百論 破一品第三

This time the outsider does not establish self from sensation or knowledge, but from possession: “Existence, unity, a jar, and the rest belong to self.” The treatise author answers that self has already been found unobtainable, then immediately opens that sentence and asks: are existence, unity, and jar one, or different? This chapter follows only the path of unity.

When Names Can Be Substituted

If the three are one, they must be like three names of one lord of the devas, interchangeable in every locus: “Wherever existence is, unity and jar are.” A garment exists; the garment must therefore be a jar. If “existence” is permanent, the jar is permanent; if the jar is impermanent, “existence” and unity are impermanent too. This is called “as with one, all is established.” The same nondifference can be driven in reverse: existence is everywhere yet no jar is present there, so no jar should be present where the jar is; if “existence” is not a jar, “the jar too is not a jar.” This is called “as with one, nothing is established.” Add jar and existence-unity establishing one another first and last, and it becomes “as with one, everything is inverted.” When one premise yields three contrary paths, the premise itself cannot stand. The received text preserves a lacuna here: “Four folios of argument about names cannot be translated.”

Where Existence Is Present but No Jar, Two Have Already Appeared

The outsider revises the claim: where existence is present, a jar need not be present. The treatise author answers, “The jar and existence are two. Why two? Because there can be no jar.” Between one thing and itself, it cannot be present here and absent there. The criterion falls on trust: “If one says ‘existent,’ people trust that jars and other things are included. If one says ‘jar,’ they do not trust that garments and other things are included.” What gathers broadly is a universal character; what gathers narrowly is a particular character. The outsider invokes one person who is both father and son, only to hear: “Before a son is born, he is not called a father.” Both roles are established in dependence upon another.

One Scale Weighs Everything

Head and feet with body, color and the rest with jar, pine and cypress with forest, elephants, horses, chariots, and infantry with army: the outsider changes the scale four times, while the treatise author never changes the reason. “If the foot is not different from the body, why is the foot not the head?” “If one speaks of one forest, pines, cypresses, and the rest should also be one.” Once nondifference is claimed, properties must pass through in both directions. If they cannot, the nondifference must be withdrawn.

The Three Times Crushed into One

The outsider retreats to cause. The answer is: “Now that fruit is refuted, cause refutes itself, because in your doctrine cause and fruit are one.” One step further: “The lump of clay is present, the jar future, and earth past.” If cause and fruit are one, jar and earth already exist in the lump, so “the language of done, doing, and to be done is destroyed.” The final rescue invokes long and short as mutually dependent, but the character of long is sought in long, short, and their conjunction and found nowhere. The rescue becomes a witness: “If neither long nor short exists, how could they be mutually dependent?”

Hundred Treatise, fascicle one, “Refutation of Unity, Chapter Three,” composed by the Bodhisattva Deva, explained by the adept Vasu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin · Taishō T30n1569. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. What Belongs to Self

〔T30 0173b23〕The outsider says—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: A self must exist, because existence, unity, a jar, and the rest belong to self.

The adept Vasu explains: If self exists, what belongs to self exists; if self is absent, what belongs to self is absent. Existence, unity, a jar, and the rest now belong to self; therefore, self exists.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Why? Because self has already been sought and found unobtainable. Let us now consider existence, unity, the jar, and the rest: do they exist as one, or do they exist as different? Both paths entail faults.

The outsider asks: If existence, unity, the jar, and the rest exist as one, what fault is there?

2. As with One, All Is Established

The treatise author answers—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: If existence, unity, and jar are one, then, as with one, all is established, or nothing is established, or everything is inverted.

The adept Vasu explains: If existence, unity, and jar are one, it is like Indra, Śakra, and Kauśika being three names of the same lord of the devas: wherever Indra is, Śakra and Kauśika are. So wherever “existence” is, unity and jar are; wherever unity is, existence and jar are; wherever a jar is, existence and unity are.

