十二門論 觀緣門第三
論主要對面指一指:果在哪裡?
找處
「廣略眾緣法,是中無有果;
緣中若無果,云何從緣生?」
廣是分開一個一個找,略是合起來一團找。瓶不在泥裡、不在輪繩陶師裡,那一堆和合之中也取不出瓶。除此再無第三處可找。
名字
對面問「云何名為諸緣?」,論主答得極死:只此「四緣生諸法」,且「更無第五緣」。數目一說盡,往後便不許臨時添一個來救。四名逐一釋去,因緣指所從生,次第緣指前滅後起,緣緣指所念之境,增上緣指以有此故彼得生——無一名立在自己身上,個個都要指著另一頭才說得成。
撤看
因中有果,撤了緣該還有果;緣中有果,撤了因該還有果;若兩處都有,那果該是取得到的。然而「以理推求而不可得,是故二處俱無」。
無中生有攔不住
「何故不從非緣生?二俱無故。」——就無果這一點說,緣與非緣一般齊。許無中生有,便沒有理由攔住非緣。
掛不上的名字
「果不生故,緣亦不生。何以故?以先緣後果故。」先是對著後說的先。果一落空,緣字無處可掛。於是「緣果無故,一切有為法空」,順下去,無為亦空,末後只剩一問:「云何有我耶?」
問的始終只是那一句:你說有,指出來給我看。
The treatise author asks the opponent to point: where is the effect?
Places to Look
“Among the multitude of conditions, whether treated broadly or in summary, no effect exists; if no effect exists among conditions, how could it arise from conditions?”
Broadly means searching one condition at a time; in summary means searching the combined mass. The jar is not in the clay, wheel, cord, or potter, nor can a jar be extracted from their conjunction. There is no third place to search.
Names
The opponent asks, “What are called the multitude of conditions?” The author answers with finality: only these “four conditions produce all dharmas,” and “there is no fifth condition.” Once the number is exhausted, no extra one can later be added to save the claim. He explains each name: the causal condition refers to that from which something arises; the immediate antecedent condition to the preceding dharma’s ceasing and the next arising; the object-condition to the object recollected; and the predominant condition to the fact that because this exists, that can arise. Not one name stands on itself; each can be spoken only while pointing to another side.
Remove and See
If the effect exists within the cause, remove the conditions and it should remain. If it exists within the conditions, remove the cause and it should remain. If it exists in both places, it should be obtainable. Yet “sought through reason, it cannot be obtained; therefore it is absent in both places.”
Arising from Nothing Cannot Be Contained
“Why does it not arise from nonconditions? Because neither side contains an effect.” In the single respect of containing no effect, conditions and nonconditions are equal. Permit existence to arise from nonexistence and there is no reason to stop nonconditions.
A Name with Nowhere to Hang
“Because the effect does not arise, the conditions do not arise either. Why? Because conditions precede and the effect follows.” The prior is prior only relative to the later. Once the effect falls empty, the word condition has nowhere to hang. Thus, “because conditions and effect do not exist, all conditioned dharmas are empty.” From there unconditioned dharmas are empty too, and only one question remains: “how could a self exist?”
The question throughout is only this: you say it exists—point it out for me.
龍樹菩薩造,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《十二門論》卷一〈觀緣門第三〉· 大正藏 T30n1568〔起 T30 0162b02〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0162b02〕復次,諸法緣不成。何以故?
廣略眾緣法,是中無有果;
緣中若無果,云何從緣生?
瓶等果,一一緣中無,和合中亦無,若二門中無,云何言從緣生?
問曰:「云何名為諸緣?」
答曰:
「四緣生諸法,更無第五緣,
因緣次第緣,緣緣增上緣。」
四緣者:因緣、次第緣、緣緣、增上緣。因緣者,隨所從生法,若已從生、今從生、當從生,是法名因緣。次第緣者,前法已滅次第生,是名次第緣。緣緣者,隨所念法,若起身業、若起口業、若起心心數法,是名緣緣。增上緣者,以有此法故彼法得生,此法於彼法為增上緣。如是四緣,皆因中無果。若因中有果者,應離諸緣而有果,而實離緣無果。若緣中有果者,應離因而有果,而實離因無果。若於緣及因有果者,應可得,以理推求而不可得,是故二處俱無。如是一一中無、和合中亦無,云何得言果從緣生?
