百論 破常品第九

The outsider retreats to his last line of defense. Everything you have refuted is caused, but “space, time, direction, fine particles, and nirvāṇa are uncaused dharmas.” This chapter examines these five in sequence and to the end.

No Cause and Revealing Cause

The treatise author does not initially touch the five dharmas, but asks on what basis they are established: “Do you say it is permanent because it has a cause, or because it has no cause?” If caused, it falls into impermanence; if uncaused, “one may equally call it impermanent.” The outsider distinguishes productive cause from revealing cause. The treatise author answers, “This cause is not right.” A container cannot substitute for what it contains: “Self was refuted before, and the remaining permanent dharmas will be refuted afterward.” Nor can one infer “because constructed dharmas are impermanent, unconstructed dharmas are permanent,” for the two sides do not differ at every point: “Unconstructed and constructed dharmas are alike in lacking contact; therefore, the unconstructed should be impermanent.”

Space, Time, and Direction

If all of space is in a jar, space does not pervade; “if this counts as pervading, the jar too should pervade.” If only part is there, then “the whole possessing parts is what is called space.” Said to be the receptive place of all things, space has nowhere of its own to abide—“because a solid contains no space.” To take formlessness as its character receives the answer: “Formlessness means the negation of form, not a further dharma.” If time is permanent and one, “past time never becomes future time,” so the future has nowhere to come from. If each temporal character is already present, “then everything is present”; yet “the past is not past,” and therefore “the dharma of time has no substance, only speech.” Direction follows the sun’s course and the observer’s position; the four continents take turns being east, and thus “direction exists in speech, but in reality there is no direction.”

The Smallest and the Final

If fine particles conjoin with their whole bodies, “the effect made of two fine particles should likewise be round.” Since the visible effect is not round, they conjoin “by one part; therefore the fine particle has parts, and because it has parts, it is impermanent.” If nirvāṇa is precisely the absence of afflictions, it is a dharma attained through cultivation and is “impermanent because constructed.” If it is what enables liberation, “then it is not liberation.” Establish something apart from bondage, what is bound, and the means, and “it has no use.” At the end the treatise author no longer argues only over dharma-character, but asks the mind: “How can one crave a place of fear?”

Who Attains It?

“There is no attainer of nirvāṇa.” As when a lamp goes out, its direction cannot be stated: “All speech has ceased; there is nothing that can be discussed.” Self is permanent and all-pervading, and therefore “should not attain nirvāṇa”; the five aggregates arise and cease, and they too do not attain it. Yet cultivation and realization are not rejected: “If one says that nirvāṇa is attained, this is said within worldly convention.”

Hundred Treatise, fascicle two, “Refutation of Permanence, Chapter Nine,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. Have Permanent Dharmas without Causes Gone Unrefuted?

〔T30 0179b09〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Dharmas should exist, because uncaused permanent dharmas have not been refuted. The adept Vasu explains: Although you have refuted dharmas that possess causes, you have not refuted uncaused permanent dharmas. Space, time, direction, fine particles, and nirvāṇa are all uncaused dharmas. Since they have not been refuted, dharmas should exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If one forcibly takes them as permanent, the same applies to impermanence. The adept Vasu explains: Do you call a thing permanent because it has a cause, or because it has no cause? If a permanent dharma has a cause, what has a cause is impermanent. If you call it permanent because it has no cause, one may equally call it impermanent.

2. Productive Cause and Revealing Cause

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because of a revealing cause, there is no fault. The adept Vasu explains: Causes are of two kinds: first, a productive cause; second, a revealing cause. If a productive cause is involved, the thing is indeed impermanent. But I call space and the other permanent dharmas permanent because of a revealing cause. I do not call them permanent because they lack a cause, nor impermanent because they possess one. Therefore, I am not forcibly taking them as permanent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: This cause is not right. The adept Vasu explains: Although you say that permanent dharmas have a cause, this cause cannot be established. Self was refuted before; the remaining permanent dharmas will now be refuted one by one.

