百論 破神品第二
外道要的東西只有一件：在諸法背後有一個常住、周遍而又能知的主人，名之為神。立法有兩家——僧佉說「覺相是神」，衛世師說「知與神異」。《百論》這一品便沿這兩條各走到底。
若牠就是那個覺
若覺就是神的相，覺無常則神無常，「譬如熱是火相，熱無常故，火亦無常」。而覺確是無常的：「相各異故、屬因緣故、本無今有故、已有還無故。」改說神「不生故常」，那覺與神就得是異；說覺周遍，覺卻只「行一處」；說無用之處也有覺力，那「但有是語」；說待因緣合乃有用，那便「墮生相故」——常，是被自己的解釋磨掉的。
人牽了牛，人不是牛
若知另是一物，與神和合而神名能知——如人與牛合而名有牛。答只一句：「牛相牛中住，非有牛中」。所以「但知能知非神知」，「譬如火能燒，非有火人燒」。既然「知即能知」，那麼「神復何用」？其後馬身、黑疊、有杖三喻，都敗在同一處：合了不改名。
知斷掉的時候
外道改用比量：見人先去後到，故知有去；見諸法有依，故知有神。答曰「不知非神」——「有處名身外，有時名身內，睡眠悶等是時不知」。以知為相的東西，在沒有知的那段時間裡憑什麼還算在；何況神「若有知、若無知，無能見者」。故曰：「不可見龜而有毛想，不可見石女而有兒想，如是不應見知便有神想。」
刀、眼與意
刀害身則生惱；神若同惱，也該同斷。若說神無觸不可斷，身神便湊不出盲跛那樣的「二觸二思惟」，人就走不動。若說神藉眼而見，「神與眼異」則神無眼，無眼何以能見。而意本自能知，如「火性自熱，無有不熱之火」；憶念也不必有一物穿行其中——「以現在意知過去意，意法無常故無咎」。
一分燒的衣
末後爭一個「分」字：一分處生知，不足以名神為知；如衣一分燒，不足以名為燒衣，因為「是衣多不燒，實有用故」。全品收在五個字：「是以莫著語言。」
The outsider wants only one thing: behind all dharmas there must be a permanent, all-pervading lord that knows, called the self. Two schools establish it in different ways—Sāṃkhya says, “Awareness is the self,” while Vaiśeṣika says, “Cognition differs from self.” This chapter of the Hundred Treatise follows each path to its end.
If It Is That Awareness
If awareness is the self’s mark, then because awareness is impermanent, self is impermanent: “As heat is the mark of fire, since heat is impermanent, fire too is impermanent.” Awareness is indeed impermanent: “because its marks differ, because it belongs to causes and conditions, because formerly absent it now exists, and because, having existed, it returns to absence.” Say instead that self is “permanent because unarisen,” and awareness must differ from it; say awareness is all-pervading, yet it “operates in one place” alone; say the power of awareness remains where it has no function, and “there is only this statement”; say it functions when conditions meet, and it “falls under the mark of arising.” Permanence is worn away by its own explanations.
A Person Leading a Cow Is Not a Cow
If cognition is another thing, and self is called a knower because the two conjoin, this is like a person conjoined with a cow and called an owner of a cow. The answer is one sentence: “The mark of a cow abides in the cow, not in the cow’s owner.” Therefore, “cognition alone can cognize; self does not cognize,” just as “fire can burn, not the person who possesses fire.” Since “cognition itself can cognize,” what further use is self? The analogies of a horse’s body, black cloth, and a staff all fail at the same point: conjunction does not change identity.
When Cognition Ceases
The outsider turns to inference: because one sees a person depart and later arrive, one knows there was going; because one sees dharmas supported, one knows there is a self. The answer is, “What does not cognize is not self”—“in place” means outside the body, and “in time” means within the body: “in sleep, fainting, and the like, at that time there is no cognition.” On what basis does something defined by knowing still count as present through the interval when knowing is absent? Moreover, whether cognition is present or absent, “there is no one able to see self.” Thus: “One must not see a turtle and conceive hair, nor see a barren woman and conceive a child; likewise, one must not see cognition and conceive a self.”
Knife, Eye, and Mind
When a knife harms the body, distress arises; if self shares the distress, it should share the severing. If self is said to be untouchable and therefore unseverable, body and self cannot furnish the “two contacts and two thoughts” of the blind-and-lame analogy, and the person cannot move. If self sees by means of the eye, then “self differs from the eye,” so self has no eye—how could the eyeless see? Mind, meanwhile, knows by its own nature, as “fire’s nature is itself hot, and there is no fire that is not hot.” Recollection also needs no entity traveling through it: “Present mind cognizes past mind; because mind-dharmas are impermanent, there is no fault.”
A Garment Burned in One Part
The final dispute turns on “part”: cognition arising in one place is not enough to call self a knower. Just as a garment burned in one part is not wholly a burned garment, for “most of this garment is unburned and remains genuinely usable.” The entire chapter closes in five words: “Therefore, do not cling to language.”
提婆菩薩造、婆藪開士釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《百論》卷一〈破神品第二〉· 大正藏 T30n1569〔起 T30 0170c12〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0170c12〕外曰：不應言一切法空無相，神等諸法有故〔修妬路〕。迦毘羅、優樓迦等言：神及諸法有。迦毘羅言：從冥初生覺，從覺生我心，從我心生五微塵，從五微塵生五大，從五大生十一根。神為主，常、覺相、處中、常住、不壞不敗、攝受諸法。能知此二十五諦，即得解脫；不知此者，不離生死。優樓迦言：實有神常，以出入息、視眴、壽命等相故，則知有神。復次以欲恚、苦樂、智慧等所依處故，則知有神。是故神是實有，云何言無？若有而言無，則為惡邪人，惡邪人無解脫。是故不應言一切法空無相。 內曰：若有神而言無，是為惡邪。若無而言無，此有何過？諦觀察之，實無有神。 外曰：實有神。如僧佉經中說，覺相是神。 內曰：神覺為一耶？為異耶？ 外曰：神覺一也。 內曰：覺若神相，神無常〔修妬路〕。若覺是神相者，覺無常故，神應無常。譬如熱是火相，熱無常故，火亦無常。今覺實無常。所以者何？相各異故、屬因緣故、本無今有故、已有還無故。 〔T30 0171a02〕外曰：不生故常〔修妬路〕。生相法無常，神非生相故常。 內曰：若爾覺非神相〔修妬路〕。覺是無常，汝說神常，神應與覺異。若神覺不異者，覺無常故，神亦應無常。復次若覺是神相，無有是處。所以者何？覺行一處故〔修妬路〕。若覺是神相者，汝法中神遍一切處，覺亦應一時遍行五道；而覺行一處不能周遍，是故覺非神相。復次若爾神與覺等〔修妬路〕。汝以覺為神相者，神應與覺等，神則不遍。譬如火無熱不熱相，神亦如是，不應有遍不遍相。復次若以為遍，則有覺不覺相〔修妬路〕。汝欲令神遍，神則二相：覺、不覺相。何以故？覺不遍故。神若墮覺處是則覺，若墮不覺處是則不覺。 外曰：力遍故無過〔修妬路〕。有處覺雖無用，此中亦有覺力，是故無無覺過。 內曰：不然。力有力不異故〔修妬路〕。若有覺力處是中，覺應有用而無用，是故汝語非也。若如是說覺無用處亦有覺力者，但有是語。 外曰：因緣合故覺力有用〔修妬路〕。神雖有覺力，要待因緣合故乃能有用。 內曰：墮生相故〔修妬路〕。若因緣合時覺有用者，是覺屬因緣故，則墮生相。若覺神不異，神亦是生相。 外曰：如燈〔修妬路〕。譬如燈能照物、不能作物。因緣亦如是，能令覺有用，不能生覺。 內曰：不然。燈雖不照瓶等，而瓶等可得亦可持用。若因緣不合時，覺不可得，神亦不能覺苦樂，是故汝喻非也。 外曰：如色〔修妬路〕。譬如色，雖先有燈，不照則不了。如是覺雖先有，因緣未合故亦不了。 內曰：不然。自相不了故〔修妬路〕。若未有照，人雖不了，色相自了。汝覺相自不了，是故汝喻非也。復次以無相故，色相不以人知故為色相，是故若不見時常有色。汝知是神相，不應以無知處為知。無知處為知，是事不然，汝法中知覺一義。 外曰：優樓迦弟子誦衛世師經言，知與神異，是故神不墮無常中，亦不無知。何以故？神知合故。如有牛〔修妬路〕。譬如人與牛合，故人名有牛。如是神情意塵合故，神有知生。以神合知故，神名有知。 內曰：牛相牛中住，非有牛中〔修妬路〕。牛相牛中住，不在有牛中。是故雖人牛合有牛不作牛，但牛為牛。如是雖神知合，知相知中住，神不為知。汝言神情意塵合故知生，是知知色塵等，是故但知能知非神知。譬如火能燒，非有火人燒。 外曰：能用法故〔修妬路〕。人雖有見相，用燈則見、離燈則不見。