百論 破空品第十
外道這一品守的不是某個法，是「破」這件事。你若承認能破是有的，一切法就沒破乾淨；你若說能破是無的，你就沒破過什麼。
那把刀不歸誰所有
答只四字：「破如可破」。有，則「已墮可破中，空無所有」；無，則「汝何所破？」病根在「汝著破故，以有無法欲破是破」。一異也是這樣：「一異不可得先已破，先已破故無所執」——前九品的工具，拆完隨手一併拆掉。
外道遂罵人：你是破人。答：「說空人無所執，無所執故非破人，汝執自法破他執」。又說破他即成自，答：「成名稱歎功德，破名出其過罪」，且「成名有畏」——急著在別人身上立自法的，是對自法沒有把握的人。真要照這條規則走，也照樣通到底：「自法成故一切不成，一切不成故我無所成。」
說一句沒有，不會生出一個沒有
「無執不名執，如無」——「是實無，不以言無故便有無。」外道的病始終是一個：把否定當成一件所有物。指人滅法，答「我自無法，則無所破」；立長短高下之相待，答「若無不空則無空，云何相待？」；舉室中無馬以為無總是實有，答「若無有亦無無」。無是靠有立起來的，有既不可得，無也沒有落腳處。
沙上的水從來沒有過
「諸法自性空」，既空何須破？答：「雖自性空，取相故縛」。喻在「愚人見熱時焰妄生水想，逐之疲勞」，智者「告言此非水也」——「為斷彼想，不為破水」。所破從來在取相的顛倒上，不在法上。至於非有非無不可說，對方經中原有：聲「不名大、不名小」，泥團「非瓶、非非瓶」，光「非明、非闇」，故曰「有第四」。
到最後也沒有給他一個東西
既空，何以仍說善惡？「諸佛說法，常依俗諦、第一義諦，是二皆實」；佛知「若除土木等，城不可得」，仍告阿難入城乞食。俗諦是不是諦？「於世人為實，於聖人為不實」，如一柰「於棗為大、於瓜為小」；然而「若於棗言小、於瓜言大者，是則妄語」——在它的份上，不許亂說。
得何等利？「如是捨我，名得解脫」：破神則無我，破一切法則無我所，而相狀樸素——「聞有不喜、聞無不憂」。末問何以只說名為得，答「畢竟清淨故」，「破神故，無人；破涅槃故，無解脫」，收在「於俗諦故，說名解脫」。不是解脫為假，是它不成為誰手上的東西。
In this chapter, the outsider defends no particular dharma. He defends the act of “refutation” itself. If you admit that the refuting act exists, not every dharma has been completely refuted; if you say it does not exist, then you have refuted nothing.
The Knife Belongs to No One
The answer has only four words: “Refutation is like what can be refuted.” If it exists, “it has already fallen among what can be refuted and is empty, with nothing there”; if it does not, “what are you refuting?” The illness lies in this: “Because you cling to refutation, you use the dharmas of existence and nonexistence to refute that refutation.” Unity and difference are the same: “That unity and difference cannot be found was already refuted; because it was already refuted, there is nothing grasped.” The tools of the first nine chapters are dismantled along with everything they dismantled.
The outsider therefore condemns his opponent as a destroyer. The answer is: “The speaker of emptiness grasps nothing; because there is nothing grasped, he is not a destroyer. You grasp your own dharma and use it to refute another’s grasping.” The outsider next says that refuting another establishes oneself. The answer distinguishes them: “Establishing means praising merits; refuting means exposing faults,” and “establishing is called having fear.” The one hurrying to establish his own dharma through another’s defeat lacks confidence in that dharma. Even if the rule were accepted, it would run all the way through: “Because my own dharma is established, nothing is established; because nothing is established, I establish nothing.”
Saying “Absent” Does Not Produce an Absent Thing
“Nongrasping is not called grasping, as with ‘absent’”—“It truly is absent; saying ‘absent’ does not therefore make an absence exist.” The outsider’s illness is always the same: taking negation as a possession. When he points to the one who annihilates dharmas, the answer is: “I myself have no dharma, so there is nothing to refute.” When he establishes the mutual dependence of long and short, high and low, emptiness and reality, the answer asks: “If there is nothing nonempty, there is no emptiness; how could they be mutually dependent?” When he invokes a room without a horse to claim that absence is always real, the answer is: “If there is no existence, there is also no nonexistence.” Absence is established in dependence on presence; when presence cannot be found, absence too has nowhere to stand.
There Never Was Water on the Sand
“Dharmas are empty in their intrinsic nature”; if already empty, why refute them? The answer is: “Although intrinsically empty, beings are bound because they grasp marks.” The analogy is “a fool sees a heat shimmer, falsely imagines water, and exhausts himself pursuing it”; a wise person “tells him this is not water”—“to stop that conception, not to destroy water.” What is refuted was always the inversion of grasping marks, never a dharma. As for the allegedly ineffable neither-existence-nor-nonexistence, the opponent’s own scriptures contain it: sound is “called neither large nor small,” a lump of clay is “neither a jar nor not a jar,” and light is “neither bright nor dark.” Therefore “there is a fourth proposition.”
Even at the End, Nothing Is Handed Over
If all is empty, why still speak of good and evil? “When buddhas teach the Dharma, they always rely on conventional truth and the truth of the ultimate meaning; both are true.” The Buddha knows that “if earth, timber, and the rest are removed, no city can be found,” yet still tells Ānanda to enter the city for alms. Is conventional truth really truth? “It is true for people of the world and not true for sages,” as one rose apple is “large beside a jujube and small beside a melon.” Yet “to call it small beside a jujube and large beside a melon would be false speech”: within its own scope, one may not speak carelessly.
What benefit is gained? “Relinquishing self in this way is called attaining liberation.” Refuting the self leaves no self; refuting all dharmas leaves nothing belonging to self. Its lived mark is plain: “Hearing existence, one does not rejoice; hearing nonexistence, one does not grieve.” Asked why the text says only “called attaining,” the answer is “because it is ultimately pure.” “Because the self is refuted, there is no person; because nirvāṇa is refuted, there is no liberation.” It closes: “Because of conventional truth, it is spoken of as liberation.” Liberation is not false; it simply never becomes an object held in someone’s hand.