復次:
若果緣中無,而從緣中出,
是果何不從,非緣中而出?
若謂果,緣中無而從緣生者,何故不從非緣生?二俱無故。是故無有因緣能生果者。
果不生故,緣亦不生。何以故?以先緣後果故。緣果無故,一切有為法空;有為法空故,無為法亦空;有為、無為空故,云何有我耶?
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《十二門論》卷一〈觀緣門第三〉·大正藏 T30n1568。段首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、諸法之緣不能成立
〔T30 0162b02〕其次,諸法的緣是不能成立的。為什麼?
不論把眾緣廣廣地攤開來說、還是略略地合起來說,這裡面都沒有果;
緣中若是沒有果,怎麼能說果是從緣生出來的呢?
瓶等等的果,在一一的緣之中沒有,在眾緣和合之中也沒有;若是這兩門之中都沒有,怎麼能說它是從緣生的?
二、何謂諸緣
問的一方說:什麼叫作諸緣?
答的一方說:
四種緣生起一切法,此外再沒有第五種緣;
就是因緣、次第緣,緣緣、增上緣。
所謂四緣,就是因緣、次第緣、緣緣、增上緣。
所謂因緣,是隨著那個所從而生起的法來說的:若是已經從它生了、如今正從它生、將要從它生,這個法就名為因緣。
所謂次第緣,是前一個法已經滅去,隨即次第生起後一個法,這名為次第緣。
所謂緣緣,是隨著所憶念的法,若因此起了身業、若起了口業、若起了心與心數法,這名為緣緣。
所謂增上緣,是因為有這個法的緣故,那個法才得以生起;這個法對於那個法,就是增上緣。
三、四緣都是因中無果
像這樣的四種緣,都是因中沒有果的。
若說因中已經有果,那麼應當離開諸緣也還有果;而事實上離了緣就沒有果。
若說緣中已經有果,那麼應當離開因也還有果;而事實上離了因就沒有果。
若說在緣以及因這兩處都有果,那麼果應當是可以取得的;然而依著道理推求,卻取它不到——因此因、緣這兩處都沒有果。
像這樣,一一緣中沒有,和合之中也沒有,怎麼能說果是從緣生的呢?
四、緣中既然沒有,為何不從非緣出
其次:
若是果在緣中本來沒有,卻能夠從緣中出來,
那麼這個果為什麼不從非緣之中出來呢?
若說果在緣中本來沒有而卻從緣生,那為什麼不從非緣生?因為這兩邊同樣是沒有果的緣故。所以並沒有哪一個因緣是能夠生果的。
五、果不生故緣亦不生,乃至無我
果既然不生,緣也就不生。為什麼?因為是先有緣、後有果的緣故。
緣與果都沒有,所以一切有為法都是空的;有為法既然空了,無為法也是空的;有為、無為都空了,又哪裡還有一個我呢?
Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of Conditions, Gate Three,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.
1. The Conditions of Dharmas Cannot Be Established
〔T30 0162b02〕 Next, the conditions of dharmas cannot be established. Why?
Among the multitude of conditions, whether treated broadly or in summary, no effect exists; if no effect exists among conditions, how could it arise from conditions?
Such effects as a jar do not exist within each condition individually and do not exist within the conjunction of the multitude of conditions. If they exist in neither of these two approaches, how can one say that they arise from conditions?
2. What Are Called the Multitude of Conditions?
The questioner says: What are called the multitude of conditions?
The respondent says:
Four kinds of conditions produce all dharmas; beyond them there is no fifth condition: the causal condition, the immediate antecedent condition, the object-condition, and the predominant condition.
The four conditions are the causal condition, immediate antecedent condition, object-condition, and predominant condition.
The causal condition is named according to the dharma that arises from it. If that dharma has arisen from it, is now arising from it, or will arise from it, this dharma is called a causal condition.
The immediate antecedent condition means that after the preceding dharma has ceased, the next dharma immediately arises in sequence. This is called the immediate antecedent condition.
The object-condition follows the dharma recollected. If bodily action, verbal action, or mind and mental factors arise because of it, it is called the object-condition.
