十二門論 觀有果無果門第二

One verse asks only a single question: “Who, then, could be something that arises?” The questioner has already exhausted the answers—previously existent, previously nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent.

You Say the Effect Already Exists

Then it “is already existent and accomplished—what use is further arising?” Moreover, if it always exists in the cause and remains after arising, “the process is endless.” You revise the claim and say what has arisen does not arise again. The author answers: “Within this there is no coherent principle of arising.”

You Say It Is Merely Unseen

The author asks for its mark: “By what mark do you know and say that a jar already exists in the clay?” There is no mark of jar, nor mark of cow or horse. You offer eight reasons something may be unknowable—medicine in the eye, a distant bird, damaged faculties, a mind attending to form, a wall’s obstruction, an ink dot on black, a bell or drum masking a faint brushing sound, and a mote. The author denies none of them. He only points to the remedy for each: what is unseen because too near “should be apprehended from slightly farther away”; what is obscured “should be apprehended when the stronger ceases”; what is too subtle should be apprehended when coarse. Every one of the eight has a way for its obstruction to end. The jar in the clay does not. If you next say, “Before arising it is subtle; after arising it becomes coarse,” you have admitted that “the coarse is absent in the cause.”

You Say Threads Are the Cause of Cloth

If cloth already exists in the threads, the threads are merely its place of residence: “It is like cloth in threads or fruit in a vessel—only a dwelling place, not a cause.” Once the cause side is empty, the effect side is empty with it. What lies hidden always gives some sign—“seeing smoke, one knows there is fire”—yet neither the effect’s entity nor its mark can be found.

You Say the Effect Was Previously Absent

Then “a second head and third hand should arise.” You say a jar has conditions while extra heads and hands do not. The author asks only this: the jar is absent from clay and equally absent from stone, so “why call a lump of clay the jar’s cause and not call a stone its cause?” If both are alike in being absent, “each thing should produce every thing,” and carts and horses should issue from a fingertip. You appeal to prior experience: oil has been seen to come from sesame. The author says this “falls into a reason identical with what is doubted”: you invoke arising as evidence when arising is precisely the disputed matter.

You Say It Is Both

“Because the natures of existence and nonexistence contradict one another,” they cannot share one place, just as light and dark, pain and pleasure, going and staying, bondage and release do not. Combining two positions already refuted does not produce a third.

Then What?

The author states his own position: “I say that action, agent, cause, and effect are all empty.” When you refute action and agent, you state his point for him.

The three cases are exhausted: “Reason reaches its limit here.” Since the effect ultimately does not arise and every conditioned dharma is both cause and effect, all conditioned dharmas are empty. Because the conditioned is empty, the unconditioned is empty as well. As for that self—there is no need to ask the question again.

Composed by Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Twelve Gate Treatise, fascicle one, “Examination of an Existing or Nonexisting Effect, Gate Two,” Taishō T30n1568. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. The Opening Verse

〔T30 0160b17〕 Next, every dharma is unarisen. Why?

  If the effect already exists in the cause, it does not arise; if previously absent in the cause, it does not arise;   if said to be both existent and nonexistent, it likewise does not arise—who, then, could be something that arises?

If the effect already exists in the cause, one should not say it arises. If it was previously absent in the cause, one likewise should not say it arises. If it is said both to exist and not exist in the cause, one still should not say it arises.

2. The First Difficulty for Prior Existence and Arising: An Endless Process

Why? If the effect already exists in the cause and is nevertheless said to arise, the process becomes endless.

For example, suppose this effect was previously unarisen and has now arisen. Now that it has arisen, it should arise again. Why? Because on your account the effect is permanently present in the cause. Since that existent aspect remains, it should arise again. After it arises again, the existent aspect still remains and it should arise yet again. There would be no end.

If you revise your claim and say that what has already arisen does not arise again, while only the unarisen arises, then no coherent principle of arising can be stated here. Therefore the claim that what already exists arises is untenable.

3. One Effect Cannot Be Half Arising and Half Not Arising

Furthermore, suppose you say the effect already exists in the cause, yet claim that the part not yet arisen must arise while the part already arisen does not. This too is wrong. On your account, both parts equally exist beforehand. Though equally existent, one would arise and the other not; there is no such principle.

4. Arisen and Unarisen Are Opposed

Furthermore, if you say that while unarisen it determinately exists, then after arising it should be nonexistent. Why? Arisen and unarisen contradict one another; because they contradict one another, the active marks they bear also contradict one another.

Furthermore, existence contradicts nonexistence and nonexistence contradicts existence. If it exists both after arising and while still unarisen, arisen and unarisen should not differ. Why? If arising truly exists, yet what has arisen exists and what has not arisen also exists, what difference remains between arisen and unarisen? The claim that they do not differ is untenable. Therefore what already exists does not arise.