提婆菩薩造、婆藪開士釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《百論》卷二〈破空品第十〉· 大正藏 T30n1569〔起 T30 0181a07〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0181a07〕外曰：應有諸法破有故。若無破餘法有故〔修妬路〕。汝破一切法相，是破若有，不應言一切法空，以破有故。是破有故，不名破一切法。若無破，一切法有。 內曰：破如可破〔修妬路〕。汝著破故，以有無法欲破是破。汝不知耶？破成故，一切法空無所有。是破若有，已墮可破中，空無所有。是破若無，汝何所破？如說無第二頭，不以破故便有。如人言無，不以言無故有。破可破亦如是。 外曰：應有諸法，執此彼故〔修妬路〕。汝執異法故說一法過，執一法故說異法過，是二執成故有一切法。 內曰：一非所執，異亦爾〔修妬路〕。一異不可得先已破，先已破故無所執。復次若有人言：「汝無所執，我執一異法。」若有此問，應如是破。 外曰：破他法故，汝是破法人〔修妬路〕。汝好破他法，強為生過，自無所執，是故汝是破人。 內曰：汝是破人〔修妬路〕。說空人無所執，無所執故非破人，汝執自法破他執，故汝是破人。 外曰：破他法故自法成〔修妬路〕。汝破他法時自法即成。何以故？他法若負，自法勝故，是以我非破人。 內曰：不然。成破非一故〔修妬路〕。成名稱歎功德，破名出其過罪。歎德、出罪不名為一。復次成名有畏〔修妬路〕。畏名無力。若人自於法畏故，不能成於他法。不畏故好破，是故成破不一。若破他法是即自成法者，汝何故先言說空人但破他法、自無所執？ 外曰：說他執過自執成〔修妬路〕。汝何以不自執成法，但破他法？破他法故，即是自成法。 內曰：破他法、自法成故，一切不成〔修妬路〕。破他法故自法成，自法成故一切不成，一切不成故我無所成。 外曰：不然。世間相違故〔修妬路〕。若諸法空無相者，世間人盡不信受。 內曰：是法世間信〔修妬路〕。是因緣法世間信受。所以者何？因緣生法是即無相。汝謂乳中有酪酥等、童女已姙、諸子食中已有糞，又除梁椽等別更有屋、除縷別有布。或言因中有果、或言因中無果、或言離因緣諸法生。其實空不應言說世事，是人所執誰當信受？我法不爾，與世人同故，一切信受。 外曰：汝無所執是法成〔修妬路〕。汝言無執是即執。又言我法與世人同，是則自執。 內曰：無執不名執，如無〔修妬路〕。我先說因緣生諸法是即無相，是故我無所執。無所執不名為執，譬如言無。是實無，不以言無故便有無。無執亦如是。 外曰：汝說無相法故，是滅法人〔修妬路〕。若諸法空無相，此執亦無，是則無一切法。無一切法故，是名滅法人。 內曰：破滅法人，是名滅法人〔修妬路〕。我自無法，則無所破。汝謂我滅法而欲破者，是則滅法人。 外曰：應有法，相待有故〔修妬路〕。若有長必有短，若有高必有下，有空必有實。 內曰：何有相待？一破故〔修妬路〕。若無一，則無相待。若少有不空，應有相待。若無不空則無空，云何相待？ 外曰：汝無成是成〔修妬路〕。如言室空無馬則有無馬。如是汝雖言諸法空無相，而能生種種心故，應有無，是則無成是成。 內曰：不然。有無一切無故〔修妬路〕。我實相中種種法門說有無皆空。何以故？若無有亦無無，是故有無一切無。 外曰：破不然，自空故〔修妬路〕。諸法自性空，無有作者。以無作故，不應有破。如愚癡人欲破虛空，徒自疲勞。 內曰：雖自性空，取相故縛〔修妬路〕。一切法雖自性空，但為邪想分別故縛。為破是顛倒故言破，實無所破。譬如愚人見熱時焰妄生水想，逐之疲勞。智者告言此非水也。為斷彼想，不為破水。如是諸法性空，眾生取相故著。為破是顛倒故，言破實無所破。 外曰：無說法，大經無故〔修妬路〕。汝破有、破無、破有無，今墮非有非無。是非有非無不可說。何以故？有無相不可得故，是名無說法。是無說法，衛世師經、僧佉經、尼乾法等大經中皆無，故不可信。 內曰：有第四〔修妬路〕。汝大經中亦有無說法。如衛世師經，聲不名大、不名小。僧佉經，泥團非瓶、非非瓶。尼乾法，光非明、非闇。如是諸經，有第四無說法，汝何言無？ 外曰：若空不應有說〔修妬路〕。若都空，以無說法為是，今者何以說善惡法教化耶？ 內曰：隨俗語故無過〔修妬路〕。諸佛說法，常依俗諦、第一義諦，是二皆實，非妄語也。如佛雖知諸法無相，然告阿難入舍衛城乞食。若除土木等，城不可得。而隨俗語故，不墮妄語。我亦隨佛學，故無過。 〔T30 0182a01〕外曰：俗諦無，不實故〔修妬路〕。俗諦若實，則入第一義諦。若不實，何以言諦？ 內曰：不然。相待故，如大小〔修妬路〕。俗諦於世人為實，於聖人為不實。譬如一柰，於棗為大、於瓜為小，此二皆實。若於棗言小、於瓜言大者，是則妄語。如是隨俗語故無過。 外曰：知是過，得何等利〔修妬路〕。如初捨罪福乃至破空，如是諸法皆見有過，得何等利？ 內曰：如是捨我，名得解脫〔修妬路〕。如是三種破諸法，初捨罪福中破神，後破一切法，是名無我無我所。又於諸法不受不著，聞有不喜、聞無不憂，是名解脫。 外曰：何以言名得解脫，不實得解脫耶？ 內曰：畢竟清淨故。破神故，無人；破涅槃故，無解脫。云何言人得解脫？於俗諦故，說名解脫。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
提婆菩薩造、婆藪開士釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《百論》卷二〈破空品第十〉·大正藏 T30n1569。段首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、能破這件事，是有還是無
〔T30 0181a07〕外道說——提婆的本文：應有諸法破有故。若無破餘法有故。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，你破斥一切法之相。你這個破若是有的，就不該說一切法空，因為破就是有的緣故。既然破是有，那就不能算你已經破了一切法。你這個破若是無的，那麼一切法還是有。
論主答——提婆的本文：破如可破。
婆藪開士釋道：你執著那個破，所以拿一個時有時無的法，想來破這個破。你難道不知道嗎？破一旦成立，一切法就空無所有。你這個破若是有的，它自己早已落在可破的東西裡頭，一樣是空無所有。你這個破若是無的，那你又是在破什麼？譬如說沒有第二個頭——並不因為有一個破，第二個頭就變成有。又譬如有人說『無』——並不因為說了一句無，就真多出一個無來。破與可破，也正是這樣。
二、你執一、我執異，兩頭一併立不住
外道說——提婆的本文：應有諸法，執此彼故。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，你執取異法，所以能說一法的過失；你執取一法，所以能說異法的過失。這兩種執取既然成立，可見是有一切法的。
論主答——提婆的本文：一非所執，異亦爾。
婆藪開士釋道：一與異推求不可得，這在前面已經破過了。既然前面已經破過，就沒有什麼可執取的。再者，假使有人說：你沒有所執，我倒是執取一與異之法。若有這樣的質問，也應當照這個樣子破。
三、到底誰才是破人
外道說——提婆的本文：破他法故，汝是破法人。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，你一味喜歡破別人的法，硬要替別人生出過失來，自己卻沒有所執；因此你就是個破人。
論主答——提婆的本文：汝是破人。
婆藪開士釋道：說空的人沒有所執，因為沒有所執，所以不是破人。你自己執取著自己的法，拿它去破別人的執取；所以你才是破人。
四、成與破不是同一件事
外道說——提婆的本文：破他法故自法成。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，你破別人的法的時候，自己的法當下就成立了。為什麼？別人的法若是輸了，自己的法就是勝的緣故。因此我不是破人。
論主答：不是這樣。提婆的本文：成破非一故。
婆藪開士釋道：成，是稱揚讚歎人家的功德；破，是舉出人家的過罪。讚歎功德與舉出過罪，不能算作同一件事。
再者，提婆的本文：成名有畏。婆藪開士釋道：畏，是說沒有力量。一個人若對自己的法先存著畏怯，就沒辦法在別人的法上成立什麼；正因為不畏怯，才一味喜歡破。所以成與破不是一件事。再說，破別人的法若當下就是成立自己的法，那你先前為什麼說：說空的人只會破別人的法、自己卻沒有所執？
五、自法成，所以一切都不成
外道說——提婆的本文：說他執過自執成。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，你為什麼不自己執取一個法把它立起來，卻只破別人的法？破了別人的法，就等於立起自己的法了。
論主答——提婆的本文：破他法、自法成故，一切不成。
婆藪開士釋道：照你這樣說，破別人的法所以自己的法成立；自己的法一成立，一切就都不成立了；一切既然不成立，我也就沒有什麼所成立的。
六、世間信受的正是因緣
外道說：不是這樣。提婆的本文：世間相違故。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，假使諸法都空、都沒有相，世間的人全都不會信受。
論主答——提婆的本文：是法世間信。
婆藪開士釋道：這因緣之法，世間是信受的。為什麼？從因緣生的法，當下就是無相。你們說牛乳裡頭早已有酪、有酥這些東西，說童女的身中早已懷了胎，說眾人所吃的食物裡早已有糞；又說除去梁與椽這些材料之外，另有一個屋子，除去絲縷之外，另有一匹布。有的說因中已經有果，有的說因中並沒有果，有的說離開因緣諸法也能生。這些說法其實是空的，不該拿來講說世間的事；這樣的人所執取的，有誰會信受？我的法不是這樣，因為與世人所見相同的緣故，一切人都信受。
七、無執並不算另一種執
外道說——提婆的本文：汝無所執是法成。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，你說沒有執，這句話本身就是執。你又說我的法與世人相同，那也就是自己有所執。
論主答——提婆的本文：無執不名執，如無。
婆藪開士釋道：我先前說過，從因緣生的諸法當下就是無相，所以我沒有所執。沒有所執並不叫作執，譬如說一個無字：那是真實的沒有，並不因為說了無，就真有一個無擺在那裡。無執也正是這樣。
八、滅法人這頂帽子，該戴在誰頭上
外道說——提婆的本文：汝說無相法故，是滅法人。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，假使諸法都空、都沒有相，那麼這個執也沒有了，這樣就沒有一切法。沒有一切法的緣故，你就叫作滅法人。
論主答——提婆的本文：破滅法人，是名滅法人。
婆藪開士釋道：我自己本來就沒有立什麼法，也就沒有什麼可破的。你認定我在滅法，因而想要來破我；這樣一來，你才是滅法人。
九、相待：長短高下與空實
外道說——提婆的本文：應有法，相待有故。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，若是有長，必定就有短；若是有高，必定就有下；有空，必定就有實。
論主答——提婆的本文：何有相待？一破故。
婆藪開士釋道：假使沒有一，就沒有相待這回事。假使還有一點點不空的東西在，那才談得上相待。既然沒有不空的東西，也就沒有空可說；那要拿什麼來相待？
十、說一句無，並不因此多出一個無
外道說——提婆的本文：汝無成是成。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，譬如說屋子裡空著沒有馬，那就有一個沒有馬。同樣的道理，你雖然說諸法空、沒有相，可是這話能引生種種心念，可見是有一個無的；這就是你的無成反倒成了一種成。
論主答：不是這樣。提婆的本文：有無一切無故。
婆藪開士釋道：我在實相當中，用種種法門說有與無都是空的。為什麼？假使沒有有，也就沒有無；所以有與無，一切都是無。
十一、自性既空，為什麼還要破
外道說——提婆的本文：破不然，自空故。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，諸法的自性本來就空，沒有一個造作者。既然沒有造作，就不該有破這回事。譬如愚癡的人想要破虛空，白白地自找疲累。
論主答——提婆的本文：雖自性空，取相故縛。
婆藪開士釋道：一切法雖然自性是空，只因為有邪妄的想念與分別，所以被繫縛。為了破除這個顛倒才說一個破字，其實並沒有什麼被破掉。譬如愚人看見暑天的陽焰，胡亂生起有水的想頭，追著它跑得疲累；有智慧的人告訴他：這不是水。那是為了斷掉他那個想頭，並不是為了破掉水。像這樣，諸法的體性是空的，眾生因為取相而執著；為了破除這個顛倒，所以說破，實際上並沒有什麼被破掉。
十二、第四句：你們自己的大經裡也有
外道說——提婆的本文：無說法，大經無故。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，你破有、破無、又破有無，如今就落在非有非無上頭。這非有非無是不可說的。為什麼？因為有相與無相都推求不可得的緣故；這就叫作無說法。這個無說法，在衛世師經、僧佉經、尼乾法這些大經裡頭全都沒有，所以不可信。
論主答——提婆的本文：有第四。
婆藪開士釋道：你們的大經裡頭也有無說法。譬如衛世師經說，聲不叫作大，也不叫作小。僧佉經說，泥團不是瓶，也不是非瓶。尼乾法說，光不是明，也不是闇。像這些經，都有第四句的無說法，你為什麼說沒有？
十三、若一切都空，還說什麼善惡
外道說——提婆的本文：若空不應有說。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，假使全都是空，以無說法為對，那麼你如今為什麼還說善法惡法來教化人？
論主答——提婆的本文：隨俗語故無過。
婆藪開士釋道：諸佛說法，常常依著俗諦與第一義諦這兩重；這兩重都是真實的，不是妄語。譬如佛雖然明知諸法無相，仍舊吩咐阿難進舍衛城去乞食。那城若把土木這些去掉，城是找不出來的；然而順著世俗的說法，所以不落在妄語裡。我也是跟著佛學的，所以沒有過失。
