百論 白話全本

Sengzhao composed the “Preface to the Hundred Treatise,” placed at the head of the Hundred Treatise translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, Taishō T30n1569. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. The Opening Sentence: This Is a Path

〔T30 0167c14〕Broadly speaking, the Hundred Treatise is a ford and road leading to the mind of a sage, and an essential treatise that opens and discloses the true meaning.

2. The Person Deva

More than eight hundred years after the Buddha entered nirvāṇa, there was a great renunciant named Deva. His mind accorded with the hidden and profound, awakening independently, and his talent was lofty and bright. The Way he practiced illuminated his age, and his spirit transcended the worldly marks. He could therefore open the layered barriers of the Tripiṭaka and level the profound and difficult roads of the twelvefold teaching. He walked unmatched in the region of Kāśī and became a moat protecting the city of Dharma.

3. The Conditions for Composing the Treatise

At that time, outsiders arose in profusion and heterodox positions competed for prominence. Cunning and erroneous arguments approached the semblance of truth and nearly threw the right path into confusion. Deva looked upward and lamented the daily decline of the sacred teaching; bending downward, he grieved over the many deluded people who abandoned themselves to deception. Intending to rescue those long sunk and lost, he composed this treatise. Its function is to protect the correct Dharma, guard against and check erroneous teachings, and magnificently disclose the ultimate point of the tenet.

Through it the correct teaching flourished, and through it erroneous paths declined. If he had not been one capable of comprehending all subtle meanings, who could have accomplished this?

4. Named for One Hundred Verses

The treatise contains one hundred verses and therefore takes “Hundred” as its name. Its principles and purport are deep and profound, gathering the essential meanings of many scriptures. Its language and intent are subtle and concise, exhausting the excellence of treatise-making. Yet its ultimate destination is subtle and spare, and few have found its gate.

5. The Adept Vasu Composes the Commentary

There was an adept named Vasu, lucid in wisdom and inwardly integrated, whose marvelous thought rose beyond common ways. From afar he accorded with Deva’s profound traces and composed an instructional commentary on the treatise. Meanings once sunk and hidden were disclosed through his elegant writing; the treatise’s flavor circulated and spread, covering later generations. Its literary brilliance shone, and the path of its tenet became easy to understand.

6. How This Treatise Works

As a treatise, it speaks without landing upon any fixed object and refutes without clinging to what it establishes. Though freely without any ground, events do not lose their truth; though quietly without any lodging, principle naturally meets the profound. The path of returning to the root is manifest here.

7. Kumārajīva’s Study and the First Translation That Had Not Yet Been Integrated

There was an Indian śramaṇa named Kumārajīva, profound and vast in capacity, with inspired thought outstanding and far-reaching. He studied and revered the treatise for many years, finding it ever more unfathomable the longer he read; he constantly recited and savored it as the heart-essence. Although he had translated it personally before, the language of this land had not yet been fully integrated. Consequently, those who sought its meaning hesitated before erroneous phrases, and those who marked out its doctrinal position could even contradict the treatise’s destination.

8. The Person Yao Song

Yao Song, Colonel Director of Retainers and Marquis of Ancheng in the Great Qin, possessed a lucid and relaxed bearing and a tranquil mind that excelled in concision. He studied widely in both inner and outer canons and penetrated principle and thought alike. In youth he delighted in the Great Way and grew firmer with age. Though his body was bound by affairs of government, his discourse on Dharma never ceased. Whenever he handled and read this text, his reflections were many.

9. The Recollation in the Sixth Year of Hongshi

In the sixth year of Hongshi, the year of Shouxing, Yao Song gathered śramaṇas deeply versed in principle and, together with Kumārajīva, collated and established the correct text. They repeatedly refined, tempered, reviewed, and clarified it, striving to preserve the treatise’s intent. The revised language was plain without being crude, concise yet certain to arrive at the meaning. Its tenet and purport were exhausted here, leaving nothing further to fault.

10. Twenty Chapters, and the Ten Transmitted

The treatise originally had twenty chapters, each with five verses. The people responsible for transmission considered the latter ten of no benefit to this land, so they were omitted and not transmitted. Sengzhao closes by hoping that discerning and knowledgeable gentlemen will unfold and examine in detail the portion now transmitted.

Hundred Treatise, fascicle one, “Relinquishing Demerit and Merit,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. Homage to the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha

〔T30 0168a23〕I bow at the Buddha’s feet—to the World-Honored One who feels compassion for the world, who for immeasurable aeons bore the suffering of sentient beings, whose afflictions have been extinguished and even the lingering traces of affliction completely removed, and whom Brahmā, Śakra, dragons, and spirits all revere.

I also bow to the unsurpassed Dharma that illuminates the world, washes away flaws, stains, and defilement, and brings all conceptual proliferation to rest—the Dharma taught by the buddhas, the World-Honored Ones. And I bow to the Saṅgha of the eight classes of noble persons.

2. Who Is a World-Honored One?

The outsider asks: The verse refers to what the World-Honored One taught. What kind of person counts as a World-Honored One?

The treatise author asks in return: Why has this doubt arisen in you?

The outsider says: The world gives many different accounts of the marks of a World-Honored One, and therefore I doubt. Some say the god Viṣṇu—called the All-Surpassing God in the language of Qin—is a World-Honored One. Others say the god Maheśvara—called the Great Sovereign God in the language of Qin—is a World-Honored One. Still others say that such seers as Kapila, Ulūka, and Ṛṣabha are all World-Honored Ones. Why do you alone say the Buddha is the World-Honored One? This is why I doubt.

The treatise author answers: The Buddha knows the true mark of all dharmas clearly and without obstruction and can also teach the profound, pure Dharma. For this reason, the Buddha alone is called the World-Honored One.

3. The Various “Good Dharmas” Proposed by Non-Buddhists

The outsider says: Other teachers too can discern the marks of the dharmas clearly and teach profound, pure Dharma. The disciples of Kapila, for example, recite the Sāṃkhya Sūtra. They teach the general and specific marks of various good dharmas and say that, among the twenty-five principles, the portion of purified awareness is good Dharma. Ulūka’s disciples recite the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. They say that among the six principles, the portion of self produced within the principle of qualities through bathing three times each day, making offerings, and the conjunction of fire and other elements is good Dharma. Ṛṣabha’s disciples recite the Nirgrantha Sūtra. They call such painful practices as scorching the body with the five fires and plucking out the hair good Dharma. Other teachers practice starving themselves, throwing themselves into chasms or fire, casting themselves down from high cliffs, maintaining silence, standing for long periods, or observing the discipline of cattle; they too call these good Dharma. All of these are profound, pure Dharma. Why say that only the Buddha can teach it?

The treatise author answers: All of these are wrong views. Because wrong view obscures right view, they cannot teach profound, pure Dharma. This matter will be explained in detail later.

4. Stopping Evil and Practicing Good

The outsider asks: What are the marks of the good Dharma taught by the Buddha?

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: The Dharma consists in stopping evil and practicing good.

The adept Vasu then explains: The Buddha briefly teaches two marks of good Dharma: the mark of stopping and the mark of practice. Bringing every evil to rest is called the mark of stopping; cultivating every good is called the mark of practice.

What is evil? Wrong conduct of body, speech, and mind. For the body it is killing, stealing, and sexual misconduct. For speech it is false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, and frivolous speech. For the mind it is greed, anger and malice, and wrong view. There are also such acts as flogging, beating with staffs, binding, and imprisonment, which are not included within the ten unwholesome courses, as well as the various acts of wrongdoing that precede and follow those ten. All are called evil.

What is stopping? It is bringing evil to rest and no longer performing it. Whether the resolve arises in the mind, is spoken aloud, or is formally undertaken as a precept—one will not perform it again from this day until the end of one’s life. This is called stopping.

What is good? Right conduct of body, speech, and mind. Bodily good includes welcoming and seeing off others, joining the palms, and paying respect. Verbal good includes truthful, harmonious, gentle, and beneficial speech. Mental good includes loving-kindness, compassion, and right view. Such pure dharmas are called good Dharma.

What is practice? Trusting, accepting, and cultivating these good dharmas is called practice.

5. Must a Scripture Begin with an Auspicious Word?

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Your scripture is faulty because its beginning is inauspicious.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means that when teachers compose scriptures and teachings, they all begin with words of auspiciousness. Their meaning and flavor are therefore easy to understand, and the sound of the Dharma can circulate. When wise people read, recite, recollect, and understand them, their lifespan, majesty, and the respect they receive from others increase. There is, for example, a scripture named Bṛhaspati—called the Scripture of the Broad Lord in the language of Qin. Scriptures such as this all begin with auspicious words. Because their beginning is auspicious, their middle and end are auspicious too. Your scripture begins instead with evil and is therefore inauspicious. Thus your scripture is faulty.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. This scripture is taught in order to eliminate wrong view—this is Deva’s root statement—and therefore it is precisely auspicious. Calling it inauspicious is merely a residue of wrong view; there is no fault.

Deva’s root statement continues: Because no auspiciousness exists. The adept Vasu explains: If even the slightest auspiciousness genuinely existed, a scripture ought to begin with it. But in fact no auspiciousness exists. Why? The very same thing is taken as auspicious here, inauspicious there, and elsewhere as neither auspicious nor inauspicious. Since the judgment is unfixed, no intrinsic auspiciousness exists. You foolish person lack skillful means. Forcing the pursuit of happiness, you produce imagined distinctions at random and call this auspicious and that inauspicious.

Deva’s root statement continues: Because it cannot be obtained from self, other, or both. The adept Vasu explains: This auspicious dharma does not arise from itself. Why? Because no dharma arises from itself. Self-arising also entails the fault of two marks: one that which is produced, the other that which produces. Nor does it arise from another, because if a mark of self does not exist, a mark of other does not exist either. It further entails an infinite regress, because that arising would require another arising. Nor does it arise from self and other together, because it would bear the faults of both sides. Arising dharmas have only three possibilities: arising from self, from another, or from both. Sought among these three, auspiciousness cannot be obtained. Therefore no such thing as auspiciousness exists.

6. The Simile of Salt

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Auspiciousness arises from itself, like salt. The adept Vasu explains: Salt, for example, has a salty intrinsic nature and can make other things salty. Auspiciousness is the same: its intrinsic nature is auspicious and can make other things auspicious.

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Because this was refuted before; and because the mark of salt abides within salt. The adept Vasu explains: I have already refuted the claim that any dharma arises from intrinsic nature. Moreover, you yourself hold that salt comes from causes and conditions; salt then cannot be salty by intrinsic nature. I do not accept your account, so I will now return your own words and use them to refute what you say. Although salt combines with another thing, that thing does not become salt, because the mark of salt abides only within salt—just as the mark of a cow does not become the mark of a horse.

7. The Simile of a Lamp

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Like a lamp. The adept Vasu explains: A lamp illuminates both itself and other things. Auspiciousness is the same: it is itself auspicious and can make what is inauspicious auspicious.

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Because there is no darkness either in the lamp itself or in the other. The adept Vasu explains: There is no darkness within the lamp itself. Why? Because light and darkness do not coexist. The lamp therefore has nothing it could illuminate. If it cannot illuminate, positing illumination also incurs the fault of two marks: first what illuminates, second what is illuminated. Thus a lamp does not illuminate itself. Nor is there darkness in the place illuminated by the lamp, so it cannot illuminate another either. The name “illumination” is established because darkness is broken. When there is no darkness to break, it is not called illumination.

〔T30 0169a02〕The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Because at the moment it first arises, it illuminates both. The adept Vasu explains: I do not say the lamp first arises and only afterward illuminates. At the very moment it first arises, it illuminates both itself and another.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement says: Because a single dharma possessing both the mark of existence and nonexistence cannot be obtained. The adept Vasu explains: At the moment of first arising, the lamp is said to be half arisen and half unarisen. The half already arisen cannot illuminate, for the reasons just given. How much less could the half not yet arisen illuminate anything? Moreover, how could one dharma possess both a mark of existence and a mark of nonexistence?

Deva’s root statement continues: Because it does not reach the darkness. The adept Vasu explains: Whether already arisen or not yet arisen, the lamp cannot reach the darkness because their natures and marks are opposed. If the lamp cannot reach the darkness, how can it break the darkness?

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Like a spell or a star. The adept Vasu explains: A spell recited from far away can distress a person at a distance; an abnormality among the stars in the heavens can make people inauspicious. A lamp is the same. Although it does not reach the darkness, it can break darkness.

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Because this would extend much too far. The adept Vasu explains: If a lamp truly possessed the power to break darkness without reaching it, why would lighting a lamp in India not break the darkness in China? The power of spells and stars can reach distant places, but a lamp does not work this way. Your simile therefore fails.

8. Auspiciousness in One Small Part Cannot Make the Whole Auspicious

Deva’s root statement continues: If the beginning is auspicious, the remainder is inauspicious. The adept Vasu explains: If a scripture declares auspiciousness at its beginning, the remainder ought to be inauspicious. If the remainder is auspicious too, then your saying only that the beginning is auspicious becomes false speech.

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Because the beginning is auspicious, the remainder is also auspicious. The adept Vasu explains: Through the power of the beginning’s auspiciousness, the remainder too becomes auspicious.

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Because the inauspicious is greater, the auspicious becomes inauspicious. The adept Vasu explains: Your scripture states auspiciousness only at its beginning, leaving the inauspicious in the majority. Because the inauspicious is greater, it should instead make the auspicious inauspicious.

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Like an elephant’s hand. The adept Vasu explains: An elephant is called “having a hand” because its trunk resembles a hand, yet it is not called “having eyes,” “having ears,” or “having a head” merely because it also has eyes, ears, a head, and so forth. In the same way, the power of auspiciousness in one small part can make the greater inauspicious part auspicious.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement says: Because this incurs the fault that no elephant exists. The adept Vasu explains: If the elephant and hand are different, then the head, feet, and other parts are each different as well, and no separate elephant remains to be spoken of. If a part contains the complete whole within it, why are the feet not present in the head? This is as explained in the refutation of difference. If the elephant and hand are not different, again no separate elephant remains. If whole and part are not different, the head should be the feet, because both are not different from the elephant. This is as explained in the refutation of unity. Thus auspiciousness cannot be obtained when sought through its various causes and conditions. How can you say the middle and end are auspicious because the beginning is auspicious?

9. Sequence: Know Evil First and Remove Coarse Stains First

The outsider asks: Stopping evil is most excellent. Why is stopping not placed first?

The treatise author answers: Practitioners must first know what evil is before they can stop it. Therefore evil is stated first and stopping afterward.

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Practicing good should come first because it has excellent results. The adept Vasu explains: Various good dharmas have excellent results, and practitioners stop evil precisely because they wish to obtain those results. Practicing good should therefore be stated first and stopping evil afterward.

The treatise author answers: This Dharma follows a sequence. First coarse stains are removed, then subtle stains. If practitioners do not stop evil, they cannot cultivate good. Coarse stains are therefore removed first, and only afterward are they dyed with good dharmas. It is like washing a garment: first the dirt is removed, and only then can it be dyed.

10. Stopping Evil and Practicing Good Cannot Replace One Another

The outsider says: Since stopping evil has already been taught, practicing good need not be taught again.

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Because giving and the like are good practices. The adept Vasu explains: Giving is a good practice; it is not stopping evil. Great bodhisattvas, for example, have already stopped evil. They practice the four immeasurable states, feel compassion for sentient beings, and protect the lives of others. This is practicing good, not stopping evil.

The outsider says: Giving is the Dharma that brings miserliness to rest, so giving should count as stopping evil.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. If not giving were evil, everyone who did not give would be guilty. Moreover, those whose contaminants are exhausted have already extinguished greed and miserliness; when they give, what evil are they stopping? There are also people who give without stopping a miserly mind. Even when giving can stop it, giving still has good practice as its basis. Giving is therefore good practice.

