百論 破異品第四

The difference established by the outsider makes jar, existence, and unity three separate things. Throughout the chapter, the treatise author asks only one question: if they are different, by what can they be joined again?

What Differs Does Not Draw the Other with It

“If existence and the rest differ, each is absent.” The jar differs from existence and unity, so “this jar neither exists nor is one.” The same follows for existence and unity: “Thus each is lost.” More important is the second level: “If the jar is destroyed, existence and unity should not be destroyed,” “because they differ,” “as when this person dies, that person should not die.” When the jar breaks, its existence does not remain where it was. This present fact is the verdict.

Using Difference to Prove Difference

The outsider establishes three kinds—conjoined difference, separate difference, and transformative difference—as a rescue. The treatise author first counts: “If so, there are many jars.” Then he identifies the illness: “I wish to refute your difference; how can you use difference to prove difference?” Hence, “You should state another reason.” When the outsider separates them still more cleanly, the answer is, “If so, there is no jar.” He retreats to many jars and hears: “Unity is the first among numbers.” If one is absent, many is absent too.

The Jar before Conjunction

The outsider establishes his own rule: “What is absent cannot conjoin.” The treatise author uses this rule to pursue the jar before conjunction. If the jar was then absent, “because an absent dharma cannot conjoin, it should not conjoin with existence.” If it already existed then, “What use is the later existence?”

Lamp and Mark

“If existence can disclose like a lamp, the jar should already exist.” “Objects exist first, and only then are illuminated by a lamp.” If the jar exists only upon conjunction, “existence is a productive cause, not a disclosing cause.” Further, “if an object cannot be established apart from mark and marked,” existence requires another mark, without end. If existence needs no mark, “jars and the rest should be the same.” At last the analogy is returned: “As a lamp illuminates itself and does not rely on another illumination, the jar too exists by itself and does not await an external existence.”

Parts and the Whole Possessing Parts

“If the whole possessing parts is complete within a part, why are the feet not in the head?” If it resides portion by portion, “the whole possessing parts is like a part.” The conclusion is: “Because the whole possessing parts is absent, the parts too are absent.” The rescue through atoms likewise fails: “If all gather into the jar, all atoms should wholly be the jar.” The power of threads and drops is defeated because it is “indeterminate”: “Each barren woman cannot bear a child, each blind person cannot see form, and each grain of sand cannot produce oil; many gathered together likewise cannot.” If each part already has power, the claim again falls into “the faults of identity and difference between parts and the whole possessing parts.”

The Liar

The outsider accuses: “You are one who destroys dharmas.” The treatise author returns it: “Parts such as head and feet conjoined are visibly the body, yet you say they are not the body”; “wheels, axle, and the rest conjoined are visibly a chariot, yet you say there is another chariot apart from them.” Saying what is seen is absent and what is unseen exists—“therefore, you are the liar.”

Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of Difference, Chapter Four,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. If Existence, Unity, and Jar Each Differ, Each Is Lost

〔T30 0174c07〕The outsider asks: You said before that if existence, unity, and jar differ, this too entails faults. What sort of faults?

The treatise author answers—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: If existence and the rest differ, each is absent.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose existence, unity, and jar each differ from the others. Then all three are each absent. Since the jar differs from existence and unity, this jar neither exists nor is one. Since existence differs from unity and jar, this existence is neither a jar nor one. Since unity differs from existence and jar, this unity is neither a jar nor existent. Pursued item by item in this way, each of the three is lost.

Further, if the jar is destroyed, existence and unity should not be destroyed with it. If existence is destroyed, unity and jar should not be destroyed with it. If unity is destroyed, existence and jar should not be destroyed with it. Why? Because they differ from one another, as when this person dies and that person should not die with him.

2. Rescuing Difference through Conjunction

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because existence and unity conjoin, an existent one jar is established.

The adept Vasu explains: Although existence, unity, and jar differ, because jar conjoins with existence, the jar is called existent; because jar conjoins with unity, the jar is called one. Your statement that existence and unity should not be destroyed when the jar is destroyed is incorrect. Why? Because they differ and yet conjoin. Difference is of three kinds: first, conjoined difference; second, separate difference; third, transformative difference. Conjoined difference is like dravya and guṇa. Separate difference is like this person and that person. Transformative difference is like a lump of cow dung becoming a lump of ash. Because they differ yet conjoin, when the jar is destroyed, unity is destroyed too; when unity is destroyed, the jar is destroyed too. Existence is not destroyed because it is permanent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there are many jars.