The predominant condition means that because this dharma exists, that dharma can arise. This dharma is a predominant condition for that dharma.
3. None of the Four Conditions Contains an Effect within the Cause
In each of these four conditions, the effect is absent within the cause.
If the effect already existed within the cause, it should exist apart from the multitude of conditions; yet in fact no effect exists apart from conditions.
If the effect already existed within the conditions, it should exist apart from the cause; yet in fact no effect exists apart from the cause.
If the effect existed within both conditions and cause, it should be obtainable. Yet sought through reason, it cannot be obtained. Therefore no effect exists in either cause or conditions.
Thus, no effect exists within each condition individually and no effect exists in their conjunction. How can one say that the effect arises from conditions?
4. Since No Effect Exists among Conditions, Why Does It Not Emerge from Nonconditions?
Next:
If the effect originally does not exist among conditions but can emerge from conditions, why does this effect not emerge from nonconditions?
Suppose one says that although the effect originally does not exist among conditions, it arises from them. Why does it not arise from nonconditions? Neither side contains an effect. Therefore no causes and conditions can produce an effect.
5. Because the Effect Does Not Arise, Conditions Do Not Arise; Finally, There Is No Self
Since the effect does not arise, conditions do not arise either. Why? Because conditions precede and the effect follows.
Since neither conditions nor effect exist, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Since conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too. Since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how could there be a self?
十二門走到第三扇。前一門問的是因中先有果還是先無果;這一門起手一句「復次,諸法緣不成」,把話頭從因移到緣。
移了一個字,事情就不同了。因是一個,緣是一群。人被問到『果在因裡嗎』,還有一步退路可走:不在這一個因裡,是眾緣合起來才有的。這一步退路,正是本門要走到的地方。
起首的「復次」二字也要留意。這不是另起爐灶,是接著前門往下說:前門把因這一頭問過了,如今換一個問法再問一次。十二門一門一門下來,多半是這樣相承的——不是十二個彼此無關的論證,是同一件事從十二個入處各走一趟。
一、開門之頌:廣說略說,都無有果
論主先立頌:
「廣略眾緣法,是中無有果;
緣中若無果,云何從緣生?」
「廣略」二字要看清。廣是把眾緣一一攤開來看,一個一個地找;略是把眾緣合起來看,就這一團和合裡找。找法只有這兩種——要嘛分開找,要嘛合起來找,此外沒有第三個找處。兩處都說「是中無有果」,下句才敢問:「緣中若無果,云何從緣生?」
論主隨即用長行把頌坐實:「瓶等果,一一緣中無,和合中亦無,若二門中無,云何言從緣生?」舉的仍是瓶——泥團、輪、繩、陶師,這是第一門就數過的一串。分開看,泥裡沒有瓶,輪裡沒有瓶,繩與陶師裡也沒有瓶;合起來看,那一堆和合之中還是取不出一個瓶。「二門」就是這兩個找處。
有人到此會想:和合裡怎麼會沒有瓶?分明是和合之後瓶才出來的。論主問的不是這個。他問的是:你說果從緣生,那你所謂的果,是一個原就在那裡、只等眾緣把它送出來的東西嗎?若是,請指出它在哪一緣裡,或在和合的哪一處。指不出,「從緣生」三個字裡的那個「生」,就不是把一個現成的東西搬出來。第一門說瓶不能自己站住,此門更進一步:連那個要把瓶送出來的緣,也送不出一個站得住的瓶。
二、問緣之名:四緣與「更無第五緣」
到這裡,對面問了一句很要緊的話:「云何名為諸緣?」——你說緣中無果,那你所謂的緣,究竟指什麼?