5. Already Existent and Accomplished—What Use Is Further Arising?

Furthermore, what previously exists is already accomplished. Why should it arise again? What has been done should not be done again, and what has been accomplished should not be accomplished again. Therefore an existent dharma should not be said to arise.

6. The Jar in the Clay Should Be Visible

Furthermore, if that existent thing can arise, then before it arises the effect should be visible in the cause; in fact, it is not. A jar in a lump of clay or a mat in reeds should be visible, yet in fact neither is. Therefore what already exists does not arise.

7. The Challenge “It Is Unseen Because It Has Not Changed,” and Its Refutation

The questioner says: The effect already exists, but it cannot be seen because it has not yet undergone transformation.

The answerer says:

If you say that before the jar arises its entity has not yet changed and therefore cannot be seen, then by what mark do you know and say that a jar already exists in the clay? Do you say the jar exists on the basis of a jar’s mark, or on the basis of the mark of a cow or horse? If the clay has no mark of a jar, it equally has no mark of a cow or horse. When there is no mark at all, is that not called nonexistence? Thus the claim that an effect already exists in the cause and then arises is untenable.

Furthermore, if the transformation itself is the effect, then that transformation should already exist in the cause. Why? Because in your teaching the effect already exists in the cause. Since jars and the rest already exist, their transformation already exists too and should be visible; in fact, it cannot be found. Therefore the claim that it is unseen because it has not yet changed is untenable.

If you say that before transformation it is not called an effect, then the effect can never be found. Why? Since this transformation was previously absent, it should also be absent afterward; therefore such effects as jars can never be found.

If you say that it becomes the effect only after transformation, then the effect was previously absent in the cause. Your claim is thereby unstable: at one time you say the effect already exists in the cause, at another that it was previously absent.

8. Eight Ways Something May Exist Yet Remain Unknown

The questioner says: Transformation already exists but simply cannot be seen. Things may indeed exist yet remain unfindable to a person.

Some are unknowable because too near, some because too far, some because a faculty is damaged, some because the mind does not attend, some because an obstruction intervenes, some because they are the same as their location, some because a stronger thing overwhelms them, and some because they are too minute.

What is too near and unknowable is like medicine placed in the eye. What is too far is like a bird soaring high in the sky and disappearing into the distance. Damage to a faculty is like a blind person unable to see color, a deaf person unable to hear sound, one with a blocked nose unable to smell, one with an impaired tongue unable to taste, one with a numb body unable to feel touch, or one with a deranged mind unable to know reality. Inattention is like a mind fixed on form and therefore not knowing sound. Obstruction is like earth covering the great waters beneath it or a wall blocking objects beyond it. Sameness is like a dot of ink upon black. Being overwhelmed by something stronger is like failing to hear a faint brushing sound while bells and drums are sounding. Minuteness is like motes that do not appear.

In these ways, dharmas may exist yet remain unknown because of eight conditions. Therefore your claim that transformation in the cause cannot be found and jars and the rest cannot be found is untenable. Why? These things exist but are unapprehended only because of the eight conditions.

9. Each of the Eight Is Turned Back

〔T30 0161a10〕 The answerer says:

Transformation and such effects as jars are not unapprehended in the same manner as the eight conditions. Why?

If transformation and such effects as jars are unapprehended because extremely near, they should be apprehended from slightly farther away. If because extremely far, they should be apprehended from slightly nearer. If because a faculty is damaged, they should be apprehended by one whose faculties are sound. If because the mind does not attend, they should be apprehended when it attends. If because of obstruction, transformation and the jar should be apprehended when unobstructed. If because they are the same as their location, they should be apprehended at another time. If because a stronger thing overwhelms them, they should be apprehended when the stronger thing ceases. If because too minute, such effects as jars are coarse and should be apprehended.

Moreover, if the jar is unapprehended because minute, it should remain unapprehended after arising. Why? In your teaching, it has the same minute mark before and after arising, and it determinately exists both before and after arising.

10. Revising the Claim to “Minute before Arising, Coarse after Arising” Also Fails

The questioner says: Before arising it is minute; after arising it becomes coarse. Therefore it can be apprehended after arising but not before.

The answerer says:

If so, the effect is absent in the cause. Why? Because the coarse is absent from the cause.

Furthermore, since the coarse was previously absent from the cause—if the coarse already existed there, one should not call it minute and say it is unapprehended because minute. The present effect is coarse, but you say it was unapprehended because minute; then this coarse thing is not called the effect. Consequently the present effect should never be apprehended, yet in fact the effect is apprehended. Therefore it is not unapprehended because minute.

Thus the claim that an effect already exists in the cause but is unapprehended because of the eight conditions is untenable.

11. The Marks of Both Cause and Effect Collapse

Furthermore, if an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises, the cause loses the mark of cause and the effect loses the mark of effect. Why? If cloth is in threads or fruit in a vessel, that is merely a place of residence and cannot be called a cause. Why? Threads are not cloth and a vessel is not the cause of fruit.