3. Is Whatever Is Not Constructed Permanent?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Permanent dharmas should exist, because constructed dharmas are impermanent and unconstructed dharmas are permanent. The adept Vasu explains: The eye sees that jars and the various other things are all impermanent. If a dharma differs from these, it should be permanent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Absence too is shared by both. The adept Vasu explains: Because it stands in opposition to constructed dharmas, you give it the name “unconstructed dharma.” But constructed dharmas are now seen to possess the character of existence, so the unconstructed dharma of which you speak should be absent.

Further, because it opposes constructed dharmas, you say an unconstructed dharma is permanent. Yet with respect to existence it does not oppose constructed dharmas, so it should be impermanent. Why? Because unconstructed and constructed dharmas are alike in lacking contact, the unconstructed should be impermanent.

In this way, both all-pervading permanence and nonpervading permanence have been refuted in general. They should now be refuted individually.

4. Is the Space in a Jar Whole or Partial?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Space certainly exists as a permanent dharma, both all-pervading and partless, because people believe it exists in every place and at every time. The adept Vasu explains: People in the world believe space exists everywhere and therefore call it all-pervading. They believe that space exists throughout the past, future, and present and therefore call it permanent.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because parts conjoin within parts, part is not different. The adept Vasu explains: Consider the space within a jar or a window opening. Is the whole of space present there, or only one part? If the whole is present, space does not pervade. If that still counts as pervading, the jar too should pervade. If only one part is present, space is merely those individual parts and there is no whole possessing parts; yet what possesses parts is what is called space. Therefore, space neither pervades nor is permanent.

5. Where Does Space Itself Abide?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Space certainly exists; its character is all-pervading and permanent, because actions occur. The adept Vasu explains: If there were no space, there would be no lifting, no putting down, and no coming or going. Why? Because there would be no place to receive them. Since these actions can in fact be performed, space exists and is both all-pervading and permanent.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Space abides in space. The adept Vasu explains: If space exists as a dharma, it should have a place in which to abide. If it has no abiding place, it is as though the dharma did not exist. Suppose space abides within an opening. Space would then abide in space, because an opening is precisely a place that receives. But this is not right, so space does not abide in an opening. Nor does it abide within a solid thing. Why? Deva’s root statement: Because a solid contains no space. The adept Vasu explains: A solid thing is not called empty. Since there is no space there, there is no abiding place, because there is no place that receives.

Further, you say that wherever action occurs, there is space. Within a solid thing there is no place for action, and so no space exists there. Therefore, space neither pervades nor is permanent.

Further, because it lacks a character, space does not exist. Every dharma has its own character; because the character exists, these dharmas are known to exist. Earth has hardness as its character, water wetness, fire heat, wind movement, and consciousness knowing. But space has no character and therefore does not exist.

6. Is Formlessness the Character of Space?

The outsider says: Space has a character. You simply do not know it and therefore call it absent. Formlessness is the character of space.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. “Formlessness” merely negates form; it is not a further dharma. It is like cutting through a tree: at the severed place there is not another separate dharma. Thus there is no character of space.

Further, space has no character. Why? You say formlessness is the character of space, so before form arises, space lacks its character. Further, form is an impermanent dharma, while you say space is permanent. Before form exists, the dharma of space should already exist. If there is not yet any form to be extinguished, space lacks a character; without a character, the dharma does not exist. Therefore, formlessness is not the character of space. Space has only a name and no substance. All the various all-pervading permanent dharmas are refuted in general in the same way.

7. Time: The Future Is Not within the Past

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: The dharma of time exists, because the character of permanence exists. The adept Vasu explains: Although some dharmas cannot be seen in immediate presence, they can be known through inference from a shared character, and therefore are believed to exist. Time is the same: although subtle and invisible, time is known through seasons, blossoms, fruit, and the rest; this is seeing an effect and knowing its cause. Further, time is known from such characters as simultaneity, nonsimultaneity, long duration, and nearness. There is no place outside time, and therefore time is permanent.