這一問是要論主把話說死。論主答得也乾脆,立頌:
「四緣生諸法,更無第五緣,
因緣次第緣,緣緣增上緣。」
先說「四緣生諸法」,再說「更無第五緣」。這一句是論主替對面把門關上的。緣只有這四種,數目已盡,往後不許臨時添一個第五緣來救。若容許有第五緣,一一破去之後對面總可以說『還有一種你沒破到』;四種說死了,底下的破才是徹底的。
同樣的四句在《中論》〈觀因緣品〉裡是對面所引:「因緣次第緣,緣緣增上緣,四緣生諸法,更無第五緣。」兩處的句序不同,本門把「四緣生諸法,更無第五緣」提在前面——先數盡,再列名。
三、四緣各有其職事
論主接著一一釋名。四條都是就作用說的,沒有一條說緣自身有個什麼性質。
「因緣者,隨所從生法,若已從生、今從生、當從生,是法名因緣。」因緣是就「所從生」立名的:果已經從它生、正從它生、將要從它生。三時都說了,意思是這個名字自始至終掛在果那一頭。
「次第緣者,前法已滅次第生,是名次第緣。」前法滅,後法接著起。這裡的「已滅」二字,正是它得名之處。
「緣緣者,隨所念法,若起身業、若起口業、若起心心數法,是名緣緣。」緣緣是所念之境。這一條特別要看「隨所念法」四字:境之所以稱緣,是因為有能念的心緣著它;若無人念,它便不是誰的緣緣。而它所發起的,論主一連舉了三樣——身業、口業、心心數法,從身口一直說到心,可見這一緣所涉甚廣。
「增上緣者,以有此法故彼法得生,此法於彼法為增上緣。」增上緣說的是助成:以有此法,故彼法得生。這一條的句式最見分明——「此法於彼法」為增上緣,名字是掛在「於彼法」這幾個字上的,不是掛在此法自己身上。
四條讀下來,可以看見一件事:四個名字沒有一個是站在自己身上的,都要指著另一頭才說得成——因緣指著所生,次第緣指著後起,緣緣指著能念之心,增上緣指著彼法。名字既然如此立,論主底下要問的就是:那被指著的果,究竟在哪裡?
四、皆因中無果:離緣無果,離因無果
論主一句總收:「如是四緣,皆因中無果。」然後拆成三段來驗。
「若因中有果者,應離諸緣而有果,而實離緣無果。」你說果早已在因裡,那把其餘的緣撤走,果也該還在——泥團裡若真藏著瓶,不要輪、不要繩、不要陶師,瓶也該出來;事實不然。
「若緣中有果者,應離因而有果,而實離因無果。」反過來說果在緣裡,那把因撤走,果也該還在;事實也不然。
「若於緣及因有果者,應可得,以理推求而不可得,是故二處俱無。」最後把因與緣合起來說:兩處都有果,那果應當是取得到的;可是依理推求,取不到。所以「二處俱無」。
三段驗完,論主重述頌意:「如是一一中無、和合中亦無,云何得言果從緣生?」繞了一圈,仍舊落回廣略兩處。四緣之名說得再細,也逃不出這兩個找處。
五、緣中既無,何不從非緣出
破到這裡,對面還有最後一種說法:果本來不在緣中,但緣就是能生它。論主為此另立一頌:
「若果緣中無,而從緣中出,
是果何不從,非緣中而出?」
長行說得更直白:「若謂果,緣中無而從緣生者,何故不從非緣生?二俱無故。」
這一問的鋒在「二俱無故」四字。你所持的理由是無中可以生有;那麼緣中無果,非緣中也一樣無果——就「無果」這一點說,緣與非緣完全一樣。你既許無果者能生果,就沒有理由只許緣生而不許非緣生。論主於是收:「是故無有因緣能生果者。」
要看清論主在此破的是什麼。他並不是說泥不成瓶而乳可成瓶;他是說:一旦你把緣說成一個自己能從無中生有的東西,緣與非緣的分際立刻失守。緣之為緣,本來只在待果而立名,不在自身有一種生的本事。
這一難與前一段合看,正是一副兩扇的鉗。前一段驗的是『先有』這一路:果若先在因中、先在緣中,那撤去其餘也該有果,而事實不然。此處驗的是『先無』這一路:果若先不在緣中而緣猶能生,那非緣也一樣不在,也該能生。先有一路走不通,先無一路也走不通;除此再無第三種說法,那麼緣能生果這件事,便無處可立。
這一副鉗,正是前一門〈觀有果無果門〉的話頭在此重現。前門就因說有果無果,此門就緣說緣中無而從緣出——所問的形式相同,所問的對象不同。一個問法能在兩處都用得上,可見所破的不是某一種主張,是主張背後那個『它自己就是如此』的想頭。
六、果不生故緣亦不生
末後一轉最快,也最容易讀漏:「果不生故,緣亦不生。何以故?以先緣後果故。」
果不生,為什麼緣也跟著不生?論主給的理由是「以先緣後果故」。緣這個名字是先於果而說的——先有緣,後有果,這是說緣的人自己立的次第。可是這個「先」是對著果說的先:沒有後面那個果,前面這個先就落空了。果一空,緣的名字就沒有掛處。
第一門說「緣空故,從緣生法亦空」,是從緣推到果;此處是從果回推到緣。兩門合看,緣與果彼此都不能先自站住。
七、一路推到我
收尾三句,一句比一句遠:「緣果無故,一切有為法空;有為法空故,無為法亦空;有為、無為空故,云何有我耶?」
緣與果都沒有,凡是待緣而起的有為法就都空了;有為既空,對著有為而立的無為之名也空;有為無為都空,那個依著這些法而說出來的我,更無處安放。
這三句與第一門末後的「是故有為、無為及我皆空」是同一條路,只是入口換了——第一門從自性入,這一門從緣入。十二門所以稱門,正在於此:入處不同,所至無二。
讀這一門的人可以帶走什麼
一是記住只有兩個找處:一一與和合。凡說『果從緣生』的人,請他指出果在哪裡,答案不出這兩處。
二是留意「更無第五緣」。把數目說死,是為了不留活門;讀論時遇見這一類把話說盡的句子,多半是關鍵處。
三是分清緣的用與緣的能。論主未曾說泥、輪、繩、陶師無用;他所不許的,是緣自身有一種能從無生有的本事。
承衍:同軸之照
以上是本門自身之義。此下就《中論》〈觀因緣品〉一處旁照——照非本論,只是同一義理在別處的說法,並錄不判。
那一品破四緣的篇幅遠比此門為長:先各別破因緣、次第緣、緣緣、增上緣,一緣一頌,然後才說:
「略廣因緣中,求果不可得;
因緣中若無,云何從緣出?」
「若謂緣無果,而從緣中出;
