成唯識論 白話全本 · 冊3

〔Verses expounded〕

(5) "Next, the second transformer: this consciousness is named the manas; resting on that, referring to that, it has cogitation for its nature and mark." (v5) (6) "Four defilements are constantly co-present, namely: self-delusion, self-view, together with self-conceit and self-love, and co-present with the rest, contact and so on." (upper half of v6) (7) "It belongs to the veiled-indeterminate; it follows the realm into which one is born and bound. In the arhat, in the concentration of cessation, and on the supramundane path it is absent." (v7 — not reached in this section, listed here for the record)

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A. Opening the theme — the second transformer is the cogitating transformer (the manas)

The treatise says: after the first transformer (the maturational transformer, the eighth, the ālaya-consciousness), the next thing to clarify is the marks of the second transformer, "the cogitating transformer." In scripture this consciousness has another, special name, "manas" — because its cogitation is both constant (never broken off) and examining (it investigates, it decides), surpassing all the other consciousnesses; and that is why it is given this distinct name.

〔challenge〕 Since "manas" is rendered "intellect" (意), how does it differ from the "intellect" in "the sixth, the mental consciousness" (意識)? 〔answer〕 This seventh-consciousness name is a "karmadhāraya gloss" (an appositional gloss) — just like the name "store-consciousness," where the "consciousness" here just is the "intellect" (the very body of the consciousness is the intellect, the two words pointing to one and the same dharma); whereas that sixth-consciousness name is a "tatpuruṣa gloss" (a dependent gloss) — just like "eye-consciousness," where the "consciousness" and the "intellect" are not one thing (the eye-consciousness is set up in dependence on the eye-faculty, consciousness and faculty being two, and likewise consciousness and intellect being two).

Scripture, again, fears that the seventh's "intellect" might be confused with the sixth's "mental consciousness," and so for the seventh it sets up only the single name "intellect," not calling it "consciousness." Further, lifting up the one word "intellect" serves to set apart the two senses "mind" (心) and "consciousness" (識) — for the seventh's "accumulating" (this is the sense of "mind") and its "discerning" (this is the sense of "consciousness") are both weaker than in the other consciousnesses, and so neither of these two names is taken; and on the other side it serves to display that the seventh and the sixth, the mental consciousness, are each other's "near support" (the seventh is the defiling-and-purifying support of the sixth), and so it is called only "intellect."

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B. What it rests on — glossing "resting on that"

1. "That" is the eighth; this consciousness rests on the store-consciousness

The verse's line "resting on that" is meant to clarify "on what the manas relies in arising." "That" refers precisely to the first transformer spoken of before — that is, the eighth, the ālaya-consciousness. Scripture says: this consciousness, the manas, is able to arise only by relying on the store-consciousness (the eighth).

〔The seed-as-support view〕 One view holds: what the manas relies on is the "seed" of the eighth consciousness, and not its risen-up "present-activity consciousness." The reason: the manas is never broken off, always continuing, so it has no need to draw in the present-activity consciousness of the eighth to serve as a "concomitant support" (that is, the kind of support that co-exists simultaneously and props it up mutually) in order to arise.

〔The seed-and-present-both-as-support view · leaning correct〕 Another view holds: what the manas relies on is the "seed" of the eighth consciousness and its "present-activity consciousness" both, neither one to be lacked. The reason: the manas, though never broken off, still "alters" (changes and shifts), and just because it can change it is called an "evolving consciousness"; and being an evolving consciousness, it must draw in the present-activity consciousness of the eighth to serve as concomitant support before it can arise.

The word "evolving" (轉) in the verse means just "flowing-on." It is meant to point out: this consciousness, the manas, constantly relies on the eighth consciousness and unceasingly reaches out to grasp its own object (that is, referring to the eighth and grasping it as a "self").

2. Side-treatise — the three supports of every mind and mental factor

〔The side-treatise begins〕 Here the text first turns aside to set out a general scheme. All minds (mind-kings) and mental factors must have something they rest on; and what they rest on comes, in all, to three kinds:

First, the causal-condition support — that is, the "seed" of one's own kind. All conditioned dharmas must rely on this to arise; lacking its own causal condition (its seed), it absolutely cannot grow forth. Second, the dominant-condition support — that is, the "inner six bases," namely the six faculties, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and intellect. All minds and mental factors must rely on this to arise; lacking the "concomitant faculty" (the faculty that co-exists simultaneously), the mind cannot stir. Third, the immediately-antecedent-condition support — that is, the "just-ceased intellect," namely the mind of the preceding moment that has just ceased and made way for the moment to follow. All minds and mental factors must rely on this to arise; lacking this "opening-and-guiding faculty" (the mind that yields its place and leads the way), the following moment cannot arise.

Note well: only mind and mental factors, these two, possess all three of these supports at once, and so are called "having a support"; the rest of the dharmas (such as the form-dharmas) do not count.

(a) First · the causal-condition support (the seed-support)

The first is the "seed-support" (also called the causal-condition support). 〔The seed-fruit-in-sequence view〕 One view maintains: the seed must first cease, and only then does the present-activity fruit arise next — that is, seed and fruit run one after the other and are never simultaneous. They give two reasons: first, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (the Compendium) said "there is no such thing as 'the seed still present while the fruit has already been born'"; second, a seed and the sprout it grows are, after all, not simultaneous.

〔The seed-fruit-both-present view · the correct view〕 It should be known (the correct view): the "in-sequence view" above — the proofs it brings out in fact none of them stand. Take them one by one: (one) that line of the Compendium was "said with respect to 'a seed drawing forth a later seed'" — meaning that one seed draws forth the next, which is the continuity of one kind of seed; it speaks not at all of "a seed producing a present-activity," and so cannot be used to prove that seed and present-activity are likewise in sequence. (two) "a seed growing a sprout" and the like are only a worldly figure of speech, not the ultimate truth, and cannot be carried straight over to settle that seed and present-activity must also be in sequence. (three) "the seed ceases and only then the sprout arises" is not itself something both sides concede (it is not common ground). (four) take a further figure: a lamp-flame and the lamp-wick (the 炷) are plainly simultaneous, and moreover each other's cause — which shows that "cause" and "fruit" can be simultaneous.

Here, though, two cases must be told apart: the cause-and-fruit "of the seed's own kind" (one seed drawing forth the next) is indeed not simultaneous; but the kind where seed and present-activity "produce each other" (the seed producing the present-activity, and the present-activity perfuming back into a seed) is necessarily simultaneous and co-existent. And so the Yogācārabhūmi says: an impermanent dharma "is a cause to another-nature" (the seed and the present-activity being each other's cause — this is "other-nature") and "is also a cause to the same-nature of a later moment" (the prior seed drawing forth the later seed — this is "self-nature") — and this is the meaning of "causal condition."

In the text the word "self-nature" says that "the seed's own kind," the prior moment serving as cause to the later (this is sequential, not simultaneous); the word "other-nature" says that "the seed and the present-activity" serve as each other's cause (this is simultaneous, co-existent).

The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says the same: the store-consciousness and the defiled dharmas are each other's causal condition, just as two bundles of reeds lean on each other and stand up at the same time; and it says further: a seed and its fruit are necessarily simultaneous. So the matter of the "seed-support" (between seed and present-activity) is by no means sequential and apart, but simultaneous and co-existent.

If somewhere it does say "seed and fruit are in sequence," then one should know: that is all "the gate of going-along-with the [other school's] principle" — that is, going along with another school's way of speaking and saying so for the moment, not the ultimate account. So the conclusion is: the eight consciousnesses and the several mental factors each, every one, have their own "seed-support" (the causal-condition support).

(b) Second · the concomitant support

The second is called the "concomitant support" (which belongs to the dominant-condition support spoken of above). 〔The faculties-are-just-the-seeds view〕 Someone maintains thus: the five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, take "the mental consciousness" as their concomitant support — because the moment the five consciousnesses appear, there is necessarily the mental consciousness alongside; as for "the five faculties, eye and the rest," they say there is no such separate thing serving as concomitant support, because "the five faculties, eye and the rest, just are the seeds of the five consciousnesses." They also cite the verse of the Viṃśatikā (the Twenty Verses on consciousness-only) in proof:

(prose unpacking of the verse) Consciousness arises from a seed of its own kind, and transforms so as to resemble an object-mark, evolving and manifesting; in order to establish the inner bases (the faculties) and the outer bases (the objects), the Buddha taught them as ten (the five faculties and the five objects).

They read this verse thus: the World-Honored One, in order to establish the twelve bases, spoke of "the seeds of the five consciousnesses" as the five faculties, eye and the rest, and of "the perceived-part of the five consciousnesses" as the five objects, form and the rest; and so (they say) the five faculties, eye and the rest, just equal the seeds of the five consciousnesses. They also cite the Ālambana-parīkṣā (the Treatise on the Object of Cognition), which says the same:

(prose unpacking of the verse) The "function" upon consciousness that can produce (form), named the five faculties — this alone is reasonable; this function and the object-form have, from beginningless time, been each other's cause.

They read this verse to mean: upon the maturation consciousness (the eighth), the seed that "can produce the eye and the other form-consciousnesses" is named the "form-function," and this is what is spoken of as the five faculties — there being no separate set of faculties, eye and the rest; and the seed and the five consciousnesses constantly serve as each other's cause, because "the perfuming agent (the present-activity)" and "the perfumed seed" take turns being each other's cause.

〔The faculties-are-just-the-seeds view, continued〕 They go on to say further: the seventh and the eighth, these two consciousnesses, have no separate concomitant support — because they evolve in continuous succession, their own power being strong enough; only the sixth, the mental consciousness, has besides a concomitant support (namely the manas) — because the sixth can arise only by relying on the manas.

〔Refuting the faculties-are-just-the-seeds view · the correct view〕 It should be known (the correct view): the account "the five faculties just are the seeds of the five consciousnesses" does not get through, whether by reasoning or by scripture. Below it is driven down point by point —

(one) Suppose the five form-faculties just were the seeds of the five consciousnesses; then would not the seeds of the eighteen elements collapse together into a tangle? Yet scripture everywhere plainly says: the eighteen elements each have their own separate seed. (So one cannot mash "the seeds of the faculties" and "the seeds of the consciousnesses" into one.)

(two) Again, the seeds of the five consciousnesses can each grow forth two different things, "the perceived-part" (the image reached out to) and "the perceiving-part" (the apprehending function). So tell us, which of these do you take and call "the faculties, eye and the rest"? If you take "the seed of the perceiving-part" as the faculty, then the faculty should be classed under the aggregate of consciousness; if you take "the seed of the perceived-part" as the faculty, then the faculty should be classed under the outer bases — yet both of these contradict scripture, for scripture says the five faculties, eye and the rest, are all the aggregate of form and all the inner bases.

(three) Again, suppose the five faculties just were the seeds of the five consciousnesses; then the five faculties should be the "causal condition" of the five consciousnesses (since only a seed counts as causal condition), and should not be said to belong to the "dominant condition." (But scripture says precisely that the faculty is a dominant condition.)

(four) Again, suppose the nose-faculty and the tongue-faculty just were the seeds of the nose-consciousness and the tongue-consciousness; then two conclusions are forced out: either the nose- and tongue-faculties too, following their consciousnesses, can belong only to the desire-realm; or the nose- and tongue-consciousnesses too, following their faculties, can extend up to the form-realm — take whichever you like, and either contradicts scripture (scripture says the nose- and tongue-faculties can extend to the upper realm, but the nose- and tongue-consciousnesses are only in the desire-realm).

(five) Likewise, if the eye-, ear-, and body-faculties just were the seeds of the eye-, ear-, and body-consciousnesses, then on the divisions of "the two realms, desire and form," and "the five stages," the very same trouble breaks out as in the previous point (the realm and stage to which the faculty belongs and to which the consciousness belongs do not match up).

(six) Again, since the seeds of the five consciousnesses extend to the wholesome and the unwholesome (the five consciousnesses being by nature of all three moral kinds), the five form-faculties too should be not only indeterminate. (But scripture says the five faculties can only be indeterminate.)

(seven) Again, the seeds of the five consciousnesses do not count as "appropriated" (a seed is not something appropriated), so the five faculties too should not count as "appropriated." (But the five faculties are plainly form-dharmas that are "appropriated.")

(eight) Again, if the five form-faculties just were the seeds of the five consciousnesses, then by the same reasoning carried on, "the seed of the mental consciousness" too should just be "the manas" — for they are taking "the faculty on which the five consciousnesses rest" as their case in point: since the faculty on which the five consciousnesses rest equals the seeds of the five consciousnesses, the faculty on which the mental consciousness rests (the manas) too should equal the seed of the mental consciousness. 〔But this plainly does not get through — the manas is a present-activity consciousness, not the seed of the mental consciousness.〕

(nine) Again, the Yogācārabhūmi says: the consciousnesses, eye and the rest, all possess the three supports in full (causal, dominant, immediately-antecedent). But if you say the five form-faculties just are the seeds of the five consciousnesses, then you have merged "the seed" and "the faculty" into one, and the five consciousnesses' supports come down to only two — which contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi's account of "three supports."

(ten) Again, scripture everywhere says: the faculties, eye and the rest, have both sides, "present-activity" and "seed." Now you insist the five faculties are only seeds — and that runs against the whole of scripture.

〔The retreating-rescue view〕 Someone wants to dodge the whole heap of faults above, yet is loath to let go of the position, and shifts to rescue it with a phrase: in the maturation consciousness, that "dominant karmic seed that can summon the five consciousnesses" (the seed of the karma that draws the five consciousnesses on) is what is named the five form-faculties; it is not the kind of seed that "serves as causal condition to produce the five consciousnesses" — by this shift (he fancies) he both neatly matches the two verses cited before and falls in well with the Yogācārabhūmi (on one hand still calling it a seed, on the other not a causal-condition seed, so that the faculty comes out as a dominant condition yet still tinged with the sense of "seed").

〔Refuting the retreating-rescue view · the correct view〕 This is mere talk on the lips, with no real principle in it. Taking the faculty to be the karmic seed, the old heap of faults is not lessened by even one: (1) the five form-faculties should then be not indeterminate (a karmic seed extends to the wholesome and the unwholesome); (2) the five faculties should then be not only "appropriated, of the aggregate of form, of the inner bases" (a karmic seed possesses none of these three); (3) the nose- and tongue-faculties should then belong only to the desire-realm; (4) the eye-, ear-, and body-faculties, three faculties, should then not extend to the five stages; (5) "the karma that summons the mental consciousness" should then equal the manas (the fault being the same as point eight before); (6) the faculties, eye and the rest, should then not have both sides, "present-activity" and "seed" (you admit only the karmic seed); (7) the faculties, eye and the rest, should then not be "form-faculties" (a karmic seed is not form).

(8) Again, suppose the five consciousnesses were all summoned by karma; then the five consciousnesses should belong wholly and only to "the indeterminate nature"; but the wholesome and unwholesome five consciousnesses are not summoned by karma (only the indeterminate maturation is summoned by karma). On your account, then, would not the wholesome and unwholesome five consciousnesses have no "faculties, eye and the rest," to serve as concomitant support? — so this 〔retreating-rescue〕 too is no clever rescue.

(9) Again, scripture everywhere says: the ālaya-consciousness transforms so as to manifest things like "the form-faculties," "the seats of the faculties" (the gross sense-organs, that is, these eyes of flesh and so on), and "the receptacle-world" (the outer mountains, rivers, and earth). How can you, then, wipe out "the form-faculties" with one stroke, saying the faculty is only a seed, that there are no real form-faculties? You already grant that "the consciousnesses, eye and the rest, transform so as to manifest things resembling form-objects," yet refuse to grant that "the faculties, eye and the rest, are form transformed out by the store-consciousness" — so muddled is this, it deeply violates both scripture and reason.

〔Correctly explaining the intent of the two verses〕 Then what do the two verses cited before, saying "the seed and the function are named the five faculties," in fact mean? Their real intent is to "break the notion that 'apart from consciousness, there is a really-existent form-faculty'" (that is, to refute the real faculty the heterodox speak of). They are aimed at "the thing transformed and manifested by consciousness, resembling the eye-faculty" (that is, the form-faculty transformed out by the store-consciousness) — because this thing has the "function of setting the five consciousnesses going," they borrow a name for it and call it a "seed," call it a "form-function"; it is not said that "a form-faculty just equals the karmic seed of consciousness."

〔Supplying the concomitant support · the five-accompanying mental consciousness〕 Add one more: that "clear mental consciousness" which refers to the five objects, clearly and distinctly (the mental consciousness that arises together with the five consciousnesses), should take "the five consciousnesses" as its concomitant support — because this clear mental consciousness is necessarily simultaneous with the five consciousnesses. Turn it the other way: were this clear mental consciousness not to rely on the five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, then the five consciousnesses too should not rely on this clear mental consciousness — for the force of the mutual reliance on the two sides is equal (you not relying on me, I too not relying on you).

〔Supplying the concomitant support · the seventh〕 Add one more: the seventh consciousness, though never broken off, still "alters" (changes) at stages such as the path of seeing. Since it alters, it should, like the first six consciousnesses, have a concomitant support; were one to say it has none, then the seventh could not count as an "evolving consciousness," which again contradicts scripture's account of "the seven evolving consciousnesses." So one must grant that the seventh too has a concomitant support — and this concomitant support is "the present-activity eighth consciousness" (the present-activity of the eighth serving as the concomitant support of the seventh).

So the Yogācārabhūmi says: "because there is the store-consciousness, there can be the manas; and with the manas as support, the mental consciousness can evolve." What this means is just: it is by relying on the "present-activity store-consciousness" as support that there is the manas, and not by relying on the "seed" of the eighth.

Otherwise (if the manas relied only on the seed of the eighth), then the Yogācārabhūmi should have said "because there is the store-consciousness, the mental consciousness can evolve"; but it says rather "with the manas as support, the mental consciousness evolves" — which shows the manas relies on the present-activity of the eighth. From this it can be seen: that 〔seed-as-support view〕 does not get through, whether by reasoning or by scripture.

〔This view's conclusion · the count of concomitant supports〕 So this view's conclusion is:

• The first five evolving consciousnesses, each one, certainly has "two concomitant supports": namely "the five form-faculties" and "the simultaneously-arising mental consciousness";
• The sixth evolving consciousness certainly and always has "one concomitant support": namely "the seventh consciousness"; if it arises at the same time as the five consciousnesses, then "the five consciousnesses" too count as concomitant support;
• The seventh evolving consciousness certainly has only "one concomitant support": namely "the eighth consciousness";
• only "the eighth consciousness" never alters and can stand by its own power, and so it has no concomitant support.

〔The correct view · refuting the prior view's "the eighth has no concomitant support"〕 Yet again someone says (going one layer deeper): the account above has still not gone all the way. Since the eighth, like the rest of the consciousnesses, is alike of the nature "consciousness," on what grounds do you single it out and forbid it a concomitant support? And further, the seventh and the eighth, these two consciousnesses, do after all always evolve together, each serving as the other's support — what is wrong with this mutual reliance?

You already grant that "the present-activity consciousness relies on the seed for support"; then "the seed of consciousness" too should be allowed to "rely on the present-activity consciousness" — that is, "the perfuming agent (the present-activity of the seven evolving consciousnesses)" and "the maturation (the present-activity of the eighth)" are precisely the support by which the seed can "be born, grow, and abide"; for the seed, were it to leave this perfuming agent and this maturation, could not be born, could not grow, and could not abide. (So the eighth, whether as seed or as present-activity, each has its support, and the relation of mutual reliance is established.)

Again: the maturation consciousness (the eighth), within the "form-possessing realms" (that is, the desire-realm and the form-realm), can maintain this faculty-body, and does so precisely by "relying on the form-faculties and evolving" — as a scripture says, "the ālaya-consciousness, blown along by the wind of karma, relies pervadingly on the several faculties and evolves in continuous succession"; and the Yogācārabhūmi says too, "the six consciousnesses, eye and the rest, because they each rely on their own separate faculty, cannot govern, cannot appropriate, this form-possessing faculty-body" (the six consciousnesses each rely on their own, and so cannot appropriate it; turned the other way, this displays just that the eighth relies pervadingly on the several faculties, and so can appropriate it). Were the maturation consciousness not to rely pervadingly on "the several form-possessing faculties," then it should, like the six consciousnesses, be unable to appropriate the faculty-body; and otherwise, the reason set up before ("the six consciousnesses each rely on their own, and so cannot appropriate it") would incur the fault of "not necessarily holding."

〔The correct view · the support of the eighth〕 So it is said: if the store-consciousness is "present-activity," it certainly has "one support": namely the seventh consciousness; and within the form-possessing realms, it must besides rely on "the form-faculties." If the store-consciousness is "seed," it certainly has "one support": namely the maturation consciousness (that is, the present-activity eighth); and at the very first stage of perfuming, it must besides rely on "the perfuming agent (the seven evolving consciousnesses)." The rest (the concomitant supports of the first five, the sixth, and the seventh) are as said before.

〔The ultimate correct view · distinguishing "what it rests on" (所依) from "the support" (依)〕 Yet again someone says (and this is the most ultimate account): these several views above have still not gone all the way, and the fault is that they have not told apart the two words "what-it-rests-on" (所依) and "support" (依), which are not the same.

First, the word "support" (依): its range is wide — whatever dharma has arising-and-perishing, that must rely on a cause and lean on a condition to arise and to abide, and so whatever it relies on and leans on is all called a "support" — just as a king and his minister rely on each other (both sides counting as support).

Next, the word "what-it-rests-on" (所依): its demand is strict — it must be a dharma that is "decisive" (fixed and unchanging), "has an object" (itself has an object it reaches out to), "is dominant" (takes the lead), and can make the mind and mental factors lay hold of their own object — only such a one is fit to be called "what it rests on," and that is "the inner six bases" (that is, the six faculties). The rest (such as the form-objects), being neither having-an-object, nor decisive, nor dominant, are at most like "the minister" (a support, not a what-it-rests-on); only the six faculties are like "the king" (and these alone are what it rests on).

So scripture says only mind and mental factors are called "having a what-it-rests-on," and does not say the form-dharmas have a what-it-rests-on — because the form-dharmas have no object of their own. And further: scripture says only that "the mind-king" is the what-it-rests-on of "the mental factors," and does not say that "the mental factors" are the what-it-rests-on of "the mind-king" — because the mental factors are not dominant (the mind-king alone is dominant).

In some places, though, "support" is spoken of as "what-it-rests-on," or "what-it-rests-on" as "support" — and that is all said for the moment, as convenient (the wide sense and the strict sense being used interchangeably, not fixed).

Reckoning anew by this strict "what-it-rests-on," the five consciousnesses' concomitant what-it-rests-on certainly comes to four kinds: namely "the five form-faculties," "the sixth consciousness," "the seventh consciousness," and "the eighth consciousness" — for lacking any one of these four, the five consciousnesses cannot evolve. These four each have their own designation: "the same-object support" (the five form-faculties), "the discriminating support" (the sixth), "the defiling-and-purifying support" (the seventh), and "the root support" (the eighth).

As for scripture's saying only that the five consciousnesses "rely on the five faculties," that is because: the five faculties are "exclusive" to the five consciousnesses (only the five consciousnesses rely on them, the other consciousnesses do not), and the five faculties are necessarily "of the same object" as the five consciousnesses, the nearest and most accordant — so it lifts up only this nearest one to speak of, and not that there are no other three supports.

The sixth, the mental consciousness, has its concomitant what-it-rests-on in only two kinds: namely the seventh consciousness and the eighth consciousness — for lacking either one, the sixth cannot evolve. As for that clear mental consciousness which arises together with the five consciousnesses and can be of the same object as them, clearly and distinctly — the five consciousnesses "are not necessarily present" (they do not accompany it every time), and so the five consciousnesses do not count as the (strict-sense) what-it-rests-on of the sixth.

As for scripture's saying only that the sixth "relies on the seventh," that is because: the seventh is the "defiling-and-purifying support" of the sixth, and they are alike classed within "the evolving consciousnesses," the nearest and most accordant — so it lifts up only this nearest one to speak of.

The seventh intellect (that is, the manas) has its concomitant what-it-rests-on in only one kind: namely the eighth consciousness — for if the store-consciousness be absent, the seventh certainly cannot evolve. As the verse says:

(prose unpacking of the verse) With the ālaya as support, there comes to be the evolving of the manas; relying on "mind" (the eighth) and "intellect" (the seventh), the other evolving consciousnesses (the first six) can then arise.

The ālaya-consciousness has its concomitant what-it-rests-on also in only one kind: namely the seventh consciousness — for if that seventh be absent, the eighth too certainly cannot evolve.

The treatise says "the store-consciousness always evolves at the same time as the manas"; and it says "the store-consciousness always relies on the defiled one," and this "defiled one" refers to the manas. Someone will ask: then the treatise also says "in three states (the arhat, the concentration of cessation, the supramundane path) there is no manas" — how is that to be understood? One should know: that is "said with respect to the 'veiled-and-defiled' layer of meaning" — meaning that in these three states there is no such veiled-and-defiled manas, and not that the seventh has utterly ceased to exist. It is just like the treatise's saying "in four states there is no ālaya," which does not mean the eighth is utterly gone (only that the designation "ālaya," the appropriating-store, is gone); here too it is to be understood by the same reasoning.

〔The ultimate correct view · supplying the remainder〕 The eighth, though within the form-possessing realms it must besides rely on the five faculties, yet the five faculties "are not necessarily present" (in the formless realm there are none), and so the five faculties do not amount to the (strict-sense) what-it-rests-on of the eighth. Again, the seed of consciousness cannot here-and-now lay hold of its own object (it has no reaching-out function), and so it may be said to have the sense of "support" yet to have no "what-it-rests-on" (in the strict sense). As for the what-it-rests-on of the several mental factors, that is spoken of following the consciousness they are concomitant with, and then to each is besides added "the mind-king it is concomitant with" (as its what-it-rests-on). Said in this way, it neatly matches both reason and scripture.

(c) Last · the opening-and-guiding support (the immediately-antecedent-condition support)

The third is called the "opening-and-guiding support" (that is, the immediately-antecedent-condition support, the support of the preceding moment that makes way for the following). 〔Opening-and-guiding view one〕 One view speaks thus —

• The first five consciousnesses, whether their own kind or another's, cannot connect back and forth (once arisen, they break off), and moreover must be drawn forth by the sixth consciousness, and so take only "the sixth consciousness" as their opening-and-guiding support;
• The sixth, the mental consciousness, can connect with its own kind, and can also be drawn forth by the five consciousnesses, and so takes "the first six consciousnesses" as its opening-and-guiding support;
• The seventh and eighth consciousnesses can connect with their own kind, and have no need of another consciousness to draw them forth, and so take only "their own kind" as their opening-and-guiding support.

〔Refuting opening-and-guiding view one · the correct view〕 Yet again someone says: the account above has not gone all the way. The first five consciousnesses, at "the not-yet-sovereign stage" (the stage of the ordinary worldling), and meeting a non-special object, may be as he says (unable to connect); but at "the sovereign stage" (as with the buddhas), wholly sovereign over objects, the faculties even interchanging their uses, settling spontaneously, with no need to toil and seek — at that time how could the five consciousness-bodies fail to connect? (They plainly do connect continuously.)

Again, the "outflow five consciousnesses" — since they are drawn forth by the several forces of "the determining mind," "the defiling-and-purifying mind," and "attention," and stay fixed on their object, not able to let go for a moment — how can one refuse them moment-after-moment continuity? And so the Yogācārabhūmi says: first there is "the determining mind," next there is "the defiling-and-purifying mind," and only after that is there "the outflow eye-consciousness" evolving as wholesome or unwholesome; and this outflow eye-consciousness is not by its own power of discrimination (turning at will); right up until this intellect (the sixth) has not turned to another object, for just such a span of time the eye-consciousness and the mental consciousness, the two of them, evolve continuously, now wholesome, now defiled. As the eye-consciousness arises, so on down to the body-consciousness, it should be known to be likewise.

What the Yogācārabhūmi means is plainly just this: for just such a span of time, the eye-consciousness and the mental consciousness, the two of them, each evolve continuously; and since, at the time the eye-consciousness arises, the mental consciousness is not absent (the two being simultaneous), it is therefore not the case that "the two consciousnesses arise by relieving each other in turn" (not eye and intellect taking turns in a relay, but each connecting on its own).

If a "specially intense object" stays continuously present, gripping body and mind so they cannot let go for an instant, then at that time the five consciousness-bodies must by reason connect continuously — as in the hot hells (fierce suffering pressing the body, which cannot be let go) and the heaven of forgetful play (lost in amusement, forgetting the body) and the like.

And so the Yogācārabhūmi says: "taking 'these six consciousnesses' as the immediately-antecedent condition of 'those six consciousnesses,' one sets up the designation 'the intellect-faculty' (mano-indriya) for this." Suppose before and after the five consciousnesses there were certainly only "the mental consciousness" (to serve as their immediately-antecedent condition); then the treatise should have said "taking 'this one consciousness' (the mental consciousness) as the immediately-antecedent condition of 'those six consciousnesses'"; or it should have said "taking 'these six consciousnesses' as the immediately-antecedent condition of 'that one consciousness.'" But the treatise precisely does not say so (it says six-to-six), which shows that the five consciousnesses too have the sense of "connecting with their own kind."

〔Refuting "the sixth relies on the first six"〕 The moment the five consciousnesses arise, there is necessarily the mental consciousness alongside (arising simultaneously); this mental consciousness can of itself draw forth the next moment's mental consciousness and make it arise — so where is the need to draw in "the five consciousnesses" to serve as the opening-and-guiding support of the sixth? (So the sixth need not take the five consciousnesses as its opening-and-guiding support.)

Again, at stages such as "mindless sleep" and "faint," the mental consciousness has already broken off, and when later it arises again — the store-consciousness and the manas, since they are never broken off, should by 〔view one〕's logic come and serve as the opening-and-guiding support of this re-arisen mental consciousness (yet in fact this is not so; the mental consciousness still takes the preceding moment's own-kind mental consciousness as opening-and-guiding). Since you 〔view one〕 already allow the mental consciousness to take "the preceding moment's own kind" as opening-and-guiding (that is, leaping across the intervening blank and joining back to the own-kind before the break), on what grounds do you forbid the five consciousnesses' "own-kind" opening-and-guiding to do likewise? Since this (the mental consciousness leaping the break to rejoin its own kind) is so, how is that (the five consciousnesses doing the same) not so?

Again, the manas that is concomitant with "the wisdom of equality," when it first arises, is certainly drawn forth by the sixth, the mental consciousness; so by 〔view one〕's logic the seventh too should take the sixth as its opening-and-guiding support (yet 〔view one〕 insists the seventh takes only its own kind). Again, the pure eighth consciousness that is concomitant with "the great-mirror wisdom," when it first arises, must too be drawn forth with the aid of the sixth and the seventh; and again, the maturation mind (the eighth) relies on the defiled intellect (the seventh), or relies on the wholesome mind concomitant with compassion-and-vow (the sixth) — that being so, one must grant that the eighth too takes the sixth and the seventh as its opening-and-guiding support (yet 〔view one〕 insists the eighth takes only its own kind). From this it can be seen: 〔view one〕's words have not gone all the way.

〔Opening-and-guiding view two · the conclusion〕 So it should be said thus:

• The five consciousnesses: within "the preceding moment's first six consciousnesses," whichever consciousness may be taken as opening-and-guiding support;
• The sixth, the mental consciousness: takes "the preceding moment's own kind," or "the seventh and the eighth," as opening-and-guiding support;
• The seventh, the manas: takes "the preceding moment's own kind," or "the sixth consciousness," as opening-and-guiding support;
• The ādāna-consciousness (that is, the eighth): takes "the preceding moment's own kind," and "the sixth and the seventh," as opening-and-guiding support.

Said this way, none of it violates reason (the grounds having been given before).

〔The ultimate correct view · refuting opening-and-guiding view two〕 Yet again someone says (and this is the most ultimate account): 〔view two〕 too is wrong. What is called the "opening-and-guiding support" must be a dharma that "has an object," is "dominant (the mind-king alone is dominant)," and can serve as the "immediately-antecedent condition"; toward the mind and mental factors that are to arise after, it can "make way" (the preceding moment first yielding its place) and "lead the way" (drawing the following moment up), and so is called the "opening-and-guiding support." This qualification belongs only to "the mind-king"; the mental factors and the rest do not count (the mental factors are not dominant, and cannot serve as opening-and-guiding support).

Only when "this one" and "that one" have no sense of "arising at the same time" (this one ceasing and only then that one arising, ranked one before the other, not side by side) can one speak of this one's having an "opening-and-guiding power" over that one (the opening-and-guiding support must yield place one before another, and cannot stand side by side). But "the eight consciousnesses in one body" plainly can arise at the same time (the eight consciousnesses evolving all together), so how can one take "a consciousness of another kind" as opening-and-guiding support? Were one to allow another kind to be the support, then this one and that one should not arise at the same time — which then comes to the same as "another school's" (the Hīnayāna's) thesis that "minds cannot arise side by side" (only one mind at a time).

Again, when the several consciousnesses in one body arise at the same time, their number is besides now more, now fewer (sometimes one arises, sometimes several); were one to allow consciousnesses of differing kinds to serve as each other's immediately-antecedent condition (even with unequal numbers serving as each other's condition), then "the form-dharmas and the rest" too should be able to do this (form too able to serve as immediately-antecedent condition) — which violates scripture's account that "the immediately-antecedent condition extends only to mind and mental factors."