神雖有能知，用知則知、離知則不知。 內曰：不然。知即能知故〔修妬路〕。以情意塵合故知生，是知能知色等諸塵，是故知即能知，非是所用。若知即能知，神復何用？燈喻非也。何以故？燈不知色等故〔修妬路〕。燈雖先有，不能知色等，非知法故，是故但知能知色。若不能知，不名為知。是故縱有能知，彼能何用？ 外曰：馬身合故神為馬〔修妬路〕。譬如神與馬身合故，神名為馬。神雖異身，亦名神為馬。如是神知合故，神名為知。 內曰。不然。身中神非馬〔修妬路〕。馬身即馬也。汝謂身與神異，則神與馬異，云何以神為馬？是故此喻非也。以神喻神，則墮負處。 外曰：如黑疊〔修妬路〕。譬如黑疊，黑雖異疊，疊與黑合故名為黑疊。如是知雖異神，神與知合故神名為知。 內曰：若爾無神〔修妬路〕。若神與知合，故神名為知，神應非神。何以故？我先說知即是能知，若知不名神，神亦不名能知。若他合故以他為名者，知與神合，何不名知為神？又如先說黑疊喻者，自違汝經。汝經黑是求那，疊是陀羅驃。陀羅驃不作求那，求那不作陀羅驃。 外曰：如有杖〔修妬路〕。譬如人與杖合，故人名有杖，不但名杖。杖雖與人合，杖不名有人，亦不名人。如是神與知合，故神名能知，不但名知，亦非是知與神合故，知名為神。 內曰：不然。有杖非杖〔修妬路〕。雖杖與有杖合，有杖不為杖。如是知相知中非神中，是故神非能知。 外曰：僧佉人復言，若知與神異，有如上過。我經中無如是過。所以者何？覺即神相故。我以覺相為神，是故常覺無不覺。 內曰：雖已先破，今當更說。若覺相神不一〔修妬路〕。覺有種種苦樂覺等，若覺是神相，神應種種。 外曰：不然。一為種種相，如頗梨〔修妬路〕。如一頗梨珠隨色而變，或青黃赤白等。如是一覺隨塵別異，或覺苦或覺樂等。覺雖種種相，實是一覺。 內曰：若爾罪福一相〔修妬路〕。若益他覺是名福，若損他覺是名罪，一切慧人心信是法。若益他覺、損他覺是一者，應罪福一相，如施盜等亦應一。復次如珠先有，隨色而變。然覺共緣生，是故汝喻非也。復次珠新新生滅故，相則不一。汝言珠一者，是亦非也。 〔T30 0172a02〕外曰：不然。果雖多，作者一，如陶師〔修妬路〕。如一陶師作瓶瓫等，非作者一故果便一也。如是一覺能作損益等業。 內曰：陶師無別異〔修妬路〕。譬如陶師身一無異相，而與瓶瓫等異。然益他覺、損他覺實有異相。又損益等與覺不異，是故汝喻非也。 外曰：實有神，比知相故〔修妬路〕。有物雖不可現知，以比相故知。如見人先去然後到彼，日月東出西沒雖不見去，以到彼故知去。如是見諸求那依陀羅驃，以比知相故知有神。神知合故，神名能知。 內曰：是事先已破，今當更說。不知非神〔修妬路〕。汝法神遍廣大而知少。若神知者，有處有時不知，是則非神。有處名身外，有時名身內，睡眠悶等是時不知。若神知相有處有時不知，是則非神。何以故？無知相故。汝以知相有神者，空無實也。 外曰：行無故知無，如煙〔修妬路〕。如煙是火相，炭時無煙，是時雖無煙而有火。如是知雖神相，若有知、若無知，神應常有。 內曰：不然。神能知故〔修妬路〕。若不知時欲令有神者，神則不能知，亦無知相。所以者何？汝神無知時亦有神故。復次若無煙時，現見有火知有火。神若有知、若無知，無能見者，是故汝喻非也。復次汝說見共相比知故有神，此亦非也。所以者何？見去者去法到彼故〔修妬路〕。若離去者無去法，離去法無去者到彼，如是見去者曰到彼，必知有去法。若離神無知，是事不然，是故不應以知故知有神。不可見龜而有毛想，不可見石女而有兒想，如是不應見知便有神想。 外曰：如手取〔修妬路〕。如手有時取、有時不取，不可以不取時不名為手，手常名手。神亦如是，有時知、有時不知，不可以不知時不名為神，神常名神。 內曰：取非手相〔修妬路〕。取是手業非手相。何以故？不以取故知為手。汝以知即神相，此喻非也。 外曰：定有神，覺苦樂故〔修妬路〕。若無覺者則無覺，身獨不能覺苦樂。何以故？死人有身，不能覺苦樂。如是知有身者能覺苦樂，此則為神，是故定有神。 內曰：若惱亦斷〔修妬路〕。如刀害身，是時生惱。若刀害神，神亦有惱者，神亦應斷。 外曰：不然。無觸故如空〔修妬路〕。神無觸故不可斷。如燒舍時，內空無觸故不可燒，但有熱。如是斷身時，內神無觸故不可斷，但有惱。 內曰：若爾無去〔修妬路〕。若神無觸，身不應到餘處。何以故？去法從思惟生、從身動生。身無思惟，非覺法故。神無動力，非身法故。如是身不應到餘處。 外曰：如盲跛〔修妬路〕。譬如盲跛相假能去。如是神有思惟、身有動力，和合而去。 內曰：異相故〔修妬路〕。如盲跛，二觸二思惟故法應能去。身神無二事故不應去，是故無去法。若不爾，有如上斷過。復次汝謂空熱，此事不然。何以故？空無觸故，微熱遍空。身觸覺熱，非空熱也，但假言空熱。 外曰：如舍主惱〔修妬路〕。如燒舍時，舍主惱而不燒。如是身斷時，神但惱而不斷。 內曰：不然。無常故燒〔修妬路〕。舍燒時，草木等無常故，亦燒亦熱。空常故，不燒不熱。如是身無常故，亦惱亦斷。神常故，不惱不斷。復次舍主遠火故不應燒。汝經言神遍滿故，亦應斷壞。 外曰：必有神取色等故〔修妬路〕。五情不能知五塵，非知法故，是故知神能知。神用眼等知色等諸塵，如人以鎌收刈五穀。 內曰：何不用耳見〔修妬路〕。若神見有力，何不用耳見色？如火能燒，處處皆燒。又如人或時無鎌，手亦能斷。又如舍有六向，人居其內所在能見。神亦如是，處處應見。 外曰：不然。所用定故，如陶師〔修妬路〕。神雖有見力，然眼等所伺不同，於塵各定故，不能用耳見色。如陶師雖能作瓶，離泥不能作。如是神雖有見力，非眼不能見。 內曰：若爾盲〔修妬路〕。若神用眼見，則神與眼異。神與眼異，則神無眼。神無眼云何見？汝陶師喻者，是亦不然。所以者何？離泥更無有瓶，泥即為瓶；而眼色異故。 外曰：有神異情動故〔修妬路〕。若無神者，何故見他食果口中生涎，如是不應以眼知味，有眼者能知。復次一物眼身知故〔修妬路〕。如人眼先識瓶等，闇中雖不用眼，身觸亦知，是故知有神。 內曰：如盲，修妬路中已破。復次若眼見他食果而口生涎者，餘情何以不動？身亦如是。 外曰：如人燒〔修妬路〕。譬如人雖能燒，離火不能燒。神亦如是，用眼能見，離眼不能見。 內曰：火燒〔修妬路〕。言人燒者，是則妄語。何以故？人無燒相，火自能燒。如風動木相揩生火，焚燒山澤，無有作者。是故火自能燒，非人燒也。 〔T30 0173a01〕外曰：如意〔修妬路〕。如死人雖有眼，無意故神則不見，若有意神則見。如是神用眼見，離眼不見。 內曰：若有意能知、無意不能知者，但意行眼等門中便知，神復何用？ 外曰：意不自知。若意意相知，此則無窮，我神一故。以神知意，非無窮也。 內曰：神亦神〔修妬路〕。若神知意，誰復知神？若神知神，是亦無窮。我法以現在意知過去意，意法無常故無咎。 外曰：云何除神〔修妬路〕？若除神，云何但意知諸塵？ 內曰：如火熱相〔修妬路〕。譬如火熱，無有作者，火性自熱，無有不熱之火。如是意是知相，雖復離神，性知故能知。神知異故，神不應知。 外曰：應有神宿，習念相續故，生時憂喜行〔修妬路〕。如小兒生便知行憂喜等事，無有教者，以先世宿習憶念相續故，今世還為種種業。是故知有神亦常相。 內曰：遍云何念〔修妬路〕？神常遍諸塵，無不念時，念從何生？復次若念一切處生，念亦應遍一切處，如是一切處應一時念。若念分分處生，神則有分，有分故無常。復次若神無知、若知非神，此事先已破。 外曰：合故念生〔修妬路〕。若神意合，以勢發故念生。何以故？神意雖合，勢不發者則念不生。 內曰：雖先已破，今當重說。神若知相，不應生念。若非知相，亦不應生念。復次若念知〔修妬路〕。若念生是時知，若念不生是時不知，應念即是知，神復何用？ 外曰：應有神。左見右識故〔修妬路〕。如人先左眼見，後右眼識，不應彼見此識。以內有神故，左見右識。 內曰：共答二眼〔修妬路〕。分知不名知。復次若爾無知，復次遍云何念？復次若念知，復次何不用耳見？復次若爾盲，復次如左眼見不應右眼識，神亦不應此分見彼分識，是故不應以左眼見右眼識故便有神。 外曰：念屬神故神知〔修妬路〕。念名神法，是念神中生，是故神用念知。 內曰：不然。分知不名知〔修妬路〕。若神一分處知生，神則分知。若神分知，神不名知。 外曰：神知非分知。何以故？神雖分知，神名知，如身業〔修妬路〕。譬如身分，手有所作名為身作。如是神雖分知，神名知。 內曰：若爾無知〔修妬路〕。汝法神遍意少，神意合故神知生，是知與意等少。若以少知神名知者，汝何不言以多不知故神名不知？又汝身業喻者，此事不然。何以故？分有分一異不可得故。 外曰：如衣分燒〔修妬路〕。譬如衣一分燒，名為燒衣。如是神雖一分知，名為神知。 內曰：燒亦如是〔修妬路〕。若衣一分燒，不名為燒，應名分燒。汝以一分燒故衣名燒者，今多不燒應名不燒。何以故？是衣多不燒，實有用故。是以莫著語言。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
提婆菩薩造、婆藪開士釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《百論》卷一〈破神品第二〉·大正藏 T30n1569。段首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、外道立神：兩家的說法
〔T30 0170c12〕外道說——這一句是提婆的本文：不應該說一切法空無相，因為神等諸法是有的。
婆藪開士釋道：迦毘羅、優樓迦這些人說：神以及諸法都是有的。迦毘羅說：從冥初生出覺，從覺生出我心，從我心生出五微塵，從五微塵生出五大，從五大生出十一根。神是主，是常的、以覺為相、處在正中、常住不動、不壞不敗，能攝受諸法。若能知道這二十五諦，就得解脫；不知道這些的人，離不開生死。優樓迦說：確實有神而且是常的，因為有出入息、視眴、壽命等等相的緣故，就知道有神。再者，因為神是欲、恚、苦、樂、智慧等等所依止之處的緣故，就知道有神。所以神是實有的，怎麼能說沒有？若是有卻說沒有，那就是惡邪的人；惡邪的人得不到解脫。所以不應該說一切法空無相。
論主答：若真有神卻說沒有，那是惡邪。若本來沒有而說沒有，這有什麼過失？仔細觀察，實在沒有神。
二、覺與神，是一還是異
外道說：確實有神。如《僧佉經》中所說，覺相就是神。
論主問：神與覺是一呢？還是異呢？
外道答：神與覺是一。
論主答——提婆的本文：覺若神相，神無常。婆藪開士釋道：若覺是神的相，因為覺是無常的緣故，神也應該無常。譬如熱是火的相，熱既然無常，火也就無常。如今覺確實是無常。為什麼？因為相各各不同的緣故、因為屬於因緣的緣故、因為本來沒有如今才有的緣故、因為已經有了又還歸於沒有的緣故。
三、不生故常
〔T30 0171a02〕外道說——提婆的本文：不生故常。婆藪開士釋道：有生相的法才無常；神不是生相，所以是常。
論主答——提婆的本文：若爾覺非神相。婆藪開士釋道：覺是無常的，你說神是常的，那麼神就應該與覺是異。若神與覺不異，覺既無常，神也應該無常。再者，若說覺是神的相，沒有這樣的道理。為什麼？——提婆的本文：覺行一處故。婆藪開士釋道：若覺是神的相，你法中的神遍在一切處，覺也應該一時之間遍行五道；然而覺只行在一處，不能周遍，所以覺不是神的相。
再者——提婆的本文：若爾神與覺等。婆藪開士釋道：你拿覺當作神的相，那神就應該與覺相等，神也就不遍了。譬如火沒有又熱又不熱的相，神也是這樣，不應該有又遍又不遍的相。
再者——提婆的本文：若以為遍，則有覺不覺相。婆藪開士釋道：你想要讓神是遍的，那神就有兩種相：覺相與不覺相。為什麼？因為覺不遍的緣故。神若落在有覺的地方就是覺，若落在沒有覺的地方就是不覺。
四、覺力與因緣
外道說——提婆的本文：力遍故無過。婆藪開士釋道：有些地方覺雖然沒有作用，那裡面還是有覺的力；所以沒有『沒有覺』的過失。
論主答：不是這樣——提婆的本文：力有力不異故。婆藪開士釋道：若某處有覺力，那裡的覺就應該有作用，然而實際上沒有作用；所以你的話不對。若照你這樣說，覺沒有作用的地方也有覺力，那不過是有這句話罷了。
外道說——提婆的本文：因緣合故覺力有用。婆藪開士釋道：神雖然有覺力，必須等待因緣和合，才能夠有作用。
論主答——提婆的本文：墮生相故。婆藪開士釋道：若因緣和合的時候覺才有作用，這覺就是屬於因緣的，那就落在生相裡頭了。若覺與神不異，神也就是生相。
五、燈喻與色喻
外道說——提婆的本文：如燈。婆藪開士釋道：譬如燈能照物，卻不能造物。因緣也是這樣，能令覺有作用，不能生出覺來。
論主答：不是這樣。燈雖然不照瓶等等，瓶等等仍舊拿得到，也仍舊可以拿來使用。若因緣不和合的時候，覺就不可得，神也就不能覺苦樂；所以你的譬喻不對。
外道說——提婆的本文：如色。婆藪開士釋道：譬如色雖然先有，燈不去照就顯不明白。覺也是這樣，雖然先有，因緣還沒和合的緣故，也就顯不明白。
論主答：不是這樣——提婆的本文：自相不了故。婆藪開士釋道：若還沒有照，人雖然不明白，色相自己是明白的。你的覺相自己就不明白，所以你的譬喻不對。再者，因為沒有相的緣故——色相並不是因為人知道了才成為色相，所以就算不見的時候也常有色。你說知是神的相，就不應該拿無知之處當作知。把無知之處當作知，這件事不對；何況你法中知與覺是同一個意思。
六、知與神異：有牛之喻
外道說：優樓迦的弟子誦習《衛世師經》，說知與神是異的，所以神不落在無常裡頭，也不是無知。為什麼？因為神與知和合的緣故——提婆的本文：如有牛。婆藪開士釋道：譬如人與牛和合，所以人名為有牛。像這樣，神與情、意、塵和合的緣故，神就有知生起；因為神與知和合的緣故，神名為有知。
論主答——提婆的本文：牛相牛中住，非有牛中。婆藪開士釋道：牛的相住在牛裡頭，不在有牛的人裡頭。所以雖然人與牛和合，有牛的人並不成為牛，只有牛才是牛。像這樣，雖然神與知和合，知的相住在知裡頭，神並不成為知。你說神與情、意、塵和合所以知生起，這知所知的是色塵等等，所以只有知能知，不是神在知。譬如火能燒，並不是有火的人在燒。