十四、俗諦算不算諦
〔T30 0182a01〕外道說——提婆的本文：俗諦無，不實故。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，俗諦若是真實的，那它就該歸入第一義諦；若是不真實的，又憑什麼稱它作諦？
論主答：不是這樣。提婆的本文：相待故，如大小。
婆藪開士釋道：俗諦在世間人份上是實的，在聖人份上是不實的。譬如同一顆柰子，比起棗來就算大，比起瓜來就算小，這兩種說法都是實的。假使拿它比棗卻說小、比瓜卻說大，那才是妄語。像這樣順著世俗說話，所以沒有過失。
十五、看見這些過失，究竟得到什麼
外道說——提婆的本文：知是過，得何等利。
婆藪開士釋道：外道的意思是，從最初的捨罪福一直到破空，這樣一路看下來，諸法都見出有過失；那麼究竟得到什麼好處？
論主答——提婆的本文：如是捨我，名得解脫。
婆藪開士釋道：像這樣以三種方式破諸法：最初在捨罪福當中破神，其後破一切法。這就叫作無我、無我所。並且對諸法不領受、不執著，聽見說有也不歡喜，聽見說無也不憂愁；這就叫作解脫。
十六、為什麼只說名為得解脫
外道問：為什麼說名為得解脫，而不是真實地得解脫呢？
論主答：因為畢竟清淨的緣故。破了神，就沒有一個人；破了涅槃，就沒有一個解脫。既然如此，怎麼可以說是有人得解脫？只是在俗諦的份上，才說名為解脫。
Composed by Deva Bodhisattva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva of Later Qin: Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of Emptiness, Chapter Ten,” Taishō T30n1569. A marker such as 〔T30 …〕 at the start of a paragraph is a Taishō page–column–line anchor.
1. Does the Act of Refutation Exist or Not?
〔T30 0181a07〕 The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Dharmas must exist, because refutation exists. If refutation does not exist, the other dharmas exist.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You refute the marks of all dharmas. If this refutation exists, you should not say that all dharmas are empty, because refutation itself exists. Since refutation exists, you cannot have refuted all dharmas. If this refutation does not exist, then all dharmas remain existent.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Refutation is like what can be refuted.
The adept Vasu explains: You cling to that refutation, so you take a dharma that is now existent and now nonexistent and try to refute this refutation. Do you not understand? Once refutation is established, all dharmas are empty, with nothing there. If this refutation exists, it has already fallen among what can be refuted and is equally empty, with nothing there. If this refutation does not exist, what are you refuting? It is like saying there is no second head: a second head does not come into existence merely because there is a refutation. Or it is like a person saying “absent”: saying “absent” does not therefore produce an absence. Refutation and what can be refuted are just the same.
2. If You Grasp Unity and I Grasp Difference, Neither Side Can Stand
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Dharmas must exist, because this and that are grasped.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You grasp a dharma of difference and can therefore state the faults of unity; you grasp a dharma of unity and can therefore state the faults of difference. Since these two forms of grasping are established, all dharmas must exist.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Unity is not grasped; difference is the same.
The adept Vasu explains: Inquiry cannot find either unity or difference; this was already refuted earlier. Since it has already been refuted, there is nothing to grasp. Furthermore, suppose someone says: You have nothing that you grasp, but I grasp the dharmas of unity and difference. If such a question is raised, it too should be refuted in this way.
3. Who, Then, Is the Destroyer?
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you refute another’s dharma, you are a person who destroys dharmas.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You delight only in refuting other people’s dharmas, forcibly generating faults for them while grasping nothing yourself. Therefore, you are a destroyer.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: You are the destroyer.
The adept Vasu explains: A speaker of emptiness grasps nothing. Because there is nothing grasped, that speaker is not a destroyer. You grasp your own dharma and use it to refute another’s grasping; therefore, you are the destroyer.
4. Establishing and Refuting Are Not the Same Act
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because another’s dharma is refuted, one’s own dharma is established.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. When you refute another’s dharma, your own dharma is thereby established. Why? If the other’s dharma is defeated, one’s own dharma is victorious. Therefore I am not a destroyer.
The treatise author answers: This is not so. Deva’s root statement: Establishing and refuting are not one.
The adept Vasu explains: Establishing means proclaiming and praising another’s merits; refuting means exposing another’s faults and wrongdoing. Praising merits and exposing faults cannot be called the same act.
Furthermore, Deva’s root statement: Establishing is called having fear. The adept Vasu explains: Fear means lack of strength. If a person first fears for his own dharma, he cannot establish anything concerning another’s dharma; because he is not afraid, he delights only in refuting. Therefore establishing and refuting are not the same. Again, if refuting another’s dharma immediately established one’s own, why did you previously say that the speaker of emptiness only refutes other people’s dharmas and grasps nothing himself?
5. Because One’s Own Dharma Is Established, Nothing Is Established
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: By stating the faults in another’s grasping, one’s own grasping is established.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. Why do you not yourself grasp and establish a dharma, but only refute other people’s dharmas? Refuting another’s dharma is equivalent to establishing your own.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because another’s dharma is refuted and one’s own dharma established, nothing is established.
The adept Vasu explains: According to your statement, because another’s dharma is refuted, one’s own dharma is established. Because one’s own dharma is established, nothing is established. Because nothing is established, I too establish nothing.