The adept Vasu explains: Because jar conjoins with existence, there is one existent jar; because jar conjoins with unity, there is one one-jar; and the jar itself is another jar. Counted this way, there are many jars. You claim that because dravya and guṇa differ yet conjoin, when jar is destroyed unity is destroyed and when unity is destroyed jar is destroyed. I wish precisely to refute the difference you establish; how can you use difference in turn to prove difference? You should state another reason.

3. Existence Is Universal, Unity Is Guṇa—and Then Even the Jar Is Absent

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because existence is a universal character and unity a guṇa, existence and unity are not the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Because existence is a universal character, it is not the jar. Because unity is a guṇa, it is not the jar. The jar is a dravya.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose existence is not the jar because it is a universal character; unity is not the jar because it is a guṇa; and jar, because it is a dravya, is neither existence nor unity. Then there is no jar.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: You accept many jars.

The adept Vasu explains: You previously spoke of many jars to refute one jar; now instead you accept many jars yourself.

〔T30 0175a01〕The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because one is absent, many is absent too.

The adept Vasu explains: You say that because jar conjoins with existence, there is an existent jar; because jar conjoins with unity, there is a one-jar; and the jar itself is a jar. If so, the world originally speaks of one jar, yet you calculate it as many jars. Thus one jar becomes many jars. Once one has become many, there is no one jar; because one jar is absent, many too is absent, since one comes before many.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Because the first number is absent. The adept Vasu explains: Among dharmas of number, one comes first. If unity differs from the jar, the jar does not become one. Once one is absent, many too is absent.

4. The Jar before Conjunction

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because jar conjoins with existence.

The adept Vasu explains: Because jar conjoins with existence, the jar is called existent; this does not mean the jar is all existence. Likewise, because jar conjoins with unity, the jar is called one; this does not mean the jar is all unity.

The treatise author answers: You merely have this statement. It has already been refuted: if existence is not the jar, there is no jar. Let us now say another layer—Deva’s root statement: The jar should be a nonjar. The adept Vasu explains: Suppose the jar is existent because it conjoins with existence, while this existence is itself not a jar. Since the jar conjoins with what is not a jar, why does the jar not become a nonjar?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because absence cannot conjoin, it is not a nonjar.

The adept Vasu explains: A nonjar is an absent jar. Since it is absent, nothing exists that could conjoin; therefore, the jar does not become a nonjar. Existence now really exists and should therefore conjoin. Because there is conjunction, the jar becomes existent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because existence now conjoins with the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose there is no existence apart from the jar; without existence, there is no conjunction. Since existence now conjoins with the jar, existence too should become a jar. Suppose you say that before the jar conjoins with existence it is absent, and because absent it has no conjunction. Then, as stated before, an absent dharma cannot conjoin. Thus before conjoining with existence, the jar is an absent dharma; as an absent dharma, it should not be able to conjoin with existence.

5. Does Existence Illuminate the Jar or Produce It?

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because existence discloses the jar and the rest, like a lamp.

The adept Vasu explains: Existence is not only a cause of jars and various other objects; it can also disclose them, as a lamp illuminates various objects. In this way, existence discloses the jar, and therefore one knows there is a jar.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If existence can disclose like a lamp, the jar should already exist.

The adept Vasu explains: Various objects exist first, and only then are they illuminated by a lamp. If existence is like a lamp, then before existence conjoins with the jar, jars and other objects should already exist. If they already exist, what use is the later existence? Suppose jars and other objects do not exist before conjoining with existence and exist only after that conjunction. Then existence is a productive cause, not a disclosing cause.

Further, Deva’s root statement says: If mark and marked establish one another, why does one not become two? The adept Vasu explains: Suppose you take existence as the jar’s mark and therefore know there is a jar. One should know that an object is not established apart from mark and marked; hence existence itself should have another mark. If one can know a dharma exists without another mark, jars and the rest should be the same and need not separately borrow an existence. The lamp analogy has already been refuted. Further, since the lamp illuminates itself and does not borrow an external illumination, the jar too exists by itself and does not await an external existence.