As for the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's saying "the form-dharmas too may have an immediately-antecedent condition," that is a "yield-then-take-back" manner of speaking — meaning: it provisionally "yields" a step, conceding the Hīnayāna's claim that "form and mind have an immediately-antecedent condition before and after," and then "takes back" its "causal condition" (breaking it down by right reasoning), so that it is not really a concession at all. Otherwise, the word "immediately" (等, "equal") in "immediately-antecedent condition" would become a useless word (this word "equal" is precisely meant to show before-and-after evenness, single-line connection, and so it bars the form-dharmas from outside). And a further step back: were you to insist that this word "equal" is not meant to bar "unequal numbers" but only to show "same kind," then this strikes squarely at your own 〔view two〕 — you 〔view two〕 maintain "taking consciousnesses of differing kinds as immediately-antecedent condition," yet since the word "equal" shows "same kind," differing kinds cannot count.

〔The correct view · the conclusion〕 So it is said: the eight consciousnesses each take only "their own kind" as opening-and-guiding support — and this truly accords with reason and scripture, because one's own kind certainly has no sense of "arising at the same time" (the own kind being ranked one before another, not side by side), which is just what fits the requirement that "the opening-and-guiding support must not arise at the same time."

The opening-and-guiding support of the mental factors is to be spoken of following their mind-king. Although the mind-king and the mental factors are of differing kinds yet arise together, they are concomitant with one another, blending so as to seem one, certainly arising and perishing together, their work necessarily the same — and so when "the one" (the mind-king) opens-and-guides, "the rest" (the concomitant mental factors) also open-and-guide at the same time, and thus they can serve as each other's immediately-antecedent condition back and forth (the concomitant mind-king and mental factors can open-and-guide each other, precisely because they blend so as to seem one). But "the several consciousnesses" (among the eight) are not like this (they do not blend into one), and so one cannot use the example of the mind-king-and-mental-factors to set it over the eight consciousnesses.

Yet the several "mental factors" are themselves not an opening-and-guiding support — because toward the dharmas they draw forth after, they have no qualification of "being dominant" (only the mind-king is dominant).

〔Challenge · the four conditions〕 Someone objects: if the immediately-antecedent condition of mind and mental factors can only be "one's own kind," then when the seventh and eighth consciousnesses first reach "the transformation of the basis" (newly turning into pure wisdom), the wholesome mental factors concomitant with them, "trust" and the rest (which, at the stage before the transformation, had no own-kind such wholesome factor preceding them) — would not their "immediately-antecedent condition" then be lacking one? Is this not a violation of scripture's saying that "all minds and mental factors arise from the four conditions (causal, immediately-antecedent, object, dominant)"?

〔Answer · leaping the break to join the preceding own kind〕 The answer: at stages such as mindless sleep and faint, although the mental consciousness has broken off, when it later arises its opening-and-guiding support is still that "preceding moment's own kind" (that is, the moment of mental consciousness before the break); and the five consciousnesses that have been interrupted should be known to be likewise (leaping across the intervening blank to join back to the preceding moment's own kind) — because in the middle there is "no other own-kind mind set between as a divider," and so it is called "immediate (without intervening)" all the same; and that preceding moment's own-kind mind, at the time it first ceased, had already served as opening-and-guiding for the present moment, so why trouble to draw in "another kind" to serve as opening-and-guiding support? (So the four conditions are not lacking: the immediately-antecedent condition of that "trust" and other wholesome factors at the transformation is just the preceding moment's own-kind wholesome factor-seed manifesting as present-activity — the own kind connects up all the same.)

As for scripture's saying "the first six consciousnesses draw one another forth," or saying "the seventh and eighth arise relying on the sixth and seventh," those are all said with respect to "a specially potent dominant condition," and not that they are an immediately-antecedent condition, and so it does not conflict with this (a dominant condition may be of a differing kind; only the immediately-antecedent condition can be one's own kind alone).

The Yogācārabhūmi says "if this consciousness be without intervening, then the consciousnesses certainly arise, and one calls this the immediately-antecedent condition of those"; and it says "taking these six consciousnesses as the immediately-antecedent condition of those six consciousnesses, one sets up the designation 'the intellect-faculty' for this" — this is "the words said in a general way, but the meaning told apart" (on the face of it speaking generally of six-to-six, but in meaning each connecting with its own kind), and so it too does not conflict.

〔The side-treatise concludes〕 So the account "taking one's own kind as opening-and-guiding support" truly accords with reason and scripture. This turned-aside talk ends here, and we should return to the main subject (back to the manas itself).

3. Returning to the main argument — "resting on that" displays only the first two supports

This second transformer (the manas), though it possesses all three what-it-rests-on (the causal-condition support, the concomitant support / dominant, the opening-and-guiding support / immediately-antecedent), is nonetheless pointed at by the verse's line "resting on that" in only "the first two supports" (the causal-condition support and the concomitant support) — and this for three reasons: (one) it is to display that the manas's "what-it-rests-on" and its "what-it-refers-to" are one and the same (both being the eighth, relying on it and also referring to it); (two) the first two supports "have a more conspicuous function"; (three) or else because the "opening-and-guiding support" is of itself easy to understand (the own-kind connection being plain at a glance, so it need not be specially pointed out).

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C. What it refers to — glossing "referring to that"

Now that the manas's "what it rests on" has been told, what of its "what it refers to"? It is just the verse's two words "referring to that." "That" refers to the consciousness on which the manas rested before (the eighth, the store-consciousness) — scripture says: the manas refers to the store-consciousness, and thereupon raises a "self-attachment."

〔Object-view one · referring to the substance and the concomitant dharmas〕 One view says: what the manas refers to is the "consciousness-substance" of the eighth itself, plus "the dharmas concomitant with it" (that is, the mental factors, contact and the rest, concomitant with the eighth). The reason: the treatise says "the manas is always concomitant with the 'self-attachment' and the 'attachment to what-belongs-to-self,'" meaning it refers to the "consciousness-substance" of the eighth and to its "concomitant dharmas," and in sequence grasps the former as "self" and the latter as "what-belongs-to-self." And since the several mental factors are inseparable from consciousness, to say it "refers to the concomitant dharmas" still accords with the principle of "consciousness-only," and incurs no fault against scripture.

〔Object-view two · referring to the perceiving-part and the perceived-part〕 Another view says: the account above does not get through — for nowhere does scripture ever say the manas "refers to the mental factors, contact and the rest." It should be said: the manas refers only to the "perceiving-part" (the apprehending side) and the "perceived-part" (the side of the reached-out-to image) of the eighth consciousness, and in sequence grasps the former as "self" and the latter as "what-belongs-to-self"; and since the perceived-part and the perceiving-part both have "consciousness" for their substance, it does not violate scripture (what it refers to is still consciousness).

〔Object-view three · referring to the store-consciousness and the seeds〕 Yet another view says: 〔view two〕 too is wrong — for within the perceived-part of the eighth are contained outer objects such as the five form-faculties and the receptacle-world, and were the manas to refer even to these, three faults would break out: (1) the objects such as the five form-faculties do not belong to the aggregate of consciousness, and were the manas to refer to them, it would be just the same as the five consciousnesses (also referring to outer objects); (2) the manas would then be like the sixth, the mental consciousness (referring to objects common to all); (3) it would further entail that "one born into the formless realm does not grasp what-belongs-to-self" (the formless realm having no form-perceived-part, there is naturally nothing to grasp) and that "one who, weary of form, is born there has the eighth no longer manifesting form" (the eighth not manifesting a form-perceived-part, the manas then has no what-belongs-to-self to reach) — these are all faults. So it should be said: the manas refers only to "the store-consciousness" (its perceiving-part) and "its seeds," and in sequence grasps the former as "self" and the latter as "what-belongs-to-self"; and since the seed just is that consciousness's function and not a really-existent thing, it does not violate scripture.

〔The ultimate correct view · refuting the three prior views〕 Yet again someone says (and this is the most ultimate account): the three prior views are all wrong. 〔First refuting view three's "referring to the seeds as what-belongs-to-self"〕 The seeds of form and the rest do not belong to the aggregate of consciousness (were the seed to be referred to and grasped as what-belongs-to-self, the fault would be the same as view two's); and the treatise plainly says the seed is "really, truly existent" (the seed is not unreal, and so one cannot say, as view three does, that "the seed is just a function, not a really-existent thing"); were you to insist the seed is unreal, then the unreal thing should be just like "nothing" (having no substance), and then it could not serve as a "causal condition" (an unreal dharma cannot be a causal condition, yet the seed precisely is a causal condition, which shows the seed is really existent — and this breaks view three).

Again, the "satkāya-view" (the view that grasps body-and-mind as a "self") that is concomitant with the manas is "spontaneously arising" (born with one), "of one unchanging savor," and arises in unbroken continuous succession — how could it split apart and grasp on one side "there is a self" and on the other "there is what-belongs-to-self," these two? 〔The reason〕 there is no such thing as "in one and the same mind, referring at once to 'annihilation' and to 'permanence,' two differing objects, separately grasping a set apiece, and moreover running side by side" (one view cannot at once refer to two objects and grasp two sets apart); nor can one say "the self-attachment and the attachment-to-what-belongs-to-self arise by turns, before and after" — because the manas, from beginningless time, evolves "of one savor" (forever a single line in succession, with no such thing as a before-and-after split-grasping). 〔So view one, view two, and view three's "in sequence grasping self, grasping what-belongs-to-self" all fail to stand.〕

〔The correct view · referring only to the perceiving-part〕 It should be known: the manas refers only to the "perceiving-part" of the store-consciousness, and to nothing else (not to the consciousness-substance, not to the concomitant dharmas, not to the perceived-part, not to the seeds) — because that perceiving-part of the eighth, from beginningless time, is "of one kind in unbroken succession," appearing like "permanent" (constant and unchanging), like "one" (a single one), and constantly serving all the dharmas as what-they-rest-on (and so it is most easily grasped as "the self within").

The manas only grasps that perceiving-part of the eighth as "the self within"; as for the treatise's text also saying "what-belongs-to-self" alongside, that is only "carried along on the run of the words" (following the verbal momentum and saying it in passing), and so the word "what-belongs-to-self" comes out (it is not that it really goes on besides to refer to a what-belongs-to-self). Or one may put it thus: it grasps that eighth as "the very self that is mine" (grasping it as self over and over), and so upon the meaning of "a single body-view" it says the two words "self, what-belongs-to-self." Said this way, it falls in well with scripture and reason.

〔Side-proof · only a self-view〕 Scripture in many places says only that the manas "has a self-view" (it does not say it has a view-of-what-belongs-to-self), and moreover "the self-attachment" and "the attachment-to-what-belongs-to-self" do not arise together (in one mind two sets are not grasped at once). 〔Before and after the transformation, what it refers to differs〕 The manas, at "the stage not yet transformed at its basis," refers only to the store-consciousness; but once "the transformation of the basis" is done (having turned into the wisdom of equality), it can then refer even to "suchness" and the several other dharmas — because the wisdom of equality has realized "the ten kinds of equality," and so it can know the differences in the resolute understanding of the several sentient beings, and can manifest the various buddha-images (the range of what it refers to having broadened).

The treatise's text here speaks only of "the time not yet transformed," and so it says only that the manas "refers to that store-consciousness." "Awakened" (after the transformation), what it refers to is wide; "deluded" (before the transformation), what it refers to is narrow — this is how the principle ought to be; and further, "the object of no-self" (suchness) is all-pervading, while "the object of self" (the store-consciousness) is not all-pervading, and so the wide-and-narrow of what is referred to in the deluded and awakened states differs.

〔Challenge · referring to its own what-it-rests-on〕 Someone asks: since the manas takes the eighth as its what-it-rests-on, how can it again take the eighth as its what-it-refers-to (how can a thing refer to what it itself relies on)? 〔Answer〕 It is just like there being "a later-moment consciousness" (the following moment of mental consciousness) that refers to "the preceding-moment intellect" (the preceding moment's intellect, which was originally its immediately-antecedent what-it-rests-on) — since that (referring to one's own what-it-rests-on) is conceded by all, what fault is there in the manas's referring to its own what-it-rests-on?

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D. Self-nature and activity-mark — glossing "cogitation for its nature and mark"

The verse's line "cogitation for its nature and mark," in one breath, points out both the "self-nature" of the manas (what it is) and its "activity-mark" (how it operates), the two sides. The manas takes "cogitation" as its self-nature, and so also takes this same cogitation as its activity-mark (both nature and mark being cogitation). And it is precisely by this line that the special name set up before is glossed in passing — "being able to cogitate examiningly" is just the source of the name "manas."

At "the stage not yet transformed at its basis," the manas is constantly and examiningly cogitating "the mark of self that it grasps" (that is, grasping a self); at "the stage already transformed at its basis," it is likewise examiningly cogitating "the mark of no-self" (that is, realizing no-self) — which shows that this nature-and-mark "cogitation" is present both in delusion and in awakening, the difference lying only in the object cogitated: in the one case "self," in the other "no-self."

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E. The concomitant mental factors — the four defilements constantly co-present (self-delusion · self-view · self-conceit · self-love)

How many mental factors are concomitant with the manas? 〔This section first treats the four root defilements〕 First, it is constantly bound up with "four defilements." That word "co-present" here just means "concomitant." It means: from beginningless time, right up until before the transformation of the basis, the manas spontaneously and constantly refers to the store-consciousness, and is concomitant with "four root defilements."

Which four are they? They are just the verse's "self-delusion, self-view, together with self-conceit and self-love" — these are the four kinds.

Self-delusion: that is, "ignorance" — being all in a fog about "the mark of self," and dazed and dim about "the principle of no-self," and so it is named "self-delusion."

Self-view: that is, "self-attachment" — wildly taking dharmas that are originally not the self (that is, the five aggregates) to be "self," and so it is named "self-view."

Self-conceit: that is, "haughtiness" — relying on that "self" it has grasped to lift the mind high and aloft (puffed up, looking down on others), and so it is named "self-conceit."

Self-love: that is, "greed for the self" — being deeply infatuated with that "self" it has grasped (clinging in craving and not letting go), and so it is named "self-love."

The word "together" in the verse ("together with self-conceit and self-love") is meant to make clear that "self-conceit and self-love" can arise together with "self-view and self-conceit" (that is, that self-view, self-conceit, and self-love, these three, can be concomitant and arise side by side), and uses this to drive down another school's claim that "these three cannot arise together."

These four defilements arise unceasingly, stirring up and muddying the inner mind, and besides keeping those outer seven evolving consciousnesses (the first six, and the manas's own present-activity as well) ever defiled and unclean. It is precisely because of this that sentient beings die and are born again and again, revolving without end and unable to get out — and so these are named "defilements."

〔Challenge · why only four〕 Someone asks: the root defilements come in ten in all (greed, hatred, delusion, conceit, doubt, plus the five views); why does the manas have only four? 〔Answer〕 Because the manas, having already the "self-view" (that is, the body-view), the other four views (the extreme view, the wrong view, view-clinging, the clinging to precepts-and-observances) cannot arise — the reasoning being "in one and the same mind there cannot be two wisdoms" (a view is in fact a kind of defiled wisdom, and one mind cannot have two wisdoms at once), so once there is the self-view, the other views cannot get going.

〔Challenge · why it must have a self-view〕 Then why must the manas have just the "self-view" (and not some other view)? 〔Answer〕 (1) The two clingings, view-clinging and the clinging-to-precepts-and-observances, and the wrong view, all arise by "discrimination" (stirred up after birth) and can be severed only at "the path of seeing"; but the defilements concomitant with the manas are only "born-with-one and spontaneous," and can be severed only at "the path of cultivation" — so those two clingings and the wrong view are not within the manas. (2) The "view-of-what-belongs-to-self" and the "extreme view" both must arise in dependence on the "self-view"; but this view concomitant with the manas "does not arise in dependence on them (the view-of-what-belongs-to-self, the extreme view)" (the manas only grasps a self within, neither referring outward nor grasping annihilation or permanence) — so it can only be the "self-view." (3) The manas is forever within grasping "there is a self," and so it must have the "self-view."

〔Glossing the absence of doubt, the absence of hatred〕 Because the "self-view" examines so decisively (without the least wavering), "doubt" cannot arise (the view being fixed, doubt is gone); and because it "is infatuated with this self of its own" (that is, self-love), "hatred" too cannot arise (within, it only loves the self, and will not hate this very object of its own). So the root defilements concomitant with the manas are just these four (self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love).

〔Challenge · self-view, conceit, and love arising together〕 Someone asks: self-view, self-conceit, and self-love, these three — how can they arise together? 〔Answer〕 The way they operate does not conflict with one another, so what is wrong with their arising together? 〔A further challenge · greed and conceit conflicting〕 But the Yogācārabhūmi says "greed makes the mind go down (cravingly bending low), conceit makes the mind go up (loftily looking down on others)" — would these two not conflict (and then how can self-love and self-conceit arise together)?

〔Answer · distinguishing inner-and-outer, coarse-and-subtle〕 The Yogācārabhūmi's "greed goes down, conceit goes up" conflicting is said with respect to another situation: that is the greed and conceit "arisen by later discrimination," referring to "outer objects," having "an object looked down upon" (conceit going to bully others) and "another object relied on" (greed having something else to lean on), and of a relatively "coarse" cast. But the manas's self-conceit and self-love are "born with one," referring to "the inner object" (within, referring to the store-consciousness), relying on the same one self, and of a very "subtle" cast — the two being one coarse and one subtle, utterly different; and so the Yogācārabhūmi's passage and this passage here (self-conceit and self-love arising together), the two accounts, do not conflict in their meaning.

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〔Verses commented〕Continuing the previous chapter, unfolding verses 5–7

〔Verses expounded〕

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A. The remaining concomitant mental factors (contact and so on arising with the manas)

〔Q〕Are the mental factors concomitant with the manas (that is, "mentation") only the four afflictions spoken of before (self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love)? 〔A〕No. For the verse says "and concurrent with the rest, contact and so on" — meaning that, besides those four afflictions, the manas also arises together with "contact" and the remaining mental factors.

〔One view · the mental factors are only nine〕 One view: the manas has only nine mental factors — that is, the four afflictions before, plus the five "contact and so on" dharmas pointed to by the word "rest" in the verse (contact, attention, feeling, conception, and volition — these five together called the "five omnipresent factors," which follow along whenever any mind arises). Why must these five be present? Because the manas is "definitely concomitant" with the five omnipresent factors — that is, the moment the manas arises, these five are bound to follow.

When the eighth consciousness was discussed earlier, it was already said that the five omnipresent factors, contact and so on, arise together with the eighth maturation-consciousness (that is, the ālaya-consciousness). The worry here is that someone might mistakenly suppose the contact-and-so-on on the manas's side to be just like those on the eighth's side, and likewise "unobscured" (unobscured-indeterminate, the sort of indeterminate that does not obstruct the holy path). In fact it is not so: the contact and so on concomitant with the manas are "obscured" (they obstruct the holy path), differing from the set concomitant with the eighth. To point out this distinction, the verse deliberately places the word "rest."

The word "and" in the verse means "joined together": it joins the four afflictions before with the five omnipresent factors after, nine in all, all of them constantly concomitant with the manas — the word "and" gathers these nine in altogether.

〔Q〕Besides these nine, why does the manas have no other mental factors at all (the determinative-object factors, the good, the secondary-afflictions, and the indeterminate factors — how is it that none of these is in it)?

First, "desire" (the "desire" among the determinative-object factors, that is, wanting). "Desire" arises toward "a matter not yet attained, something one is just seeking"; but the manas turns spontaneously, and what it takes as object is the present, already-attained object at hand (it constantly takes the store-consciousness as object and grasps it as a "self" — a matter long since accomplished, with nothing to seek). Since there is nothing to hope for, there is no "desire" within the manas.

"Resolve" is that "settling-fast" upon what was formerly not yet certain but is later determined — toward a matter once undecided, finally affixing approval and holding it firm. But from beginningless time the manas takes as object what is already long determined (it has settled fast on the store-consciousness as "self," never wavering), and so there is no "first-wavering-then-determining" for it to settle fast upon; hence there is no "resolve" within the manas.

"Mindfulness" merely retains "matters formerly practiced over and over" (that is, recalling past matters). But the manas constantly takes as object "the present object presently received"; it does not take the past as object, with no past matters to retain; hence there is no "mindfulness" within the manas.

"Concentration" merely binds the mind and fixes it on a single object. But the manas turns spontaneously, taking now this, now that as object from moment to moment, switching back and forth, and is not fixed staring at one; hence there is no "concentration" within the manas.

As for "wisdom" (the "wisdom" among the determinative-object factors), it is in fact just the "self-view" spoken of before (self-view by nature takes wisdom as its essence, being a defiled wisdom); it is already counted within the four afflictions, and so here it is not mentioned again, no separate mental factor being set up for it.

The "good" class (the eleven good mental factors, faith, shame, abashment, and the rest) is by nature "pure"; but the manas is a defiled consciousness (obscured), and defiled and pure do not match, so the good dharmas do not arise together with the manas.

For the "secondary-afflictions" (the small afflictions that arise following the root afflictions) to be established, one must rely on the various partial-marks that the "root afflictions" display across their prior and posterior phases — that is, the root affliction is one way in this state, another way in that, and only from these differing partial-marks can the secondary-afflictions be set up. But the manas is constantly bound up with those four root afflictions, ever of "one kind" prior and posterior (continuing along the same single line, with no high-and-low difference of phase); and since there is no change of partial-marks, no secondary-afflictions can be set up; hence among the mental factors arising with the manas there are no "secondary-afflictions."

"Regret" (also called "remorse," one of the four indeterminate factors) is afterward repenting what one had done before. But the manas turns spontaneously, constantly taking the present object as object; it does not turn back to repent what was done before; hence there is no "regret" within the manas.

"Drowsiness" (one of the four indeterminate factors), to arise, must rely on body-and-mind becoming heavy and dull, and on the force of various outer conditions converging, only then arising for a moment now and then. But from beginningless time the manas is merely "of one kind grasping inwardly" (constantly grasping the store-consciousness inwardly as "self"); it needs no outer conditions; hence there is no "drowsiness" within the manas.

"Applied thought" and "sustained thought" (two among the four indeterminate factors) both turn in reliance on the "outer gate," that is, taking outer objects as object — "applied thought" deliberates shallowly, "sustained thought" deliberates deeply and finely, the one giving rise to coarse speech, the other to fine speech. But the manas turns only in reliance on the "inner gate," that is, constantly taking inwardly as object the "self" it grasps, of one kind grasping the self, never deliberating outward upon outer objects; hence it does not arise together with applied or sustained thought.

〔Another view · refuting the former〕 Another view: the former faction (which glosses the word "rest" as the five omnipresent factors and says the manas's mental factors are only nine) has glossed the word "rest" untenably. There are two reasons: first, the verse separately says plainly that the manas is comprised within the "obscured-indeterminate," yet if the manas had only nine dharmas (four afflictions plus five omnipresent factors), then among those nine there would be no defiled secondary-afflictions, and the "obscured" layer of defilement would have nothing to rest on, fitting nowhere; second, on such a count the "secondary-afflictions arising with the manas" would be left out.

When a root affliction arises, there must be secondary-afflictions arising with it. So this word "rest" in the verse aims to point out precisely the "secondary-afflictions," and not merely the five omnipresent factors.

〔Herein one view · five secondary-afflictions pervade defiled mind〕 Once the secondary-afflictions are to be counted, one must first settle "just how many secondary-afflictions accompany any defiled mind that arises." Here one view: there are "five secondary-afflictions" that universally are concomitant with all defiled mind (that is, the moment the mind is defiled, these five are present).

This is stated following the Abhidharmasamuccaya: sloth (the mind sunk, unable to rouse itself), restlessness (the mind floating, unable to settle), non-faith, indolence, and negligence — these five are constantly concomitant together within every kind of the defiled.

Why must these five be present? Because if one departs from "unworkability" (the sloth-like quality of being unable to rouse, unable to put forth strength) and the rest of these five qualities, and yet "defilement" could be established on the strength of something else alone — there is no such case. In other words, wherever there is defilement, these five are sure to be carried along.

The moment an affliction arises, the mind being thereby defiled, in every state of defiled mind there are sure to be those five (sloth and the rest).

Again, for an affliction to arise, it must rely on these five as its inner contributing causes: "unworkability" (that is, sloth, the mind unable to rouse), "clamorous stirring" (that is, restlessness, the mind in an uproar, unable to settle), non-faith, indolence, negligence — only with these five can the affliction arise.

Here a doubt is first resolved: although restlessness pervades all defiled mind, it is especially conspicuous and strong when "greed" arises, and so other treatises everywhere count it only as "a portion of greed" (a portion reckoned along with greed) — this does not mean it is present only with greed. Just so with drowsiness and regret (remorse): although these two extend across all three natures of mind (good, bad, indeterminate), they are especially strong when "delusion" arises, and so they too are counted only as "a portion of delusion." (This explains why the various treatises often hang a given secondary-affliction beneath some one root affliction in the telling — that is said with respect to where it is most conspicuous, and does not mean it does not pervade.)

Here a further discrepancy is reconciled: some other treatises say "the secondary-afflictions pervading defiled mind are six," some say "there are ten"; but one should understand that those are each said to "pervade" with respect to "another sense," and it is not that those six, those ten, each and every one truly pervade all defiled mind. Below, the particular sense on which each of these two positions rests is made clear.

First, the "six pervade" position: it takes, from within the twenty secondary-afflictions, those that at once meet three conditions — first, their mode reaches both coarse and fine; second, their nature reaches both indeterminate and unwholesome; third, they obstruct both concentration and wisdom; and just because the marks of those meeting these three conditions are most conspicuous, these six are picked out and said to pervade.

Next, the "ten pervade" position: it takes, from within the twenty-two secondary-afflictions (on another way of enumerating), those that meet two conditions — first, their mode reaches both coarse and fine; second, their nature reaches "two natures" (that is, the unwholesome and the indeterminate); and just on this sense, these ten are picked out and said to pervade.

So this position's "five pervade," and the others' saying of "six" and saying of "ten," do not contradict one another — because each rests on its own particular sense.

Reckoning it out this way, according to this faction (the five-secondary-afflictions-pervade position), the mental factors arising with the manas are fifteen in all: namely the nine before (four afflictions plus five omnipresent factors), the five secondary-afflictions, and the "wisdom" among the determinative-object factors.

Here someone may ask: is not self-view just the "wisdom" among the determinative-object factors? Then how can the count above include both self-view and the determinative-object wisdom — is that not a duplication? One should understand: although self-view is comprised under the "wisdom" of the determinative-object factors, within the classification of the fifty-one mental factors these two senses are not the same (self-view inclines toward that strand of defiled grasping, whereas wisdom itself reaches across the three natures, good, bad, indeterminate), and so they are split into two for the count — one counted as "self-view" (within the four afflictions), and one also counted as "determinative-object wisdom."

〔Q〕Then why does the manas have no other mental factors at all (for instance, the remaining secondary-afflictions)?

First, the ten such as wrath (that is, the ten "lesser secondary-afflictions"): their mode is coarse and violent, agitated; but the manas in its examining is fine, not coarse, and does not match that coarse violence, so it does not arise together with them.

Next, shamelessness and immodesty, these two: they reach only the "unwholesome" nature; but the manas is of "indeterminate" (obscured-indeterminate) nature, the natures not matching, so it is not concomitant with them.

Next, "distraction": it makes the mind race outward, scattering onto outer objects. But the manas constantly arises taking as object "the one-kind object within" (that is, grasping the self inwardly), and does not run scattering outward, so there is no "distraction" within the manas.

Next, "improper knowing": it is, when setting in motion the various activities of body, speech, and mind through the outer gate, doing them out of accord with the rules, gone wrong. But the manas merely grasps the self within, and does not set those activities in motion outward, so it does not arise together with it.

As for there being no other mental factors at all (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, regret, drowsiness, applied thought, sustained thought — none of these arises with the manas), the reasoning is the same as stated before, not restated.

〔Another view · six secondary-afflictions pervade defiled mind〕 Another view: it should be said that there are "six" secondary-afflictions that pervade all defiled mind. The ground is that the Yogācārabhūmi says: non-faith, indolence, negligence, forgetting-mindfulness (failing to retain the true dharma, losing right mindfulness), distraction, and bad-wisdom (a confused discernment) — these six are accompanied by all defiled mind.

How is it known that these six pervade? Look first at the three, forgetting-mindfulness, distraction, and bad-wisdom: if these were absent, the mind simply could not arouse those afflictions at all — which shows that these three surely pervade defiled mind.

The reasoning is this: to arouse greed and the other afflictions, one must first take as object "that kind of object formerly received," and upon it arouse "forgetting-mindfulness" (failing to retain the true dharma) and "wrong discrimination" (that is, bad-wisdom, discerning amiss), and only thus can greed and the other afflictions be produced. (Since the arousing of every affliction cannot do without these two, it shows that they pervade.)

Next, look at distraction: the moment an affliction arises, the mind is sure to scatter and waver, unable to settle, and this is all because, taking an object as object, "distraction" has arisen. Which shows that distraction too pervades.

Then why are sloth and restlessness not counted among these six? Because the modes of these two are exactly opposite (the one sinks downward, the other moves upward), and it is impossible for every defiled mind to arouse these two at once together — and so this faction does not list them within the "pervading six."

Then what of the former faction's treatise saying "five dharmas pervade defiled mind"? That picked out another sense — their mode reaches both coarse and fine, they are opposed only to the good dharmas, they are pure secondary-afflictions, and their nature reaches "two natures" (the unwholesome and the indeterminate). So saying five before and six here, each rests on its own particular sense, and they do not conflict.

As for the line "saying ten pervade," the sense it rests on has already been stated before (namely, within the twenty-two secondary-afflictions, resting on the sense "the mode reaches both coarse and fine, the nature reaches the two natures").

Reckoning it out this way, according to this faction (the six-secondary-afflictions-pervade position), the mental factors arising with the manas are nineteen in all: namely the nine before, the six secondary-afflictions, plus mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom (the determinative-object factors), and the addition of one sloth.

Here, why is "mindfulness" set up separately (not folded into the secondary-afflictions but counted on its own)? The reasoning is the same as the earlier gloss of "wisdom": just as self-view (defiled wisdom) and the determinative-object wisdom are counted separately, so here that defiled mindfulness (forgetting-mindfulness) and the clean determinative-object mindfulness are to be counted separately, and so "mindfulness" is set up on its own.

Why does this faction also count one "concentration"? Because the manas is fixed upon "the one-kind self-object it grasps," never letting go — though it turns spontaneously, on this one object of grasping the self it is, after all, constantly fixed, and so it is counted as having "concentration." (This differs from the saying in section A that "the manas has no concentration"; that is the difference of the several factions' standpoints.)

Why is one "sloth" further added? Because the "ignorance" arising with the manas is especially deep and heavy, pressing the mind down into a dull, unrousable sinking, and so it is counted as having "sloth."

Then why is "restlessness" not added? Because restlessness is floating and clamorous, exactly opposite to the manas's manner of "grasping the self inwardly, of one kind, sunk and dull," not matching, and so restlessness is not added.

As for there being no other mental factors at all, it is to be understood from what was stated above.

〔Another view · ten secondary-afflictions pervade defiled mind〕 Another view: going a step further, the secondary-afflictions pervading all defiled mind should be said to be "ten."

The ground is that the Yogācārabhūmi says: negligence, restlessness, sloth, non-faith, indolence, wrong-desire, wrong-resolve, wrong-mindfulness, distraction, and improper knowing — these ten arise in all defiled mind, reach to all places (that is, to every stage and realm), and are bound throughout the three realms.

Among these ten, what the former faction left out are wrong-desire and wrong-resolve, and so these two are especially argued: if there were no "wrong-desire" and "wrong-resolve," the mind simply could not arouse those afflictions at all — which shows that these two pervade as well.

The reasoning is this: toward the object received, one must first have "a wishing-to-join, a wishing-to-shun" (this is wrong-desire) and "settle fast upon the mark of that matter" (this is wrong-resolve), and only thus can greed and the other afflictions arise. (Since the arousing of every affliction cannot do without these two, it shows that they pervade.)

Here an objection must be answered: someone will say, "'Doubt' is by its nature wavering — how can it coexist with 'resolve' (settling fast), something decisive, and how can resolve still be said to pervade defiled mind?" The reply: one must distinguish two layers, "principle" and "matter." A person who doubts on a "point of principle" need not, after all, waver toward the concrete "matter" of form and the like before him; and so even the mind concomitant with "doubt" still has, with respect to the concrete mark of the matter, its "resolve" (it can settle fast). Which shows that wrong-resolve still pervades defiled mind, and is not blocked out by "doubt."

And what of someone who wavers even toward the "matter" before him? That sort of wavering is no longer the affliction-natured "doubt." To draw a comparison: in the dark one sees a thing and cannot make out "whether it is a person or a tree-stump" — this is just an ordinary uncertainty about a matter, and is not that affliction-natured "doubt" deluded on a point of principle.

Then why do other treatise-passages not count these two (wrong-desire, wrong-resolve) among those pervading defiled mind? That is because, when "taking as object an unlovely matter," and in "the mind concomitant with doubt," these two wrong-desire and wrong-resolve are not coarse and not conspicuous, and so those passages pass over them in silence — it is not that they do not pervade.

As for the remaining secondary-afflictions, which is present and which absent and how they are arranged, the reasoning is the same as stated before.

Reckoning it out this way, according to this faction (the ten-secondary-afflictions-pervade position), the manas's mental factors are twenty-four in all: namely the nine before, the ten secondary-afflictions, plus the five determinative-object factors (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom); the reasoning of this count is to be understood from the gloss before.

As for there being no other mental factors at all, it is to be understood from what was stated above.