6. What the World Trusts Is Precisely Conditions
The outsider says: This is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because it contradicts the world.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If dharmas were all empty and without marks, no one in the world would trust or accept your teaching.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The world trusts this dharma.
The adept Vasu explains: The world trusts the dharma of conditions. Why? A dharma born from conditions is, just there, without marks. You say that curds, ghee, and other products already exist in milk; that a young girl already bears a fetus; that excrement already exists in food people eat. You also say that apart from beams, rafters, and other materials there is a separate house, and apart from threads there is a separate bolt of cloth. Some say the effect already exists in the cause, some say it does not exist in the cause, and some say dharmas can arise apart from conditions. These claims are in fact empty and should not be used to describe the affairs of the world. Who would trust what such people grasp? My Dharma is not like this. Because it agrees with what people in the world see, everyone trusts and accepts it.
7. Nongrasping Is Not Another Form of Grasping
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Your having nothing grasped establishes this dharma.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You say there is no grasping, but that statement itself is grasping. You also say that your Dharma accords with the people of the world; that too means you grasp something of your own.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Nongrasping is not called grasping, as with “absent.”
The adept Vasu explains: I said before that dharmas born from conditions are, just there, without marks; therefore I grasp nothing. Having nothing grasped is not called grasping. It is like saying the word “absent”: it truly is absent; saying “absent” does not therefore cause an absence to exist there. Nongrasping is just the same.
8. Who Should Wear the Name “Annihilator of Dharmas”?
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you speak of dharmas without marks, you are an annihilator of dharmas.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If dharmas are all empty and without marks, this grasping too is absent, and consequently all dharmas are absent. Because all dharmas are absent, you are called an annihilator of dharmas.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: One who refutes an annihilator of dharmas is called an annihilator of dharmas.
The adept Vasu explains: I myself have never established any dharma, so there is nothing for me to refute. You decide that I am annihilating dharmas and therefore seek to refute me; as a result, you are the annihilator of dharmas.
9. Mutual Dependence: Long and Short, High and Low, Emptiness and Reality
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Dharmas must exist, because they exist in mutual dependence.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If long exists, short must exist; if high exists, low must exist; if emptiness exists, reality must exist.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: What mutual dependence could there be? Unity has been refuted.
The adept Vasu explains: If there is no unity, there can be no mutual dependence. If even the slightest nonempty thing remained, mutual dependence could be discussed. Since there is nothing nonempty, there is no emptiness either. What could mutually depend on what?
10. Saying “Absent” Does Not Thereby Add an Absence
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Your nonestablishment is itself establishment.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. It is like saying that a room is empty and has no horse: there then exists a no-horse. By the same reasoning, although you say dharmas are empty and without marks, that statement can generate many kinds of thought; therefore an absence must exist. Your nonestablishment thus becomes a form of establishment.
The treatise author answers: This is not so. Deva’s root statement: Existence and nonexistence are all absent.
The adept Vasu explains: Within the true mark of things, I use many Dharma gates to say that existence and nonexistence are both empty. Why? If existence is absent, nonexistence is also absent. Therefore existence and nonexistence are all absent.
11. If Intrinsic Nature Is Already Empty, Why Refute Anything?
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Refutation is untenable, because things are empty in themselves.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. The intrinsic nature of dharmas is originally empty and there is no maker. Since there is no making, there should be no act of refutation. It is like a foolish person trying to destroy space and merely exhausting himself.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Although intrinsically empty, beings are bound because they grasp marks.
The adept Vasu explains: Although all dharmas are empty in intrinsic nature, beings are bound by deluded conceptions and discriminations. The word “refutation” is spoken in order to remove that inversion; in fact, nothing is destroyed. It is like a fool who sees a heat shimmer on a hot day, mistakenly imagines water, and exhausts himself chasing it. A wise person tells him, “This is not water.” That statement stops his conception; it does not destroy water. In the same way, the nature of dharmas is empty, but sentient beings grasp marks and cling. Refutation is spoken in order to remove this inversion, while in fact nothing is destroyed.
12. The Fourth Proposition Is Also in Your Own Great Scriptures
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: There is no ineffable dharma, because it is absent from the great scriptures.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. You refute existence, nonexistence, and both existence and nonexistence, and now fall into neither existence nor nonexistence. This neither existence nor nonexistence cannot be spoken. Why? Because neither the mark of existence nor the mark of nonexistence can be found through inquiry; this is called an ineffable dharma. No such ineffable dharma occurs in the great scriptures of the Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhyas, or Nirgranthas, so it cannot be trusted.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: There is a fourth proposition.
The adept Vasu explains: Your own great scriptures also contain ineffable dharmas. The Vaiśeṣika scripture says that sound is called neither large nor small. The Sāṃkhya scripture says that a lump of clay is neither a jar nor not a jar. The Nirgrantha teaching says that light is neither bright nor dark. Such scriptures all contain the ineffable dharma of a fourth proposition. Why do you say they do not?
13. If Everything Is Empty, Why Still Speak of Good and Evil?
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: If all is empty, there should be no teaching.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If everything is empty and the ineffable dharma is correct, why do you now teach good and evil dharmas in order to transform people?
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because language follows convention, there is no fault.
The adept Vasu explains: When buddhas teach the Dharma, they always rely on two levels, conventional truth and the truth of the ultimate meaning. Both are true and neither is false speech. For example, although the Buddha knows that dharmas are without marks, he still instructs Ānanda to enter Śrāvastī and beg for food. If earth, timber, and the other materials are removed, no city can be found. Yet because this language accords with convention, it does not fall into false speech. I too study in accordance with the Buddha, so there is no fault.
14. Does Conventional Truth Count as Truth?
〔T30 0182a01〕 The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Conventional truth is absent, because it is not real.
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. If conventional truth were real, it should be included within the truth of the ultimate meaning. If it is not real, on what basis can it be called truth?
The treatise author answers: This is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because of mutual dependence, as with large and small.
The adept Vasu explains: Conventional truth is real for people of the world and unreal for sages. The same rose apple is large beside a jujube and small beside a melon; both statements are true. If one called it small beside a jujube and large beside a melon, those statements would be false. Speaking in accordance with convention is just like this, so there is no fault.
15. Having Seen These Faults, What Is Ultimately Gained?
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Knowing these faults, what benefit is gained?
The adept Vasu explains: The outsider means this. From the initial relinquishment of demerit and merit all the way through the refutation of emptiness, one has seen faults in every dharma. What benefit is ultimately gained?
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Relinquishing self in this way is called attaining liberation.
The adept Vasu explains: In this way dharmas are refuted in three modes. At the beginning, in the relinquishment of demerit and merit, the self is refuted; afterward all dharmas are refuted. This is called having neither self nor anything belonging to self. One neither receives nor clings to dharmas: hearing of existence, one does not rejoice; hearing of nonexistence, one does not grieve. This is called liberation.
16. Why Does It Say Only “Called Attaining Liberation”?
The outsider asks: Why does the text say “called attaining liberation,” rather than truly attaining liberation?
The treatise author answers: Because it is ultimately pure. Because the self is refuted, there is no person; because nirvāṇa is refuted, there is no liberation. Since that is so, how could one speak of a person attaining liberation? Only from the standpoint of conventional truth is it spoken of as liberation.
