated from nonexistence, one member is removed from the opponent’s own seven co-arisen dharmas: “therefore, apart from nonexistence, existence does not arise.”
One immediately evident fact blocks the other side for the author: “yet abiding does in fact exist.” A dharma does remain for an interval, so existence is not eternally nonexistent from the moment it arises.
Only one sentence remains: “Impermanence should exist only when existence is destroyed.” The name follows destruction; it is not stored within the thing. Until destruction arrives, the name points to nothing.
The conclusion therefore reaches far: existence and nonexistence are empty, conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty, and “sentient beings are empty too.”
At the seventh of the Twelve Gates, what is dismantled is no longer a thing but the claim that its time “has not yet come.”
觀性門第八Examination of Nature
全文五層 →Full five layers →這一扇門審的是「性」字。凡要領這個名的,先過兩關。
第一關:你改不改?
改了就出局。「諸法若有性,則不應變異」——而放眼一切法,無一不在變。頌立得直:
「見有變異相,諸法無有性;
無性法亦無,諸法皆空故。」
後兩句是回身補的一刀:別把「無性」領回去當新名牌。
第二關:你等不等人?
要等眾緣才有的,是被造出來的,不是性。論主給定義:「不作法不因待他名為性」。緣起法兩關皆不過,所以空。
有人喊:你把四諦拆了
苦集滅道、沙門果、佛法僧,說是隨空一齊倒。論主先分二諦:「因世諦得說第一義諦」,再點病根——「汝今聞說世諦,謂是第一義諦」。空不在因緣法之外:「是因緣法無自性,故我說是空。」
然後把那一串原樣還他。五陰有定性便無生滅,無生滅便無無常,無無常便無苦;「諸法若有定性,則無苦滅聖諦。何以故?性無變異故。」——苦滅不了,道也修不成。拆四諦的從來不是空。
推到世間亦然:定性之下無罪無福,「世間常是一相」。
最後一處落腳
改口說他性?「他性即是他自性故」——搬了位置,還是那個性。自他俱不成,離二亦無法可得。也別掉頭去立一個無:「若有不成,無亦不成。」
「有為、無為尚空,何況我耶?」
This gate examines the word nature. Anything claiming that name must first pass two gates.
First Gate: Do You Change?
If it changes, it is disqualified. “If dharmas possessed intrinsic nature, they should not alter”—yet wherever one looks, every dharma changes. The verse states it directly:
“Seeing that dharmas bear the mark of alteration, one knows that dharmas possess no intrinsic nature; even a dharma of no intrinsic nature does not exist, because all dharmas are empty.”
The latter two lines turn back for one more cut: do not reclaim “absence of intrinsic nature” as a new nameplate.
Second Gate: Do You Wait for Others?
Whatever waits for conditions in order to exist is made, not nature. The treatise author gives a definition: “What is not made and does not depend upon another is called nature.” Dependently arisen dharmas fail both gates and therefore are empty.
Someone Shouts: You Have Dismantled the Four Truths
Suffering, origin, cessation, path, the fruits of recluseship, and Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha are said to fall together with emptiness. The author first distinguishes the two truths: “Through the conventional truth one can state the truth of the ultimate meaning.” He then identifies the illness: “You now hear a teaching of conventional truth and take it to be the truth of the ultimate meaning.” Emptiness is not outside conditioned dharmas: “These conditioned dharmas have no intrinsic nature; therefore I call them empty.”
He then returns the entire chain unchanged. If the five aggregates had fixed nature, they would neither arise nor cease; without arising and ceasing there would be no impermanence, and without impermanence no suffering. “If dharmas had fixed nature, there would be no noble truth of the cessation of suffering. Why? Because nature does not alter.” Suffering could not cease, and the path could not be cultivated. It was never emptiness that dismantled the four truths.
The same inference reaches the world: under fixed nature there would be neither demerit nor merit, and “the world would always have a single mark.”
The Final Place to Stand
Change the claim to other-nature? “Other-nature is precisely the other’s own self-nature.” Its position has moved, but it remains the same nature. When self and other both fail, no dharma can be found apart from them. Nor may one turn around and establish nonexistence: “If existence is not established, nonexistence is not established either.”
“Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?”