〔It should be said · the correct view〕 Another view (this is the correct one): the foregoing factions (counting nine, fifteen, nineteen, twenty-four) all still fall short of the truth. Below, each one's bias is pointed out in turn.

First, refute the wrong-desire and wrong-resolve over-counted by the "ten pervade" faction. Take the matter of "doubting whether there is or is not a world to come": just when a person is wavering like this, undecided, where is there any "desire" (wishing-to-join, wishing-to-shun) to speak of, and where any "resolve" (settling fast)? Which shows that wrong-desire and wrong-resolve do not pervade all defiled mind — the "ten pervade" faction over-counted.

Next, refute the "six pervade" faction's kicking out sloth and restlessness. When an affliction arises, if there were no "sloth," then there would not definitely be "unworkability" (that strand of being unable to rouse); if there were no "restlessness," then there would be no "clamorous stirring" (the uproar) — but in that case that state would be just like a good state and would not amount to a defiled state at all. Which shows that sloth and restlessness ought, on the contrary, to pervade — the "six pervade" faction ought not to have struck these two out.

Next, on distraction: if in defiled mind there were no "distraction," then the mind would not waver and would not amount to a defiled mind. Which shows that distraction too pervades.

Next, on losing-mindfulness and improper knowing: if there were no these two, then how could afflictions be made to come to the fore? Which shows that these two pervade as well.

Settling it thus, point by point, yields the correct view: defiled mind definitely arises concomitant in every case with "eight secondary-afflictions," these eight being: sloth, restlessness, non-faith, indolence, negligence, forgetting-mindfulness, distraction, and improper knowing.

But here a key distinction must be added, else a contradiction arises — for forgetting-mindfulness and improper knowing seem to be just "mindfulness" and "wisdom," so how can they be counted among the eight that pervade defiled mind? One must distinguish what they take as their "self-nature" (essence). The first reading: if forgetting-mindfulness and improper knowing take "mindfulness and wisdom" as their self-nature, then they do not pervade defiled mind — for not every defiled mind "takes as object a formerly-received object" (mindfulness alone takes a past object as object), nor does every defiled mind "perform discernment" (wisdom alone presides over discernment); so on this layer, they do not pervade.

The second reading: if forgetting-mindfulness and improper knowing take "ignorance" as their self-nature (they may also be reckoned a portion of ignorance), then they arise pervading defiled mind, for the reason already given (every defiled mind cannot do without ignorance). The correct view takes this second layer, and so these two can be listed among the eight that pervade defiled mind.

Reckoning it out this way, according to this correct view, the mental factors arising with the manas are eighteen in all: namely the nine before, the eight secondary-afflictions, and the "wisdom" among the determinative-object factors.

As for there being no other mental factors at all, and how the three passages cited from the Yogācārabhūmi ("five, six, ten") are to be reconciled together, both are to be resolved as in the glosses before.

Put this way (the mental factors being eighteen), it neither contradicts right principle nor contradicts holy scripture.

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B. The manas's concomitant feeling (with what feeling it is concomitant)

〔The following is fascicle five of the Cheng Weishi Lun.〕

〔Q〕This defiled manas — with which kind of "feeling" (sensation: pain, pleasure, displeasure, joy, equanimity) is it concomitant?

〔One view · only joy-feeling〕 One view: what arises with the manas is only "joy-feeling" — because the manas constantly grasps the self within, and out of this self-grasping there arises joy-and-love, so what it is matched with is joy-feeling.

〔Another view · refuting only-joy〕 Another view: not so. If the manas were matched only with joy-feeling, then since the manas is always present, one would have to admit joy-feeling all the way from the lower realms up to the "peak of existence" (the topmost stage of the three realms, that is, the station of neither-perception-nor-non-perception) — but this contradicts holy scripture (holy scripture says the upper realms have no joy-feeling at all).

It should be said: the manas is concomitant with "four kinds of feeling," and which feeling matches it differs according to which stage it is born in.

Born in an evil destiny (the hells, the hungry ghosts, the animals), the manas is matched with "displeasure-feeling" — because what it takes as object is the fruit drawn on by unwholesome karma (the maturation of the evil destinies), and so it is displeasure.

Born among humans, the desire-realm gods, the first meditation, or the second meditation, the manas is matched with "joy-feeling" — because what it takes as object is the fruit drawn on by the wholesome karma of "those stages that have joy," and so it is joy.

Born in the third meditation, the manas is matched with "pleasure-feeling" — because what it takes as object is the fruit drawn on by the wholesome karma of "that stage which has pleasure," and so it is pleasure.

Born from the fourth meditation all the way up to the peak of existence, the manas is matched with "equanimity-feeling" (the neither-painful-nor-pleasant, the even sort of feeling) — because what it takes as object is the fruit drawn on by the wholesome karma of "those stages that have only equanimity," and so it is equanimity.

〔It should be said · the correct view〕 Another view (this is the correct one): that "matched with four kinds of feeling" account is also untenable.

From beginningless time the manas turns spontaneously, constantly of "one kind" (one and the same mode), constantly taking as object the "self" it grasps within, never altering. But the four kinds of feeling spoken of above are feelings that "alter" according to the differing stages; the manas, being of one kind and unchanging, naturally cannot be matched with that altering kind of feeling, and so they are not concomitant.

Again, wherever the manas differs in meaning from the store-consciousness (the eighth) spoken of earlier, the treatise points it out separately, one by one. Were the manas really concomitant with "four kinds of feeling" (in which case it would differ from the eighth, which is matched only with equanimity-feeling), the treatise ought by rights to have pointed that out as well; yet the treatise has not said one word more. That it is not said separately is enough to determine that the manas is the same as that store-consciousness — likewise matched only with equanimity-feeling.

So what is concomitant with the manas is only the one "equanimity-feeling."

In the "not-yet-turned-around" stage, the manas is concomitant with the defiled mental factors spoken of before; in the "already-turned-around" stage (that is, the manas turned into the wisdom of equal-nature), there remain only twenty-one mental factors arising with it, namely the five omnipresent factors, the five determinative-object factors, and the eleven good.

This is like the eighth consciousness, which in the already-turned-around stage too arises only with equanimity-feeling — because it turns spontaneously and constantly turns evenly toward its object, so it is matched with equanimity-feeling. The manas, after turning around, is likewise so.

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C. The manas comprised within the three natures (within what nature it is comprised)

〔Q〕The manas together with its mental factors — within which nature is it comprised? 〔A〕It is comprised within the "obscured-indeterminate" nature, not the other three (good, unwholesome, unobscured-indeterminate).

How so? The four afflictions and so on concomitant with the manas are all defiled dharmas; just because they obstruct the holy path and veil one's own mind, they are called "obscured" ("obscured" meaning to cover and obstruct). Yet it counts as neither good nor unwholesome, and so it is called "indeterminate" (it cannot be reckoned as good, nor reckoned as evil). The two sides together make "obscured-indeterminate."

Here a comparison explains why it is "indeterminate": the afflictions of the upper two realms (the form realm, the formless realm), because they are subdued and held down by the "power of concentration," are likewise comprised within the indeterminate (subdued by concentration, unable to put forth coarse evil, they cannot be reckoned as evil). The defiled dharmas arising on the manas's side, because what they depend on is very subtle and because they turn spontaneously (not coarsely committing evil), are likewise comprised within the indeterminate.

If it has already turned around (the manas turned into the wisdom of equal-nature), then it is purely of "good" nature (no longer obscured-indeterminate).

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D. The manas's realm-binding (to what stage it is bound)

〔Q〕The manas together with its mental factors — to what stage is it bound? 〔A〕The verse answers "bound to the stage of wherever it is born" — meaning that whatever stage the manas is born in, it is bound to that stage.

That is to say: born in the desire realm, the present-activity manas together with its concomitant mental factors is "desire-realm-bound"; pushing on up this way, all the way to being born at the peak of existence, it is to be understood likewise (born at the peak of existence, it is peak-of-existence-bound).

Why is it bound according to the stage? Because the manas spontaneously and constantly takes as object the store-consciousness of "its own stage" and grasps it as the inner "self"; it does not take another stage as object, and so it is bound to its own stage.

To unpack the line "bound to the stage of wherever it is born": when the maturation store-consciousness of a given stage arises and is present before one, that is called "being born in that stage"; the defiled manas, taking that store-consciousness as object and grasping the self, is thereby bound to that stage, called "bound to that" (bound by that stage).

The phrase "bound to that" can also be taken on another sense: the manas is fettered by "the various afflictions of that stage," and so is called "bound to that" (both readings hold, and stand together).

If it has already turned around, then the manas is no longer bound to any stage (it has already passed beyond the bondage of the three realms).

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E. Absent in the three states (in what state it is severed forever or severed for a time)

〔Q〕This defiled manas, continuing on without break from beginningless time — in what stage is it "severed forever"? Or again, in what stage is it "severed for a time"?

〔The verse answers〕 "In the arhat, in cessation-attainment, and in the supramundane path, it is not present" (in these three states the defiled manas is not present).

First, the word "arhat": it generally points to the no-more-learning fruit-state of the three vehicles (the disciples, the solitary buddhas, the bodhisattvas) — that is, the station where cultivation is complete and there is nothing more to learn. At this station both the "seeds" and the "present activity" of the defiled manas (the seeds being the latent power to give rise, the present activity being the activity issuing forth here and now) are severed and extinguished forever, and so it is said to be "not present."

As for one at the "learner's" stage (still on the way of cultivation), in the "cessation-attainment" and in the "supramundane path" the defiled manas is for a time suppressed, no longer arising, and so these two places too say "not present" — but this is temporary severance, not permanent severance.

Why must it be the holy path alone that can suppress-and-extinguish it? Because the defiled manas, from beginningless time, is subtle, of one kind, turning spontaneously, and those "contaminated paths" (cultivation still carrying afflictions) cannot hold it down; only the "holy path of the three vehicles" (the uncontaminated path that truly severs affliction) can suppress-and-extinguish it.

Why can the holy path subdue it? Because the "true insight into no-self" within the holy path (the wisdom of the uncontaminated true vision directly realizing no-self) is exactly opposite to "self-grasping" and stands against it, and so it can suppress-and-extinguish this manas of single-minded self-grasping.

Further, when the "subsequently-attained uncontaminated wisdom" (the wisdom that arises again after directly realizing no-self) is present before one, being of the same outflow stemming from the "true insight into no-self," it too is likewise opposite to the manas (self-grasping) and stands against it.

The "true insight into no-self" (that is, the fundamental uncontaminated wisdom) and the "subsequently-attained wisdom" — these two are both uncontaminated, and so together they are called the "supramundane path."

The "cessation-attainment," being of the same outflow stemming from the holy path and being utterly still, is such that within this concentration the defiled manas too is not present (held down for a time).

But one should understand: one at the learner's stage has only suppressed it for a time, and has not yet severed forever the "seeds" of the manas. So after he rises from the cessation-attainment or the supramundane holy path, this defiled manas will arise again — and right up until the seeds are truly severed, it will still come forth once more.

Next, how are the manas's seeds severed? The afflictions concomitant with the manas (the four afflictions) are "innate" (born together with one, not arisen later from hearing wrong views), and so it does not belong to "what is severed by [the path of] seeing" (not the sort that is severed the moment one sees the path).

Yet because it is "defiled," it also does not belong to "what is not to be severed" (the category of "what is not to be severed" refers to the undefiled dharmas that simply do not need severing at all). In other words, it lies neither within "what is severed by seeing" nor within "what is not to be severed."

Then when, after all, are its seeds severed? Precisely because it is utterly subtle, its seeds are cut all at once together with the very last "lowest-of-the-low grade" afflictions of the "peak-of-existence stage" (the subtlest, last-to-be-severed grade in the three realms) — because the two are equally subtle and matched in strength, they are finished off at the same time.

When the "vajra-like concentration" (the concentration firm and keen as a vajra, able to sever the very last fraction of affliction) is present before one, it cuts the manas's seeds all at once, and one becomes an arhat; and so at the no-more-learning stage, the defiled manas never comes forth again.

Here a word is added: if a no-more-learning [adept] of the two vehicles turns his mind and heads toward the Great Vehicle, then from his first arousing of the [bodhi-]mind right up until before he becomes a buddha, although he is in fact already a bodhisattva, he may also still be called "arhat" — because the sense of "worthy" (arhat: worthy of offerings, worthy [for having] severed the afflictions) is equally complete in him. Just because this name already takes him in, the verse here does not mention him separately, and the single name "arhat" subsumes him.

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〔Verses commented〕Continuing: the residual sense of verse 7, and the proof of a seventh consciousness

A. The dispute over whether the manas pervades the defiled and undefiled (the two gates of scripture and reason)

〔Herein one view · the manas is only defiled〕 Next one must ask: can the manas only be defiled, or might there also be an undefiled manas? Here one view: the manas is bound up only with the "affliction-obstruction" — that is, it is always defiled, and there is no undefiled manas at all. There are three reasons: first, holy scripture all says that in those three states (the arhat, cessation-attainment, the supramundane path) there is no manas; second, it further says that the manas is always concomitant with the four afflictions; third, it further says that the manas is "the basis of the defilement of the consciousnesses."

〔It should be said · the correct view · the manas pervades the defiled and undefiled〕 Another view (this is the correct one): that "the manas can only be defiled" account is at odds with holy scripture and with reason alike — because the "supramundane manas" (that is, the purified manas) is plainly said by scripture to exist. Below, this point is set up under separate heads.

The first reason: the "undefiled mind-consciousness" in the supramundane state (that is, the sixth consciousness in supramundane times), just as in its defiled times, must have a basis "co-arisen with it and exclusively its own" — and this basis is the seventh manas. Which shows that in the supramundane state there must be a purified manas serving as the support of the sixth consciousness.

The second reason: first a passage of treatise is cited. The Treatise says: the store-consciousness (the eighth) definitely turns constantly together with "one consciousness," and this consciousness is the manas; when the mind-consciousness also arises, then it is "two consciousnesses" turning together, namely the mind-consciousness plus the manas; if any one of the five consciousnesses arises, then it is "three consciousnesses" turning together; all the way to a time when the five consciousnesses arise at once, which is "seven consciousnesses" turning together. (Throughout all of this, the manas is present.)

This passage of treatise is used to press the opponent: on the "the manas is only defiled" faction's account, when abiding in the cessation-attainment there is no seventh consciousness (since they say the manas can only be defiled, and in cessation-attainment the defiled is gone, then there is no seventh at all). But then at that time would not the store-consciousness have "no consciousness turning with it at all"? And this runs square against the line just cited, "the store-consciousness definitely turns constantly together with one consciousness."

Likewise, when abiding in the supramundane holy path, if there were no seventh consciousness, then at that time (the mind-consciousness being aroused in the holy path) the store-consciousness would turn together with "only one consciousness" (only the mind-consciousness); but how does this then square with the earlier line, "when the mind-consciousness also arises, the store-consciousness definitely turns together with two consciousnesses" (the mind-consciousness plus the manas)? The two ends will not meet. Which shows that in the holy path and in the cessation-attainment there must still be a purified manas present.

The third reason cites the Xianyang lun. It says: the manas is always concomitant with the four afflictions; yet "or, reversing, it is concomitant [otherwise]" — that is, it can also turn around, turning the defiled into the pure and becoming concomitant with the good dharmas. In other words, the manas at times has "haughtiness" (self-exalting) as its mode of operation (this is the defiled), and at times has "equanimity" as its mode of operation (this is the pure). Two modes are set down in a single sentence, which shows that the manas reaches both sides, the defiled and the undefiled.

The fourth reason takes the eighth for comparison. Because the treatise says "at the arhat-state there is no defiled manas," the opponent flatly insists that at that state there is no seventh consciousness; but on this same logic, the treatise has also said "at the arhat-state the [name] 'ālaya' is given up," so must one not then say that at that state there is no eighth consciousness either? Yet everyone plainly grants the eighth is not so (it is not that the moment the name "ālaya" is given up the very essence of the eighth is gone — only the name is changed). Since the eighth cannot be argued this way, then on what does the seventh allow being argued this way (on what does its very essence vanish the moment one says there is no defiled manas)?

The fifth reason works back from the wisdom of equal-nature. The various treatises all say: turn the seventh consciousness around, and one obtains the "wisdom of equal-nature." This wisdom of equal-nature, like every other wisdom, must have its supporting "concomitant purified consciousness"; that being so, if the seventh consciousness simply did not exist, then the wisdom of equal-nature would have no support and ought not to exist either — for "the supported" cannot stand alone apart from "the support."

Someone may perhaps say: then let the wisdom of equal-nature take the "first six consciousnesses" as its support — would that not do? This too will not do. For all already grant that the buddha's wisdom of equal-nature is "ever-operating" (constant, without break), just like the great-mirror wisdom, never breaking off. But the first six consciousnesses do break off, and what breaks off cannot serve as the support of a wisdom that never breaks off. So the support of the wisdom of equal-nature can only be that never-breaking seventh purified consciousness — which proves the seventh must exist.

The sixth reason speaks from the eighth's co-existent basis. At the no-more-learning stage, if there were no seventh consciousness, then the eighth consciousness would "have no co-existent basis" (no support standing alongside it at once and mutually upholding it). But the eighth consciousness must have this co-existent basis (namely the seventh), just as each of the other consciousnesses has its own co-existent basis — this is the rule for consciousnesses. So at the no-more-learning stage too there must be a seventh.

The seventh reason speaks from the dharma-self-grasping. Just as one who has not yet realized "the no-self of persons" (that is, the no-self of the person) has his "person-self-grasping" arising constantly, so by the same reasoning one who has not yet realized "the no-self of dharmas" ought to have his "dharma-self-grasping" arising constantly. But on which consciousness must this dharma-self-grasping rely in order to arise? If there were no seventh consciousness, it would have nowhere to settle. It cannot rely on the eighth — because the eighth is not concomitant with "wisdom," having no wisdom (grasping dharmas as real requires taking wisdom as its support, and since the eighth has no wisdom, it cannot hold up the dharma-grasping). So there must be a seventh for the dharma-self-grasping to have its footing.

From this one should believe: in the supramundane holy path, the cessation-attainment, and the no-more-learning stage of the two vehicles, this seventh consciousness still arises constantly (arising as dharma-self-grasping) — because the two-vehicle people have not realized the no-self of dharmas, the dharma-self-grasping naturally still remains, and so the seventh still remains.

The eighth reason speaks from a ready-made argument. The various treatises commonly use "the five consciousnesses as a parallel case" to prove there is a seventh — meaning: each of the five consciousnesses has its own exclusive co-existent basis (namely the five faculties); by the same reasoning, the sixth mind-consciousness too ought to have such an exclusive co-existent basis, and that is the seventh. In this argument, "the five consciousnesses all have an unshared co-existent basis" serves as the example (the corroborating instance), used to infer that the seventh is the support of the sixth. But if, just in the arising of the holy path and at the no-more-learning stage, there were no seventh to serve as the sixth's support, then the "thesis" (the proposition) and the "reason" (the ground) set up by this argument would both fail together and could not be carried through.

Pressing one step further: if you allow that the sixth at times has no support, then by the same example the five consciousnesses too ought at times to have no support. But the five consciousnesses plainly have a support at all times; then the sixth too ought likewise to have a support at all times (that is, to have the seventh as support at all times).

Putting these several points together, the conclusion is: there definitely is an "undefiled manas" (the purified manas), constantly arising and present in the above three states (the holy path, the cessation-attainment, the no-more-learning).

Then how is the verse's saying that "in these three states it is not present" to be taken? That is said with respect to the "defiled manas," and does not mean that the essence of the seventh is gone. This is just like what was said before: to say "in the four states there is no ālaya" means that the name "ālaya" is gone, not that the essence of the eighth is gone; here too "in the three states there is no defiled manas" should be understood on this same principle.

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B. The manas's three differentiations (the self-view · the dharma-view · the wisdom of equal-nature)

The manas, according to what it is matched with, broadly divides into three kinds: the first, concomitant with "the view of a self in persons" (that is, the person-self-view, grasping body-and-mind as a single "self"); the second, concomitant with "the view of a self in dharmas" (grasping the dharmas as really existent); the third, concomitant with "the wisdom of equal-nature" (this being the purified manas after turning around).

The first (matched with the person-self-view) extends to these classes: the continua of all ordinary beings (that is, the unenlightened), the learners of the two vehicles, and "a certain kind of bodhisattva" prior to the seventh stage (referring to the stage of their contaminated mind where person-self-grasping can still arise) — the manas at these stages takes the ālaya-consciousness as object and arouses the view of a self in persons.

The second (matched with the dharma-self-view) extends to these classes: the continua of all ordinary beings, disciples, and solitary buddhas, and the stage where "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not yet present" for all bodhisattvas — the manas at these stages takes the maturation-consciousness as object and arouses the view of a self in dharmas.

The third (matched with the wisdom of equal-nature) extends to these classes: the continua of all Tathāgatas, and the stage where "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is present" for bodhisattvas in the path of seeing and the path of cultivation — the manas at these stages takes the "stainless consciousness" (the utterly pure eighth), the maturation-consciousness, and so on as object, and arouses the wisdom of equal-nature.

Here the relation between the person-view and the dharma-view must be pointed out: the moment the person-self-view arises, the dharma-self-view too must be present at the same time. For the person-self-grasping can only arise by resting on the dharma-self-grasping — to draw a comparison: in the dark one mistakes a "tree-stump" for something, but one must first be deluded onto the mark "there is something here" (this is the dharma-grasping) before one can go on to misidentify it as "a person" (this is the person-grasping). Which shows that the dharma-grasping underlies it, and only so can the person-grasping stand up.

The person-self-view and the dharma-self-view, though their functions each differ, do not clash with each other; they both rest on "one wisdom" (taking the same wisdom as their essence).

To draw a comparison: just as the eye-consciousness and the rest, plainly one in themselves, can yet have many functions — discerning blue, discerning yellow, and so on — these functions not clashing with one another, so here too "one wisdom bearing up both the person-view and the dharma-view as its functions" works on the same principle.

Below it tells which stages arouse only the dharma-grasping and not the person-grasping. The learners of the two vehicles when the holy path or the cessation-attainment is present, the sudden-awakening bodhisattvas at the stage of the path of cultivation, and the learner gradual-awakeners when "the fruit of the wisdom of person-emptiness" (the fruit of the wisdom directly realizing the no-self of persons) is present — these several cases all arouse only the dharma-grasping and not the person-grasping, because at these times the person-self-grasping has already been suppressed.

The no-more-learning [adepts] of the two vehicles, and this gradual-awakener when "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not yet present," also arouse only the dharma-grasping, because at these times the person-self-grasping has already been severed.

From the eighth stage on up, all bodhisattvas' "self-grasping" (the person-self-grasping) never comes forth again — either already severed forever, or already suppressed forever. Yet when "the fruit of the wisdom of dharma-emptiness is not yet present," they still arouse "dharma-grasping"; and this does not clash with "self-grasping never coming forth" (the one being the person-grasping, long since stopped, the other the dharma-grasping, still present — two different matters).

There is a scripture to attest this. The scripture says: from the eighth stage on up, all the "affliction-obstruction" no longer arises, and there remains only the "knowable-obstruction" on which it depends. This "remaining" knowable-obstruction refers to "present activity," not to "seeds" (the seeds of the affliction-obstruction are in fact not yet wholly severed, only no longer arising). How is it known that "remaining" here refers to present activity? Because if it were not put this way (if even the present activity of the knowable-obstruction were reckoned gone), then since the seeds of the affliction-obstruction too are not severed, it ought equally to be said to "remain" — yet the scripture says only that the knowable-obstruction "remains" and does not mention the affliction-obstruction "remaining," which shows that this "remain" speaks of present activity (the present activity of the knowable-obstruction still remains, while the present activity of the affliction-obstruction has already stopped).

This manas arising together with the "dharma-grasping" — whether it is called defiled or undefiled depends on whom one is speaking of. With respect to the two vehicles and the like, it is called "undefiled" (because it does not obstruct the kind of wisdom the two vehicles seek); but with respect to the bodhisattvas, it is then called "defiled" — because it obstructs the wisdom the bodhisattvas would realize (the wisdom of dharma-emptiness). Just because it is "defiled" with respect to the bodhisattvas, it (on the bodhisattvas' side) is also called "obscured-indeterminate."

And with respect to the two vehicles and the like, it is said to be called "unobscured" (unobscured-indeterminate), because it does not obstruct the kind of wisdom the two vehicles seek.

This (the manas arising together with the dharma-grasping) is comprised within the class "maturation-born" — because it is born unceasingly from the maturation-consciousness, it is called "maturation-born"; but it is not the "maturation-fruit" (the true maturation). The name "maturation-born" reaches wide, just like "the predominant condition" (whatever the other three conditions cannot take in is all assigned to the predominant condition): whatever the other categories cannot take in is all assigned to this "maturation-born."

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C. Proving the existence of the seventh consciousness (the scriptural authority · the six doctrinal grounds)

〔Q〕How is it to be known that this seventh consciousness, apart from the eye and the other consciousnesses, has its own separate essence? 〔A〕By relying on "holy scripture" and "right reason," these two, as the most reliable authority (the one being the Buddha's word, the other being reasoning that holds firm).

1. The scriptural authority

First on the scripture side. The World-Honored One, in many scriptures, has said that "mind, mentation, and consciousness" each have their own meaning.

The sense "accumulating-and-arising" (accumulating the seeds and giving rise to all dharmas) is named "mind"; the sense "cogitating" is named "mentation"; the sense "discerning" (distinguishing and cognizing) is named "consciousness" — these are the three distinct senses of the three.

These three senses do, in fact, each pertain in some measure to all eight consciousnesses (each consciousness has, more or less, something of accumulating-and-arising, of cogitating, and of discerning); but in whichever sense a given consciousness is most outstanding, by that sense its name is set up.

So the eighth has its name set up as "mind" — because it stores the seeds of all dharmas and gives rise to all dharmas from those seeds; the seventh has its name set up as "mentation" — because it takes the store-consciousness and so on as object and cogitates "constantly" and "examiningly," grasping it as a "self"; the remaining six have their names set up as "consciousness" — because, toward the six distinct kinds of object, they discern coarsely, movingly, and intermittently, and so turn.

Just as the gāthā (that is, a verse) in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says:

The store-consciousness has its name set up as "mind"; that cogitating nature is named "mentation"; and that which can discern the various marks of objects, this has its name set up as "consciousness."

Again, the Mahāyāna scriptures in many places separately state plainly that there is a seventh consciousness, and so it is known that this seventh consciousness separately has its own essence.

Are the Mahāyāna scriptures themselves trustworthy? These Mahāyāna scriptures are all "the authority of supreme teaching" (the most reliable witness of the Buddha's word) — this point has already been argued at length before (it has been demonstrated that they truly are the Buddha's word), and so it is not repeated here.

In the Vimokṣa-sūtra too there is a separate statement that there is this seventh consciousness, just as its verse says:

The defiled mentation, at all times, arises together and ceases together with those afflictions; once one is freed from these afflictions, this defiled mentation neither was in the past nor will be in the future.

That scripture itself glosses the meaning of this verse, saying: there is a "defiled mentation" that, from beginningless time, arises and ceases together constantly with four afflictions, these four being the self-view, self-love, self-conceit, and self-delusion.

When the countering path arises and the afflictions are severed, this defiled mentation thereupon attains freedom from those afflictions.

At that time, the afflictions concomitant with this mentation are not only absent in the present, but absent in the past and future as well — because past and future are by nature simply not really existent (they are not really there).

Teachings of this kind are found throughout all the divisions of the scriptures and treatises; for fear of wearying [the reader] with extensive text, they are not enumerated one by one.

2. Right reason (the six doctrinal grounds)

Holy scripture has already been cited as witness above; below should come the "right reason," that is, proving by reasoning that the seventh consciousness truly exists.

〔Ground one · the non-shared ignorance〕

The first doctrinal ground. The scripture says there is a kind of "non-shared ignorance" that is subtle and constantly operating, covering over the true and real. Consider: if there were no seventh consciousness, then this "non-shared ignorance" would have nowhere to lodge and ought simply not to exist (it must have something to rest on before it can arise).

In detail: all ordinary beings, in "all phases" (all stages, all times), constantly arouse the "non-shared ignorance deluded as to principle," covering over the true and real meaning and obstructing the holy eye of wisdom that can see the truth. Just as the gāthā says:

When the mind that would see the true meaning is just about to arise, it always blocks and hinders; that which goes along through all phases (all stages) is named the non-shared ignorance.

This is why the scripture says: the class of ordinary beings is constantly in a long night, blinded by ignorance, the mind bound up in stupor-and-intoxication, never once awake.

This being so, if at the ordinary-being stage there were a time when "this ignorance were for a moment not arising," that would run against the meaning of the scripture (the scripture plainly says the ordinary being "is constantly in the long night, never once awake").

Within one and the same ordinary-being stage, for this "principle-deluding ignorance" to sometimes operate and sometimes not is untenable — it ought to be constantly operating.

Then can this "constantly operating non-shared ignorance" be hung on the first six consciousnesses? It cannot hold. Because the first six consciousnesses do break off (in sleep, in fainting, and the like, in the five mindless states, or when turning into a good mind and so on, the six consciousnesses all stop); but this ignorance must defile constantly, not pausing for a moment. The moment the six consciousnesses break off, the ignorance hung upon them breaks off along with them, and this does not square with "constantly operating."

But if one admits there is a manas (so that this constantly-operating ignorance is hung on the manas, which never breaks off), then this fault is gone.

〔Q〕Here someone picks at a word: the defiled manas is always concomitant with the four afflictions (self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love); then this "ignorance" arising with the manas — how can it still deserve to be called "non-shared"? By ordinary reckoning, a "non-shared ignorance" ought to arise alone, not partnering with other afflictions; yet the manas's ignorance plainly partners with the other three afflictions, so how does it count as "non-shared"?

〔One view · the three are not root [afflictions]〕 One view: the self-view, self-conceit, and self-love arising with the manas, these three, do not count as "root afflictions" (only ignorance is root). Since the three it partners with are not root afflictions, then this ignorance is still "not partnering with any other root affliction," and what is wrong with calling it "non-shared"?

〔It should be said · the correct view〕 Another view (this is the correct one): that "the three are not root" account is at odds with reason and with holy scripture. For within the rubric of "pure secondary-afflictions," these three (self-view, self-conceit, self-love) are simply not counted as secondary-afflictions; and these three are plainly comprised within "the six root afflictions" and "the ten afflictions." Which shows they are root afflictions, not secondary-afflictions — so to say "the three it partners with are not root" will not stand.

Moreover, the various treatises everywhere say "the defiled manas is always concomitant with four (root) afflictions," which shows that each of these four afflictions is a root affliction.

Then how, after all, should "non-shared" be glossed? It should be said: among the four afflictions, "ignorance" is the principal; and although the other three (self-view, self-conceit, self-love) arise together with it, this ignorance may still be called "non-shared" — because it is the strong principal, while those three are the attendant supporting parts, and the principal alone holds the name.

Why is ignorance said to be the principal? Because from beginningless time this ignorance has been deluded inwardly without break, never reflecting, "delusion (ignorance) being especially predominant" — and since ignorance is especially strong, it alone is marked out as "non-shared."

〔Q〕Then someone goes on to ask: the self-view and the rest arising with the manas, because they arise along with others, ought to be called "concomitant (of the ignorance strand)"; but when it is their turn to "be the principal," ought they too to be called "non-shared"? 〔A〕Yes — just as ignorance when principal is called non-shared, so it is allowed that the self-view and the rest, when they are principal, may also be called non-shared, and there is nothing wrong with this.

〔Another gloss · the first sense of "non-shared"〕 "Non-shared" has yet another gloss. Someone glosses "this delusion is called non-shared" thus: just like the "non-shared" of the "non-shared buddha-dharmas" (referring to the dharmas that only a buddha has), this ignorance too is something only the manas has — only the seventh consciousness has this constantly-operating ignorance, and no other consciousness has it, and so it is called "non-shared."

〔Q〕Someone rebuts: if "non-shared" is glossed by "only this consciousness has it," then the fault becomes large — the afflictions concomitant with the other consciousnesses (which the manas does not have) ought all to be called "non-shared" too. If whatever "another has and the manas lacks" can be called non-shared, the name becomes far too loose.

〔A〕This "non-shared" is a name set up with respect to "an outstanding sense," and it is not that whatever "you have and I lack, I have and you lack" is all called non-shared. Below it makes clear what counts as outstanding.

What is meant by outstanding is this: the ignorance concomitant with the seventh consciousness operates constantly from beginningless time and can obstruct the wisdom that sees the true meaning. Such an outstanding function is something the other consciousnesses lack and the seventh consciousness alone has, and so it is called "non-shared" (not a loose having-and-lacking, but this outstanding [function] uniquely its own).

〔Q〕Then someone goes on to ask: that being so, the three arising with the manas (self-view, self-conceit, self-love, which are also constantly operating from beginningless time) ought all to be called "non-shared" too?

〔A〕Both sayings hold. One: with ignorance as the principal, it alone gets the name "non-shared" (those three being attendant, not marked out separately). Two: it is also allowed that those three be likewise called non-shared, only that, in order to set them off clearly from "the delusion that partners with the host of afflictions in the other consciousnesses (the shared ignorance)," here ignorance is for the moment singled out as "non-shared."

Here the "non-shared ignorance" is further divided into two kinds: the first is called "ever-operating non-shared" — this is what the other consciousnesses lack, namely the ignorance concomitant with the manas (constantly operating). The second is called "solitary non-shared" — this, on the contrary, the manas does not have, referring to that sort of ignorance that does not partner with other afflictions but comes forth alone.

This squares with the Yogācārabhūmi's dividing of ignorance into two: that which arises along with greed and the like is called "concomitant ignorance"; that which does not arise along with greed and the like but comes forth alone is called "solitary ignorance."

