百論 破因中無果品第八

The outsider hands over a choice: either the effect existed beforehand in the cause or it did not—“Since arising exists, one of the two must be established.” The treatise author does not choose. He asks about something prior: “If arising exists, did it exist beforehand in the cause, or was it absent beforehand? Sought through such reflection, it cannot be obtained—how much less an arising that does not exist.”

That Temporal Position Cannot Be Found

Seek arising once the jar is complete, and “the jar already exists”; moreover, beginning, middle, and end “exist in mutual dependence,” so with the whole jar present, “what further use is arising?” Seek it when the lump of clay has not yet become a jar, and it is “not yet present”—“if there is no jar, how could there be the jar’s arising?” Change the answer to the time of arising, and the reply is: “The time of arising means half arisen and half not yet arisen, and it incurs both faults.” Replace arising with completion, and the answer is: “Completion means already arisen”; “therefore one should not take completion as arising, for arising would come afterward.”

Names Leaning upon Names

Beginning, middle, and end—“apart from one another, how could they exist?” If they arise simultaneously, “one should not say this is beginning, this is middle, and this is end.” Arising, abiding, and destruction are the same: “without abiding there is no arising.” And if the three marks themselves are conditioned, each must again contain three marks, “and then there is no end.” The father-and-son analogy also fails, because “this father has yet another father.” Arising and what can arise are two names for one event: “If the jar has arising, the jar has already arisen and is not called what can arise.” Let what can arise establish arising, and “arising becomes what can arise and is not called what produces arising.” If two real dharmas together produce, “why is there no third dharma, as when father and mother produce a child?”

Letting Both Sides Go Together

If the effect exists as the cause is destroyed, it “does not differ from destruction, and therefore arising too is cessation.” If it exists after destruction, “because there is no cause, the effect should not arise.” The nonexistent-effect side must answer: “Why is a jar found only in clay and cloth only in thread?” The existent-effect side makes “this cause itself this effect”; it also puts curd and ghee beforehand in milk, producing many effects in one cause and many causes in one effect. Therefore, “whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause, in either case there is no arising.” The final four alternatives exhaust the question: the examples of mother and child, blood constituent, maturity and old age, and mirror image all fail to establish thing producing thing; hare’s horn, barren woman, and turtle hair close the remaining three alternatives. “Therefore, there is no dharma of arising.”

Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of the Effect Not Existing in the Cause, Chapter Eight,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. Since Arising Exists, One of the Two Paths Must Be Established

〔T30 0178a19〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Since arising exists, one of the two must be established.

The adept Vasu explains: You say that dharmas arise through causes and conditions. Did this arising already exist in the cause, or was it previously absent from the cause? Since the event of arising exists, one of these two paths must be established.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Neither arising nor nonarising arises.

The adept Vasu explains: If arising exists, did it previously exist in the cause, or was it previously absent? Sought through such reflection, neither side can be obtained; how much less can one speak of an arising that originally does not exist.

If you say that the arising of a jar exists, does it exist when the jar first becomes a jar, or after the lump of clay and before it is yet a jar?

To say that the jar’s arising exists when the jar first becomes a jar is not right. Why? Because the jar already exists. The three divisions—beginning, middle, and end—are established in mutual dependence. Without middle and end there is no beginning; if the jar has a beginning, it necessarily has a middle and end. Thus the jar already existed beforehand. What further use is arising?

To say that the jar’s arising exists after the lump of clay but before there is yet a jar is also not right. Why? Because the jar does not yet exist at that time. If the jar has no beginning, no middle, and no end, there is no jar. Since there is no jar, how could there be the jar’s arising?

Further, if the jar’s arising exists, should it exist after the lump of clay when there is already a jar, or at the jar’s beginning when there is still a lump of clay? After the lump, when there is already a jar, there is no arising of the jar. Why? Because it already exists. Nor does the jar’s arising exist at the jar’s beginning, when there is still a lump of clay. Why? Because it does not yet exist.

2. Then Call It “the Time of Arising”

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it arises at the time of arising, there is no fault.

The adept Vasu explains: I do not say that the jar’s arising exists when it has already arisen, nor that its arising exists when it has not yet arisen. Apart from these two, there is a second account: the very time when it is arising—that is arising.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The time of arising is likewise so.