《百論》十品，一路破神、破一、破異、破情、破塵、破因中有果無果、破常，破到這一品，外道換了打法。他不再守某一個法，他來守『破』這件事本身。
他的算盤很清楚：你既然一路破過來，那個能破總得是有的吧？只要『破』是有的，一切法就沒有被你破乾淨；而只要『破』是無的，你根本就沒破過什麼。這是一把兩頭都有刃的鉗子，論主無論答有答無，都得留下一件東西在手上。
一品十六番問答，全部繞著這件事轉：說空的人，手裡到底還捏著什麼。到末後一句「於俗諦故，說名解脫」落下，全論才算收得住。
一、破如可破
第一難開門見山：「應有諸法破有故」，接一句「若無破餘法有故」。婆藪開士鋪開來說：「汝破一切法相，是破若有，不應言一切法空，以破有故」；反過來「若無破，一切法有」。
論主答出本品第一句本文：「破如可破」。四個字：那個能破的，跟被破的東西是同一個待遇。
婆藪開士先點出病根：「汝著破故，以有無法欲破是破」——外道自己執著在破上，於是拿一個忽有忽無的東西來對付它。接著兩路一齊斷：「是破若有，已墮可破中，空無所有」；「是破若無，汝何所破？」若有，它自己就在被破之列；若無，這場質問就無從說起。
末後兩喻極輕：「如說無第二頭，不以破故便有」，「如人言無，不以言無故有」。說一句沒有，並不會因此生出一個『沒有』擺在那裡。外道的整套難法，都建立在把否定當成一件東西。
二、一與異，早就破過了
第二難換一個角度：「應有諸法，執此彼故」——「汝執異法故說一法過，執一法故說異法過」，你左右開弓，可見你手上一異兩樣都有，兩執既成，一切法就有。
論主答「一非所執，異亦爾」，理由只一句：「一異不可得先已破，先已破故無所執。」〈破一〉〈破異〉兩品的工作在這裡收成——那兩把工具不是論主的私產，是拆完就跟著一起拆掉的。
婆藪開士補一筆，說得很老實：「復次若有人言」——外道若說『你沒有所執，我倒執一異法』——那麼「若有此問，應如是破」。外道若換到自己這邊來執，一樣照這個樣子破。同一把破法對兩邊等用，才不是偏袒。
三、誰是破人
外道退到人身上：「破他法故，汝是破法人」——「汝好破他法，強為生過，自無所執」。他罵的是一種態度：專拆別人，自己不擔。
論主把這頂帽子原樣送回：「汝是破人」。理由分兩截：「說空人無所執，無所執故非破人」；「汝執自法破他執，故汝是破人」。要破，先得有一個立場站著；沒有立場的人破不了誰。外道手裡有自法，他每一次發難都是從那裡發出來的。
四、成與破，不能算一件事
外道再進一步，索性主張破就是立：「破他法故自法成」——「他法若負，自法勝故」。這是辯場上最自然的想法：對方輸了，我就贏了。
論主答「成破非一故」，先分名義：「成名稱歎功德，破名出其過罪」；「歎德、出罪不名為一」。稱歎是給出一個東西，舉罪是拿掉一個東西，兩件事的方向相反。
接著一句本文極利：「成名有畏」。婆藪開士解「畏名無力」，再申：「若人自於法畏故，不能成於他法。不畏故好破，是故成破不一。」一個人急著要在別人身上立起自己的法，正說明他對自己的法沒有把握。成之所以與破不同，是因為成裡頭藏著怕。
末後一擊回到外道自己的話上：「汝何故先言說空人但破他法、自無所執？」你剛才才說我只破不立，現在又說破就是立；兩句話不能同時用。
五、自法若成，一切都不成
外道乾脆挑明：「說他執過自執成」——「汝何以不自執成法，但破他法？」
論主的答法是把外道的規則接過來，順著推到底：「破他法、自法成故，一切不成」。婆藪開士一路推下去：「破他法故自法成，自法成故一切不成，一切不成故我無所成。」
這裡值得慢讀。論主沒有否認那條規則，他借用它：好，就照你說，破他即成自。可是我所破的是一切法；一切法既不成立，我那個『自法』也在一切法之內，同樣不成立。規則若真通用，最後連使用規則的人也一併通過去。這正是〈破空品〉的手法——不是把空立成一個高處，是讓空自己也走完那條路。
六、世間信受的是因緣
外道改換陣地，訴諸常識：「若諸法空無相者，世間人盡不信受。」
論主答「是法世間信」，理由是「因緣生法是即無相」。他接著做了一件本品裡少見的事：正面點名對方那些說法不合世間。「乳中有酪酥等、童女已姙、諸子食中已有糞」——因中有果推到底，乳裡就得先有酥，女孩身上就得先有胎，飯裡就得先有糞。「除梁椽等別更有屋、除縷別有布」——離開材料另立一個整體。再攏總一句：「或言因中有果、或言因中無果、或言離因緣諸法生」。
判語是：「其實空不應言說世事，是人所執誰當信受？」——真正離世間的，是那些說法。論主自己則「我法不爾，與世人同故，一切信受」：世人日用之間見的本就是因緣生法，而因緣生法當下就無相。空不是外加給世間的一層主張，是世間本來的樣子。
七、無執不名執
外道抓住上一句反咬：「汝言無執是即執」；並且你說「我法與世人同」，那也是一種自執。
論主答「無執不名執，如無」。先重申來路：「我先說因緣生諸法是即無相，是故我無所執。」再說那個譬喻——「無所執不名為執，譬如言無。是實無，不以言無故便有無。」
這是第一段那兩個小喻的正式立法。否定不是一種所有物。外道每次都在做同一件事：把一句『沒有』讀成『有一個沒有』；把『不執』讀成『執了一個不執』。這個病一旦看清，本品後面好幾難都是同一個。
八、滅法人
外道升高語氣：「汝說無相法故，是滅法人」——「是則無一切法。無一切法故，是名滅法人。」這是很重的指控：你不是在辯，你是在毀。
論主答「破滅法人，是名滅法人」，理由只兩句：「我自無法，則無所破」；「汝謂我滅法而欲破者，是則滅法人。」我手上沒有立起法來，也就沒有可毀之物；倒是你認定我在滅法、要動手來破我——這一動手，才真有一個能滅與所滅。
九、相待：長短高下與空實
外道換一條路，從對待關係上立法：「若有長必有短，若有高必有下，有空必有實。」既然空與實對待而有，那空總得靠著實才立得住。
論主答「何有相待？一破故」，並補：「若無一，則無相待。」對待要成立，先得有兩個各自站得住的東西；一既然破了，就沒有可以互相靠的兩端。
末後一問把外道的路封死：「若少有不空，應有相待。若無不空則無空，云何相待？」你若還留著一點不空的東西，我這個空才有對象；一點不空的都沒有了，那個與它對待的空也就不必立。空不是一端，它是連兩端一起收掉。
十、無成是成
外道再試一次，這一次的譬喻很漂亮：「如言室空無馬則有無馬」。屋裡沒有馬——『沒有馬』總是一件確實的事吧？你說諸法空無相，「而能生種種心故，應有無，是則無成是成」：這話能在人心裡引起種種念頭，可見它有內容，那你的無成也就成了一種成。
論主答「有無一切無故」：「我實相中種種法門說有無皆空。」然後給出理由——「若無有亦無無，是故有無一切無。」
這一句是本品的關節。『無』是靠著『有』才立得起來的；有既不可得，那個與它相對的無也沒有立足處。外道總以為破到最後會剩下一個無擺在那裡，可以指著它說『你看，還是有東西』。論主的答覆是：那個無，是你從有那裡借來的。
十一、自性既空，何必要破
第十一難是全品最見水準的一問，而且它是站在論主這邊發出來的：「諸法自性空，無有作者。以無作故，不應有破。」既然本來就空，你破個什麼？「如愚癡人欲破虛空，徒自疲勞。」
論主答「雖自性空，取相故縛」：「一切法雖自性空，但為邪想分別故縛。」空的是法，縛住的是想。
於是有了本品唯一的長喻：「譬如愚人見熱時焰妄生水想，逐之疲勞。智者告言此非水也。」——智者說的那一句，不是在毀水，是在斷他的想。婆藪開士自己把喻與法對上：「如是諸法性空，眾生取相故著。為破是顛倒故，言破實無所破。」
這一段把全品的『破』定了性。破從來不落在法上——法上本無可破；破落在取相的那個顛倒上。顛倒一息，破也就沒有事情可做。沙上的水從頭到尾沒有過，跑得滿身汗的是那個人。
十二、第四句
外道換一條路數，改從經典的權威上難：你破有、破無、破有無，「今墮非有非無」，而「是非有非無不可說」——「有無相不可得故，是名無說法」。這個無說法，「衛世師經、僧佉經、尼乾法等大經中皆無，故不可信」。
論主答「有第四」，隨即在對方自家經裡逐部舉證：衛世師經「聲不名大、不名小」；僧佉經「泥團非瓶、非非瓶」；尼乾法「光非明、非闇」。三家各有一條走出簡單二分的說法。末了反問一句：「汝何言無？」
你所以覺得第四句不可信，只是沒有回頭看自己的經。這一答不立新義，只把對方的家當攤在桌上。
十三、隨俗語故無過
外道逼到最實際的一問：「若都空，以無說法為是，今者何以說善惡法教化耶？」你既主張不可說，怎麼還天天說法度人？
論主答「隨俗語故無過」，並第一次把二諦端出來：「諸佛說法，常依俗諦、第一義諦，是二皆實，非妄語也。」
譬喻取得極家常：「如佛雖知諸法無相，然告阿難入舍衛城乞食。」佛知道城無自性——「若除土木等，城不可得」；然而還是說『進城去乞食』，「而隨俗語故，不墮妄語」。若因為城不可得就不肯說一個城字，阿難那天就不必吃飯了。
末句是論主全品說得最低的一句：「我亦隨佛學，故無過。」他不替自己另找一條理據，只說我是照著佛的樣子做。
十四、俗諦算不算諦
外道立刻在二諦上找縫：「俗諦若實，則入第一義諦。若不實，何以言諦？」實就該併入第一義，不實就不配叫諦——這一問很硬。
論主答「相待故，如大小」，先分位次：「俗諦於世人為實，於聖人為不實。」再舉那顆柰子：「譬如一柰，於棗為大、於瓜為小，此二皆實。」
這個譬喻要讀準。它不是說大小隨便講都行——底下緊接一句：「若於棗言小、於瓜言大者，是則妄語。」同一顆柰子上，大與小都是實話，卻不是任何話都算實話。俗諦之為諦，正在這裡：它在它的份上不許亂說。二諦不是真的一層、假的一層，是同一件事在兩個份上各自不許亂說。
十五、如是捨我，名得解脫
外道問到頭上來了：「如初捨罪福乃至破空，如是諸法皆見有過，得何等利？」從第一品讀到這裡，處處是過失，那讀者到底得著什麼。
論主答「如是捨我，名得解脫」，並第一次回望全論：「如是三種破諸法，初捨罪福中破神，後破一切法，是名無我無我所。」神破則無我，法破則無我所——十品的次第到這一句才顯出它是一條路，不是一串駁論。
解脫的相狀說得非常樸素：「於諸法不受不著，聞有不喜、聞無不憂，是名解脫。」這是全論唯一一次描寫得手的人是什麼樣子：不是他知道了什麼，是他聽見有無兩種話的時候，心不再跟著起落。
十六、於俗諦故，說名解脫
末後一問沒有夾注記本文，是直問：「何以言名得解脫，不實得解脫耶？」你為什麼只說『名為』得解脫，不敢說真得？
論主答得斬截：「畢竟清淨故。」下面兩句把最後一點餘地也收了：「破神故，無人；破涅槃故，無解脫。」既沒有一個得的人，也沒有一件被得的事，「云何言人得解脫」？
而全論的末句是：「於俗諦故，說名解脫。」
這一句必須順著上一段讀。俗諦「於世人為實」，不是虛應故事；說名解脫，不是說解脫是假的。是說：解脫這件事真實不虛，只是它從來不成為誰的所有物。外道要一個能捏在手裡的東西——能破也好，無也好，解脫也好；論主到最後一個字，也沒有給他。
承衍
本品是現存《百論》十品之末，前九品破的是外道所立的法，本品破的是破法本身，連空、連無執、連解脫都納進同一個檢驗。論中兩度自己回指前品：「一異不可得先已破」用的是〈破一〉〈破異〉的成果；「初捨罪福中破神」則把第一品到第九品攏作一句。一部論到末品才把自己的工具也交出去，這是《百論》收束的方式。
也因此，末段的「破涅槃故，無解脫」不可讀成否認修證。上一段才說過「俗諦於世人為實」，緊接的「於俗諦故，說名解脫」正是在那個份上說的。所破的是把解脫當作一個可據為己有之物的取相，不是解脫本身——一如智者對那個追焰的人說「此非水也」，斷的是水想，「不為破水」。
Across ten chapters, the Hundred Treatise refutes the self, unity, difference, the faculties, atoms, the effect as existent or nonexistent in its cause, and permanence. Reaching this chapter, the outsider changes tactics. He no longer defends a particular dharma; he defends the act of “refutation” itself.
His calculation is clear. Since you have refuted your way through the treatise, the act that refutes must at least exist. If “refutation” exists, you have not refuted every dharma completely; if it does not exist, you have never refuted anything. It is a pair of pincers sharpened at both ends. Whether the author answers existence or nonexistence, something must remain in his hand.
The chapter’s sixteen exchanges all circle one question: what, in the end, does the speaker of emptiness still clutch? Only when the final sentence—“Because of conventional truth, it is spoken of as liberation”—comes down can the entire treatise close securely.