If the cause collapses, the effect collapses as well. Therefore threads and the rest are not the causes of cloth and the rest. Because there is no cause, there is no effect. Why? An effect is established precisely because there is a cause. If the cause is not established, how could the effect be established?

12. What Is Not Made Is Not Called an Effect

Furthermore, what has not been produced is not called an effect, yet threads and other causes cannot produce cloth and other effects. Why? Threads do not produce cloth merely because cloth resides upon them. Thus there would be neither cause nor effect.

If cause and effect are both absent, one need not continue asking whether the effect previously exists or is previously absent in the cause.

13. What Exists Must Show a Mark

Furthermore, if the effect exists in the cause but cannot be apprehended, some mark should at least appear. Smelling fragrance, one knows flowers are present; hearing a sound, one knows a bird is present; hearing laughter, one knows a person is present; seeing smoke, one knows fire is present; seeing a swan, one knows a pond is present.

In the same way, if an effect already exists in the cause, some mark should appear. Yet neither the effect’s entity nor its mark can now be found. Thus one should know that the effect was previously absent in the cause.

14. If the Effect Already Exists, One Can No Longer Say Cloth Exists Because of Threads

Furthermore, if the effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises, one should no longer say that cloth exists because of threads or a mat because of reeds.

If this cause did not produce it, nothing else produced it either. If cloth was not made by threads, could it have been made from reeds? If neither threads nor reeds made it, would one not have to say it was made from nothing?

If it was made from nothing, it is not called an effect. Since there is no effect, there is no cause, as already explained. Therefore the claim that an effect already exists in the cause and then arises is untenable.

15. Made from Nothing, It Becomes Permanent

Furthermore, if the effect is made from nothing, it is permanent, like the nature of nirvāṇa.

If the effect is permanent, every conditioned dharma is permanent. Why? Because every conditioned dharma is an effect.

If every dharma is permanent, there is no impermanence. If there is no impermanence, neither is there permanence. Why? Impermanence exists in relation to permanence, and permanence in relation to impermanence. Therefore the claim that both permanence and impermanence are absent is untenable. Consequently one cannot say that an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises.

16. An Effect Does Not Become the Cause of Another Effect

Furthermore, if an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises, this effect should itself become the cause of another distinct effect: cloth the cause of wearing, a mat the cause of covering, and a cart the cause of carrying. Yet in fact it does not become the cause of another distinct effect. Therefore one cannot say that an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises.

Suppose you say: fragrance already exists in the earth but does not emerge until water is sprinkled; an effect is the same and cannot function as a cause before the conditions assemble. This is untenable. Why? On your account it is called an effect only when it can be known; then jars and other objects are not effects. Why? Being made knowable is produced, whereas jars and the rest already exist and are unproduced. You have thereby treated production itself as the effect. Therefore the claim that an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises is untenable.

17. A Revealing Cause Can Only Disclose; It Cannot Produce a Thing

Furthermore, a revealing cause can only disclose something already there; it cannot produce a thing. If a lamp is lit to illuminate a jar in darkness, it also illuminates bedding and other objects. But when conditions combine to make a jar, they do not simultaneously produce bedding and other objects. Therefore know that an effect does not already exist in the cause and afterward arise.

18. The Distinction between Making Now and Making Later

Furthermore, if an effect already exists in the cause and afterward arises, there should be no distinction between making now and making later. Yet you accept both making now and making later. Therefore an effect does not already exist in the cause and afterward arise.

19. Refuting Prior Nonexistence: A Second Head and Third Hand

The claim that an effect was previously absent in the cause and then arises is likewise wrong. Why? If what is nonexistent could arise, a second head and a third hand should arise. Why? Because on your account what is nonexistent can arise.

The questioner says: Jars and other things have causes and conditions; a second head and third hand lack them. How could they arise? Therefore your claim is wrong.

The answerer says: A second head, a third hand, and such effects as jars are all equally absent in the cause. A jar is absent from a lump of clay and equally absent from a stone. Why, then, call the lump of clay the cause of a jar but not call the stone its cause? Why call milk the cause of curds and threads the cause of cloth, but not call reeds the cause?

20. Each Thing Should Produce Every Thing

Furthermore, if an effect is previously absent in the cause and nevertheless arises, every single thing should produce every thing. Carts, horses, food, and the rest should arise from a fingertip; threads should not produce only cloth but also carts, horses, food, and every other thing. Why? If what is absent can arise, why should threads produce only cloth and not carts, horses, food, and the rest? All are equally absent.

If an effect previously absent in the cause can arise, causes should not each possess a distinct power to produce their effects. One who needs oil seeks it from sesame and does not press sand. If oil is equally absent from sesame and sand, why seek it in sesame and not press sand?

Suppose you say: Oil has previously been seen to come from sesame and never from sand, so it is sought in sesame rather than sand. This is untenable. Why? Only if the mark of arising were established could you say that at another time oil was seen to come from sesame and not from sand, and therefore one seeks it in sesame rather than sand. Since the mark of arising for every dharma is not established, you cannot say that because oil was formerly seen to come from sesame, it should now be sought in sesame rather than sand.