觀因果門第九Examination of Cause and Effect
全文五層 →Full five layers →十二門走到第九扇,字最少。論主開口是「復次」,收口是「何況我耶?」,中間只做一件事。
前八門已經逼到牆角
被問住的人還有一步可走:果不在緣裡,那就說它是從別處來的。日常想事情本就這樣——不在這個匣子,就在那個匣子。論主答語的後半句,正是替這一步設的:「亦不從餘處來」。
頌把兩個匣子一起蓋上
「果於眾緣中,畢竟不可得,
亦不餘處來,云何而有果?」
「畢竟」不是一時找不著。末句是問不是斷:你說有果,那個「有」字指著什麼。
第一個匣子,論主不重講
「眾緣若一一中、若和合中,俱無果」——一一與和合一齊說,才沒有縫。至於何以無果,只三個字:「如先說」。短門不薄,是踩在前面幾門的地基上。
第二個匣子要付帳
假使果真從餘處來,帳單有兩筆:「則不從因緣生」——因緣沒有生它,就不是它的因緣;「亦無眾緣和合功」——現成之物運進來,緣湊不湊都不相干。想保住果,賠掉的是因果與和合。
空字落在「即」上
「若果眾緣中無,亦不從餘處來者,是即為空。」不是由此推知空,是這樣就是空。所空的是那個能被指出所在的果,不是果報,不是芽從種生。
最後三下
「果空故,一切有為法空;有為法空故,無為法亦空;有為、無為尚空,何況我耶?」
入處與第一門不同,收處一字不差。門闔上了,末句仍是問句——留給讀的人自己去看那個我依在哪裡。
The ninth of the Twelve Gates has the fewest words. The treatise author opens with “next” and closes with “how much more so the self?” Between them he does only one thing.
The First Eight Gates Have Already Driven the Claim into a Corner
The person being questioned still has one move: if the effect is not within the conditions, say that it comes from elsewhere. Ordinary thought already works this way—if it is not in this box, it must be in another. The latter half of the author’s answer is set precisely against this move: “nor does it come from elsewhere.”
The Verse Closes Both Boxes Together
“Among the multitude of conditions, the effect is ultimately unobtainable; nor does it come from elsewhere—how, then, could an effect exist?”
“Ultimately” does not mean that it cannot be found for the moment. The final line is a question, not a declaration: when you say that an effect exists, to what does that word point?
The Author Does Not Explain the First Box Again
“Whether within each condition individually or within the conjunction of the conditions, no effect exists”—both the individual and the combined must be stated for no crack to remain. Why no effect exists is given in only three words: “as explained before.” The short gate is not thin; it stands upon the foundations of the gates before it.
The Second Box Incurs a Debt
If the effect truly came from elsewhere, the account would have two charges: “it would not arise from causes and conditions”—the conditions did not produce it and thus are not its causes and conditions; and “the conjunction of the conditions would have no efficacy”—if a finished thing is carried in, whether the conditions assemble is irrelevant. In trying to preserve the effect, one forfeits causality and conjunction.
The Word Empty Falls upon “Precisely”
“If the effect is absent among the multitude of conditions and does not come from elsewhere, that precisely is emptiness.” The author does not infer emptiness from this; this itself is emptiness. What is empty is the effect whose location could supposedly be indicated, not karmic result and not a sprout arising from a seed.
The Final Three Steps
“Because the effect is empty, all conditioned dharmas are empty; because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too; since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?”
Its entrance differs from the first gate, but its conclusion is word for word the same. The gate closes, yet the final line remains a question—leaving the reader to look for where that self depends.
觀作者門第十Examination of the Agent
全文五層 →Full five layers →人吃了苦,第一個念頭多半是找人。是我自己招的?是別人加的?是老天給的?還是就這麼碰上了?這一門,把這四個念頭一起接下來。
四個格子
「自作及他作,共作無因作,
如是不可得,是則無有苦。」
自、他、兩者、都不是——問『誰造的』,答案只能落在這四處。四處全空,那句問話也就沒有著落了。
兩個現成的例子
自作要苦自己造自己的體,可是「如識不能自識,指不能自觸」;能與所若擠成一頭,作用就開不出來。他作呢,論主起初只回一句:「他何能作苦?」
眾緣不是一位作者
有人替他作找了個好靠山:眾緣不就是他嗎。論主答得妙——苦既從眾緣生,苦就是眾緣的樣子,哪裡還隔著一個他。「泥不名為他」,「金不名為他」,瓶不會拿泥當外人,釧不會拿金當外人。
何況緣自己也作不了主:
「果從眾緣生,是緣不自在;
若緣不自在,云何緣生果?」
一群作不了主的,湊不出一位主宰。緣生說的是條件,不是命令。
佛的四次沉默
裸形迦葉把四格照樣問了一遍。第一問,「佛默然不答」;後三問,都是「佛亦不答」。
不是四個答案裡挑不出來,是問話的人心裡先擺著一個常淨的神:好醜苦樂都是它造,造完它自己再去受身。四問問的其實是同一位,只換了姿勢。答哪一格,都等於點頭。
神被拆開來看
有人辯:那是父親要教孩子認得樂。論主便一路問下去——要教樂就給樂,何必給苦;供養一位就能離苦,可是人明明各受各的報。他若有所須,就受制於所須;他若一無所須,造萬物豈不成了小兒遊戲。他自己又是誰造的?站在哪裡造?何以還要苦行去求別人歡喜?