The solitary ignorance can be subdivided further. The sort of "solitary ignorance that is principal" belongs only to "what is severed by [the path of] seeing" (severed the moment one sees the path). Just as the scripture says: "Those holy ones who are learners, because their non-shared ignorance is already severed forever, do not create new karma."

The sort of "solitary ignorance that is not principal" then also reaches "what is severed by [the path of] cultivation" (severed only in the path of cultivation); because the secondary-afflictions such as wrath that go along with it reach, by their very nature, both what is severed by seeing and what is severed by cultivation.

Finally, to settle accounts: the "ever-operating non-shared" (that is, the ignorance concomitant with the manas) is what the other schools (sectarian divisions) do not have (only the Great Vehicle sets it up); the "solitary non-shared" is something both the Great Vehicle and the other schools have (this one all sides acknowledge).

〔Ground two · the mind-consciousness arising with mentation-and-dharma as condition〕

The second doctrinal ground. The scripture says: taking the eye-faculty and the form-object as condition, the eye-consciousness arises; and so on through, all the way to taking "mentation (the faculty) and the dharma (the object)" as condition, the mind-consciousness arises. Consider: if there were no seventh consciousness, then that "mentation" which serves as the condition for the arising of the mind-consciousness (that is, the co-existent basis of the mind-consciousness, the mentation-faculty) would have nowhere to rest.

In detail: just as the five consciousnesses must have their "predominant, unshared, co-existent basis" such as the eye-faculty (that is, the five faculties), the mind-consciousness, being likewise comprised among the six consciousnesses, ought by rights to be granted such a basis; but if this seventh consciousness simply did not exist, then where would the mind-consciousness's basis come from?

Someone may want to take "the form (dharma)" to stand in as the mind-consciousness's basis — this will not do, because the mind-consciousness's faculty is "mentation (the faculty)," and the mentation-faculty is not form. Moreover, if one took form as the mind-consciousness's basis, then the mind-consciousness ought to lack the two discriminations of "recollective discrimination" (discriminating along the track of memory) and "investigative discrimination" (discriminating by deliberation) — for form-dharmas cannot give rise to these two; yet the mind-consciousness plainly has these two discriminations, which shows that its basis is not form but the seventh.

The opponent may, on the contrary, say "the five consciousnesses simply have no co-existent basis," using this to overturn "the sixth must have a co-existent basis." This too will not do — because the five consciousnesses turn together at the same time with the five faculties, just like the seed and the sprout that grows from it, or a body and its shadow, always coexisting as one. Which shows that the five consciousnesses really do have a co-existent basis, and it is not that they have none.

Again, since the consciousness and the faculty must take one and the same object, it is just like the mind-king and the mental factors, which definitely arise together at the same time (since they take one and the same object as object, the faculty must be present at the same time as the consciousness — and this is precisely the sense of a co-existent basis).

Putting these several steps together establishes an argument: "the established mind-consciousness" (that is, the sixth consciousness that both sides admit), like the eye and the other consciousnesses, must have an "unshared basis," and this basis can mark out the mind-consciousness's own name and own locus. And one must distinguish clearly: this basis is not of the "equal-immediate condition" strand (the equal-immediate condition being the preceding moment of mind-consciousness, the kind that has ceased and yielded its place); it is the basis of the "predominant, productive" strand. On what ground is this said? Because the mind-consciousness is one of the "established six consciousnesses" — being in the same line as the other five, by rule it ought to have an unshared co-existent basis, and that is the seventh.

〔Ground three · cogitating is named mentation〕

The third doctrinal ground. The scripture says "cogitating is named mentation." Consider: if there were no seventh consciousness, then that "(constantly and examiningly) cogitating mentation" ought simply not to exist.

In detail: suppose we take just the time when the "mind-consciousness" is present before one; then its equal-immediate basis, "the preceding moment of mentation," has long since ceased and is no longer there (it has fallen away into the past); and the past and future are, by reason, not really existent. Thus the function of "cogitating" simply cannot be established at all — for there is no constantly-present mentation to preside over the cogitating.

This being so (the preceding moment of mentation having long ceased, and there being no constantly-present cogitating thing), then how can one possibly speak of "(constantly and examiningly cogitating) being named mentation"?

The opponent may say: this "mentation" is "conventionally posited" (a name set up by resting on that already-ceased preceding moment, no more). This too will not get through — for if there were no "thing that truly cogitates" at all, then on what could this conventional name be set up? (A conventional name must after all have some real ground beneath it.)

The opponent may again say: then set up this "mentation" by relying on "the present, once-cogitating thing" (that is, the presently-active mind-consciousness). This too will not do — for at the present moment it leads precisely by "discerning," and is precisely named "consciousness"; how then can it be spoken of as "mentation" (cogitating)? (At one present moment, the designation can take only the single most outstanding one; since it is already named consciousness, it cannot hold the name mentation.)

Pressed by these several points, it is known: there is a separate seventh manas that constantly and examiningly cogitates, and it is the one properly named "mentation"; while "the already-ceased preceding moment of the sixth" is, by resting on this seventh, merely lent the name "mentation" (that is to say, the preceding moment of mentation that serves as the equal-immediate basis is conventionally called mentation by borrowing the seventh's name).

〔Ground four · the two concentrations, no-perception and cessation, differing〕

The fourth doctrinal ground. The scripture says that the "no-perception concentration" and the "cessation-attainment," these two concentrations, do differ; yet consider: if there were no "defiled mentation" (the defiled manas), these two concentrations ought to be indistinguishable. How so? Both these concentrations alike extinguish the first six consciousnesses together with their mental factors, the essence and number of what is extinguished being completely the same — that is, viewed from the side of the six consciousnesses and their factors, the two concentrations look exactly alike on the surface.

Since they look alike on the surface, the difference can fall only on the defiled mentation: in the no-perception concentration there is still defiled mentation, while in the cessation-attainment there is no defiled mentation — by this "one having, one lacking" they can be told apart. If there were no such thing as defiled mentation at all, and one could not set up this one-having-one-lacking, then on what could these two concentrations possibly be told apart?

The opponent may say: then take "the preparatory effort (the effort before entering the concentration), the realm, the stage, the basis," and the like — would not these differences serve to tell these two concentrations apart? This too will not get through — because those differing "causes" arise precisely from "whether or not there is defiled mentation"; if there were not even this one item, the presence-or-absence of defiled mentation, then the causes of those differences would be gone along with it (the root still lies in the defiled mentation, which is the more fundamental layer).

So there must be "this (defiled manas)" mentation separately, to serve as the most fundamental cause of difference between these two concentrations.

〔Ground five · the no-perception beings having self-grasping〕

The fifth doctrinal ground. The scripture says: the "no-perception beings" (the beings born in the no-perception heaven), throughout that one lifetime, have the mind and mental factors of the first six consciousnesses utterly extinguished. Consider: if there were no seventh consciousness, then the no-perception beings ought to have no "defilement" (that is, no self-grasping).

In detail: the no-perception beings have, for that long stretch of time, no first six evolving consciousnesses; if there were furthermore no this manas-mentation, then their self-grasping would simply not exist at all (throughout the long time of a whole lifetime there would be no self-grasping).

But there is no such thing anywhere: that a "fully-bound" person (an ordinary being, complete in every fetter of affliction) elsewhere should, throughout a lifetime, be wholly without self-grasping. A fully-bound person must constantly have self-grasping; and since the beings of the no-perception heaven are, after all, still fully-bound ordinary beings, they too ought constantly to have self-grasping throughout their lifetime — and this self-grasping rests precisely on the manas.

Again, if the no-perception beings truly had no self-grasping, then they ought to be like nirvāṇa (already free of grasping), and ought not to be reproached and shunned with one accord by the sages and worthies. But the no-perception heaven is precisely what the sages and worthies together reproach and shun (the sages and worthies regard it as a wrong turn), which shows that within it there is still self-grasping.

〔Q · arguing by the three times〕 The opponent may say: at the very "beginning" of entering no-perception and at the "end" just before emerging, the being does have the first six consciousnesses and does have self-grasping, and so the earlier fault (wholly without self-grasping for a lifetime) does not stand. 〔A〕But during that great long stretch in the "middle" there are no first six consciousnesses; and since in the middle there is no self-grasping, the fault "a fully-bound ordinary being having a long stretch wholly without self-grasping" still stands there, not dodged.

〔Q〕The opponent may again say: then prop it up with the "past, future" self-grasping (that is, its seeds or residual force), and the earlier fault is gone. 〔A〕But that past-and-future self-grasping is neither "present activity" nor "abiding-constant," and so amounts to nothing; and since it amounts to nothing, the earlier fault still stands.

Then it blocks off the opponent's remaining lines of retreat one by one. First: since "the obtained" (the fruit that self-grasping yields) does not exist, "the obtainer" (the support that can arouse self-grasping) does not exist either. Second: if the opponent would take the "non-concurrent formation dharmas" (the sort like "attainment" and the life-faculty) to serve as the basis of self-grasping, these have already been refuted earlier as not really existent at all, and cannot serve as a basis. Third: if the opponent would take the store-consciousness to serve as the basis — but this faction (the one that maintains the no-perception heaven is undefiled and does not set up a seventh) does not set up a seventh in the first place, and in the matter of perfuming the store-consciousness — since the perfuming of self-grasping in the store-consciousness does not exist, there is no perfuming to speak of at all. Fourth: if the opponent would take "the remaining various dharmas" to receive the perfuming (to store the seeds of self-grasping), this too was already argued earlier to be untenable, for the other dharmas simply cannot receive perfuming. All four lines of retreat are blocked off.

So there must be separately a "defiled manas" that constantly arouses self-grasping in the no-perception heaven; and just because it arouses self-grasping, the worthies and sages with one accord reproach and shun that no-perception heaven.

〔Ground six · the mind of the three natures constantly carrying self-grasping〕

The sixth doctrinal ground. The scripture says: whichever of the "good, defiled, indeterminate" minds the ordinary being arouses, he constantly carries "self-grasping"; consider, if there were no seventh consciousness, then this self-grasping carried along at all times ought not to exist.

In detail: the class of ordinary beings, at the time of arousing a mind of the three natures, though outwardly performing various deeds, inwardly grasps constantly at a "self."

Just because it constantly grasps the self within, it causes the giving and the like aroused in the six consciousnesses to be "unable to lose the marks" — that is, unable to let go of the marks "I am giving, giving to such-and-such," and so unable to attain true purity.

So the Yogācārabhūmi says: the defiled manas is the support of the (first six) consciousnesses; while it has not yet ceased, the "bondage of discerning marks" (being bound by one's own discerning of the seen-part) cannot be freed; once the manas has ceased, this "bondage to marks" is then freed.

What is meant by "bondage to marks" is this: toward the marks of objects one cannot see through them as in fact illusion-like (one does not realize these are like phantom-things), and thereupon one is held fast, bound, and not free by the "seeing-part and the seen-part," and so it is called "bondage to marks."

In accordance with this sense, there is a gāthā that says:

This defiled mentation is the support of the first six consciousnesses; while this mentation has not yet ceased, the bondage of the first six consciousnesses can after all never be freed.

Again, a still weightier point is added from the angle of "the contaminated." When the ordinary being arouses a "good" mind or an "unobscured-indeterminate" mind, if there were no self-grasping accompanying it at all times, then these minds ought not to count as "contaminated." How so? Because within one and the same continuum, the afflictions of the first six consciousnesses do not arise at the same time as this good mind or unobscured-indeterminate mind (the afflictions of the six consciousnesses are intermittent — now a good mind arises, only later does an affliction arise, and the two never meet). Since they never meet, the afflictions of the first six consciousnesses have no way to contaminate this good mind or indeterminate mind into being contaminated — for them to become contaminated must rely on something constantly present, and that is the manas's self-grasping.

Here two crooked roads are first blocked off. First: to take "the past or future afflictions binding-as-condition this good mind" as the reason will not get through in principle, because the past and future are not really existent. Second: nor can one say that "relying on the afflictions in another's continuum" could contaminate my good mind into being contaminated — otherwise, by the same logic, "relying on the liberation in another's continuum" could just as well make my own self uncontaminated, which is plainly untenable.

The third crooked road: nor can one say that there is separately a "latent tendency" that is a "non-concurrent formation dharma," arising now in the continuum, and that by it the good mind and the rest are contaminated into being contaminated; because such a (non-concurrent formation) latent tendency is not really existent, a point already commonly established.

The fourth crooked road: nor can one say that this good mind and the rest are born "from contaminated seeds" and so become contaminated; because that seed, at a still earlier point, had no "cause" that could make it contaminated (one should understand: without the manas's self-grasping, that seed has no way to become a contaminated seed — the root of the malady still lies in self-grasping).

It nails down this fourth point again: it is simply not "contaminated seeds" that make the good mind and the rest contaminated. Otherwise, the "uncontaminated mind" aroused by a learner (which is itself also born out of a contaminated body and seeds) ought too to become contaminated; yet the uncontaminated mind is plainly uncontaminated. Which shows it is not by way of seeds, but by way of the present-active self-grasping, that the good mind is contaminated into being contaminated.

That said, the afflictions of the first six consciousnesses do, to be sure, draw forth giving and the other deeds; but they do not arise at the same time as that good deed; and since they are not at the same time, they cannot serve as the "proper cause" of "the contaminated." Why? Because the very word "contaminated" means "accompanied at all times by the contaminant (affliction)" — and what can accompany the good deed moment by moment must be that constantly-present manas's self-grasping, and that is the proper cause of the contaminated.

There is, moreover, a still plainer example: "indeterminate karma" is not drawn forth by afflictions at all; then how does it manage to become "contaminated"? (Since it is not drawn forth by afflictions, yet is contaminated all the same, it shows there must surely be separately a manas's self-grasping accompanying it at all times, contaminating it into being contaminated.)

Then how, after all, do the various dharmas become contaminated? Stated positively: it is because they arise together, cease together, and mutually augment with "the affliction constantly present and active in one's own body," and only thus do they become contaminated — and this affliction present and active at all times is precisely the manas's self-grasping.

By this constant accompaniment, the "seeds of contaminated dharmas" are perfumed into being, and when later they arise again, the sense of the contaminated is then made firm. The ordinary being is so, and the learner is likewise so.

Then what of the contaminated dharmas at the no-more-learning stage? The no-more-learner already has no present-active contaminant, and his contaminated dharmas, though for the moment not accompanied by a contaminant, are born from "the contaminated seeds perfumed at an earlier time," and so are contaminated all the same — and this is not at odds with reason.

Gathering up this whole chain: it is precisely because there is a manas constantly arousing self-grasping that the good and other dharmas are able to attain the sense of "the contaminated"; were there no this manas-mentation, then the contaminated sense of the good and the rest definitely could not be established. From this it is known that there is separately this seventh consciousness.

〔Conclusion · the six doctrinal grounds〕

The lines of reasoning that prove there is this seventh consciousness are very many; here only six kinds have been briefly set forth, following the Mahāyānasaṃgraha; those of wisdom should accordingly arouse faith-and-understanding toward it and learn by it.

Then how is one to take it that some scriptures speak of only "six consciousnesses"? One should understand: that is "the gate of reasoning that goes along [with another's view]" (provisionally putting it that way as an accommodation, following others' manner of speaking), or it is a counting into six following "the six faculties on which they depend"; but if one speaks of the classes of consciousness, there are in fact eight kinds.

〔Expounding the third transformer〕

The second transformer (that is, the cogitation-transformer · the manas-consciousness) has already been treated above. So what does the third transformer look like? The verse below answers:

〔The verse expounded〕

"Next, the third transformer: its differentiations are of six kinds; discerning objects is its nature-and-mark; good, bad, and neither-of-the-two." (v8) "Their mental factors — the universal, the object-specific, the good, the afflictions, the secondary afflictions, and the indeterminate — are all concurrent with the three feelings." (v9) "First the universal: contact and the rest; next the object-specific, namely desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom — their objects being different." (v10)

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A. The third transformer · marks-and-nature (v8)

1. The differentiation of the six consciousnesses · named after the faculty

The treatise says: having finished [treating] the cogitation-transforming consciousness (that is, the manas), we come next to the third class — "the object-discerning transforming consciousness," meaning "the consciousness that discerns the realm of objects (the things cognized)" — and its appearance. This class of consciousness, broken down, comes to six kinds in all; and the reason it splits into six is that they each face the six faculties and the six objects (the six gates of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; the six kinds of object: form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas), and so their kinds differ accordingly.

These six kinds of consciousness are called the eye-consciousness, the ear-consciousness… on down to the mind-consciousness. Why use the faculty to give the consciousness its name (this is "named after the faculty")? Because between consciousness and faculty there are five layers of relation, making up exactly five senses [of dependence]. The five senses are: first, the consciousness must rely on this faculty (depending on the faculty); second, the consciousness is issued from this faculty (issued from the faculty); third, the consciousness belongs to this faculty (belonging to the faculty); fourth, the consciousness assists this faculty in its work (assisting the faculty); fifth, the consciousness resembles this faculty (being like the faculty).

Here someone might ask: all six kinds of consciousness actually need the "manas" (that is, the seventh, the manas-consciousness) before they can turn at all — so why is it just the sixth that is called "mind-consciousness"? The answer is: although all six consciousnesses rely on the manas, the "mind-faculty (manas)" is what the mind-consciousness relies on exclusively (the other consciousnesses do not exclusively rely on the manas-faculty — this is being "not-shared"), so the consciousness is named after this exclusively-relied-on faculty and called the "mind-consciousness." This is the same principle by which the earlier five consciousnesses are named — the five consciousnesses likewise each have their own exclusively-relied-on form-faculty (the eye-consciousness exclusively relies on the eye-faculty, the ear-consciousness on the ear-faculty…), and are named accordingly. Naming this way, the names will not get confused with one another (no "mutual confusion").

Or, to put it another way: the mind-consciousness relies on the "manas" (the mind-faculty) alone, so it is simply called the "mind-consciousness." But it must be made clear: this method of "taking the faculty to give a name" applies only to naming "consciousnesses" (the sixth being the mind-consciousness, the eye-consciousness being the eye-consciousness, all of this kind); as for the two names "mind" (the eighth) and "manas" (the seventh), they are not formed by this method (they are not names taken "after the faculty").

There is also another method of naming: one may also call these six kinds of consciousness the form-consciousness, the sound-consciousness… on down to the dharma-consciousness. This is "taking the object to give a name" (called "named after the object"), and naming this way also conforms to the very meaning of the word "consciousness" — for "consciousness" originally means "discerning an object." That is, whatever discerns upon the six kinds of object is called "consciousness": the first five consciousnesses, the eye and the rest, discern only the five objects of form, sound, smell, taste, and touch, and so are called the form-consciousness, the sound-consciousness…; whereas the "dharma-consciousness" (that is, the mind-consciousness) is able to discern all dharmas, or rather, precisely because it alone "is able to discern that class called 'dharmas,'" it alone gets the name "dharma-consciousness." This way too, the names of the six kinds of consciousness will not get confused with one another.

But a word must be added: that method just given of "taking the object to name the six consciousnesses" is spoken with regard to the stage where "the five form-faculties are not yet sovereign" (that is, the stage of the ordinary being, where the eye can only see, the ear can only hear, one faculty managing one object). If one cultivates to "attained sovereignty" (as with a Buddha), then each faculty can stand in for the others — any one faculty at all can issue a consciousness that reaches out to all objects (the eye-faculty too can hear, can smell). At that point faculty and object no longer correspond one to one, and one must switch to "taking the faculty to name [them]"; named that way, they likewise will not get confused (one can no longer rely on the single method of "naming after the object").

This "faculties used interchangeably" has scriptural warrant. The Sūtrālaṃkāra says "the Tathāgata's five faculties, each one, turn upon all five objects" — meaning the Buddha's eye-faculty can not only see but can also turn upon sound, smell, taste, and touch. Yet this saying is for the moment spoken with regard to the "coarser, more manifest, same-class" objects (it speaks first of the plainly evident, not saying that even the subtlest objects too are all handled across the board). The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra likewise says: the Buddha's "wisdom of accomplishing what is to be done" can judge the manifold differences in the mind-and-conduct of all sentient beings, can set going the transformations of the three [kinds of] action — body, speech, and mind (the transformations of the three actions) — and can make the "four kinds of reply" (four different ways of answering) to people, and so on. None of these powers could be managed unless "one faculty could reach out across all objects" — which, conversely, proves that the Buddha truly does use the faculties interchangeably and can reach out across [all objects].

As for what the first six consciousnesses "rely on" (their support) and what they "reach out to" (their object), both of these are quite manifest and commonly conceded — there is no dispute about them — and so they are not spelled out separately here. Earlier, when treating "naming after the faculty," the "what they rely on" was already mentioned in passing; as for "what they reach out to" (their object-realm), this too will be touched on below as the discussion runs on.

2. Discerning objects as nature-and-mark

Next, the verse-line "discerning objects is its nature-and-mark" points out, in one stroke, both sides of the six consciousnesses: one side is their "self-nature" (what they are in themselves), the other their "mode-of-action" (how they operate). These two sides are in fact one and the same thing — "discerning the realm of objects": the six consciousnesses in themselves are just "discerning objects" (this is the self-nature), and in their operation they are likewise just "discerning objects" (this is the mode-of-action). Following this line, the name given them earlier is also explained — precisely because they "are able to discern objects," they are called "consciousness."

Just as scripture says: "What is the eye-consciousness? It is, relying on the eye-faculty, the discerning of the various forms"… and so on down to "What is the mind-consciousness? It is, relying on the mind-faculty, the discerning of the various dharmas." But this passage of scripture speaks only with regard to three aspects: first, it raises only each consciousness's "exclusively-relied-on faculty" (the not-shared support, the eye-consciousness raising the eye-faculty, the mind-consciousness raising the mind-faculty), not mentioning the manas they rely on in common; second, it speaks with regard to "the stage where transformation [of the basis] has not yet occurred" (the ordinary-being's stage); third, the "discerning" it speaks of is what the "perceiving part" (the side that does the reaching-out) discerns. As for the rest that it does not mention — such as the "manas" the several consciousnesses rely on in common, and the discerning after the transformation of the basis, and so on — these have all already been supplemented above.

3. The six consciousnesses subsumed under the three natures

So these six transforming consciousnesses — along the line of "good and bad," which nature do they count as? The answer is: they run through the three natures — good, bad (evil), and neither-of-the-two (that is, the indeterminate, being neither good nor bad) — they can be any of these three.

First, what "neither-of-the-two" means. "Neither-of-the-two" is just "the indeterminate": it is neither good nor bad, being neither of the two sides, and so is called "neither-of-the-two" ("neither-of-the-two" means "neither one nor the other").

Then how are good and bad to be defined? Here a single standard is used: see whether a thing is beneficial to "this life" and "the next life" both. Only what brings benefit to this life and to the next life both is called "good." Take an illustration: the "pleasant fruit" of the human and heavenly [realms] (being reborn as a human, or born into heaven to enjoy blessings — this is the karmic fruit drawn on by past good deeds) can, in this life, let one enjoy benefit, yet it cannot in itself go on to bring benefit to the next life (enjoying blessings does not in itself make any further good cause), so the pleasant fruit does not count as "good" (it is merely an indeterminate ripening-fruit).

Conversely, only what brings harm to "this life" and "the next life" both is called "bad" (evil). Take the same kind of illustration: the "painful fruit" of the evil destinies (the hells, hungry ghosts, animals), though it makes one suffer and be harmed in this life, cannot in itself go on to harm the next life (suffering does not in itself make any further bad cause), so the painful fruit too does not count as "bad."

In this way, what one can call neither good nor bad, and what affords neither benefit nor harm — this sort that "cannot be marked off to either side, good or bad" — is called "the indeterminate" ("indeterminate" means "having no way to mark off as good or bad").

As to which nature the six kinds of transforming consciousness fall into, that depends on what sort of mental factors they are joined with (concurrent with) at the moment. There are three cases: first, if it is joined with the eleven good mental factors of "trust" and the rest, then at that moment it is "good"; second, if it is joined with the ten bad mental factors of "shamelessness" and the rest (that is, the defiled mental factors), then at that moment it is "bad" (evil); third, if it is joined with neither of these two classes — no good mental factor and no bad mental factor — then at that moment it is "indeterminate."

4. Are the three natures of the six consciousnesses concurrent or not (a dispute)

〔One view · the three natures are not concurrent〕 One party maintains: in one and the same moment the six kinds of consciousness will not have all three natures — good, bad, and indeterminate — appearing together (called "the three natures are not concurrent"). Their reasoning runs like this: all six kinds of consciousness "turn outward" (they all run toward outer objects, arising in dependence on outer objects — this is "turning through the outer gate"), and good, bad, and indeterminate are mutually opposed to one another, so they cannot be mixed together in one and the same outward-facing moment. Moreover, the first five consciousnesses must be led (guided) by the mind-consciousness; the five consciousnesses and the mind-consciousness arise at the same time and face the same object, and only so do they come to be good or defiled. That being so, suppose one grants that the five consciousnesses can arise with all three natures at once — then the leading mind-consciousness too would in that moment have to run through all three natures along with them — and that would not get through, would contradict right principle. So it is determined: the three natures definitely will not arise concurrently.

Then someone may rejoin: 〔Q〕 Did not the Yogācārabhūmi and the like say "the store-consciousness (the eighth) is concurrent with the transforming consciousnesses at one and the same time, and the three natures may arise together"? 〔A〕 This party answers: that saying is spoken with regard to "several moments" (several successive, one-after-another moments), not to a single moment. It is just like saying "one mind" — this "one mind" means "a stretch of continuing mind," not "the mind of a single arising-and-perishing moment." So what that scripture-and-treatise speaks of is several successive moments, and it does not contradict the point here that "in a single moment the three natures cannot arise together."

〔The right meaning to be known · the three natures may be concurrent〕 Another party (this is the correct account) says: in one and the same moment the six kinds of consciousness may indeed have good, bad, and indeterminate appearing together (called "the three natures may be concurrent"). The reasoning is: among the eye and the rest of the five consciousnesses there is the "spontaneous mind" (the consciousness in the very first moment of just meeting an object, that first instant) and also the "outflowing mind" (the consciousness continuing on moment after moment thereafter), and these may, in greater or lesser number, arise at the same time, not bound to be all of one nature. Moreover, although the five consciousnesses and the mind-consciousness definitely arise at the same time, their good, bad, and indeterminate need not be the same (the mind-consciousness being good, the five consciousnesses need not be good along with it). So the difficulty set up earlier by 〔the one view〕 ("if the five consciousnesses arose with the three natures together, the mind-consciousness too would have to run through the three natures") here comes to nothing, falls flat.

There is scriptural warrant for this. The Yogācārabhūmi says: suppose a person is in concentration, and suddenly a sound comes from outside and draws him out of the concentration — at that moment the mind-consciousness concurrent with the concentration is still turning on (the person is still in concentration), while at the same time another ear-consciousness arises (to hear the sound). That is to say, it is not "by the concentration-mind-consciousness alone" that this sound can be heard.

Here the author inserts a stretch of reasoning back from the consequence, to prove it: suppose it really were "by the concentration-mind-consciousness alone that the sound is taken," with no ear-consciousness at all — what then? Then the sound would simply not be received by any ear-consciousness, and the person ought not, on that account, to come out of concentration (not having heard it, on what could he come out?). But the fact is: the person does not come out of concentration the instant a sound is heard; rather, the ear-consciousness first receives the sound, a wish to attend to it arises in his mind (if there is a hankering), and only a while later does he truly come out. — This, conversely, proves that in that moment there really is another ear-consciousness doing the hearing.

Look next at the good-or-bad of that moment: while in concentration, the ear-consciousness, in the first instant, hears the sound (the spontaneous hearing of the sound), and by rights this ear-consciousness will not be good (because at that time what is in concentration is the mind-consciousness, and the mind-consciousness is good, while the ear-consciousness is not good along with it). And as for the ordinary being who has not yet transformed [the basis], his "spontaneous falling mind" (the first instant of just meeting an object, that one moment before there is even time to discriminate) is definitely indeterminate. From this it is conclusively proven: the "mind-consciousness concurrent with the five" that arises together with the five consciousnesses need not be of the very same good-or-bad nature as the five consciousnesses. In quite a few places the scriptures-and-treatises only say "the mind-consciousness concurrent with the five also reaches out to the five objects" (facing the same object as the five consciousnesses), but they never say that their good-or-bad nature must be the same.

Then someone may bring in the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā to ask: 〔Q〕 Does the treatise not say "in the 'equipoise state' (that is, when one is in concentration) there are no five consciousnesses"? 〔A〕 This party answers: that saying is spoken with regard to "the majority of cases" (the greater part), not that in concentration there is absolutely never a single one of the five consciousnesses (the example of the ear-consciousness arising in concentration was just given, which shows it is not utterly absent).

Then the principle is stated in full: suppose at a given moment the five consciousnesses turn with all three natures together (some good, some indeterminate…), then the mind-consciousness will "lean its attention" — that is, lean especially toward, attend to, one of those consciousnesses, and at that point the mind-consciousness's nature is the same as the consciousness it leans toward; but if the mind-consciousness does not lean especially toward any one of them, then it is of indeterminate nature. So it can be seen that, whichever the case, the six kinds of transforming consciousness in one and the same moment can indeed have good, bad, and indeterminate, all three natures, coexisting together (this clinches "the three natures may be concurrent").

But one exception must be added: when one has cultivated to "the state of attained sovereignty" (that is, the stage of becoming a Buddha), the six consciousnesses are left with the one nature "good" alone. Why? Because the Buddha's form-dharmas, mind-dharmas, and the rest are all subsumed under the "Path-truth" (all pure and undefiled), and because the Buddha has long ago forever severed away the seeds of conceptual proliferation (he will never again give rise to defilement), so the consciousness in the Buddha's state runs through the good nature only.

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B. The General Statement of the Six Consciousnesses' Mental Factors · Concurrence with the Three Feelings (v9)

1. The general sense of the mental factors

With how many mental factors do the six consciousnesses go together? The verse has answered it above (v9). The treatise says: these six evolving consciousnesses (the first six consciousnesses), taken all together, go together with "the six classes of mental factors" (the six great classes of mental factors) — that is, the class of the omnipresent and the rest, six great classes in all.

Why are they called "mental factors"? Because they constantly arise only by leaning on the "mind" (the mind-king, the very substance of the eight consciousnesses), and they go together with the mind, and they belong to the mind (are under the mind's charge) — and so they are called "mental factors" (things belonging to the mind). This is just like the way anything belonging to me gets given the name "mine."

A step further in the analysis: the mind-king, facing the object it refers to, grasps only its "general mark" (the whole, large look of it); the mental factors, facing the very same object, besides the general mark also grasp its "particular mark" (the individual, detailed parts), and help get done the business the mind-king means to do — and so they too have won this name "mental factors." This is like painting a picture: the master-painter (the teacher) and his apprentice (the "helper," that is, the assistant) divide the labor — one first sketches the outline (makes the model), the other then fills in the color — each doing his own share, the two together making one picture.

This principle is put thus in the Yogācāra treatise it relies on: "the 'consciousness' (mind-king) can cognize the 'general mark' of a thing; while the mental factor 'attention' can cognize the side this consciousness has not yet cognized" — and this not-yet-cognized side is precisely the "particular mark" that each of the several mental factors goes to grasp. One by one: "contact" can cognize this object's side of "the agreeable and the like"; "feeling" can cognize this object's side of "favoring-and-oppressing (taking-in)"; "conception" can cognize this object's side of "what name-and-word it should be set with (the cause of saying)"; "volition" can cognize this object's side of "which direction it should be fashioned toward (the right course)" — and so attention and the rest are all called "mental-factor dharmas." This passage makes plain: the mental factors, besides grasping the particular mark, in fact also refer to the general mark (referring to both general and particular).

Elsewhere it again says: "desire" too can cognize the object's side of "whether or not it is worth wishing for (the wished-for thing)"; "resolve" too can cognize the side of "whether or not it is settled, determined (the determined thing)"; "mindfulness" too can cognize the side of "whether or not one has grown familiar with it before (the once-practiced thing)"; "concentration and wisdom" too can cognize the side of "whether it is a merit, a fault, or neither of the two (merit-fault and the like)" — and just because each grasps these particular marks, the mind then raises, toward the object, its differing responses of wholesome, defiled, and so forth. One sees, then, that all the mental-factor dharmas, facing the object they refer to, grasp the particular mark along [with the general] (not the general mark alone).

2. The number of the six classes of mental factors · totaling fifty-one

Although the several mental factors are alike when one speaks of "name" and of "sense" (all called mental factors, all things belonging to the mind), yet when sorted by kind there is a difference of six great classes: the omnipresent five, the object-specific five, the wholesome eleven, the defilements (the root defilements) six, the secondary defilements twenty, the indeterminate four — fifty-one in all. Why each of these six classes is called by its name, said one by one — the omnipresent: because in "any single mind" whatever it is surely to be found (pervading every mind), and so it is called omnipresent; the object-specific: because it arises only on leaning on "its several distinct objects" (it does not arise on just any object at all), and so it is called object-specific; the wholesome: because it arises only within a wholesome mind, and so it is called wholesome; the (root) defilements: because its very substance is reckoned within the "root defilements," and so it is called the defilements; the secondary defilements: because it is merely the branch-and-tip flowing out from the root defilements (the outflow-nature), and so it is called the secondary defilements; the indeterminate: because among wholesome, defiled, and the rest it is not fixed (now following the wholesome, now following the evil, unable to settle), and so it is called the indeterminate.