The adept Vasu explains: The refutation of the time of arising is as stated above. If it has arisen, its arising is complete; if it has not yet arisen, how could arising exist? What is called the time of arising means that one half has arisen and one half has not yet arisen. It must incur the faults on both sides, just as refuted above. Therefore, there is no arising.

3. Taking “Completion” as Arising

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because arising and completion have one meaning.

The adept Vasu explains: I do not say that arising exists after the jar has already arisen, nor that it exists before the jar has arisen. The jar now becomes complete in immediate presence; this itself is the jar’s arising.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, arising comes afterward.

The adept Vasu explains: Completion means that arising is finished. If there is no arising, there is no beginning and no middle; without a beginning, there is no middle and no completion. Therefore, one should not take completion as arising—otherwise arising falls afterward.

4. Can Beginning, Middle, and End Arise in Sequence?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because beginning, middle, and end arise in sequence, there is no fault.

The adept Vasu explains: The lump of clay produces the jar’s base, belly, neck, mouth, and the rest in sequence. Beginning, middle, and end arise one after another; it is not that a completed jar follows immediately after the lump. Therefore, the jar’s arising exists neither at the time of the lump nor at the time of the jar, yet it is also not absent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Beginning, middle, and end do not arise in sequence.

The adept Vasu explains: “Beginning” means absent before and present afterward; “middle” means present before and present afterward; “end” means present before and absent afterward. Viewed in this way, beginning, middle, and end are established in mutual dependence. Apart from one another, how could these three divisions remain? Therefore, beginning, middle, and end should not arise in sequence.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Their arising at one time is also not right. The adept Vasu explains: If they arise at one time, one should not say that this is beginning, this is middle, and this is end, and they would not be established in mutual dependence. Therefore, this is not right.

5. Arising, Abiding, Destruction—and the Infinite Regress of the Three Marks

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with arising, abiding, and destruction.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as the marks of the conditioned—arising, abiding, and destruction—exist in sequence, so do beginning, middle, and end.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Arising, abiding, and destruction are likewise so.

The adept Vasu explains: Do they exist in sequence, or do they exist at one time? Neither is right. Why? Without abiding there is no arising. If arising could exist without abiding, abiding should likewise exist without arising. Destruction is the same. If they exist at one time, one should not distinguish this as arising, this as abiding, and this as destruction.

Further, Deva’s root statement: In every place there is everything. The adept Vasu explains: “Every place” means the three marks of the conditioned. If arising, abiding, and destruction are themselves conditioned marks, then arising should contain the three marks, because it is a conditioned dharma. Each of those marks in turn contains another three, and so there is no end. Abiding and destruction are the same. If arising, abiding, and destruction do not themselves contain another three marks, then the present arising, abiding, and destruction are not called conditioned marks.

Suppose you say that secondary arising and primary arising produce each other, like father and son. This is not right. Does this secondary arising depend upon what already existed in the cause, depend upon what was previously absent from the cause, or depend upon what was partly present and partly absent? These three were already discussed in “Refutation of the Faculties.” Further, a father exists first and only afterward produces a son, while this father has yet another father. Therefore, the analogy is wrong.

6. Arising and What Can Arise

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Arising and what can arise certainly exist, because a dharma exists.

The adept Vasu explains: If arising exists, what can arise exists; if arising is absent, what can arise is absent. Dharmas such as a jar that can arise now exist in immediate presence, so arising must exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If arising exists, there is nothing that can arise.

The adept Vasu explains: If the jar has arising, the jar has already arisen and is not called what can arise. Why? If there is no jar, there is likewise no arising of a jar. Therefore, if arising exists, there is nothing that can arise—how much more so if arising does not exist.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Self, other, and both are likewise so. The adept Vasu explains: If arising and what can arise are two things, then does it arise from self, from another, or from both? This was already discussed in “Relinquishing Demerit and Merit.”

7. Two Things Established Together at One Time

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Arising and what can arise certainly exist, because they are established together.

The adept Vasu explains: It is not that arising exists first and what can arise only afterward. The two are established together at one time.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Arising and what can arise cannot produce.

The adept Vasu explains: If what can arise could establish arising, arising would become what can arise and would no longer be called what produces arising. Without arising, where is what can arise? Therefore, neither of these two things exists.