If so, garments and all other objects should also be jars, because existence, unity, and jar are one. Thus every existent object should be a jar, and jars, garments, and all other objects should now all be one.

Further, “existence” is permanent, and so unity and jar should also be permanent.

Further, once “existence” has been spoken, unity and jar have already been spoken.

Further, unity is a number, and therefore “existence” and jar should also be numbers.

Further, if the jar has a body complete in five parts—color, sound, smell, taste, and touch—then “existence” and unity should also have five-part bodies. If the jar has form and offers resistance, “existence” and unity should also have form and offer resistance. If the jar is impermanent, “existence” and unity should likewise be impermanent.

This is called “as with one, all is established.”

3. As with One, Nothing Is Established

The adept Vasu continues: “Existence” is everywhere, while in many of those places no jar is present. Therefore, wherever a jar is present now, it likewise should be absent, because jar and “existence” are not different.

Further, every particular thing has “existence,” yet those things are not jars. The jar must now therefore be a nonjar, because it is not different from “existence.”

Further, if speaking the single word “existence” does not include unity and jar, then speaking of unity and jar should likewise fail to include unity and jar, because they are not different from “existence.”

Further, if “existence” is not a jar, the jar too is not a jar, because it is not different from “existence.”

This is called “as with one, nothing is established.”

4. As with One, Everything Is Inverted

The adept Vasu further explains: If one wishes to speak of a jar, one must speak of “existence”; if one wishes to speak of “existence,” one must speak of a jar.

Further, according to what you establish, once the jar is established, “existence” and unity are established with it; once “existence” and unity are established, the jar should be established with them, because the three are one.

This is called “as with one, everything is inverted.” 〔The received text inserts a note here: Four folios of argument about names cannot be translated.〕

5. An Object Both Exists and Is One

The outsider says—this sentence is Deva’s root statement: There is no fault because an object both exists and is one.

The adept Vasu explains: An object both “exists” and is one. Therefore, wherever a jar exists, “existence” and unity necessarily exist; yet it is not the case that wherever “existence” and unity exist there is a jar. Further, when a jar is spoken of, one should know that “existence” and unity have already been included; but speaking of “existence” and unity does not necessarily include a jar.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: The jar and existence are two. Why two? Because there can be no jar.

The adept Vasu explains: If existence, unity, and jar are one, why can “existence” and unity be present where no jar exists? Further, how can it be said that “existence” and unity do not include the jar?

6. The Jar-Existence within the Jar

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because the jar-existence within the jar is determinate.

The adept Vasu explains: The jar-existence within the jar is not different from the jar, but it differs from the existence of garments and other objects. Therefore, wherever a jar exists, jar-existence is present; and wherever jar-existence is present, a jar exists. Yet it is not the case that wherever “existence” is present, there is a jar.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because jar and existence are not different.

The adept Vasu explains: “Existence” is a universal character. Why? If one says “existent,” people trust that the jar and all other objects are included. If one says “jar,” people do not trust that garments and other objects are also included. Therefore, jar is a particular character, while “existence” is a universal character. Since one is particular and the other universal, how could they be one?

7. Father and Son

〔T30 0174a01〕The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Like father and son.

The adept Vasu explains: The same person is both a son and a father. In the same way, a universal character is also a particular character, and a particular character is also a universal character.

The treatise author answers: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because of the son, one is a father.

The adept Vasu explains: Before a person has begotten a son, he is not called a father. A son is born, and only then does he become a father. Moreover, this analogy agrees with what I say, while contradicting you.

8. People Plainly See a Jar

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: A jar should exist, because everyone trusts it.

The adept Vasu explains: People in the world plainly see and all trust that a jar has a use; therefore, a jar should exist.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because it is not different from existence, all is absent.

The adept Vasu explains: If the jar is not different from “existence,” the jar should be a universal character and not a particular character. When the particular character is absent, the universal character is also absent; only because particular characters exist is there a universal character. If particular characters do not exist, the universal character does not exist. Since both are absent, all is absent.