七、能用之法與燈不知色
外道說——提婆的本文：能用法故。婆藪開士釋道：人雖然有見的相，用燈就見得到，離開燈就見不到。神雖然有能知，用知就知，離開知就不知。
論主答：不是這樣——提婆的本文：知即能知故。婆藪開士釋道：因為情、意、塵和合的緣故知生起，這知能知色等等諸塵；所以知就是能知，不是被使用的東西。若知就是能知，神還有什麼用？燈的譬喻也不對。為什麼？——提婆的本文：燈不知色等故。婆藪開士釋道：燈雖然先有，卻不能知色等等，因為它不是知法的緣故；所以只有知能知色。若不能知，就不叫作知。所以縱然另立一個能知的神，牠那個能又派得上什麼用場？
八、馬身、黑疊、有杖
外道說——提婆的本文：馬身合故神為馬。婆藪開士釋道：譬如神與馬身和合的緣故，神就名為馬。神雖然與身是異的，也還是名神為馬。像這樣，神與知和合的緣故，神名為知。
論主答：不是這樣——提婆的本文：身中神非馬。婆藪開士釋道：馬身就是馬。你認為身與神是異的，那麼神就與馬是異的，怎麼可以拿神當作馬？所以這個譬喻不對。拿神來譬喻神，就落到負處去了。
外道說——提婆的本文：如黑疊。婆藪開士釋道：譬如黑疊，黑雖然與疊是異的，疊與黑和合的緣故就名為黑疊。像這樣，知雖然與神是異的，神與知和合的緣故，神就名為知。
論主答——提婆的本文：若爾無神。婆藪開士釋道：若因為神與知和合、神就名為知，那神應該就不是神了。為什麼？我先前說過知就是能知；若知不叫作神，神也就不叫作能知。若因為與別的東西和合就拿別的東西作名字，那麼知與神和合，為什麼不叫知為神？又如先前所說的黑疊之喻，那是自己違背你自己的經。你的經裡黑是求那，疊是陀羅驃；陀羅驃不作求那，求那不作陀羅驃。
外道說——提婆的本文：如有杖。婆藪開士釋道：譬如人與杖和合，所以人名為有杖，不只名為杖。杖雖然與人和合，杖不名為有人，也不名為人。像這樣，神與知和合，所以神名為能知，不只名為知；也不是說知與神和合的緣故，知就名為神。
論主答：不是這樣——提婆的本文：有杖非杖。婆藪開士釋道：雖然杖與有杖的人和合，有杖的人並不成為杖。像這樣，知的相在知裡頭，不在神裡頭；所以神不是能知。
九、一覺能不能有種種相
外道說：僧佉的人又說：若知與神是異的，就有上面那些過失；我的經裡沒有這樣的過失。為什麼？因為覺就是神的相。我拿覺相當作神，所以神是常覺，沒有不覺的時候。
論主答：雖然先前已經破過，如今再說一遍——提婆的本文：若覺相神不一。婆藪開士釋道：覺有種種苦覺、樂覺等等；若覺是神的相，神也就應該有種種。
外道說：不是這樣——提婆的本文：一為種種相，如頗梨。婆藪開士釋道：如一顆頗梨珠隨著色而變，或青、或黃、或赤、或白等等。像這樣，一個覺隨著塵而有分別差異，或者覺苦，或者覺樂等等。覺雖然有種種相，其實只是一個覺。
論主答——提婆的本文：若爾罪福一相。婆藪開士釋道：若利益他人的覺名為福，若損害他人的覺名為罪，一切有智慧的人心裡都信這個法。若利益他人的覺與損害他人的覺是一個，那就應該罪與福是一相，像布施與偷盜等等也應該是一。再者，像那顆珠是先有的，隨著色而變；然而覺是共著緣才生的，所以你的譬喻不對。再者，珠是新新生滅的，相就不是一；你說珠是一個，這也不對。
十、陶師之喻
〔T30 0172a02〕外道說：不是這樣——提婆的本文：果雖多，作者一，如陶師。婆藪開士釋道：如一個陶師造作瓶、瓫等等，並不因為作者是一，果就跟著是一。像這樣，一個覺能作損、益等等的業。
論主答——提婆的本文：陶師無別異。婆藪開士釋道：譬如陶師的身是一個，沒有別異之相，而與瓶、瓫等等是異的。然而利益他人的覺與損害他人的覺，實在有差異之相；又損、益等等與覺並不是異的，所以你的譬喻不對。
十一、比知之相與有時不知
外道說——提婆的本文：實有神，比知相故。婆藪開士釋道：有的東西雖然不能現前知道，憑著比類之相就能知道。譬如看見人先離去、然後到了那邊；又如日月從東邊出、從西邊沒，雖然沒看見牠們走，因為到了那邊，就知道牠們走過。像這樣，看見諸求那依著陀羅驃，憑比知之相就知道有神。神與知和合的緣故，神名為能知。
論主答：這件事先前已經破過，如今再說一遍——提婆的本文：不知非神。婆藪開士釋道：你法中的神遍滿廣大，而知卻很少。若神是知者，卻有的地方、有的時候不知，那就不是神。有的地方，是說身外；有的時候，是說身內睡眠、悶絕等等，這時候不知。若神以知為相，卻有的地方、有的時候不知，那就不是神。為什麼？因為沒有知相的緣故。你拿知相來立神，是空的、不實的。
外道說——提婆的本文：行無故知無，如煙。婆藪開士釋道：如煙是火的相，成炭的時候沒有煙；那時候雖然沒有煙，卻還是有火。像這樣，知雖然是神的相，不論有知、不論無知，神都應該常有。
論主答：不是這樣——提婆的本文：神能知故。婆藪開士釋道：若在不知的時候還想要有神，那神就不能知，也沒有知相。為什麼？因為你的神在無知的時候也還是有神的緣故。再者，若沒有煙的時候，現前看得見火，才知道有火；至於神，不論有知、不論無知，都沒有能看見牠的人，所以你的譬喻不對。
再者，你說看見共相、以比類而知，所以有神，這也不對。為什麼？——提婆的本文：見去者去法到彼故。婆藪開士釋道：若離開去者就沒有去法，離開去法也就沒有去者到那邊；像這樣，看見去的人說他到了那邊，必定知道有去法。若說離開神就沒有知，這件事並不成立；所以不應該因為有知就說有神。不可以因為見到龜就起毛的想，不可以因為見到石女就起兒子的想；像這樣，也不應該見到知就起神的想。
十二、如手取
外道說——提婆的本文：如手取。婆藪開士釋道：如手有時候取、有時候不取，不可以因為不取的時候就不叫作手，手常常名為手。神也是這樣，有時候知、有時候不知，不可以因為不知的時候就不叫作神，神常常名為神。
論主答——提婆的本文：取非手相。婆藪開士釋道：取是手的業，不是手的相。為什麼？並不是因為取才知道牠是手。你拿知就當作神的相，這個譬喻不對。
十三、覺苦樂的是不是常神
外道說——提婆的本文：定有神，覺苦樂故。婆藪開士釋道：若沒有能覺的，就沒有覺；身自己單獨不能覺苦樂。為什麼？死人有身，卻不能覺苦樂。像這樣，能知道有這個身的，才能覺苦樂，這就是神；所以一定有神。
論主答——提婆的本文：若惱亦斷。婆藪開士釋道：如刀害身，這時候生出惱來。若刀害神，神也有惱，那神也應該可以斷。
外道說：不是這樣——提婆的本文：無觸故如空。婆藪開士釋道：神沒有觸的緣故，不可斷。如燒房舍的時候，裡面的空因為沒有觸的緣故燒不著，只是有熱。像這樣，斷身的時候，裡面的神因為沒有觸的緣故不可斷，只是有惱。
論主答——提婆的本文：若爾無去。婆藪開士釋道：若神沒有觸，身就不應該到別的地方去。為什麼？去法是從思惟生的、從身動生的。身沒有思惟，因為它不是覺法的緣故；神沒有動的力，因為它不是身法的緣故。這樣一來，身就不應該到別的地方去。
外道說——提婆的本文：如盲跛。婆藪開士釋道：譬如盲人與跛人互相憑藉就能走。像這樣，神有思惟，身有動力，和合起來就能走。
論主答——提婆的本文：異相故。婆藪開士釋道：如盲人與跛人，是兩個觸、兩個思惟，所以按理能走；身與神沒有這兩件事，所以不應該走，因此沒有去法。若不是這樣，就有上面所說可斷的過失。再者，你說空是熱的，這件事不對。為什麼？因為空沒有觸的緣故。微微的熱遍在空中，是身觸覺得熱，不是空熱，只是假借言說說空熱罷了。
外道說——提婆的本文：如舍主惱。婆藪開士釋道：如燒房舍的時候，舍主只是惱而不被燒。像這樣，身斷的時候，神只是惱而不斷。
論主答：不是這樣——提婆的本文：無常故燒。婆藪開士釋道：房舍燒的時候，草木等等因為無常的緣故，既燒也熱；空因為常的緣故，不燒也不熱。像這樣，身因為無常的緣故，既惱也斷；神既然是常的，就不惱也不斷。再者，舍主是因為離火遠才不被燒；你的經裡說神是遍滿的，那牠也應該斷壞。
十四、五根是不是神的工具
外道說——提婆的本文：必有神取色等故。婆藪開士釋道：五情不能知五塵，因為它們不是知法的緣故；所以知道是神能知。神用眼等等來知色等等諸塵，如同人拿鐮刀收割五穀。
論主答——提婆的本文：何不用耳見。婆藪開士釋道：若神見的力量真是有的，為什麼不用耳朵來見色？如火能燒，處處都能燒。又如人有時候沒有鐮刀，用手也能斷。又如房舍有六個窗向，人住在裡頭，所在之處都看得見。神也是這樣，處處都應該見得到。
外道說：不是這樣——提婆的本文：所用定故，如陶師。婆藪開士釋道：神雖然有見的力量，然而眼等等所伺察的各不相同，對於塵各有定分，所以不能用耳朵來見色。如陶師雖然能作瓶，離開泥就作不成。像這樣，神雖然有見的力量，不藉著眼就不能見。
論主答——提婆的本文：若爾盲。婆藪開士釋道：若神是用眼來見的，那神與眼就是異的；神與眼是異的，神就沒有眼；神沒有眼，怎麼能見？你那陶師的譬喻，也不對。為什麼？離開泥再沒有一個瓶，泥就是瓶；而眼與色卻是異的。
十五、口中生涎與暗中身觸
外道說——提婆的本文：有神異情動故。婆藪開士釋道：若沒有神，為什麼看見別人吃果子，自己口中生出涎來？像這樣，不該是用眼睛知道味道，是有神的人才能知道。再者——提婆的本文：一物眼身知故。婆藪開士釋道：如人先用眼認得瓶等等，在暗中雖然不用眼，身觸也知道，所以知道有神。
論主答：如盲的那一段，修妬路裡已經破過了。再者，若眼睛看見別人吃果子而口中生出涎來，其餘的情為什麼不動？身也是這樣。
十六、人燒與火燒
外道說——提婆的本文：如人燒。婆藪開士釋道：譬如人雖然能燒，離開火就不能燒。神也是這樣，用眼就能見，離開眼就不能見。
論主答——提婆的本文：火燒。婆藪開士釋道：說人在燒，那是妄語。為什麼？人沒有燒的相，是火自己能燒。如風吹木頭互相摩擦生出火來，焚燒山澤，並沒有一個作者。所以是火自己能燒，不是人在燒。
十七、意能知，神還有什麼用
〔T30 0173a01〕外道說——提婆的本文：如意。婆藪開士釋道：如死人雖然有眼，因為沒有意的緣故，神就不見；若有意，神就見。像這樣，神用眼來見，離開眼就不見。
論主答：若有意就能知、沒有意就不能知，那麼只要意在眼等等門中運行便知道了，神還有什麼用？
外道說：意不能自己知道自己。若意與意互相知，那就沒有窮盡了；我的神是一個，用神來知意，就不是無窮。
論主答——提婆的本文：神亦神。婆藪開士釋道：若神知意，那又是誰知道神？若神知神，這也是無窮。我的法中是以現在的意知道過去的意，意法是無常的，所以沒有過失。
外道問——提婆的本文：云何除神？婆藪開士釋道：若除掉神，怎麼能只憑意就知道諸塵？
論主答——提婆的本文：如火熱相。婆藪開士釋道：譬如火是熱的，並沒有一個作者；火性自己就是熱的，沒有不熱的火。像這樣，意就是知相，雖然離開神，因為它性自能知的緣故就能知。神與知既然是異的，神就不應該知。
十八、宿習之念
外道說——提婆的本文：應有神宿，習念相續故，生時憂喜行。婆藪開士釋道：如小兒生下來便知道行走、憂、喜等等事，沒有人教他，是因為先世宿習憶念相續的緣故，今世還作種種業。所以知道有神，而且神是常相。
論主答——提婆的本文：遍云何念？婆藪開士釋道：神既然常遍諸塵，就沒有不憶念的時候，那念又從哪裡生？再者，若念在一切處生，念也應該遍在一切處，這樣一切處應該同時憶念。若念只在一分一分的地方生，神就有分；有分的緣故就是無常。再者，若神是無知的、或者知不是神，這件事先前已經破過。
外道說——提婆的本文：合故念生。婆藪開士釋道：若神與意和合，因為勢用發起的緣故，念就生。為什麼？神與意雖然和合，勢用不發起的話，念就不生。
論主答：雖然先前已經破過，如今再說一遍。神若以知為相，就不應該生念；若不是知相，也不應該生念。再者——提婆的本文：若念知。婆藪開士釋道：若念生起的時候就知道、念不生的時候就不知道，那就應該念本身即是知，神還有什麼用？
十九、左眼見、右眼識
外道說——提婆的本文：應有神。左見右識故。婆藪開士釋道：如人先用左眼見，後來用右眼認得；不應該是那一個見了、這一個認得。因為裡頭有神的緣故，才能左眼見、右眼識。
論主答——提婆的本文：共答二眼。婆藪開士釋道：分知不叫作知。再者，若是這樣就成了無知；再者，遍的話怎麼能念？再者，若念本身即是知；再者，為什麼不用耳朵來見？再者，若是這樣就成了盲。再者，如左眼所見不應該右眼認得，神也不應該這一分見了、那一分認得；所以不應該因為左眼見、右眼識，就說有神。
二十、分知不名知
外道說——提婆的本文：念屬神故神知。婆藪開士釋道：念名為神的法，這念是在神中生的，所以神用念來知。
論主答：不是這樣——提婆的本文：分知不名知。婆藪開士釋道：若神的一分處生起知，神就是分知；若神是分知，神就不叫作知。
外道說：神的知不是分知。為什麼？神雖然是分知，神仍名為知——提婆的本文：如身業。婆藪開士釋道：譬如身的一分，手有所作，就名為身作。像這樣，神雖然是分知，神仍名為知。
論主答——提婆的本文：若爾無知。婆藪開士釋道：你法中的神是遍的而意是少的，神與意和合的緣故神的知才生起，這知就與意一樣少。若拿少分的知就名神為知，你為什麼不說拿多分的不知，就名神為不知？又你身業的譬喻，這件事不對。為什麼？因為分與有分的一異不可得的緣故。
外道說——提婆的本文：如衣分燒。婆藪開士釋道：譬如衣的一分燒了，就名為燒衣。像這樣，神雖然只是一分知，也名為神知。
論主答——提婆的本文：燒亦如是。婆藪開士釋道：若衣的一分燒了，不該名為燒，應該名為分燒。你因為一分燒了就說這衣名為燒，那麼如今多分沒燒，也應該名為不燒。為什麼？這衣多分沒燒，實在還有用處。所以不要執著在語言上。
Hundred Treatise, fascicle one, “Refutation of a Self, Chapter Two,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.