The Yogācāra treatise, however, reckons these "six great classes" as merged into "five great classes" — for the defilements and the secondary defilements are both defiled, and so it simply merges them into "one defiled class" (and thus the six become five).

3. The differentiation of the five by the four "all"

Next, by this measuring-stick of "the four 'all,'" the differences of these five great classes are sorted out. Which four "all"? Just whether or not [the class] runs through "four sides": first, whether it runs through "all nature" (does it go through all three natures, wholesome, evil, indeterminate?); second, whether it runs through "all stage" (does it go through all the three realms and nine stages?); third, whether it runs through "all time" (is it present at any time?); fourth, whether it runs through "all concurrence" (can it arise together with any mind?). Take these four sticks to measure the five great classes: the omnipresent — runs through all four "all" (every one complete); the object-specific — runs only through the first two (runs through all-nature, runs through all-stage; the latter two it does not); the wholesome — runs through only one (only all-stage); the defiled (that is, the class of the defilements and the secondary defilements) — runs through not one of the four; the indeterminate — runs through only one (only all-nature). By one measuring with these four sticks, the difference of kind among the five great classes is told clear.

4. Concurrence with the three feelings · the sense of the three feelings

These six evolving consciousnesses (the first six consciousnesses) change very easily, unable to settle ("slipping easily" being changing-and-altering), and so they may all go together with "the three kinds of feeling." Why can they all go together? Because these six consciousnesses all take in (receive, sense) the three kinds of object-mark "agreeable, contrary, not-of-the-two" — that is, the one that goes with me, the one that goes against me, and the one neither-going-with-nor-against. One by one: taking in the object that goes with me, and feeling body-and-mind fitted and gladdened, is called "pleasant feeling"; taking in the object that goes against me, and feeling body-and-mind pressed and oppressed, is called "painful feeling"; taking in that neither-with-nor-against, middling (middling-bearable) object, with neither pressing nor gladdening in body or in mind, is called "neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling" (that is, equanimity feeling).

5. The three feelings unfolded into two / three / four / five

These three kinds of feeling may also each be split again into two: the one that goes with the first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) is called "body-feeling" (because it additionally leans on the body-faculty); the one that goes with the mind-consciousness is called "mind-feeling" (because it leans on the mind alone). Again, these three feelings all run through "outflowing" (still within defilement) and "unoutflowing" (already out of defilement) — even painful feeling can be one that arises within the unoutflowing (for instance, the kind of compassion-pain a bodhisattva raises on seeing sentient beings suffer is just such an unoutflowing painful feeling).

They may also each be split into three: one set is sorted by "what severs it" — that severed only on the path of seeing (severed-by-seeing), that severed only on the path of cultivation (severed-by-cultivation), and that needing no severing at all (not-to-be-severed); another set is sorted by the stages of training-realization — the one still in training (training), the one whose training is complete (no-more-training), and the one in neither of these two (not-of-the-two, that is, neither-training-nor-no-more-training).

They may also be sorted together into four: the wholesome, the unwholesome, the obscured-indeterminate, and the unobscured-indeterminate — these last two are both "indeterminate feeling" (the class neither-wholesome-nor-evil), only one carries a veil (obscured) and one carries no veil (unobscured).

〔Fork on splitting the three feelings into four · a divergent account〕 One account: these three kinds of feeling may each be split into four (wholesome, unwholesome, obscured, unobscured). Why say so? Because two sorts of "spontaneous defilement" (defilements not deliberately raised, but coming up of themselves, naturally) are of indeterminate nature: one is the "spontaneous greed, spontaneous delusion" that comes up together with the first five consciousnesses; the other is those spontaneous defilements within the pure painful destiny (the hells) — these defilements, so long as they "set no [new] karma going" (do not drive the fashioning of new karma), are of indeterminate nature, and may all go together with the painful faculty. Two treatises witness to this. The Yogācāra treatise says: "Whatever defilements come up spontaneously can all be found in present operation within the three feelings; of these, the kind that runs through all the consciousnesses (present in all six) goes with all the faculties (the five feeling-faculties of pleasure, joy, grief, pain, equanimity); the kind that does not run through all the consciousnesses goes with all the faculties only in the one stage of the mind-consciousness." The Vyākhyā treatise (the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā) says: "Within the desire-realm, a spontaneous defilement, if it drives an evil deed, then becomes unwholesome; the rest (those that drive no evil deed) are all obscured-indeterminate." By these two passages it is known: the three feelings can indeed each hold four (wholesome, unwholesome, obscured, unobscured).

They may also be sorted together into five: pain, pleasure, grief, joy, equanimity. There were originally only three feelings — why here do they become five? Because the "pain" and "pleasure" among the three feelings are each split into two (pleasure split into "pleasure" and "joy," pain split into "pain" and "grief"), and the reasons for the splitting are three: first, the pressing-and-gladdening on the body and the pressing-and-gladdening on the mind are by nature different marks (the marks of body-feeling and mind-feeling differ); second, body-feeling is without discrimination, mind-feeling is with discrimination (one carries no conceiving, one carries conceiving); third, body-feeling is especially gross-and-heavy, mind-feeling rather slight, a difference of weight. As for why "neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling" (equanimity feeling) is not split into two, there are likewise three reasons: first, being neither pressing nor gladdening, its "neither-pressing-nor-gladdening" mark in body and in mind has no two-ness about it; second, it carries no discrimination; third, it turns calmly and evenly, all of a piece (with no gross-fine split of body and mind), and so there is no need to break it into two.

6. Matching pleasure and joy to the stages

First, whether the various "fitting-and-gladdening feelings" (the feelings that make one comfortable) are called pleasure or joy depends on which consciousness they go with and in which stage. The kind going with the first five consciousnesses is, without exception, called "pleasure." The kind going with the mind-consciousness must be sorted further by stage: if it is in the desire-realm, or in the access-concentration of the first or second meditative absorption (the stretch nearing the basic absorption, not yet reached), it is called "joy" (because at this point it has gladdened only the mind, not yet reached the body); if it is in the basic absorption of the first or second meditative absorption, then both names "pleasure" and "joy" apply (because at this point it has gladdened both body and mind); if it is in the access or basic absorption of the third meditative absorption, then again only "pleasure" (because at this point it is calm and still, especially deep, already carrying no discrimination, and so is called pleasure, not joy).

7. Matching pain and grief to the consciousnesses (the dispute over the hells' grief and pain)

Next, whether the various "pressing-and-oppressing feelings" (the feelings that make one suffer) are called pain or grief. The kind going with the first five consciousnesses is, without exception, called "pain." As for that pressing-and-oppressing feeling going with the mind-consciousness, what it should be called — here there are two accounts below. 〔The pressing-feeling concurrent with the mind-consciousness · divergent account one · only grief〕 The first account says: the kind going with the mind-consciousness can only be called "grief" (because what it presses is the mind, not the body). The reason: the several holy teachings all say "the painful feeling in the stage of the mind (the dejected feeling) is called the grief-faculty"; the Yogācāra treatise also says "the sentient beings born in the hells, their maturation-fruit arising one upon another without a break, pain-feeling and grief-feeling continuing unbroken," and again says "in the hells, applied thought and sustained thought both go together with grief; a part of the hungry-ghost destiny and the animal destiny are likewise." This account then reasons: in the hells even that especially deep dejected feeling is still called only "grief" — how much more so the lighter ones (they should the more be called grief)?

〔Divergent account two · running through both (grief and pain)〕 The second account says: the pressing feeling going with the mind-consciousness runs through both "grief" and "pain," depending on which destiny one is in. In the human and heavenly [destinies] it is, without exception, called "grief" (because it does not reach the especially-deep degree); in the animal and hungry-ghost destinies, both "grief" and "pain" may be said (because there some have a "mixed feeling" laced with pleasure, some a pure painful feeling, the weights uneven); in the hells (Naraka) only "pain" is said (because that is a pure feeling, especially deep, carrying no discrimination). This account too cites a treatise as witness. The Yogācāra treatise says "whatever defilements come up spontaneously can all be found in present operation within the three feelings" (spoken out at length as in the passage above); and again says "the view-of-self-in-the-aggregates (satkāya-dṛṣṭi, that view which grasps body-and-mind into a 'self') born together [with one] is of indeterminate nature only" — then the extreme-grasping view (the view that grasps annihilation, that grasps eternity) linked to it should likewise be of indeterminate [nature]. Here is a key inference: since the view-of-self-in-the-aggregates is indeterminate, the painful feeling arising together with it cannot be reckoned "the grief-faculty" — for the Treatise plainly says "the grief-faculty is not indeterminate" (the grief-faculty being of obscured nature), and since this born-together view is indeterminate only, the painful feeling going with it cannot be the grief-faculty, but can only be the painful faculty. (This precisely shows that the mind-consciousness too has painful feeling, not only grief.)

The second account next goes on to nail down the matter that "in the hells there is only pain, no grief." The Yogācāra says: "Among the various faculties in the hells, the remaining three — their present operation definitely cannot be established." (The pure-painful hungry-ghost and animal [destinies] are likewise.) This "remaining three (the remaining three)" must mean the pleasure-faculty, the joy-faculty, and the grief-faculty — for in the hells the present operation of "equanimity" is definitely established (the equanimity-faculty is established, and so equanimity is not among the "remaining three"; what is ruled out is precisely pleasure, joy, grief). Here someone presses a challenge. 〔Q〕 Is it not so that "occasional equanimity" (the kind of equanimity that arises now and then, not lasting) likewise cannot be established in the hells (how can you then say equanimity is established)? 〔A〕 (The second account presses back) How do you know that the treatise-passage speaks of "occasional feeling" (a feeling that arises now and then) alone? Were that passage speaking only of occasional feeling, it ought not to say the hells "definitely establish the mind-faculty" (lastingly establish it) — for those six "occasional consciousnesses" (the six consciousnesses that arise only now and then) are sometimes simply not there (the occasional consciousnesses are not always present); so the treatise-passage cannot be read as speaking of occasional feeling alone — it is in fact spoken running through "the lasting establishment of the mind-faculty," and there is no other reason that would let one cut it forcibly into the two halves "occasional feeling" and "lasting feeling." (Since the mind-faculty is lastingly established, the equanimity spoken of in the same passage is also lastingly established, not a fleeting occasional equanimity.)

Press one step further: were that treatise-passage spoken in terms of "occasional feeling" (a fleeting feeling), how could it go on to say the hells "definitely establish eight faculties" (lastingly establish eight)? (How could a fleeting thing be lastingly established?) 〔A turn of reckoning〕 The opponent changes his account: in the hells the first five consciousnesses do not connect up, breaking off in fits, so the lastingly-established "eighth faculty" must be the "grief-faculty" (using the grief-faculty to fill out the eighth). 〔Refutation〕 But at the very moment of dying, the very moment of being just reborn, and at the time of swooning into a dead faint — where is there a grief-faculty (grief being a feeling-with-discrimination in the stage of the mind, and these three states all lacking the mind-consciousness's discrimination, naturally have no grief-faculty, so the grief-faculty is not lastingly established)? 〔Yet another reckoning〕 And there are those who instead grasp the "painful faculty" as the eighth faculty — refuted by the very same reasoning (dying, being born, swooning, these three states equally lacking the lasting establishment of the painful faculty).

〔Yet another reckoning〕 Again there are those who instead grasp "a single sex-organ (the male or female organ)" as the eighth faculty — this too does not work, for the sex-organ is not fixedly there (the hells are summoned by evil karma, and there may be among them those with no sex-organ). First reckon the lastingly-established faculties in the hells: the hell-beings, by evil karma, have their five faculty-gates constantly receiving pain, and so definitely establish the five form-faculties, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, with the painful faculty, the life-faculty, and the mind-faculty added — that is already seven faculties. 〔Counter-question〕 What use, then, is it to insist that "there must still be one sex-organ" to fill out the eighth? In the great hell of no-interval there simply cannot be such a thing as craving for sexual acts (since there is no such need, the sex-organ is not that lastingly-established eighth faculty). Once these are ruled out one by one, the lastingly-established eighth faculty must be the "equanimity-faculty" — for the seventh and eighth consciousnesses constantly go together with equanimity feeling (these two consciousnesses keep turning even in the hells, so the equanimity-faculty is lastingly established, and this is the eighth faculty).

Set the two extremes side by side and it grows clearer. In "the place of utmost pleasure" (the third meditative absorption) the gladdening in the stage of the mind is called only "pleasure," with no joy-faculty (pure pleasure, no joy); by the same principle, in "the place of utmost pain" (the hells) the pressing in the stage of the mind is called only "pain," with no grief-faculty (pure pain, no grief). So the "remaining three (remaining three)" that the Yogācāra spoke of above must mean the three feeling-faculties grief, joy, pleasure (the hells establishing not these three, lastingly establishing only the equanimity-faculty). As for other places saying the hells "have outflow-pleasure" (a pleasure that flows out), one should know that is spoken in terms of the "principle-of-following" (going along, for the moment, with another school's account, not the ultimate teaching); or else it is spoken running through "it is the other places laced with pleasure (not the hells) that have no maturation-pleasure, and so are called pure-pain" — it is not that there is really pleasure in the hells.

Then how do the holy teachings cited by the first account above, saying "the dejected feeling in the stage of the mind is called the grief-faculty," reconcile [with this]? One must know: that is spoken in terms of "the most part" (the majority of cases), or in terms of the "gate-of-following" (going along, for the moment, with another school's account), and so does not clash with this [teaching] (the hells being pure-pain, without grief). Likewise, the Yogācāra treatise's "the sentient beings born in the hells, their maturation-fruit arising one upon another without a break, pain-feeling and grief-feeling continuing unbroken," and its "in the hells applied thought and sustained thought go together with grief, a part of the hungry-ghost destiny and the animal destiny likewise" — these words too are all spoken in terms of the gate-of-following (not the definitive, ultimate account).

Then how is it that the holy teachings call this feeling in the stage of the mind "grief"? There are two ways of reading it. One: the "painful faculty" going with the mind-consciousness counts as "of the same class as grief," and so it borrows the name "grief" (though it is really the painful faculty). The other: that painful faculty harms both body and mind, and so, though its substance is the painful faculty, it is also called "grief" by extension — just as "access-joy" (the joy in the access-concentration) benefits both body and mind, and so, though its substance is the joy-faculty, it is also called "pleasure" by extension (both cases being "one substance, one borrowed name"). This principle the Prakaraṇāryavāca and like treatises set out in full. There is also a point to add in passing: in "the not-yet-reached stage" (the access-concentration before the first meditative absorption) there is definitely no pleasure-faculty (for the Treatise says that stage has only eleven faculties, and counting them up there is no pleasure-faculty). Putting these together, one should know: "the dejected feeling in the stage of the mind" and "the place of pure-pain feeling" (the hells) are in fact both reckoned under "the painful faculty" (not under the grief-faculty).

This sort of holy teaching has yet many more ways of sorting; for fear the text should drag on longer and longer, it is not set out item by item.

8. Whether the six consciousnesses' three feelings are concurrent or not (the dispute)

〔The six consciousnesses' three feelings · divergent account one · not concurrent〕 The first account says: the three feelings of the six consciousnesses do not arise at once (in one and the same instant there is not at once pleasure, pain, and equanimity). Why? Because the six consciousnesses all "turn toward the outer gate" (reach outward to grasp objects), and pleasure, pain, equanimity in turn mutually contradict (cannot stand together). Add a further reason: the "five-concurrent mind-consciousness" arising together with the five consciousnesses refers to the same object as the five; were the five consciousnesses able to raise three feelings at once, the mind-consciousness ought to raise three feelings along with them at once — but this contradicts right principle, and so it is settled that the six consciousnesses' three feelings definitely are not concurrent. As for the Yogācāra and like treatises' saying "the store-consciousness at one time goes together with the evolving consciousnesses, the three feelings arising at once," that is spoken running through "several instants (several thoughts)" linked together (just as when we say "one mind," it too is in fact not a single arising-and-ceasing but many instants), and so does not clash with "the three feelings are not concurrent."

〔The correct view · the three feelings may be concurrent〕 The second account says (this is the correct account): the three feelings of the six consciousnesses may arise at once. The reason: the three kinds of object, agreeable, contrary, middling, may be set before one all at once, and so the three feelings too may be taken in at once; moreover the feeling of that five-concurrent mind-consciousness need not be the same as the feeling of the five consciousnesses (when the five consciousnesses feel pain, the mind-consciousness need not feel pain too); and if the mind-consciousness "stares fixedly" at one particular object (fixed attention), it raises that one feeling alone, while if it stares fixedly at none in particular (no fixed attention), it raises equanimity feeling. By these several points, one knows the six consciousnesses' three feelings can be concurrent. But upon reaching "the stage of attained mastery" (Buddhahood) only the three feelings pleasure, joy, equanimity remain — for the Buddhas have already severed the things that would give rise to "grief and pain." The six classes of mental factors having been roughly marked out above, their several distinguishing marks should now be set out at length. First ask: the first class (the omnipresent) and the second class (the object-specific) — what are their marks? The verse answers (v10).

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C. The First Class · The Five Omnipresent (v10)

1. The scriptural proof and rational proof of the omnipresent

The treatise says: among the six great classes of mental factors, the first is "the omnipresent mental factors" (the mental factors present in every mind), namely the five — contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition (set out at length above). How is this "omnipresent" mark to be known? It must be settled by leaning on two things as the standard: one is "scripture" (the holy teaching, the sūtras the Buddha spoke), the other is "reason" (right principle, inference on the side of reasoning).

First, the side of "scripture." The sūtra puts it thus: "Taking the eye-faculty and the form-object as conditions, eye-consciousness is given rise to; once the three — eye-faculty, form-object, eye-consciousness — come together (the three coming-together), there is 'contact'; and arising together with 'contact' there are further feeling, conception, volition" (a long stretch follows). On the strength of this sūtra, one knows that "contact," together with feeling, conception, volition — these four — are all omnipresent (whatever mind arises, they arise along with it).

And what of "attention"? There is also a sūtra to witness for it. One sūtra says "only when the faculty is unimpaired, and the object is present before one, and 'attention' moreover rightly arises — only then can consciousness be given rise to" (without attention, consciousness cannot be given rise to). Another sūtra again says "where there is attention, there is cognizing; where there is cognizing, there is attention" — one sees that attention and consciousness, these two, are matched together all the while (a stretch follows here too). On the strength of these, one knows that "attention" too is omnipresent. The plain words of this sort of holy teaching are not one alone (everywhere they are found) — the proof is as solid as a mountain.

Next, the side of "reason," pressing the mental factors through one by one. First press "contact": the moment a consciousness arises, there must be "the three coming-together" (the three — faculty, object, consciousness — gathering into one place); the three coming-together must give rise to "contact," and conversely the three coming-together too must rely on "contact" before they can gather (contact has the function of drawing the three coming-together into one place). Were there no contact, then the mind-king and mental factors could not gather into one place, could not meet upon the same object (the very function of contact being to make mind and mental factors meet upon one and the same object) — and so contact is omnipresent (whenever a mind arises, there is contact).

Next press "attention": attention's function is to draw the mind along, to make it head toward the very object it ought to refer to. Were there no attention, then the mind simply could not arise at all (with nothing to draw it, it could not be given rise to) — and so attention is omnipresent.

Next press "feeling": feeling's function is to take in the three kinds of object, agreeable, contrary, middling, making the mind raise the look of gladness, dejection, or evenness (gladness, dejection, equanimity). There is no mind that arises yet carries not even one of these three feelings — and so feeling is omnipresent.

Next press "conception": conception's function is to set up the "bounds" of the object it itself refers to (that is, its limits, its outline, what shape it is — drawing it a range, setting it a name). Were there no such conception at the time the mind arises, then one could not grasp the bounds-mark of the object (could not tell what it is) — and so conception is omnipresent.

Next press "volition": volition's function is to make the mind grasp the mark of "which direction it should head toward (the right course and the rest)," and then go on to fashion the various deeds, wholesome and evil (volition being just that force which makes the mind stir into action and do). There is no mind that arises yet has not even this volition — and so wherever a mind arises there must be volition. Pressing the five above through one by one proves it: contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition — these five are surely all present the moment a mind arises, and so they are "the omnipresent." As for why the rest (the class of the object-specific and so on) are not omnipresent, that is left for later.

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D. The Second Class · The Five Object-Specific (v10)

Next comes the second class, "the object-specific." It takes in the five from "desire" all the way to "wisdom" (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom). Why are they called "object-specific"? Because the objects these five each refer to are, for the most part, each different (each refers to its own, not, like the omnipresent, referring to everything alike). Among the six great classes of mental factors, it is expounded next after "the first class (the omnipresent)," and so is the second class.

1. Desire

What is "desire"? Facing "the wished-for object (the wished-for object)," its nature is "wish" (hoping for, wanting), and its function is "being that on which exertion rests" (one must first have a wanting mind before one will put strength into the doing).

What this "wished-for (the wished-for object)" points to, the accounts below differ. 〔On the reading of "the wished-for" · divergent account one · the delighting object〕 The first account says: "the wished-for" just means "the delighting object" (the object that gladdens one, that one wants to draw near) — for facing a delighting thing, one wants to see it, wants to hear it, and there is a hoping in the heart. 〔Q〕 Someone challenges: but facing a hateful thing, one hopes "not to be joined with it," hopes "to be parted from it" — is this not also a kind of desire (how can you say a hateful thing carries no desire)? 〔A〕 This account answers: what one is really seeking there is "the delighting itself (the ease that comes after being free of the hateful)" got at "the time of being parted from it, no longer stuck to it" — it is not really a desire raised toward "the hateful thing itself." So one says: toward "the hateful" and toward "the middling, neither-hateful-nor-pleasing" object, there is never any desire; and even facing a delighting thing, if no hope is raised in the heart, there is likewise no desire raised.

〔Divergent account two · the sought object〕 The second account says: "the wished-for" just means "the sought object" (whatever object one has some seeking toward) — for whether toward a delighting thing or a hateful thing, one raises a hoping: toward the delighting one seeks "to be joined with it," toward the hateful one seeks "to be parted from it," and both carry a hoping. On this account, then, it is only toward the "middling, neither-hateful-nor-pleasing" object that there is never any desire; and facing delighting and hateful things, if no thought of seeking is raised in the heart, there is likewise no desire raised.

〔Divergent account three · the to-be-contemplated object〕 The third account says: "the wished-for" just means "the to-be-contemplated object" (the object one wants to go and contemplate) — for toward any single thing, the moment one stirs the thought "I want to go and look it over, examine it," there is a hoping. Turn it around: if one does not want to go and contemplate, but merely follows the prior cause, follows the momentum of the present object, referring to it of itself (spontaneously), then there is not a trace of desire. By this line of reasoning one sees: "desire is not omnipresent" (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over desire being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is yet another account that one-sidedly holds desire to be omnipresent: they say, only by the strength of "hoping for that object (hoping for the object)" can the various minds and mental factors grasp the object they refer to, and so the sūtra says "desire is the root of all dharmas" — which would show desire to be omnipresent. The refutation: this is wrong — the mind grasps its object by means of "attention" (the several holy teachings all say that the moment attention comes to the fore it can give rise to consciousness); nowhere has it ever been said that "it is by desire that mind and mental factors are given rise to." Take a comparison: the sūtra has also said "the dharmas have craving for their root" — does that mean every mind and mental factor is given rise to by craving (of course not)? So the sūtra's "desire is the root of all dharmas" means "all the deeds and works that desire sets going" (it says that to do a thing one must first have a mind to do it — not that desire can give rise to the several minds); or else it means "good desire (wholesome desire) can set right exertion going" — for by this wholesome desire helping all wholesome deeds get done, the Treatise says desire's function is "being that on which exertion rests (being that on which exertion rests)."

2. Resolve

What is "resolve"? Facing "the already-determined object (the determined object)," its nature is "stamping-and-holding" (fixing it down and biting onto it like setting a seal, not letting go), and its function is "cannot be drawn off, cannot be turned away (being undivertible)" — that is, by the strength of "teaching (heard), reason (thought through), realization (seen for oneself)," whether wrong or right, a person bites firmly onto the object he has taken, so that thereafter no other factor coming at it can shake or wrench it. So toward "an object still in doubt, not yet settled (the doubtful object)" there is no resolve at all; and toward a mind not yet bitten firm, still hazy, there is no resolve either. From this one knows: resolve is not reckoned omnipresent (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over resolve being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is an account that one-sidedly holds resolve to be omnipresent: they say, when the mind grasps its own object it meets no holding-back, runs through unhindered, and this "unhindered" is just resolve, so every mind has resolve. The refutation: this is unreasoning. Why? Take apart this matter of "unhindered": the "one that can refrain from hindering it (the one that does not hinder)" is in fact the various object-dharmas (the object never hinders the mind); the "one let through, not hindered (the one not hindered)" is in fact the mind and the rest (the mind was never hindered); the "one that mightily sets [the mind] going to head toward the object (the one that sets it going)" is in fact the faculty and attention (the strength driving the mind to rush toward the object is the strength of faculty and attention) — and among these three there is simply no turn for resolve. Furthermore, if you insist "it is by resolve that the mind is so mightily set going," then this resolve must itself rely on something else to be set going, and that on yet another… relying on and on without end, you fall into the fault of "the endless regress."

3. Mindfulness

What is "mindfulness"? Facing "the object once experienced before (the once-practiced object)," its nature is to make the mind "record it clearly, not forget it (clear recording, not forgetting)," and its function is "being that on which concentration rests" — that is, by recording firm, again and again, the object once experienced, and not letting it slip away, one can then draw concentration forth (the mind must first hold fast to a familiar object before it can settle). Toward "what has never been experienced at all," whether the thing itself or its kind, no mindfulness can be raised (what has not been gone through cannot be recalled); and even what was experienced before, if it can no longer be recorded clearly, no mindfulness arises either. So mindfulness is surely not reckoned omnipresent (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over mindfulness being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is an account that one-sidedly holds mindfulness to be omnipresent: they say, the moment a mind arises there must be mindfulness along with it, for later one can recall (later recollection), which would show that within that earlier mind there must have been mindfulness, so mindfulness ought to be omnipresent. The refutation: this is unreasoning. 〔A counter-instance〕 A counter-instance refutes it: you cannot, because "later there came delusion, came faith," reason backward that "within that earlier mind there must also have been delusion, have been faith" (what is present later does not prove it was present earlier) — by the same token, that one can recall later does not prove there must have been mindfulness within that earlier mind. Moreover, the mind and mental factors of the prior instant, or just the lingering momentum of that earlier "conception," already suffice to serve as the cause of "later recollection" (there need not have been a prior mindfulness at all).

4. Concentration

What is "concentration"? Facing "the object to be contemplated (the contemplated object)," its nature is to make the mind "concentrate single-mindedly, not scatter (concentrating, not scattering)," and its function is "being that on which wisdom rests" — that is, when one contemplates the objects of "merit, fault, neither of the two (merit, fault, neither)," concentration gathers the mind together and keeps it from scattering, and following on this concentration there is then born that "wisdom" which can judge and discern (the mind must first grow still before it can see through).

The phrase "the mind concentrates single-mindedly" is meant to show that "wherever one wishes to abide, there one can abide," not that concentration can only stare dead at "one single object" — for were it not so, then on the path of seeing, contemplating the four truths, pain, origin, cessation, path, one after another, the object referred to before and after changing one for the next, there would surely be no "even-holding" (that is, concentration) (when in fact there is concentration all the same). Turn it around: if the mind is not gathered, not at that very point of concentrating, then concentration does not arise, and so concentration is not omnipresent (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over concentration being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is an account that one-sidedly holds concentration to be omnipresent: they say, even at a scattered time there is concentration arising, only its mark is very faint, hard to make out (so concentration ought to be omnipresent). 〔A〕 One should speak the honest truth, not strain to prop it up. Below he shifts to three accounts to rescue it, refuted one by one — 〔A turn of reckoning, one〕 if he says "concentration can make mind-king and mental factors gather into one place and head together toward one and the same object, and so is omnipresent" — this too is wrong, for that knack of gathering the mind into one place is the function of "contact" (not of concentration). 〔A turn of reckoning, two〕 if he says "this concentration can keep the mind, in an instant, from changing its object (not turning its referring), and so counts as omnipresent" — this too does not get through, for the mind of a single instant, facing its object, simply has no such matter as "changing" (turning its referring): a single instant is too brief, there is no time to change at all, and no need for concentration to manage it. 〔A turn of reckoning, three〕 if he says "it is by concentration that the mind grasps its object, and so it counts as omnipresent" — this too is without reason: the one that makes the mind grasp its object is "attention" (not concentration).

〔The dispute that concentration just is the mind · the refutation〕 There is again an account that says: the very substance of concentration just is "the mind" itself (not a separate mental factor) — their ground being that the sūtra has spoken of "concentration as 'the training of mind,'" and has spoken of concentration as "the mind's one-pointedness-on-an-object (the mind one upon an object)." 〔Refutation〕 The refutation: these two phrases cannot prove "concentration just is the mind." That the sūtra speaks so is because "it is by leaning on concentration that the mind is gathered, made to be one upon an object" that it is put thus (it says concentration can manage the mind — not that concentration just equals the mind). Moreover, concentration is reckoned within the items "concentration-faculty, concentration-power, concentration-awakening-factor, right-concentration (the path-limb)," just like mindfulness, wisdom, and the rest (all mental factors, not the mind-king) — which shows it is not the mind itself at all.

5. Wisdom

What is "wisdom"? Facing "the object to be contemplated (the contemplated object)," its nature is "discerning" (sifting, telling apart, judging), and its function is "severing doubt" (cutting through perplexity and settling it down) — that is, when one contemplates the objects "merit, fault, neither of the two," it is by wisdom going to probe and seek that one at last comes to a settled judgment. As for that kind of "object not contemplated at all (the not-contemplated object)," in a mind dim and dull, there is no sifting and telling apart going on, and so wisdom is not reckoned omnipresent (it is not that every mind has it).

〔The dispute over wisdom being omnipresent · the refutation〕 There is an account that one-sidedly holds wisdom to be omnipresent: they say, even at a dim-and-dull time there is wisdom arising, only the mark is very faint, not to be made out (so wisdom ought to be omnipresent). 〔Refutation〕 The refutation: how do you "Heaven-beloveds" (this is a sarcasm, as good as saying "you Heaven-pity-them fools") know it (when it cannot be made out at all, on what ground do you say it is there)? 〔A turn of reckoning〕 You may perhaps haul out the Abhidharma's having said wisdom is a "great-stage dharma (a dharma pervading every mind)" to prop yourself up — 〔A〕 but the Abhidharma of the several schools do not match up with one another, contradicting each other; on what ground, then, do you take it as a standard? What truly can be the standard is scripture: scripture says only "the five, contact and the rest," are omnipresent; as for the account "the great-stage dharmas number ten," it does not come from scripture, and ought not to be clung to. Furthermore, since "the five, desire and the rest (the object-specific)," are not of the band of "the five, contact and the rest," they are surely not omnipresent — by the very same principle as faith, greed, and the rest (faith and greed too being not omnipresent).

6. The mutual support of the five object-specific and the arising-phrases (the dispute · thirty-one phrases)

When these five object-specific (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) arise, whether they must gather all together or may arise singly, two accounts follow below. 〔The mutual support of the object-specific · divergent account one · they definitely support one another〕 The first account says: these five definitely prop and help one another, not one to be missing — the moment any one of them arises, the other four are surely there along with it.

〔The correct view · unfixed (need not be concurrent)〕 The second account says (this is the correct account): unfixed (they need not gather all together). The reasons are two. First, the Yogācāra says that among the "four 'all'" the object-specific lack the latter two (all-time, all-concurrence) — and since they lack "all-concurrence," it shows they need not all arise at once. Second, the Yogācāra again says these five arise on referring each to "one of the four objects" (the wished-for, the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated), and the object referred to and the referring mental factor need not necessarily come together at once (each refers to its own object, each arises in its own time).

It should be put thus: of these five, sometimes only "one arises." For instance: facing the wished-for object, one raises "wish" alone (that is, raises desire alone); or facing the determined object, one raises "biting-firm (stamping-resolve)" alone (raises resolve alone); or facing the once-practiced object, one raises "holding-in-record (recollection)" alone (raises mindfulness alone); or facing the to-be-contemplated object, one raises "concentrating" alone (raises concentration alone).

〔Here is explained "how it can be that, facing the to-be-contemplated object, one raises concentration alone and not wisdom"〕 There is a dim-and-dull sort who, to still a scattered mind, can indeed stare at an object (having concentration) but cannot tell good from bad (having no wisdom) — everyone knows this sort to be "with concentration, without wisdom." Such a one, in the stage of preparatory practice (the stage of effort), still carries a little hearing and thinking, and so one says he "even-holds, referring to a to-be-contemplated object" (granting him, just barely, to be contemplating); or else this is spoken loosely in terms of "the most part." Again, take the "play-and-forget gods" (the sort of god who, sunk in play, grows so glad as to forget himself), who stare fixedly at one object in play yet raise greed, anger, and the rest — this too is "with concentration, without wisdom"; of this sort there are, in truth, very many.

Or, the other way round, facing the to-be-contemplated object one raises "discerning" alone (that is, raises wisdom alone) — this is when the mind does not concentrate but, scattering this way and that, goes to probe and seek (with wisdom, without concentration).

Sometimes "two arise." For instance: facing the two objects "the wished-for, the determined," one raises desire and resolve; or facing the two objects "the wished-for, the once-practiced," one raises desire and mindfulness… and so on down the pairings, all the way to facing the to-be-contemplated object and raising concentration and wisdom — count up all the two-by-two pairings and there are twelve in all (twelve phrases).