6. Body and the Part Called Foot: Does a Whole Possessing Parts Exist within a Part?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Like the mark of a body.

The adept Vasu explains: From the foot as a part, one knows there is a whole possessing parts called body; the foot itself need not seek another mark. In the same way, existence is taken as the jar’s mark and therefore one knows there is a jar; existence itself need not seek another mark.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If the whole possessing parts is complete within a part, why are the feet not in the head?

The adept Vasu explains: Suppose a body-dharma exists among parts such as the feet. Is it wholly complete within them, or divided among them? If wholly complete, feet should exist in the head, because the body-dharma is one. If divided among them, that too is incorrect. Why? Deva’s root statement says: The whole possessing parts is like a part. The adept Vasu explains: If the portion of the whole possessing parts within the foot equals the foot as a part, and so with all the other parts, then the whole possessing parts and the parts become one. No whole possessing parts remains that can be called a body. In this way, parts such as the feet themselves exist, but that whole possessing parts is refuted. Because the whole possessing parts is absent, the parts too are absent.

7. Can Aggregated Atoms Produce a Whole Possessing Parts?

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because atoms exist.

The adept Vasu explains: The parts are not absent. Why? Atoms have no parts and do not reside within parts. Because atoms aggregate, they can produce such fruits as jars; therefore, a whole possessing parts should exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If all gather into the jar, all are the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Your statement that atoms have no parts is merely a statement. It will be refuted later; for now, let us state one layer briefly. When atoms aggregate into a jar, if all of them aggregate into the jar, every atom should wholly become the jar. If not all aggregate into the jar, every atom is a nonjar.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Like the gathered power of threads and drops; atoms are the same.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as individual threads cannot bind an elephant and individual drops of water cannot fill a jar, while many gathered together can, so because atoms aggregate, they possess the power to become a jar.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because it is indeterminate.

The adept Vasu explains: For example, each barren woman cannot bear a child, each blind person cannot see form, and each grain of sand cannot produce oil; many gathered together likewise cannot. In the same way, if individual atoms cannot, many gathered atoms cannot either.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because each part has power, it is not indeterminate.

The adept Vasu explains: Each portion of thread and each drop of water already has some power to bind an elephant or fill a jar. Barren women, blind people, and grains of sand have no power in each part, so many gathered together likewise have no power. Therefore it is not indeterminate, and barren women, blind people, and sand should not be used as analogies.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because parts and the whole possessing parts entail the faults of identity and difference.

The adept Vasu explains: The faults of whether parts and the whole possessing parts are one or different have already been refuted. Further, because the whole possessing parts is absent, the parts too are absent. If before the whole possessing parts exists, the parts themselves are unobtainable, where could they have active power? If the whole possessing parts already exists, what use is the power of the parts?

8. Who Is the One Who Destroys Dharmas?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: You are one who destroys dharmas.

The adept Vasu explains: People in the world all see jars and various other objects, yet you refute them through various causes and conditions; therefore, you are one who destroys dharmas.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. You say existence differs from jar, and I say that if existence differs from jar, there is no jar. Further, Deva’s root statement says: You see absence as existence and existence as absence, and so forth. The adept Vasu explains: You resemble one who destroys dharmas and are even worse. Why? Parts such as head and feet conjoined are visibly the body, yet you say this is not the body and that apart from these exists another whole possessing parts called body. Further, wheels, axle, and the rest conjoined are visibly a chariot, yet you say another chariot exists apart from them. Therefore, you are one who speaks falsely.

In the preceding chapter, the treatise author pressed “unity” until it had nowhere to stand. The outsider therefore moves to the other side. If existence, unity, and jar cannot be said to be one, then let them differ. This chapter begins with the outsider’s question: “You said before that if existence, unity, and jar differ, this too entails faults. What sort of faults?” He wants the reason.

First set out the three terms on the field. A jar sits on the table. We say it “exists,” that it is “one,” and that it is a “jar.” The outsider maintains that these three names each refer to a real thing: jar belongs to the category dravya, one to the category guṇa, and existence is a universal character pervading all objects. Each is real in itself, each differs from the others, and afterward they conjoin into the jar before our eyes.