1. The Outsider Establishes Self: Two Schools’ Accounts
〔T30 0170c12〕The outsider says—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: One should not say that all dharmas are empty and markless, because self and the other dharmas exist.
The adept Vasu explains: Kapila, Ulūka, and their followers say that self and all dharmas exist. Kapila says: From primordial obscurity arises awareness; from awareness arises ego-mind; from ego-mind arise the five subtle elements; from the five subtle elements arise the five great elements; and from the five great elements arise the eleven faculties. Self is the lord. It is permanent, has awareness as its mark, occupies the center, abides forever without movement, is neither broken nor undone, and gathers all dharmas. One who knows these twenty-five principles attains liberation; one who does not know them does not leave birth and death. Ulūka says: Self truly exists and is permanent. This is known from such marks as inhalation, exhalation, blinking, life, and the rest. Further, self is known to exist because it is the locus upon which desire, anger, pain, pleasure, wisdom, and the rest depend. Therefore self truly exists—how could it be said not to exist? If it exists yet one says it does not, one holds a wrong and harmful view; one who holds such a view does not attain liberation. Therefore one should not say that all dharmas are empty and markless.
The treatise author answers: If self truly exists yet one says it does not, that is a wrong and harmful view. But if it is originally absent and one says it is absent, what fault is there? Examine it carefully: in fact, there is no self.
2. Are Awareness and Self One or Different?
The outsider says: Self truly exists. As the Sāṃkhya Sūtra says, the mark of awareness is the self.
The treatise author asks: Are self and awareness one, or are they different?
The outsider answers: Self and awareness are one.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If awareness is self’s mark, self is impermanent. The adept Vasu explains: If awareness is the mark of self, because awareness is impermanent, self too should be impermanent. For example, heat is the mark of fire; since heat is impermanent, fire too is impermanent. Awareness now is indeed impermanent. Why? Because its marks differ from one another, because it belongs to causes and conditions, because formerly absent it now exists, and because, having existed, it returns to absence.
3. Permanent Because Unarisen
〔T30 0171a02〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: It is permanent because unarisen. The adept Vasu explains: Only a dharma bearing the mark of arising is impermanent. Self does not bear the mark of arising and therefore is permanent.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, awareness is not self’s mark. The adept Vasu explains: Awareness is impermanent, while you say self is permanent; self should therefore differ from awareness. If self and awareness do not differ, because awareness is impermanent, self too should be impermanent. Further, to say that awareness is self’s mark is unreasonable. Why?—Deva’s root statement: Because awareness operates in one place. The adept Vasu explains: If awareness is self’s mark, then since the self in your teaching pervades every place, awareness too should operate throughout the five destinies at one time. Yet awareness operates only in one place and cannot pervade them all. Therefore awareness is not self’s mark.
Further—Deva’s root statement: If so, self is equal to awareness. The adept Vasu explains: If you take awareness as self’s mark, self should be equal to awareness, and so self likewise does not pervade. Fire, for example, does not possess a mark that is both hot and not hot. Self is the same: it should not possess the marks of both pervading and not pervading.
Further—Deva’s root statement: If one takes it to pervade, it then has the marks of awareness and nonawareness. The adept Vasu explains: If you want self to pervade, self then has two marks—the mark of awareness and the mark of nonawareness. Why? Because awareness does not pervade. Where self falls in a place of awareness, it is aware; where it falls in a place without awareness, it is unaware.
4. The Power of Awareness and Causes and Conditions
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because its power pervades, there is no fault. The adept Vasu explains: Though awareness does not function in some places, the power of awareness is still present there; therefore, there is no fault of “lacking awareness.”
The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because power and that which has power are not different. The adept Vasu explains: If the power of awareness is present in some place, awareness there should function, yet in fact it does not function. Therefore your statement is not right. If, as you say, the power of awareness remains where awareness does not function, there is only this statement and nothing more.
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because causes and conditions conjoin, the power of awareness functions. The adept Vasu explains: Although self possesses the power of awareness, it must await the conjunction of causes and conditions before it can function.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because it falls under the mark of arising. The adept Vasu explains: If awareness functions only when causes and conditions conjoin, this awareness belongs to causes and conditions and therefore falls under the mark of arising. If awareness does not differ from self, self too bears the mark of arising.
5. The Lamp Analogy and the Color Analogy
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with a lamp. The adept Vasu explains: A lamp can illuminate an object but cannot make it. Causes and conditions are the same: they can make awareness function but cannot produce awareness.
The treatise author answers: It is not so. Although a lamp does not illuminate a jar and the rest, the jar and the rest can still be obtained and put to use. But when causes and conditions do not conjoin, awareness cannot be obtained and self cannot experience pain and pleasure. Therefore your analogy is not right.
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with color. The adept Vasu explains: Color, for example, exists beforehand, but without a lamp illuminating it, it is not clearly manifest. Awareness is the same: although it exists beforehand, it is not clearly manifest before causes and conditions conjoin.
The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because its own mark is not clear. The adept Vasu explains: Before illumination, although a person does not apprehend it clearly, the mark of color is itself clear. The mark of your awareness is itself unclear, so your analogy is not right. Further, because there is no mark: the mark of color does not become the mark of color because a person knows it, so even when it is unseen, color is continually present. You say cognition is self’s mark, so you should not take a place without cognition to be cognition. It is not right to take a place without cognition to be cognition—especially since cognition and awareness have the same meaning in your teaching.
6. Cognition Differs from Self: The Analogy of Owning a Cow
The outsider says: Ulūka’s disciples recite the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra and say that cognition differs from self; therefore self does not fall under impermanence and is not unaware. Why? Because self conjoins with cognition—Deva’s root statement: As with one who owns a cow. The adept Vasu explains: Because a person conjoins with a cow, the person is called a cow owner. In the same way, through self’s conjunction with faculty, mind, and object, cognition arises for self; because self conjoins with cognition, self is called one who possesses cognition.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The mark of a cow abides in the cow, not in the cow’s owner. The adept Vasu explains: The mark of a cow abides in the cow, not in the person who owns the cow. Thus although the person and cow conjoin, the cow owner does not become a cow; only the cow is a cow. In the same way, although self and cognition conjoin, the mark of cognition abides in cognition, and self does not become cognition. You say that cognition arises through the conjunction of self, faculty, mind, and object. What this cognition cognizes is color and the other objects; therefore cognition alone can cognize, and self does not cognize. For example, fire can burn, not the person who possesses fire.
7. A Dharma That Can Be Used—and a Lamp That Does Not Cognize Color
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it can use a dharma. The adept Vasu explains: Although a person possesses the mark of seeing, by using a lamp the person can see, and apart from the lamp cannot see. Although self possesses the capacity to know, by using cognition it knows, and apart from cognition it does not know.
The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because cognition itself can cognize. The adept Vasu explains: Through the conjunction of faculty, mind, and object, cognition arises; this cognition cognizes color and the other objects. Therefore cognition itself is what can cognize and is not something used by another. If cognition itself can cognize, what further use is self? The lamp analogy is also wrong. Why?—Deva’s root statement: Because a lamp does not cognize color and the rest. The adept Vasu explains: Although a lamp exists beforehand, it cannot cognize color and the rest, because it is not a cognitive dharma. Therefore only cognition can cognize color. If it cannot cognize, it is not called cognition. Thus even if a separate self capable of cognition is established, what use could that capacity possibly have?
8. Horse’s Body, Black Cloth, and Staff Holder
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it conjoins with a horse’s body, self becomes a horse. The adept Vasu explains: Because self conjoins with the body of a horse, self is called a horse. Although self differs from the body, self is still called the horse. In the same way, because self conjoins with cognition, self is called cognition.
The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: The self in the body is not the horse. The adept Vasu explains: The horse’s body itself is the horse. You hold that body differs from self; self therefore differs from the horse, so how could self be taken as the horse? Thus the analogy is wrong. To use self as an analogy for self is to fall into defeat.
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with black cloth. The adept Vasu explains: Take black cloth. Although blackness differs from the cloth, because cloth and blackness conjoin, it is called black cloth. In the same way, although cognition differs from self, because self and cognition conjoin, self is called cognition.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no self. The adept Vasu explains: If self is called cognition because it conjoins with cognition, then self should cease to be self. Why? I said earlier that cognition itself can cognize. If cognition is not called self, self likewise is not called a cognizer. If conjunction with another thing warrants taking that other thing’s name, then when cognition conjoins with self, why is cognition not called self? Further, the black-cloth analogy just given contradicts your own scripture. In your scripture, blackness is a quality and cloth is a substance; substance does not become quality, and quality does not become substance.
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with one who has a staff. The adept Vasu explains: Because a person conjoins with a staff, the person is called a staff holder, not merely a staff. Although the staff conjoins with the person, the staff is not called a person holder and is not called a person. In the same way, because self conjoins with cognition, self is called a knower, not merely cognition; nor is cognition called self because cognition conjoins with self.
The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: The staff holder is not the staff. The adept Vasu explains: Although the staff and the staff holder conjoin, the staff holder does not become the staff. In the same way, the mark of cognition is in cognition, not in self. Therefore self is not a knower.
9. Can One Awareness Have Many Marks?
The outsider says: The Sāṃkhyas further say that if cognition differed from self, the preceding faults would follow, but our scripture has no such fault. Why? Because awareness is the mark of self. I take the mark of awareness as self, and so self is continually aware and never unaware.
The treatise author answers: Although this has already been refuted, let it now be stated again—Deva’s root statement: If awareness is the mark of self, self is not one. The adept Vasu explains: Awareness has many forms—painful awareness, pleasant awareness, and the rest. If awareness is self’s mark, self too should be many.
The outsider says: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: The one has many marks, as does crystal. The adept Vasu explains: One crystal changes according to color, becoming blue, yellow, red, white, and so forth. In the same way, one awareness differentiates according to objects, becoming awareness of pain, awareness of pleasure, and so forth. Although awareness has many marks, it is in fact only one awareness.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, demerit and merit have one mark. The adept Vasu explains: Awareness that benefits others is called merit; awareness that harms others is called demerit. Every wise person inwardly accepts this dharma. If awareness that benefits and awareness that harms are one, demerit and merit should have one mark, and giving and stealing and the rest should likewise be one. Further, that crystal exists first and changes according to color, but awareness arises together with conditions, so your analogy is wrong. Further, because the crystal arises and ceases anew at every moment, its marks are not one. Your claim that the crystal is one is also wrong.
10. The Potter Analogy
〔T30 0172a02〕The outsider says: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Although effects are many, their maker is one, as with a potter. The adept Vasu explains: One potter makes jars, basins, and the rest; the maker being one does not require the effects to be one. In the same way, one awareness can perform acts of harm, benefit, and the rest.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The potter has no difference. The adept Vasu explains: The potter’s body is one and possesses no mark of difference, while differing from the jar, basin, and the rest. Yet awareness that benefits others and awareness that harms others truly possess different marks, and harm, benefit, and the rest do not differ from awareness. Therefore your analogy is wrong.
11. An Inferential Mark—and Times without Cognition
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self truly exists, because there is an inferential mark of knowing. The adept Vasu explains: Although some things cannot be known through immediate presence, they can be known through a comparable mark. For example, one sees a person first depart and then arrive over there. Again, sun and moon rise in the east and set in the west; although one does not see them move, because they arrive there, one knows they have moved. In the same way, seeing the qualities depend on substance, one knows through an inferential mark that self exists. Because self conjoins with cognition, self is called a knower.