The outsider says: Since practicing good has already been taught, stopping evil need not be taught again. Why? Because stopping evil is itself practicing good.

The treatise author answers: Stopping has rest as its mark, while practice has action as its mark. Their natures and marks are opposed. Thus teaching good practice does not include stopping evil within it.

The outsider says: That is indeed so. I am not saying stopping evil and practicing good have the same mark, only that stopping evil is a good dharma. Since good practice has been taught, stopping evil therefore need not be taught again.

The treatise author answers: Stopping evil must be taught, and practicing good must be taught. Why? Stopping evil means bringing evils to rest when precepts are undertaken; practicing good means cultivating good dharmas. Suppose only the merit of good practice were taught and stopping evil were not. When someone undertook precepts and stopped evil while the mind was unwholesome or indeterminate, that person would not be practicing good at that moment and should therefore have no merit. Yet because evil is being stopped, there is still merit at that moment. Stopping evil and practicing good must therefore both be taught.

11. Giving, Precepts, and Wisdom for Persons of Lesser, Middling, and Higher Capacity

The Buddha distinguishes this Dharma of stopping evil and practicing good in three ways according to the faculties and intentions of sentient beings. Deva’s root statement says: Giving, precepts, and wisdom for lesser, middling, and higher persons.

The adept Vasu explains: Practitioners are of three kinds. Those of lesser wisdom are taught giving; those of middling wisdom are taught precepts; those of higher wisdom are taught wisdom. Giving means the volition corresponding to benefiting others and relinquishing possessions, together with the bodily and verbal karma it sets in motion. Precepts mean that, whether one speaks aloud, resolves inwardly, or formally undertakes precepts, from this day onward one no longer commits the three kinds of bodily misconduct or the four kinds of verbal misconduct. Wisdom means that the mind is concentrated and unmoving amid the marks of the dharmas.

Why are they called lesser, middling, and higher? Because their benefits differ in degree. The benefit brought by giving is small, and the giver is therefore called one of lesser wisdom. The benefit brought by precepts is middling, and their keeper is therefore called one of middling wisdom. The benefit brought by wisdom is supreme, and its practitioner is therefore called one of higher wisdom. Again, the result of giving is lesser, the result of precepts middling, and the result of wisdom higher. Thus they are called lesser, middling, and higher wisdom.

12. Pure and Impure Giving

The outsider asks: Are all who give persons of lesser wisdom?

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Why? Giving is of two kinds: one impure, the other a pure practice. Only impure giving is called the giving of a person of lesser wisdom.

The outsider asks: What is called impure giving?

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Giving for recompense is impure, like trade in a marketplace. The adept Vasu explains: Recompense is of two kinds: recompense in the present life and recompense in a later life. Present recompense means fame, respect, affection, and the like; later recompense means wealth and rank in a future life. This is called impure giving. Why? Because one still wishes to obtain something. A merchant who travels far to another land, for example, carries many kinds of goods and benefits many people, yet he does so not from compassion for sentient beings but to seek profit for himself. His business is therefore impure. Giving while seeking a result is the same.

The outsider asks: What is called pure giving?

The treatise author answers: When someone gives out of love, respect, and a wish to benefit others, seeking recompense neither in this life nor in a later one—like the pure giving practiced by bodhisattvas and other superior persons—this is called pure giving.

13. Pure and Impure Precepts

The outsider asks: Are all who keep precepts persons of middling wisdom?

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Why? Keeping precepts is of two kinds: one impure, the other pure. Only impure observance is called that of a person of middling wisdom.

The outsider asks: What is called impure observance of precepts?

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Keeping precepts while seeking pleasant recompense is for the sake of sexual desire, like a disguised appearance. The adept Vasu explains: Pleasant recompense is of two kinds: birth in the heavens and wealth and rank among humans. One keeps precepts in order to be born in heaven and sport with heavenly women or to enjoy the five desires among humans. Why? For the sake of sexual desire. “Like a disguised appearance” means inwardly desiring another’s body while outwardly pretending affection and friendliness. This is called impure observance of precepts.

It is like the passage Ānanda spoke to Nanda: rams about to butt one another first draw back before surging forward. Your keeping precepts for the sake of desire is just the same. Although the body can keep the precepts, the mind is pulled by desire. Such karma is impure—what use are these precepts?

The outsider asks: What is called pure observance of precepts?

The treatise author answers: A practitioner reflects as follows. All good dharmas have precepts as their root. One who keeps precepts has no remorse; without remorse, one rejoices; rejoicing, the mind is happy; when the mind is happy, it becomes unified; when unified, it gives rise to true wisdom; when true wisdom arises, one becomes disenchanted; through disenchantment one becomes dispassionate; through dispassion one attains liberation; through liberation one attains nirvāṇa. This is called pure observance of precepts.

14. Pure and Impure Wisdom

〔T30 0170a04〕The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: If the wise are highest, Udraka and the others are highest. The adept Vasu explains: If those who cultivate wisdom are called persons of higher wisdom, then non-Buddhists such as Udraka and Ārāḍa should now be persons of higher wisdom.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Why? Wisdom too is of two kinds: one impure, the other pure.

The outsider asks: What is called impure wisdom?

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: It is impure because it binds one to the world, like an enemy who comes as a friend. The adept Vasu explains: Worldly wisdom can increase birth and death. Why? Because this wisdom turns back and binds a person. It is like an enemy who at first pretends intimacy and attachment but, after a long time, forms the intention to harm. Worldly wisdom is the same.

15. The Dharma of Continued Course and the Dharma of No Continued Course

The outsider asks: Does only this wisdom increase birth and death? Are giving and keeping precepts the same?

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Grasping merit and relinquishing evil is a dharma of continued course. The adept Vasu explains: “Merit” means meritorious recompense.

The outsider asks: If merit means meritorious recompense, why does the root sūtra state only the one word “merit”?

The treatise author answers: Merit is the cause and meritorious recompense the effect. Sometimes a cause is spoken of as an effect, and sometimes an effect as a cause. Here the cause is spoken of as the effect. One says, for example, “He ate a thousand ounces of gold.” Gold cannot be eaten, but because gold obtained food, one says he ate gold. Or on seeing a painting one says, “Those are good hands.” The painting was obtained through hands, and so one speaks of good hands. “Grasping” means attachment. Attachment to meritorious recompense and attachment to evil were explained above. “Course” means carrying a person onward in constant passage through birth and death.

The outsider asks: What is a dharma of no continued course?

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Relinquishing both. The adept Vasu explains: “Both” means the recompense of merit and the recompense of demerit; “relinquishing” means the mind does not cling. When the mind does not cling to merit, it no longer goes back and forth among the five destinies. This is called a dharma of no continued course.

16. Why Merit Must Be Relinquished

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Merit should not be relinquished because its recompense is excellent, and you have given no reason. The adept Vasu explains: The recompense of meritorious acts is excellent, and all sentient beings continually seek excellent results. How could it be relinquished? Moreover, the Buddha said: Bhikṣus, do not fear merit. You have now given no reason, so merit should not be relinquished.

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: When merit ceases, there is suffering. The adept Vasu explains: “Merit” means meritorious recompense, and “ceases” means decays and is lost. When meritorious recompense decays and ceases, one is separated from what one enjoyed and great grief and suffering arise. As the Buddha taught: pleasant feeling is pleasure when it arises, pleasure while it abides, and suffering when it decays. Merit should therefore be relinquished. As for your citation of the Buddha saying not to fear merit, that is because merit assists the path and should be practiced. As the Buddha said: even merit should be relinquished, how much more demerit.

The outsider says: Demerit and merit are opposed. You say that when merit decays there is suffering; demerit should therefore be pleasure while arising and abiding.

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: While demerit abides, there is suffering. The adept Vasu explains: “Demerit” means demeritorious recompense. Its recompense is already suffering when it arises; how much more while it abides. As the Buddha taught: painful feeling is suffering when it arises, suffering while it abides, and pleasure when it ceases. You argue that because demerit and merit are opposed, the arising of demerit should be pleasure. I answer: why not instead say that because merit and demerit are opposed, the cessation of demerit is pleasure, while its arising and abiding are suffering?

17. The Permanent Merit of a Horse Sacrifice Cannot Be Established

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: Permanent merit has no condition for relinquishment and therefore should not be relinquished. The adept Vasu explains: You say merit should be relinquished because suffering occurs when its causes and conditions decay. The recompense of permanent merit that I now propose contains no suffering of decay and therefore should not be relinquished. As the scripture says, one who can perform a horse sacrifice crosses beyond aging and death; the meritorious recompense is permanent, and the place of rebirth is permanent. Merit of this kind should not be relinquished.

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: Merit should be relinquished because it has two marks. The adept Vasu explains: Merit has two marks: it can give pleasure and it can give suffering. It is like food mixed with poison—delicious while being eaten but painful when it is about to be digested. Merit is the same. Again, a certain meritorious recompense is a cause of pleasure, yet when experienced to excess it becomes a cause of suffering. It is like drawing near a fire: stopping the cold is pleasant, but moving closer until one’s body burns is suffering. Merit thus has two marks. Because it has two marks, it is impermanent; because it is impermanent, it should be relinquished.

Moreover, your claim that the meritorious recompense of the horse sacrifice is permanent consists only of words. Deva’s root statement says: Because it has no reason. The adept Vasu explains: The recompense of a horse sacrifice is in fact impermanent. Why? Because the causes and conditions of the sacrificial action have a measure. When a worldly cause has a measure, its effect has a measure as well. A small lump of clay, for example, produces a small jar. Since the sacrificial action has a measure, it is impermanent. Moreover, we hear that your gods still become angry, fight one another, and cause one another distress; they therefore cannot be permanent. Again, actions such as horse sacrifice arise from causes and conditions and are therefore all impermanent.

Deva’s root statement continues: Since even pure, contaminated merit is impermanent and should be relinquished, how much more merit mixed with demerit. The adept Vasu explains: This is because the action of horse sacrifice includes such wrongs as killing. Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya Sūtra itself says that sacrificial practices are impure and impermanent and have the marks of victory and defeat. They should therefore be relinquished.

18. If It Must Be Relinquished, Why Produce It in the First Place?

The outsider says, in Deva’s root statement: If merit is to be relinquished, it should not be produced. The adept Vasu explains: If merit must certainly be relinquished, it should never have been produced. What wise person would undertake painful labor for nothing? It is like a potter making a vessel only to break it after it has been completed.

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: The Dharma of the path of birth follows a sequence, like washing and dyeing a soiled garment. The adept Vasu explains: A dirty garment is first washed; only after it is clean is it dyed. The cleaning was not wasted. Why? Because dyeing follows a sequence, and a dirty garment cannot take the dye. In the same way, one first removes the stain of demerit, next perfumes the ground of mind with merit, and only then receives the dye of the path to nirvāṇa.

19. The Signless Is Supreme

The outsider asks, in Deva’s root statement: On what does the relinquishment of merit rely? The adept Vasu explains: One can rely on merit to relinquish evil; on what does one rely to relinquish merit?

The treatise author answers with Deva’s root statement: The signless is supreme. The adept Vasu explains: Those who grasp merit are born among humans and gods; those who grasp demerit are born in the three bad destinies. Signless wisdom is therefore supreme. “Signless” means not recollecting any mark, leaving every appropriation behind, and clinging in mind to no dharma of the past, future, or present. Because all dharmas lack intrinsic nature, there is no place upon which to rely. This is called the signless. Through this skillful means, merit can be relinquished.

Why? Apart from the three gateways to liberation, the highest benefit cannot be obtained. As the Buddha told the bhikṣus: Suppose someone says, “Without using emptiness, the signless, or the wishless, I wish to know and see and yet be free of overweening pride.” That person speaks empty words without real meaning.

Hundred Treatise, fascicle one, “Refutation of a Self, Chapter Two,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. The Outsider Establishes Self: Two Schools’ Accounts

〔T30 0170c12〕The outsider says—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: One should not say that all dharmas are empty and markless, because self and the other dharmas exist.

The adept Vasu explains: Kapila, Ulūka, and their followers say that self and all dharmas exist. Kapila says: From primordial obscurity arises awareness; from awareness arises ego-mind; from ego-mind arise the five subtle elements; from the five subtle elements arise the five great elements; and from the five great elements arise the eleven faculties. Self is the lord. It is permanent, has awareness as its mark, occupies the center, abides forever without movement, is neither broken nor undone, and gathers all dharmas. One who knows these twenty-five principles attains liberation; one who does not know them does not leave birth and death. Ulūka says: Self truly exists and is permanent. This is known from such marks as inhalation, exhalation, blinking, life, and the rest. Further, self is known to exist because it is the locus upon which desire, anger, pain, pleasure, wisdom, and the rest depend. Therefore self truly exists—how could it be said not to exist? If it exists yet one says it does not, one holds a wrong and harmful view; one who holds such a view does not attain liberation. Therefore one should not say that all dharmas are empty and markless.

The treatise author answers: If self truly exists yet one says it does not, that is a wrong and harmful view. But if it is originally absent and one says it is absent, what fault is there? Examine it carefully: in fact, there is no self.

2. Are Awareness and Self One or Different?

The outsider says: Self truly exists. As the Sāṃkhya Sūtra says, the mark of awareness is the self.

The treatise author asks: Are self and awareness one, or are they different?

The outsider answers: Self and awareness are one.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If awareness is self’s mark, self is impermanent. The adept Vasu explains: If awareness is the mark of self, because awareness is impermanent, self too should be impermanent. For example, heat is the mark of fire; since heat is impermanent, fire too is impermanent. Awareness now is indeed impermanent. Why? Because its marks differ from one another, because it belongs to causes and conditions, because formerly absent it now exists, and because, having existed, it returns to absence.

3. Permanent Because Unarisen

〔T30 0171a02〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: It is permanent because unarisen. The adept Vasu explains: Only a dharma bearing the mark of arising is impermanent. Self does not bear the mark of arising and therefore is permanent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, awareness is not self’s mark. The adept Vasu explains: Awareness is impermanent, while you say self is permanent; self should therefore differ from awareness. If self and awareness do not differ, because awareness is impermanent, self too should be impermanent. Further, to say that awareness is self’s mark is unreasonable. Why?—Deva’s root statement: Because awareness operates in one place. The adept Vasu explains: If awareness is self’s mark, then since the self in your teaching pervades every place, awareness too should operate throughout the five destinies at one time. Yet awareness operates only in one place and cannot pervade them all. Therefore awareness is not self’s mark.

Further—Deva’s root statement: If so, self is equal to awareness. The adept Vasu explains: If you take awareness as self’s mark, self should be equal to awareness, and so self likewise does not pervade. Fire, for example, does not possess a mark that is both hot and not hot. Self is the same: it should not possess the marks of both pervading and not pervading.

Further—Deva’s root statement: If one takes it to pervade, it then has the marks of awareness and nonawareness. The adept Vasu explains: If you want self to pervade, self then has two marks—the mark of awareness and the mark of nonawareness. Why? Because awareness does not pervade. Where self falls in a place of awareness, it is aware; where it falls in a place without awareness, it is unaware.

4. The Power of Awareness and Causes and Conditions

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because its power pervades, there is no fault. The adept Vasu explains: Though awareness does not function in some places, the power of awareness is still present there; therefore, there is no fault of “lacking awareness.”