Throughout the chapter, the treatise author asks only one question: since they differ, by what can you join them again?

1. The First Price of Difference: All Three Fall Empty Together

Deva’s root statement has only five characters: “If existence and the rest differ, each is absent.” The adept Vasu unfolds it into an extremely orderly calculation.

“Since the jar differs from existence and unity, this jar neither exists nor is one.” Since the jar differs from existence, existence is absent from the jar; since it differs from unity, unity is absent from the jar. Likewise, “existence differing from unity and jar is neither jar nor one,” and “unity differing from existence and jar is neither jar nor existent.” The three names each stand apart and do not touch the others—“thus each is lost.”

Then comes a second level, sharper than the first: “If the jar is destroyed, existence and unity should not be destroyed. If existence is destroyed, unity and jar should not be destroyed. If unity is destroyed, existence and jar should not be destroyed.” The reason has only three words: “because they differ.” The analogy could not be more ordinary: “When this person dies, that person should not die.”

This sentence deserves a slow reading. Difference has a price: the fates of two truly different affairs do not implicate one another. Since you say jar and existence differ, when the jar shatters on the ground that “existence” should remain entirely unharmed; the jar is gone, but its “one” should remain. Yet no one in the world sees it this way. When the jar breaks, the existence of that jar is gone, and the unity of that jar is gone. One affair has broken. The jar before us refuses the difference the outsider wants.

2. Can the Move of Conjunction Rescue It?

The outsider’s rescue is conjunction: “Because existence and unity conjoin, an existent one jar is established.” Although the three differ, they can conjoin. “Because jar conjoins with existence, it is called existent; because jar conjoins with unity, it is called one.” As for their linked fates, he establishes a scheme: “Difference is of three kinds: conjoined difference, separate difference, and transformative difference.” Conjoined difference is like dravya and guṇa; separate difference like this person and that; transformative difference “like a lump of cow dung becoming a lump of ash.” His point is that only the difference between this person and that is unrelated. He means conjoined difference, and what is conjoined arises and ceases together: “When the jar is destroyed, unity is destroyed too; when unity is destroyed, the jar is destroyed too. Existence is not destroyed because it is permanent.”

The treatise author’s answer has two sections.

First comes arithmetic: “If so, there are many jars.” Jar conjoins with existence into one existent jar; jar conjoins with unity into one one-jar; “and the jar itself is a jar.” Three jars now stand on the table. You wished to rescue one jar and rescued three.

The second section reaches the heart: “I wish to refute your difference; how can you use difference to prove difference?” The very matter under question is whether “difference” can be established, yet you bring forward a difference called “conjoined difference” as your reason. This does not answer; it treats what awaits proof as already proven. The treatise author says only: “You should state another reason.”

The outsider indeed gives another: “Because existence is a universal character and unity a guṇa, existence and unity are not the jar.” Existence is not jar because it is universal; unity is not jar because it is a guṇa; jar is dravya. He has separated the three still more cleanly. The treatise author’s answer is shorter still: “If so, there is no jar.” Existence is not jar; unity is not jar; and jar, because it is dravya, “is neither existence nor unity.” The object on the table neither exists nor is one—what is it? The cleaner the separation, the less remains.

The outsider seizes the earlier line and counterattacks: “You accept many jars.” You first said “many jars” to refute my one jar, so have you not now accepted many jars? The treatise author answers: “Because one is absent, many too is absent.” Those three jars were produced by your arithmetic, not established by me. The world “speaks of one jar, while you calculate it as many.” Once one becomes many, there is no one jar. “Because one jar is absent, many too is absent, since one comes before many.” He adds a cut straight to the root: “One is first among dharmas of number. If unity differs from the jar, the jar does not become one; because one is absent, many too is absent.” Many is counted beginning with one. Once you judge one an external thing, where can many begin?

3. Before Conjunction, Where Is the Jar?

The outsider retreats and narrows his claim. The jar is called existent because it conjoins with existence, but it is “not all existence.” He does not claim the jar is the whole of existence. The treatise author does not take up this softening and instead pushes one step back: “The jar should be a nonjar.” You say that existence itself is not the jar. “If the jar conjoins with a nonjar, why does the jar not become a nonjar?” If conjunction can give the jar existence’s properties, then since existence is “nonjar,” why does that property not pass over too?