The treatise author answers: This was already refuted, but let it now be stated again—Deva’s root statement: What does not cognize is not self. The adept Vasu explains: In your teaching self is all-pervading and vast, while cognition is slight. If self is the knower yet in some places and at some times does not cognize, then it is not self. “In some places” means outside the body. “At some times” means within the body: in sleep, fainting, and the like, at that time there is no cognition. If cognition is self’s mark, yet in some places and at some times self does not cognize, then it is not self. Why? Because it lacks the mark of cognition. You establish self through the mark of cognition, but this is vacuous and unreal.
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because activity is absent, cognition is absent, as with smoke. The adept Vasu explains: Smoke is a mark of fire, yet once wood becomes charcoal there is no smoke; although smoke is then absent, fire remains. In the same way, although cognition is self’s mark, whether cognition is present or absent, self should always exist.
The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because self can cognize. The adept Vasu explains: If you still want self to exist when cognition is absent, that self cannot cognize and lacks the mark of cognition. Why? Because in your account self remains self even when cognition is absent. Further, only because one directly sees fire when smoke is absent does one know that fire is present. As for self, whether cognition is present or absent, there is no one able to see it. Therefore your analogy is wrong.
Further, your claim that self exists because one sees a shared relation and knows by comparison is also wrong. Why?—Deva’s root statement: Because one sees a goer arrive there through the dharma of going. The adept Vasu explains: Apart from the goer there is no going; apart from going, no goer arrives there. Thus when one sees that the person who went has arrived there, one necessarily knows there was going. But the claim that apart from self there is no cognition is not established. Therefore one should not assert self because cognition exists. One must not see a turtle and conceive hair; one must not see a barren woman and conceive a child. In the same way, one must not see cognition and conceive a self.
12. As with a Hand That Grasps
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with a hand that grasps. The adept Vasu explains: A hand sometimes grasps and sometimes does not. Because it does not grasp at some time, one cannot refuse to call it a hand; a hand is always called a hand. Self is the same: it sometimes cognizes and sometimes does not. Because it does not cognize at some time, one cannot refuse to call it self; self is always called self.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Grasping is not the hand’s mark. The adept Vasu explains: Grasping is the hand’s activity, not the hand’s mark. Why? It is not because it grasps that one knows it is a hand. You take cognition itself to be self’s mark, so this analogy is wrong.
13. Is What Experiences Pain and Pleasure a Permanent Self?
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self certainly exists, because it experiences pain and pleasure. The adept Vasu explains: If there is nothing that experiences, there is no experience. The body alone cannot experience pain and pleasure. Why? A corpse has a body but cannot experience pain or pleasure. Thus what knows that it has this body can experience pain and pleasure; this is self. Therefore self certainly exists.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If distressed, it is also severed. The adept Vasu explains: When a knife harms the body, distress arises. If the knife harms self and self is distressed, self too should be severable.
The outsider says: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because it has no contact, it is like space. The adept Vasu explains: Because self has no contact, it cannot be severed. When a house burns, for example, the space within cannot be burned because it has no contact; it only has heat. In the same way, when the body is severed, because the self within has no contact, it cannot be severed; it only has distress.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no going. The adept Vasu explains: If self has no contact, the body should not go to another place. Why? The dharma of going arises from thought and from the body’s movement. The body has no thought because it is not a cognitive dharma; self has no power of movement because it is not a bodily dharma. It follows that the body should not go to another place.
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with the blind and the lame. The adept Vasu explains: The blind and the lame, relying on each other, can move. In the same way, self has thought and body has the power of movement; when they conjoin, they can move.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because their marks differ. The adept Vasu explains: The blind person and lame person have two contacts and two thoughts, and therefore according to principle they can move. Body and self lack these two things, so they should not move; thus there is no dharma of going. Otherwise, the fault of severability stated above follows. Further, your claim that space is hot is not right. Why? Because space has no contact. A subtle heat pervades space, and the body touches and experiences that heat. It is not space that is hot; to call space hot is merely borrowed speech.
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with the distress of the owner of the house. The adept Vasu explains: When a house burns, its owner is merely distressed and is not burned. In the same way, when the body is severed, self is merely distressed and is not severed.
The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: It burns because it is impermanent. The adept Vasu explains: When a house burns, its grass, wood, and the rest, being impermanent, both burn and become hot. Space, being permanent, neither burns nor becomes hot. In the same way, the body, being impermanent, is both distressed and severed. Since self is permanent, it is neither distressed nor severed. Further, the owner of the house is not burned because he is far from the fire. Your scripture says self is all-pervading; it too should therefore be severed and destroyed.
14. Are the Five Faculties Self’s Instruments?
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self must exist, because it apprehends color and the rest. The adept Vasu explains: The five faculties cannot cognize the five objects, because they are not cognitive dharmas. Thus one knows that self can cognize. Self uses the eye and the other faculties to cognize color and the other objects, as a person uses a sickle to harvest the five grains.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Why not see with the ear? The adept Vasu explains: If self truly possesses the power of sight, why does it not use the ear to see color? As fire can burn, it burns everywhere. Again, when a person is without a sickle, a hand can also cut. Again, a house has six windows facing outward, and the person dwelling within can see from wherever he stands. Self should likewise be able to see everywhere.
The outsider says: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Because what is used is fixed, as with a potter. The adept Vasu explains: Although self possesses the power of sight, the objects examined by the eye and the other faculties differ, and each has a fixed share among the sense objects. Therefore it cannot use the ear to see color. Although a potter can make a jar, apart from clay he cannot make one. In the same way, although self possesses the power of sight, without relying on the eye it cannot see.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, it is blind. The adept Vasu explains: If self sees by using the eye, self differs from the eye. If self differs from the eye, self has no eye. How can a self without an eye see? Your potter analogy is also wrong. Why? Apart from clay there is no further jar; clay itself is the jar. But eye and color differ.
15. Saliva Arising in the Mouth—and Bodily Touch in the Dark
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self exists, because a faculty different from the first moves. The adept Vasu explains: If self did not exist, why would seeing another person eat fruit make saliva arise in one’s own mouth? The eye should not be what knows flavor; only a person who possesses self can know it. Further—Deva’s root statement: Because one thing is known by eye and body. The adept Vasu explains: A person first recognizes a jar and the rest by eye; later, in the dark, although the eye is not used, bodily touch also knows it. Therefore one knows that self exists.
The treatise author answers: This was already refuted in the sūtra passage concerning blindness. Further, if the eye sees another person eating fruit and saliva arises in the mouth, why do the other faculties not move? The same applies to the body.
16. A Person Burns—and Fire Burns
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As when a person burns something. The adept Vasu explains: Although a person can burn something, apart from fire the person cannot burn it. Self is the same: by using the eye it can see, and apart from the eye it cannot see.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Fire burns. The adept Vasu explains: To say that a person burns is false speech. Why? A person has no mark of burning; fire itself can burn. When wind rubs pieces of wood against one another, fire arises and burns mountain and marsh, yet there is no agent. Thus fire itself can burn; it is not the person who burns.
17. If Mind Can Cognize, What Further Use Is Self?
〔T30 0173a01〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As with mind. The adept Vasu explains: Although a corpse has eyes, because it lacks mind, self does not see; when mind is present, self sees. In the same way, self sees by using the eye, and apart from the eye it does not see.
The treatise author answers: If with mind there is cognition and without mind there is no cognition, then mind need only operate through the doors of the eye and the rest to know. What further use is self?
The outsider says: Mind cannot itself know itself. If one mind and another mind knew each other, there would be no end. My self is one; when self knows mind, there is no infinite regress.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Self also requires a self. The adept Vasu explains: If self knows mind, then who knows self? If self knows self, this too has no end. In my teaching, present mind cognizes past mind. Because mind-dharmas are impermanent, there is no fault.
The outsider asks—Deva’s root statement: How can self be removed? The adept Vasu explains: If self is removed, how can mind alone cognize the various objects?
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: As heat is the mark of fire. The adept Vasu explains: Fire is hot, yet there is no maker. Fire’s nature is itself hot, and there is no fire that is not hot. In the same way, mind has cognition as its mark; although apart from self, it can cognize because its nature can know by itself. Since self and cognition are different, self should not cognize.
18. Recollection from Past Habit
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: There should be a self abiding from before, because the recollection of ingrained habit continues, and at birth there are acts of distress and joy. The adept Vasu explains: An infant knows how to move and experiences distress, joy, and the rest as soon as it is born, though no one taught it. Because recollection of habits from a past life continues, it still performs various actions in this life. Therefore one knows that self exists and that self has the mark of permanence.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If it pervades, how can it recollect? The adept Vasu explains: Since self permanently pervades every object, there is no time when it does not recollect. From where, then, does recollection arise? Further, if recollection arises in every place, recollection too should pervade every place, and all things should be recalled everywhere at the same time. If recollection arises only place by place, self has parts; because it has parts, it is impermanent. Further, if self is unaware, or if cognition is not self, this was already refuted.
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because of conjunction, recollection arises. The adept Vasu explains: When self and mind conjoin, recollection arises because their active force is set in motion. Why? Although self and mind have conjoined, if their active force is not set in motion, recollection does not arise.
The treatise author answers: Although this was already refuted, let it now be stated again. If self has cognition as its mark, recollection should not arise; if it does not have cognition as its mark, recollection likewise should not arise. Further—Deva’s root statement: If recollection cognizes. The adept Vasu explains: If there is cognition when recollection arises and no cognition when recollection does not arise, recollection itself should be cognition. What further use is self?
19. The Left Eye Sees and the Right Eye Recognizes
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Self should exist, because the left sees and the right recognizes. The adept Vasu explains: A person first sees with the left eye and later recognizes with the right eye; it should not be that one saw while another recognizes. Because there is a self within, one can see with the left eye and recognize with the right.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: A common answer concerning both eyes. The adept Vasu explains: Partial cognition is not called cognition. Further, if so, there is no cognition. Further, if it pervades, how can it recollect? Further, if recollection itself is cognition. Further, why not see with the ear? Further, if so, it is blind. Further, just as what the left eye sees should not be recognized by the right eye, self likewise should not see in this part and recognize in that part. Therefore one should not assert a self because the left eye sees and the right eye recognizes.
20. Partial Cognition Is Not Called Cognition
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because recollection belongs to self, self cognizes. The adept Vasu explains: Recollection is called a dharma of self; this recollection arises in self, and so self uses recollection to cognize.
The treatise author answers: It is not so—Deva’s root statement: Partial cognition is not called cognition. The adept Vasu explains: If cognition arises in one part of self, self has partial cognition. If self has partial cognition, self is not called a knower.
The outsider says: Self’s cognition is not partial cognition. Why? Although self cognizes in part, self is still called a knower—Deva’s root statement: As with bodily action. The adept Vasu explains: When a hand, one part of the body, performs an action, the body is said to act. In the same way, although self cognizes in part, self is still called a knower.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no cognition. The adept Vasu explains: In your teaching self pervades while mind is limited; because self and mind conjoin, cognition arises for self, and this cognition is as limited as mind. If cognition in a small part warrants calling self a knower, why do you not say that because the greater part does not cognize, self is called a nonknower? Further, your analogy of bodily action is wrong. Why? Because identity and difference between part and whole possessing parts cannot be obtained.
The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As when part of a garment burns. The adept Vasu explains: When one part of a garment burns, it is called a burned garment. In the same way, although self cognizes in only one part, it is called a knowing self.
The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Burning is likewise so. The adept Vasu explains: When one part of a garment burns, it should not simply be called burned; it should be called partially burned. If, because one part burns, you say this garment is called burned, then because its greater part is now unburned, it should also be called unburned. Why? Most of this garment is unburned and remains genuinely usable. Therefore, do not cling to language.