Further, Deva’s root statement: It is not right for existence and nonexistence to depend upon each other. The adept Vasu explains: What can arise does not yet exist, and therefore is nonexistent; arising is existent. How can existence and nonexistence depend upon each other? Therefore, neither exists.

8. If the Effect Is Produced from Two, Why Is There No Third?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because arising and what can arise depend upon each other, dharmas are established.

The adept Vasu explains: Not only are arising and what can arise established through mutual dependence; precisely because these two depend upon each other, jars and the various other things are established.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If it is produced from two, why is there no third?

The adept Vasu explains: You say that because arising and what can arise depend upon each other, dharmas are established. If the effect is produced from these two, why is there not a separate third dharma, as when father and mother produce a child? Apart from arising and what can arise, there is now no third dharma such as a jar. Therefore, this is not right.

9. Since the Cause Is Destroyed, Should Arising Exist?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Arising should exist, because the cause is destroyed.

The adept Vasu explains: If the effect did not arise, the cause should not be destroyed. Now one directly sees that the jar’s cause is destroyed, so arising should exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because the cause is destroyed, arising too is cessation.

The adept Vasu explains: If the effect arises, does this effect exist while the cause is being destroyed, or after it has been destroyed? If it exists while the cause is being destroyed, it does not differ from destruction, and therefore arising too is cessation. If it exists after the cause has been destroyed, the cause is already destroyed and so there is no cause; without a cause, the effect should not arise.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Because the effect is fixed in the cause. The adept Vasu explains: Whether the effect existed beforehand in the cause or did not exist beforehand, in either case there is no arising. Why? If the effect is absent from the cause, why is a jar found only in clay and cloth only in thread? If effects are altogether absent, clay should contain cloth, and thread should contain a jar. If the effect existed beforehand in the cause, then this effect arises from this cause—but that is not right. Why? Because this cause itself is this effect; in your teaching cause and effect do not differ. Therefore, whether the effect existed beforehand in the cause or did not, it does not arise.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Because causes and effects are many. The adept Vasu explains: If the effect exists beforehand in the cause, milk contains curd, ghee, and the rest, while ghee also contains curd, milk, and the rest. If milk contains curd, ghee, and so forth, one cause contains many effects; if ghee contains curd, milk, and so forth, one effect contains many causes. It follows that prior and later, cause and effect, all exist together at one time. If the effect is absent from the cause, the same fault follows. Therefore, whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause, in either case there is no arising.

10. The Four Alternatives of Thing and Nonthing

〔T30 0179a12〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because cause and effect have not been refuted, arising and what can arise are established.

The adept Vasu explains: You say that many effects in one cause and many causes in one effect are faults, but you have not said that cause and effect are absent. Therefore, arising and what can arise are established.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Thing does not produce thing or nonthing, and nonthing does not produce either.

The adept Vasu explains: Thing does not produce thing; nonthing does not produce nonthing; thing does not produce nonthing; and nonthing does not produce thing.

If one says thing produces thing, as when a mother produces a child, this is not right. Why? The mother does not in fact produce the child; the child already existed beforehand and merely emerged from the mother. If one says the child is produced from the mother’s blood constituent and takes this as thing producing thing, that too is not right. Why? Apart from the blood constituent and the rest, the mother cannot be obtained. If one says it is produced through transformation and takes this as thing producing thing, that too is not right. Why? Maturity itself changes into old age; maturity does not produce old age. If one says it is like an image in a mirror and takes this as thing producing thing, that too is not right. Why? The image in the mirror comes from nowhere. Further, just as the image in the mirror resembles the face, all other effects should likewise resemble their causes; in fact, they do not. Therefore, thing does not produce thing.

Nonthing does not produce nonthing, as a hare’s horn does not produce a hare’s horn. Thing does not produce nonthing, as a barren woman does not produce a child. Nonthing does not produce thing, as turtle hair does not produce rushes. Therefore, there is no dharma of arising.

Further, if one says that thing produces thing, it should be produced through one of two dharmas: either the effect exists in the cause, or the effect does not exist in the cause. Neither is right. Why? If the effect was previously absent from the cause, the cause should not produce the effect, and a separate effect different from the cause cannot be obtained on the side of the cause. If the effect already existed in the cause, how could there be arising or cessation?