21. Not One Matter Alone Is Refuted; Every Cause and Effect Is Refuted Together

〔T30 0162a03〕 Furthermore, I am not now refuting this one matter alone; I refute every cause and effect together. The three kinds of arising—an effect already existent in the cause, previously nonexistent there, or both existent and nonexistent there—are all unestablished. Therefore your statement that oil was previously seen to come from sesame falls into a reason identical with what is under doubt.

22. If the Effect Was Previously Absent, the Marks of Causes Cannot Be Established

Furthermore, if an effect is previously absent from the cause and then arises, the marks of causes cannot be established. Why? If causes are absent, by what can this dharma be made? By what can it be accomplished? If there is neither making nor accomplishment, why call anything a cause? Thus an agent cannot produce anything, and one who directs an agent likewise cannot produce anything.

23. Action, Agent, and What Is Made: Neither Side Can Be Found

If the effect already exists in the cause, there should be no distinction among action, agent, and what is made. Why? If the effect already exists, what need is there to make it again? Therefore all the causes you describe—action, agent, and what is made—cannot be found.

The claim that the effect was previously absent in the cause is likewise wrong. Why? Only if someone accepted action and agent and distinctly established cause and effect should this be used to challenge me. I say that action, agent, cause, and effect are all empty. If you refute action, agent, cause, and effect, you thereby establish my Dharma and do not challenge it. Therefore the claim that an effect was previously absent in the cause and then arises is untenable.

Furthermore, only one who accepted that an effect already exists in the cause should be challenged in this way. I do not say it already exists in the cause, so I do not accept this challenge; neither do I accept that it was previously absent in the cause.

24. Both Existent and Nonexistent: Light and Dark Cannot Share One Place

The claim that an effect is both existent and nonexistent in the cause and then arises is likewise wrong. Why? Existence and nonexistence possess mutually contradictory natures and marks. Since their natures and marks conflict, how could they occupy one place? Light and dark, pain and pleasure, going and staying, bondage and release cannot occupy one place. Therefore neither an effect previously existent nor previously nonexistent in the cause arises.

Furthermore, prior existence and prior nonexistence of the effect in the cause have already been refuted above in the discussions of existence and nonexistence.

25. Reason Reaches Its Limit Here

Therefore an effect already existent in the cause does not arise, an effect absent there does not arise, and one both existent and nonexistent does not arise. Reason reaches its limit here.

Inquiry everywhere finds nothing; therefore the effect is ultimately unarisen. Because the effect is ultimately unarisen, every conditioned dharma is empty. Why? Every conditioned dharma is both cause and effect.

Because conditioned dharmas are empty, unconditioned dharmas are empty. When conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are empty, how much more so the self?

Gate One says that every dharma arises from a gathering of conditions and therefore lacks intrinsic nature. Someone hearing this may move the question one step back: I accept conditioned arising, but before the conditions assemble, does the effect already exist in the cause or not?

This question gives intrinsic nature a new hiding place. The effect is prepared in advance within the cause, and conditions merely invite it out. Gate Two opens for this question. The author begins: “Furthermore, dharmas do not arise.” The point of the inquiry moves to a single word.

1. The Four-Line Verse Seals the Paths of Arising into Three

  “If previously existent, it does not arise; if previously nonexistent, it does not arise;   if both existent and nonexistent, it likewise does not arise—who, then, could be something that arises?”

The first three lines exhaust every possible answer: the effect already exists in the cause, is wholly absent there, or is both existent and nonexistent. There is no fourth path. The fourth line presses the question: when all three paths are sealed, “who, then, could be something that arises?”

The author immediately unfolds the verse in prose: “If the effect already exists in the cause, it should not arise; if previously absent, it should not arise; if both existent and nonexistent, it should not arise.” The many exchanges that follow make each path concrete. Gate One counts the conditions; Gate Two fixes upon the act “arising” itself. With the same jar, Gate One asks what supports it; Gate Two asks how it came.

2. If What Already Exists Arises, the Process Is Endless

“If the effect already exists in the cause and arises, the process is endless.”

Since the effect was already in the cause and has now emerged, the “existent” share in the cause has not been canceled—“because it is permanently present in the cause.” Since it remains, it should arise again: “Now that it has arisen, it should arise once more.” After arising, it still exists, and “from this existent side it should arise again”; thus the process has no end. The thesis of prior existence opens a gate of its own and gives arising no reason ever to stop.

The questioner tries to stop the bleeding: what has arisen does not arise again; only what has not arisen arises. The author answers, “If one says what has arisen does not arise again and the unarisen arises, there is no coherent principle of arising here.” On that account the difference between arising and not arising no longer comes from the effect itself, for the effect is existent throughout; it comes only from an improvised rule. One further cut follows: “If the effect already exists in the cause, yet you say the unarisen arises and the arisen does not, both are equally existent while one arises and the other does not. There is no such case.” One status cannot bear two treatments.