The outsider answers cleverly: “Because absence cannot conjoin, it is not a nonjar.” A nonjar is an absent jar, and what is absent has nothing that can conjoin. Existence, however, really exists, so only existence can conjoin.

The treatise author follows this rule backward: “Because existence now conjoins with the jar.” Since absence cannot conjoin, before existence arrives to conjoin, is the jar existent or absent? If absent, “because an absent dharma cannot conjoin, it should not conjoin with existence.” It cannot even enter the conjunction and will never receive that existence. If already existent then, “What use is the later existence?” It already exists and needs no giver. The very rule established by the outsider—absence cannot conjoin—blocks the jar he wishes to save outside the door.

4. The Lamp: Does It Illuminate or Produce?

The outsider changes routes. Existence is not only the jar’s cause but discloses the jar: “as a lamp illuminates various objects.” Because existence illuminates it, we know there is a jar.

The treatise author answers through the lamp itself: “If existence can disclose like a lamp, the jar should already exist.” The sequence of lighting a lamp is obvious: “Objects exist first, and only then are illuminated by the lamp.” If you take a lamp as analogy, you must accept this sequence. Before existence conjoins with the jar, the jar should already stand there. Since it already does, “What use is the later existence?” Conversely, if before conjunction there truly is no jar and the jar exists only afterward, then “existence is a productive cause, not a disclosing cause.” It is not an illuminator but a maker, and the lamp analogy collapses by itself. An analogy cannot be borrowed by halves.

Then comes a short question that sees to the bottom: “If mark and marked establish one another, why does one not become two?” You take existence as the jar’s mark and know jar through that mark. But “an object is not established apart from mark and marked.” Mark and marked form a pair; apart from the other, neither is established. Existence itself therefore needs another mark through which it can be known; that mark requires another without end. If you say existence can be known without another mark, do not make things difficult for the jar: “jars and the rest should be the same,” requiring no borrowed existence. The treatise author finally retrieves the lamp: “As a lamp illuminates itself and does not borrow an external illumination, the jar too exists by itself and does not await an external existence.” The lamp you raised proves precisely that the jar does not need your “existence.”

5. Body and Feet: Is a Whole Hidden within the Part?

The outsider offers another analogy, one that directly presses the core of the chapter’s second half: “Like the mark of a body.” “From the foot as a part, one knows there is a whole possessing parts called body; the foot need not seek another mark.” Likewise, seeing existence lets one know there is a jar.

The treatise author asks one question: “If the whole possessing parts is complete within a part, why are the feet not in the head?” You say the whole body resides in the foot as a part. Does it reside there wholly complete, or as one divided portion? If wholly complete, “feet should exist in the head, because the body-dharma is one.” The body is one; if that one whole exists entirely in the foot, it exists entirely in the head, and feet naturally should exist in the head. If divided portion by portion, Deva’s root statement continues: “The whole possessing parts is like a part.” The portion of body in the foot equals the foot as a part, and so for all remaining parts. Then “whole and parts become one, and no whole possessing parts remains that can be called body.” The alleged whole is only these parts themselves; no separate thing called body remains.

The last sentence weighs most: “Because the whole possessing parts is absent, the parts too are absent.” The name “part” is established in relation to a “whole possessing parts.” Apart from a whole, of what is it a part? Once the whole is dismantled, those things styling themselves “parts” are no longer parts; they are simply themselves.

6. Atoms, Threads, and Barren Women

The outsider retreats to the smallest ground: “Because atoms exist.” “Atoms have no parts and do not reside within parts. Because atoms aggregate, they can produce such fruits as jars.” Since aggregation can produce fruit, a fruit—a whole possessing parts—must exist.

The treatise author first establishes a dilemma: “If all gather into the jar, all are the jar.” When atoms aggregate into a jar, “if all gather into the jar, every atom should wholly be the jar. If not all gather into the jar, all are nonjars.” If the whole participates, all atoms in the world must become this jar; if not the whole, then the participating atoms cannot separately count as jar.