是果何不從,非緣中而出?」
兩頌與本門的兩頌同鋒,字句亦幾乎相同。所異者在體例:《中論》先各別破四緣而後總收,本門則省去各別之破,只取廣略求果與非緣之難兩頌,把四緣一併收在「如是四緣,皆因中無果」一句之下。此門自有其省文——十二門本是為「略解摩訶衍義」而立,此處正見其略。
同軸互照,各還其位;本門的義理仍以本門長行為準。
The Twelve Gates have reached their third entrance. The preceding gate asks whether the effect first exists or does not exist within the cause. This gate begins, “Next, the conditions of dharmas cannot be established,” shifting the discussion from cause to conditions.
Changing one word changes the matter. A cause is one; conditions are many. When asked whether the effect lies within the cause, one still has a route of retreat: it is not within this single cause, but exists only when the multitude of conditions come together. This gate walks precisely to that retreat.
The opening word “next” also deserves attention. The author does not begin a new enterprise but continues from the preceding gate. The preceding gate has questioned the cause; now he asks the same matter another way. Most of the Twelve Gates succeed one another like this. They are not twelve unrelated arguments but twelve entrances through which the same matter is traversed.
1. Opening Verse: Whether Treated Broadly or in Summary, No Effect Exists
The author first gives a verse:
“Among the multitude of conditions, whether treated broadly or in summary, no effect exists; if no effect exists among conditions, how could it arise from conditions?”
The words “broadly and in summary” must be seen clearly. Broadly means spreading out the multitude of conditions and searching them individually. In summary means gathering them and searching within the conjunction as a whole. There are only these two ways to search—either separately or together—and no third place exists. Only after saying “no effect exists here” in both places can the next line ask, “If no effect exists among conditions, how could it arise from conditions?”
The extended prose immediately seats the verse in its example: “Such effects as a jar do not exist within each condition individually and do not exist within their conjunction. If they exist in neither approach, how can one say that they arise from conditions?” The example remains the jar. Clay, wheel, cord, and potter form a sequence already counted in the first gate. Separately, no jar exists in the clay, wheel, cord, or potter. Together, no jar can be extracted from the mass of conjunction. These are the “two approaches,” the two places of search.