The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because power and that which has power are not different. The adept Vasu explains: If the power of awareness is present in some place, awareness there should function, yet in fact it does not function. Therefore your statement is not right. If, as you say, the power of awareness remains where awareness does not function, there is only this statement and nothing more.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because causes and conditions conjoin, the power of awareness functions. The adept Vasu explains: Although self possesses the power of awareness, it must await the conjunction of causes and conditions before it can function.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because it falls under the mark of arising. The adept Vasu explains: If awareness functions only when causes and conditions conjoin, this awareness belongs to causes and conditions and therefore falls under the mark of arising. If awareness does not differ from self, self too bears the mark of arising.

5. The Lamp Analogy and the Color Analogy

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with a lamp. The adept Vasu explains: A lamp can illuminate an object but cannot make it. Causes and conditions are the same: they can make awareness function but cannot produce awareness.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Although a lamp does not illuminate a jar and the rest, the jar and the rest can still be obtained and put to use. But when causes and conditions do not conjoin, awareness cannot be obtained and self cannot experience pain and pleasure. Therefore your analogy is not right.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with color. The adept Vasu explains: Color, for example, exists beforehand, but without a lamp illuminating it, it is not clearly manifest. Awareness is the same: although it exists beforehand, it is not clearly manifest before causes and conditions conjoin.

The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because its own mark is not clear. The adept Vasu explains: Before illumination, although a person does not apprehend it clearly, the mark of color is itself clear. The mark of your awareness is itself unclear, so your analogy is not right. Further, because there is no mark: the mark of color does not become the mark of color because a person knows it, so even when it is unseen, color is continually present. You say cognition is self’s mark, so you should not take a place without cognition to be cognition. It is not right to take a place without cognition to be cognition—especially since cognition and awareness have the same meaning in your teaching.

6. Cognition Differs from Self: The Analogy of Owning a Cow

The outsider says: Ulūka’s disciples recite the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra and say that cognition differs from self; therefore self does not fall under impermanence and is not unaware. Why? Because self conjoins with cognition—Deva’s root statement: As with one who owns a cow. The adept Vasu explains: Because a person conjoins with a cow, the person is called a cow owner. In the same way, through self’s conjunction with faculty, mind, and object, cognition arises for self; because self conjoins with cognition, self is called one who possesses cognition.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The mark of a cow abides in the cow, not in the cow’s owner. The adept Vasu explains: The mark of a cow abides in the cow, not in the person who owns the cow. Thus although the person and cow conjoin, the cow owner does not become a cow; only the cow is a cow. In the same way, although self and cognition conjoin, the mark of cognition abides in cognition, and self does not become cognition. You say that cognition arises through the conjunction of self, faculty, mind, and object. What this cognition cognizes is color and the other objects; therefore cognition alone can cognize, and self does not cognize. For example, fire can burn, not the person who possesses fire.

7. A Dharma That Can Be Used—and a Lamp That Does Not Cognize Color

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it can use a dharma. The adept Vasu explains: Although a person possesses the mark of seeing, by using a lamp the person can see, and apart from the lamp cannot see. Although self possesses the capacity to know, by using cognition it knows, and apart from cognition it does not know.

The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because cognition itself can cognize. The adept Vasu explains: Through the conjunction of faculty, mind, and object, cognition arises; this cognition cognizes color and the other objects. Therefore cognition itself is what can cognize and is not something used by another. If cognition itself can cognize, what further use is self? The lamp analogy is also wrong. Why?—Deva’s root statement: Because a lamp does not cognize color and the rest. The adept Vasu explains: Although a lamp exists beforehand, it cannot cognize color and the rest, because it is not a cognitive dharma. Therefore only cognition can cognize color. If it cannot cognize, it is not called cognition. Thus even if a separate self capable of cognition is established, what use could that capacity possibly have?

8. Horse’s Body, Black Cloth, and Staff Holder

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it conjoins with a horse’s body, self becomes a horse. The adept Vasu explains: Because self conjoins with the body of a horse, self is called a horse. Although self differs from the body, self is still called the horse. In the same way, because self conjoins with cognition, self is called cognition.

The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: The self in the body is not the horse. The adept Vasu explains: The horse’s body itself is the horse. You hold that body differs from self; self therefore differs from the horse, so how could self be taken as the horse? Thus the analogy is wrong. To use self as an analogy for self is to fall into defeat.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with black cloth. The adept Vasu explains: Take black cloth. Although blackness differs from the cloth, because cloth and blackness conjoin, it is called black cloth. In the same way, although cognition differs from self, because self and cognition conjoin, self is called cognition.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no self. The adept Vasu explains: If self is called cognition because it conjoins with cognition, then self should cease to be self. Why? I said earlier that cognition itself can cognize. If cognition is not called self, self likewise is not called a cognizer. If conjunction with another thing warrants taking that other thing’s name, then when cognition conjoins with self, why is cognition not called self? Further, the black-cloth analogy just given contradicts your own scripture. In your scripture, blackness is a quality and cloth is a substance; substance does not become quality, and quality does not become substance.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with one who has a staff. The adept Vasu explains: Because a person conjoins with a staff, the person is called a staff holder, not merely a staff. Although the staff conjoins with the person, the staff is not called a person holder and is not called a person. In the same way, because self conjoins with cognition, self is called a knower, not merely cognition; nor is cognition called self because cognition conjoins with self.

The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: The staff holder is not the staff. The adept Vasu explains: Although the staff and the staff holder conjoin, the staff holder does not become the staff. In the same way, the mark of cognition is in cognition, not in self. Therefore self is not a knower.

9. Can One Awareness Have Many Marks?

The outsider says: The Sāṃkhyas further say that if cognition differed from self, the preceding faults would follow, but our scripture has no such fault. Why? Because awareness is the mark of self. I take the mark of awareness as self, and so self is continually aware and never unaware.

The treatise author answers: Although this has already been refuted, let it now be stated again—Deva’s root statement: If awareness is the mark of self, self is not one. The adept Vasu explains: Awareness has many forms—painful awareness, pleasant awareness, and the rest. If awareness is self’s mark, self too should be many.

The outsider says: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: The one has many marks, as does crystal. The adept Vasu explains: One crystal changes according to color, becoming blue, yellow, red, white, and so forth. In the same way, one awareness differentiates according to objects, becoming awareness of pain, awareness of pleasure, and so forth. Although awareness has many marks, it is in fact only one awareness.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, demerit and merit have one mark. The adept Vasu explains: Awareness that benefits others is called merit; awareness that harms others is called demerit. Every wise person inwardly accepts this dharma. If awareness that benefits and awareness that harms are one, demerit and merit should have one mark, and giving and stealing and the rest should likewise be one. Further, that crystal exists first and changes according to color, but awareness arises together with conditions, so your analogy is wrong. Further, because the crystal arises and ceases anew at every moment, its marks are not one. Your claim that the crystal is one is also wrong.

10. The Potter Analogy

〔T30 0172a02〕The outsider says: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Although effects are many, their maker is one, as with a potter. The adept Vasu explains: One potter makes jars, basins, and the rest; the maker being one does not require the effects to be one. In the same way, one awareness can perform acts of harm, benefit, and the rest.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The potter has no difference. The adept Vasu explains: The potter’s body is one and possesses no mark of difference, while differing from the jar, basin, and the rest. Yet awareness that benefits others and awareness that harms others truly possess different marks, and harm, benefit, and the rest do not differ from awareness. Therefore your analogy is wrong.

11. An Inferential Mark—and Times without Cognition

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self truly exists, because there is an inferential mark of knowing. The adept Vasu explains: Although some things cannot be known through immediate presence, they can be known through a comparable mark. For example, one sees a person first depart and then arrive over there. Again, sun and moon rise in the east and set in the west; although one does not see them move, because they arrive there, one knows they have moved. In the same way, seeing the qualities depend on substance, one knows through an inferential mark that self exists. Because self conjoins with cognition, self is called a knower.

The treatise author answers: This was already refuted, but let it now be stated again—Deva’s root statement: What does not cognize is not self. The adept Vasu explains: In your teaching self is all-pervading and vast, while cognition is slight. If self is the knower yet in some places and at some times does not cognize, then it is not self. “In some places” means outside the body. “At some times” means within the body: in sleep, fainting, and the like, at that time there is no cognition. If cognition is self’s mark, yet in some places and at some times self does not cognize, then it is not self. Why? Because it lacks the mark of cognition. You establish self through the mark of cognition, but this is vacuous and unreal.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because activity is absent, cognition is absent, as with smoke. The adept Vasu explains: Smoke is a mark of fire, yet once wood becomes charcoal there is no smoke; although smoke is then absent, fire remains. In the same way, although cognition is self’s mark, whether cognition is present or absent, self should always exist.

The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because self can cognize. The adept Vasu explains: If you still want self to exist when cognition is absent, that self cannot cognize and lacks the mark of cognition. Why? Because in your account self remains self even when cognition is absent. Further, only because one directly sees fire when smoke is absent does one know that fire is present. As for self, whether cognition is present or absent, there is no one able to see it. Therefore your analogy is wrong.

Further, your claim that self exists because one sees a shared relation and knows by comparison is also wrong. Why?—Deva’s root statement: Because one sees a goer arrive there through the dharma of going. The adept Vasu explains: Apart from the goer there is no going; apart from going, no goer arrives there. Thus when one sees that the person who went has arrived there, one necessarily knows there was going. But the claim that apart from self there is no cognition is not established. Therefore one should not assert self because cognition exists. One must not see a turtle and conceive hair; one must not see a barren woman and conceive a child. In the same way, one must not see cognition and conceive a self.

12. As with a Hand That Grasps

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with a hand that grasps. The adept Vasu explains: A hand sometimes grasps and sometimes does not. Because it does not grasp at some time, one cannot refuse to call it a hand; a hand is always called a hand. Self is the same: it sometimes cognizes and sometimes does not. Because it does not cognize at some time, one cannot refuse to call it self; self is always called self.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Grasping is not the hand’s mark. The adept Vasu explains: Grasping is the hand’s activity, not the hand’s mark. Why? It is not because it grasps that one knows it is a hand. You take cognition itself to be self’s mark, so this analogy is wrong.

13. Is What Experiences Pain and Pleasure a Permanent Self?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self certainly exists, because it experiences pain and pleasure. The adept Vasu explains: If there is nothing that experiences, there is no experience. The body alone cannot experience pain and pleasure. Why? A corpse has a body but cannot experience pain or pleasure. Thus what knows that it has this body can experience pain and pleasure; this is self. Therefore self certainly exists.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If distressed, it is also severed. The adept Vasu explains: When a knife harms the body, distress arises. If the knife harms self and self is distressed, self too should be severable.

The outsider says: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because it has no contact, it is like space. The adept Vasu explains: Because self has no contact, it cannot be severed. When a house burns, for example, the space within cannot be burned because it has no contact; it only has heat. In the same way, when the body is severed, because the self within has no contact, it cannot be severed; it only has distress.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no going. The adept Vasu explains: If self has no contact, the body should not go to another place. Why? The dharma of going arises from thought and from the body’s movement. The body has no thought because it is not a cognitive dharma; self has no power of movement because it is not a bodily dharma. It follows that the body should not go to another place.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with the blind and the lame. The adept Vasu explains: The blind and the lame, relying on each other, can move. In the same way, self has thought and body has the power of movement; when they conjoin, they can move.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because their marks differ. The adept Vasu explains: The blind person and lame person have two contacts and two thoughts, and therefore according to principle they can move. Body and self lack these two things, so they should not move; thus there is no dharma of going. Otherwise, the fault of severability stated above follows. Further, your claim that space is hot is not right. Why? Because space has no contact. A subtle heat pervades space, and the body touches and experiences that heat. It is not space that is hot; to call space hot is merely borrowed speech.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with the distress of the owner of the house. The adept Vasu explains: When a house burns, its owner is merely distressed and is not burned. In the same way, when the body is severed, self is merely distressed and is not severed.

The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: It burns because it is impermanent. The adept Vasu explains: When a house burns, its grass, wood, and the rest, being impermanent, both burn and become hot. Space, being permanent, neither burns nor becomes hot. In the same way, the body, being impermanent, is both distressed and severed. Since self is permanent, it is neither distressed nor severed. Further, the owner of the house is not burned because he is far from the fire. Your scripture says self is all-pervading; it too should therefore be severed and destroyed.

14. Are the Five Faculties Self’s Instruments?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self must exist, because it apprehends color and the rest. The adept Vasu explains: The five faculties cannot cognize the five objects, because they are not cognitive dharmas. Thus one knows that self can cognize. Self uses the eye and the other faculties to cognize color and the other objects, as a person uses a sickle to harvest the five grains.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Why not see with the ear? The adept Vasu explains: If self truly possesses the power of sight, why does it not use the ear to see color? As fire can burn, it burns everywhere. Again, when a person is without a sickle, a hand can also cut. Again, a house has six windows facing outward, and the person dwelling within can see from wherever he stands. Self should likewise be able to see everywhere.

The outsider says: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because what is used is fixed, as with a potter. The adept Vasu explains: Although self possesses the power of sight, the objects examined by the eye and the other faculties differ, and each has a fixed share among the sense objects. Therefore it cannot use the ear to see color. Although a potter can make a jar, apart from clay he cannot make one. In the same way, although self possesses the power of sight, without relying on the eye it cannot see.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, it is blind. The adept Vasu explains: If self sees by using the eye, self differs from the eye. If self differs from the eye, self has no eye. How can a self without an eye see? Your potter analogy is also wrong. Why? Apart from clay there is no further jar; clay itself is the jar. But eye and color differ.

15. Saliva Arising in the Mouth—and Bodily Touch in the Dark

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self exists, because a faculty different from the first moves. The adept Vasu explains: If self did not exist, why would seeing another person eat fruit make saliva arise in one’s own mouth? The eye should not be what knows flavor; only a person who possesses self can know it. Further—Deva’s root statement: Because one thing is known by eye and body. The adept Vasu explains: A person first recognizes a jar and the rest by eye; later, in the dark, although the eye is not used, bodily touch also knows it. Therefore one knows that self exists.

The treatise author answers: This was already refuted in the sūtra passage concerning blindness. Further, if the eye sees another person eating fruit and saliva arises in the mouth, why do the other faculties not move? The same applies to the body.

16. A Person Burns—and Fire Burns

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As when a person burns something. The adept Vasu explains: Although a person can burn something, apart from fire the person cannot burn it. Self is the same: by using the eye it can see, and apart from the eye it cannot see.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Fire burns. The adept Vasu explains: To say that a person burns is false speech. Why? A person has no mark of burning; fire itself can burn. When wind rubs pieces of wood against one another, fire arises and burns mountain and marsh, yet there is no agent. Thus fire itself can burn; it is not the person who burns.

17. If Mind Can Cognize, What Further Use Is Self?

〔T30 0173a01〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with mind. The adept Vasu explains: Although a corpse has eyes, because it lacks mind, self does not see; when mind is present, self sees. In the same way, self sees by using the eye, and apart from the eye it does not see.

The treatise author answers: If with mind there is cognition and without mind there is no cognition, then mind need only operate through the doors of the eye and the rest to know. What further use is self?

The outsider says: Mind cannot itself know itself. If one mind and another mind knew each other, there would be no end. My self is one; when self knows mind, there is no infinite regress.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Self also requires a self. The adept Vasu explains: If self knows mind, then who knows self? If self knows self, this too has no end. In my teaching, present mind cognizes past mind. Because mind-dharmas are impermanent, there is no fault.

The outsider asks—Deva’s root statement: How can self be removed? The adept Vasu explains: If self is removed, how can mind alone cognize the various objects?

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: As heat is the mark of fire. The adept Vasu explains: Fire is hot, yet there is no maker. Fire’s nature is itself hot, and there is no fire that is not hot. In the same way, mind has cognition as its mark; although apart from self, it can cognize because its nature can know by itself. Since self and cognition are different, self should not cognize.