上一品拆掉一個『吉』字，這一品要拆的東西大得多。外道開口就把整場空義推回來：「不應言一切法空無相，神等諸法有故」——你說一切法空無相，可是神在那裡，諸法在那裡。
論主沒有先講空，先問一句反話：「若無而言無，此有何過？」若真有神而說無，那是惡邪；若本來就無而說無，過失在哪裡。然後只給一句話作全品的方法：「諦觀察之，實無有神。」不是先斷後查，是查了才說。
於是外道舉出他們的神，論主一路問下去，直到最末一句「是以莫著語言」。
一、他們立的是什麼
先要看清所立之物，否則以為論主在否認人會知覺。
迦毘羅一路先開二十五諦：「從冥初生覺，從覺生我心，從我心生五微塵，從五微塵生五大，從五大生十一根。」在這一串之上安一個東西：「神為主，常、覺相、處中、常住、不壞不敗、攝受諸法。」牠是主、是常、以覺為相、遍而不壞，且能攝受一切法；能知這二十五諦便得解脫，「不知此者，不離生死」。
優樓迦一路走的是另一條：不從生次立，從現有的事相反推——「以出入息、視眴、壽命等相故，則知有神」，又「以欲恚、苦樂、智慧等所依處故，則知有神」。呼吸、眨眼、活著，喜怒苦樂，總得有個所依。所以他說：「是故神是實有，云何言無？」
兩家所要的是同一件事：一個在諸法背後、常住不變而又能知的主人。分歧只在它與知的關係——僧佉說「覺相是神」，衛世師說「知與神異」。全品便沿這兩條走。
二、說一：常的東西守不住無常的覺
論主先把話問死：「神覺為一耶？為異耶？」外道答一。
第一句本文隨即落下：「覺若神相，神無常」。理由是現成的：熱是火相，「譬如熱是火相，熱無常故，火亦無常」。相若無常，以它為相的也就無常。而覺是不是無常，論主給了四條：「相各異故、屬因緣故、本無今有故、已有還無故。」苦覺樂覺相貌各別；覺要待因緣；先前沒有而今有；有過了又歸於沒有。四條都不必另找證據，就在自己身上看得見。
外道退一步：「不生故常」——有生相的才無常，神不是生相。論主便把這一退坐實：「若爾覺非神相」。你既說神常，覺既無常，兩個就得是異；不肯是異，神便隨覺無常。
接著把「遍」逼出來。神說遍，覺卻不遍——「覺行一處故」：你法中神遍一切處，覺就該「一時遍行五道」，然而覺只在一處。若硬說覺是神相，「神與覺等」，神也跟著不遍了；而火不會既熱又不熱，「不應有遍不遍相」。若還要遍，就得認兩個相：「若以為遍，則有覺不覺相」——「神若墮覺處是則覺，若墮不覺處是則不覺。」
外道搬出「力遍故無過」：無用之處也還有覺的力在。論主答「力有力不異故」：既有覺力，那裡的覺就該有用而實無用；至於說無用處也有力，「但有是語」——只是一句話而已，拿不出對應的事。外道再補「因緣合故覺力有用」，這一補卻自己交出了神：「墮生相故」。要待因緣才起用，就屬因緣；屬因緣就落生相；覺神既不異，神也是生相。常，就是這樣被自己的解釋磨掉的。
三、燈與色：兩個救不了場的譬喻
外道拿燈來救：燈能照物不能作物，因緣能令覺有用而不生覺。論主的答很實在：「燈雖不照瓶等，而瓶等可得亦可持用。」不照的時候，瓶還在那裡，摸得到用得著；可是「若因緣不合時，覺不可得」，神也不能覺苦樂。譬喻的兩邊對不上——一邊不照仍在，一邊不合即無。
外道換色：色先有，燈不照則不了；覺先有，因緣未合則不了。論主答「自相不了故」：沒照的時候，人雖不了，「色相自了」——色自己的相並不因人不見而缺。而「汝覺相自不了」。再往下一層更緊：「色相不以人知故為色相，是故若不見時常有色。」色不是被知才成色；你的神卻是拿知作相的，「不應以無知處為知」。而且在你法中「知覺一義」，說覺不了、卻仍是覺，等於說不知即是知。
四、說異：和合改不了名
僧佉這一路走不通，衛世師接上：「知與神異」，因此神不落無常，也不無知——因為神與知和合。譬喻是「如有牛」：人與牛合，人便名有牛；神與情意塵合，神便名有知。
論主的答是全品最俐落的一句：「牛相牛中住，非有牛中」——牛的相住在牛身上，不住在那個「有牛」的人身上；人跟牛合了一輩子，人也不變成牛，「但牛為牛」。同理，知的相住在知裡，神不因和合而成知。所以「但知能知非神知」，並附一句：「譬如火能燒，非有火人燒。」拿著火把的人不會燒東西，燒的是火。
外道改說神是使用者：人有見相而須用燈，神有能知而須用知。論主答「知即能知故」：情意塵合而知生，這知能知色等塵，它本身就是能知的那一位，不是被誰拿來用的工具。既然如此，「若知即能知，神復何用？」燈的比法也不成，因為「燈不知色等故」——燈根本不是知法，它從來不曾知色；能知色的一直只有知。
五、四個借來的腳
和合既然改不了名，外道連舉四喻，都在找一種『合了就能改名』的例。
一是馬：神與馬身合，神便名為馬。論主答「身中神非馬」——「馬身即馬也。」馬身自己就是馬，用不著另外一個神來當馬；何況你主張身神是異，那神與馬也異，「以神喻神，則墮負處」：拿要證的東西當證據。
二是黑疊：黑與疊異，合而名黑疊。論主先順著問：若合而取他名，那麼知與神合，「何不名知為神」？名字為什麼只朝一邊改。再指出這喻自壞己經：「汝經黑是求那，疊是陀羅驃。陀羅驃不作求那，求那不作陀羅驃。」你自家的分類裡，實與德本來就不互相變成。
三是杖：人與杖合名有杖，杖不名有人——外道以此說名分是有方向的，神合知而名能知，知卻不名為神。論主順這個方向答「有杖非杖」：方向確是你說的那樣，可是有杖的人終究不是杖；「知相知中非神中，是故神非能知」。
四是回到僧佉。他們說：知神若異便有上過，我以「覺相為神」，故「常覺無不覺」。論主答「若覺相神不一」——覺有苦覺樂覺種種，神就跟著種種。外道舉頗梨珠：「一為種種相，如頗梨」，一珠隨色而青黃赤白，一覺隨塵而覺苦覺樂。論主答「若爾罪福一相」：益他之覺是福，損他之覺是罪，若二覺是一，罪福便一相，「如施盜等亦應一」。再拆珠喻本身：珠是先有而隨色變，覺卻是「共緣生」；而且「珠新新生滅故，相則不一」——你舉來證一的那顆珠，自己就不是一。
外道換陶師：一個作者能作多種果。論主答「陶師無別異」：陶師的身確實一相無別異，可是他「與瓶瓫等異」——喻中的一是作者，多是果，兩邊分得開；而益他覺、損他覺「實有異相」，卻又「與覺不異」。多的那一邊就在覺自己身上。
六、由推理立神，與那段不知的時間
外道換路，改用比量：「實有神，比知相故」。這一著相當有力，且舉了好例：見人先去後到，日月東出西沒，雖不見其行走，「以到彼故知去」。同樣，見諸求那依陀羅驃，便可比知有神。
論主的答不繞：「不知非神」。你的神「遍廣大而知少」，可是「有處有時不知」——「有處名身外，有時名身內，睡眠悶等是時不知」。睡著的時候、悶絕的時候，知是斷的。以知為相的東西，在沒有知的那段時間裡，憑什麼還算它在。
外道以煙火作答：炭時無煙而火猶在，知雖是神相，有知無知神應常有。論主答「神能知故」：若不知時仍要有神，那神就「不能知，亦無知相」——你保住了牠的存在，卻交出了牠的定義。更要緊的是驗證：無煙時人還「現見有火」，所以敢說火在；而神「若有知、若無知，無能見者」，沒有第二個管道能看見牠。
接著回頭拆比量本身：「見去者去法到彼故」。那個譬喻之所以成立，是因為去者與去法相依而現，一頭見得到；「若離去者無去法，離去法無去者到彼」。可是「若離神無知，是事不然」——你的第二頭從來沒被見過。所以論主收得極重：「不可見龜而有毛想，不可見石女而有兒想，如是不應見知便有神想。」
外道最後在這一段舉手取：手有時取有時不取，不取時仍名手。論主答「取非手相」——「取是手業非手相」，手不是因為取才叫手；而你偏偏「以知即神相」。相與業不同層，喻便接不上。
七、刀砍下來的時候
換一條進路：「定有神，覺苦樂故」。死人有身而不覺苦樂，可見覺苦樂的另有其物。
論主答「若惱亦斷」：刀害身則生惱，若刀也害到神而神有惱，神便也該可斷。外道答「無觸故如空」：燒舍時內空無觸，不可燒，「但有熱」；斷身時內神無觸，不可斷，「但有惱」。
論主由此逼出一個更硬的後果：「若爾無去」——若神無觸，人就走不動了。因為「去法從思惟生、從身動生」，而「身無思惟，非覺法故。神無動力，非身法故」。你把兩件必要的事分給兩個互不相干的東西，走這件事就沒地方發生。
外道舉盲跛相假能去。論主答「異相故」：盲跛是兩個人，「二觸二思惟故法應能去」；身與神「無二事」——神無觸、身無覺，湊不出那兩件。順帶把空熱一併澄清：空無觸，是「身觸覺熱，非空熱也」，說空熱只是假借言說。
外道再舉舍主：舍燒而主人惱不被燒。論主答「無常故燒」：舍中草木「無常故，亦燒亦熱」，空「常故，不燒不熱」。這譬喻自己劃出了界線——會燒的是無常的，常的連熱都不熱。那麼身無常，「亦惱亦斷」；神既常，「不惱不斷」，惱也輪不到牠。而舍主之所以不燒，是他離火遠；可是「汝經言神遍滿故，亦應斷壞」——遍滿的東西沒有遠處可站。
八、若牠是使用者，為什麼有用不上的門
再換：「必有神取色等故」。五情不是知法，知的是神；神用眼等知色等塵，「如人以鎌收刈五穀」。
論主答「何不用耳見」。若見的力在神，力就該處處起用：「如火能燒，處處皆燒」；沒有鐮刀「手亦能斷」；舍有六向，人在其中「所在能見」。你這位使用者卻只能從一個門看色。外道以陶師應之——所用有定，離泥不能作瓶，非眼不能見色。論主答「若爾盲」：神既用眼，神與眼異；異則「神無眼」，無眼何以能見。至於陶師之喻，「離泥更無有瓶，泥即為瓶；而眼色異故」——泥與瓶是同一物的前後，眼與色卻是兩物，比不到一處。
外道舉兩件小事作證：見人食果而口生涎，可見知味不由眼；暗中不用眼而身觸能識先前眼所識之瓶。論主答得極短：如盲之難已破；而且「若眼見他食果而口生涎者，餘情何以不動？」若真有一個總攬的知者，怎麼只動一處。
外道再借人燒之喻——人能燒而離火不能，神能見而離眼不能。論主連喻的前提都不許：「人無燒相，火自能燒。」風吹木相揩而生火，焚燒山澤，「無有作者」。你借來的那個作者，在那個譬喻裡本來就不存在。
九、意既能知，神在何處
外道以死人有眼而無意故不見，說神須用眼。論主直接指向意：「若有意能知、無意不能知者，但意行眼等門中便知，神復何用？」
外道給出保留神的理由：意不能自知，若意意相知則無窮；「我神一故」，以神知意便止住無窮。論主答「神亦神」：那麼誰知神？若神知神，一樣無窮。而自家不必立這個止點——「以現在意知過去意，意法無常故無咎。」正因為意是無常的、前後相續的，後念知前念，鏈子自然接得上，也自然停得住。
外道問「云何除神」，論主答「如火熱相」：火熱無有作者，「火性自熱，無有不熱之火」。意也如此，「是知相」，性自能知，離神仍知。而「神知異故，神不應知」——你既把知與神判開，知的事就與神無干。
外道舉小兒生便知憂喜，說是宿習念相續，故有常神。論主答「遍云何念」：神既常遍諸塵，就沒有不憶念的時候，那念從何而生？若念一切處生，就該一時盡念；若「念分分處生」，神便有分，有分即無常。外道說「合故念生」——神意合而勢發則念生。論主答：神若知相不應生念，非知相亦不應生念；而且「若念知」——念生時知、念不生時不知，那「應念即是知，神復何用」。念自己已經把事情辦完了。
外道又舉左眼見、右眼識。論主以「共答二眼」一口氣把前面的門都搬過來：分知不名知、若爾無知、遍云何念、若念知、何不用耳見、若爾盲。而後點出這例子本身的難處：既然「如左眼見不應右眼識」，神也不該「此分見彼分識」。
十、末後一句：莫著語言
最後一輪爭的是「分」。外道說念屬神法，神用念知；論主答「分知不名知」：知只在神的一分處生，那便是分知，分知不足以名神為知。
外道以身業護之：手有所作而名身作，神雖分知而名知。論主答「若爾無知」：你的神遍而意少，神意合而知生，這知「與意等少」；若以少分之知名神為知，「汝何不言以多不知故神名不知」？取名的規矩不能只朝有利的一邊用。至於身業之喻，「分有分一異不可得故」——手與身是一是異，本身就不成立。
外道最後舉衣：一分燒名為燒衣。論主答「燒亦如是」：一分燒該名分燒；你既以一分名全體，那多分未燒也該名不燒。理由是實事：「是衣多不燒，實有用故。」燒過的那件衣還穿得，可見「燒衣」二字並沒有把整件衣說盡。
全品便收在這裡：「是以莫著語言。」
一路數下來，外道給神的每一個名字都是這樣來的——有牛、黑疊、有杖、燒衣，都是就一分而立的通稱。通稱在世間好用，可是把通稱當成一個真有自性的東西，它就得同時是常又是無常、是遍又是不遍、是知又是不知。論主自始至終沒有否認人會見、會知、會憶、會苦；否認的，是在這些事之外另有一個常住的知者。
承衍
本品是《百論》治外諸品的第一品，所立的問法貫串其後：破一、破異兩品把此處反覆用到的一異兩路正面展開；破情、破塵兩品接手情與塵；破常一品追那個「常」字。本品既已由「分有分一異不可得故」把手與身放下，一異之破自須另品足之。
品名〈破神〉，破的是那個被安在諸法背後的主人。所以本品讀完不必去找一個替代的東西來坐那個位子——「以現在意知過去意，意法無常故無咎」，這一句已經把位子撤了。
The previous chapter took apart the single word “auspicious.” What this chapter takes apart is far larger. The outsider opens by pushing back the whole teaching of emptiness: “One should not say that all dharmas are empty and markless, because self and the other dharmas exist.” You say that all dharmas are empty and markless, but there is self, and there are all those dharmas.