〔T30 0180a05〕The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The future does not exist within the past; therefore, there is no future. The adept Vasu explains: The time of the lump of clay is present, the time of earth is past, and the time of the jar is future. If the character of time is permanent, past time never changes into future time. Your scripture says that time is one dharma, so past time never becomes future time and does not become present time. If the past could become the future, the fault of confusion would follow. Further, future time does not exist within the past, and therefore there is no future. The present is refuted in the same way.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you accept the past, time exists. The adept Vasu explains: Since you accept that past time exists, future time necessarily exists. Therefore, the dharma of time truly exists.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The past is not the character of the future. The adept Vasu explains: Did you not hear me say before that past earth does not become a future jar? If it falls within the character of the future, it is the future character; how could it still be called past? Therefore, the past likewise does not exist.

8. Each of the Three Times Enacts Its Own Character

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Time should exist, because its own characters differ. The adept Vasu explains: The present has the character of the present, the past has the character of the past, and the future has the character of the future. Therefore, time exists.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, everything is present. The adept Vasu explains: If the respective characters of the three times are all already established and existent, then now all three should be present. If one calls something future, it does not yet exist; if one says it already exists, it should not be called future but already arrived. Therefore, this reasoning cannot be established.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because past and future enact their own characters, there is no fault. The adept Vasu explains: Past and future time do not enact the character of the present. Past time enacts the character of the past, and future time enacts the character of the future. Because each enacts its own character, there is no fault.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The past is not past. The adept Vasu explains: If the past is still going through the past, it is not called past. Why? Because it has departed from its own character. Fire, for example, is not called fire once it relinquishes heat, because it has left its own character. If the past does not pass away, you should not now say that past time enacts the character of the past. The future is refuted in the same way. Therefore, the dharma of time has no substance; there is only speech.

9. Direction: East Has No First Point

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Direction truly exists, because the character of permanence exists. The adept Vasu explains: The place at which the sun conjoins is the character of direction. As our scripture says: throughout past, future, and present, the place first reached by the sun is called east; the other directions are also named according to the sun.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because east has no first point. The adept Vasu explains: The sun travels around Mount Sumeru through the four continents. When it is noon in Uttarakuru, the sun has just risen in Pūrvavideha, and the people of Pūrvavideha take that place as east. When it is noon in Pūrvavideha, the sun rises in Jambudvīpa, and the people of Jambudvīpa take that place as east. When it is noon in Jambudvīpa, the sun rises in Aparagodānīya, and its people take that place as east. When it is noon in Aparagodānīya, the sun rises in Uttarakuru, and its people take that place as east. Thus the same place is wholly east, wholly south, wholly west, and wholly north.

Further, where the sun does not conjoin, direction does not exist, because it lacks a character. Further, direction is absent because it is unfixed: those on this side take it as east, while those on that side take it as west. Therefore, there is no real direction.

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because this character of direction is stated for one continent. The adept Vasu explains: This character of direction is stated with reference to one continent and not to all. Therefore, east does not incur the fault of having no first point.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, it has a boundary. The adept Vasu explains: If only the place first reached by the sun is called east, then each direction has a boundary. What has a boundary has parts; what has parts is impermanent. Thus direction exists in speech, but in reality there is no direction.

10. Fine Particles

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Although there is no all-pervading permanence, there are nonpervading permanent fine particles, because the character of an effect exists. The adept Vasu explains: People in the world sometimes see an effect and know that a cause exists, and sometimes see a cause and know that an effect exists—for example, seeing a sprout and knowing that a seed exists. According to worldly dharmas, all produced things are first subtle and later coarse. Thus one knows that two fine particles form the first effect, while one fine particle is the cause. Fine particles therefore exist, round and permanent, because they themselves have no cause.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Two fine particles do not conjoin with their entire bodies, because the effect is not round. The adept Vasu explains: When fine particles produce an effect, their whole bodies do not conjoin. Why? The eye sees that the effect formed from two fine particles is not round. If fine particles conjoined with their entire bodies, an effect made of two fine particles should likewise be round. Further, if their whole bodies conjoined, the two would be destroyed together. If fine particles overlapped in conjunction, the effect would be tall; if many fine particles conjoined, the effect would be large. This occurs because they conjoin by one part. Thus fine particles have parts, and what has parts is impermanent.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Fine particles are impermanent because they are distinguished from space. The adept Vasu explains: If fine particles exist, they should be distinguished from space. The particles would then have parts; what has parts is impermanent.