18. Recollection from Past Habit

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: There should be a self abiding from before, because the recollection of ingrained habit continues, and at birth there are acts of distress and joy. The adept Vasu explains: An infant knows how to move and experiences distress, joy, and the rest as soon as it is born, though no one taught it. Because recollection of habits from a past life continues, it still performs various actions in this life. Therefore one knows that self exists and that self has the mark of permanence.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If it pervades, how can it recollect? The adept Vasu explains: Since self permanently pervades every object, there is no time when it does not recollect. From where, then, does recollection arise? Further, if recollection arises in every place, recollection too should pervade every place, and all things should be recalled everywhere at the same time. If recollection arises only place by place, self has parts; because it has parts, it is impermanent. Further, if self is unaware, or if cognition is not self, this was already refuted.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because of conjunction, recollection arises. The adept Vasu explains: When self and mind conjoin, recollection arises because their active force is set in motion. Why? Although self and mind have conjoined, if their active force is not set in motion, recollection does not arise.

The treatise author answers: Although this was already refuted, let it now be stated again. If self has cognition as its mark, recollection should not arise; if it does not have cognition as its mark, recollection likewise should not arise. Further—Deva’s root statement: If recollection cognizes. The adept Vasu explains: If there is cognition when recollection arises and no cognition when recollection does not arise, recollection itself should be cognition. What further use is self?

19. The Left Eye Sees and the Right Eye Recognizes

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self should exist, because the left sees and the right recognizes. The adept Vasu explains: A person first sees with the left eye and later recognizes with the right eye; it should not be that one saw while another recognizes. Because there is a self within, one can see with the left eye and recognize with the right.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: A common answer concerning both eyes. The adept Vasu explains: Partial cognition is not called cognition. Further, if so, there is no cognition. Further, if it pervades, how can it recollect? Further, if recollection itself is cognition. Further, why not see with the ear? Further, if so, it is blind. Further, just as what the left eye sees should not be recognized by the right eye, self likewise should not see in this part and recognize in that part. Therefore one should not assert a self because the left eye sees and the right eye recognizes.

20. Partial Cognition Is Not Called Cognition

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because recollection belongs to self, self cognizes. The adept Vasu explains: Recollection is called a dharma of self; this recollection arises in self, and so self uses recollection to cognize.

The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Partial cognition is not called cognition. The adept Vasu explains: If cognition arises in one part of self, self has partial cognition. If self has partial cognition, self is not called a knower.

The outsider says: Self’s cognition is not partial cognition. Why? Although self cognizes in part, self is still called a knower—Deva’s root statement: As with bodily action. The adept Vasu explains: When a hand, one part of the body, performs an action, the body is said to act. In the same way, although self cognizes in part, self is still called a knower.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no cognition. The adept Vasu explains: In your teaching self pervades while mind is limited; because self and mind conjoin, cognition arises for self, and this cognition is as limited as mind. If cognition in a small part warrants calling self a knower, why do you not say that because the greater part does not cognize, self is called a nonknower? Further, your analogy of bodily action is wrong. Why? Because identity and difference between part and whole possessing parts cannot be obtained.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As when part of a garment burns. The adept Vasu explains: When one part of a garment burns, it is called a burned garment. In the same way, although self cognizes in only one part, it is called a knowing self.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Burning is likewise so. The adept Vasu explains: When one part of a garment burns, it should not simply be called burned; it should be called partially burned. If, because one part burns, you say this garment is called burned, then because its greater part is now unburned, it should also be called unburned. Why? Most of this garment is unburned and remains genuinely usable. Therefore, do not cling to language.

Hundred Treatise, fascicle one, “Refutation of Unity, Chapter Three,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. What Belongs to Self

〔T30 0173b23〕The outsider says—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: A self must exist, because existence, unity, a jar, and the rest belong to self.

The adept Vasu explains: If self exists, what belongs to self exists; if self is absent, what belongs to self is absent. Existence, unity, a jar, and the rest now belong to self; therefore, self exists.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Why? Because self has already been sought and found unobtainable. Let us now consider existence, unity, the jar, and the rest: do they exist as one, or do they exist as different? Both paths entail faults.

The outsider asks: If existence, unity, the jar, and the rest exist as one, what fault is there?

2. As with One, All Is Established

The treatise author answers—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: If existence, unity, and jar are one, then, as with one, all is established, or nothing is established, or everything is inverted.

The adept Vasu explains: If existence, unity, and jar are one, it is like Indra, Śakra, and Kauśika being three names of the same lord of the devas: wherever Indra is, Śakra and Kauśika are. So wherever “existence” is, unity and jar are; wherever unity is, existence and jar are; wherever a jar is, existence and unity are.

If so, garments and all other objects should also be jars, because existence, unity, and jar are one. Thus every existent object should be a jar, and jars, garments, and all other objects should now all be one.

Further, “existence” is permanent, and so unity and jar should also be permanent.

Further, once “existence” has been spoken, unity and jar have already been spoken.

Further, unity is a number, and therefore “existence” and jar should also be numbers.

Further, if the jar has a body complete in five parts—color, sound, smell, taste, and touch—then “existence” and unity should also have five-part bodies. If the jar has form and offers resistance, “existence” and unity should also have form and offer resistance. If the jar is impermanent, “existence” and unity should likewise be impermanent.

This is called “as with one, all is established.”

3. As with One, Nothing Is Established

The adept Vasu continues: “Existence” is everywhere, while in many of those places no jar is present. Therefore, wherever a jar is present now, it likewise should be absent, because jar and “existence” are not different.

Further, every particular thing has “existence,” yet those things are not jars. The jar must now therefore be a nonjar, because it is not different from “existence.”

Further, if speaking the single word “existence” does not include unity and jar, then speaking of unity and jar should likewise fail to include unity and jar, because they are not different from “existence.”

Further, if “existence” is not a jar, the jar too is not a jar, because it is not different from “existence.”

This is called “as with one, nothing is established.”

4. As with One, Everything Is Inverted

The adept Vasu further explains: If one wishes to speak of a jar, one must speak of “existence”; if one wishes to speak of “existence,” one must speak of a jar.

Further, according to what you establish, once the jar is established, “existence” and unity are established with it; once “existence” and unity are established, the jar should be established with them, because the three are one.

This is called “as with one, everything is inverted.” 〔The received text inserts a note here: Four folios of argument about names cannot be translated.〕

5. An Object Both Exists and Is One

The outsider says—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: There is no fault because an object both exists and is one.

The adept Vasu explains: An object both “exists” and is one. Therefore, wherever a jar exists, “existence” and unity necessarily exist; yet it is not the case that wherever “existence” and unity exist there is a jar. Further, when a jar is spoken of, one should know that “existence” and unity have already been included; but speaking of “existence” and unity does not necessarily include a jar.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The jar and existence are two. Why two? Because there can be no jar.

The adept Vasu explains: If existence, unity, and jar are one, why can “existence” and unity be present where no jar exists? Further, how can it be said that “existence” and unity do not include the jar?

6. The Jar-Existence within the Jar

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because the jar-existence within the jar is determinate.

The adept Vasu explains: The jar-existence within the jar is not different from the jar, but it differs from the existence of garments and other objects. Therefore, wherever a jar exists, jar-existence is present; and wherever jar-existence is present, a jar exists. Yet it is not the case that wherever “existence” is present, there is a jar.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because jar and existence are not different.

The adept Vasu explains: “Existence” is a universal character. Why? If one says “existent,” people trust that the jar and all other objects are included. If one says “jar,” people do not trust that garments and other objects are also included. Therefore, jar is a particular character, while “existence” is a universal character. Since one is particular and the other universal, how could they be one?

7. Father and Son

〔T30 0174a01〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Like father and son.

The adept Vasu explains: The same person is both a son and a father. In the same way, a universal character is also a particular character, and a particular character is also a universal character.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because of the son, one is a father.

The adept Vasu explains: Before a person has begotten a son, he is not called a father. A son is born, and only then does he become a father. Moreover, this analogy agrees with what I say, while contradicting you.

8. People Plainly See a Jar

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: A jar should exist, because everyone trusts it.

The adept Vasu explains: People in the world plainly see and all trust that a jar has a use; therefore, a jar should exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because it is not different from existence, all is absent.

The adept Vasu explains: If the jar is not different from “existence,” the jar should be a universal character and not a particular character. When the particular character is absent, the universal character is also absent; only because particular characters exist is there a universal character. If particular characters do not exist, the universal character does not exist. Since both are absent, all is absent.

9. Head and Feet

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As parts such as the feet are called a body.

The adept Vasu explains: Although parts such as head and feet are not different from the body, the foot alone is not taken as the body. In the same way, although jar and “existence” are not different, the jar is not a universal character.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If the foot is not different from the body, why is the foot not the head?

The adept Vasu explains: If parts such as head and feet are not different from the body, the foot should be the head, because both are not different from the body. Just as Indra and Śakra are not different and therefore Indra is Śakra.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because the parts differ, there is no fault.

The adept Vasu explains: A part is not different from the whole that possesses parts, but it is not the case that one part is not different from another part. Therefore, head and feet are not one.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no body.

The adept Vasu explains: If the feet differ from the head and the head in turn differs from the feet and the other parts, then only the various parts exist; no further whole possessing parts remains that can be called the body.

10. Many Causes Manifest One Fruit

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because many causes manifest one fruit, as color and the rest are the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as the many parts of color and the rest serve as causes and manifest the single fruit of a jar, it is neither the case that color alone is the jar nor that another jar exists apart from color. Therefore, the parts such as color do not become one. The relation of parts such as the feet to the body is the same.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Like color and the rest, the jar too is not one.

The adept Vasu explains: If the jar is not different from its five parts of color, sound, smell, taste, and touch, one should not speak of one jar. If one does speak of one jar, the parts such as color should likewise be one, because color and the rest are not different from the jar.

11. Army and Forest

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Like an army or a forest.

The adept Vasu explains: Elephants, horses, chariots, and infantry gather in one place and are called an army. Likewise, many trees such as pines and cypresses gather in one place and are called a forest. Neither is a pine alone taken as a forest, nor does another forest exist apart from the pine; the army is the same. In like manner, color alone is not called a jar, nor does another jar exist apart from color.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: A collection is like the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: If pines, cypresses, and the rest are not different from the forest, one should not speak of one forest. If one speaks of one forest, pines, cypresses, and the rest should likewise be one, because they are not different from the forest. The pine tree’s roots, stalk, branches, nodes, flowers, and leaves should be refuted in the same way. Every object, including an army, should be refuted in this way.

12. You Yourself Accept Many Jars

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you accept many jars. Another root statement by Deva: You say that color and the other parts are many.

The adept Vasu explains: Since the parts such as color are many, jars should likewise be many. Thus, while wishing to refute one jar, you instead accept many jars.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: It is not because color and the rest are many that jars are many.

The adept Vasu explains: I state the fault in your position; I do not accept many jars. You yourself say that color and the other parts are many, while apart from color and the rest no separate jar-dharma exists that could be their fruit.

13. Since the Cause Has Not Been Refuted, the Fruit Is Established

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Fruit exists because the cause has not been refuted. Because a cause exists, fruit is established.

The adept Vasu explains: You refute the jar as fruit but do not refute color and the rest as the jar’s causes. If a cause exists, fruit necessarily exists; there is no cause that produces no fruit. Further, color and the rest are causes of the jar and fruits of atoms. Since you accept color and the rest, cause and fruit are established together.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If fruit is absent, cause too is absent.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as the jar should not be one because it is not different from its many parts such as color, now the many parts such as color should likewise not be many because they are not different from the jar. Further, you say there is no cause that does not produce fruit. Since the fruit has now been refuted, the cause refutes itself, because in your doctrine cause and fruit are one.

Further, Deva’s root statement: The three times become one.

The adept Vasu explains: The time of the lump of clay is present, the time of the jar future, and the time of earth past. If cause and fruit are one, the jar and earth should exist within the lump of clay. The three times would thus become one time. Every statement of what has been done, is now being done, and will be done is destroyed.

14. Long and Short

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because cause and fruit are established in mutual dependence, like long and short.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as short is seen by reason of long and long by reason of short, so this lump of clay is a cause when viewed in relation to the jar and a fruit when viewed in relation to earth.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because it depends upon another, is contrary, and bears both faults, the character of long exists neither in the long, nor in the short, nor in their conjunction.

The adept Vasu explains: If a character of long really existed, would it exist in the long, in the short, or where long and short are conjoined? It is unobtainable in all three. Why? The character of long does not exist in the long because long is established in dependence on another and is called long only by reason of short. Long does not exist in the short because their natures and characters are contrary; if long existed in short, it would not be called short. Nor does long exist where long and short are conjoined, because it would bear the faults of both sides. The faults of claiming it exists in long or in short have already been explained. The character of short is the same. Since there is neither long nor short, what could be mutually dependent?

Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of Difference, Chapter Four,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. If Existence, Unity, and Jar Each Differ, Each Is Lost

〔T30 0174c07〕The outsider asks: You said before that if existence, unity, and jar differ, this too entails faults. What sort of faults?

The treatise author answers—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: If existence and the rest differ, each is absent.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose existence, unity, and jar each differ from the others. Then all three are each absent. Since the jar differs from existence and unity, this jar neither exists nor is one. Since existence differs from unity and jar, this existence is neither a jar nor one. Since unity differs from existence and jar, this unity is neither a jar nor existent. Pursued item by item in this way, each of the three is lost.

Further, if the jar is destroyed, existence and unity should not be destroyed with it. If existence is destroyed, unity and jar should not be destroyed with it. If unity is destroyed, existence and jar should not be destroyed with it. Why? Because they differ from one another, as when this person dies and that person should not die with him.

2. Rescuing Difference through Conjunction

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because existence and unity conjoin, an existent one jar is established.

The adept Vasu explains: Although existence, unity, and jar differ, because jar conjoins with existence, the jar is called existent; because jar conjoins with unity, the jar is called one. Your statement that existence and unity should not be destroyed when the jar is destroyed is incorrect. Why? Because they differ and yet conjoin. Difference is of three kinds: first, conjoined difference; second, separate difference; third, transformative difference. Conjoined difference is like dravya and guṇa. Separate difference is like this person and that person. Transformative difference is like a lump of cow dung becoming a lump of ash. Because they differ yet conjoin, when the jar is destroyed, unity is destroyed too; when unity is destroyed, the jar is destroyed too. Existence is not destroyed because it is permanent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there are many jars.

The adept Vasu explains: Because jar conjoins with existence, there is one existent jar; because jar conjoins with unity, there is one one-jar; and the jar itself is another jar. Counted this way, there are many jars. You claim that because dravya and guṇa differ yet conjoin, when jar is destroyed unity is destroyed and when unity is destroyed jar is destroyed. I wish precisely to refute the difference you establish; how can you use difference in turn to prove difference? You should state another reason.

3. Existence Is Universal, Unity Is Guṇa—and Then Even the Jar Is Absent

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because existence is a universal character and unity a guṇa, existence and unity are not the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Because existence is a universal character, it is not the jar. Because unity is a guṇa, it is not the jar. The jar is a dravya.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose existence is not the jar because it is a universal character; unity is not the jar because it is a guṇa; and jar, because it is a dravya, is neither existence nor unity. Then there is no jar.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: You accept many jars.

The adept Vasu explains: You previously spoke of many jars to refute one jar; now instead you accept many jars yourself.

〔T30 0175a01〕The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because one is absent, many is absent too.