Someone may think: how could no jar exist within the conjunction? The jar obviously appears only after conjunction. This is not the author’s question. He asks: when you say that the effect arises from conditions, is that effect something already there, merely waiting for the conditions to deliver it? If so, indicate the condition in which it rests or its position within the conjunction. If it cannot be indicated, then the arising within “arising from conditions” is not the carrying out of a finished object. The first gate says a jar cannot stand by itself; this gate goes farther. Even the conditions that are supposed to deliver the jar cannot deliver a self-standing jar.
2. Asking the Name of Conditions: Four Conditions and “No Fifth Condition”
At this point the opponent asks an important question: “What are called the multitude of conditions?” You say that no effect exists among conditions; what exactly do you mean by conditions?
The question asks the author to make his claim final. He answers just as directly with a verse:
“Four kinds of conditions produce all dharmas; beyond them there is no fifth condition: the causal condition, immediate antecedent condition, object-condition, and predominant condition.”
First he says, “four conditions produce all dharmas,” then “there is no fifth condition.” With this sentence the author closes the gate on the opponent’s behalf. Conditions are limited to these four. Once the number is exhausted, no fifth can be added later to save the claim. If a fifth were permitted, then after each condition was refuted the opponent could always say, “there remains another that you have not refuted.” Once four is final, the refutation below is exhaustive.
The same four lines appear in the Treatise on the Middle, “Examination of Causes and Conditions,” as a citation by the opponent: “the causal condition, immediate antecedent condition, object-condition, and predominant condition; four conditions produce all dharmas, and there is no fifth condition.” Their sequence differs. This gate places “four conditions produce all dharmas; there is no fifth condition” first—exhausting the number before listing the names.
3. Each of the Four Conditions Has Its Function
The author next explains each name in turn. All four are spoken in terms of function; none states some nature belonging to the condition itself.
“The causal condition is named according to the dharma arising from it. If that dharma has arisen from it, is now arising from it, or will arise from it, this dharma is called a causal condition.” The causal condition is named by reference to “that from which something arises.” The effect has arisen, is arising, or will arise from it. All three times are stated, meaning that the name hangs upon the side of the effect throughout.
“The immediate antecedent condition means that after the preceding dharma has ceased, the next dharma arises in sequence.” A prior dharma ceases and the next immediately arises. The words “has ceased” are exactly where this condition receives its name.
“The object-condition follows the dharma recollected. If bodily action, verbal action, or mind and mental factors arise because of it, it is called the object-condition.” The object-condition is the object recollected. Attend especially to the words “follows the dharma recollected.” An object is called a condition because a recollecting mind apprehends it; if no one recollects it, it is no one’s object-condition. The author names three things it can initiate—bodily action, verbal action, and mind with mental factors—moving from body and speech through mind, showing this condition’s broad reach.
“The predominant condition means that because this dharma exists, that dharma can arise. This dharma is a predominant condition for that dharma.” A predominant condition assists completion: because this dharma exists, that dharma can arise. The sentence makes this clearest—“this dharma is a predominant condition for that dharma.” The name hangs not upon this dharma alone, but upon its relation “for that dharma.”
After reading all four definitions, one matter becomes visible: not one of the four names stands on itself. Each must point to another side to be spoken. The causal condition points to what is produced, the immediate antecedent condition to what next arises, the object-condition to the apprehending mind, and the predominant condition to that other dharma. Since the names are established this way, the author’s next question is: where exactly is the effect to which they point?
4. In Every Case the Effect Is Absent from the Cause: Apart from Conditions No Effect, Apart from Cause No Effect
The author gathers them in one sentence: “In each of these four conditions, the effect is absent within the cause.” He then tests this through three sections.
“If the effect existed within the cause, it should exist apart from the multitude of conditions; yet in fact no effect exists apart from conditions.” You say the effect already rests within the cause. Remove the other conditions, then, and it should remain. If a jar truly lies hidden in the lump of clay, no wheel, cord, or potter should be needed; the jar should still emerge. In fact it does not.
“If the effect existed within the conditions, it should exist apart from the cause; yet in fact no effect exists apart from the cause.” Conversely, if the effect rests within the conditions, remove the cause and it should remain. In fact it does not.