3. Arisen and Unarisen Contradict One Another

“If while unarisen it determinately exists, then after arising it should be nonexistent. Why? Arisen and unarisen contradict one another; because they contradict, the active marks they bear also contradict.” Arisen and unarisen are an opposed pair. Their positions conflict, and so must the active marks assigned to them. If you assign existence to the unarisen side, the arisen side should receive nonexistence.

Yet you insist on placing existence at both ends: “Existence contradicts nonexistence and nonexistence contradicts existence. If it exists both after arising and while unarisen, arisen and unarisen should not differ.” “What difference, then, is there between arisen and unarisen?” Whenever one speaks of arising, there must be movement from something to something. Fill both ends with the same status and the path has neither beginning nor end. The author concludes: “The claim that arisen and unarisen do not differ is untenable; therefore what exists does not arise.”

4. Already Existent and Accomplished—What Use Is Further Arising?

“Already existent and accomplished—what use is further arising? What is done should not be done again, what is accomplished should not be accomplished again; therefore an existent dharma should not arise.”

Once something is done there is no room to do it again; once accomplished there is no room to accomplish it again. This follows from the ordinary meanings of “doing” and “accomplishing.” If the effect is already complete in the cause, arising is merely a superfluous procedure. If the jar already stands whole inside the clay, what are the potter’s wheel, cord, and hands doing?

5. The Jar in the Clay Should Be Visible Now

“If what exists arises, the effect should be visible in the cause before arising, yet in fact it is not visible. A jar in clay and a mat in reeds should be visible, yet in fact they are not; therefore what exists does not arise.”

The preceding challenges argue from principle; this one argues from the matter before one’s eyes. Since you say it is there now, it should be visible now. The dispute moves from concepts into direct experience, and the questioner must explain why it is unseen. The treatise’s longest debate on perception begins here.

6. “Unseen Because Unchanged”: By What Mark Do You Say It Is There?

The questioner’s first explanation is: “The effect already exists, but because it has not yet changed, it is unseen.”

The author begins at the crucial point: “By what mark do you know and say that a jar already exists in the clay?” Is it “because the jar’s mark is present, or because the mark of a cow or horse is present?” If the clay has no jar-mark, it equally has no cow-mark or horse-mark. How does a thing with no mark at all differ from nonexistence? The author therefore asks: “Is this not called nonexistent?”

He then takes up the word “change” and forces the questioner to choose. First, if “the transformation itself is the effect, then transformation should already exist in the cause”; that transformation too “should be visible, yet in fact cannot be found.” What was invoked to explain invisibility is itself invisible. Second, “if the untransformed is not called an effect, the effect can never be found,” because “this transformation was previously absent and should be absent afterward.” Third, “if it is the effect only after transformation, the effect was previously absent in the cause”; then the questioner claims “at one time that the effect already exists in the cause and at another that it was previously absent.” One speaker has given two accounts in succession.

7. Eight Ways Something May Exist Yet Remain Unknown

The questioner brings forward a complete theory of perception: “Transformation already exists but cannot be seen. Things can exist yet remain unapprehended.” There are eight reasons why something present may escape awareness.

Too near, “as with medicine in the eye”; too far, “as with a bird soaring high in the sky and passing into the distance”; a damaged faculty, “as a blind person does not see form, a deaf person does not hear sound, one with a blocked nose does not smell fragrance, one with an impaired tongue does not know taste, one with a numb body does not know touch, and one with a deranged mind does not know reality”; an inattentive mind, “as a mind attending to form does not know sound”; obstruction, “as earth obstructs the great waters and a wall blocks an outside object”; sameness, “as an ink dot upon black”; dominance, “as the sound of bells and drums prevents hearing a faint brushing sound”; minuteness, “as motes do not appear.”

From damaged bodily faculties to distraction of mind, from obstruction to sameness of background, from strong sound overwhelming weak to the invisibility of motes, the eight examples are arranged with great precision. The questioner says: “Dharmas may exist yet remain unknown because of these eight conditions.” Therefore the claim that transformation in the cause and such effects as jars cannot be found is untenable. It is an elegant challenge: failure to see something has eight possible causes, and none proves that the thing is absent.

8. Turning Each Back: Every One of the Eight Has an Opposite

The author does not deny a single example; all eight are matters of fact. He instead brings each example’s conditions of validity into view: “Transformation and such effects as jars are not unapprehended in the same way as the eight conditions.”〔T30 0161a10〕

“If transformation and jars are unapprehended because extremely near, they should be apprehended from slightly farther away; if because extremely far, from slightly nearer; if because a faculty is damaged, by one whose faculties are sound; if because the mind does not attend, when it attends; if because obstructed, transformation and jar should be apprehended without the obstruction; if because the same as their location, at another time; if because overwhelmed by the stronger, when the stronger ceases; if because minute, such effects as jars are coarse and should be apprehended.”