9. Head and Feet

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: As parts such as the feet are called a body.

The adept Vasu explains: Although parts such as head and feet are not different from the body, the foot alone is not taken as the body. In the same way, although jar and “existence” are not different, the jar is not a universal character.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If the foot is not different from the body, why is the foot not the head?

The adept Vasu explains: If parts such as head and feet are not different from the body, the foot should be the head, because both are not different from the body. Just as Indra and Śakra are not different and therefore Indra is Śakra.

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because the parts differ, there is no fault.

The adept Vasu explains: A part is not different from the whole that possesses parts, but it is not the case that one part is not different from another part. Therefore, head and feet are not one.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If so, there is no body.

The adept Vasu explains: If the feet differ from the head and the head in turn differs from the feet and the other parts, then only the various parts exist; no further whole possessing parts remains that can be called the body.

10. Many Causes Manifest One Fruit

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because many causes manifest one fruit, as color and the rest are the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as the many parts of color and the rest serve as causes and manifest the single fruit of a jar, it is neither the case that color alone is the jar nor that another jar exists apart from color. Therefore, the parts such as color do not become one. The relation of parts such as the feet to the body is the same.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Like color and the rest, the jar too is not one.

The adept Vasu explains: If the jar is not different from its five parts of color, sound, smell, taste, and touch, one should not speak of one jar. If one does speak of one jar, the parts such as color should likewise be one, because color and the rest are not different from the jar.

11. Army and Forest

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Like an army or a forest.

The adept Vasu explains: Elephants, horses, chariots, and infantry gather in one place and are called an army. Likewise, many trees such as pines and cypresses gather in one place and are called a forest. Neither is a pine alone taken as a forest, nor does another forest exist apart from the pine; the army is the same. In like manner, color alone is not called a jar, nor does another jar exist apart from color.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: A collection is like the jar.

The adept Vasu explains: If pines, cypresses, and the rest are not different from the forest, one should not speak of one forest. If one speaks of one forest, pines, cypresses, and the rest should likewise be one, because they are not different from the forest. The pine tree’s roots, stalk, branches, nodes, flowers, and leaves should be refuted in the same way. Every object, including an army, should be refuted in this way.

12. You Yourself Accept Many Jars

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Because you accept many jars. Another root statement by Deva: You say that color and the other parts are many.

The adept Vasu explains: Since the parts such as color are many, jars should likewise be many. Thus, while wishing to refute one jar, you instead accept many jars.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: It is not because color and the rest are many that jars are many.

The adept Vasu explains: I state the fault in your position; I do not accept many jars. You yourself say that color and the other parts are many, while apart from color and the rest no separate jar-dharma exists that could be their fruit.

13. Since the Cause Has Not Been Refuted, the Fruit Is Established

The outsider says—Deva’s root statement: Fruit exists because the cause has not been refuted. Because a cause exists, fruit is established.

The adept Vasu explains: You refute the jar as fruit but do not refute color and the rest as the jar’s causes. If a cause exists, fruit necessarily exists; there is no cause that produces no fruit. Further, color and the rest are causes of the jar and fruits of atoms. Since you accept color and the rest, cause and fruit are established together.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: If fruit is absent, cause too is absent.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as the jar should not be one because it is not different from its many parts such as color, now the many parts such as color should likewise not be many because they are not different from the jar. Further, you say there is no cause that does not produce fruit. Since the fruit has now been refuted, the cause refutes itself, because in your doctrine cause and fruit are one.

Further, Deva’s root statement: The three times become one.

The adept Vasu explains: The time of the lump of clay is present, the time of the jar future, and the time of earth past. If cause and fruit are one, the jar and earth should exist within the lump of clay. The three times would thus become one time. Every statement of what has been done, is now being done, and will be done is destroyed.