Sometimes "three arise." For instance: facing the three objects "the wished-for, the determined, the once-practiced," one raises desire, resolve, mindfulness; and so on down the triplings, all the way to facing "the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated" and raising mindfulness, concentration, wisdom — count up all the three-by-three triplings and there are thirteen in all (thirteen phrases).

Sometimes "four arise." For instance: facing the four objects "the wished-for, the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated," one raises the front four (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration); and so on down the line, all the way to (this time desire being missing) facing such objects as "the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated" and raising the back four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) — of this "four-in-a-group" case there are in all "five fours" (five kinds, each raising four).

Sometimes "five arise": facing these four objects, "the wished-for, the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated," all five (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) arise. Thus, raising desire and the [other] five upon these "four objects," counting together all the cases of raising one, raising two, raising three, raising four, raising five (the singly-counted and the combined), there are in all "thirty-one (thirty-one phrases)."

There are also some occasions of mind where these five "do not arise at all." For instance: when what is met is not those "four objects" (neither the wished-for, nor the determined, the once-practiced, the to-be-contemplated), the "sudden-falling mind" that flares up of an instant the moment one makes contact (the abrupt, just-arisen mind, before there is time to think it over); and again, the kind of mind arising together with the store-consciousness (the eighth) — of this sort, too, there is more than one [occasion].

7. The presence or absence of the five object-specific in the several consciousnesses

These five object-specific — in which consciousnesses they are present and in which not — must be sorted out separately. In the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, these five are, following the differing stages, now present, now absent (set out above). In the sixth mind-consciousness, at every stage they may arise together with these five — for whether "after transformation-of-the-basis" or "not yet transformed," neither blocks these five (the sixth being the most lively, able to muster them at any time).

Then do the first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) have these five object-specific or not? Two accounts below. 〔Whether the five consciousnesses have the object-specific · divergent account one · all absent〕 The first account says: in the first five consciousnesses these five are all absent, said one by one with the reasons — the five consciousnesses refer to "the object already in hand right now (the already-gotten object)," with no need to hope, and so have no desire; the five consciousnesses do not go to settle carefully, and so have no biting-firm stamping-and-holding, no resolve; the five consciousnesses always grasp "the new object before them," not turning back to recall, and so have no mindfulness; the five consciousnesses are by nature scattering-and-stirring, unable to hold still, and so have no concentration; the five consciousnesses do not go to probe and weigh, and so have no sifting-and-telling-apart, no wisdom.

〔The correct view · they may have these five〕 The second account says (this is the correct account): in the first five consciousnesses these five may in fact be present, only all of them faint. Said one by one — toward the object the five consciousnesses, though they have no strong "hope (heightened hope)," still have a faint flavor of "wanting this object (the pleasing object)," and so have desire; toward the object, though they have no strong "settling (heightened settling)," they still have a faint flavor of "biting onto this object (the stamped object)," and so have resolve; though they cannot record clearly the once-familiar object itself, they still have a faint flavor of "an impression of this kind of object (the minded object)," and so have mindfulness; though they do not deliberately tie the mind to one object, they still have a faint flavor of "concentrating," and so have concentration — what the first account above spoke of, "the five consciousnesses are by nature scattering-and-stirring," is meant to block out "the even-drawing (the deep concentration drawn forth from the concentration-stages)," not to block out "the even-holding (ordinary concentrating)," and so the five consciousnesses may have concentration; though toward the object they do not go to probe and weigh, they still have a faint flavor of "telling-apart (discerning)," and so have wisdom.

Just for this, the holy teaching says "the eye-power and ear-power are that wisdom-nature which goes with the eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness" (this proves that there is wisdom in the five consciousnesses). The other three consciousnesses (nose, tongue, body), reasoned out by this principle, may be said to have wisdom too, with nothing amiss in it.

One must also sort it out by stage. In "the stage not yet at mastery" (that is, the stage of the ordinary being), these five in the five consciousnesses may still be absent at times; but upon reaching "the time of attained mastery" (Buddhahood), these five are surely all present, said one by one with the reasons — the Buddha delights to contemplate the several objects, and so "desire" is not lacking; the Buddha's resolve in biting onto an object is ever full, and so "resolve" is not lacking; the Buddha can hold in record what was experienced before, and so "mindfulness" is not lacking; moreover the Buddha's five consciousnesses can refer to the three times, past, present, and future (this too must lean on mindfulness), and so there is mindfulness; the Tathāgata has no mind that fails to settle (never scattered), and so there is "concentration"; the Buddha's five consciousnesses all carry "the duty-doing wisdom (that is, the all-accomplishing wisdom)," and so there is "wisdom."

8. The feeling-concurrence of the five object-specific (the dispute)

With which feelings do these five object-specific go together? Two accounts below. 〔Divergent account one〕 The first account says: "desire" goes with three feelings (only grief-feeling and painful-feeling must be left out, for the grief and painful objects are hateful, not "the wished-for," and so desire does not go with those two); the other four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) go with four feelings, leaving out only painful-feeling — for the settling-set is not in the five consciousnesses (whereas painful-feeling happens to be in the five consciousnesses), so these four, being absent from the five consciousnesses, cannot go together with painful-feeling.

〔The correct view · they go with all five feelings〕 The second account says (this is the correct account): all five object-specific go with all five feelings. First on "desire" going with grief and pain too, there are three grounds: first, the Treatise says "toward the unsurpassed Dharma one yearns and longs, grieves and is dejected (the grief-faculty), single-mindedly seeking to realize it" — and this is desire going together with grief; second, in "the place of pure-pain feeling" (the hells), the beings single-mindedly seek release, and so in the mind there is the painful faculty (said above — this is desire going together with pain); third, the Treatise says "greed-craving goes with grief and pain," and when greed-craving arises there must be desire along with it — and this again is desire going together with grief and pain. Next on the other four: since the painful faculty can go with the mind-consciousness, what wrong is there in the settling four (resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) going with the painful faculty (being in the mind-consciousness, they match up with pain)? Moreover, when the five consciousnesses arise, there are too those faint "biting-onto-the-object (the stamped object)" and the [other] three (the principle being as said above). By all this one knows: the object-specific, desire and the rest, go with all five feelings.

These five object-specific may further be sorted from several more angles: for instance, by the three natures (wholesome, evil, indeterminate); by the three realms (desire, form, formless); by the stages of training-realization (training, no-more-training, and so on) — these are left for each to think out for himself, according to right principle.

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〔The verses expounded〕

The wholesome are: trust, shame, embarrassment; the three roots beginning with non-greed; diligence, ease, non-heedlessness; equanimity-of-formations, and non-harm. (v11) The afflictions are: greed, hatred, delusion, pride, doubt, and evil views. (v12)

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A. The Eleven Wholesome

The treatise says: only those mental factors that arise together with the "wholesome mind" are called "wholesome mental factors." Such wholesome mental factors are eleven in all: trust, shame, embarrassment, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, diligence, ease (that is, buoyant-ease), non-heedlessness, equanimity-of-formations, and non-harm.

1. Trust

What is "trust"? Facing three sorts of object, the mind comes to deeply accept it (accept-as-true), to delight in it (delight-and-liking), and to want it (hope-and-desire); its very nature is to make "the mind grow clear and clean" (mind-purifying). Its function is twofold: it counteracts "non-trust," and it makes one glad to cultivate the wholesome.

"Trust" can be divided into three sorts. The first is called trust-in-the-real — toward every dharma, whether its concrete fact or its principle, one believes and accepts from the bottom of the heart. The second is called trust-in-the-virtuous — toward the truly pure virtues of the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha), one believes and delights from the bottom of the heart. The third is called trust-in-the-capable — toward every wholesome thing, worldly and supramundane, one believes it truly has the power, that one can attain it and can accomplish it, and so a hope arises (the hope that one might do it oneself).

By these three trusts one can counteract the "non-trusting" mind, and is made glad to realize and to cultivate the wholesome, worldly and supramundane. Of the three words used above: "accepting" (deep believing-and-accepting) is in fact "resolve" (the settled, doubt-free understanding), and it is the "cause" by which trust arises; "delight-and-desire" (liking, wanting) is in fact "desire" (longing), and it is the "fruit" that trust gives rise to.

Now to pin down further just what the "own-mark" of trust is (the look that is its alone). 〔Q〕Someone asks: was it not just said that "mind-purifying is its nature"? 〔A〕Merely saying that has still not made it clear. For the two words "mind-purifying" can be taken in three ways, and each has a fault; they must be gone through one by one —

(1) If one says "the pure" just is "the mind" itself, then trust would amount to the mind-king. But trust is plainly a "mental factor," turning along with the mind-king, and is not the mind-king itself — so this reading does not get through. (2) If one says "what makes the mind pure" is enough, that is wrong too: shame, embarrassment, and those wholesome [factors] also make the mind pure, and then what would distinguish trust from shame and embarrassment? (Everyone would come out the same.) (3) If one says "mind-purifying" means "the pure dharma that arises together with the mind," the fault is the same as the one just above — it still cannot tell apart just where trust and shame and embarrassment differ.

〔A〕How, then, is it to be put positively? The substance of trust is a force that "makes [things] clarify"; it can cleanse the mind and the mental factors both. Because among these the "mind" is the chief one, one takes just the "mind" to speak of it, and calls it "mind-purifying." A comparison: it is like casting a "water-clearing gem" into turbid water — the water clears of itself; trust's action on the mind is just so. As for shame, embarrassment, and the rest, although they too are wholesome, they do not take "purity" as the look that is theirs alone; trust alone takes "purity" as its look. Drawn apart this way, trust no longer gets jumbled with shame and embarrassment, and the earlier fault of "they cannot be told apart" is gone.

Look again from the reverse side: each of the various defiled dharmas has its own different look; but "non-trust" alone is itself turbid, and it further muddies the surrounding mind and mental factors along with it — just like an utterly filthy thing, dirty itself and making others dirty too. Trust is exactly the reverse of "non-trust," and so trust takes "purity" as its look (the one turbid, the other clear — squarely opposed).

〔One view · taking "delight-and-liking" as the look of trust〕 One view holds: trust takes "delight-and-liking" (fondness) as its look. This can be refuted, on two grounds. First, "delight-and-liking" runs through all three natures — wholesome, unwholesome, and neither-wholesome-nor-unwholesome — so if trust took delight-and-liking as its look, would not trust's substance amount to "desire" (longing)? Second, the truth of suffering and the truth of its origin (the suffering of birth-and-death and the cause of suffering) are simply not things one would be fond of, so would they not then fall outside what trust takes as its object? Yet trust plainly refers to the Four Truths (it refers to suffering, origin, cessation, and path alike). So "taking delight-and-liking as the look of trust" is wrong.

〔Another view · taking "conformity" as the look of trust〕 Again, one view holds: trust takes "conformity" (going along with, complying-and-accepting) as its look. This too can be refuted. First, "conformity" likewise runs through all three natures, wholesome and unwholesome and indeterminate. Second, press further what this "conformity" points to — if it points to "fixed, confirming compliance" (confirming-conformity), that just is "resolve"; if it points to "glad compliance" (glad-conformity), that just is "desire." Apart from the two, "resolve" and "desire," there is simply no independent "conformity"-look to be found. Since both views thus fail to stand, it can be known (the correct position): the look of trust just is "mind-purifying."

2. Shame · Embarrassment

What is "shame"? It leans on two forces, "oneself" and "the true Dharma"; its very nature is "to revere the worthy and revere the wholesome" (revering-the-worthy-and-wholesome), and its function is to counteract "shamelessness" and to halt evil conduct. Said in more detail: because one prizes one's own worth and prizes the dignity of the true Dharma, one therefore reveres the worthy-and-wholesome and feels ashamed of one's own faults and evil deeds, and in this way counteracts "shamelessness" and halts every kind of evil conduct. ("Shamelessness" is doing wrong yet feeling no shame.)

What is "embarrassment"? It leans on one force, "the world" (the opinion of the many); its very nature is "to slight and to refuse the violent-and-evil" (slighting-and-refusing the violent-and-evil), and its function is to counteract "unembarrassment" and to halt evil conduct. Said in more detail: because one minds the world's blame and disgust, one therefore slights and refuses violent-and-evil conduct and feels ashamed of one's own faults and crimes, and in this way counteracts "unembarrassment" and halts every kind of evil deed. ("Unembarrassment" is doing wrong yet not fearing what people say.)

"Feeling ashamed of fault and evil" is the shared look of both shame and embarrassment (a thing both have, not the private possession of either one). And so the holy teachings will sometimes borrow just this point and provisionally call it the "substance" of shame-and-embarrassment.

〔Q · distinct-mark, first〕Suppose someone insists on taking "feeling ashamed" as the look that is distinctively each one's own (a distinct mark): a fault follows. Since both then take "feeling ashamed" as their substance, would not shame's substance and embarrassment's substance turn out exactly alike, undistinguishable? And if their substance is alike, the two dharmas would have to "definitely not concur at all" (one and the same thing does not arise alongside itself, just as "feeling" and "conception" are two different things and do not run together into one) — but this contradicts the holy teachings, for the holy teachings say shame and embarrassment do arise together.

〔Q · distinct-mark, second〕(To rescue the previous line, someone changes tack and) says: then let us tell the two apart by "facing oneself" and "facing another" (shame is being ashamed before oneself, embarrassment is fearing another). But this brings a fresh fault: since shame and embarrassment would then be set up only "with respect to something faced," they would become "conventional [factors] spoken of relatively," and not real things truly there — which again contradicts the holy teachings (which say shame and embarrassment are really existent). And if one insists they are both real and arise separately (only one at a time), that contradicts the line in the Treatise that "the eleven wholesome dharmas all pervade every wholesome mind" (if they are separate, the two cannot pervade the wholesome mind at the same time).

〔Q · distinct-mark, third〕(Stepping back once more, someone) says: then let us tell the two distinct marks apart by "revering the wholesome (this is shame)" and "refusing the evil (this is embarrassment)." But on this account the two have different objects (one refers to the wholesome, one to the evil), so they ought not to arise together. 〔A〕(The treatise's author retorts:) this third fault you raise is the same as the "two faults" committed before (in the second distinct-mark line) — all of them make shame and embarrassment unable to pervade the wholesome mind at the same time; so on what grounds do you pick on just one side to attack (when your own distinct-mark account commits the very same fault)?

〔A〕(The author now sets out his own account positively.) Who says shame's and embarrassment's two objects are different? 〔Q〕If they are not different, then how is it to be put? 〔A〕It is in fact like this: the moment a wholesome mind arises, whatever object it refers to, that wholesome mind carries within it both senses at once — "revering the wholesome" and "refusing the evil" (referring to any object whatever, it both reveres the good and refuses the evil). So shame and embarrassment both pervade every wholesome mind, and the object they refer to is no different (it is not that one refers to the wholesome and one to the evil; rather, within one and the same wholesome mind both senses are present in full).

〔The author presses the distinct-mark holder once more〕Do not you (who hold the distinct-mark view) also have to grant the principle that "shame and embarrassment both pervade the wholesome mind"? Yet since you hold that shame's and embarrassment's own looks are the same (both taking feeling-ashamed as their substance), by what principle can you fend off the three faults set out above? (You cannot fend them off — and so only the "shared-mark" account stands: shame and embarrassment take feeling-ashamed as their shared look, each with its own function, and both able to pervade the wholesome mind at the same time.)

Then how is the holy teachings' word — that shame "regards oneself" and embarrassment "regards another" (regarding self, regarding other) — to be fitted in? There are two ways to take it. One takes "oneself and the true Dharma" as the "self" and "the world (the many)" as the "other" (so shame leans on self-and-Dharma, embarrassment leans on the world). The other takes it from whether "revering the good and refusing the evil" is of benefit or of harm to oneself — revering the good benefits oneself, refusing the evil saves oneself from harm — and along these lines provisionally pins on the names "self" and "other." In sum, this "self" and "other" is only a convenient way of telling them apart, and does not mean that shame's and embarrassment's objects are truly different.

3. Non-Greed · Non-Hatred · Non-Delusion (the three wholesome roots)

The word "beginning with" in the verse's "the three roots beginning with non-greed" takes in non-hatred and non-delusion as well (non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion — three). These three are called "wholesome roots" for two reasons: first, their "power to produce wholesome dharmas" is especially strong (the wholesome dharmas grow out from here, like a root); second, they are exactly the close counteragents of the three "unwholesome roots," greed, hatred, and delusion (the head-root of all bad things).

What is "non-greed"? Facing "existence" (that is, the fruits of rebirth in the three realms, the continuance of life) and "the means of existence" (the causes that draw on that round of rebirth), the mind does not crave them, does not cling to them — this is its nature; its function is to counteract craving-and-clinging and to do the wholesome. What is "non-hatred"? Facing "suffering" (the various fruits of suffering) and "the means of suffering" (the causes that bring on suffering), the mind does not hate them, does not flare up — this is its nature; its function is to counteract hatred-and-ire (hating and flaring up) and to do the wholesome.

Here is a key point: the moment a wholesome mind arises, whatever object it refers to, that wholesome mind carries within it this disposition of "not craving existence, not hating suffering." Note well — this is "set up with respect to 'existence, suffering' and the like," and does not mean that each time one actually refers to the objects "existence, suffering" and the rest (it is not that one must reach those objects). It is just as with shame and embarrassment spoken of earlier, which are also "set up with respect to 'the wholesome, the evil'" (not that each time one actually refers to the good or the evil). For just this reason, non-greed and non-hatred too both pervade every wholesome mind.

What is "non-delusion"? Toward every principle and every concrete fact, being able to understand them clearly and plainly — this is its nature; its function is to counteract delusion (muddle, ignorance) and to do the wholesome.

〔One view · non-delusion just is wisdom〕 One view holds: non-delusion is in fact nothing but "wisdom" (intelligence, the mind-force that can discriminate) taken as its nature, with no separate thing besides. Its ground is the Abhidharmasamuccaya: non-delusion takes as its substance the "discriminating-decision" (decision, the power to tell right from wrong, what to take and what to leave) of "the wisdom of report, the wisdom of teaching, the wisdom of realization" — that is, the four wisdoms "wisdom of innate-attainment (had from birth), wisdom of hearing, wisdom of reflection, wisdom of cultivation." Since these four are all of the nature "discriminating-decision," it is plain that non-delusion just is wisdom. Why, then, set up another name for it at all? Only to bring out that, within the wholesome class, this wisdom has an especially excellent function, and so it is singled out and spoken of — just as, within the affliction class, a [certain] defiled wisdom is likewise singled out and given the separate name "evil view."

〔It should be known · non-delusion has a substance of its own (the correct position)〕 Again, one view holds (and this is the correct account): non-delusion is not just wisdom; it has a substance of its own, set squarely against "ignorance" (delusion). There are three grounds, taken one by one —

(1) Non-greed and non-hatred are both comprised among the "wholesome roots," each with its own substance; non-delusion ought, by the same token, to have a substance of its own (the three wholesome roots are discussed as a set, and it would not do for this one alone to lack [a substance]). (2) The Treatise says "great compassion is comprised by 'non-hatred and non-delusion,'" and not by "[the wholesome] roots." If non-delusion's nature were just wisdom, would not great compassion, like the "[ten] powers" (which take wisdom as their substance), have to be comprised by "wisdom" (that is, by the wisdom-faculty class)? — Yet the Treatise precisely does not say so, which shows non-delusion is not wisdom. (3) If non-delusion had no independent substance (like "non-harm" and the rest, which are mere conventional [factors] set up by borrowing a name), then it ought not to be a real thing — but this contradicts the line in the Treatise: "Of the eleven wholesome dharmas, only three are conventionally set up, the remaining eight are really existent." (Non-delusion is squarely among those eight real ones, so it must have a substance of its own.)

Then how is the Abhidharmasamuccaya's "non-delusion takes wisdom as its substance" to be reconciled? It is "raising the cause and the fruit of non-delusion in order to disclose its nature" (non-delusion's look is, for the most part, seen by way of wisdom, and so wisdom is used to point to it), and does not mean non-delusion is the same as wisdom. This is just like the earlier account of "trust," where one also uses "accepting (resolve) and delight (desire)" — that is, trust's cause and fruit — to point out the substance of trust. The principle must be so (using cause-and-fruit to disclose the substance does not mean it is that cause-and-fruit).

Add one more reason: greed, hatred, and delusion are the three that concur with all six consciousnesses, and they are precisely afflictions, with an especially strong power to stir up evil, and so they are set up as the "unwholesome roots" (the head-root of bad things). To sever these three, two counteragents are needed: one is the "general counteragent" (the common one — namely wholesome wisdom, a single wisdom treating all three), the other is the "particular counteragent" (treating them one by one — namely the three wholesome roots non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, each treating one). Since the level of "particular counteragent" must be used (non-delusion specifically treating delusion), non-delusion must have a substance of its own, and is not just that "general counteragent" wisdom (otherwise only the general counteragent would be left, with no particular counteragent).

4. Diligence (vigor)

"Diligence" is vigor. Its nature is "brave-and-bold" — in the two affairs of "cultivating the wholesome" (going after the good) and "severing the evil" (cutting off the bad), pressing forward both bravely and boldly. Its function is to counteract indolence (slackness) and to bring the wholesome to fullness. The two words "brave" and "bold" each carry their point: "brave" (brave, pressing-forward) is to set aside the "defiled dharmas" — for the defiled dharmas too have a forward drive, and that drive does not count as wholesome; "bold" (pure-and-bold) is to set aside the "pure-indeterminate" (the neither-wholesome-nor-unwholesome and pure). Setting both aside, it comes out that vigor belongs to the "wholesome" nature alone (neither defiled nor indeterminate).

The looks of vigor fall, broadly, into five sorts: donning-armor, application, no-lowness, no-retreat, no-satisfaction (fixing one's resolve as though donning armor, actually setting to work, not flinching low, not stopping halfway, not resting until the end). These five line up one-for-one with the five phrases scripture states — "having force, having diligence, having bravery, firm-and-strong, not dropping the wholesome yoke (not casting off the burden of the wholesome)."

How these five are matched up, the old [masters] explained in several ways, and one may take one's pick —

One matches them by "the first arousing-of-the-mind / holding-to-one's-own-share / pressing-onward-higher" (first arousing-the-mind, one's-own-share, pressing-onward) — that is, within the stretch of "holding to one's own share" there are again three grades, beginning, middle, and end. One matches them by the several levels of cultivation — "first arousing-the-mind, long-time, unbroken, earnest-and-grave, with-nothing-left-over" (first arousing-the-mind, long-time, unbroken, earnest, with-nothing-left-over). One matches them by the differences of the five paths, "the path of provisions" and the rest (provisions, application, the path of seeing, the path of cultivation, the ultimate path) — of which the ultimate path of the two vehicles gladly seeks great awakening, while the ultimate path of the buddhas takes joy in benefiting-and-gladdening others. One matches them by the differences of the four [sub-]paths "application, unbroken, liberation, pressing-onward" (the four stages that follow one upon another in cultivating a single fruition-position).

5. Ease (buoyant-ease)

"Ease" is buoyant-ease. Its nature is "fit-for-the-task" (body-and-mind light and quick, ready to bear, equal to taking up the practice) — it can leave behind the "gross-and-heavy" (that coarse, sluggish, leaden state of body-and-mind that cannot be lifted) and tune body-and-mind to flow smooth and supple. Its function is to counteract "torpor" (a dull, stuffy heaviness), and to make one "transmute-the-basis" (turn the body-and-mind one rests on wholly over into the pure). Said in more detail: buoyant-ease can press down and clear away the dharmas that obstruct meditative concentration, so that this body-and-mind one rests on turns into something light, quick, ease-filled.

6. Non-Heedlessness

"Non-heedlessness" (not letting-go, not slacking) is, when laid bare, just "vigor plus non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion" — these four dharmas taken together. Its nature is "guarding-and-cultivating" — toward the evil that should be severed, guarding against it lest it be committed; toward the wholesome that should be cultivated, cultivating it to the utmost. Its function is to counteract "heedlessness" (letting-go, slacking), and to bring to fullness every wholesome thing, worldly and supramundane. Said in more detail: it is just these four dharmas being able, in the affair of "severing the evil and cultivating the wholesome," both to guard and to cultivate, and the whole given the name "non-heedlessness." Note well — it has no separate substance of its own (its look is no different at all from those four dharmas): in the affair of guarding-against-evil and cultivating-the-wholesome, take away the function of those four dharmas, and one can no longer find any function belonging to "non-heedlessness" of its own.

Someone might ask: do not trust, shame, and the rest also have some of this "guarding-against-evil and cultivating-the-wholesome" capacity — why are they not counted in? The answer is: although trust, shame, and the rest do have a little of this capacity, compared with the four (vigor, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion) their force is far weaker; and besides, they are neither "wholesome roots" nor able to "universally spur on" (they cannot broadly spur on and drive every wholesome dharma). So trust, shame, and the rest are not taken as the support of non-heedlessness; only the four, vigor plus the three wholesome roots, are.

〔Q〕Someone retorts: is not "guarding-and-cultivating" the very function that is non-heedlessness' own (how can you say it has no substance of its own)? 〔A〕"Guarding-and-cultivating" does not step outside vigor and the three wholesome roots (guarding-and-cultivating is just the work these four dharmas do). If you say "guarding-and-cultivating must come forth from 'non-heedlessness' before it can take effect," then by the same logic, would not "non-heedlessness" too have to lean on yet another thing before it could take effect? This way, one leans on another, on and on without end, and so commits the fault of "infinite regress" (one never finds the head).

〔Q〕Again someone asks: vigor's function is only "to spur on universally," and the three wholesome roots' function is only "to serve as a support" — so how can it be said that these four have a "guarding-and-cultivating" function (guarding-and-cultivating seems not to lie within these four's own jobs)? 〔A〕Then it is asked back of you: this "guarding-and-cultivating function" you speak of — just what is its look? Trace it down one by one, and you will find it cannot run outside those four dharmas —

• If you say it is "universal supporting-and-holding," that just is non-greed and the rest (the three wholesome roots serving as support);
• If you say it is "universal spurring-on and driving," that is no different from vigor;
• If you say it is "halting the evil, advancing the wholesome," that is precisely what the four dharmas do together;
• If you say it is "keeping the mind from scattering," that ought to be "concentration" (meditative stability);
• If you say it is "making the mind meet its object, taking the object together [with it]," then how does it differ from "contact" (that "contact" within the universal [factors])?
• If you say it is "keeping one from forgetting," then it ought to be "mindfulness."

Tracing it down this way, one by one, when one seeks out a function of "non-heedlessness" that is its own, apart from non-greed and those four dharmas, it simply cannot be found. So non-heedlessness definitely has no separate substance of its own; it is a conventional [factor] set up by borrowing a name.

7. Equanimity-of-Formations

What is "equanimity-of-formations" (this "equanimity" is the equanimity within the formations-aggregate, not the same as the "equanimity-feeling")? It too is those four dharmas (vigor, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion) making the mind keep "even, upright, and effortlessly abiding" (even, upright, effortlessly-abiding) — this is its nature; its function is to counteract "agitation" (the mind's restlessness, unable to settle) and to make the mind abide quiet and still. Said in more detail: it is just these four dharmas making the mind leave behind "agitation" and the rest of those obstructions and abide quiet and still, the whole given the name "equanimity." Of the three phrases "even, upright, effortlessly abiding," they tell apart, by the three stages of cultivation — beginning, middle, and end — the differing looks of "equanimity" before and after (first the mind made even, then the mind made upright, and last made to abide of itself without any effort).

These two come one after the other: first "non-heedlessness" clears away the defiled, then "equanimity-of-formations" makes the mind abide quiet and calm. Equanimity-of-formations, like non-heedlessness, also has no separate substance of its own: apart from those four dharmas, it has neither look nor function — for "what makes the mind quiet-and-calm" just is those four dharmas, and "what is made quiet-and-calm" just is the mind and the mental factors and the rest; both ends have their own lodging, and in between there is no independent "equanimity-of-formations."

8. Non-Harm

What is "non-harm"? It is, toward all sentient beings, not to injure them and not to vex them; its nature is in fact just "non-hatred"; its function is to counteract "harm" (the mental factor that injures sentient beings) and to raise a mind of compassion-and-pity. Said in more detail: it is taking the portion within "non-hatred" that "does not injure and does not vex sentient beings," singling it out, and giving it the name "non-harm."

Then how are non-hatred and non-harm to be told apart? Non-hatred is set in reverse against the kind of hatred that "cuts off another's life," while non-harm stands squarely against the kind of harm that "injures and vexes sentient beings"; non-hatred leans toward "giving beings ease" (this just is loving-kindness), non-harm leans toward "drawing out beings' suffering" (this just is compassion) — this is the difference between the two at a coarse glance. Yet, speaking at the point of what is truly so, non-hatred alone truly has a substance of its own, while non-harm is only a conventional name set up upon one portion of non-hatred. That being so, why set up "non-harm" separately at all? Because one must bring out the difference between the two looks "loving-kindness" and "compassion" — for in the affair of "benefiting and gladdening sentient beings," these two, loving-kindness and compassion, are the most excellent, and so they are set up apart, the better to point each one out clearly.

〔One view · non-harm has a substance of its own〕 One view holds: non-harm is not just non-hatred; it has a substance of its own — namely a "worthy-and-wholesome disposition." This can be refuted: first it is asked of you, what is the look of this "worthy-and-wholesome disposition"? You say it is "not injuring and not vexing sentient beings" — but non-hatred is precisely that too (non-hatred is, toward beings, originally not injuring and not vexing, originally loving-kind, compassionate, worthy, wholesome), so why set up another substance of its own? Hence non-harm is only a conventional name (with no substance of its own).

9. Variant-Meaning Mental Factors Included by the Word "And"

The word "and" in the verse is to point out: besides these eleven wholesome mental factors above, there are still other wholesome mental factors (such as elation and aversion) — they are "different in sense, but no different in substance from the foregoing eleven." That is, although they each have their own sense and their own name, in substance they none of them step outside those eleven before, and so they are not set up separately and counted.

Take first "elation" (gladness, arising together with "desire"): it is in fact a portion of non-hatred — for not hating the object one is glad about is precisely non-hatred. Likewise, non-anger, non-rancor, non-vexation, non-envy and the rest are all on this principle, each being exactly the reverse of "a portion of hatred" (anger, rancor, vexation, envy are all offshoots of hatred; turned over, they revert into non-hatred). Take next "aversion" (turning-away, arising together with "wisdom"): it is in fact a portion of non-greed — for not clinging to the object one turns away from is precisely non-greed. Likewise, non-stinginess, non-conceit and the rest are also on this principle, each being exactly the reverse of "a portion of greed." As for non-concealment, non-deceit, non-flattery, these three are a portion of non-greed and non-delusion, each being exactly the reverse of "a portion of greed and delusion" (concealment, deceit, flattery have within them both greed and delusion; turned over, they revert into non-greed and non-delusion).

〔The dispute over which portion non-concealment reverts to〕 One view holds: non-concealment is only a portion of non-delusion (it does not revert to the non-greed side) — the ground being that nowhere in scripture or treatise is it said that "concealment" too counts as a portion of greed ("concealment" carries delusion alone, not greed, so its reverse, non-concealment, reverts to non-delusion alone).

〔The dispute over which portion non-pride reverts to〕 As to where "non-pride" reverts, there are three views: one holds it reverts to a portion of "trust" (because, trusting the other, one does not slight the other); one holds it reverts to a portion of "equanimity" (equanimity-of-formations) (because, the mind once even, one does not put oneself up high in pride); one holds it reverts to a portion of "shame" (because, revering the other, one does not slight the other).

〔The dispute over which portion non-doubt reverts to〕 As to where "non-doubt" reverts, there are likewise three views: one holds it is comprised by "trust" (once one trusts, one no longer wavers); one holds it just is "right resolve" (once one's understanding is settled, one no longer wavers); one holds it just is "right wisdom" (once one's seeing is correct, one no longer wavers).

As for the remaining few: "non-distraction" reverts to "right concentration" (the mind not scattering just is concentration); "right view" and "right knowing" both revert to "wholesome wisdom" (seeing correctly and knowing correctly are both wisdom); "non-forgetful-mindfulness" just is "right mindfulness" (holding fast, not forgetting the true Dharma, just is mindfulness).

Then there are remorse, torpor, applied-thought, sustained-thought, these four (they belong to the "indeterminate" mental factors): they are present sometimes when defiled and sometimes when not defiled, running through both sides; they are like contact, desire, and the rest (the universal and the object-specific mental factors), in that there is no wholesome dharma specially "turned over against" them to be matched up — and so no wholesome dharma is set up apart for them (it is not that every one must be matched with a wholesome reverse).

〔Q〕Someone asks: among the wholesome [factors] formed by "turning over the defiled dharmas," why are some set up with a separate name (like non-harm) while some are not? Where lies the standard? 〔A〕The standard is this: the ones whose look and function are distinct from others get set up separately; the rest (whose look and function are nothing special) are not set up separately, and at this you should not cavil (it is not that every one must be set up). And a further layer: among those defiled dharmas, the ones that reach through all six consciousnesses (pervade the six consciousnesses) are powerful, and so they are turned over and a separate wholesome dharma is set up [against them]. The likes of pride and the likes of anger arise only together with the mind-consciousness (they do not reach the six consciousnesses), and so no wholesome reverse is specially set up for them.

As for "harm," although it too arises only together with the mind-consciousness (by rights it should likewise not be set up), it has two special points: first, it crops up again and again, injuring and vexing others; second, it squarely obstructs the most excellent cause of the "unsurpassed vehicle (the path to buddhahood)" — namely "compassion." To make people see clearly this especially grave fault of "harm," it is specially turned over, and a "non-harm" is set up.