Move the medicine farther away and it is seen; restore the eye and color is seen; remove the wall and the object is seen; stop the bells and drums and the brushing sound is heard. Each of the eight includes a way for its obstruction to end. Yet after all eight remedies are applied, the jar in the clay still cannot be found. The eight conditions explain temporary unknowability, not perpetual unknowability.

The author then follows the case of minuteness: “If the jar is unapprehended because minute, it should remain unapprehended after arising. Why? The minute mark is the same before and after arising, and it determinately exists both before and after.” According to prior existence, the effect is the same and equally existent before and after arising; therefore it should remain equally minute and equally unapprehended after arising.

9. To Say “The Minute Becomes Coarse” Abandons the Effect’s Prior Existence

The questioner revises the account: “Before arising it is minute; after arising it becomes coarse. Thus it is apprehended after arising and unapprehended before.”

The author answers: “If so, the effect is absent in the cause. Why? Because the coarse is absent in the cause.” You now admit that only the minute is in the cause, while the effect in hand is coarse. “The present effect is coarse, yet you say it was unapprehended because minute; this coarse thing is not called the effect. The present effect should then never be apprehended, yet in fact it is.” With that revision, the claim that the effect existed beforehand makes room for its own opposite. The author concludes: “Therefore it is not unapprehended because minute”; “the claim that the effect already exists in the cause is untenable.”

10. Threads Are Merely the Cloth’s Dwelling Place, Not Its Cause

Until now the question was whether the effect can be seen. From here the inquiry asks whether cause and effect still deserve their names. “If an effect already exists in the cause and then arises, the cause loses the mark of cause and the effect loses the mark of effect.” Why? “If cloth is in threads or fruit in a vessel, that is merely a dwelling place and is not called a cause.”

If cloth already exists in the threads, the threads are only a container, like fruit resting in a vessel. A container is not a cause—“threads and vessel are not the causes of cloth and fruit.” The consequence is grave: “If the cause collapses, the effect collapses; therefore threads and the rest are not causes of cloth and the rest. Because there is no cause, there is no effect. Why? An effect is established because of a cause; if the cause is not established, how can the effect be?” The thesis of prior existence set out to protect cause and effect and instead canceled the cause.

The author repeats the point through making: “What is not made is not called an effect, yet threads and other causes cannot produce cloth and other effects. Threads do not produce cloth merely because cloth rests upon them.” Threads merely let cloth reside there and do not make it; “there would thus be neither cause nor effect.” This reaches an intriguing point: “If cause and effect are both absent, one should not ask whether the effect previously exists or is previously absent in the cause.” The two disputed alternatives had depended on the words cause and effect from the outset.

11. What Exists Must Show a Mark, Yet the Effect Shows None

“If the effect exists in the cause but cannot be apprehended, a mark should appear.” Something hidden always sends some sign: “Smelling fragrance, one knows flowers; hearing a sound, one knows a bird; hearing laughter, one knows a person; seeing smoke, one knows fire; seeing a swan, one knows a pond.”

“In the same way, if an effect already exists in the cause, a mark should appear. Yet neither the effect’s entity nor its mark can be found; thus know that the effect was previously absent in the cause.” Neither entity nor mark can be found. This goes beyond saying it is unseen: it leaves not the slightest indication.

12. Insist on Prior Existence, and One Can No Longer Say “Cloth Exists Because of Threads”

“If an effect already exists in the cause and then arises, one should not say cloth exists because of threads or a mat because of reeds.” Since cloth already exists, threads did not make it. “If this cause did not make it, nothing else made it either. If cloth is not made by threads, could it be made from reeds?” Threads do not make it and reeds still less; then it is “made from nothing.” Yet “if made from nothing, it is not called an effect. If there is no effect, there is no cause, as already explained.”

Everyone says cloth exists because of threads and a mat because of reeds. The doctrine of prior existence can no longer utter that sentence.

13. Made from Nothing, It Falls into Permanence

“If the effect is made from nothing, it is permanent, like the nature of nirvāṇa.” What is not produced from anywhere does not depend on conditions and is therefore permanent. But “if the effect is permanent, every conditioned dharma is permanent. Why? Because every conditioned dharma is an effect.”

Every conditioned dharma is an effect. If effects are permanent, not one conditioned dharma is impermanent. Yet “if every dharma is permanent, there is no impermanence; if there is no impermanence, neither is there permanence. Why? Impermanence exists because of permanence, and permanence because of impermanence.” Permanence and impermanence stand in mutual dependence; erase one side and the other cannot stand. The author concludes: “Therefore the claim that permanence and impermanence are both absent is untenable. Thus one cannot say an effect already exists in the cause and then arises.” Prior existence sought a secure place for the effect; followed to its end, it destroys even the name permanence.