“If the effect existed in both conditions and cause, it should be obtainable. Yet sought through reason, it cannot be obtained. Therefore it is absent in both places.” Finally, cause and conditions are taken together. If the effect exists in both places, it should be obtainable; searched rationally, it is not. Thus, “it is absent in both places.”
After completing the three tests, the author restates the verse: “Thus, no effect exists within each condition individually and none exists within their conjunction. How can one say that the effect arises from conditions?” After going in a circle, the argument returns to the two places of broad and summary. However finely the four conditions are named, they cannot escape those two places of search.
5. Since No Effect Exists among Conditions, Why Does It Not Emerge from Nonconditions?
At this point the opponent still has one final claim: the effect originally is not within the conditions, but conditions possess the power to produce it. The author therefore gives another verse:
“If the effect does not exist among conditions but emerges from conditions, why does this effect not emerge from nonconditions?”
The extended prose states it more directly: “Suppose one says that although the effect is absent among conditions, it arises from them. Why does it not arise from nonconditions? Because both sides equally lack an effect.”
The point of the question lies in the words “both sides equally lack an effect.” Your reason is that what does not contain an effect can give rise to one. Yet no effect exists among conditions and no effect exists among nonconditions. In the single respect of not containing an effect, conditions and nonconditions are exactly alike. Once what lacks an effect is permitted to produce an effect, no reason remains to allow conditions but prevent nonconditions. The author therefore concludes, “Thus no causes and conditions can produce an effect.”
See what the author refutes here. He does not say that clay cannot become a jar while milk can. He says that once conditions are treated as something able by themselves to produce existence from nonexistence, the boundary between condition and noncondition immediately fails. A condition is a condition only by receiving its name in dependence upon an effect, not through possessing an intrinsic capacity to produce.
Together with the preceding section, this objection forms a two-jawed pincer. The preceding section tests the path of “preexistence.” If the effect already exists in the cause or conditions, it should remain when the others are removed, yet it does not. This section tests the path of “prior nonexistence.” If the effect does not first exist among conditions but the conditions nevertheless produce it, then nonconditions also do not contain it and should likewise produce. Preexistence fails; prior nonexistence fails. Since there is no third claim, conditions have nowhere from which to establish a power to produce an effect.
This pincer is the return here of the preceding gate’s topic, “Examination of an Existing or Nonexisting Effect.” That gate asks through the cause whether the effect exists or not; this gate asks through conditions whether what is absent can emerge from them. The form of the question is the same, while its object differs. That one question works in both places shows that what is refuted is not one specific thesis, but the thought behind the thesis that “it is simply thus of itself.”
6. Because the Effect Does Not Arise, Conditions Do Not Arise Either
The final turn is fastest and easiest to overlook: “Because the effect does not arise, conditions do not arise either. Why? Because conditions precede and the effect follows.”
Why do conditions fail when the effect fails? The author’s reason is that “conditions precede and the effect follows.” The name condition is spoken as prior to an effect: first the condition, then the effect. This is the order established by the person who speaks of conditions. Yet this prior is prior only relative to the effect. Without the later effect, the earlier prior falls empty. When the effect is empty, the name condition has nowhere to hang.
The first gate says, “because conditions are empty, dharmas produced from conditions are empty too,” moving from condition to effect. Here the movement returns from effect to condition. Read together, neither condition nor effect first stands by itself.
7. Proceeding All the Way to Self
The three concluding sentences reach farther with every clause: “Because conditions and effect do not exist, all conditioned dharmas are empty; because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty too; because conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how could there be a self?”
Since neither conditions nor effect exist intrinsically, all conditioned dharmas arising in dependence are empty. Once the conditioned are empty, the name unconditioned, established in contrast to them, is empty. Once conditioned and unconditioned are empty, the self spoken on the basis of those dharmas has nowhere to rest.
These three sentences follow the same road as the first gate’s conclusion, “thus conditioned, unconditioned, and self are all empty.” Only the entrance has changed. The first gate enters through intrinsic nature; this one through conditions. They are called the Twelve Gates precisely because their entrances differ while what they reach is not two.
What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Gate?
First, remember that there are only two places to look: the individual and the conjunction. Anyone saying that an effect arises from conditions must indicate where the effect is; the answer cannot escape these two.
Second, attend to “there is no fifth condition.” Fixing the number leaves no escape. When a treatise exhausts what can be said in this way, the sentence is usually a hinge.