1. Refutation Is Like What Can Be Refuted
The first challenge is direct: “Dharmas must exist, because refutation exists,” followed by, “If refutation does not exist, the other dharmas exist.” The adept Vasu expands it: “You refute the marks of all dharmas. If this refutation exists, you should not say that all dharmas are empty, because refutation exists”; conversely, “If refutation does not exist, all dharmas exist.”
The treatise author gives the chapter’s first root statement: “Refutation is like what can be refuted.” Four words: the refuting act receives exactly the same treatment as the things it refutes.
The adept Vasu first identifies the illness: “Because you cling to refutation, you use the dharmas of existence and nonexistence to refute that refutation.” The outsider himself clings to refutation and therefore deploys something intermittently existent and nonexistent against it. Then both paths are cut at once: “If this refutation exists, it has already fallen among what can be refuted and is empty, with nothing there”; “If this refutation does not exist, what are you refuting?” If it exists, it belongs among the things refuted. If it does not, the challenge has nowhere to begin.
The final two analogies are exceedingly light: “It is like saying there is no second head; a second head does not come to exist merely because it is refuted,” and “It is like a person saying ‘absent’; saying ‘absent’ does not make an absence exist.” Saying that something is absent does not generate an “absence” and set it before us. The outsider’s entire challenge rests on turning a negation into a thing.
2. Unity and Difference Were Already Refuted
The second challenge changes angle: “Dharmas must exist, because this and that are grasped.” That is, “You grasp a dharma of difference and therefore state the faults of unity; you grasp a dharma of unity and therefore state the faults of difference.” You shoot in both directions, so you must possess unity and difference as two weapons. If both graspings are established, all dharmas exist.
The treatise author answers, “Unity is not grasped; difference is the same,” for one reason alone: “That unity and difference cannot be found was already refuted; because it was already refuted, there is nothing grasped.” Here the earlier chapters “Refutation of Unity” and “Refutation of Difference” bear their fruit. Those tools are not the author’s private property; once their work is done, they are dismantled as well.
The adept Vasu adds one candid sentence: “Furthermore, suppose someone says”—if the outsider says, “You grasp nothing, but I grasp the dharmas of unity and difference”—then “if such a question is raised, it should be refuted in this way.” If the outsider takes up the grasping on his own side, the same refutation applies without alteration. Only a refutation applied equally to both sides is free of favoritism.
3. Who Is the Destroyer?
The outsider retreats from dharmas to the person: “Because you refute another’s dharma, you are a person who destroys dharmas”—“You delight in refuting other people’s dharmas, forcibly generating faults for them while grasping nothing yourself.” The accusation concerns an attitude: you only dismantle others and accept no burden yourself.
The treatise author returns the title unchanged: “You are the destroyer.” The reason has two parts: “The speaker of emptiness grasps nothing; because there is nothing grasped, he is not a destroyer”; and “You grasp your own dharma and refute another’s grasping, so you are the destroyer.” To refute, one must first have a position on which to stand; one with no position cannot destroy anyone. The outsider holds his own dharma, and every challenge launches from there.
4. Establishing and Refuting Cannot Be the Same Act
The outsider presses further and simply declares that refuting is establishing: “Because another’s dharma is refuted, one’s own dharma is established”—“If another’s dharma is defeated, one’s own dharma wins.” It is the most natural thought in a debate: if the other loses, I win.
The author answers, “Establishing and refuting are not one,” first separating the names: “Establishing means proclaiming and praising merits; refuting means exposing faults and wrongdoing”; “Praising merits and exposing faults are not called one.” Praise gives something; exposing faults removes something. The two acts move in opposite directions.
Then comes a cutting root statement: “Establishing is called having fear.” The adept Vasu explains that “fear means lack of strength,” then continues: “If a person fears for his own dharma, he cannot establish anything concerning another’s dharma. Because he is not afraid, he delights in refuting; therefore establishing and refuting are not one.” Someone in a hurry to establish his own dharma through another person reveals uncertainty about that dharma. Establishing differs from refuting because fear is hidden inside establishment.
The final blow returns to the outsider’s own words: “Why did you previously say that the speaker of emptiness only refutes other people’s dharmas and grasps nothing himself?” You just said I refute but do not establish; now you say that refuting is establishing. Both statements cannot be used together.
5. If One’s Own Dharma Is Established, Nothing Is Established
The outsider now states it plainly: “By stating the fault in another’s grasping, one’s own grasping is established”—“Why do you not grasp and establish a dharma yourself, but only refute another’s dharma?”