14. Long and Short

The outsider says: It is not so. Deva’s root statement: Because cause and fruit are established in mutual dependence, like long and short.

The adept Vasu explains: Just as short is seen by reason of long and long by reason of short, so this lump of clay is a cause when viewed in relation to the jar and a fruit when viewed in relation to earth.

The treatise author answers—Deva’s root statement: Because it depends upon another, is contrary, and bears both faults, the character of long exists neither in the long, nor in the short, nor in their conjunction.

The adept Vasu explains: If a character of long really existed, would it exist in the long, in the short, or where long and short are conjoined? It is unobtainable in all three. Why? The character of long does not exist in the long because long is established in dependence on another and is called long only by reason of short. Long does not exist in the short because their natures and characters are contrary; if long existed in short, it would not be called short. Nor does long exist where long and short are conjoined, because it would bear the faults of both sides. The faults of claiming it exists in long or in short have already been explained. The character of short is the same. Since there is neither long nor short, what could be mutually dependent?

The “Refutation of a Self” carried its examination into language, but the outsider has not left. He changes his route. No longer proving self from sensation or knowledge, he now proves it from possession: “A self must exist. Existence, unity, a jar, and the rest belong to self.” The reason is clean and brisk: “If self exists, what belongs to self exists; if self is absent, what belongs to self is absent.” Existence, unity, and jars now stand before the eyes. To whom do they belong? If there is possession, there must be an owner who possesses.

The treatise author’s answer has two parts. The first is one sentence: “Because self has already been found unobtainable.” The account from the prior chapter is not reopened. The real work lies in the second part: “Let us now consider existence, unity, a jar, and the rest. Do they exist as one, or as different? Both entail faults.”

This question moves the field. The outsider intended to use the three words “existence, unity, a jar” as ready-made ground. The treatise author first opens the ground itself. Your “existence,” your “unity,” and your “jar”—are these one thing or three? This chapter walks the path of “one”; the next walks “different.” Across fourteen exchanges, every time the outsider retreats, he raises another analogy—Indra’s three names; father and son; head and feet with body; color and the rest with jar; pines and cypresses with forest; elephants, horses, chariots, and infantry with army; lump of clay with jar and earth; long and short. Each time, the treatise author places that analogy on the same scale.

1. Indra, Śakra, and Kauśika

The outsider asks directly: “If existence, unity, jar, and the rest exist as one, what fault is there?” The treatise author gives the first root statement: “If existence, unity, and jar are one, then, as with one, all is established, or nothing is established, or everything is inverted.”

The adept Vasu first uses a ready example to explain “one”: “As with Indra, Śakra, and Kauśika: wherever Indra is, there are Śakra and Kauśika.” Three names stand over the same lord of the devas, so the names and their loci can be interchanged. If “existence,” “unity,” and “jar” are likewise three names, they must likewise substitute: “Wherever existence is, unity and jar are; wherever unity is, existence and jar are; wherever a jar is, existence and unity are.”

Once substitution opens, the faults walk out by themselves.

All is established. A garment exists, so it should be a jar—“because existence, unity, and jar are one.” Therefore “every existent object should be a jar; jars, garments, and all other objects should now all be one.” The adept Vasu then gives five successive “furthers,” pouring all properties of “existence” and “unity” into the jar, and all properties of the jar back into them. “Existence” is permanent, so unity and jar should be permanent. Saying “existence” already says unity and jar. Unity is number, so “existence” and jar should be numbers. The jar has a five-part body of color, sound, smell, taste, and touch, so “existence” and unity should have one too. The jar has form, offers resistance, and is impermanent; “existence” and unity must accept all of it. This path is called “as with one, all is established.” Everything can be established precisely because nothing can stop it.