Deva’s root statement: Because they do not differ. The adept Vasu explains: If the jar does not differ from the lump of clay, when the jar arises, the lump should not cease, and the lump should not be the jar’s cause. If the lump does not differ from the jar, the jar should not produce the jar and should not be the lump’s effect. Therefore, whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause, thing does not produce thing.

The preceding chapter refuted “the effect existing beforehand in the cause.” Hearing this, the outsider readily takes up the other side: if prior existence fails, then the effect must have been absent; after all, the jar unquestionably arises. The opening sentence of this chapter is precisely that move—“Since arising exists, one of the two must be established.”

The treatise author does not take the side offered to him. He reaches further back. Your two schools dispute whether the effect existed or did not exist in the cause, but can you first establish the word “arising”? “If arising exists, did it exist beforehand in the cause, or was it absent beforehand? Sought through such reflection, it cannot be obtained—how much less an arising that does not exist.” One sentence moves the entire dispute to an earlier position. The outsider thinks he stands at a fork between two roads; the treatise author tells him that the road has not yet begun.

The chapter proceeds as a continuous pursuit. At every retreat the outsider changes his foothold—temporal position, name, sequence, mutual dependence, destruction of the cause, analogy—and the treatise author follows him there. What must be seen is the route of retreat; that route itself is the teaching.

1. Seeking Arising in Three Temporal Positions

The first exchange takes up the jar: “If you posit the arising of a jar, does it exist when the jar first becomes a jar, or after the lump of clay and before the jar exists?”

If arising exists when the jar has become a jar, “the jar already exists.” Moreover, the jar’s beginning cannot stand alone: “Beginning, middle, and end exist in mutual dependence. Without middle and end there is no beginning. If the jar has a beginning, it necessarily has a middle and end.” Since beginning, middle, and end are all there, the entire jar already exists: “What further use is arising?” If arising exists after the lump but before the jar, the jar is “not yet present.” It has no beginning, middle, or end: “If there is no jar, how could there be the jar’s arising?” Arising must find something to arise, but that thing either already exists or is not yet there.

The outsider immediately supplies a third place: “Because it arises at the time of arising, there is no fault.” It lies neither in what has arisen nor in what has not yet arisen, but in the very instant of arising. His statement is explicit: “I do not say the jar’s arising exists when it has already arisen or when it has not yet arisen.” He establishes another place. The treatise author answers, “The time of arising is likewise so,” for a simple reason: “If it has arisen, arising is finished; if it has not yet arisen, how could arising exist?” If the function of arising is already present at that instant, arising is complete; if the function is absent, the jar remains unarisen. To open a separate ground between them, one must say it is “half arisen and half not yet arisen”—and it “incurs both faults.” Joining half of each untenable place does not make a tenable one.

The treatise author runs the temporal question once more in reverse: “If the jar’s arising exists, should it exist after the lump, when there is a jar, or at the jar’s beginning, when there is still a lump?” The same two answers return—“because it already exists” and “because it does not yet exist.” Asked forward or backward, the point of arrival is the same.

2. Changing the Name: Taking Completion as Arising

The outsider changes terms: “The jar now becomes complete in immediate presence; this itself is the jar’s arising.” No separate arising need be sought; the jar’s completion is arising.

The treatise author answers, “If so, arising comes afterward,” first opening up the word: “Completion means already arisen.” Completion is a name given after arising has finished. Yet “if there is no arising, there is no beginning and no middle. Without a beginning, there is no middle and no completion.” If arising itself has no place, whence comes completion? Use completion to stand in for arising, and arising is pushed behind completion. The name changes, but the difficulty has not moved a step.

3. Sequence and Simultaneity

The outsider retreats to process: “The lump of clay produces in sequence the jar’s base, belly, neck, mouth, and the rest.” Beginning, middle, and end arise section by section; surely this is something one directly sees.

The treatise author first explains the three words: “Beginning means absent before and present afterward; middle means present before and present afterward; end means present before and absent afterward.” Each name includes the other two in its own content—“Thus beginning, middle, and end exist in mutual dependence; apart from one another, how could they exist?” Names that stand only by leaning on one another cannot arise one by one with individual intrinsic natures. What if one says they arise simultaneously? “If they arise at one time, one should not say this is beginning, this is middle, and this is end; nor do they depend upon one another.” Neither sequence nor simultaneity works.