再看他造的世界:一造就定,該「馬則常馬,人則常人」,而世間隨業在變;全由他作,就沒有罪福可分,而世間分明有罪有福;同是他的孩子,該人人愛他,而有憎有愛;若持戒修梵行都無所益,世間法就整個垮了。論主只回三個字:「而實不爾」。
連他們自家經裡那位造物者,也得一遍遍行苦行才生出蟲、鳥、人天——那是業的次第,「不從苦行有」。
剩下的那一句
四格拆盡,論主沒有再補一位作者,只留下「從眾因緣生」。這一句就是空:「若從眾因緣生,則無自性,無自性即是空。」
苦沒有作者,卻有條件。問『誰給的』問不出東西;問『靠什麼在續』,路就開了。
When people suffer, their first thought is usually to find someone. Did I bring it on myself? Did someone else impose it? Did heaven give it? Or did it simply happen? This gate receives all four thoughts together.
Four Cells
“Produced by oneself, produced by another, produced by both, or produced without a cause—when sought in these ways, suffering is not found.”
Self, other, both, or neither—once the question “Who produced it?” is asked, the answer can fall only into these four places. When all four are empty, the question itself has nowhere to land.
Two Ready Examples
Self-production requires suffering to create its own entity, yet “consciousness cannot cognize itself, and a finger cannot touch itself.” When subject and object are squeezed into one end, activity cannot begin. As for production by another, the master initially returns only one sentence: “How can another produce suffering?”
The Many Conditions Are Not an Agent
Someone finds a good refuge for production by another: are not the many conditions precisely other? The master answers adroitly. Since suffering arises from the many conditions, suffering is the shape those conditions take. Where is a separate other? “Clay cannot be called other”; “gold cannot be called other.” A jar does not treat clay as an outsider, nor a bracelet gold.
Moreover, the conditions cannot themselves govern:
“A result arises from many conditions, yet these conditions cannot govern themselves; since the conditions cannot govern themselves, how could they produce a result?”
A group that cannot govern itself cannot assemble a sovereign. Conditioned arising speaks of conditions, not commands.
The Buddha’s Four Silences
The naked ascetic Kāśyapa asks the same four cells in order. At the first question, “the Buddha remained silent and did not answer”; for the remaining three, “again the Buddha did not answer.”
It is not that he cannot choose among four answers. The questioner has already placed a permanent and pure spirit in his mind: it creates fine and ugly, suffering and pleasure, then itself goes on to receive a body. The four questions ask about the same being in four postures. To answer within any cell would be to nod assent.
The Spirit Taken Apart
Someone argues that this is a father teaching children to recognize pleasure. The master keeps asking: if he would teach pleasure, why not give pleasure rather than suffering? If worshiping one being could end suffering, why does each person plainly receive that person’s own results? If he needs something, he is constrained by the need. If he needs nothing, is creating all things not a child’s game? Who created him? Where did he stand while creating? Why must he practice austerities to seek another’s favor?
Then look at the world he created. Once created and fixed, “a horse should always be a horse and a person always a person,” yet the world changes with karma. If he created everything, there could be no demerit and merit, yet the world plainly has both. If all are his children, everyone should love him, yet there is hatred and love. If observing precepts and cultivating the holy life were useless, conventional dharmas would collapse entirely. The master returns only three words: “Yet this is not so.”
Even the creator in their own scripture must practice austerities again and again before producing creatures, birds, humans, and gods. This is a sequence of karma; they do not arise from austerities.
The Sentence That Remains
After dismantling all four cells, the master does not add another agent. He leaves only “arises from many causes and conditions.” This sentence is emptiness: “What arises from many causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature. Absence of intrinsic nature is emptiness.”