Nothing is established. The same nondifference runs just as well in reverse: “If existence is everywhere and no jar is present there, then wherever the jar is present there should likewise be no jar, because existence and jar are not different.” Every particular thing has “existence” but is not a jar, so “the jar is now a nonjar.” If saying the single word “existence” does not include unity and jar, then saying “unity and jar” cannot include unity and jar. “If existence is not a jar, the jar too is not a jar.” From beginning to end the reason has only four words: “because existence is not different.”

Everything is inverted. “If one wishes to speak of a jar, one must speak of existence; if one wishes to speak of existence, one must speak of a jar.” Moreover, when jar is established, existence and unity are established, while when existence and unity are established, the jar is established—“because they are one.” First and last lose their footing. This is called “as with one, everything is inverted.”

The three paths are three ways of running one assumption. Once nondifference is established, establishment, nonestablishment, and inversion can all be inferred in the same way. A premise capable of yielding contrary conclusions at once cannot itself stand.

Here the received text inserts a note: “Four folios of argument about names cannot be translated.” The translation workshop plainly records four folios of argument about names that could not be rendered into Chinese. The lacuna remains a lacuna and is not filled by imagination.

2. Why Can Existence Be Present Where No Jar Is?

The outsider immediately supplements the thesis with an asymmetry: “There is no fault because an object both exists and is one.” “An object exists and is one; therefore, wherever a jar exists, existence and unity necessarily exist, but it is not the case that wherever existence and unity exist there is a jar.” Substitution is made one-way: speaking jar includes existence and unity; speaking existence and unity need not include jar.

The treatise author answers: “The jar and existence are two. Why two? Because there can be no jar.” Since existence and unity can be present where no jar exists, jar and existence are already two. Between a thing and itself, “it is here” and “it is absent there” cannot occur.

The outsider makes a finer distinction: “Because the jar-existence within the jar is determinate.” The “jar-existence” inside the jar is not different from the jar, but differs from the existence of garments and other objects. Jar and jar-existence therefore pervade each other, while universal “existence” need not be jar everywhere. This step has in fact already cut the original common “existence” into separate portions.

The treatise author therefore lays out universal and particular: “Existence is a universal character. Why? If one says ‘existent,’ people trust that jars and other objects are included. If one says ‘jar,’ they do not trust that garments and other objects are included. Therefore, jar is a particular character and existence a universal character. How could they be one?” The criterion falls upon trust—how many things the listener admits when a word is spoken. Say “existent,” and jars and garments enter together; say “jar,” and garments remain outside the door. What gathers broadly and what gathers narrowly cannot be one thing.

3. One Is Called Father Only After There Is a Son

The outsider offers the chapter’s most elegant analogy: “Like father and son.” “The same person is both a son and a father; in the same way, the universal character is also particular and the particular character also universal.” Two roles proceed together in one person without contradiction; why not universal and particular?

The treatise author’s answer has three words: “Because of the son, father.” “Before a son is born, one is not called a father; a son is born and only then does one become a father.” The name “father” was not originally present in that person’s own substance; it is attached only when a son exists. The adept Vasu adds: “This analogy agrees with me, while contradicting you.” Your analogy states precisely my principle: the two roles proceed together because each is established in dependence on another; no role supports itself.

The outsider wants it to prove one substance bearing two characters. What it actually proves is both characters depending on another.

4. People Plainly See a Jar—Does That Count as a Reason?

The outsider retreats to the most ordinary ground: “A jar should exist, because everyone trusts it.” “People in the world plainly see and trust that a jar has a use; therefore, a jar should exist.”

The treatise author does not dispute plain sight. He follows the outsider’s own nondifference through: “Because it is not different from existence, all is absent.” If jar is not different from existence, jar becomes universal rather than particular. “When the particular character is absent, the universal character too is absent. Only because particular characters exist is there a universal character; without particulars there is no universal. Since both are absent, all is absent.”

We must see this move clearly. It is the outsider, not the treatise author, who raises jar into “existence” and makes it universal. The jar the outsider wants to preserve is devoured by his own nondifference. The universal was supported by particular after particular. Once particulars are annexed, the universal also falls empty; in the end even the jar’s use that he wanted to prove cannot be preserved.