The treatise author accepts the outsider’s rule and pushes it to its end: “Because another’s dharma is refuted and one’s own dharma established, nothing is established.” The adept Vasu follows the sequence: “Because another’s dharma is refuted, one’s own dharma is established; because one’s own dharma is established, nothing is established; because nothing is established, I establish nothing.”
This deserves slow reading. The author does not deny the rule but borrows it. Very well: let refuting another establish oneself. Yet what I refute is every dharma. Once no dharma is established, that “dharma of my own” is itself included among every dharma and is equally unestablished. If a rule truly applies throughout, it finally passes through the person using the rule as well. This is the method of “Refutation of Emptiness”: it does not enthrone emptiness above everything else; it lets emptiness itself complete the same passage.
6. What the World Trusts Is Conditions
The outsider shifts ground and appeals to common sense: “If dharmas were all empty and without marks, no one in the world would trust or accept this.”
The treatise author answers, “The world trusts this dharma,” because “a dharma born from conditions is, just there, without marks.” He then does something rare in this chapter: he directly names the opponents’ claims as contrary to the world. “Curds, ghee, and the rest are already present in milk; a young girl is already pregnant; excrement is already present in the food children eat”—pushed to its conclusion, an effect existing in its cause puts ghee already in milk, a fetus already in a girl, and excrement already in food. “Apart from beams and rafters there is a further house; apart from threads there is cloth”—a whole is posited apart from its materials. Then he gathers them together: “Some say the effect exists in the cause, some say it does not exist in the cause, and some say dharmas arise apart from conditions.”
The judgment is: “These are in fact empty and should not be used to describe the affairs of the world. Who would trust what such people grasp?” Those claims are what truly depart from the world. The author says of his own Dharma: “My Dharma is not so. Because it agrees with the people of the world, everyone trusts it.” What people encounter in daily use is precisely dharmas born from conditions, and what is born from conditions is, just there, without marks. Emptiness is not an additional thesis imposed upon the world; it is how the world has always been.
7. Nongrasping Is Not Called Grasping
The outsider seizes upon the preceding sentence and turns it back: “When you say there is no grasping, that itself is grasping”; moreover, to say “My Dharma accords with the world” is also a form of personal grasping.
The treatise author answers, “Nongrasping is not called grasping, as with ‘absent.’” He first restates the route: “I previously said that dharmas born from conditions are, just there, without marks; therefore I grasp nothing.” Then comes the analogy: “Having nothing grasped is not called grasping. It is like saying ‘absent.’ It truly is absent; saying ‘absent’ does not therefore make an absence exist.”
This formally states the principle behind the two brief analogies in the first movement. Negation is not a possession. Each time, the outsider does the same thing: he reads “there is none” as “there is a none,” and “not grasping” as “grasping a not-grasping.” Once that illness is seen, several later challenges in the chapter reveal themselves as the same one.
8. The Annihilator of Dharmas
The outsider raises the charge: “Because you speak of dharmas without marks, you are an annihilator of dharmas”—“There are then no dharmas at all. Because there are no dharmas at all, you are called an annihilator of dharmas.” It is a grave accusation: you are not debating; you are destroying.
The author answers, “One who refutes an annihilator of dharmas is called an annihilator of dharmas,” for only two reasons: “I myself have no dharma, so there is nothing to refute”; “You suppose I annihilate dharmas and seek to refute me, so you are the annihilator of dharmas.” I have established no dharma in my hand, and so there is no object to destroy. You, however, decide that I annihilate dharmas and move to refute me. That movement first produces a destroyer and something destroyed.
9. Mutual Dependence: Long and Short, High and Low, Emptiness and Reality
The outsider takes another route and establishes dharmas through relations: “If long exists, short must exist; if high exists, low must exist; if emptiness exists, reality must exist.” Since emptiness and reality occur in mutual dependence, emptiness must rely on reality in order to stand.
The author answers, “What mutual dependence could there be? Unity has been refuted,” adding: “If there is no unity, there is no mutual dependence.” For a relation to be established, two things must first stand in their own right. Once unity has been refuted, there are no two endpoints to lean upon one another.
The final question seals the outsider’s path: “If even a little of the nonempty remained, there should be mutual dependence. If there is nothing nonempty, there is no emptiness; how could they be mutually dependent?” If you retain even one nonempty thing, my emptiness has an object. Once nothing nonempty remains, the emptiness opposed to it need not be established either. Emptiness is not one endpoint; it gathers both endpoints away.
10. Nonestablishment Is Establishment
The outsider tries once more with an elegant analogy: “It is like saying that a room is empty and has no horse; then there exists a no-horse.” A room contains no horse—surely “no horse” is an actual state of affairs? You say dharmas are empty and without marks, “yet these words can generate many kinds of thought, so an absence must exist; consequently your nonestablishment is establishment.” The statement has content in the mind, and therefore absence exists; nonestablishment has become a kind of establishment.
The author answers, “Existence and nonexistence are all absent”: “Within the true mark of things, I use many Dharma gates to say that existence and nonexistence are both empty.” Then comes the reason: “If existence is absent, nonexistence is also absent; therefore existence and nonexistence are all absent.”
This sentence is the chapter’s hinge. “Nonexistence” can stand only by depending on “existence”; when existence cannot be found, the nonexistence opposed to it has no foothold either. The outsider always assumes that at the end of refutation an absence will remain, something he can point at and say, “See, something is still there.” The author replies: you borrowed that absence from existence.
11. If Intrinsic Nature Is Empty, Why Refute Anything?
The eleventh challenge is the chapter’s most accomplished question, and it is asked from the author’s own side: “Dharmas are empty in intrinsic nature and have no maker. Because there is no making, there should be no refutation.” If they were empty from the beginning, what are you refuting? It is “like a foolish person trying to destroy space and merely exhausting himself.”
The author answers, “Although intrinsically empty, beings are bound because they grasp marks”: “Although all dharmas are empty in intrinsic nature, beings are bound by false conceptions and discriminations.” Dharmas are empty; what binds is conception.
The chapter’s only extended analogy follows: “A fool sees a heat shimmer on a hot day, falsely conceives water, and exhausts himself pursuing it. A wise person tells him: this is not water.” The wise person’s sentence does not destroy water; it stops the conception. The adept Vasu maps analogy to teaching: “Dharmas are likewise empty in nature, but sentient beings grasp marks and therefore cling. To refute this inversion, one speaks of refutation, while in fact nothing is refuted.”
This movement fixes the character of “refutation” throughout the chapter. Refutation never falls upon a dharma—there is no dharma there to refute. It falls upon the inversion that grasps marks. Once inversion ceases, refutation has nothing more to do. There never was water on the sand; the person drenched in sweat is the one who ran after it.
12. The Fourth Proposition
The outsider changes method again and challenges from scriptural authority. You refute existence, nonexistence, and both, and “now fall into neither existence nor nonexistence,” yet “this neither existence nor nonexistence cannot be spoken”—because “the marks of existence and nonexistence cannot be found, this is called an ineffable dharma.” Such an ineffable dharma “is absent from the great scriptures of the Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhyas, Nirgranthas, and others, and therefore cannot be trusted.”
The author answers, “There is a fourth proposition,” then produces evidence from each opponent’s own scripture. The Vaiśeṣika scripture says “sound is called neither large nor small”; the Sāṃkhya scripture says “a lump of clay is neither a jar nor not a jar”; the Nirgrantha teaching says “light is neither bright nor dark.” Each school has a statement that exceeds a simple binary. He ends with one question: “Why do you say there is none?”
You find the fourth proposition untrustworthy only because you have not turned back to look at your own scriptures. The answer establishes no new doctrine; it simply lays the opponent’s own belongings upon the table.
13. Because Language Follows Convention, There Is No Fault
The outsider presses the most practical question: “If everything is empty and the ineffable dharma is correct, why do you now teach good and evil dharmas to transform people?” If you hold the ineffable, why speak Dharma every day?
The author answers, “Because language follows convention, there is no fault,” and for the first time presents the two truths: “When buddhas teach the Dharma, they always rely on conventional truth and the truth of the ultimate meaning. Both are true and are not false speech.”
The analogy is thoroughly homely: “Although the Buddha knows that dharmas are without marks, the Buddha still tells Ānanda to enter Śrāvastī and beg for food.” The Buddha knows that the city lacks intrinsic nature—“if earth, timber, and the rest are removed, no city can be found”—yet still says, “Enter the city and beg for food”; “because the words follow convention, they do not fall into false speech.” If the city’s unfindability forbade the word “city,” Ānanda would go hungry that day.