4. The Three Conditioned Marks—and the Question without End

The outsider introduces a general rule: “As with the conditioned marks, arising, abiding, and destruction exist in sequence.”

This is an intelligent retreat. Beginning, middle, and end may be his own division, which the treatise author can reject. But arising, abiding, and destruction are a general account of conditioned dharmas accepted by both sides; borrowed as support, they look much firmer.

The treatise author asks the same question of this general rule: “Do they exist in sequence, or at one time? Neither is right.” First, he presses each mark with the others: “Without abiding there is no arising. If arising could exist without abiding, abiding should likewise exist without arising”—the three names lean upon one another in the same way. Remove abiding, and arising has nothing against which to stand. If arising without abiding is allowed, abiding without arising must also be allowed; “destruction is likewise so.” If all three are simultaneous, “one should not distinguish this as arising, this as abiding, and this as destruction.” Second, he follows the account to its end—“In every place there is everything.” If arising is itself a conditioned dharma, arising must contain arising, abiding, and destruction. Each of those three is conditioned and must contain three more, “and then there is no end.” If arising, abiding, and destruction contain no further three marks, they “are not called conditioned marks,” and the borrowed example fails on the spot.

The outsider tries father and son as an escape: primary arising and secondary arising produce each other, as father produces son and son makes the man a father. The treatise author answers concretely: “The father exists first and afterward produces a son, and this father has yet another father; therefore this analogy is wrong.” Father and son belong to successive generations, not two things simultaneously manufacturing one another. Moreover, the claim that primary and secondary arising produce together was already examined case by case in “Refutation of the Faculties”: “Did their mutual dependence previously exist in the cause, was it previously absent, or was it partly present and partly absent?”

5. Arising and What Can Arise: Two Names, One Event

The outsider changes direction and establishes arising from the effect: “Dharmas such as jars that can arise now exist in immediate presence; therefore arising must exist.”

The treatise author answers, “If arising exists, there is nothing that can arise”: “If the jar has arising, the jar has already arisen and is not called what can arise.” Once arising is said already to exist, what can arise disappears; conversely, “if there is no jar, there is likewise no arising of a jar.” The two names are two ends of one event. Grasp one tightly, and the other is empty.

The outsider says instead that the two are established together at one time. The treatise author answers, “Arising and what can arise cannot produce”—“If what can arise could establish arising, arising would become what can arise and would not be called what produces arising.” Let what can arise establish arising, and the distinction between producer and produced collapses. A further cut follows: “It is not right for existence and nonexistence to depend upon each other.” “What can arise does not yet exist and is therefore nonexistent; arising is existent. How can existence and nonexistence depend upon each other?” One side is not yet there and the other already is; how could the two lean upon each other?

Mutual dependence is ordinarily a sound expression. The outsider uses it to let two things unable to stand alone hold each other up—A is established by B and B by A, so neither must stand by itself. The treatise author points out that for dependence to work, both sides first require their respective positions. If what can arise already exists, it is no longer what can arise; if arising already exists, what can arise is superfluous. Two things that are both absent cannot support each other.

The outsider finally generalizes mutual dependence: not only arising and what can arise, but the jar and every other thing are established by this dependence. The treatise author asks, “If it is produced from two, why is there no third?”—“If the effect is produced from two, why is there not a third dharma, as when father and mother produce a child? Apart from arising and what can arise, there is now no third dharma such as a jar.” Father and mother are two actual things, and the child they produce is a third. Arising and what can arise produce no separate third jar. They are therefore not two things, but two names for one event.

6. Since the Cause Is Destroyed, Does Arising Exist?

The outsider finds visible evidence: “Now one sees the jar’s cause destroyed; therefore arising should exist.” The lump’s shape is destroyed. If no effect arose, why would the cause need to be destroyed?

The treatise author divides the time in two: “Does it exist while the cause is being destroyed, or after it has been destroyed?” If it exists during destruction, it “does not differ from destruction, and therefore arising too is cessation.” If afterward, “because the cause has already been destroyed, there is no cause; because there is no cause, the effect should not arise.”