5. Why Is the Foot Not the Head?

The outsider moves to the body: “As parts such as the feet are called a body.” “Although parts such as the head and feet are not different from the body, the foot alone is not taken as the body. Likewise, although jar and existence are not different, jar is not universal.” Everyday life appears full of nondifference without equivalence.

The treatise author brings back the earlier names of the lord of the devas: “If the foot is not different from the body, why is the foot not the head?” “Because both are not different from the body. Just as Indra and Śakra are not different, and therefore Indra is Śakra.” If two things are both not different from a third, they must be not different from one another. Head and foot are both not different from body; foot should therefore be head.

The outsider makes a finer distinction: “Because the parts differ, there is no fault.” “Part and the whole possessing parts are not different; it is not the case that part and part are not different.” Part and whole may be nondifferent while parts differ from one another; therefore, head and feet are not one.

The treatise author answers: “If so, there is no body.” “If feet differ from head, and head differs from feet and the other parts, then only the various parts exist; no whole possessing parts remains to be called body.” Once the parts differ from one another, only a collection of mutually different things remains. Ask once more, “Where is the body?”—nothing can be pointed out. The previous step preserved the distinction between head and feet; this step loses the body.

6. Color and Jar, Pine and Forest, Elephants, Horses, Chariots, and Infantry with Army

The outsider offers another formulation: “Because many causes manifest one fruit, as color and the rest are the jar.” “Color alone is not the jar, nor is a jar separate from color; therefore, color and the other parts do not become one.” Neither identical nor separate sounds like a stable middle path.

The treatise author answers, “Like color and the rest, the jar too is not one.” “If the jar is not different from its five parts of color, sound, smell, taste, and touch, one should not speak of one jar. If one speaks of one jar, the parts such as color should likewise be one, because they are not different from the jar.” You yourself said nondifferent. The “one” in the one jar must therefore turn all five parts into one as well. If the five parts are not allowed to become one, neither can that “one jar” be spoken.

The outsider invokes army and forest: “A pine alone is not the forest, nor is a forest separate from pine; an army is the same.” The treatise author answers, “A collection is like the jar,” sending the same sentence back unchanged: “If pines, cypresses, and the rest are not different from the forest, one should not speak of one forest. If one speaks of one forest, pines, cypresses, and the rest should likewise be one, because they are not different from the forest.” Nor does he refute only once: “The roots, stalk, branches, nodes, flowers, and leaves of a pine should be refuted in the same way. Every object, including an army, should be refuted in this way.” Forest is divided into trees, tree into roots, stalk, branches, nodes, flowers, and leaves; the army of elephants, horses, chariots, and infantry follows likewise.

What is truly pursued here is neither jar nor forest, but the source of one’s right to “say one.” Each time the outsider changes analogy, he changes only the scale. The pivot of nondifference does not move, so the same scale weighs them all.

7. Does Refuting One Instead Fall into Many?

The outsider seizes an apparently forceful counterattack: “Because you accept many jars.” He adds: “You say that color and the other parts are many.” Since color and the other parts are many, jars become many; “therefore, wishing to refute one jar, you accept many jars.”

The treatise author answers: “It is not because color and the rest are many that jars are many.” “I state the fault in your position; I do not accept many jars. You yourself say the parts such as color are many, while apart from color and the rest no separate jar-dharma exists as their fruit.” Stating the consequence of another’s thesis does not mean accepting that consequence oneself. Moreover, “many” belongs to the outsider’s own statement; apart from color and the rest there is no other jar-dharma that could serve as their fruit.