The adept Vasu explains: You say that because jar conjoins with existence, there is an existent jar; because jar conjoins with unity, there is a one-jar; and the jar itself is a jar. If so, the world originally speaks of one jar, yet you calculate it as many jars. Thus one jar becomes many jars. Once one has become many, there is no one jar; because one jar is absent, many too is absent, since one comes before many.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Because the first number is absent. The adept Vasu explains: Among dharmas of number, one comes first. If unity differs from the jar, the jar does not become one. Once one is absent, many too is absent.

4. The Jar before Conjunction

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because jar conjoins with existence.

The adept Vasu explains: Because jar conjoins with existence, the jar is called existent; this does not mean the jar is all existence. Likewise, because jar conjoins with unity, the jar is called one; this does not mean the jar is all unity.

The treatise author answers: You merely have this statement. It has already been refuted: if existence is not the jar, there is no jar. Let us now say another layer—Deva’s root statement: The jar should be a nonjar. The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the jar is existent because it conjoins with existence, while this existence is itself not a jar. Since the jar conjoins with what is not a jar, why does the jar not become a nonjar?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because absence cannot conjoin, it is not a nonjar.

The adept Vasu explains: A nonjar is an absent jar. Since it is absent, nothing exists that could conjoin; therefore, the jar does not become a nonjar. Existence now really exists and should therefore conjoin. Because there is conjunction, the jar becomes existent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because existence now conjoins with the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose there is no existence apart from the jar; without existence, there is no conjunction. Since existence now conjoins with the jar, existence too should become a jar. Suppose you say that before the jar conjoins with existence it is absent, and because absent it has no conjunction. Then, as stated before, an absent dharma cannot conjoin. Thus before conjoining with existence, the jar is an absent dharma; as an absent dharma, it should not be able to conjoin with existence.

5. Does Existence Illuminate the Jar or Produce It?

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because existence discloses the jar and the rest, like a lamp.

The adept Vasu explains: Existence is not only a cause of jars and various other objects; it can also disclose them, as a lamp illuminates various objects. In this way, existence discloses the jar, and therefore one knows there is a jar.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If existence can disclose like a lamp, the jar should already exist.

The adept Vasu explains: Various objects exist first, and only then are they illuminated by a lamp. If existence is like a lamp, then before existence conjoins with the jar, jars and other objects should already exist. If they already exist, what use is the later existence? Suppose jars and other objects do not exist before conjoining with existence and exist only after that conjunction. Then existence is a productive cause, not a disclosing cause.

Further, Deva’s root statement says: If mark and marked establish one another, why does one not become two? The adept Vasu explains: Suppose you take existence as the jar’s mark and therefore know there is a jar. One should know that an object is not established apart from mark and marked; hence existence itself should have another mark. If one can know a dharma exists without another mark, jars and the rest should be the same and need not separately borrow an existence. The lamp analogy has already been refuted. Further, since the lamp illuminates itself and does not borrow an external illumination, the jar too exists by itself and does not await an external existence.

6. Body and the Part Called Foot: Does a Whole Possessing Parts Exist within a Part?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Like the mark of a body.

The adept Vasu explains: From the foot as a part, one knows there is a whole possessing parts called body; the foot itself need not seek another mark. In the same way, existence is taken as the jar’s mark and therefore one knows there is a jar; existence itself need not seek another mark.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If the whole possessing parts is complete within a part, why are the feet not in the head?

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose a body-dharma exists among parts such as the feet. Is it wholly complete within them, or divided among them? If wholly complete, feet should exist in the head, because the body-dharma is one. If divided among them, that too is incorrect. Why? Deva’s root statement says: The whole possessing parts is like a part. The adept Vasu explains: If the portion of the whole possessing parts within the foot equals the foot as a part, and so with all the other parts, then the whole possessing parts and the parts become one. No whole possessing parts remains that can be called a body. In this way, parts such as the feet themselves exist, but that whole possessing parts is refuted. Because the whole possessing parts is absent, the parts too are absent.

7. Can Aggregated Atoms Produce a Whole Possessing Parts?

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because atoms exist.

The adept Vasu explains: The parts are not absent. Why? Atoms have no parts and do not reside within parts. Because atoms aggregate, they can produce such fruits as jars; therefore, a whole possessing parts should exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If all gather into the jar, all are the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Your statement that atoms have no parts is merely a statement. It will be refuted later; for now, let us state one layer briefly. When atoms aggregate into a jar, if all of them aggregate into the jar, every atom should wholly become the jar. If not all aggregate into the jar, every atom is a nonjar.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Like the gathered power of threads and drops; atoms are the same.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as individual threads cannot bind an elephant and individual drops of water cannot fill a jar, while many gathered together can, so because atoms aggregate, they possess the power to become a jar.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because it is indeterminate.

The adept Vasu explains: For example, each barren woman cannot bear a child, each blind person cannot see form, and each grain of sand cannot produce oil; many gathered together likewise cannot. In the same way, if individual atoms cannot, many gathered atoms cannot either.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because each part has power, it is not indeterminate.

The adept Vasu explains: Each portion of thread and each drop of water already has some power to bind an elephant or fill a jar. Barren women, blind people, and grains of sand have no power in each part, so many gathered together likewise have no power. Therefore it is not indeterminate, and barren women, blind people, and sand should not be used as analogies.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because parts and the whole possessing parts entail the faults of identity and difference.

The adept Vasu explains: The faults of whether parts and the whole possessing parts are one or different have already been refuted. Further, because the whole possessing parts is absent, the parts too are absent. If before the whole possessing parts exists, the parts themselves are unobtainable, where could they have active power? If the whole possessing parts already exists, what use is the power of the parts?

8. Who Is the One Who Destroys Dharmas?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: You are one who destroys dharmas.

The adept Vasu explains: People in the world all see jars and various other objects, yet you refute them through various causes and conditions; therefore, you are one who destroys dharmas.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. You say existence differs from jar, and I say that if existence differs from jar, there is no jar. Further, Deva’s root statement says: You see absence as existence and existence as absence, and so forth. The adept Vasu explains: You resemble one who destroys dharmas and are even worse. Why? Parts such as head and feet conjoined are visibly the body, yet you say this is not the body and that apart from these exists another whole possessing parts called body. Further, wheels, axle, and the rest conjoined are visibly a chariot, yet you say another chariot exists apart from them. Therefore, you are one who speaks falsely.

Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of the Faculties, Chapter Five,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. The Outsider Establishes: Present Awareness Proves the Real Existence of Faculties, Objects, and Mind

〔T30 0175c12〕The outsider says—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: Dharmas belonging to self determinately exist, because they are present before us.

The adept Vasu explains: Because the faculties—the eye and the other powers that apprehend—the objects—color and the other referents—and mind conjoin, awareness arises. This awareness is presently manifest. Because this awareness really exists, faculties, objects, and mind all exist.

2. Seeing and Knowing: Whether Seeing or Knowing Comes First, Neither Path Works

The treatise author answers—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: Once color has been seen, what use is arising awareness?

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the eye first sees color and awareness arises afterward. What further use does this awareness have? The work of seeing is already complete, so awareness becomes superfluous. Suppose awareness arises first and the eye sees color afterward; this too is incorrect. Why?

Deva’s root statement: Without seeing color, the causes and conditions are absent, and arising too is absent.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the eye has not yet seen color. Then the causes and conditions have not conjoined; because they have not conjoined, awareness should not arise. You say awareness arises because faculties, objects, and mind conjoin. If awareness arises before they have conjoined, this is incorrect.

3. Simultaneous Arising Is Unobtainable Too

The outsider asks: Suppose seeing and awareness arise simultaneously. What fault is there?

The treatise author answers: If they arise simultaneously, this cannot be established. Deva’s root statement: Arising and nonarising do not arise simultaneously together, because existent, because nonexistent, and because already refuted.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose seeing and awareness already existed before and arise simultaneously while mutually awaiting one another; or suppose they were previously absent; or suppose they were half existent and half absent. To say they arise simultaneously in any of these three cases is incorrect. Why? If seeing and awareness already existed beforehand, they should not arise again, because they already exist. If they were absent beforehand, they likewise should not arise, because they are absent. Since absent, there can be no mutual dependence and therefore no arising. If half existed and half were absent, the two preceding sūtras have each already refuted it. Further, how could one dharma be both existent and nonexistent? Further, if they arise simultaneously, awareness need not await seeing, nor seeing await awareness.

4. Does the Eye Travel or Not? The Near Jar and Distant Moon

Further, does the eye reach color and then see, or does it see without reaching color?

Deva’s root statement: If the eye travels, what is distant is seen later.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the eye travels and reaches color before seeing. Then distant colors should be seen later, and near colors sooner. Why? Such is the nature of traveling. Yet now a near jar and the distant moon are seen at the same time. From this one knows the eye does not travel; if it does not travel, there can be no conjunction.

Further, suppose the eye’s power can see color without reaching it. Why, then, can it see what is near but not what is far? The distant and near should be seen at the same time.

5. Does It Go after Seeing or before Seeing?

Further, if the eye really travels, does it go after seeing or without first seeing?

Deva’s root statement: If it has already seen, what further use is going?

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the eye has already seen color. The affair is complete; what further use is going?

Deva’s root statement: If it has not seen, in going it does not apprehend what is intended.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the eye travels without first seeing color. Then it instead fails to apprehend the intended object, because the eye itself lacks awareness—intending to go east, it goes west.

6. Where the Eye Is, No Color; Where Color Is, No Eye

Further, Deva’s root statement: Nor can it apprehend where the eye is absent.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the eye travels and reaches color before apprehending it. Then the body has no eye; because the body has no eye, nothing is apprehended here. Suppose the eye does not travel but apprehends color. Then no eye exists where the color is; because the eye is absent there, nothing is apprehended there either. Further, if the eye could apprehend color without traveling, it should see color in the heavens and color beyond obstructions. Yet it does not. Therefore this is incorrect.

7. Is Seeing the Eye’s Character?

〔T30 0176a15〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because seeing is the eye’s character.

The adept Vasu explains: Seeing is the eye’s character. The eye has the power to apprehend among its referents; such is its intrinsic nature.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If seeing is the eye’s character, the eye sees itself.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose seeing is the eye’s character. Just as fire has heat as its character, is itself hot, and can heat other things, so if the eye has seeing as its character, it should see the eye itself. Yet it does not. Therefore, the eye does not have seeing as its character.

8. A Fingertip Cannot Touch Itself

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Like a finger.

The adept Vasu explains: Although the eye has seeing as its character, it does not see itself, just as a fingertip cannot touch itself. Although the eye has seeing as its character, it likewise cannot see itself.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because touching is the finger’s activity.

The adept Vasu explains: Touching is the finger’s activity, not its character. You say seeing is the eye’s character; why does it not see the eye itself? Therefore, the finger analogy is incorrect.

9. Eye-Light and Mind Travel

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because light and mind travel, color is seen.

The adept Vasu explains: Because the eye’s light and mind travel, they reach that place and can apprehend color.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If mind travels and reaches color, there is no awareness here.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose mind reaches color. Mind is then there; if mind is there, the body here has no mind and is like a corpse. Yet mind does not in fact travel, because it apprehends what is far and near simultaneously. Although it also recollects past and future, that thought does not reside in past or future, because when the thought arises it does not travel.

10. Mind Remains in the Body Yet Can Know What Is Distant

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Mind remains in the body.

The adept Vasu explains: Although mind remains in the body, it can know what is distant.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no conjunction.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose mind remains in the body while color is over there. Because color is over there, there is no conjunction. Without conjunction, color cannot be apprehended.

11. Conjunction Remains, but the Seer Disappears

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because mind, light, and color conjoin, there is seeing.

The adept Vasu explains: Eye and mind conjoin in the body. Through the power of mind, eye-light is made to conjoin with color. In this way color is seen, and therefore conjunction is not lost.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If seeing arises because of conjunction, there is no seer.

The adept Vasu explains: You say color is seen because of conjunction. If one says the eye alone sees color or mind alone apprehends color, this is incorrect.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you accept conjunction, apprehension of color is established.

The adept Vasu explains: Since you accept conjunction, conjunction exists. Since conjunction exists, the apprehension of color should exist.

12. Within Conjunction, None Can Apprehend Color

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Mind is not seeing, eye is not knowing, and color is neither seeing nor knowing—how is there seeing?

The adept Vasu explains: Because mind differs from eye, mind does not have the character of seeing. Because it lacks the character of seeing, it cannot see the eye. Because the eye is produced by the four great elements, it does not have the character of knowing. Because it lacks the character of knowing, it cannot know color. Color too has neither the character of seeing nor the character of knowing. Even if these conjoin in this way, how can color be apprehended? Ear, nose, tongue, and body are refuted in the same way.

Composed by Deva Bodhisattva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of Atoms, Chapter Six,” Taishō T30n1569. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. Because a Jar Can Be Apprehended, There Are Apprehending Faculties

〔T30 0176b15〕 The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: The faculties must exist because jars and other objects can be apprehended.

The adept Vasu explains: At present one directly sees that such various things as jars can be apprehended. If the faculties could not apprehend their objects, by what could those objects be apprehended? Thus one knows that the faculties can apprehend such various things as jars.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Form alone is not the jar; therefore the jar is not directly seen.

The adept Vasu explains: The form in a jar can be directly seen, but its odor and the rest cannot be seen. Form alone is not the jar; odor and the rest combine with it to constitute the jar. If the jar were directly visible, odor and the rest should also be directly visible. Yet they are not visible. Therefore the jar is not directly seen.

2. Does Apprehending One Part Count as Apprehending the Whole?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because a part is apprehended, the whole is apprehended; this is known through belief.

The adept Vasu explains: One part of the jar can be seen, and therefore the jar is called directly visible. Why? After seeing the jar, a person believes and knows, “What I see is a jar.”

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If a part is apprehended, not everything is apprehended.

The adept Vasu explains: The jar’s part consisting of form can be seen, but its parts consisting of odor and the rest cannot. At present, a part does not constitute the possessor of parts. If a part could constitute the possessor of parts, the parts consisting of odor and the rest should also be visible. Therefore the jar is not visible in its entirety. This matter is as explained in the refutations of unity and difference.

3. Even Form Itself Is Not Entirely Present

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: A jar exists and can be seen, because you accept that form is directly visible.

The adept Vasu explains: Since you accept that form is directly visible, the jar too should be directly seen.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If this part is directly seen, that part is not directly seen.

The adept Vasu explains: Your statement that form is directly seen is not so, because form has shape. The part on that side is not directly seen because it is obstructed by this part; the part on the other side is the same. Furthermore, as said before, if a part is apprehended, not everything is apprehended. That earlier passage should answer this one.

4. Atoms

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because an atom has no parts, the refutation is not exhaustive.

The adept Vasu explains: An atom has no parts. What fault is there in saying that it is entirely directly visible?

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: An atom is not directly seen.

The adept Vasu explains: Your scripture says that an atom is not directly seen. Therefore the atom cannot establish a dharma of direct visibility. If an atom too were directly visible, it would be refuted together with form.

5. Everyone Believes It, and the Eye Has Not Yet Met It

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: A jar should be directly visible because people believe it is.

The adept Vasu explains: Everyone believes that a jar is directly seen, because it has a use.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Direct visibility is absent; the jar is not thereby absent.

The adept Vasu explains: You say that if a jar is not directly seen, then at that time no jar exists. This is not so. Although the jar is not manifest, it is not the case that no jar exists. Therefore the jar is not directly visible.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it conjoins with the eye, there is no fault.

The adept Vasu explains: Although the jar has the mark of being directly visible, when the eye has not yet met it a person naturally does not see the jar. It is not that the jar lacks the mark of direct visibility.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Since the arising of direct visibility is absent, existence too is unreal.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose that before the jar met the eye there was no different mark, but when it was later seen some slight different mark arose. One should then know that this jar’s mark of direct visibility had arisen. Yet in fact no different mark arises, and therefore the mark of direct visibility does not arise. Since the arising of the mark of direct visibility is absent, the jar’s existence too is absent.