Suffering has no agent, yet it has conditions. Ask “Who gave it?” and nothing is found. Ask “Upon what does it continue?” and the path opens.
觀三時門第十一Examination of the Three Times
全文五層 →Full five layers →十二門走到第十一門,論主換了問法。他不去問這個法是什麼,只問一句:因與果之間,究竟在哪一刻搭上手?「因與有因法,前時、後時、一時生不可得故。」
頌只列三個字
「若法先、後、共,是皆不成者,
是法從因生,云何當有成?」
先、後、共——時間所能給的樣子,就這麼多。
一處一處走過去
因獨自在前的那一刻,所生者還沒有出現:「先因時則無有因,與誰為因?」
反過來說果在前,那它不待因已經立住了:「無因時有因已成,何用因為?」
只剩同時。牛角是同時長的,可是「左右不相因」——並在,不等於一個從另一個出來。三處走盡,論主判:「是故三時因果皆不可得。」
對面掉轉刀口
好一著棋:既然三時能問倒因果,就用同一套來問你的破。破在前,破誰?可破在前,還破什麼?同時,則如牛角。「如是破不因可破,可破不因破。」
論主答得平靜:「若諸法空,則無破、無可破,我今說空,則成我所說。」你以為在拆,其實是在替我說。隨後一句劃界最清:「我不說破、可破定有故,不應作是難。」
——他從沒有另立一個屬於自己的實有主張。刀是對面遞來的,用完就還。
眼見的三件事
陶師作瓶、因弟子有師、燈與明:人工、人倫、自然,各配一時。
論主的答,三次都落在同一個地方——那個名字所對的東西,當時在不在場:「若未有瓶,陶師與誰作因?」「若未有弟子,誰為是師?」
至於燈明,它自己也是同時而生的一對,正是眼下所疑:「是亦同疑因,燈明一時生,云何相因?」
末後
「如是因緣空故,當知一切有為法、無為法、眾生皆空。」
第一門說到「我」,這一門說到「眾生」。眾生之為眾生,是靠前後相牽的那一條線;線上每一環都要過三時這一關。
At the eleventh of the twelve gates, the author changes the form of the question. He does not ask what a dharma is, but only this: at what exact moment do cause and effect meet? “Cause and the dharma that has a cause cannot be found to arise before, after, or at the same time.”
The Verse Lists Only Three Words
“If a dharma is before, after, or simultaneous, and none can be established, how could this dharma be established as arising from a cause?”
Before, after, together—these exhaust the forms time can supply.
Passing through Each Position
At the moment when the cause stands alone beforehand, what it is said to produce has not yet appeared: “At the prior time of the cause there is no dharma that has a cause; for what is it a cause?”
Reverse the order and place the effect first: it is already established without awaiting a cause. “When there is no cause, the dharma that has a cause is already established; what use is the cause?”
Only simultaneity remains. A bull’s horns grow at the same time, yet “left and right are not causes of one another.” Being present together does not mean that one emerges from the other. Once all three positions have been traversed, the author judges: “Therefore cause and effect cannot be found in any of the three times.”
The Other Side Turns the Blade Around
It is a skillful move: if the three times overturn cause and effect, use the same examination against your refutation. If refutation comes first, what does it refute? If what is refuted comes first, what use is refutation? If they are simultaneous, they resemble a bull’s horns. “Thus refutation does not depend on what can be refuted, and what can be refuted does not depend on refutation.”
The author answers calmly: “If dharmas are empty, there is neither refutation nor what can be refuted. I now teach emptiness, so you establish what I teach.” The next sentence marks the boundary with perfect clarity: “I do not say that refutation and what can be refuted determinately exist; therefore this challenge should not be made.”
—He never established a separate, intrinsically existent thesis of his own. The knife was handed over by the other side; when its work is done, it is returned.
Three Things Seen before One’s Eyes
A potter making a jar, a teacher named through a disciple, and a lamp with illumination: manufacture, human relation, and natural event, each assigned to one temporal position.
All three answers land at the same place: was the referent of the relational name present then? “Before there is a jar, for what is the potter a cause?” “Before there is a disciple, who is the teacher?”
As for lamp and illumination, they are themselves a simultaneously arising pair and therefore the very point under question: “This is likewise a cause identical with what is doubted. Since lamp and illumination arise at the same time, how could they cause one another?”
At the End
“Because conditions are empty in this way, know that every conditioned dharma, every unconditioned dharma, and every sentient being is empty.”