Further, Deva’s root statement: Because color, taste, and the rest are distinct. The adept Vasu explains: If fine particles exist, they should have distinct parts of color, taste, and the rest. Fine particles would then have parts; what has parts is impermanent.

Further, a shaped dharma possesses a character. If a fine particle has shape, it should possess length, shortness, squareness, roundness, and the rest. It would then have parts, and what has parts is impermanent. Because it is impermanent, no fine particle exists.

11. Is Nirvāṇa Constructed?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Nirvāṇa exists as a permanent dharma, because it is without afflictions and nirvāṇa does not differ from that. The adept Vasu explains: When craving and the various other afflictions are forever exhausted, this is called nirvāṇa. With afflictions there is birth and death; without afflictions there is forever no further birth and death. Therefore, nirvāṇa is permanent.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because nirvāṇa is a constructed dharma. The adept Vasu explains: Through cultivation of the path, the various afflictions cease. If absence of afflictions is nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa is a dharma that has been constructed, and a constructed dharma is impermanent. Further, if afflictions are absent, this is called having nothing whatever. If nirvāṇa does not differ from the absence of afflictions, there is no nirvāṇa.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because it is a productive cause. The adept Vasu explains: Nirvāṇa is the productive cause of the absence of afflictions.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: What can destroy is not what is destroyed. The adept Vasu explains: If nirvāṇa is what enables a person to be liberated, then nirvāṇa itself is not liberation. Further, before the afflictions have been exhausted, nirvāṇa should be absent. Why? Because without the effect there is no cause.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: It is the effect of the absence of afflictions. The adept Vasu explains: This nirvāṇa is neither itself the absence of afflictions nor the cause of their absence; it is the effect of their absence. Therefore, one cannot say that nirvāṇa is absent.

12. Beyond Bondage, What Is Bound, and the Means

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Bondage, what is bound, and the means—apart from these, it has no use. The adept Vasu explains: “Bondage” means afflictions and karma; “what is bound” means sentient beings; “the means” means the noble eightfold path. Through the path, bondage is untied and sentient beings are thereby liberated. If a separate nirvāṇa exists outside these three dharmas, it has no use. Further, absence of afflictions is called having nothing whatever, and having nothing whatever should not be taken as a cause.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Nirvāṇa exists; it is where these are absent. The adept Vasu explains: The place in which bondage, what is bound, and the means are all absent is called nirvāṇa.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: How can one crave a place of fear? The adept Vasu explains: Because of the faults of impermanence, a wise person relinquishes conditioned dharmas and becomes dispassionate toward them. If nirvāṇa contains no various forms of consciousness and nothing desired, then compared with conditioned dharmas, nirvāṇa is an even more terrifying place. Why does your mind still crave it? Nirvāṇa is free from every attachment and extinguishes every recollection and conception. It is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither thing nor nonthing. It is like a lamp going out: nothing can be discussed.

13. Who Attains Nirvāṇa?

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Who attains nirvāṇa? The adept Vasu explains: By what person is this nirvāṇa attained?