6. The Five Bodies: How Can What Does Not Contact Conjoin with What Contacts?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: One part of the five bodies has been refuted, but the remaining parts exist.

The adept Vasu explains: The five bodies constitute the jar. You have refuted form alone, but have not refuted odor and the rest. Since odor and the rest have not been refuted, objects must exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If not all of them contact, how can form and the rest conjoin?

The adept Vasu explains: Your statement that the five bodies constitute the jar is not so. Why? One part among form and the rest is contact, while the remaining parts are not contact. How can what is not contact conjoin with contact? Therefore the five bodies do not constitute the jar.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because they conjoin with the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: The parts consisting of form and the rest do not conjoin with one another, but those parts conjoin with the jar.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Once difference is eliminated, how can the jar conjoin with contact?

The adept Vasu explains: If the jar differs from contact, then the jar is not contact. How can what is not contact conjoin with contact? If apart from form and the rest there is no further jar-dharma, then because no jar-dharma exists, how could contact conjoin with the jar?

7. Since the Four Great Elements Are Not Seen by the Eye

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Form should be directly visible because scripture is trusted.

The adept Vasu explains: Your scripture says that form is the four great elements and what the four great elements produce. Within the part consisting of produced form, the portion included within the form-entrance is directly visible. How can you say that no directly visible form exists?

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The four great elements are not seen by the eye; how could they produce what is directly visible?

The adept Vasu explains: Earth has hardness as its mark, water moisture, fire heat, and wind motion. Since these four great elements are not seen by the eye, the form they produce should not be directly visible either.

〔T30 0177a02〕 The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: The four great elements exist because the bodily faculty apprehends them.

The adept Vasu explains: At present the bodily faculty can apprehend the four great elements, so the four great elements exist. Therefore fire and other various things, which are produced by the four great elements, must also exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because everything in fire is hot.

The adept Vasu explains: Among the four great elements, fire alone has heat as its mark, while the others do not. Yet within fire all four great elements have the mark of heat, and therefore fire does not constitute four bodies. If the others were not hot, they would not be called fire. Therefore fire does not constitute four bodies. The same applies to earth’s mark of hardness, water’s mark of moisture, and wind’s mark of motion.

8. Present Time: New and Old

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Form should be visible because present time exists.

The adept Vasu explains: Because the eye-faculty and the rest apprehend objects in present time, it is called present time. If the eye-faculty and the rest could not apprehend such objects as form, no present time would exist. Yet present time does in fact exist, and therefore form is visible.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If a dharma is old afterward, it is old at the beginning too.

The adept Vasu explains: If a dharma later displays the mark of oldness, that mark does not arise only at the time when it is old; it has accompanied the dharma ever since its initial arising. Only because it is subtle and goes unnoticed does one know it only when the mark changes and becomes manifest. It is like a person wearing wooden clogs: as soon as they are first worn they have already become subtly old, and this accompanies them all along, though it is not noticed or known. After a long time, the mark of oldness becomes manifest. If there were no oldness at first, there should be no oldness later either, and the dharma should always be new. If so, the mark of oldness should never arise. Therefore subtle oldness has accompanied it from the beginning, and only later does the mark of oldness become manifest. Now because dharmas do not abide, there is no time of abiding; if there is no time of abiding, there is no place in which objects are apprehended.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because newness and oldness are accepted, present time exists.

The adept Vasu explains: You accept the marks of newness and oldness. Relative to the time of arising, something is called new; relative to the time of alteration, it is called old. These two marks cannot be apprehended in past time or future time. Precisely because present time exists, the marks of newness and oldness can be apprehended.

The treatise author answers: This is not so. Deva’s root statement: It is new because it arises, and old because it alters.

The adept Vasu explains: If a dharma arose long ago, its mark of newness has already passed. When this mark of newness alters, it is called old; but if a mark of oldness arises, then at that very time the old itself becomes new. Whether new or old, these are merely spoken words. In the ultimate meaning there is no new, no middle, and no old.

The outsider asks: If this is so, what benefit is attained?

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: One attains lasting release.

The adept Vasu explains: If the new does not make the middle and the middle does not make the old, then seed, sprout, stalk, decaying node, flower, fruit, and the rest do not conjoin with one another. Because they do not conjoin with one another, dharmas do not abide; because they do not abide, they become distant; because they become distant, they cannot be apprehended.

Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of the Effect Existing in the Cause, Chapter Seven,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. What Exists Is Not Lost; What Is Absent Does Not Arise

〔T30 0177b01〕The outsider says—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: Dharmas do not fail to abide, because what already exists is not lost and what was originally absent does not arise.

The adept Vasu explains: Consider dharmas bearing the character of existence, such as a lump of clay. From the lump one makes the base of a jar; from the base one makes its belly; from the belly one makes its neck; from the neck one makes its mouth. Earlier and later stages are cause and effect for one another. When the various effects arise, the various causes are not lost. If the effect did not exist in the cause, the effect would not arise. It is only that the cause changes into the effect, and therefore dharmas exist.

2. If the Effect Has Arisen, the Cause Has Been Lost

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If, because the effect arises, what exists is not lost, then because the cause is lost, what exists is lost.

The adept Vasu explains: You say that when the effect, the jar, arises, the lump of clay is not lost; then the jar is the lump of clay. But if the effect, the jar, arises and at that time the cause, the lump of clay, has been lost, it is as though there were no cause. If the lump of clay truly were not lost, one should not distinguish the lump from the jar. Yet now one actually sees differences in shape, time, capacity, cognition, name, and the rest. Therefore, the existent of which you speak must have been lost.

3. A Bent Finger and a Straightened Finger

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with a finger bent and straightened.

The adept Vasu explains: Although a finger’s bent and straightened shapes differ, it is in fact the same finger. In the same way, although the shapes of the lump and the jar differ, the clay does not differ.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because activity and agent differ.

The adept Vasu explains: Bending and straightening are the finger’s activities; the finger is what performs them. If the activity itself were the agent, the finger should be lost when it bends. Further, bending and straightening should become the same thing. According to your scripture, the lump of clay itself is the jar. Therefore, the finger analogy is wrong.

4. Youth, Maturity, and Old Age

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with youth, maturity, and old age.

The adept Vasu explains: One person’s body is youthful, mature, and old. Cause and effect are the same.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because they are not one.

The adept Vasu explains: Youth does not make maturity, and maturity does not make old age. Therefore, your analogy is wrong.

Further, Deva’s root statement: If what exists is not lost, there is no loss.

The adept Vasu explains: If what exists is not lost, the lump of clay should not change into a jar, and there would then be no jar. If what exists is not lost, then because there is no nonexistence, nothing should be lost. It would follow that there is no loss at all.

5. What Fault Is There If Nothing Is Lost?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: What fault is there if nothing is lost?

The adept Vasu explains: If there is no loss because the cause is permanent, the lump of clay should not change into a jar. What fault is there if there is no impermanence?

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If there is no impermanence, there is no demerit, merit, or the rest.

The adept Vasu explains: If there were no impermanence, demerit, merit, and the rest should all be absent. Why? A person of demerit would always remain a person of demerit and should not become meritorious; a meritorious person would always remain meritorious and should not become a person of demerit. Demerit, merit, and the rest mean giving and stealing, observing precepts and violating precepts, and so forth. All such things would be absent.

6. The Effect Exists in the Cause Beforehand

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: The effect exists in the cause beforehand, because the cause exists.

The adept Vasu explains: If a jar did not already exist in clay, clay should not be the cause of a jar.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If, because the effect exists beforehand in the cause, an effect exists, then because the effect is absent, the cause has no effect.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the lump of clay is made into a jar and, because the clay is not lost, you say the effect exists in the cause. Then if this jar breaks, you should say there is no effect in the cause.

7. If Cause and Effect Are One, the Three Times Are Disordered

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because cause and effect are one.

The adept Vasu explains: Earth is the cause and clay the effect; clay is the cause and jar the effect. The cause changes into the effect, and there is no other dharma. Therefore, one should not say the effect is absent from the cause.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If cause and effect are one, there is no future.

The adept Vasu explains: The lump of clay is present, while the jar is future. If cause and effect are one, there is no future. Without a future there is also no present; without a present there is also no past. It follows that the three times are disordered.

8. It Is Merely Named According to the Time

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because names and the rest are lost, and names and the rest arise.

The adept Vasu explains: There is no new dharma, and the old dharma is not lost; only the name differs according to the time. One lump of clay, for example, is made into a jar; the jar breaks and is made into a basin; the basin breaks and returns to clay. Thus there is no going at all and no coming. Where, then, are jar and basin? Things merely receive names according to the time; in fact, there is no difference.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, the cause has no effect.

The adept Vasu explains: If a name is lost and arises, then this name was absent before and exists later; therefore, precisely, the effect is absent from the cause. If the name existed beforehand, the clay would already be the jar. Thus one knows that the effect did not exist beforehand.

9. What Kind of Vessel Emerges from Clay Is Not Fixed

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it is not fixed.

The adept Vasu explains: Which kind of vessel will emerge from the lump of clay is not fixed, so the corresponding name is not fixed within the clay.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If clay is indeterminate, the effect too is indeterminate.

The adept Vasu explains: If the jar in the lump of clay is not fixed, then your claim that the effect exists beforehand in the cause is equally unfixed.

10. Subtle Form and Eight Grounds of Imperceptibility

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because a subtle form exists.

The adept Vasu explains: The jar’s shape in the lump of clay is subtle and therefore difficult to know; through the potter’s power it becomes clear at that time. Although the jar in the clay cannot be known, one should understand that a subtle form certainly exists in the clay. There are two kinds of imperceptibility: a thing may be unknown because it is absent, or it may truly exist but be unknown because of some condition. There are eight such conditions. What are the eight? It is unknown because it is far away, as with a distant country; because it is too near, as with one’s own eyelashes; because a faculty is damaged, as with the deaf and blind; because the mind does not abide, as when a person’s thoughts are scattered; because it is subtle, as with a fine particle; because an obstruction intervenes, as with something beyond a wall; because it is overpowered by something stronger, as with a small amount of salt placed in a great body of water; or because it resembles its surroundings, as with one grain of rice cast into a great heap of rice. Thus although the eye cannot see the jar in the lump of clay, a jar never emerges from rushes. Therefore, a subtle jar certainly exists in the clay.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If a subtle form exists beforehand, the cause has no effect.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose that before the jar arises, a subtle form already exists in the clay and later becomes coarse and therefore knowable. This is precisely the effect being absent from the cause. Why? Because the coarse character was originally absent and arose only later. Therefore, the effect is absent from the cause.

11. Why Select Clay Rather Than Rushes?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: The effect should exist in the cause, because each effect selects its cause.

The adept Vasu explains: The effect should exist beforehand in the cause. Why? One who makes a jar selects clay, not rushes. If the effect were absent from the cause, rushes could also be selected. Yet people truly know that clay can produce a jar; they knead sticky earth into a vessel able to withstand firing. Therefore, the effect exists in the cause.

〔T30 0178a03〕The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If what is to exist exists, then what is to be absent is absent.

The adept Vasu explains: You say that a jar is to emerge from clay, and therefore the effect already exists in the cause. But now that the jar has broken, one should say that the effect is to be absent; therefore, the effect is absent from the cause.

12. The Sequence of Arising, Abiding, and Destruction

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because arising, abiding, and destruction exist in sequence, there is no fault.

The adept Vasu explains: Although the character of destruction is present in a jar, the jar always first arises, next abides, and only afterward is destroyed. Why? Because before it arises, there is no destruction.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If arising is first and not later, the same follows for the absence of the effect.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the jar in the clay is destroyed as soon as it arises. Why must it first arise and later be destroyed, rather than first be destroyed and later arise? You say that because it has not yet arisen, there is no destruction. It follows that before the jar arises, there is also no abiding and no destruction. These two things, abiding and destruction, were formerly absent and later exist; therefore, precisely, the effect is absent from the cause.

13. Because It Continues, It Is Not Annihilated; Because It Is Destroyed, It Is Not Permanent

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you refute the effect’s existence, you incur the fault of annihilation.

The adept Vasu explains: If it is wrong for the effect to exist in the cause, the effect must be absent from the cause. If the effect is absent from the cause, one falls into annihilation.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because it continues, it is not annihilated; because it is destroyed, it is not permanent.

The adept Vasu explains: Do you not know? From grain to sprout and the rest, continuity is unbroken, and therefore there is no annihilation; grain and the other causes are destroyed, and therefore there is no permanence. In this way, the Buddhas teach dharmas arising through the twelvefold dependent origination. Free from an effect existing or not existing in the cause, they cling neither to annihilation nor to permanence; they travel the middle way and enter nirvāṇa.

Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of the Effect Not Existing in the Cause, Chapter Eight,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. Since Arising Exists, One of the Two Paths Must Be Established

〔T30 0178a19〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Since arising exists, one of the two must be established.

The adept Vasu explains: You say that dharmas arise through causes and conditions. Did this arising already exist in the cause, or was it previously absent from the cause? Since the event of arising exists, one of these two paths must be established.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Neither arising nor nonarising arises.

The adept Vasu explains: If arising exists, did it previously exist in the cause, or was it previously absent? Sought through such reflection, neither side can be obtained; how much less can one speak of an arising that originally does not exist.

If you say that the arising of a jar exists, does it exist when the jar first becomes a jar, or after the lump of clay and before it is yet a jar?

To say that the jar’s arising exists when the jar first becomes a jar is not right. Why? Because the jar already exists. The three divisions—beginning, middle, and end—are established in mutual dependence. Without middle and end there is no beginning; if the jar has a beginning, it necessarily has a middle and end. Thus the jar already existed beforehand. What further use is arising?

To say that the jar’s arising exists after the lump of clay but before there is yet a jar is also not right. Why? Because the jar does not yet exist at that time. If the jar has no beginning, no middle, and no end, there is no jar. Since there is no jar, how could there be the jar’s arising?

Further, if the jar’s arising exists, should it exist after the lump of clay when there is already a jar, or at the jar’s beginning when there is still a lump of clay? After the lump, when there is already a jar, there is no arising of the jar. Why? Because it already exists. Nor does the jar’s arising exist at the jar’s beginning, when there is still a lump of clay. Why? Because it does not yet exist.

2. Then Call It “the Time of Arising”

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it arises at the time of arising, there is no fault.

The adept Vasu explains: I do not say that the jar’s arising exists when it has already arisen, nor that its arising exists when it has not yet arisen. Apart from these two, there is a second account: the very time when it is arising—that is arising.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The time of arising is likewise so.

The adept Vasu explains: The refutation of the time of arising is as stated above. If it has arisen, its arising is complete; if it has not yet arisen, how could arising exist? What is called the time of arising means that one half has arisen and one half has not yet arisen. It must incur the faults on both sides, just as refuted above. Therefore, there is no arising.

3. Taking “Completion” as Arising

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because arising and completion have one meaning.

The adept Vasu explains: I do not say that arising exists after the jar has already arisen, nor that it exists before the jar has arisen. The jar now becomes complete in immediate presence; this itself is the jar’s arising.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, arising comes afterward.

The adept Vasu explains: Completion means that arising is finished. If there is no arising, there is no beginning and no middle; without a beginning, there is no middle and no completion. Therefore, one should not take completion as arising—otherwise arising falls afterward.

4. Can Beginning, Middle, and End Arise in Sequence?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because beginning, middle, and end arise in sequence, there is no fault.