There are still forgetfulness, distraction, and incorrect-knowing, these three defiled dharmas: turned over, they fall squarely into the "object-specific" mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom (forgetfulness turns into mindfulness, distraction into concentration, incorrect-knowing into wisdom), and so they are not spoken of again separately here among the wholesome.

〔Q〕Again someone asks: defiled dharmas and pure dharmas turn over one against the other, two by two; why then are the pure dharmas (only eleven wholesome) so many fewer than the defiled (six root afflictions plus twenty secondary afflictions)? 〔A〕There are two reasons. First, pure dharmas are strong and defiled dharmas weak, so by nature one can "match the many with the few" (one wholesome can counteract several defiled, with no need for a one-to-one match). Second, pure dharmas "penetrate the principle," and so they can run through [things] (many seemingly different wholesome [factors] are in fact one and the same substance, so there is no need to divide them into so many); defiled dharmas are "mired in concrete fact," and so they are cramped (dividing very finely along one concrete mark after another, the number naturally grows large). So between defiled and pure, one ought not to demand that the numbers come out equal.

〔The wholesome's being-conventional-or-real〕

Of these eleven wholesome dharmas, three are conventionally existent (set up by borrowing a name, with no substance of their own) — namely non-heedlessness, equanimity-of-formations, and non-harm (why they are conventional has been told above); the remaining eight are really existent (truly have a substance of their own) — for these eight each have a distinct look and function of their own.

〔Whether the wholesome pervade the wholesome mind · whether buoyant-ease pervades〕

〔One view · only four pervade the wholesome mind, distributed across six positions〕 One view holds: among these eleven, only vigor, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion — "these four pervade every wholesome mind" (every wholesome mind has them), while the remaining seven "are not necessarily all present." The grounds are: at the time of seeking out concrete fact and principle, before one's mind is made up, "trust" does not arise (so trust does not pervade); shame and embarrassment, though of one kind, have separate basis-loci, so when one happens to arise, the other is absent (so shame and embarrassment cannot pervade at the same time); buoyant-ease comes only when one severs the afflictions by the "worldly path"; non-heedlessness and equanimity-of-formations come to arise only at the "outflow-free path"; non-harm comes only when one pities sentient beings. He further cites the Treatise's "these eleven arise distributed across six positions" to prove it: the position of resolve (the decided position) has trust; at the time of stilling the defiled there are shame and embarrassment (one regarding self, one regarding other); the position of cultivating-the-wholesome has vigor plus the three wholesome roots; on the worldly path there is buoyant-ease; on the supramundane path there are equanimity-of-formations and non-heedlessness; at the time of gathering-in sentient beings there is non-harm.

〔Refuting the previous view〕 Again, one view rebuts the previous account, saying it is wrongly put, and breaks it one by one —

(1) Saying "in the mind seeking out concrete fact and principle, before it is made up, there is no trust" is wrong: if that mind had no trust at all, it could not count as a wholesome mind in the first place (just as a defiled mind, precisely because it has no pure trust, does not count as wholesome). So as long as it is a wholesome mind, it definitely has trust; trust pervades. (2) Shame and embarrassment, though of two kinds, have the same "object-specific" basis (they depend on one and the same wholesome mind), and so they pervade the wholesome mind together — this point was already established earlier (it is not that when one happens to arise the other is absent). (3) If one says "on the supramundane path there is no buoyant-ease," then would not the "buoyant-ease awakening-limb" (one of the seven awakening-limbs) fail to be outflow-free? (Yet it is plainly outflow-free, so the supramundane path has buoyant-ease too.) (4) If one says "on the worldly path there is no equanimity-of-formations, no non-heedlessness," then would not the worldly path turn out to be "un-quiet, un-guarding-against-evil, un-cultivating-the-wholesome"? And would it not then fail to press down agitation and heedlessness? (This plainly does not get through.) What is more, since the contaminated wholesome mind also possesses those four dharmas (vigor, the three wholesome roots), then, just as "the supramundane path has equanimity and non-heedlessness," the contaminated wholesome mind too ought to have these two. (5) The moment a wholesome mind arises, it never injures sentient beings at all, and is wholly at odds with "the dharmas that can injure" — that being so, the wholesome mind definitely has non-harm (not only at the time of gathering-in beings).

As for the Treatise's saying "the eleven arise distributed across six positions," that is "spoken according to whichever [factor] stands out most in each several position" (whichever wholesome dharma is most conspicuous in a given position is the one pointed to), and does not mean that the other positions lack the remaining wholesome dharmas. So the previous account does not accord with principle.

〔It should be known · the correct account〕 So it should be put this way: among these eleven, ten pervade every wholesome mind, only the one buoyant-ease does not pervade — for buoyant-ease can tune body-and-mind to flow smooth only in the position of "concentration," and in the scattered positions there is none of it. The Yogācārabhūmi's "Viniścaya section" says just this: those ten wholesome mental factors, whether in "the concentrated ground" (the state of being in concentration) or in "the unconcentrated ground" (the state of a scattered mind), all pervade every wholesome mind; only in the mind of "the concentrated ground" is there the added one, buoyant-ease.

〔The dispute over just which grounds have buoyant-ease〕 One view holds: the "application" before concentration (the preparatory work) may also count as "the concentrated ground" (for at that time body-and-mind too is faintly tuned and smooth), and so even the desire realm has buoyant-ease — otherwise it would contradict the "Foundational-Stages section"'s line that "the eleven wholesome dharmas beginning with trust run through every ground." Again, one view holds (and this view accords better with right principle): buoyant-ease is present only in concentration (it must be nourished by concentration before body-and-mind can be tuned smooth); it cites the Treatise's "the various minds and mental factors of the desire realm, because they lack buoyant-ease, are named the unconcentrated ground" to prove it; and as for the "Foundational-Stages section"'s saying "every ground has these eleven," that is spoken with respect to "the ground with applied-and-sustained-thought, the ground with sustained-thought alone, the ground without applied-or-sustained-thought" — these three grounds all having them (all three of these grounds belong to the concentrated ground; it does not mean that a scattered mind has buoyant-ease too).

Now look at whether these eleven wholesome dharmas are present or absent in the several consciousnesses: in the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, it depends on which position one is in — sometimes present, sometimes absent; in the sixth consciousness, in the position of "concentration" all eleven are present, and in the position not of concentration only the one buoyant-ease is lacking. 〔The dispute over whether the five [sense] consciousnesses have buoyant-ease〕 One view holds: the five consciousnesses have only ten (no buoyant-ease) — for the five consciousnesses are by nature stirring-and-scattered, and admit no buoyant-ease. Again, one view holds: the five consciousnesses too have buoyant-ease — for the wholesome (of the five consciousnesses) that is drawn forth by concentration also has that body-and-mind smoothness; and moreover, when the five consciousnesses arise together with the "wisdom-of-accomplishing-what-is-to-be-done" (the wisdom the Buddha makes by transmuting the former five consciousnesses), there is definitely buoyant-ease.

〔The various gates of the wholesome〕

Finally, the eleven wholesome dharmas are judged through a few gates —

〔With which feelings they concur〕 The eleven wholesome concur with "fifteen feelings" (the five feelings matched against each of the several grounds of the three realms, fifteen in all); only "the feeling of grief" and "the feeling of pain" are excepted, because these two feelings are oppressive and tormenting, with none of that smoothness, and do not square with the wholesome dharmas' smooth ease.

〔Whether they concur with the object-specific〕 The eleven wholesome can concur with "the five object-specific [factors]" (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) — for trust and the rest are not at odds with desire and the rest (they can arise at the same time).

〔Which of the three natures they belong to〕 These eleven all belong to "the wholesome" nature alone.

〔To which realm they are bound〕 Buoyant-ease does not belong to the desire realm (it is present only in the concentrated grounds of the upper two realms); the remaining ten run through all three realms.

〔Their division by the learner-positions〕 These eleven all run through the three — "the learner, the no-more-learner, the neither-learner-nor-no-more-learner" (the ordinary and the noble alike may have them).

〔Whether they are severed by seeing or by cultivation〕 They are not severed by the path of seeing — the Yogācārabhūmi says: the six faculties beginning with trust are severed by the path of cultivation alone, not by the path of seeing.

How the remaining gates are to be divided, one should think out for oneself along this same principle (they are not all set out one by one here).

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B. The Six Root Afflictions

The treatise-master says: these six — greed and the rest (greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, bad view) — are by their very nature all subsumed under this class called "the root afflictions" ("root" meaning that all those other, branch-tip afflictions are born out of these six) — and just for that they got the name "afflictions."

What is "greed"? Its nature is "craving-attachment" — it sticks fast, unable to let go, to "existence" (that is, the karmic fruit of the three realms, this very life before one's eyes) and to "the instruments of existence" (the various causes that summon up this life, the things that keep one rolling on in saṃsāra). Its function has two sides: one, it "obstructs non-greed," that is, it blocks the wholesome mind of non-greed from arising; two, it "gives rise to suffering," that is, it draws on every kind of suffering. Why does it give rise to suffering? Because, by the force of this craving-greed, the "five appropriated aggregates" (this body-and-mind that is appropriated and summons suffering) arise again and again, and so suffering too goes on without end.

What is "anger"? Its nature is "hatred-resentment" — toward "suffering" (the karmic fruit that goes against one's wishes) and "the instruments of suffering" (the things that summon up suffering) it stirs up hatred and flies into a rage. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs non-anger," blocking the wholesome mind of non-anger; on the other it makes one "un-secure," and becomes the root of every kind of bad conduct. Why is this so? Because the moment a person flares into anger, it surely scorches both body and mind into a fevered unrest and provokes every kind of bad karma; anger is itself "of an unwholesome nature" (purely bad — unlike greed, which may carry along a faint taste of the agreeable).

What is "delusion"? "Delusion" is "ignorance" — its nature is "benighted confusion": toward the various principles (such as the four truths, dependent arising, and the like) and the various things and phenomena, it is all a murky darkness, unable to see clearly. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs non-delusion," blocking the wholesome mind that sees clearly; on the other it becomes "the root of all defilement." How is it the root of all defilement? Because it is by way of this ignorance that there next arise "doubt," "wrong view," then greed and the other root afflictions, and along with them the deeds of every kind of secondary affliction; and these deeds in turn can summon up every kind of defiled dharma for the next life — link upon link in a chain, all starting out from this ignorance.

What is "conceit"? Its nature is "relying on oneself over others, exalting [oneself]" — leaning on oneself, sizing oneself up against others, and lifting the mind up high, swollen and self-important. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs non-conceit" (blocking the wholesome mind of humility), on the other it "gives rise to suffering." How does it give rise to suffering? Because once there is conceit, toward "virtue" (the various merits and goods) and "the virtuous" (people who possess virtue) one will not bend low, will not be humble; and so birth-and-death rolls on without end, and one undergoes every kind of suffering.

Conceit is also divided very finely, with such accounts as the "seven conceits" and the "nine conceits." From which loci are they sized up? They arise from the "three grades" plus the "self" and "virtue" — the "three grades" meaning that one sorts the other party into the three tiers of "superior" (stronger than me), "equal" (the same as me), and "inferior" (worse than me), and then, pairing these with self-exaltation toward "self" and toward "virtue," one lays out the seven kinds and the nine kinds of distinction.

These conceits, whatever the kind, can in principle all be severed at both the "path of seeing" and the "path of cultivation" stages (not severed at only one place). One point must be added here: at the sage's stage, that "conceit-of-self" does still get to arise (even a sage still has the very subtlest thought of a sense-of-self); and since even the sage's stage still has the conceit-of-self manifestly active, then the "conceit-class" arising in dependence on it is likewise coherent and free of contradiction.

What is "doubt"? Its nature is "wavering" — toward the various truths and principles (the four truths and such, the principles that ought to be trusted and accepted) it cannot make up its mind, half-believing and half-doubting. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs non-doubt" (blocking the wholesome mind of firm conviction), on the other it "blocks the wholesome class" (barring the wholesome dharmas from arising). Why does it block the wholesome? Because a person who is forever wavering and irresolute, unable to settle the mind, cannot get the wholesome dharmas to arise.

〔One view · doubt just is discernment〕 One party maintains: doubt has no substance of its own; it is in fact just "discernment" (that is, the mental factor of selecting and distinguishing). Their reasons are two. First, what is called doubt is "wavering while at the same time distinguishing" — and since it is distinguishing, that distinguishing is precisely the function of discernment, which shows doubt is discernment. Second, looking to the word-formation in Sanskrit: the word for doubt is composed by adding the prefix "vi" before "mati" (which means discernment, deliberation); and since "mati" is itself discernment, then "doubt," produced by adding the prefix, is at bottom still discernment.

〔Another view (this is the correct one) · doubt has a substance of its own〕 Another party says: doubt has a substance of its own; its function is to "make discernment irresolute," and it is not [identical with] discernment. The reasons are two layers. The first is the warrant of scriptural teaching: the Yogācārabhūmi once said — "Among the six root afflictions, only 'bad view' is 'conventionally existent' (that is, it is but a portion of discernment, not a separately set-up thing); the remaining five (greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt) are all 'really existent,' each having a substance of its own." Since doubt is reckoned among these five that are "really existent, having a separate own-substance," it shows that doubt is not discernment. The second is a rebuttal aimed at the former party's word-formation reason: you say "adding the prefix 'vi' before 'mati' (discernment) produces something that is still discernment, and so doubt just is discernment"; but by that reasoning, adding the same prefix "vi" before "jñāna" (which means knowledge) and producing "vijñāna (consciousness)" — should not that too still be knowledge? In fact "knowledge" and "consciousness" are plainly two different things. This shows that once a root-word (here the word-roots such as "mati" and "jñāna") has a prefix added, the meaning shifts entirely and can no longer be taken as the original word. So "doubt," though formed by adding a prefix to "discernment," is at bottom no longer discernment — doubt does not have discernment for its substance.

What is "bad view"? Its nature is "defiled discernment" — a discernment that has been defiled (here one can see that, while the party above, in discussing doubt, took doubt too to be discernment, the thing that truly counts as a portion of discernment is in fact this view): toward the various truths and principles it reckons and surmises in an upside-down, topsy-turvy way, guessing and gauging at random. Its function is: on one side it "obstructs good view" (blocking right understanding), on the other it "invites suffering." Why is it said to invite suffering? Because a person who holds a mistaken view must, more often than not, undergo much suffering.

This "bad view," in the way it runs and operates (its mode of activity), can be further divided into five kinds:

(1) The view of the perishing-body (also called the "body-view," the view that takes this body-and-mind to be a "self"): upon the "five appropriated aggregates" (these five heaps of body-and-mind that summon suffering) it forcibly grasps out a "self," and further grasps out the various "what-belongs-to-self" (the things belonging to me). It is "the basis of all the [false] view-courses" — every branching, wayward view-path is born out of this self-attachment. Spelled out finely, it has such accounts as the "twenty propositions" and the "sixty-five" (these are the graspings laid out one by one, pairing "self, what-belongs-to-self" with the five aggregates); this kind is wholly "discriminated" (the sort drawn out later by bad teachers and wrong teaching, requiring deliberation and reckoning to arise).

(2) The view that grasps an extreme (the view that clings to one side, falling into an extreme): taking up that "self" grasped out before, it then tips it to one side — either grasping it as "annihilated" (at death one is wholly finished, nothing left at all) or grasping it as "eternal" (this self never changes, abides forever and never perishes). Its harm is that it "obstructs the middle way" and "obstructs emancipation" (falling to either extreme of annihilation or eternity, one cannot tread the unswerving middle course, and so cannot get out of birth-and-death).

Spelled out finely, it scatters through the various wayward view-paths of the outsiders. Broadly there are two routes. One route is "reckoning from the past end" (grasping the prior limit), within which are the "four total-eternalisms" (four accounts asserting that all things are utterly permanent) and the "partial eternalism" (the account asserting that one part is permanent and one part not). The other route is "reckoning from the future end" (reckoning the latter limit), within which are the "sixteen with-conception" (accounts asserting that after death one still bears conception, sixteen in all), the "eight without-conception" and the "eight neither-conception-nor-non-conception" (these two classes each having eight), and the "seven annihilationisms" (seven accounts asserting that after death one is utterly annihilated), and the like. These are all "discriminated" (drawn out by later reckoning, brought on by wrong doctrines).

(3) Wrong view: its main trunk is "denial outright" — that is, a flat negation, a slander. What does it negate? Four things: it denies "cause" (not believing there are causes of good and evil), denies "effect" (not believing there are the fruits of suffering and pleasure), denies "function" (not believing in such real functions as seeds producing the manifest, or this life going on to a later world), and denies "the really-existent" (not believing in such truly existing facts as arhats and sages). Besides this main trunk, whatever wrong graspings remain, the messy and scattered ones, other than the four foregoing views (body-view, extreme-view, view-clinging, precept-clinging), are all gathered into wrong view as well; this is just as the term "dominant condition" is the widest of all and can take anything in — wrong view too is the widest sack, gathering in all the odds and ends of wrong grasping.

Spelled out finely, it too scatters through the various wayward view-paths of the outsiders. Reckoning from the past end (grasping the prior limit), there are the "two no-cause-isms" (two accounts asserting that the myriad things have no cause at all and pop up out of nowhere), the "four edge[-theories] and the rest" (four accounts blindly guessing the world to have an edge, no edge, and the like), and the "deathless-evasion" (the account that, for fear of misspeaking, answers vaguely and dodges every which way, refusing to reply straight). Reckoning from the future end (reckoning the latter limit), there is the "five present-nirvāṇas" (five accounts mistaking some pleasure-state before one's eyes for nirvāṇa). Besides these there are all manner of others: some take "Maheśvara (the Sovereign God)," a worldly ruler, Indra, Mahā-brahmā, and such gods, or some other thing, to be eternal and unchanging; some take Maheśvara and the like to be the total cause that produces the myriad things; some recklessly set up various false liberations (which are in fact no liberation at all); some wrongly grasp "what is not the path" as "the path" (mistaking a wrong way for the right way) — all such as these are gathered into wrong view.

(4) View-clinging: it takes "the various views," together with "the body-and-mind five aggregates that prop up these views," and grasps them wholesale as "the most brilliant, the most supreme," and further grasps them as "able to make one win purity" (supposing that to hold fast to this set of views is to be liberated). Its harm is that it becomes "the basis of all quarrels" — each clinging to his own view and each sure his own is the most right, they squabble without end.

(5) Clinging to precepts-and-observances: it takes "the precepts and prohibitions laid down in conformity with those wrong views" (such as the outsiders' set of ascetic precepts — imitating cattle, imitating dogs, throwing oneself into fire, lying on a bed of nails), together with "the body-and-mind five aggregates that prop up these precepts-and-observances," and grasps them as "the most brilliant, the most supreme," and further grasps them as "able to win purity" (supposing that to keep these is to be liberated). Its harm is that it becomes "the basis of profitless toil" (suffering toil with no benefit) — undergoing a heap of suffering for nothing, of not the slightest use for liberation.

Some places put it briefly, saying "to grasp [something] as the most brilliant is called view-clinging; to grasp [something] as able to win purity is called precept-clinging," as though the two clingings each governed one side. One must understand that this way of putting it is an "abbreviated-cross-reference statement" (each implying the other and each leaving out half the words — in fact both clingings carry within them both senses of "most supreme" and "able to purify"), or else a "deference-to-the-other gate" (provisionally putting it so in deference to another school's way of speaking); it is not really the case that view-clinging governs only "most supreme" and precept-clinging only "purity." How do we know they cannot be split rigidly? Turn it around and it becomes clear: "to mistake what is not the truth-of-cessation for the truth-of-cessation, and to mistake what is not the path for the path" — this kind of grasping the treatise plainly judges to be "wrong view," and does not gather it into the two clingings — which shows that the sense "able to win purity" does not belong to precept-clinging alone; otherwise, the kind that "reckons a non-path as the path, supposing it able to win purity" should long since have counted as precept-clinging.

In what precedes, the root afflictions were "in general" said to be six (greed, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, bad view), and then "bad view," that one of them, was split into five (body, extreme, wrong, view-clinging, precept-clinging); spreading them out thus "in particular," and joining them together, they come to ten. These ten afflictions, by the manner of their arising, can be sorted into two batches.

The first batch is six — greed, anger, delusion, conceit, plus body-view and extreme-view — these six "have both the innate and the discriminated": they can arise "spontaneously" (of themselves, born along with one, welling up naturally), and can also arise by "reflective examination" (through later deliberation and reckoning, brought on by wrong doctrines).

The second batch is four — doubt, plus the last three views (wrong view, view-clinging, precept-clinging) — these four "have only the discriminated kind": they can arise only after meeting the influence of bad friends or wrong teaching and then doing a round of pondering and reckoning oneself (born along with one they will never be).

〔The innate within the extreme-view · one view · only the annihilationist〕 Above it was said that the extreme-view too extends to the "innate" (the kind born along with one). But within the extreme-view, do both the annihilationist and the eternalist count? One party says: the innate extreme-view is only the "annihilationist" kind. Their reasons are three. First, the eternalist view is "coarse in character" (its character is coarse, requiring a stretch of reasoning before it can be grasped), and must be drawn forth by such outer forces as bad friends, which shows the eternalist view is not innate. Second, the Yogācārabhūmi's question-and-answer already said: "Which extreme-view is innate? Answer: it is subsumed under the annihilationist view." Third, take it from experience — one who is newly learning "direct contemplation" (rightly contemplating the truth) will often have a wave of fear well up: "Now this self of mine — where on earth is the self?" (afraid of finding no self, afraid the self is gone); and even beasts, meeting some peril, all instinctively fear "I am about to be annihilated, about to lose my life" and start up in alarm — this dread of "annihilation" is inborn, which shows the innate extreme-view leans to the annihilationist side.

〔Another view · the eternalist too can be innate〕 Another party says: the Yogācārabhūmi passage that party cited — "the innate extreme-view is only the annihilationist" — is in fact a statement of the Yogācārabhūmi "made with respect to the coarse side" (singling out only the conspicuous kind); pressed to the bottom, the innate extreme-view is not the annihilationist alone, but extends to the eternalist as well. How is this seen? Look at beasts: they too inborn-ly grasp "I will go on living long and long," and so they scrape together for dear life, hoarding and laying in provisions for years on end — this drive of "I can abide eternally" is precisely the innate eternalist view. The Xianyang and other treatises also say: "Upon the five appropriated aggregates one grasps annihilation, reckons eternity, which may be innate or may be discriminated" — which shows the eternalist view likewise has an innate side.

〔The gates of the root afflictions〕

〔The concurrence gate〕 (Question: can these ten afflictions arise together in one and the same thought-moment of mind?) First, "greed" — with whom it can pair and with whom it cannot.

Greed and anger, and greed and doubt, definitely do not arise together. Why? Greed is craving, anger is hatred, and the objects these two minds of "craving" and "hatred" face are exactly opposite, so they cannot stick to the same object at the same time — hence greed and anger do not arise together. As for doubt, it cannot make up its mind about its object; and since it is still wavering, unable to settle, there is no question of sticking fast — hence greed and doubt do not arise together either (one must stick fast for it to be greed, and when half-believing-half-doubting one cannot stick).

Greed and conceit, and greed and view, can sometimes pair and sometimes not. First, when they cannot: conceit is "looking down on others" (despising, wanting to overtop others), and the object conceit looks down on is often not the same as the object greed craves, and at such times greed and conceit do not go together. Then, when they can: but if "what is craved" (what greed loves) and "what is relied on" (what conceit leans on) happen to be the very same thing (for instance, both loving and self-relying on this self), then greed and conceit can arise together. As for greed and "view" (the five views), the objects of those five views can all be taken up as something to crave (a person cannot even bear to give up his own wrong view, but craves it greedily), so greed can be concurrent with all five views, with no obstruction.

Next, with whom "anger" can pair.

Anger and conceit, and anger and doubt, can sometimes go together and sometimes not. First, conceit: if the object anger hates and the object conceit leans on are not the same thing, then anger and conceit do not pair; but if "the one despised" and "the one hated" happen to be the same (despising him on one hand and hating him on the other), then anger and conceit arise together. Next, doubt: in the moment a person first starts to doubt, still wavering, no hatred has yet arisen, and at that time anger and doubt do not go together; but when, after pondering a long while, he still cannot settle, his heart frets and then flares into fire, and at that time anger and doubt do join up — and doubting "agreeable things" or doubting "disagreeable things" both follow this same principle, settling according to the case.

Anger and those two clingings (view-clinging, precept-clinging) definitely cannot pair. Because the two clingings grasp that set of views, that set of precepts, as "the most brilliant, the right path"; and since they hold it up high, they will not hate it, so anger cannot get in.

Anger and those three views (body-view, extreme-view, wrong view) can sometimes pair. Look at it case by case: (1) if upon an "agreeable body-and-mind" (a pleasure-aggregate) one raises a body-view or eternalist view (grasping self or grasping eternity upon a pleasant object), the mind is at ease and no hatred arises, and at that time anger does not pair. (2) If upon a "suffering body-and-mind" (a suffering-aggregate) one raises a body-view or eternalist view (grasping self or grasping eternity upon a suffering-laden object), the mind is repelled and hatred arises, and at that time anger does pair. (3) The annihilationist view reckons just the reverse (grasping annihilation upon a suffering object is, on the contrary, at ease; grasping annihilation upon a pleasant object, on the contrary, rouses hatred), so the annihilationist view paired with anger is likewise sometimes present, sometimes absent. (4) As for wrong view, on one side it slanders bad things (denying outright bad causes and bad effects, with no hatred in the heart at that point), and on the other it slanders good things too (denying outright good causes and good effects, and then it carries hatred) — so wrong view paired with anger, following these two sides, is likewise sometimes absent, sometimes present.

Next, "conceit" and "doubt": conceit holds its object firmly fixed (settled that oneself is precisely high), whereas doubt cannot settle on its object at all — one resolute, one wavering, exact opposites, so conceit and doubt cannot pair.

Conceit and those five views can, on the whole, all arise together, because the ways they operate do not clash with one another. There is only one exception: conceit and the "annihilationist view" definitely do not arise together — for when you are clinging to "I am about to be annihilated, I am gone," where would any drive of "self-exalting, self-relying" still spring from? With no "self" to rely on, conceit cannot arise. And along with this, conceit and the 〔annihilation-grasping〕 portion within the "body-view" and "wrong view" likewise cannot pair.

Next, "doubt" and "view": doubt cannot settle, whereas view is "decisive judgment" (biting down firmly, fixing on something and inferring from it) — one shifting, one resolute, exact opposites, so doubt and those five views definitely do not arise together.

Next, the five views among themselves: they too definitely do not pair with one another, because view is itself a kind of discernment, and "within one and the same thought-moment of mind there are not two discernments," so two of the five views will not well up together.

Last, "delusion": delusion is definitely concurrent with each of the other nine afflictions — because for any single affliction to arise, behind it there must be this ignorance (delusion) propping it up, so delusion is everywhere.

〔Which consciousness concurrent〕 (Question: with which of the consciousnesses does each of these ten afflictions pair?) Take the consciousnesses one by one.

The eighth, the store-consciousness: not a single one (it is unobscured-indeterminate, undefiled, so all ten afflictions fail to pair with it).

The seventh, the manas: only four pair with it — that is, self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, self-love (these four are precisely what the next section will treat).

The sixth, the mind-consciousness: it has all ten (its power of discrimination is the strongest, so any affliction can arise in it).

The first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body): only three pair with them — greed, anger, delusion. Why only these three? Because the first five consciousnesses "have no discrimination" (they only take in the present object, and do not reckon or compare-and-infer); whereas conceit, doubt, view, and the like must rely on such discriminating functions as "weighing" (gauging, comparing) in order to arise, and the first five consciousnesses cannot do that work — so conceit, doubt, and view all fail to enter the first five consciousnesses.

〔Which feeling concurrent〕 (Question: with which kinds of "feeling" — the five: suffering, pleasure, sorrow, joy, equanimity — does each of these ten afflictions pair?)

First, greed, anger, delusion, these three (whether innate or discriminated): all five feelings can pair with them. For example: greed normally pairs with pleasure and joy, but once greed meets an unwelcome object (craving without getting), it follows up with sorrow and suffering; anger normally pairs with sorrow and suffering, but once anger meets a welcome object (hating to good purpose, venting one's spleen), it follows up with joy and pleasure — so all five feelings get through.

〔What feeling conceit pairs with · two views〕 One view: conceit (whether innate or discriminated) can pair with the four feelings "other than suffering" (pleasure, joy, sorrow, equanimity); and as for the case of self-relying upon a suffering-laden, inferior body-and-mind, it pairs with "sorrow." Another view: innate conceit can pair even with "suffering" — because the "mind-ground" (the layer of the sixth mind-consciousness) does have a suffering-feeling, as was already said before. One more point to add: discriminated conceit and the like afflictions are absent in the "pure-suffering destinies" (that is, the hells), because there are no bad teachers or wrong teaching there to perfume them (discriminated afflictions must be perfumed to arise); however, this said, precisely because hell beings have only innate afflictions and cannot raise discriminated ones, they do not, while in hell, go on producing new karma that "summons a bad destiny" (it takes a discriminated affliction to set such drawing-karma in motion).

Next, doubt and the last three views (wrong view, view-clinging, precept-clinging): they can pair with four feelings. For instance, doubt in the desire-realm, besides not pairing with suffering, can pair even with the joy-feeling; and those two clingings, if they arise by referring to a view that was itself accompanied by sorrow, then at that moment pair with "sorrow" as well.

〔What feeling the body-view and extreme-view pair with · again two views〕 One view: the innate body-view and extreme-view pair only with the three feelings joy, pleasure, and equanimity; for they do not arise together with the first five consciousnesses (they do not fall to the layer of suffering-and-pleasure at the level of the five consciousnesses), and they are always "of indeterminate nature" (neither wholesome nor unwholesome, so they do not pair with sorrow and suffering, the two feelings carrying a good-or-evil weight). As for the discriminated body-view and extreme-view, they can pair with four feelings: for instance, grasping a suffering-laden body-and-mind as self or what-belongs-to-self (this pairs with sorrow); and the eternalist and annihilationist views are reckoned the reverse of this (when grasped amiss they too carry sorrow), so they pair with "sorrow" as well. Another view: the body-view and extreme-view, if innate, can pair even with "suffering" — because in a place of pure suffering-undergoing, referring to an extremely suffering-laden body-and-mind, this innate self-view pairs with "suffering." The treatise also says, "every innate affliction without exception can be found manifestly active within the three feelings of suffering, pleasure, and equanimity," and the detail is just as said before.

The above was the fine division by "real meaning" (the strictest, most ultimate layer of principle). If one switches to a way of speaking that goes only by "the coarse character" (the rough, easy-to-grasp side), it is simpler: greed, conceit, and the four views (those among the body, extreme, wrong, and view-clinging-and-precept-clinging) pair with pleasure, joy, and equanimity; anger pairs only with suffering, sorrow, and equanimity; delusion pairs with all five feelings; wrong view and doubt pair with four feelings (only not pairing with suffering).

Next, dividing by "ground" (the layer upon layer of stations within the three realms) the scope of "pairing with the pleasure-feeling": the "pairing-with-pleasure" of greed and delusion, these two, extends to the lower four grounds — that is, the desire-realm, plus the first, second, and third dhyānas; the "pairing-with-pleasure" of the remaining seven (other than anger) must drop the desire-realm and extend only to those three grounds in the form-realm (the first, second, third dhyānas). Furthermore, doubt and "solitary-running delusion" (the kind of delusion that pairs with no other affliction and arises on its own) in the desire-realm pair only with the two feelings sorrow and equanimity; and as for the rest of the feelings they pair with, infer it by the foregoing principle and it will be clear.

〔Concurrence with the object-specific〕 (Question: can these ten afflictions arise together with the five "object-specific" mental factors — aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, discernment?)

Greed, anger, delusion, conceit, these four, can pair with all five of the object-specific (even with "concentration," for when a person fixes attention intently on a single object, there is a component of concentration).

Doubt, and those five views, can each pair with only four of them. Doubt must drop "resolve" — because resolve is "settled, unshakable," whereas doubt is "unable to settle," the two being exact opposites and unable to pair. The five views must drop "discernment" — because view is itself a kind of defiled discernment and is of one piece with discernment; being itself discernment, it cannot, and need not, pair with a "further," separate discernment on top.

〔The three-natures gate〕 (Question: reckoned by the three natures — wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate — to which nature does each of these ten afflictions belong?)

Anger can only be "unwholesome" (purely bad), because it harms both oneself and others. The remaining nine extend to both "unwholesome" and "indeterminate," depending on the case:

First, the afflictions in the upper two realms (form-realm, formless-realm) are uniformly reckoned "indeterminate" — because in those two realms the power of concentration presses down the coarse evil, and even when the afflictions arise they are fine and subtle, with no question of doing evil.

Second, those of the desire-realm that are "discriminated" are reckoned "unwholesome" — because they set various bad conduct in motion.

Third, those of the desire-realm that are "innate" must be divided into two further sorts: those that set bad conduct in motion are likewise reckoned "unwholesome" (harming self and others just the same); the remaining innate afflictions that do not set bad conduct in motion are reckoned "indeterminate" — because they are very subtle, not so as to block the wholesome dharmas, nor so as to harshly afflict and injure oneself and others.

Last, one should know: the innate body-view and extreme-view are reckoned only "indeterminate" — they do not set bad karma in motion; though they arise manifestly all day long, they do not block the wholesome from arising, so they are judged indeterminate.

〔The realm-binding gate〕 (Question: to which of the three realms does each of these ten afflictions belong? And can they cross realms to refer to another ground?)