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: There is no attainer of nirvāṇa. The adept Vasu explains: I said before that when a lamp goes out, one cannot say it went east, south, west, north, to one of the intermediate directions, upward, or downward. Nirvāṇa is the same: all speech has ceased, and there is nothing that can be discussed. It is having nothing whatever—who could attain it? Even if nirvāṇa exists, there is no person who attains it. If self attained nirvāṇa, then because self is permanent and all-pervading, it should have nothing to attain. Nor do the five aggregates attain nirvāṇa. Why? Because the five aggregates are impermanent; the five aggregates arise and cease. To whom, then, should nirvāṇa belong? If one says that a person attains nirvāṇa, this is said within worldly convention.

Across the preceding chapters, dharmas have been taken apart one by one: self, unity, difference, the faculties, atoms, the effect existing in the cause, and the effect not existing in the cause. In this chapter the outsider changes tactics. He no longer defends a particular dharma, but retreats behind a line: everything you have refuted is produced by causes; another class of dharma has no cause at all and lies beyond your refutation. He names five—“space, time, direction, fine particles, and nirvāṇa are uncaused dharmas.”

These five share an appearance: they cannot be seen or touched, do not arise or cease, are either everywhere or too small to divide. The outsider’s thought is this: whatever can be made will of course perish, but some things must be unmade, or making would not even have a place in which to occur. The defense lies deep and feels much like common sense. The whole “Refutation of Permanence” presses this line all the way through nirvāṇa.

The argumentative form remains “the outsider says, the insider answers.” Beneath the root text, an interlinear “sūtra” note identifies the bones laid down by Deva; the long prose that follows is the flesh unfolded by the adept Vasu.

1. You Call It Permanent—Because It Has a Cause or Because It Has None?

The treatise author’s first sentence touches neither space nor time and direction. It asks only for the criterion: “If one forcibly takes them as permanent, the same applies to impermanence.”

Opened out, the sentence presents a dilemma: “Do you say it is permanent because it has a cause, or because it has no cause?” If the permanent dharma has a cause, it falls into the class already refuted: “If a permanent dharma has a cause, what has a cause is impermanent.” If it is called permanent because it lacks a cause, then “if you call it permanent because it has no cause, one may equally call it impermanent.” Once no cause is required, no one is answerable to any criterion; I may just as readily call it impermanent.

This question deserves to be remembered. The outsider wants something whose origin need not be explained. But if its origin need not be explained, it need not answer to anyone’s standard. Without a cause, there is also no reason.

2. Revealing Cause: An Apparently Safe Retreat

The outsider immediately adds a distinction: “Causes are of two kinds: first, productive cause; second, revealing cause.” A productive cause brings something into being, and what it produces is of course impermanent. A revealing cause merely manifests what was already present; it does not make the thing. Thus, “I call space and the other permanent dharmas permanent because of a revealing cause.” This is not an arbitrary assertion, but one supported by a basis.

This is a fine move. Yet the treatise author’s root answer is only one sentence: “This cause is not right.” The reason has two parts. Self was already refuted: “Self was refuted before, and the remaining permanent dharmas will be refuted afterward.” In other words, the container called revealing cause cannot support anything by itself; what the container holds must still be opened and inspected one item at a time. The chapter’s subsequent movements through space, time, direction, fine particles, and nirvāṇa open those containers one by one.

3. Must Whatever Is Unmade Be Permanent?

The outsider changes to an easier route: “Because constructed dharmas are impermanent, unconstructed dharmas are permanent.” The eye sees jars and the rest as impermanent; whatever stands opposite them must surely be permanent. The dharma is established by contrast—one need not say what it is, only what it is not.

The treatise author answers, “Absence too is shared by both,” returning precisely to this point. If you name it only by “opposition to constructed dharmas,” you must see whether the opposition holds everywhere. “Because it does not oppose constructed dharmas at this point, it should be impermanent. Why? Unconstructed and constructed dharmas are alike in lacking contact; therefore, the unconstructed should be impermanent.” With respect to lack of contact the two do not oppose one another. Once the opposition fails, the basis for the name collapses.

Something established by negating something else moves whenever that other thing moves. At this point, all-pervading and nonpervading permanence have been refuted in general. The treatise author therefore says, “They should now be refuted separately.” The five movements below inspect them one by one.