14. An Effect Does Not Become the Cause of a Different Effect

“If an effect already exists in the cause and then arises, the effect should become the cause of a different effect: cloth the cause of wearing, a mat the cause of covering, a cart the cause of carrying.” Cloth is the effect of threads and then cause of wearing; a mat is the effect of reeds and then cause of covering. By the general rule of prior existence, the effect for which it serves as cause should likewise already be prepared inside it, every use ready beforehand. “Yet in fact it does not become the cause of a different effect; therefore one cannot say the effect already exists in the cause and then arises.”

The questioner offers a subtle analogy: “Fragrance already exists in the earth but does not emerge without sprinkling water. The effect is the same: before the conditions assemble, it cannot serve as a cause.” Fragrance is present in the soil and water merely discloses it.

The author’s answer is tight: “On your account it is called an effect only when it can be known; then jars and other objects are not effects. Why? Being made knowable is produced, whereas jars and the rest previously existed and are unproduced. You thereby treat production as the effect.” If the assembling conditions merely reveal the effect, what you truly call effect is the moment of manifestation, and that moment is produced; the jar itself, by contrast, ceases to be an effect. This is the opposite of the claim that it already existed.

15. A Revealing Cause Discloses; It Does Not Produce a Thing

“A revealing cause can only disclose; it cannot produce a thing.” The analogy lies ready to hand: “If a lamp is lit to illuminate a jar in darkness, it also illuminates bedding and other objects. But when conditions assemble to make a jar, they cannot produce bedding and other objects.”

Light a lamp to see a jar and everything within its reach—bedding, vessels, and the rest—is illuminated as well. Assemble the conditions for making a jar and only a jar results. Disclosure can extend incidentally; production cannot. The doctrine of prior existence treats conditions as a lamp that merely reveals the effect, but a lamp does not make a jar.

The author adds a temporal point: “If the effect already exists in the cause and then arises, there should be no distinction between making now and making later. Yet you accept making now and making later.” If the effect stands complete already, there can be no difference between work presently underway and work yet to be done; the opponent himself accepts that distinction.

16. Refuting Prior Nonexistence: A Second Head and Third Hand

“If one says the effect is previously absent in the cause and then arises, this too is untenable.” Why? “If what is nonexistent could arise, a second head and third hand should arise. Why? Because what is nonexistent could arise.”

The questioner replies: “Jars and other things have causes and conditions; a second head and third hand do not. How could they arise?” The author answers cleanly: “A second head, a third hand, and such effects as jars are all equally absent in the cause.” Under the thesis of prior nonexistence, both occupy the same position. Since each is equally absent, “a jar is absent from clay and equally absent from stone; why call the lump of clay the jar’s cause and not call stone its cause? Why call milk the cause of curds and threads the cause of cloth, but not call reeds the cause?” The doctrine of prior nonexistence says “absent” but cannot produce the distinction between clay and stone.

17. Carts and Horses from a Fingertip; Sesame and Sand at the Same Price

“If an effect previously absent in the cause can arise, each thing should produce every thing: carts, horses, food, and the rest should arise from a fingertip; threads should not produce cloth alone but carts, horses, food, and all other things.” The reason is one phrase: “because all are equally absent.” If arising requires only absence, everything qualifies.

Then consider causal power: “Causes should not each possess a distinct power to produce an effect. One who needs oil seeks it from sesame and does not press sand.” “If oil is equally absent from both, why seek it in sesame and not press sand?” The questioner appeals to experience: “Oil has been seen to come from sesame and has not been seen to come from sand.” The author replies: “If the mark of arising were established, you could say that at another time oil was seen to come from sesame and not from sand, and therefore one seeks it in sesame rather than sand. But the mark of arising for every dharma is not established, so you cannot say that oil was formerly seen to come from sesame.”

The author does not claim that people’s pressing sesame for oil is false. He says that the disputed point is whether arising can be established, while the questioner uses a previous instance that already presupposes arising as evidence. He makes the point explicit:〔T30 0162a03〕“I do not now refute only this one matter; I refute every cause and effect together. The three forms of arising—effect already existent in the cause, previously nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent—are all unestablished. Therefore your claim that sesame was formerly seen to produce oil falls into a reason identical with what is under doubt.”

18. Prior Nonexistence Leaves No Mark of Cause; Prior Existence Leaves the Agent Idle

“If an effect previously absent in the cause arises, the marks of causes cannot be established. Why? If causes are absent, by what can a dharma be made, by what accomplished? If there is neither making nor accomplishment, why call anything a cause?” A cause is named through its power to make and accomplish; if the cause side is entirely absent, cause remains an empty name. Consequently, “the agent cannot produce anything, and one who directs an agent likewise cannot produce anything.” The person who works directly and the one who instructs another both become idle.

Looking back at prior existence, the agent is equally idle: “If the effect already exists in the cause, there should be no distinction among action, agent, and what is made. Why? If the effect already exists, what need is there to make it? Therefore the causes you describe—action, agent, and what is made—cannot be found.”