The final sentence is the author’s humblest in the chapter: “I too study in accordance with the Buddha, so there is no fault.” He offers no separate rationale for himself, saying only that he follows the Buddha’s way.
14. Does Conventional Truth Count as Truth?
The outsider immediately finds an opening in the two truths: “If conventional truth is real, it is included in the truth of the ultimate meaning. If it is not real, why call it truth?” If real, it should collapse into the ultimate; if unreal, it does not deserve the name truth. The question is formidable.
The author answers, “Because of mutual dependence, as with large and small,” first distinguishing the standpoints: “Conventional truth is real for people of the world and unreal for sages.” Then comes the rose apple: “A single rose apple is large beside a jujube and small beside a melon; both statements are true.”
The analogy must be read precisely. It does not say that one may call sizes whatever one wishes. The next sentence is strict: “To call it small beside a jujube and large beside a melon would be false speech.” On the same rose apple, both large and small are true, yet not every statement is true. Conventional truth is truth precisely here: within its own scope it does not permit careless speech. The two truths are not one real level and one false level; they are the same matter viewed in two scopes, each of which forbids careless speech.
15. Relinquishing Self in This Way Is Called Attaining Liberation
The outsider finally asks what it all comes to: “From the initial relinquishment of demerit and merit through the refutation of emptiness, faults are seen in all these dharmas. What benefit is gained?” Reading from the first chapter to here, one finds faults everywhere; what, then, has the reader obtained?
The author answers, “Relinquishing self in this way is called attaining liberation,” and for the first time looks back across the whole treatise: “In this way dharmas are refuted in three modes. At the beginning, in relinquishing demerit and merit, the self is refuted; afterward all dharmas are refuted. This is called having neither self nor anything belonging to self.” Refuting the self leaves no self; refuting dharmas leaves nothing belonging to self. Only in this sentence does the sequence of ten chapters show itself as a path rather than a chain of rebuttals.
The lived character of liberation is described with striking plainness: “One neither receives nor clings to dharmas; hearing existence, one does not rejoice; hearing nonexistence, one does not grieve. This is called liberation.” This is the treatise’s sole portrait of one who has gained the point: it is not what that person knows, but that the heart no longer rises and falls on hearing the two claims existence and nonexistence.
16. Because of Conventional Truth, It Is Spoken of as Liberation
The last question carries no root-text marker and is asked directly: “Why say ‘called attaining liberation,’ rather than truly attaining liberation?” Why say only “called” and not dare to say it is really attained?
The author’s answer is decisive: “Because it is ultimately pure.” The next two clauses gather even the last margin away: “Because the self is refuted, there is no person; because nirvāṇa is refuted, there is no liberation.” There is neither someone who attains nor something attained; “how could one speak of a person attaining liberation?”
The entire treatise’s final sentence is: “Because of conventional truth, it is spoken of as liberation.”
This sentence must be read through the preceding movement. Conventional truth is “real for people of the world,” not an empty courtesy. To say “called liberation” does not say liberation is false. It says that liberation is true without ever becoming anyone’s possession. The outsider demands something to clutch—whether the refuting act, absence, or liberation. To the final word, the author gives him nothing.
Carried Forward
This is the last of the ten extant chapters of the Hundred Treatise. The preceding nine refute the dharmas established by outsiders; this chapter refutes the act of refuting itself, drawing emptiness, nongrasping, and liberation into one examination. Twice the treatise points back to its own earlier chapters. “That unity and difference cannot be found was already refuted” uses the results of “Refutation of Unity” and “Refutation of Difference”; “At the beginning, in relinquishing demerit and merit, the self is refuted” gathers the first through ninth chapters into a single sentence. Only in its final chapter does a treatise surrender its own tools. This is how the Hundred Treatise comes to rest.
Accordingly, “Because nirvāṇa is refuted, there is no liberation” must not be read as denying cultivation and realization. The preceding movement has just said that conventional truth is “real for people of the world,” and the following “Because of conventional truth, it is spoken of as liberation” speaks precisely within that scope. What is refuted is grasping liberation as an object one can possess, not liberation itself. It is as when the wise person tells the one chasing the shimmer, “This is not water”: what ceases is the conception of water; the statement “does not destroy water.”
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
底本 T30n1569〔0181a07–0182a17〕，三十一枚「修妬路」。本品是現存十品末，能破、空、無執與解脫皆納入同一檢驗。
二、異釋對勘
本帙無另一漢譯異釋本；衛世師、僧佉、尼乾的「第四」例依本論傳文並錄。
三、諸家異釋（吉藏專疏）
吉藏《百論疏》〈破空品第十〉〔T42 0301c05 起〕逐文解說破如可破、無所執、二諦與名得解脫。
四、名相
- 破如可破：能破亦無自性，不在可破法外獨存。
- 無所執：執取止息，不是另執一個「無執法」。
- 第四：非有非無等越出簡單二分的說法。
- 俗諦／第一義諦：隨世用語與究竟無自性觀。
五、科判
十段：破與可破；一異工具；破他不成己；因緣與世間；無執；空實相待；自空何須破；第四句；二諦說善惡；無我解脫。
六、關中舊學·譯史
舍衛城乞食與熱焰水想兩例，使關中譯本中的二諦與對治語法具體可見；不另補經文版本以改寫論中引述。
七、唯識軸互讀（空有）
能破語言是否自成所執，可與認識論互讀；本品立場是對治後不留法，未裁後世空有論戰。
八、系內餘論互讀
《迴諍論》同樣面對「若空語亦空，何能破」；《中論》〈觀四諦品〉以因緣、空、假名、中道相連。本品以世人信因緣及二諦收束。
九、校本定位
主底本 T30n1569〔0181a07–0182a17〕；吉藏疏 T42n1827〔0301c05 起〕。末段明記「於俗諦故，說名解脫」，不得讀成否認修證。
Textual Collation
The base text is T30n1569〔0181a07–0182a17〕, containing thirty-one notes reading 「修妬路」 tr. “sūtra.” This final extant chapter subjects refutation itself, emptiness, nonclinging, and liberation to the same examination.
Comparative Readings
There is no second Chinese translation of this treatise for comparison. The examples of a 「第四」 tr. “fourth proposition” in the Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Nirgrantha teachings are recorded as transmitted in this treatise.
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang’s Commentary on the Hundred Treatise, “Refutation of Emptiness, Chapter Ten”〔T42 0301c05 起〕, explains passage by passage refutation as equal to what is refuted, nothing grasped, the two truths, and liberation as a conventional designation.
Terminology
- Refutation is like what can be refuted: the refuting act also lacks intrinsic nature and does not subsist independently outside the dharmas it refutes.
- Nothing grasped: grasping has ceased; this does not mean grasping another 「無執法」 tr. “dharma of nongrasping.”
- Fourth proposition: formulations such as neither existent nor nonexistent that move beyond a simple binary.
- Conventional truth / truth of the ultimate meaning: language used in accordance with the world and ultimate contemplation of the absence of intrinsic nature.
Doctrinal Outline
Ten movements: refutation and what can be refuted; unity and difference as tools; refuting another does not establish oneself; conditions and the world; nongrasping; emptiness and reality as mutual counterparts; why refute what is intrinsically empty; the fourth proposition; speaking of good and evil through the two truths; and selflessness and liberation.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
The two examples of entering Śrāvastī for alms and mistaking a heat shimmer for water make the language of the two truths and remedial teaching concrete in the old Guanzhong translation. No alternate sūtra wording is supplied to rewrite the treatise’s citations.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
Whether the language of refutation itself becomes an object of grasping may be cross-read with epistemology. This chapter’s position is that no dharma remains after the remedy has done its work; it does not adjudicate later debates over emptiness and existence.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
The Refutation of Objections likewise confronts the challenge 「若空語亦空，何能破」 tr. “If the words of emptiness are themselves empty, how can they refute?” The Treatise on the Middle, “Examination of the Four Truths,” joins conditions, emptiness, provisional designation, and the middle way. This chapter concludes through the world’s trust in conditions and through the two truths.
Position of the Editions
The principal base text is T30n1569〔0181a07–0182a17〕; Jizang’s commentary is T42n1827〔0301c05 起〕. The final movement explicitly states 「於俗諦故，說名解脫」 tr. “Because of conventional truth, it is spoken of as liberation”; it must not be read as denying cultivation or realization.