4. Space, First: Is What Lies within the Jar the Whole or One Part?

The outsider establishes space: “Because people believe it exists in every place and at every time.” It exists everywhere and therefore pervades; it exists in all three times and therefore is permanent. Moreover, it is “both all-pervading and partless.”

The treatise author answers, “Because parts conjoin within parts, part is not different,” using a jar. Is the space within a jar or a window opening the whole of space, or one part? “If the whole is present, space does not pervade. If this counts as pervading, the jar too should pervade.” If all of space is compressed into the jar, nothing remains elsewhere. If that still counts as pervasion, the jar should also spread everywhere. If only one part is present, you have admitted that space has parts—and “the whole possessing parts is what is called space,” so beneath the name space there remains only a heap of parts.

Partlessness and pervasion are both wanted by the outsider, yet each cancels the other.

5. Space, Second: Where Does It Itself Abide?

The outsider establishes it through function: “because actions occur.” Without space there would be “no lifting, no lowering, no coming, no going, and the rest,” for “there would be no place to receive.” Raising and lowering a hand require room into which it can move.

The treatise author answers, “Space abides in space.” If space is a dharma, it should have an abiding place. Does it abide in an opening? The opening itself is the receptive place, so this makes space abide in space. Does it abide in a solid? “Because a solid contains no space”—a solid is not called empty, and therefore provides no abiding place. Space is said to receive every dharma, but when its own turn comes, no place can receive it. Anything that must rely upon a place in order to stand cannot itself be every place.

The treatise author adds another route, examining its character: “Every dharma has its own character, and through possessing a character each dharma is known to exist: earth has hardness as its character, water wetness, fire heat, wind movement, and consciousness knowing.” Earth, water, fire, wind, and consciousness each possess a character by which they are known. Space can present none, “and therefore it does not exist.”

6. Space, Third: Formlessness Is Not a Character

The outsider therefore produces a character: “Formlessness is the character of space.”

The treatise author answers quickly: “Formlessness means the negation of form, not a further dharma. It is like cutting through a tree: there is no further dharma.” Once a tree is cut, the severed place is not a newly added thing. Likewise, to say “formless” only negates form; it does not thereby produce an additional dharma.

There is another temporal question. If formlessness is the character, then “before form arises, space at that time lacks its character.” Before form exists, whence comes formlessness? Yet in the outsider’s account form is impermanent while space is permanent; space should already exist before form. At that time it lacks a character, and “if it lacks a character, the dharma is absent.” Thus space “has only a name and no substance,” and every all-pervading permanent dharma is refuted in general by the same route.

7. Time: The Future Is Not within the Past

Time is the hardest of these to remove. The outsider’s establishment is elegant. Although time cannot be seen, it can be inferred: “Through seasons, blossoms, fruit, and the rest, one knows time; this is seeing the effect and knowing the cause.” It can further be known from long and short intervals, simultaneity and nonsimultaneity.

The treatise author answers, “The future does not exist within the past; therefore, there is no future.” He follows the outsider’s own two premises: first, time is permanent; second, “your scripture says that time is one dharma.” Since it is permanent and one, “past time never becomes future time and does not become present time”—otherwise confusion follows. Because the past does not become the future, the future in the sequence “the lump of clay is present, earth is past, and the jar is future” is not contained in the past. From where does the future come?

The outsider says that once I accept the past I must accept the future. The treatise author answers, “The past is not the character of the future.” Once something enters the future character, it is future: “How could it be called past?”

8. Each of the Three Times Enacts Its Own Character

The outsider’s final defense is that each of the three times has its own character: “The present has the present character, the past has the past character, and the future has the future character.” Each performs its own role without encroaching upon the others, and so there should be no fault.

The treatise author answers, “If so, everything is present.” If each character already exists fully formed, all three times must now count as present. “If it exists, it is not called future; it should be called already arrived.” Once the future exists, it is no longer future.