The treatise author does not begin by explaining emptiness. He first asks in reply: “If it is absent and one says it is absent, what fault is there?” If self truly exists and one says it does not, that is a wrong and harmful view; but if it is originally absent and one says it is absent, where is the fault? Then he gives only one sentence as the method of the chapter: “Examine it truly: in fact, there is no self.” The conclusion is not pronounced before the inquiry; it is stated after the inquiry.
The outsider therefore presents the self his schools establish, and the treatise author questions it all the way to the final sentence: “Therefore, do not cling to language.”
1. What Are They Establishing?
First see clearly what is being posited, lest the treatise author be mistaken for denying that people see and know.
Kapila’s path first lays out the twenty-five principles: “From primordial obscurity arises awareness; from awareness arises ego-mind; from ego-mind arise the five subtle elements; from the five subtle elements arise the five great elements; from the five great elements arise the eleven faculties.” Above this sequence it installs something else: “Self is the lord—permanent, having awareness as its mark, centered, ever abiding, neither broken nor undone, and gathering all dharmas.” It is lord and permanent, has awareness as its mark, pervades without destruction, and gathers every dharma. Knowing these twenty-five principles brings liberation; “one who does not know them does not leave birth and death.”
Ulūka’s path takes another route. Rather than establishing self through a sequence of production, it infers it from present phenomena: “From such marks as inhalation, exhalation, blinking, and life, one knows that self exists”; further, “Because self is the locus upon which desire, anger, pain, pleasure, wisdom, and the rest depend, one knows that self exists.” Breathing, blinking, being alive, joy and anger, pain and pleasure—all must have some substrate. Thus he says: “Therefore self truly exists; how can one say it is absent?”
Both schools want the same thing: behind all dharmas, a permanent and unchanging lord that knows. They differ only over its relation to knowing—Sāṃkhya says, “Awareness is the self”; Vaiśeṣika says, “Cognition differs from self.” The entire chapter follows these two routes.
2. To Say They Are One: What Is Permanent Cannot Keep Impermanent Awareness
The treatise author first closes off every evasion with a question: “Are self and awareness one, or are they different?” The outsider answers that they are one.
The first root sentence immediately falls: “If awareness is self’s mark, self is impermanent.” The reason is already at hand. Heat is the mark of fire: “As heat is the mark of fire, since heat is impermanent, fire too is impermanent.” If the mark is impermanent, what it marks is likewise impermanent. As for whether awareness is impermanent, the treatise author gives four grounds: “because its marks differ, because it belongs to causes and conditions, because formerly absent it now exists, and because, having existed, it returns to absence.” Painful and pleasant awareness have different appearances; awareness awaits causes and conditions; it was absent before and exists now; after existing, it returns to absence. None of these four requires evidence from elsewhere. Each can be seen in awareness itself.
The outsider retreats one step: self is “permanent because unarisen”—only what bears the mark of arising is impermanent, and self does not bear that mark. The treatise author makes the retreat binding: “If so, awareness is not self’s mark.” You say that self is permanent, while awareness is impermanent, so the two must differ. Refuse their difference, and self becomes impermanent along with awareness.
Next he forces out the claim of pervasion. Self is said to pervade, but awareness does not—“because awareness operates in one place.” In your teaching self pervades everywhere, so awareness ought to “operate throughout the five destinies at one time”; yet awareness operates only in one place. If one insists that awareness is the mark of self, “self is equal to awareness” and becomes nonpervasive with it. Fire does not have a mark that is both hot and not hot, and self likewise “should not possess the marks of both pervading and not pervading.” If it must still pervade, two marks have to be admitted: “If one takes it to pervade, it then has the marks of awareness and nonawareness”—“where self falls in a place of awareness, it is aware; where it falls in a place without awareness, it is unaware.”
The outsider brings out “Because its power pervades, there is no fault”: even where awareness has no function, its power remains. The treatise author answers, “Because power and that which has power are not different.” Where the power of awareness exists, awareness should function, yet it does not. As for saying that a power remains where no function occurs, “there is only this statement”—a sentence with no corresponding fact. The outsider adds that “the power of awareness functions when causes and conditions conjoin,” but this addition hands over the self: “because it falls under the mark of arising.” What functions only when conditions meet belongs to conditions; what belongs to conditions falls under arising; and if awareness and self are not different, self too bears the mark of arising. Permanence is worn away by its own explanations.
3. Lamp and Color: Two Analogies That Cannot Rescue the Claim
The outsider tries a lamp: a lamp illuminates an object but does not make it, so conditions can make awareness function without producing awareness. The treatise author’s answer is concrete: “Although a lamp does not illuminate jars and the rest, the jars can still be obtained and put to use.” When unlit, a jar remains there, touchable and usable; but “when causes and conditions do not conjoin, awareness cannot be obtained,” and self cannot experience pain or pleasure. The two sides of the analogy do not correspond: on one side the unilluminated object remains, while on the other the unconditioned awareness is absent.
The outsider substitutes color: color exists beforehand but is not manifest without a lamp; awareness exists beforehand but is not manifest before conditions conjoin. The treatise author answers, “Because its own mark is not clear.” Before illumination a person may not apprehend the color, but “the mark of color is itself clear”—the color’s own mark is not missing because the person does not see it. Yet “the mark of your awareness is itself unclear.” The next step is tighter: “The mark of color is not a mark of color because a person knows it; therefore, when unseen, color is continually present.” Color does not become color by being known. Your self, however, takes cognition as its mark, so “one should not take a place without cognition to be cognition.” Moreover, in your teaching “cognition and awareness have one meaning.” To say awareness is unclear yet still remains awareness is to say that not knowing itself counts as knowing.
4. To Say They Differ: Conjunction Does Not Change a Name
When the Sāṃkhya route cannot continue, Vaiśeṣika takes its turn: “Cognition differs from self,” so self is neither impermanent nor unaware, because self conjoins with cognition. The analogy is “as with one who owns a cow”: a person conjoined with a cow is called a cow owner; self conjoined with faculty, mind, and object is called one who possesses cognition.
The treatise author gives the most economical answer in the chapter: “The mark of a cow abides in the cow, not in the cow’s owner.” The mark of cow remains in the cow and does not abide in the person who owns it. A person may spend a lifetime conjoined with a cow without becoming a cow; “only the cow is a cow.” In the same way, the mark of cognition abides in cognition, and self does not become cognition through conjunction. Therefore, “cognition alone can cognize; self does not cognize.” He adds: “For example, fire can burn, not the person who possesses fire.” The person holding a torch does not burn things; the fire burns.
The outsider recasts self as a user: a person possesses sight but uses a lamp to see; self possesses the capacity to know but uses cognition to know. The treatise author answers, “because cognition itself can cognize.” When faculty, mind, and object conjoin, cognition arises and cognizes the objects of color and the rest. Cognition itself is the cognizer, not an implement for someone else to use. If so, “if cognition itself can cognize, what further use is self?” The lamp does not fit either, “because a lamp does not cognize color and the rest.” A lamp is not a cognitive dharma and has never known color; only cognition cognizes color.
5. Four Borrowed Legs
Since conjunction does not change identity, the outsider offers four analogies in succession, each seeking an instance where conjunction changes a name.
First comes the horse: self conjoins with a horse’s body and is therefore called a horse. The treatise author answers, “The self in the body is not the horse”—“the horse’s body itself is the horse.” The horse’s body already is the horse; it needs no further self to be the horse. Moreover, you hold body and self to differ, so self also differs from the horse. “To use self as an analogy for self is to fall into defeat”: the very thing to be proved is being used as its evidence.
Second comes black cloth: blackness differs from cloth, but through conjunction the cloth is called black cloth. The treatise author first asks, on the analogy’s own terms: if conjunction warrants taking the other thing’s name, why, when cognition conjoins with self, “is cognition not called self”? Why should the name change in only one direction? He then shows the analogy violating its own scripture: “In your scripture blackness is a quality, and cloth is a substance. A substance does not become a quality, and a quality does not become a substance.” In your own classification, substance and quality never turn into each other.
Third comes the staff: a person conjoined with a staff is called a staff holder, while the staff is not called a person holder. The outsider uses this to claim that naming has a direction: self conjoined with cognition is called a knower, while cognition is not called self. The treatise author follows that direction and answers, “The staff holder is not the staff.” The direction is as you say, but the staff holder never becomes a staff. “The mark of cognition is in cognition, not in self; therefore self is not a knower.”
Fourth, the argument returns to Sāṃkhya. Its proponents say that if cognition and self differed, the faults above would follow, but they take “awareness as self’s mark,” so self is “continually aware, never unaware.” The treatise author answers, “If awareness is the mark of self, self is not one.” Awareness includes many states such as painful and pleasant awareness, so self too should be many. The outsider offers a crystal: “The one has many marks, as does crystal.” One crystal becomes blue, yellow, red, or white according to color; one awareness differentiates according to objects and becomes awareness of pain or pleasure. The answer is, “If so, demerit and merit have one mark.” Awareness that benefits others is merit, while awareness that harms them is demerit. If these two are one, demerit and merit have one mark, and “giving and stealing should likewise be one.” Then the crystal analogy itself is dismantled: crystal exists first and changes with color, but awareness “arises together with conditions”; further, “because the crystal arises and ceases anew at every moment, its marks are not one.” The very crystal offered to prove unity is not one.
The outsider substitutes the potter: one maker can produce many effects. The treatise author answers, “The potter has no difference.” The potter’s body indeed has one mark without difference, but he “differs from the jar, basin, and the rest.” The one in the analogy is an agent and the many are effects; the two sides remain separable. Yet awareness that benefits and awareness that harms “truly possess different marks,” while benefit and harm “do not differ from awareness.” The multiplicity lies in awareness itself.
6. Establishing Self through Inference—and the Interval without Cognition
The outsider changes routes and invokes inference: “Self truly exists, because there is an inferential mark of knowing.” This is a formidable move, supported with apt examples. One sees a person depart and later arrive elsewhere; sun and moon rise in the east and set in the west. Though their passage was not seen, “because they arrived there, one knows there was going.” In the same way, seeing qualities depend on substance, one can infer a self.
The treatise author does not circle around the point: “What does not cognize is not self.” Your self is “all-pervading and vast, while cognition is slight,” yet “in some places and at some times it does not cognize”—“place means outside the body; time means within the body: in sleep, fainting, and the like, at that time there is no cognition.” During sleep and unconsciousness, cognition is interrupted. On what basis does something defined by cognition still count as present through the interval in which cognition is absent?
The outsider answers with smoke and fire: when wood has become charcoal, smoke is absent but fire remains; so even if cognition is the mark of self, whether cognition is present or absent, self should always remain. The treatise author answers, “Because self can cognize.” If self is still to exist when cognition is absent, then it “cannot cognize and lacks the mark of cognition.” You have preserved its existence by surrendering its definition. Verification matters even more: when smoke is absent, one still “directly sees that fire is present,” and on that basis says fire remains; but as for self, “whether cognition is present or absent, no one is able to see it.” There is no second route by which it can be observed.
He next returns to the inference itself: “Because one sees a goer arrive there through the dharma of going.” That analogy works because goer and going appear in dependence, and one side is seen: “Apart from the goer there is no going; apart from going there is no goer who arrives there.” But “apart from self there is no cognition” has never been established—its second side has never been seen. Thus the treatise author closes forcefully: “One must not see a turtle and conceive hair; one must not see a barren woman and conceive a child; likewise, one must not see cognition and conceive a self.”
The outsider’s last analogy in this movement is a grasping hand: a hand sometimes grasps and sometimes does not, but it remains a hand when it does not grasp. The treatise author answers, “Grasping is not the hand’s mark”—“grasping is the hand’s activity, not its mark.” It is not known as a hand because it grasps. You, however, make cognition the very mark of self. Mark and activity belong to different levels, so the analogy does not connect.
7. When the Knife Comes Down
A different route begins: “Self certainly exists, because it experiences pain and pleasure.” A corpse has a body without experiencing either, so what experiences pain and pleasure must be something else.
The treatise author answers, “If distressed, it is also severed.” When a knife harms the body, distress arises. If the knife also reaches self and self shares the distress, it should be severable as well. The outsider answers, “Because it has no contact, it is like space.” When a house burns, the space inside is untouchable and cannot burn, but “only has heat.” When the body is cut, self within is untouchable and cannot be severed, but “only has distress.”
The treatise author presses out a harder consequence: “If so, there is no going.” If self is without contact, a person cannot move. “Going arises from thought and from the body’s movement,” but “the body has no thought, because it is not a cognitive dharma; self has no power of movement, because it is not a bodily dharma.” You have assigned the two necessities to two unrelated things, so going has nowhere to occur.