The treatise author then returns to this chapter’s central question and asks both sides together. “If the effect is absent from the cause, why is a jar found only in clay and cloth only in thread? If they are all absent, clay should contain cloth, and thread should contain a jar.” This is the difficulty for the nonexistent-effect side: if there is nothing at all in the cause, why does clay specifically yield a jar rather than cloth? The existent-effect side fares no better: “This cause itself is this effect, because in your teaching cause and effect do not differ.” Once prior existence is accepted, “milk contains curd, ghee, and the rest, while ghee also contains curd, milk, and the rest.” There follows “many effects in one cause” and “many causes in one effect,” compressing every earlier and later into one place. The treatise author releases both sides in his closing sentence: “Therefore, whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause, in either case there is no arising.”

The chapter is titled “Refutation of the Effect Not Existing in the Cause,” and this movement best shows the title’s weight. What is refuted is not merely one school; it is the form of the question, “Does the effect exist or not exist in the cause?”

7. Four Alternatives: Thing and Nonthing

In the last round, the outsider says that many causes and many effects are merely faults; cause and effect themselves have not been denied. The treatise author exhausts “arising” through four alternatives: “Thing does not produce thing; nonthing does not produce nonthing; thing does not produce nonthing; and nonthing does not produce thing.”

For thing producing thing, the outsider offers four examples, and the treatise author returns each. Mother produces child—“the mother does not in fact produce the child; the child existed beforehand and emerged from the mother.” Production from the mother’s blood constituent—“apart from the blood constituent and the rest, the mother cannot be obtained.” Production through transformation—“maturity itself changes into old age; maturity does not produce old age.” Production like a mirror image—“the image in the mirror comes from nowhere,” and “just as a mirror image resembles the face, all other effects should resemble their causes; yet they do not.” Emergence, transformation, and appearance are three different events, all called arising by the outsider; examined individually, none is one intrinsically established thing manufacturing another.

The remaining three alternatives receive one sentence and one example each: “A hare’s horn does not produce a hare’s horn”; “a barren woman does not produce a child”; “turtle hair does not produce rushes.” What is absent does not produce what is absent; what exists does not produce what is absent; what is absent does not produce what exists. The four alternatives are exhausted: “Therefore, there is no dharma of arising.”

The treatise author ends by returning to the lump of clay: “If the jar did not differ from the lump, the lump should not cease when the jar arises, and the lump should not be the jar’s cause.” Nondifference leaves no cause and effect; difference means the effect is absent from the cause and the cause cannot produce it. “Therefore, whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause, thing does not produce thing.”

8. What a Reader Can Carry Away from This Chapter

First, see whether the word itself can stand. The outsider wants to choose between an existent and a nonexistent effect; the treatise author asks only about the word “arising.” Every dispute contains such a word, tacitly accepted by both sides and never examined.

Second, do not stop at the resemblance offered by an analogy. Mother and child, blood constituent, maturity and old age, and mirror image all look to the outsider like ready evidence of thing producing thing. The treatise author follows each: emergence is not production, transformation is not production, and appearance is not production. An analogy can offer a clue; it cannot replace inquiry.

Third, watch the route of retreat. From arisen and unarisen to the time of arising, from arising to completion, from sequence to simultaneity, from arising to what can arise, from reasoning to analogy—each step is a reasonable retreat, and each is followed. What truly teaches is this route, not any single conclusion.

Carried Forward

This chapter is not an isolated passage in the treatise. Twice it points back to earlier chapters. When refuting primary and secondary arising producing each other, it says, “These three were already discussed in ‘Refutation of the Faculties’”; when refuting arising from self, other, or both, it says, “This was already discussed in ‘Relinquishing Demerit and Merit.’” The statement in the first chapter—“Every dharma of arising has three kinds: from self, another, or both. Sought among these three, it cannot be obtained”—becomes a tool used directly here. The preceding chapter refutes the effect existing in the cause; this one refutes the effect not existing in the cause. They must be read together: refuting one side does not establish the other. The final passage places the two together in its conclusion—“Therefore, whether the effect exists or does not exist in the cause, thing does not produce thing.”

What the treatise author removes at each point is an “arising” able to stand by itself at some temporal position, under some name, or within some dependence. The lump of clay still turns in the potter’s hands, and base, belly, neck, and mouth still appear in sequence. Along that whole route, however, there is no place one can point to and say, “Arising is here.”