The outsider again says that each enacts its own character and thus there is no fault. The treatise author presses this statement to the end: “The past is not past.” If the past is still passing through the past, it has left its own character: “As fire that relinquishes heat is not called fire, because it has left its own character.” Once fire relinquishes heat, it is no longer fire. If the past is still proceeding, it is not past; if it does not pass away, on what basis do you say it enacts the character of the past? Neither direction works, and therefore “the dharma of time has no substance, only speech.”

9. Direction: Wherever the Sun Goes Is East

Direction is established concretely: “The place at which the sun conjoins is the character of direction.” The place first touched by the sun is east, and the remaining directions take their names from it.

The treatise author’s refutation is equally concrete, an observation that can be revolved once in the mind. The sun circles Mount Sumeru through the four continents. When it is noon in Uttarakuru, the sun rises in Pūrvavideha; when it is noon in Pūrvavideha, the sun rises in Jambudvīpa; when it is noon in Jambudvīpa, the sun rises in Aparagodānīya; when it is noon in Aparagodānīya, the sun rises in Uttarakuru. The same place “is thus wholly east, south, west, and north.” Direction was never in the ground; it was in the observer’s position—“those on this side take it as east, while those on that side take it as west.”

The outsider retreats and says his account concerns only one continent. The treatise author answers, “If so, it has a boundary.” Once a range is marked out, each direction has a limit: “Because it has a boundary, it has parts; because it has parts, it is impermanent.” Preserve one continent, and permanence cannot be preserved. Thus “direction exists in speech, but in reality there is no direction.” The word direction remains perfectly usable, but no permanent direction abides beneath it.

10. Fine Particles: How Can a Partless Thing Combine into a Shaped Effect?

Fine particles are a nonpervading permanence. The outsider reasons backward: “Seeing that produced things are first subtle and later coarse,” one continues toward subtlety until reaching a first cause. Thus one fine particle is cause, two fine particles form the first effect, and the fine particle is round and permanent.

The treatise author answers, “Two fine particles do not conjoin with their entire bodies, because the effect is not round.” If fine particles conjoined through their whole bodies, the resulting effect should be round: “If the entire bodies of fine particles conjoined, an effect made of two fine particles should likewise be round.” Yet the eye sees it is not round. Moreover, if whole bodies conjoined, the two should be destroyed together. Therefore, they conjoin through one part: “Because they conjoin by one part, the fine particle has parts; because it has parts, it is impermanent.”

The next three supplementary refutations point to the same thing. If a fine particle differs from space, it has a boundary—“Fine particles are impermanent because they are distinguished from space.” If a fine particle exists, it should have parts of color and taste—“because color, taste, and the rest are distinct.” A shaped thing has length, shortness, squareness, and roundness, and therefore has parts. Layer by layer, “because it is impermanent, no fine particle exists.”

If a thing is truly partless, it has nowhere through which to make contact; if it can make contact, it already has this side and that side.

11. Nirvāṇa: Refuting the Final One

Once the first four are refuted, the most consequential one remains. The outsider says: “The permanent exhaustion of craving and the other afflictions is called nirvāṇa.” Without afflictions there is no further birth and death, so nirvāṇa is permanent.

The treatise author answers, “Because nirvāṇa is a constructed dharma.” You say nirvāṇa is the absence of afflictions, but absence of afflictions is attained by cultivating the path; it is “impermanent because constructed.” Further, “if afflictions are absent, this is called having nothing whatever.” If nirvāṇa does not differ at all from the absence of afflictions, one need not separately establish the designation nirvāṇa.

The outsider changes the answer: nirvāṇa is the productive cause of the absence of afflictions. The treatise author answers, “What can destroy is not what is destroyed”: “If nirvāṇa is what enables liberation, then it is not liberation.” What releases and what is released are not one thing. Moreover, before the afflictions are exhausted, the effect is absent, and “without the effect there is no cause.”