The adept Vasu explains: The lump of clay produces the jar’s base, belly, neck, mouth, and the rest in sequence. Beginning, middle, and end arise one after another; it is not that a completed jar follows immediately after the lump. Therefore, the jar’s arising exists neither at the time of the lump nor at the time of the jar, yet it is also not absent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Beginning, middle, and end do not arise in sequence.

The adept Vasu explains: “Beginning” means absent before and present afterward; “middle” means present before and present afterward; “end” means present before and absent afterward. Viewed in this way, beginning, middle, and end are established in mutual dependence. Apart from one another, how could these three divisions remain? Therefore, beginning, middle, and end should not arise in sequence.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Their arising at one time is also not right. The adept Vasu explains: If they arise at one time, one should not say that this is beginning, this is middle, and this is end, and they would not be established in mutual dependence. Therefore, this is not right.

5. Arising, Abiding, Destruction—and the Infinite Regress of the Three Marks

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with arising, abiding, and destruction.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as the marks of the conditioned—arising, abiding, and destruction—exist in sequence, so do beginning, middle, and end.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Arising, abiding, and destruction are likewise so.

The adept Vasu explains: Do they exist in sequence, or do they exist at one time? Neither is right. Why? Without abiding there is no arising. If arising could exist without abiding, abiding should likewise exist without arising. Destruction is the same. If they exist at one time, one should not distinguish this as arising, this as abiding, and this as destruction.

Further, Deva’s root statement: In every place there is everything. The adept Vasu explains: “Every place” means the three marks of the conditioned. If arising, abiding, and destruction are themselves conditioned marks, then arising should contain the three marks, because it is a conditioned dharma. Each of those marks in turn contains another three, and so there is no end. Abiding and destruction are the same. If arising, abiding, and destruction do not themselves contain another three marks, then the present arising, abiding, and destruction are not called conditioned marks.

Suppose you say that secondary arising and primary arising produce each other, like father and son. This is not right. Does this secondary arising depend upon what already existed in the cause, depend upon what was previously absent from the cause, or depend upon what was partly present and partly absent? These three were already discussed in “Refutation of the Faculties.” Further, a father exists first and only afterward produces a son, while this father has yet another father. Therefore, the analogy is wrong.

6. Arising and What Can Arise

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Arising and what can arise certainly exist, because a dharma exists.

The adept Vasu explains: If arising exists, what can arise exists; if arising is absent, what can arise is absent. Dharmas such as a jar that can arise now exist in immediate presence, so arising must exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If arising exists, there is nothing that can arise.

The adept Vasu explains: If the jar has arising, the jar has already arisen and is not called what can arise. Why? If there is no jar, there is likewise no arising of a jar. Therefore, if arising exists, there is nothing that can arise—how much more so if arising does not exist.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Self, other, and both are likewise so. The adept Vasu explains: If arising and what can arise are two things, then does it arise from self, from another, or from both? This was already discussed in “Relinquishing Demerit and Merit.”

7. Two Things Established Together at One Time

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Arising and what can arise certainly exist, because they are established together.

The adept Vasu explains: It is not that arising exists first and what can arise only afterward. The two are established together at one time.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Arising and what can arise cannot produce.

The adept Vasu explains: If what can arise could establish arising, arising would become what can arise and would no longer be called what produces arising. Without arising, where is what can arise? Therefore, neither of these two things exists.

Further, Deva’s root statement: It is not right for existence and nonexistence to depend upon each other. The adept Vasu explains: What can arise does not yet exist, and therefore is nonexistent; arising is existent. How can existence and nonexistence depend upon each other? Therefore, neither exists.

8. If the Effect Is Produced from Two, Why Is There No Third?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because arising and what can arise depend upon each other, dharmas are established.

The adept Vasu explains: Not only are arising and what can arise established through mutual dependence; precisely because these two depend upon each other, jars and the various other things are established.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If it is produced from two, why is there no third?

The adept Vasu explains: You say that because arising and what can arise depend upon each other, dharmas are established. If the effect is produced from these two, why is there not a separate third dharma, as when father and mother produce a child? Apart from arising and what can arise, there is now no third dharma such as a jar. Therefore, this is not right.

9. Since the Cause Is Destroyed, Should Arising Exist?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Arising should exist, because the cause is destroyed.

The adept Vasu explains: If the effect did not arise, the cause should not be destroyed. Now one directly sees that the jar’s cause is destroyed, so arising should exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because the cause is destroyed, arising too is cessation.

The adept Vasu explains: If the effect arises, does this effect exist while the cause is being destroyed, or after it has been destroyed? If it exists while the cause is being destroyed, it does not differ from destruction, and therefore arising too is cessation. If it exists after the cause has been destroyed, the cause is already destroyed and so there is no cause; without a cause, the effect should not arise.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Because the effect is fixed in the cause. The adept Vasu explains: Whether the effect existed beforehand in the cause or did not exist beforehand, in either case there is no arising. Why? If the effect is absent from the cause, why is a jar found only in clay and cloth only in thread? If effects are altogether absent, clay should contain cloth, and thread should contain a jar. If the effect existed beforehand in the cause, then this effect arises from this cause—but that is not right. Why? Because this cause itself is this effect; in your teaching cause and effect do not differ. Therefore, whether the effect existed beforehand in the cause or did not, it does not arise.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Because causes and effects are many. The adept Vasu explains: If the effect exists beforehand in the cause, milk contains curd, ghee, and the rest, while ghee also contains curd, milk, and the rest. If milk contains curd, ghee, and so forth, one cause contains many effects; if ghee contains curd, milk, and so forth, one effect contains many causes. It follows that prior and later, cause and effect, all exist together at one time. If the effect is absent from the cause, the same fault follows. Therefore, whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause, in either case there is no arising.

10. The Four Alternatives of Thing and Nonthing

〔T30 0179a12〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because cause and effect have not been refuted, arising and what can arise are established.

The adept Vasu explains: You say that many effects in one cause and many causes in one effect are faults, but you have not said that cause and effect are absent. Therefore, arising and what can arise are established.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Thing does not produce thing or nonthing, and nonthing does not produce either.

The adept Vasu explains: Thing does not produce thing; nonthing does not produce nonthing; thing does not produce nonthing; and nonthing does not produce thing.

If one says thing produces thing, as when a mother produces a child, this is not right. Why? The mother does not in fact produce the child; the child already existed beforehand and merely emerged from the mother. If one says the child is produced from the mother’s blood constituent and takes this as thing producing thing, that too is not right. Why? Apart from the blood constituent and the rest, the mother cannot be obtained. If one says it is produced through transformation and takes this as thing producing thing, that too is not right. Why? Maturity itself changes into old age; maturity does not produce old age. If one says it is like an image in a mirror and takes this as thing producing thing, that too is not right. Why? The image in the mirror comes from nowhere. Further, just as the image in the mirror resembles the face, all other effects should likewise resemble their causes; in fact, they do not. Therefore, thing does not produce thing.

Nonthing does not produce nonthing, as a hare’s horn does not produce a hare’s horn. Thing does not produce nonthing, as a barren woman does not produce a child. Nonthing does not produce thing, as turtle hair does not produce rushes. Therefore, there is no dharma of arising.

Further, if one says that thing produces thing, it should be produced through one of two dharmas: either the effect exists in the cause, or the effect does not exist in the cause. Neither is right. Why? If the effect was previously absent from the cause, the cause should not produce the effect, and a separate effect different from the cause cannot be obtained on the side of the cause. If the effect already existed in the cause, how could there be arising or cessation?

Deva’s root statement: Because they do not differ. The adept Vasu explains: If the jar does not differ from the lump of clay, when the jar arises, the lump should not cease, and the lump should not be the jar’s cause. If the lump does not differ from the jar, the jar should not produce the jar and should not be the lump’s effect. Therefore, whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause, thing does not produce thing.

Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of Permanence, Chapter Nine,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. Have Permanent Dharmas without Causes Gone Unrefuted?

〔T30 0179b09〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Dharmas should exist, because uncaused permanent dharmas have not been refuted. The adept Vasu explains: Although you have refuted dharmas that possess causes, you have not refuted uncaused permanent dharmas. Space, time, direction, fine particles, and nirvāṇa are all uncaused dharmas. Since they have not been refuted, dharmas should exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If one forcibly takes them as permanent, the same applies to impermanence. The adept Vasu explains: Do you call a thing permanent because it has a cause, or because it has no cause? If a permanent dharma has a cause, what has a cause is impermanent. If you call it permanent because it has no cause, one may equally call it impermanent.

2. Productive Cause and Revealing Cause

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because of a revealing cause, there is no fault. The adept Vasu explains: Causes are of two kinds: first, a productive cause; second, a revealing cause. If a productive cause is involved, the thing is indeed impermanent. But I call space and the other permanent dharmas permanent because of a revealing cause. I do not call them permanent because they lack a cause, nor impermanent because they possess one. Therefore, I am not forcibly taking them as permanent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: This cause is not right. The adept Vasu explains: Although you say that permanent dharmas have a cause, this cause cannot be established. Self was refuted before; the remaining permanent dharmas will now be refuted one by one.

3. Is Whatever Is Not Constructed Permanent?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Permanent dharmas should exist, because constructed dharmas are impermanent and unconstructed dharmas are permanent. The adept Vasu explains: The eye sees that jars and the various other things are all impermanent. If a dharma differs from these, it should be permanent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Absence too is shared by both. The adept Vasu explains: Because it stands in opposition to constructed dharmas, you give it the name “unconstructed dharma.” But constructed dharmas are now seen to possess the character of existence, so the unconstructed dharma of which you speak should be absent.

Further, because it opposes constructed dharmas, you say an unconstructed dharma is permanent. Yet with respect to existence it does not oppose constructed dharmas, so it should be impermanent. Why? Because unconstructed and constructed dharmas are alike in lacking contact, the unconstructed should be impermanent.

In this way, both all-pervading permanence and nonpervading permanence have been refuted in general. They should now be refuted individually.

4. Is the Space in a Jar Whole or Partial?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Space certainly exists as a permanent dharma, both all-pervading and partless, because people believe it exists in every place and at every time. The adept Vasu explains: People in the world believe space exists everywhere and therefore call it all-pervading. They believe that space exists throughout the past, future, and present and therefore call it permanent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because parts conjoin within parts, part is not different. The adept Vasu explains: Consider the space within a jar or a window opening. Is the whole of space present there, or only one part? If the whole is present, space does not pervade. If that still counts as pervading, the jar too should pervade. If only one part is present, space is merely those individual parts and there is no whole possessing parts; yet what possesses parts is what is called space. Therefore, space neither pervades nor is permanent.

5. Where Does Space Itself Abide?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Space certainly exists; its character is all-pervading and permanent, because actions occur. The adept Vasu explains: If there were no space, there would be no lifting, no putting down, and no coming or going. Why? Because there would be no place to receive them. Since these actions can in fact be performed, space exists and is both all-pervading and permanent.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Space abides in space. The adept Vasu explains: If space exists as a dharma, it should have a place in which to abide. If it has no abiding place, it is as though the dharma did not exist. Suppose space abides within an opening. Space would then abide in space, because an opening is precisely a place that receives. But this is not right, so space does not abide in an opening. Nor does it abide within a solid thing. Why? Deva’s root statement: Because a solid contains no space. The adept Vasu explains: A solid thing is not called empty. Since there is no space there, there is no abiding place, because there is no place that receives.

Further, you say that wherever action occurs, there is space. Within a solid thing there is no place for action, and so no space exists there. Therefore, space neither pervades nor is permanent.

Further, because it lacks a character, space does not exist. Every dharma has its own character; because the character exists, these dharmas are known to exist. Earth has hardness as its character, water wetness, fire heat, wind movement, and consciousness knowing. But space has no character and therefore does not exist.

6. Is Formlessness the Character of Space?

The outsider says: Space has a character. You simply do not know it and therefore call it absent. Formlessness is the character of space.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. “Formlessness” merely negates form; it is not a further dharma. It is like cutting through a tree: at the severed place there is not another separate dharma. Thus there is no character of space.

Further, space has no character. Why? You say formlessness is the character of space, so before form arises, space lacks its character. Further, form is an impermanent dharma, while you say space is permanent. Before form exists, the dharma of space should already exist. If there is not yet any form to be extinguished, space lacks a character; without a character, the dharma does not exist. Therefore, formlessness is not the character of space. Space has only a name and no substance. All the various all-pervading permanent dharmas are refuted in general in the same way.

7. Time: The Future Is Not within the Past

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: The dharma of time exists, because the character of permanence exists. The adept Vasu explains: Although some dharmas cannot be seen in immediate presence, they can be known through inference from a shared character, and therefore are believed to exist. Time is the same: although subtle and invisible, time is known through seasons, blossoms, fruit, and the rest; this is seeing an effect and knowing its cause. Further, time is known from such characters as simultaneity, nonsimultaneity, long duration, and nearness. There is no place outside time, and therefore time is permanent.

〔T30 0180a05〕The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The future does not exist within the past; therefore, there is no future. The adept Vasu explains: The time of the lump of clay is present, the time of earth is past, and the time of the jar is future. If the character of time is permanent, past time never changes into future time. Your scripture says that time is one dharma, so past time never becomes future time and does not become present time. If the past could become the future, the fault of confusion would follow. Further, future time does not exist within the past, and therefore there is no future. The present is refuted in the same way.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you accept the past, time exists. The adept Vasu explains: Since you accept that past time exists, future time necessarily exists. Therefore, the dharma of time truly exists.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The past is not the character of the future. The adept Vasu explains: Did you not hear me say before that past earth does not become a future jar? If it falls within the character of the future, it is the future character; how could it still be called past? Therefore, the past likewise does not exist.

8. Each of the Three Times Enacts Its Own Character

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Time should exist, because its own characters differ. The adept Vasu explains: The present has the character of the present, the past has the character of the past, and the future has the character of the future. Therefore, time exists.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, everything is present. The adept Vasu explains: If the respective characters of the three times are all already established and existent, then now all three should be present. If one calls something future, it does not yet exist; if one says it already exists, it should not be called future but already arrived. Therefore, this reasoning cannot be established.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because past and future enact their own characters, there is no fault. The adept Vasu explains: Past and future time do not enact the character of the present. Past time enacts the character of the past, and future time enacts the character of the future. Because each enacts its own character, there is no fault.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The past is not past. The adept Vasu explains: If the past is still going through the past, it is not called past. Why? Because it has departed from its own character. Fire, for example, is not called fire once it relinquishes heat, because it has left its own character. If the past does not pass away, you should not now say that past time enacts the character of the past. The future is refuted in the same way. Therefore, the dharma of time has no substance; there is only speech.

9. Direction: East Has No First Point

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Direction truly exists, because the character of permanence exists. The adept Vasu explains: The place at which the sun conjoins is the character of direction. As our scripture says: throughout past, future, and present, the place first reached by the sun is called east; the other directions are also named according to the sun.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because east has no first point. The adept Vasu explains: The sun travels around Mount Sumeru through the four continents. When it is noon in Uttarakuru, the sun has just risen in Pūrvavideha, and the people of Pūrvavideha take that place as east. When it is noon in Pūrvavideha, the sun rises in Jambudvīpa, and the people of Jambudvīpa take that place as east. When it is noon in Jambudvīpa, the sun rises in Aparagodānīya, and its people take that place as east. When it is noon in Aparagodānīya, the sun rises in Uttarakuru, and its people take that place as east. Thus the same place is wholly east, wholly south, wholly west, and wholly north.

Further, where the sun does not conjoin, direction does not exist, because it lacks a character. Further, direction is absent because it is unfixed: those on this side take it as east, while those on that side take it as west. Therefore, there is no real direction.