The outsider invokes the blind and the lame supporting one another and thereby moving. The treatise author answers, “Because their marks differ.” The blind and lame are two people, and “because there are two contacts and two thoughts, according to principle they can go.” Body and self “lack these two things”: self has no contact, body has no awareness, and their conjunction cannot supply the pair. The discussion also clarifies heat in space: space has no contact; “the body touches and experiences heat—it is not space that is hot.” To call space hot is only borrowed speech.
The outsider then offers the owner of a house: when a house burns, its owner is distressed but not burned. The treatise author answers, “It burns because it is impermanent.” The grass and wood in the house are “impermanent, and therefore both burn and become hot,” while space is “permanent, and therefore neither burns nor becomes hot.” The analogy draws its own boundary: what burns is impermanent, while what is permanent is not even heated. Thus the impermanent body is “both distressed and severed,” while permanent self is “neither distressed nor severed”; even distress cannot belong to it. Moreover, the owner of the house escapes burning because he is far from the fire, but “your scripture says self is all-pervading, so it too should be severed and destroyed.” What pervades has no distant place in which to stand.
8. If It Is the User, Why Are Some Doors Unusable?
Another proposal follows: “Self must exist, because it apprehends color and the rest.” The five faculties are not cognitive dharmas, so it is self that knows. Self uses the eye and the rest to know their objects, “as a person uses a sickle to harvest the five grains.”
The treatise author answers, “Why not see with the ear?” If the power to see belongs to self, it should function everywhere: “As fire can burn, it burns everywhere”; without a sickle, “the hand can also cut”; a house has six windows, and a person within “can see wherever he is.” Yet this user can see color through only one door. The outsider responds with the potter: an instrument has a fixed use; without clay one cannot make a jar, and without the eye one cannot see color. The treatise author answers, “If so, it is blind.” If self uses the eye, self differs from the eye; if different, “self has no eye.” How could the eyeless see? As for the potter, “apart from clay there is no further jar—clay itself is the jar; but eye and color differ.” Clay and jar are one thing at successive stages, while eye and color are two things. The analogy does not meet the claim.
The outsider cites two small events as evidence. Seeing another eat fruit makes saliva arise in one’s own mouth, so knowledge of flavor cannot come through the eye; and in darkness, without using the eye, bodily touch recognizes a jar previously recognized by sight. The treatise author’s answer is brief: the challenge concerning blindness has already refuted this. Moreover, “if the eye sees another eating fruit and saliva arises in the mouth, why do the other faculties not move?” If one knower gathers everything together, why does only one place respond?
The outsider next borrows the analogy of a person burning something: the person can burn but cannot do so apart from fire; self can see but cannot do so apart from the eye. The treatise author rejects the analogy’s premise: “A person has no mark of burning; fire itself can burn.” Wind rubs wood together, fire arises and burns mountain and marsh, yet “there is no agent.” The agent borrowed for the analogy was never present even within that analogy.
9. If Mind Can Know, Where Is Self?
Because a corpse has eyes yet does not see without mind, the outsider says that self must use the eye. The treatise author points directly to mind: “If with mind there is cognition and without mind there is no cognition, then mind need only operate through the doors of the eye and the rest to know. What further use is self?”
The outsider gives a reason to preserve self: mind cannot know itself; if one mind knew another mind, the sequence would have no end. But “my self is one,” so self knows mind and ends the regress. The treatise author answers, “Self also requires a self”: then who knows self? If self knows self, the regress is the same. His own position needs no such stopping point: “Present mind cognizes past mind; because mind-dharmas are impermanent, there is no fault.” Precisely because mind is impermanent and proceeds in continuity, a later thought knows an earlier thought; the chain connects and also comes to rest.
The outsider asks, “How can self be removed?” The treatise author answers, “As heat is the mark of fire.” Fire’s heat has no maker: “Fire’s nature is itself hot, and there is no fire that is not hot.” So too mind “has cognition as its mark” and knows by its own nature apart from self. Moreover, “because self and cognition differ, self should not cognize.” Once you separate cognition from self, the work of knowing no longer belongs to self.
The outsider invokes an infant’s inborn joy and distress as a continuity of remembered past habit and therefore evidence of a permanent self. The treatise author answers, “If it pervades, how can it recollect?” If self permanently pervades every object, there can be no time when it does not remember; from where, then, could recollection arise? If recollection arises everywhere, everything should be recalled simultaneously. If “recollection arises part by part,” self has parts, and what has parts is impermanent. The outsider says, “Because of conjunction, recollection arises”: when self and mind conjoin and their force activates, recollection arises. The answer is that if self has cognition as its mark, recollection should not need to arise; if it does not have cognition as its mark, recollection should not arise in it. Further, “if recollection cognizes”—if there is cognition when recollection arises and no cognition when it does not—then “recollection itself should be cognition. What further use is self?” Recollection has already done the work.
The outsider also cites recognition with the right eye of what the left eye saw. Under “a common answer concerning both eyes,” the treatise author brings back the earlier challenges in one sweep: partial cognition is not called cognition; if so, there is no cognition; if self pervades, how can it recollect; if recollection cognizes; why not see with the ear; if so, it is blind. Then he identifies the difficulty in this very example: just as “what the left eye sees should not be recognized by the right eye,” self likewise should not “see in this part and recognize in that part.”
10. The Final Sentence: Do Not Cling to Language
The final exchange concerns “part.” The outsider says that recollection is a dharma belonging to self, so self uses recollection to know. The treatise author answers, “Partial cognition is not called cognition.” If cognition arises in only one part of self, it is partial cognition, and partial cognition is insufficient to call self a knower.
The outsider protects the claim through bodily action: when a hand acts, the body is said to act; likewise, though self knows in part, self is called a knower. The treatise author answers, “If so, there is no cognition.” Your self pervades while mind is limited; cognition arises when self and mind conjoin, and so cognition is “as limited as mind.” If cognition in a small part warrants calling self a knower, “why do you not say that because the greater part does not cognize, self is called a nonknower?” The rule for naming cannot be used only in the favorable direction. As for bodily action, “because identity and difference between part and whole possessing parts cannot be obtained,” whether hand and body are one or different does not itself stand.
The outsider’s last analogy is a garment: when one part burns, it is called a burned garment. The treatise author answers, “Burning is likewise so.” A garment burned in one part should be called partially burned. If one burned part gives the whole garment the name “burned,” then because its greater part is unburned it should also be called unburned. The reason is concrete: “Most of this garment is unburned and remains genuinely usable.” The garment can still be worn, so the phrase “burned garment” has not exhausted what the garment is.
The entire chapter closes here: “Therefore, do not cling to language.”
Following the sequence from beginning to end, each name the outsider gives self is formed in this way—owner of a cow, black cloth, staff holder, burned garment: each is a common designation established from one part. Such designations work in the world. But when a designation is taken as something established by intrinsic nature, it must at once be permanent and impermanent, pervasive and nonpervasive, knowing and unknowing. From beginning to end, the treatise author never denies that people see, know, remember, or suffer. What he denies is an additional permanent knower standing outside these events.
Carried Forward
This is the first of the Hundred Treatise chapters directed toward non-Buddhist positions, and its mode of questioning runs through those that follow. “Refutation of Unity” and “Refutation of Difference” directly unfold the two routes of identity and difference repeatedly used here; “Refutation of the Faculties” and “Refutation of Atoms” take up faculty and object; “Refutation of Permanence” pursues the word “permanent.” Having already released hand and body through “because identity and difference between part and whole possessing parts cannot be obtained,” the present chapter leaves the full examination of identity and difference to the chapters devoted to them.
The title “Refutation of a Self” names what is refuted: the lord installed behind all dharmas. After reading the chapter, there is no need to seek another thing to occupy that seat—“Present mind cognizes past mind; because mind-dharmas are impermanent, there is no fault.” This sentence has already removed the seat itself.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
底本 T30n1569〔0170c12–0173b21〕。本品六十九枚「修妬路」為全帙最多，提婆短判與婆藪問答皆依夾注分層；「神」依漢譯原詞保留，不逕換作後世術語。
二、異釋對勘
本帙無另一漢譯異釋本。僧佉、衛世師之說只依本論所傳漢名與論式並錄，不以現代重構裁定其原貌。
三、諸家異釋（吉藏專疏）
吉藏《百論疏》〈破神品第二〉〔T42 0260a22 起〕逐文疏解本品，分判僧佉覺神一與衛世師知神異兩路；其判釋只留在古疏鏡位。
四、名相
- 神：論敵所立常、遍、主宰而能知的我體。
- 覺相是神：僧佉一路，以覺與神不異。
- 知與神異：衛世師一路，以知為神所合、所用之法。
- 分知：知只在神的一部分或與少分意合處生，與遍神相衝。
- 比知相：由已見的共同關係推知未現見者。
五、科判
自然分十段：二十五諦與常神立說；覺神一的常無常難；知神異的所有與工具諸喻；一覺多相；比量與間斷知；苦樂與身斷；五根工具說；意知與自知無窮；宿習、二眼與分知；諸門總結。
六、關中舊學·譯史
本品密集保存僧佉、衛世師的漢譯論式與頗梨、盲跛、黑疊等譬喻，是《百論》「治外」對辯體最完整的單元。所破主張與內論回答不應混成同一作者立場。
七、唯識軸互讀（空有）
本品承認根、意、境、念等認知條件可被分析，所拒絕的是在其外另立常遍知者。與識論互讀時，只比較識知條件與主體執，不把後來體系回填成論敵原說。
八、系內餘論互讀
《中論》〈觀本住品〉檢驗先於眼耳等根與苦樂而住的本體；《十二門論》〈觀因緣門〉則由五陰、十二入、十八界無自性而說我空。本品以外道兩套常神說作更細的問答展開。
九、校本定位
主底本 T30n1569〔0170c12–0173b21〕；吉藏逐文疏 T42n1827〔0260a22 起〕。本品涉及外道二十五諦、六諦與神知關係，均據古漢譯傳文，不引現代學者或現代梵本。
Textual Collation
The base text is T30n1569〔0170c12–0173b21〕. This chapter contains sixty-nine interlinear notes reading 「修妬路」 tr. “sūtra,” more than any other chapter in the work; they mark Deva’s compact root judgments within Vasu’s extended question-and-answer explanations. The word 「神」 tr. “self” is preserved in quotation as the received Chinese term and is not silently replaced by a later technical expression.
Comparative Readings
This textual lineage has no second Chinese translation for comparative interpretation. The positions attributed to Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika are therefore recorded only in the forms and argumentative patterns transmitted by this treatise, without using modern reconstruction to determine an earlier form.
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang’s Commentary on the Hundred Treatise, in “Refutation of a Self, Chapter Two”〔T42 0260a22 onward〕, comments on the chapter phrase by phrase and distinguishes the Sāṃkhya claim that awareness and self are one from the Vaiśeṣika claim that cognition and self are different. His determinations remain in the mirror of the ancient commentary.
Terminology
- Self: the opponent’s posited entity, permanent and all-pervading, governing the other principles and serving as the knower.
- Awareness is the self: the Sāṃkhya route, on which awareness is not different from self.
- Cognition differs from self: the Vaiśeṣika route, on which cognition is a dharma conjoined with and employed by self.
- Partial cognition: cognition arising only in one part of self, or where self is conjoined with the limited mind, in tension with an all-pervading self.
- Inferential mark: a relation already observed and used to infer what is not presently seen.
Doctrinal Outline
Ten natural movements: the twenty-five principles and the permanent self; the impermanence challenge to awareness and self as one; possession and instrument analogies for cognition and self as different; many states of a single awareness; inference and intermittent cognition; pleasure, pain, and the severing of the body; the five faculties as instruments; mind, self-cognition, and infinite regress; past habit, the two eyes, and partial cognition; and a conclusion against clinging to language.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
The chapter densely preserves Chinese translation patterns for Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika argument, together with analogies of crystal, the blind and lame, and black cloth. As the fullest debate in the Hundred Treatise’s 「治外」 tr. “treating outsiders” section, its layered form must remain clear: Deva supplies the short root judgments, while Vasu unfolds the dialogue; the opponent’s thesis and the treatise’s response must not be merged into one authorial position.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
The chapter allows faculties, mind, objects, recollection, and other conditions of cognition to be analyzed. What it refuses is an additional permanent, all-pervading knower established outside those conditions. Cross-axis reading may compare conditions for cognition and attachment to a subject, but must not project a later system back into the opponent’s position.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
The “Examination of a Prior Abider” in the Treatise on the Middle tests an entity said to exist before the eye, ear, and other faculties and before pleasure and pain. The “Examination of Causes and Conditions” in the Twelve Gate Treatise explains the emptiness of self through the lack of intrinsic nature in the five aggregates, twelve sense fields, and eighteen elements. This chapter expands the inquiry through two detailed accounts of a permanent self.
Position of the Editions
The principal base is T30n1569〔0170c12–0173b21〕; Jizang’s phrase-by-phrase commentary is T42n1827〔0260a22 onward〕. The chapter’s accounts of the twenty-five principles, six categories, and the relation between self and cognition follow the ancient Chinese transmission; no modern scholar or modern Sanskrit edition is used as an authority.