The outsider changes again: nirvāṇa is the effect of the absence of afflictions. The treatise author lays the whole route before him: “Bondage means afflictions and karma; what is bound means sentient beings; the means means the noble eightfold path.” There is what binds, the person bound, and the means of untying. These three suffice for liberation. “If nirvāṇa exists apart from these three dharmas, it has no use.”

The outsider finally says that the place where all three are absent is nirvāṇa. The treatise author changes direction. He no longer argues only over logic, but asks about the outsider’s mind: “How can one crave a place of fear?” In your own account it contains no forms of consciousness and nothing desired, so compared with conditioned dharmas it is an “exceedingly fearful place.” Why do you still want it? Throughout his defense of permanence, the outsider has really been trying to grasp something that cannot be lost. Only here does the grasping hand reveal itself.

The treatise author then gives the chapter’s final positive statement: nirvāṇa is “free from every attachment, extinguishing every recollection and conception, neither existent nor nonexistent, neither thing nor nonthing, like a lamp gone out and beyond discussion.”

12. Nirvāṇa without an Attainer

The outsider asks the last sentence of the entire chapter: “Who attains nirvāṇa?”

The treatise author answers, “There is no attainer of nirvāṇa,” still using the lamp that has gone out. Once a lamp is extinguished, one cannot ask whether it went east, west, south, north, to an intermediate direction, upward, or downward, because “all speech has ceased; there is nothing that can be discussed.” If so, who attains it? Even if nirvāṇa is posited, the attainer cannot be found. If self attains it, because self is permanent and all-pervading, it “should not attain nirvāṇa.” If the five aggregates attain it, “because the five aggregates are impermanent, because they arise and cease,” what arises and ceases cannot remain.

The most important sentence is the last: “If one says that nirvāṇa is attained, this is said within worldly convention.” The treatise author has not said there is no cultivation, no severing, and no liberation. He says that “attainment” is a word within worldly discourse. Cultivating the path and ending delusion remain; one simply does not place beneath the phrase a permanent attainer and a permanently attained object.

13. What a Reader Can Carry Away from This Chapter

First, see the empty rotation in “permanent because uncaused”: “If one calls it permanent because it has no cause, one may equally call it impermanent.” Anyone can casually assign the opposite name to something whose origin need never be explained.

Second, notice names established by negating something else. The unconstructed is established as the opposite of the constructed; formlessness is established through the disappearance of form. “Formlessness means the negation of form, not a further dharma.” Cutting a tree does not add a new thing.

Third, recognize where the sense of direction comes from. East is not on the ground but beneath the observer’s feet. As sunrise turns through the four continents, “the same place is wholly east, south, west, and north.” Time and direction remain speakable and usable; they simply have no permanent substance beneath them.

Fourth, watch the hand that wants to grasp. From space all the way to nirvāṇa, the outsider protects the same desire. At the end the treatise author no longer debates the character of a dharma, but asks, “Why does your mind crave it?”

Carried Forward

Standing ninth among ten chapters, this chapter closes the treatise’s refutation of dharmas. Most earlier targets possessed causes; here the unarisen, unceasing, uncaused, and unconstructed class is refuted as well. To reach nirvāṇa and say “there is no attainer of nirvāṇa” does not cancel cultivation and realization; it releases even the final attainment that could be appropriated as one’s own. “If one says that nirvāṇa is attained, this is said within worldly convention”—conventional speech remains fully able to stand.

Twice the chapter points outside itself. In discussing permanent dharmas, “self was refuted before” inherits the inquiry of “Refutation of a Self”; “the remaining permanent dharmas will be refuted afterward” announces this chapter’s five movements. After permanence has been refuted, only one thing remains untouched: the refutation itself. If one clings to “all dharmas are empty” and to the view that refutes, that becomes another permanence. The next “Refutation of Emptiness” addresses precisely this move.

After space, time, direction, fine particles, and nirvāṇa no longer provide a place to abide, what the chapter leaves is not a blank, but “freedom from every attachment and the extinguishing of every recollection and conception.”