The author then gives this gate’s most important confession: “I say action, agent, cause, and effect are all empty. If you refute action, agent, cause, and effect, you establish my Dharma and do not challenge it.” The questioner’s objections all presuppose the reality of action, agent, cause, and effect, but the author never establishes them as intrinsically existent. Each refutation of action and agent states the author’s point for him. He adds: “Only if someone accepted that the effect already exists in the cause should this challenge be made. I do not say it already exists in the cause, so I do not accept the challenge; neither do I accept that it was previously absent.” The author does not choose between the two cases. He accepts neither.

19. Both Existent and Nonexistent: Light and Dark Do Not Share One Place

“If one says the effect is both existent and nonexistent in the cause and then arises, this too is untenable. Why? Because existence and nonexistence possess mutually contradictory natures and marks. Since their natures conflict, how could they occupy one place?” Four pairs illustrate it: “Light and dark, pain and pleasure, going and staying, bondage and release cannot occupy one place.” Light comes as dark departs; pain and pleasure are relinquished in turn; going and staying do not coincide; bondage and release are not simultaneous.

Moreover, this case contains no new meaning: “The effect’s prior existence and prior nonexistence in the cause were already refuted above in the discussion of existence and nonexistence.” Combining two refuted statements cannot yield an unrefuted statement.

20. Reason Reaches Its Limit Here

“Therefore an effect existent in the cause does not arise, an effect absent there does not arise, and an effect both existent and nonexistent does not arise. Reason reaches its limit here.”

The phrase “reason reaches its limit here” is decisive. Seeking an instance of arising along cause and effect offers only three paths; all have now been traversed. Therefore “inquiry everywhere finds nothing, and the effect is ultimately unarisen.” From there the author continues: “Because the effect is ultimately unarisen, every conditioned dharma is empty. Why? Every conditioned dharma is both cause and effect.” There is no worldly conditioned dharma that is not the effect of something and the cause of something else. When the effect does not arise, conditioned dharmas have no intrinsic footing.

The conclusion rejoins Gate One: “Because the conditioned is empty, the unconditioned is empty. When conditioned and unconditioned are empty, how much more so the self?” Gate One proceeds from the emptiness of conditions to the emptiness of conditioned, unconditioned, and self; Gate Two proceeds from the unfindability of arising to the same place. The two gates open from different directions into the same room.

What Readers Can Carry Away from This Gate

First, distinguish “unseen” from “nonexistent.” The author denies none of the eight reasons for nonapprehension. He asks only whether this instance of not seeing has a way for its impediment to end. All eight do; the jar in the clay does not.

Second, distinguish disclosure from production. A lamp illuminates the jar and also the bedding; conditions making a jar make only the jar. To treat conditioned arising as switching on a lamp requires the effect to wait already in the darkness. If the effect is already there, the potter’s hands are superfluous.

Third, notice that the author accepts none of the cases. Refuting prior existence does not establish prior nonexistence; refuting prior nonexistence does not return to prior existence. What remains after all three are refuted is not a fourth thesis, but no need to continue asking the question.

Fourth, remember for whom this gate was opened. One who accepts conditioned arising may still hide intrinsic nature “inside the cause.” Gate Two examines that hiding place as well.

Carried Forward: Illumination along the Same Axis

The foregoing is the meaning of this gate itself. What follows sets beside it one passage on the same axis. The illumination is not this treatise; it is the same principle spoken elsewhere, recorded without adjudication.

Chapter Twenty, “Examination of Cause and Effect,” in the Treatise on the Middle points in the same direction as this gate. It first sets out the question: “Because an effect visibly arises from the conjunction of many causes and conditions, know that the effect exists from their conjunction.” A verse immediately blocks it:

  “If an effect arose when the many conditions conjoin,   it would already exist within their conjunction—what need would there be for conjunction to produce it?”

“What need would there be for conjunction to produce it?” is the same question as this gate’s “Already existent and accomplished—what use is further arising?” The next verse says:

  “If an effect existed within the conjunction of the many conditions,   it should be present within that conjunction, yet in fact it cannot be found.”

This corresponds directly to this gate’s “Before arising, the effect should be visible in the cause, yet in fact it is not visible.” On the side of prior nonexistence, that chapter answers: “If a thing lacks intrinsic nature, that thing will never arise,” then uses milk and water: “If curds are absent from milk, milk would be the same as water; one should not say curds come only from milk.” Its path matches this gate’s questions about clay and stone, sesame and sand.

The two passages differ in their unfolding. The Treatise on the Middle chapter proceeds verse by verse, questioning in turn the two entities cause and effect and their temporal sequence. This gate presses the single word arising to its limit through extended prose and inserts the long debate over eight reasons for nonapprehension, which the Treatise on the Middle does not contain. The matter examined is the same; the gate opened is different.

Treatises on the same axis illuminate one another while each remains in its own place. The meaning of this gate is still governed by this gate’s extended prose.