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because this character of direction is stated for one continent. The adept Vasu explains: This character of direction is stated with reference to one continent and not to all. Therefore, east does not incur the fault of having no first point.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, it has a boundary. The adept Vasu explains: If only the place first reached by the sun is called east, then each direction has a boundary. What has a boundary has parts; what has parts is impermanent. Thus direction exists in speech, but in reality there is no direction.

10. Fine Particles

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Although there is no all-pervading permanence, there are nonpervading permanent fine particles, because the character of an effect exists. The adept Vasu explains: People in the world sometimes see an effect and know that a cause exists, and sometimes see a cause and know that an effect exists—for example, seeing a sprout and knowing that a seed exists. According to worldly dharmas, all produced things are first subtle and later coarse. Thus one knows that two fine particles form the first effect, while one fine particle is the cause. Fine particles therefore exist, round and permanent, because they themselves have no cause.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Two fine particles do not conjoin with their entire bodies, because the effect is not round. The adept Vasu explains: When fine particles produce an effect, their whole bodies do not conjoin. Why? The eye sees that the effect formed from two fine particles is not round. If fine particles conjoined with their entire bodies, an effect made of two fine particles should likewise be round. Further, if their whole bodies conjoined, the two would be destroyed together. If fine particles overlapped in conjunction, the effect would be tall; if many fine particles conjoined, the effect would be large. This occurs because they conjoin by one part. Thus fine particles have parts, and what has parts is impermanent.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Fine particles are impermanent because they are distinguished from space. The adept Vasu explains: If fine particles exist, they should be distinguished from space. The particles would then have parts; what has parts is impermanent.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Because color, taste, and the rest are distinct. The adept Vasu explains: If fine particles exist, they should have distinct parts of color, taste, and the rest. Fine particles would then have parts; what has parts is impermanent.

Further, a shaped dharma possesses a character. If a fine particle has shape, it should possess length, shortness, squareness, roundness, and the rest. It would then have parts, and what has parts is impermanent. Because it is impermanent, no fine particle exists.

11. Is Nirvāṇa Constructed?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Nirvāṇa exists as a permanent dharma, because it is without afflictions and nirvāṇa does not differ from that. The adept Vasu explains: When craving and the various other afflictions are forever exhausted, this is called nirvāṇa. With afflictions there is birth and death; without afflictions there is forever no further birth and death. Therefore, nirvāṇa is permanent.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because nirvāṇa is a constructed dharma. The adept Vasu explains: Through cultivation of the path, the various afflictions cease. If absence of afflictions is nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa is a dharma that has been constructed, and a constructed dharma is impermanent. Further, if afflictions are absent, this is called having nothing whatever. If nirvāṇa does not differ from the absence of afflictions, there is no nirvāṇa.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it is a productive cause. The adept Vasu explains: Nirvāṇa is the productive cause of the absence of afflictions.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: What can destroy is not what is destroyed. The adept Vasu explains: If nirvāṇa is what enables a person to be liberated, then nirvāṇa itself is not liberation. Further, before the afflictions have been exhausted, nirvāṇa should be absent. Why? Because without the effect there is no cause.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: It is the effect of the absence of afflictions. The adept Vasu explains: This nirvāṇa is neither itself the absence of afflictions nor the cause of their absence; it is the effect of their absence. Therefore, one cannot say that nirvāṇa is absent.

12. Beyond Bondage, What Is Bound, and the Means

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Bondage, what is bound, and the means—apart from these, it has no use. The adept Vasu explains: “Bondage” means afflictions and karma; “what is bound” means sentient beings; “the means” means the noble eightfold path. Through the path, bondage is untied and sentient beings are thereby liberated. If a separate nirvāṇa exists outside these three dharmas, it has no use. Further, absence of afflictions is called having nothing whatever, and having nothing whatever should not be taken as a cause.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Nirvāṇa exists; it is where these are absent. The adept Vasu explains: The place in which bondage, what is bound, and the means are all absent is called nirvāṇa.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: How can one crave a place of fear? The adept Vasu explains: Because of the faults of impermanence, a wise person relinquishes conditioned dharmas and becomes dispassionate toward them. If nirvāṇa contains no various forms of consciousness and nothing desired, then compared with conditioned dharmas, nirvāṇa is an even more terrifying place. Why does your mind still crave it? Nirvāṇa is free from every attachment and extinguishes every recollection and conception. It is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither thing nor nonthing. It is like a lamp going out: nothing can be discussed.

13. Who Attains Nirvāṇa?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Who attains nirvāṇa? The adept Vasu explains: By what person is this nirvāṇa attained?

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: There is no attainer of nirvāṇa. The adept Vasu explains: I said before that when a lamp goes out, one cannot say it went east, south, west, north, to one of the intermediate directions, upward, or downward. Nirvāṇa is the same: all speech has ceased, and there is nothing that can be discussed. It is having nothing whatever—who could attain it? Even if nirvāṇa exists, there is no person who attains it. If self attained nirvāṇa, then because self is permanent and all-pervading, it should have nothing to attain. Nor do the five aggregates attain nirvāṇa. Why? Because the five aggregates are impermanent; the five aggregates arise and cease. To whom, then, should nirvāṇa belong? If one says that a person attains nirvāṇa, this is said within worldly convention.

Composed by Deva Bodhisattva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of Emptiness, Chapter Ten,” Taishō T30n1569. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.

1. Does the Act of Refutation Exist or Not?

〔T30 0181a07〕 The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Dharmas must exist, because refutation exists. If refutation does not exist, the other dharmas exist.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You refute the marks of all dharmas. If this refutation exists, you should not say that all dharmas are empty, because refutation itself exists. Since refutation exists, you cannot have refuted all dharmas. If this refutation does not exist, then all dharmas remain existent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Refutation is like what can be refuted.

The adept Vasu explains: You cling to that refutation, so you take a dharma that is now existent and now nonexistent and try to refute this refutation. Do you not understand? Once refutation is established, all dharmas are empty, with nothing there. If this refutation exists, it has already fallen among what can be refuted and is equally empty, with nothing there. If this refutation does not exist, what are you refuting? It is like saying there is no second head: a second head does not come into existence merely because there is a refutation. Or it is like a person saying “absent”: saying “absent” does not therefore produce an absence. Refutation and what can be refuted are just the same.

2. If You Grasp Unity and I Grasp Difference, Neither Side Can Stand

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Dharmas must exist, because this and that are grasped.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You grasp a dharma of difference and can therefore state the faults of unity; you grasp a dharma of unity and can therefore state the faults of difference. Since these two forms of grasping are established, all dharmas must exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Unity is not grasped; difference is the same.

The adept Vasu explains: Inquiry cannot find either unity or difference; this was already refuted earlier. Since it has already been refuted, there is nothing to grasp. Furthermore, suppose someone says: You have nothing that you grasp, but I grasp the dharmas of unity and difference. If such a question is raised, it too should be refuted in this way.

3. Who, Then, Is the Destroyer?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you refute another’s dharma, you are a person who destroys dharmas.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You delight only in refuting other people’s dharmas, forcibly generating faults for them while grasping nothing yourself. Therefore, you are a destroyer.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: You are the destroyer.

The adept Vasu explains: A speaker of emptiness grasps nothing. Because there is nothing grasped, that speaker is not a destroyer. You grasp your own dharma and use it to refute another’s grasping; therefore, you are the destroyer.

4. Establishing and Refuting Are Not the Same Act

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because another’s dharma is refuted, one’s own dharma is established.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. When you refute another’s dharma, your own dharma is thereby established. Why? If the other’s dharma is defeated, one’s own dharma is victorious. Therefore I am not a destroyer.

The treatise author answers: This is not so. Deva’s root statement: Establishing and refuting are not one.

The adept Vasu explains: Establishing means proclaiming and praising another’s merits; refuting means exposing another’s faults and wrongdoing. Praising merits and exposing faults cannot be called the same act.

Furthermore, Deva’s root statement: Establishing is called having fear. The adept Vasu explains: Fear means lack of strength. If a person first fears for his own dharma, he cannot establish anything concerning another’s dharma; because he is not afraid, he delights only in refuting. Therefore establishing and refuting are not the same. Again, if refuting another’s dharma immediately established one’s own, why did you previously say that the speaker of emptiness only refutes other people’s dharmas and grasps nothing himself?

5. Because One’s Own Dharma Is Established, Nothing Is Established

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: By stating the faults in another’s grasping, one’s own grasping is established.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. Why do you not yourself grasp and establish a dharma, but only refute other people’s dharmas? Refuting another’s dharma is equivalent to establishing your own.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because another’s dharma is refuted and one’s own dharma established, nothing is established.

The adept Vasu explains: According to your statement, because another’s dharma is refuted, one’s own dharma is established. Because one’s own dharma is established, nothing is established. Because nothing is established, I too establish nothing.

6. What the World Trusts Is Precisely Conditions

The outsider says: This is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because it contradicts the world.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If dharmas were all empty and without marks, no one in the world would trust or accept your teaching.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The world trusts this dharma.

The adept Vasu explains: The world trusts the dharma of conditions. Why? A dharma born from conditions is, just there, without marks. You say that curds, ghee, and other products already exist in milk; that a young girl already bears a fetus; that excrement already exists in food people eat. You also say that apart from beams, rafters, and other materials there is a separate house, and apart from threads there is a separate bolt of cloth. Some say the effect already exists in the cause, some say it does not exist in the cause, and some say dharmas can arise apart from conditions. These claims are in fact empty and should not be used to describe the affairs of the world. Who would trust what such people grasp? My Dharma is not like this. Because it agrees with what people in the world see, everyone trusts and accepts it.

7. Nongrasping Is Not Another Form of Grasping

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Your having nothing grasped establishes this dharma.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You say there is no grasping, but that statement itself is grasping. You also say that your Dharma accords with the people of the world; that too means you grasp something of your own.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Nongrasping is not called grasping, as with “absent.”

The adept Vasu explains: I said before that dharmas born from conditions are, just there, without marks; therefore I grasp nothing. Having nothing grasped is not called grasping. It is like saying the word “absent”: it truly is absent; saying “absent” does not therefore cause an absence to exist there. Nongrasping is just the same.

8. Who Should Wear the Name “Annihilator of Dharmas”?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you speak of dharmas without marks, you are an annihilator of dharmas.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If dharmas are all empty and without marks, this grasping too is absent, and consequently all dharmas are absent. Because all dharmas are absent, you are called an annihilator of dharmas.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: One who refutes an annihilator of dharmas is called an annihilator of dharmas.

The adept Vasu explains: I myself have never established any dharma, so there is nothing for me to refute. You decide that I am annihilating dharmas and therefore seek to refute me; as a result, you are the annihilator of dharmas.

9. Mutual Dependence: Long and Short, High and Low, Emptiness and Reality

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Dharmas must exist, because they exist in mutual dependence.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If long exists, short must exist; if high exists, low must exist; if emptiness exists, reality must exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: What mutual dependence could there be? Unity has been refuted.

The adept Vasu explains: If there is no unity, there can be no mutual dependence. If even the slightest nonempty thing remained, mutual dependence could be discussed. Since there is nothing nonempty, there is no emptiness either. What could mutually depend on what?

10. Saying “Absent” Does Not Thereby Add an Absence

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Your nonestablishment is itself establishment.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. It is like saying that a room is empty and has no horse: there then exists a no-horse. By the same reasoning, although you say dharmas are empty and without marks, that statement can generate many kinds of thought; therefore an absence must exist. Your nonestablishment thus becomes a form of establishment.

The treatise author answers: This is not so. Deva’s root statement: Existence and nonexistence are all absent.

The adept Vasu explains: Within the true mark of things, I use many Dharma gates to say that existence and nonexistence are both empty. Why? If existence is absent, nonexistence is also absent. Therefore existence and nonexistence are all absent.

11. If Intrinsic Nature Is Already Empty, Why Refute Anything?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Refutation is untenable, because things are empty in themselves.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. The intrinsic nature of dharmas is originally empty and there is no maker. Since there is no making, there should be no act of refutation. It is like a foolish person trying to destroy space and merely exhausting himself.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Although intrinsically empty, beings are bound because they grasp marks.

The adept Vasu explains: Although all dharmas are empty in intrinsic nature, beings are bound by deluded conceptions and discriminations. The word “refutation” is spoken in order to remove that inversion; in fact, nothing is destroyed. It is like a fool who sees a heat shimmer on a hot day, mistakenly imagines water, and exhausts himself chasing it. A wise person tells him, “This is not water.” That statement stops his conception; it does not destroy water. In the same way, the nature of dharmas is empty, but sentient beings grasp marks and cling. Refutation is spoken in order to remove this inversion, while in fact nothing is destroyed.

12. The Fourth Proposition Is Also in Your Own Great Scriptures

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: There is no ineffable dharma, because it is absent from the great scriptures.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You refute existence, nonexistence, and both existence and nonexistence, and now fall into neither existence nor nonexistence. This neither existence nor nonexistence cannot be spoken. Why? Because neither the mark of existence nor the mark of nonexistence can be found through inquiry; this is called an ineffable dharma. No such ineffable dharma occurs in the great scriptures of the Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhyas, or Nirgranthas, so it cannot be trusted.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: There is a fourth proposition.

The adept Vasu explains: Your own great scriptures also contain ineffable dharmas. The Vaiśeṣika scripture says that sound is called neither large nor small. The Sāṃkhya scripture says that a lump of clay is neither a jar nor not a jar. The Nirgrantha teaching says that light is neither bright nor dark. Such scriptures all contain the ineffable dharma of a fourth proposition. Why do you say they do not?

13. If Everything Is Empty, Why Still Speak of Good and Evil?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: If all is empty, there should be no teaching.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If everything is empty and the ineffable dharma is correct, why do you now teach good and evil dharmas in order to transform people?

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because language follows convention, there is no fault.

The adept Vasu explains: When buddhas teach the Dharma, they always rely on two levels, conventional truth and the truth of the ultimate meaning. Both are true and neither is false speech. For example, although the Buddha knows that dharmas are without marks, he still instructs Ānanda to enter Śrāvastī and beg for food. If earth, timber, and the other materials are removed, no city can be found. Yet because this language accords with convention, it does not fall into false speech. I too study in accordance with the Buddha, so there is no fault.

14. Does Conventional Truth Count as Truth?

〔T30 0182a01〕 The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Conventional truth is absent, because it is not real.

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If conventional truth were real, it should be included within the truth of the ultimate meaning. If it is not real, on what basis can it be called truth?

The treatise author answers: This is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because of mutual dependence, as with large and small.

The adept Vasu explains: Conventional truth is real for people of the world and unreal for sages. The same rose apple is large beside a jujube and small beside a melon; both statements are true. If one called it small beside a jujube and large beside a melon, those statements would be false. Speaking in accordance with convention is just like this, so there is no fault.

15. Having Seen These Faults, What Is Ultimately Gained?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Knowing these faults, what benefit is gained?

The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. From the initial relinquishment of demerit and merit all the way through the refutation of emptiness, one has seen faults in every dharma. What benefit is ultimately gained?

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Relinquishing self in this way is called attaining liberation.

The adept Vasu explains: In this way dharmas are refuted in three modes. At the beginning, in the relinquishment of demerit and merit, the self is refuted; afterward all dharmas are refuted. This is called having neither self nor anything belonging to self. One neither receives nor clings to dharmas: hearing of existence, one does not rejoice; hearing of nonexistence, one does not grieve. This is called liberation.

16. Why Does It Say Only “Called Attaining Liberation”?

The outsider asks: Why does the text say “called attaining liberation,” rather than truly attaining liberation?

The treatise author answers: Because it is ultimately pure. Because the self is refuted, there is no person; because nirvāṇa is refuted, there is no liberation. Since that is so, how could one speak of a person attaining liberation? Only from the standpoint of conventional truth is it spoken of as liberation.