8. If the Cause Remains, Does the Fruit Remain?

The outsider retreats from fruit to cause: “Fruit exists because the cause has not been refuted. Because a cause exists, fruit is established.” “You refute the jar as fruit but do not refute color and the rest as its causes. If a cause exists, fruit necessarily exists; there is no cause that produces no fruit.” He adds another layer: color and the rest are causes of the jar yet fruits of atoms. Since you accept color and the rest, cause and fruit are established together.

The treatise author answers, “If fruit is absent, cause too is absent.” First he applies the arithmetic of nondifference symmetrically. The jar is not different from its many parts and therefore should not be one; conversely, the many parts are not different from the jar and therefore should not be many. Both one and many lose their basis. Then he takes up the outsider’s own words: “Now that fruit is refuted, cause refutes itself, because in your doctrine cause and fruit are one.” You are the one who says cause and fruit are one; when half of that unity collapses, the other has nowhere to stand.

The treatise author next draws the chapter’s final great fault, giving another root statement: “The three times become one.” “The lump of clay is present, the jar future, and earth past. If cause and fruit are one, the lump should contain jar and earth; therefore, the three times become one.” If cause and fruit are nondifferent, the future jar already exists in the present lump and the past earth exists there too; three times are crushed into one. The last sentence weighs most: “The language of done, doing, and to be done is destroyed.” Not only a doctrine is destroyed, but speech. If done, doing, and to be done cannot be distinguished, no event can be discussed.

9. Mutual Dependence Cannot Rescue Unity

The outsider makes a final move: “Because cause and fruit are established in mutual dependence, like long and short.” “Short is seen by reason of long and long by reason of short. Likewise, the lump of clay is a cause when viewed in relation to the jar and a fruit when viewed in relation to earth.” He wants to say cause and fruit are relative roles rather than substances, so he need not accept the fault of making the three times one.

The treatise author’s answer searches three places for the character of long: “Because it depends upon another, is contrary, and bears both faults, the character of long exists neither in long, nor in short, nor in their conjunction.” Long does not contain long, “because it depends on another; by reason of short it is called long.” Short does not contain long, “because their natures and characters conflict”; “if short contained long, it would not be called short.” Their conjunction does not contain long, because “it bears both faults.” “The character of short is the same.”

The final sentence closes lightly and heavily at once: “If neither long nor short exists, how could they be mutually dependent?” Mutual dependence requires two ends before they can depend on one another. Once each end is sought and found unobtainable, the line of dependence hangs in empty space. The outsider brought mutual dependence to rescue the intrinsic characters of long, short, cause, and fruit that he had already established. Once mutual dependence is examined, the rescuer instead proves that the one to be rescued was never there.

10. What a Reader Can Carry Away from This Chapter

First, watch nondifference. The outsider changes analogy eight times, but the treatise author uses almost one scale only: “because existence is not different.” Whenever two things are said to be nondifferent, all their properties must be allowed to pass between them. If that cannot be accepted, nondifference must be withdrawn.

Second, once substitution opens, nothing can stop it. Indra and Śakra can exchange loci because beneath them there truly is only one lord of the devas. If the three words “existence, unity, jar” work the same way, a garment must be a jar and a jar must be a nonjar.

Third, from where comes the right to say one? The treatise author removes neither jar, body, forest, nor army from the world. He removes the “one” treated as nondifferent from the object while also standing by itself.

Carried Forward

This chapter joins its neighbors. In refuting the elephant’s trunk, the “Relinquishing Demerit and Merit” twice points outside itself, saying that refutations of unity and difference appear elsewhere and only borrowing their results there. One of those places is this chapter; the other is the following “Refutation of Difference.” Once this chapter has walked the path of unity, the outsider’s remaining path is difference.

The opening statement, “A self must exist, because existence, unity, a jar, and the rest belong to self,” also reminds us that this long argument about jars is not a study of vessels. From beginning to end, the outsider wants an owner capable of possession. When the treatise author opens the “existence, unity, jar” beneath “what belongs” all the way down to “how could they be mutually dependent,” that owner has nothing left to claim as its own.