The outsider offers his strongest analogy: “Like the gathered power of threads and drops.” “Individual threads cannot bind an elephant; individual drops cannot fill a jar. Many gathered can.” Everyone has seen this: one thread cannot bind an elephant; a bundle can.

The treatise author’s answer is also familiar to everyone: “Because it is indeterminate.” “Each barren woman cannot bear a child, each blind person cannot see form, and each grain of sand cannot produce oil; many gathered together likewise cannot.” Quantity itself does not produce power. Whether aggregation can generate a function is not decided by number. If “many gathered can” is your general rule, barren women, blind people, and grains of sand stand in its way.

The outsider quickly sees the difference and adds: “Because each part has power, it is not indeterminate.” Each thread and drop already contains a portion of the power to bind an elephant or fill a jar. Barren women, blind people, and sand lack power in every portion; therefore, they cannot serve as analogies.

It is a good repair, but one sentence returns it to the original place: “Because parts and the whole possessing parts entail the faults of identity and difference.” You say each part already contains that portion of power. Does the power belong to the part, or to the whole possessing parts? “Whether one or different, these faults have already been refuted.” Then time is calculated again: “If before the whole possessing parts exists, the parts are unobtainable, how could they have active power? If the whole already exists, what use is the power of the parts?” Before the whole exists, these things are not yet anyone’s “parts,” and that portion of power has no owner. Once the whole exists, the power has no work to do. You have written the not-yet-established whole in advance into the name “part.”

7. Who, Ultimately, Is Dismantling the World?

At the argument’s end, the outsider changes his tone. No longer discussing reasons, he attacks character: “You are one who destroys dharmas.” “People in the world all see jars and other objects, yet you refute them through many causes and conditions.”

The treatise author answers in two steps. First he settles the account: I have refuted nothing; I merely followed you. “You say existence differs from jar. I say that if existence differs from jar, there is no jar.” You first established difference. The jar was discarded by your difference.

Second, the treatise author turns the accusation around: “You see absence as existence and existence as absence, and so forth.” “You resemble one who destroys dharmas and are even worse.” The reason can be tested before the eyes: “Parts such as head and feet conjoined are visibly the body, yet you say this is not the body and that apart from these exists another whole possessing parts called body.” This head, hands, feet, and torso plainly are what we call body; you insist this is not body and posit another unseen body. “Wheels, axle, and the rest conjoined are visibly a chariot, yet you say another chariot exists apart from them.” Wheels and axle gather together and everyone says it is a chariot; you say the chariot is elsewhere, apart from these.

What is visible before the eyes, you say is not; what cannot be seen, you say exists. Who is dismantling what the world sees? The treatise author’s judgment is four words: “Therefore, you are the liar.”

8. What This Chapter Lets One Carry Away

First, difference too has a price. People call two things different because they want distinction, yet do not want their fates separated. True difference, however, means true nonimplication: “When this person dies, that person should not die.” When a jar breaks, its “existence” disappears with it. This present fact proves that independently real existence cannot stand.

Second, using what must be proven as the reason is no answer. “I wish to refute your difference; how can you use difference to prove difference?” The outsider’s conjoined difference, disclosing cause, and power in each part commit the same fault three times: the reason cited already conceals the conclusion it was meant to prove.

Third, emptiness does not dismantle what is before the eyes; it dismantles the shadow behind it. Wheels and axle conjoined are called chariot; head and feet conjoined are called body; conditions conjoined are called jar. The treatise author moves none of these. What he moves is the “other chariot existing apart from these.”

Carried Forward

This chapter and the preceding use the same materials and walk opposite extremes. The preceding chapter stops determinate unity; this chapter stops determinate difference. Only together does their full meaning appear. One is not asked to choose a stable point between identity and difference, but to release both paths at once. Here the treatise meets the refutations of identity and difference in the Treatise on the Middle and the challenges concerning parts and whole in the Twelve Gate Treatise.

Twice the chapter itself points beyond its boundaries. When refuting partless atoms it says “they will be refuted later,” speaking only briefly and not concluding the matter. Of the faults concerning part and whole it says “already refuted,” using the result of the preceding chapter. Thus the “Refutation of Difference” is not an isolated debate; the two chapters on unity and difference complete one task together.