The first gate spoke of “self”; this gate speaks of “sentient beings.” A sentient being is named through the line that links before and after, and every link in that line must pass the examination of the three times.
觀生門第十二Examination of Arising
全文五層 →Full five layers →只剩一個字要問
前門一路破過因緣、有無、相、性、作者、三時;末後還剩一件事沒問:那些被破的東西,畢竟還是「生」出來過的吧?論主取的就是這個字。
能說生的地方只有三處
已經生了、還沒有生、正在生。頌立三處,一處也不肯留:
「生果則不生,不生亦不生,
離是生不生,生時亦不生。」
名目先定住:「生名果起出,未生名未起未出未有,生時名始起未成。」
已生:作過的不再作
生了還要生,便有第二第三第四,沒有盡頭;何況「作已不應作、燒已不應燒、證已不應證」。若說能生的那個生本來未生——那就一個「生」字底下藏了兩義,「故汝先定說而今不定」。
未生:兔馬等角也該生
未生若憑未生能生,該生的太多了:凡夫的菩提、阿羅漢已斷的煩惱、「兔馬等角」,一概都該生出來。何況離生而有生,便是「離作有作、離去有去、離食有食」——先壞的是世間說話的規矩。
有人退一步:眾緣具足時才生。論主不否認緣,只問果在因中是何身分——先有、先無、亦有亦無,「是三種求生不可得」。
生時:那條路要靠走過的人才有
生時只是已生分與未生分,兩分各自不生。離生無生時;說生時生便數出兩個生,而「無有二法」。最素樸的一問是:「生於何處行?」
闔門一句
三處皆不成,於是「無生,住、滅亦如是」;三相不成而有為不成,有為不成而無為不成,末後連眾生也不成。論主寫下全論最後一句:「一切法無生,畢竟空寂故。」
十二扇門,這是最後一扇。門闔上了——不是把外面關掉,是走進來的人不必再回頭找入口。
Only One Word Remains to Be Asked
The preceding gates have successively refuted causes and conditions, existence and nonexistence, marks, nature, the agent, and the three times. At the end, one matter has not yet been asked: surely those things that were refuted nevertheless once arose? The treatise author takes up this very word.
Arising Can Be Spoken of in Only Three Places
Already arisen, not yet arisen, or presently arising. The verse establishes three positions and leaves none behind:
“An arisen effect does not arise; what has not arisen does not arise either; apart from the arisen and not arisen, the time of arising too does not arise.”
The terms are first fixed: “Arising means that an effect has emerged; not arisen means not yet begun, not yet emerged, and not yet existent; the time of arising means just beginning to emerge but not yet complete.”
Already Arisen: What Has Been Done Is Not Done Again
If what has arisen must arise again, there will be a second, third, and fourth arising without end. Moreover, “what has been done should not be done again, what has been burned should not be burned again, and what has been realized should not be realized again.” If the arising that produces could itself produce while not yet arisen, the one word arising would contain two meanings, “and thus what you first stated as fixed is now unfixed.”
Not Arisen: The Horns of Rabbits and Horses Should Arise Too
If the not-arisen could arise merely by being not-arisen, far too much would arise: the enlightenment not yet arisen in ordinary people, the afflictions that no longer arise in an arhat of the irreversible dharma, and “the horns of rabbits, horses, and the rest” should all emerge. Moreover, arising apart from arising would mean “doing apart from doing, going apart from going, and eating apart from eating.” What first collapses is the convention governing ordinary speech.
Someone retreats: arising occurs only when all conditions are complete. The author does not deny conditions; he asks what status the effect has within the cause—previously existent, previously nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent. “Sought through these three alternatives, arising cannot be obtained.”
The Time of Arising: That Road Exists Only through Someone Traversing It
The time of arising consists only of a portion already arisen and a portion not yet arisen, neither of which arises. Apart from arising, there is no time of arising. To say that arising arises during the time of arising counts two arisings, yet “there are not two dharmas.” The plainest question is: “Where does arising travel?”
One Sentence Closes the Gate
When none of the three positions can be established, “non-arising; abiding and cessation are the same.” When the three marks are unestablished, conditioned dharmas are unestablished; when conditioned dharmas are unestablished, unconditioned dharmas are unestablished; finally, sentient beings too are unestablished. The author writes the treatise’s last sentence: “All dharmas are non-arising because they are ultimately empty and quiescent.”
This is the last of the Twelve Gates. The gate closes—not to shut out what is outside, but so that the person who has entered need not turn back to seek an entrance.