Third, distinguish the use of conditions from a power intrinsic to conditions. The author never says that clay, wheel, cord, and potter are useless. What he rejects is that conditions themselves possess a capacity to produce existence from nonexistence.
Carried Forward: Illumination along the Same Axis
The preceding is the meaning of this gate itself. What follows is one cross-light from the Treatise on the Middle, “Examination of Causes and Conditions.” The illumination is not this treatise; it simply records without deciding how the same doctrinal meaning is stated elsewhere.
That chapter refutes the four conditions at much greater length. It first refutes the causal, immediate antecedent, object, and predominant conditions individually, one verse per condition, and only then says:
“Sought among causes and conditions, whether in summary or broadly, the effect cannot be obtained; if it does not exist among causes and conditions, how could it emerge from conditions?”
“If one says that the effect is absent among conditions yet emerges from them, why does this effect not emerge from nonconditions?”
These two verses have the same edge and almost the same wording as the two verses in this gate. Their forms differ. The Treatise on the Middle first refutes each of the four conditions and then gathers them; this gate omits those individual refutations and takes only the broad-and-summary search for the effect and the objection from nonconditions. It gathers the four conditions beneath one sentence: “in each of these four conditions, the effect is absent within the cause.” This gate has its own economy of text. The Twelve Gates was composed “to explain briefly the meaning of the Mahāyāna,” and here that brevity becomes visible.
Read together along one axis, each remains in its own place. The meaning of this gate is still governed by this gate’s own extended prose.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
底本為 T30n1568〔0162b02–0162c01〕;四緣名稱與次第依底本。
二、異釋對勘
本帙無另一漢譯異釋本;四緣可與《中論》第一品同題互讀,不列作異本。
三、諸家異釋(吉藏專疏)
吉藏 T1825〈觀緣門〉以一一、和合二處無果辨緣空,只置承衍。
四、名相
- 因緣:使法已、今、當生之因。
- 次第緣:前法滅後令後法次第起。
- 緣緣:心所緣境。
- 增上緣:此有故彼得生的助緣。
五、科判
兩段:四緣中無果;若緣中無果則非緣同例。
六、關中舊學·譯史
四緣以羅什譯名直列,宜保留「緣緣」古譯,不任意改成後世術語。
七、唯識軸互讀(空有)
四緣分類可與心識因緣論互讀;所破是緣的自在性,不是分類之用。
八、系內餘論互讀
承第二門因中有無果,回照《中論》第一品四緣不生。
九、校本定位
主底本 T30n1568〔0162b02–0162c01〕;吉藏 T1825〈觀緣門〉;無另一漢譯異釋本。
Textual Collation
The base text is T30n1568〔0162b02–0162c01〕; the names and order of the four conditions follow the base text.
Comparative Readings
There is no second Chinese translation of this treatise for comparison. The four conditions may be cross-read with the identically themed first chapter of the Treatise on the Middle but are not listed as a variant recension.
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang’s “Examination of Conditions” in T1825 distinguishes the emptiness of conditions through the absence of an effect in the two places—each condition and their conjunction—and is placed only in the coda.
Terminology
- Causal condition: a cause from which a dharma has arisen, is arising, or will arise.
- Immediate antecedent condition: the prior dharma’s ceasing followed by the next dharma’s arising in sequence.
- Object-condition: the object apprehended by mind.
- Predominant condition: an assisting condition through whose presence another dharma can arise.
Doctrinal Outline
Two movements: no effect exists among the four conditions; if no effect exists among conditions, then nonconditions afford the same case.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
The four conditions are directly listed under Kumārajīva’s translated names. The old translation 「緣緣」 tr. “object-condition” should be retained rather than freely replaced with later terminology.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
The classification of four conditions may be cross-read with accounts of causes and conditions for consciousness. What is refuted is the autonomy of conditions, not the utility of their classification.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
The gate continues the second gate’s examination of an effect as existent or nonexistent within a cause and looks back to the first chapter of the Treatise on the Middle, where the four conditions do not produce.
Position of the Editions
The principal base text is T30n1568〔0162b02–0162c01〕; Jizang’s “Examination of Conditions” is in T1825; there is no second Chinese translation for comparison.