First, their belonging: anger is found only in the desire-realm (the upper two realms, by the power of concentration, do not give rise to anger); the remaining nine extend to all three realms.

Next, what conditions are required for them to "arise manifestly." For one who dwells in a lower ground and has not yet left the defilement of the lower ground, the afflictions of an upper ground will not arise manifestly in him — one must first cultivate and attain "the root concentration of that ground," and only then have the afflictions of that ground a chance to arise manifestly. (Here a principle is added: cultivating concentration by the "contaminated path," though it cannot press down the discriminated afflictions or the subtle innate afflictions, can press down the coarse ones among the innate, and pressing them down step by step, one gradually realizes upward to the root concentration of the upper ground.) Conversely, for one already born into an upper ground, both the discriminated and the innate afflictions of the lower ground may arise manifestly in him — for instance, a person born in the fourth dhyāna, at the "intermediate-existence" stage, when about to fall back and be reborn in a lower ground, will raise that birth-moistening innate greed-craving (which draws one back down to take rebirth in the lower ground).

Next, "cross-ground referring." First, that lower-ground afflictions can refer up to an upper ground: the Yogācārabhūmi says "the greed bound to the desire-realm will crave to be born into an upper ground, will crave-savor the concentration of an upper ground"; and for instance the anger that hates-and-envies the truth-of-cessation and the truth-of-the-path, the view that refers comprehensively to all formations and grasps self, what-belongs-to-self, annihilation, or eternity, and conceit too — these can all refer up to an upper ground; that the remaining five can refer to an upper ground also follows as a matter of course. (Some places say "greed, anger, conceit, and such do not refer to an upper ground"; that is said with respect to the coarse side, or with respect to one particular mode of referring, and is not the general rule.) Next, that upper-ground afflictions can refer down to a lower ground: a person born in an upper ground will, relying on his lofty station and superior virtue, look down with conceit on the beings below (this is conceit referring downward); and that which refers comprehensively to all formations and grasps self, what-belongs-to-self, annihilation, eternity, or raises greed-craving can all refer down to a lower ground as well. As for whether doubt and the last three views can refer to a lower ground, infer it by this principle and it will be clear. (Some places say "an upper ground does not refer to a lower ground"; that too is said with respect to the majority of cases, or with respect to one particular mode of referring.)

〔The trainee-and-the-rest gate〕 (Question: do these ten afflictions count as "trainee" or "non-trainee"? — "trainee" being a noble one still on the path of cultivation, "non-trainee" being an arhat whose training is complete.) Answer: they count as neither. Because the two, "trainee" and "non-trainee," both speak of pure, wholesome dharmas, whereas these ten are afflictions, are defiled, so they cannot be slotted in.

〔The severed-by-seeing-or-cultivation gate〕 (Question: are these ten afflictions severed at the "path of seeing," or at the "path of cultivation"?) First, one possibility is ruled out: they are not "non-severable" — by "non-severable" is meant a dharma pure and undefiled, not needing to be severed at all, whereas these ten are defiled and so of course must be severed.

Next, they divide into two sorts: the "discriminated" are severed only at the "path of seeing" — because they are coarse and easy to sever (once one sees the truth, these later-perfumed wrong graspings collapse at once). The "innate" are severed only at the "path of cultivation" — because they are subtle and hard to sever (born along with one, deep-rooted and tangled, to be ground away bit by bit through the path of cultivation).

Last, one point to add: those ten that are "severed by the path of seeing" are, at the "true path of seeing" (the very moment of personally realizing the truth), in fact all severed at once (not severed one by one, slowly), because the true path of seeing "refers comprehensively to the four truths" (in one stroke it illumines and breaks through the truth of all four truths), so the view-afflictions that delude the four truths are all severed clean together.

As for why these afflictions severed by the path of seeing are judged to "delude the four truths": this "deluding the truths" can be spoken of from two angles — one a general statement (the "general"), one an item-by-item statement (the "particular").

First the general (the "general"): these ten afflictions can each be said to delude all four truths — for the truth-of-suffering and the truth-of-origin are the "cause and basis on which they arise" (the afflictions arise clinging to those two contaminated objects, suffering and origin), and the truth-of-cessation and the truth-of-the-path are the "place they dread and flee" (the moment the afflictions see the emancipating truth of cessation and the path, they fear it and flee). From this angle, all ten are hooked up with the four truths.

Next the item-by-item (the "particular"): this sorts by "which truth each frontally deludes." The body-view and the extreme-view, these two, delude only the "truth-of-suffering" — because they raise their grasping only at the "fruit-locus" (this very karmic-fruit body-and-mind), running squarely against the principle "empty, no-self," and "empty, no-self" is the content of the truth-of-suffering, so these two delude suffering alone. The remaining eight, by contrast, delude all four truths. Look closely at how they delude: doubt, and the three views (wrong view, view-clinging, precept-clinging), directly and frontally delude the principle of the "truth-of-suffering"; those two clingings (view-clinging, precept-clinging) grasp those three views, that set of precepts-and-observances, and the body-and-mind five aggregates that prop them up, as "the most supreme, able to win purity," and so toward one's own view, others' views, and the retinues of these, they raise, in turn, greed, anger, and conceit (so greed, anger, and conceit too follow along in deluding suffering); as for the "concurrent ignorance" yoked to these nine, it deludes along with these nine, while that "ignorance that pairs with no other and arises on its own" (the uncommon ignorance) directly and frontally deludes the principle of the truth-of-suffering.

Not deluding suffering only: doubt and wrong view can also directly and frontally delude the "truth-of-origin" and the rest of the remaining three truths; how the two clingings and greed and the rest delude the truth-of-origin and the others, infer it by analogy with the foregoing pattern of deluding suffering and it will be clear. Last, one more point to add: anger too can directly and frontally delude the "truth-of-cessation and the truth-of-the-path" — because the moment it sees the emancipating truth of cessation and the path it dreads it, and dreading it gives rise to hatred and envy, and this hatred-envy pounces squarely upon cessation and the path.

The "direct deluding (near)" and "indirect deluding (far)" spoken of above is still only the coarse side; to put it more finely, one must single out the "innate" ones for separate examination. The innate portions among greed, anger, conceit, the three views, and doubt — their deluding-the-truths situation likewise follows what was said before, fitted to each case.

Here two kinds must be picked out that "though they delude the truth-of-suffering, are not severed at the path of seeing but held over to be severed at the path of cultivation": the first kind is the innate body-view, extreme-view, and the craving, conceit, and ignorance yoked to them — these, though they too delude the truth-of-suffering, are subtle and hard to sever, so they are not severed at the path of seeing but are to be severed only at the path of cultivation. The second kind is anger and the remaining greed-craving and the like — these arise "referring to particular concrete things, one by one" (the "particular things," not aimed at the truth of the four truths), and do not get in the way of one's right contemplation of the four truths, so they too belong to "what is severed by the path of cultivation."

Last, divide them into three sets from the angle of the "object referred to."

The first set, dividing by whether there is a "substance" behind it or not. Every affliction, when it arises, floats up in the mind an "image-part" (the image that it refers to); but behind this image, whether there is a real "substance" propping it up (the thing leaned on, which casts up the image) is not fixed — sometimes there is, sometimes there is not. By this difference, afflictions are divided into the two kinds "referring to a thing that exists" (a substance behind) and "referring to a thing that does not exist" (no substance behind).

The second set, dividing by whether the substance is contaminated or uncontaminated. The image that the affliction directly refers to at the moment is, to be sure, always contaminated (the affliction itself is defiled); but the substance it leans on behind can extend even to the uncontaminated (for instance, when the affliction refers to the truth-of-cessation or the truth-of-the-path, what it leans on is an uncontaminated dharma). By this difference, afflictions are again divided into the two kinds "referring to the contaminated" and "referring to the uncontaminated."

The third set, dividing by whether the image and the substance resemble each other. When referring to an object of "one's own ground," the image that floats up in the mind looks like that substance, and this is called "referring to a thing-object set up by discrimination" (what is referred to is an object with a real thing behind it); but when referring to an object of "the truth-of-cessation, the truth-of-the-path," or of "another ground," the image and the substance do not look alike (because cessation-and-path and another ground are not what one has experienced first-hand, and can only be modeled in imagination by way of names), and this is called "referring to a name-object set up by discrimination" (what is referred to is only an object modeled out of name-and-terms). As for the other modes of dividing besides these, infer them by this principle and it will be clear.

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〔Verses commented〕Verses 13–14 · the secondary afflictions

〔The verses expounded〕

The secondary defilements are: anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess; deceit, flattery, together with harming, arrogance, lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread, agitation and torpor, lack-of-faith together with indolence (v13); heedlessness and loss-of-mindfulness, distraction, improper-knowing; the indeterminate are regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought — the two, each in two (v14).

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A. The Twenty Secondary Defilements

The marks of the six root defilements have already been told above. Then what of the marks of these "secondary defilements" (the second-tier defilements that arise following the root ones)? The verse answers as above: anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harming, arrogance, lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, agitation, torpor, lack-of-faith, indolence, heedlessness, loss-of-mindfulness, distraction, improper-knowing — twenty in all.

The treatise says: these twenty dharmas are, one and all, merely the "positional differentiations" of the root defilements (the various distinct guises one and the same root defilement shows in differing situations) and their "outflow-kind" (dharmas that flow out of a root defilement and are of one kind with it); and just because they arise only "following" the root defilements, they are called "secondary defilements." These twenty are sorted into three classes by how widely they "spread out" when they arise: (1) anger and the [other] ten arise each on its own, never two together at once, and are called the "minor secondary defilements"; (2) lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread, these two, are present in every unwholesome mind without exception, and are called the "middling secondary defilements"; (3) agitation and the [other] eight are present in every defiled mind without exception, and are called the "major secondary defilements."

1. Anger (忿)

What is "anger"? It is, when one meets a present object that goes against one and comes to harm and vex one, that surge of "indignant bursting-forth" in the mind — this is its "nature" (what it is in itself). Its function (its "business") has two sides: one, it blocks "non-anger" (the wholesome mind that does not flare up); two, it "takes up a cudgel" (snatches up sticks and weapons); for a person who harbors anger in the mind will, on that account, often issue violent bodily actions (that is, conduct outwardly manifested in the body). And as for its "substance" (what it is at bottom): anger is in fact just a small portion of "ill-will" (resentment) — apart from ill-will there is no separate anger to speak of.

2. Enmity (恨)

What is "enmity"? It has "anger" go ahead of it as its vanguard, and then it harbors that evil thought in the mind and will not let it go, binding it into a grudge — this "binding of a grudge" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-enmity," and it makes one "burn-and-fret" (an inner anguish, as though roasted over a fire); for one who has bound up enmity cannot bear and forbear, and is forever scorched by this burning fret. Its substance is likewise a small portion of ill-will; apart from ill-will there is no separate enmity.

3. Concealment (覆)

What is "concealment" (covering up, hiding away)? It is that, having committed a fault oneself, one fears that if it came to light one would lose advantage and ruin one's good name, and so one "hides it away" — this hiding is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-concealment" (the wholesome mind that does not hide, that is at ease), and it brings on "regret-and-fret"; for one who covers up a fault will surely, afterward, repent and fret over it and find no inner ease.

〔The substance of concealment · first view · merely a portion of delusion〕 One view: concealment counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (that is, ignorance, muddle-headedness). The grounds are two: first, the treatise says only that concealment is a portion of delusion; second, one who covers up a fault dares to hide his sin precisely because he does not fear the future suffering it brings — and this "not fearing the suffering to come" is just the look of muddle-headedness (delusion).

〔It should be known · the correct view · a portion of both greed and delusion〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): concealment is in fact a small portion of both "greed" and "delusion." For one who covers up a fault also hides his sin out of "fear of losing advantage and ruining his good name" — and this "fearing the loss of advantage and name" component belongs to greed. Then why does the treatise say only that it is a portion of delusion? That is merely speaking from its most conspicuous, coarsest side. Take a ready comparison: the treatise also once said "agitation is a portion of greed," yet the treatise goes on to say "agitation is present in every defiled mind without exception" — and since it is present in all alike, one cannot doggedly insist that agitation is only a portion of greed (else a defiled mind without greed should have no agitation). The principle of concealment is the same: one cannot, just because the treatise pointed out only one side, doggedly insist it is only a portion of delusion.

4. Vexation (惱)

What is "vexation"? It has "anger" and "enmity" go ahead of it as its vanguard, and then, raking up the old evils of the past on one side and running into present things that go against one on the other, there boils up in the mind a fierce, hot fury, and one turns "savage-and-perverse" (vicious, hot-tempered, contrary) — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-vexation," and it "stings" (wounds others as a wasp or scorpion stings); for a person who rakes up old evils and runs besides into present things that go against him grows savage in mind, and will often let loose blustering, violent, coarse and vile words to wound others. Its substance is likewise a small portion of ill-will; apart from ill-will there is no separate vexation.

5. Envy (嫉)

What is "envy"? It is to chase single-mindedly after one's own name and gain, unable to bear another's doing well — so that the moment another flourishes and prospers one cannot stand it, and "jealousy" rises up; this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-envy," and it brings on "grief-and-sorrow" (a melancholy distress); for the envious person, the moment he hears or sees another's success, deeply harbors a sorrowful distress and cannot sit still. Its substance is likewise a small portion of ill-will; apart from ill-will there is no separate envy.

6. Stinginess (慳)

What is "stinginess" (miserliness, grudging)? It is to clutch at goods and at "dharmas" (the principles and learning one knows oneself) and not let go, unwilling to use wisdom to give in charity, and so to "secretly hoard and tightly begrudge" — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-stinginess," and it makes one "meanly hoard" (pettily pile things up without end); for the miser is narrow and astringent of mind, knowing only how to pile up goods and dharmas, never able to give them out. Its substance is a small portion of "greed-and-craving"; apart from greed there is no separate stinginess.

7. Deceit (誑)

What is "deceit" (cheating, putting on a false front)? It is, in order to grab advantage and win a name, to fake a show of being a person of great virtue, and so to "swindle and defraud" — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-deceit," and it brings about "wrong livelihood" (making a living by improper means); for this play-acting person harbors other schemes in his mind, and often performs all manner of dishonest, swindling-livelihood doings. Its substance is a small portion of both "greed" and "delusion" (greedy for gain on one side, muddle-headed on the other); apart from these two there is no separate deceit.

8. Flattery (諂)

What is "flattery" (fawning, currying favor)? It is, in order to net another and snare him fast on one's own side, deliberately to put on all manner of unnatural airs, so that the heart within is "treacherous and crooked" — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-flattery," and it "obstructs instruction" (makes one unable to take in proper teaching). How so? The fawning, crooked person, to snare another fast, trims his sails to the wind and bends to please, deliberately contriving all sorts of ploys, in order to win the other's favor or to cover over his own faults; and once he does this, he can no longer take in the proper instruction of teachers and friends. Its substance is likewise a small portion of both greed and delusion; apart from these two there is no separate flattery.

9. Harming (害)

What is "harming"? It is to have not a scrap of compassion in the mind toward sentient beings, wanting only to "injure and torment" them — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-harming," and it "presses-and-torments" (oppresses and afflicts) others; for one with a harming mind means just to press and torment others. Its substance is likewise a small portion of ill-will; apart from ill-will there is no separate harming. As for how "ill-will" and "harming" are told apart, one may follow the method of the earlier chapter on the wholesome mental factors — there it was distinguished that "non-ill-will" is "giving others happiness" and "non-harming" is "pulling out others' suffering"; conversely, ill-will cuts off another's happiness, and harming adds to another's suffering — that is the difference between the two.

10. Arrogance (憍)

What is "arrogance" (self-satisfaction, being carried away with oneself)? It is to fall deeply infatuated and attached over one's own various points of glory (youth, wealth and power, cleverness and ability, and so on), and so to be "drunk-and-haughty" (giddily elated as if drunk, full of an overbearing air) — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-arrogance," and it becomes a "ground of defilement" (a hotbed of all manner of defiled dharmas); for the person carried away with himself will breed and grow every kind of defiled dharma. Its substance is likewise a small portion of greed-and-craving; apart from greed there is no separate arrogance.

11. Lack-of-shame (無慚)

What is "lack-of-shame"? It is that a person gives no heed to himself, and no heed to the true Dharma either, and so "slights and rejects the worthy and the good" — this is its nature. Its function: it obstructs "shame" (the wholesome mind that reflects and reproaches itself), and it "breeds and grows evil deeds" (rears up one bad deed after another); for a person who gives not the least heed to himself or to the true Dharma will slight and reject the worthy and good, will not take faults and evils for a disgrace, and so presses "shame" down and rears up every kind of evil deed.

12. Lack-of-dread (無愧)

What is "lack-of-dread"? It is that a person gives no heed to the world's ridicule and reproach, but on the contrary "esteems and prizes the violent and the evil" (takes bad people and bad deeds for good) — this is its nature. Its function: it obstructs "dread" (the wholesome mind that fears others' censure, that fears losing face), and it "breeds and grows evil deeds"; for a person who cares not at all for the world's eyes will esteem and prize the violent and evil, will not take faults and crimes for a disgrace, and so presses "dread" down and rears up every kind of evil deed.

"Not taking faults and evils for a disgrace" is the shared mark of these two, lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread (both have this side); and so the sacred teachings will at times conventionally take this "shamelessness" as their substance in describing them.

〔Q · someone maintains "shamelessness" is the distinguishing mark of each of the two〕 Suppose someone doggedly takes "not taking [faults] for a disgrace" as the distinguishing mark of each (that is, that lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread each have "shamelessness" for their own proper mark); then a string of untenable consequences follows —

First, the substances of these two could no longer be told apart (if both take the same "shamelessness" as their own mark, would lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread not be one and the same?).

Second, the substances being thus without difference, these two dharmas ought to "not arise together" — just as "feeling" and "conception" do, where there is no such thing as the two arising side by side at once (two dharmas whose proper marks are identical do not arise apart in one mind). Yet in fact lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread do, precisely, arise together at once.

Third, suppose you change the account and tell the two apart by the two heads "toward oneself" and "toward others" (lack-of-shame toward self, lack-of-dread toward other); then they become "mutually-dependent" conventional dharmas, existing only relative to each other, and not really-existent things — and this again contradicts the sacred teaching (which says lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread are both really existent).

Fourth, suppose you step back and concede they are really existent and each arises on its own; this again contradicts the treatise's saying that "lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread are present in every unwholesome mind without exception" (since they are present in all alike and always appear together, one cannot say they each arise on their own). 〔In sum, the road "shamelessness is the distinguishing mark of each" cannot be made to work, go which way you will.〕

〔A〕 In fact, when an unwholesome mind arises, whatever object it takes, that object carries two layers of sense at once: one layer is "slighting and rejecting the good" (this is the lack-of-shame side), one layer is "esteeming and prizing the evil" (this is the lack-of-dread side). And so these two dharmas are present in every unwholesome mind without exception, and take one and the same object — that being so, there is no fault of "each arising on its own" at all (no need for the two to arise apart side by side; they always appear together as a matter of course).

Then how is the line in the sacred teachings, "giving no heed to self, giving no heed to other," to be understood? Here "self" means "oneself and the true Dharma" (which lack-of-shame gives no heed to), and "other" means "the world" (which lack-of-dread gives no heed to). Or, put another way: take this "rejecting the good, esteeming the evil" by whether it benefits or harms oneself — focused on one's own gain and loss, it is called "self"; focused on the outer world, it is called "other"; this too is merely a convenient way of naming. And as for the treatise's saying that "lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread are a portion of greed and the like," the meaning is that these two are of one kind flowing out (the outflow-kind) of greed and the like — it is not to say that they themselves have greed and the like for their substance.

13. Agitation (掉舉)

What is "agitation" (mental restlessness, the inability to settle)? It is to make the mind unable to settle down at all toward its object — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "equanimity-in-action" (the wholesome mind that lets the mind rest calm and at ease), and it blocks "śamatha" (that is, "calm-abiding," the practice of settling the mind down).

〔The substance of agitation · first view · merely a portion of greed〕 One view: agitation counts only as a small portion of "greed." The grounds are two: first, the treatise says only that agitation is a portion of greed; second, agitation arises by one's recalling some pleasant matter of the past — and to savor pleasures belongs to greed.

〔Second view · every defiled mind has it, and it is a shared mark of the defilements〕 Another view: agitation is not only a portion of greed. The grounds: first, the treatise says agitation is present in every defiled mind without exception (if it were only greed, it should not be in every defiled mind — a defiled mind without greed should have none of it); second, the mark of agitation is "the failure to settle," and the treatise places this "failure to settle" within "the mark shared by all the defilements," and besides, agitation apart from this "failure to settle" can find no separate mark of its own. So this view's conclusion is: agitation is "conventionally set up by leaning on all the defilements" (having no substance of its own), only at the time "greed holds sway" agitation stands out especially, and so it is spoken of, leaningly, as a portion of greed — not that it is only greed.

〔It should be known · the correct view · agitation has a substance of its own〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): agitation has a really-existent substance of its own, and is present in every defiled mind without exception — just like "lack-of-faith" and the rest (lack-of-faith too is in every defiled mind, yet has a substance of its own). One cannot, just because the treatise calls it "a portion of greed and the like," conclude that it has no substance; were one to argue so, then "lack-of-faith" and the rest would likewise turn out to be conventional (yet lack-of-faith is plainly really existent). Then why does the treatise also say agitation is "conventionally existent" (that is, conventionally set up)? This is just like "drowsiness" and the rest, a case of "speaking conventionally by following the coarse mark of what it leans on" (not that its substance is truly conventional). Agitation's own distinguishing mark is "tumult" (a clamorous, restless stirring): the moment it arises, the dharmas arising together with it all fail to settle along with it. 〔Refuting the foregoing view〕 If it really were as that earlier view said, that apart from the defilements there is no mark of agitation, then the treatise should not separately have set down the line "agitation obstructs śamatha (calm-abiding)" — since the treatise specially says it singly blocks "calm-abiding," it must have a single mark of its own. So "the failure to settle" is only agitation's mark shared with the other defilements, not its own distinguishing mark (its own distinguishing mark is "tumult").

14. Torpor (惛沈)

What is "torpor" (sluggishness, the inability to rouse oneself)? It is to make the mind "unable to put forth strength" toward its object (dull and sunken, heavy and blunt, unable to operate nimbly) — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "pliancy" (the wholesome mind of bodily and mental lightness and ease), and it blocks "vipaśyanā" (that is, "insight," the practice of seeing clearly into the principle of things).

〔The substance of torpor · first view · merely a portion of delusion〕 One view: torpor counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (muddle-headedness). The grounds are two: first, the treatise says only that torpor is a portion of delusion; second, that "dull-and-sunken, heavy-and-blunt" look is just the mark of muddle-headedness (the dimness that delusion is).

〔Second view · conventionally set up by leaning on all the defilements〕 Another view: torpor is not only a portion of delusion. The grounds: the mark of torpor is "the inability to put forth strength," yet all the defilements make the mind unable to put forth strength (not delusion alone does this), and besides, torpor apart from this "inability to put forth strength" can find no separate mark of its own. So torpor is "conventionally set up by leaning on all the defilements," only at "delusion" the mark of torpor stands out especially, and so it is spoken of singly as a portion of delusion — not that it is only delusion.

〔It should be known · the correct view · torpor has a substance of its own〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): torpor has a really-existent substance of its own; though it is named "a portion of delusion," it is in fact of one kind flowing out of delusion (the outflow-kind, just like "lack-of-faith" and the rest), and is not identical with delusion, nor taken in under delusion. The treatise's saying that it is "conventionally existent, spoken of conventionally by following the coarse mark of what it leans on" is just like "drowsiness" and the rest — yet its substance is really existent. Torpor's own distinguishing mark is "murky-heaviness" (a dim, sunken weight): the moment it arises, the dharmas arising together with it all become unable to put forth strength along with it. 〔Refuting the foregoing view〕 If it really were as that earlier view said, that apart from the defilements there is no mark of torpor, then the treatise should not separately have set down the line "torpor obstructs vipaśyanā (insight)"; so "the inability to put forth strength" is only its mark shared with the other defilements, not its own distinguishing mark (its own distinguishing mark is "murky-heaviness"). Further, the marks of torpor and of delusion are also not the same: delusion, toward its object, has "confused-darkness" (a befuddled inability to see clearly) for its mark, and what it directly blocks is "non-delusion" (clear understanding), not murky-heaviness; torpor, toward its object, has "murky-heaviness" (dim, sunken weight) for its mark, and what it directly blocks is "pliancy," not confused-darkness. So plainly each has its own mark, and each blocks its own wholesome dharma.

15. Lack-of-faith (不信)

What is "lack-of-faith"? It is, toward the three things "the real, the virtuous, the capable" (the true principle of things, the virtues of the Three Jewels, and one's own capacity to succeed in practice), to be unwilling to accept, to take no delight in, and to have no aspiration after — so that the mind is "befouled, unclean"; this "befoulment of mind" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "pure faith" (a clear, clean faith), and it becomes "a ground for indolence"; for one who lacks faith mostly drifts, along with it, into laziness and indolence.

The "three marks" of lack-of-faith become clear the moment one turns over the three marks of "faith" and reads them backward: faith is to affirm that the real exists, to take delight in seeing that there is virtue, to wish that oneself has the capacity; lack-of-faith is then to be unwilling to accept the real, to take no delight in virtue, and to have no aspiration after that capacity. Further, the several defiled dharmas each have their own proper mark, but this lack-of-faith alone is such that "its own mark is itself a befouling," and it can further befoul the other mind-kings and mental factors around it — just as one extremely filthy thing is itself filthy and besides befouls whatever other things it touches. And so it is said that lack-of-faith has "the befoulment of mind" (the making of mind unclean) for its nature.

It is precisely because of lack-of-faith that one is unwilling to accept, takes no delight in, and has no aspiration after "the real, the virtuous, the capable"; yet this "unwillingness to accept, taking no delight, having no aspiration" is not some other substance of lack-of-faith (it is merely the function that "befoulment of mind" gives rise to). Further: if a person comes to have a "perverse" acceptance, delight, and aspiration toward some other matter (giving his faith to wrong things, say), that is a cause-and-effect drawn out by lack-of-faith (something it brings along), and likewise not the substance of lack-of-faith itself.

16. Indolence (懈怠)

What is "indolence"? It is, in the two proper tasks of "cultivating the good that ought to be cultivated" and "severing the evil that ought to be severed," to be slack — this "laziness" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "vigor" (effortful striving toward the good), and it "increases defilement" (lets the defiled grow ever more); for the indolent person nourishes the defilements ever more rank.

Here three cases are to be told apart. First: a person who, on the contrary, throws himself eagerly and strenuously into defiled doings — this too is called "indolence," for by this very strenuousness he lets the good go (indolence does not mean only lying idle; straining hard toward the evil is indolence just the same). Second: a person who throws himself strenuously into "unmarked matters" (neutral matters, neither wholesome nor unwholesome) — this does not count as indolence, for on the side of "the good" he has neither advanced nor retreated, and that energy is merely "desire" (the will to do a thing) and "resolve" (the settled conviction to do it so) at work, and is not some other substance of indolence. Third, which may be set alongside for comparison: just as the "acceptance and willingness to do" that one has toward "unmarked matters" is neither pure nor defiled, so in this case there is no talk of "faith" or "lack-of-faith" either — by the same principle, the straining toward an unmarked matter is likewise no question of whether or not it is indolence.

17. Heedlessness (放逸)

What is "heedlessness" (letting oneself go, putting on no curb)? It is to be unable to guard against the defiled and unable to cultivate the pure good, the whole person "loose and unbridled" — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "non-heedlessness" (the wholesome mind that keeps careful watch over itself), and it becomes "a ground for rearing up evil and ruining good." And how does it come about? It comes about just when "indolence" together with "greed, ill-will, and delusion" — these four dharmas combined — fail to guard against the defiled and fail to cultivate the pure, and this whole state gathered up is called "heedlessness" — so heedlessness has no separate substance of its own (it is merely a general name for these four dharmas combined).

Someone may ask: do not "conceit, doubt," and the like also have a touch of this power to "fail to guard and fail to cultivate" — why are they not reckoned in? Answer: conceit, doubt, and the like, though they too have a slight measure of this power, are much feebler in force than those four (indolence, greed, ill-will, delusion); moreover those four are just what blocks the "three wholesome roots" (non-greed, non-ill-will, non-delusion), and are the "most widely-reaching" dharmas (indolence reaches the broadest field, and greed-ill-will-delusion are root defilements), and so only these four are taken as the substance of heedlessness. As for how the mark of heedlessness is to be probed out, one may understand it by the earlier chapter on "non-heedlessness" — the principle being: apart from those four dharmas there is no such thing to be found as "guarding and cultivating" at all, which shows that heedlessness has no separate substance of its own.

18. Loss-of-mindfulness (失念)

What is "loss-of-mindfulness" (failing to remember, woolgathering)? It is to be unable to keep the object clearly in mind and hold it fast — this is its nature. Its function: it blocks "right mindfulness" (holding the mind firmly upon the right object), and it becomes "a ground for distraction"; for in the person of lost mindfulness, the mind, along with it, scatters and falls into disorder.

〔The substance of loss-of-mindfulness · first view · a portion of "mindfulness"〕 One view: loss-of-mindfulness counts only as a small portion of "mindfulness" (memory, holding fast). The ground is that the treatise says loss-of-mindfulness is in fact "the kind of mindfulness that has gotten tangled up with the defilements" (mindfulness itself become defiled is loss-of-mindfulness).

〔Second view · a portion of "delusion"〕 Another view: loss-of-mindfulness counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (muddle-headedness). The ground is that the Yogācārabhūmi says it is a portion of delusion; it is muddle-headedness that loses the memory, and so it is called "loss-of-mindfulness."

〔It should be known · the correct view · a portion of both "mindfulness" and "delusion"〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): loss-of-mindfulness is a small portion of "mindfulness" and "delusion" combined. How so? Those two earlier passages (one speaking only of mindfulness, one only of delusion) are in fact "each taking one side, setting them off against each other" (not that it is only that one side, but a speaking-by-abridgement, each supplementing the other); besides, the treatise also says loss-of-mindfulness is present in every defiled mind — yet if one reckoned only the "mindfulness" portion it would not be in every defiled mind, and one must add the "delusion" portion to make it pervade all defiled mind. So both sides must be reckoned in.

19. Distraction (散亂)

What is "distraction"? It is, toward its objects, to let the mind "run hither and thither, unable to hold still" — this "drifting-and-roving" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "right concentration" (settling the mind in one place), and it becomes "a ground for evil discernment"; for the distracted person gives rise to a crooked, misapplied "evil discernment."

〔The substance of distraction · first view · a portion of "delusion"〕 One view: distraction counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (muddle-headedness). The ground is that the Yogācārabhūmi says it is a portion of delusion.

〔Second view · a portion of greed, ill-will, and delusion, all three〕 Another view: distraction should be reckoned a small portion of "greed, ill-will, delusion," the three combined — because the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the rest say it is "the three portions." Then why did the first view say only "a portion of delusion"? That was speaking from this one point, "it is in every defiled mind" (delusion pervades all defiled mind, so delusion is picked out to show that distraction pervades all); in fact the force with which greed, ill-will, and delusion, these three, let the mind run hither and thither is stronger than that of the other dharmas, and so these three combined are spoken of as distraction.

〔It should be known · the correct view · distraction has a substance of its own〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): distraction has a really-existent substance of its own. The treatise's calling it "the three portions" means that it is of one kind flowing out of greed-ill-will-delusion (the outflow-kind, just like "lack-of-shame" and the rest), and is not identical with those three, nor taken in under them; and its being "spoken of conventionally, called conventionally existent, by following the coarse mark [of what it leans on]" is on the same principle (not that its substance is truly conventional). Distraction's own distinguishing mark is "restless-stirring" (an agitated commotion): the moment it arises, the dharmas arising together with it all run hither and thither along with it. 〔Refuting the foregoing view〕 If it really were as that earlier view said, that apart from those three dharmas there is no substance of distraction's own, then the treatise should not separately have set down the line "distraction obstructs samādhi (concentration)" — since the treatise specially says it singly blocks "concentration," it must have a substance of its own.

〔Q〕 In what does the function of these two, agitation and distraction, differ? 〔A〕 Agitation makes the mind "switch its understanding" (now one notion, now another, the interpretive grasp forever changing), distraction makes the mind "switch its object" (the object it clings to forever jumping). It should be explained: within one and the same instant, the understanding and the object have not yet had time to change (an instant is too brief); but set against the run of one thought-moment succeeding another, one can see the understanding changing and the object jumping — and so the functions of these two can be told apart. When a defiled mind arises, it would, by the force of agitation and distraction, switch its understanding and switch its object thought-moment by thought-moment; unless some other force such as "mindfulness" (the power that holds the mind to the right object) reins it in, so that for a moment it does not switch — just as one ties up a gibbon with a rope to let it stop a while. Precisely for this reason agitation and distraction are present in every defiled mind and appear together (the two arising side by side, only one governing "switching the understanding" and one "switching the object" — they merely point in different directions).

20. Improper-knowing (不正知)

What is "improper-knowing"? It is, toward the object observed, to "understand it wrongly" (to take its sense amiss, to read it crookedly) — this "mistaken understanding" is its nature. Its function: it blocks "proper knowing" (a correct cognizing), and it brings about "transgression-and-violation" (the breaking of precepts and proper deportment); for the person who understands wrongly will often commit this transgression and that.

〔The substance of improper-knowing · first view · a portion of "discernment"〕 One view: improper-knowing counts only as a small portion of "discernment" (the faculty of judging and knowing). The ground is that the treatise says it is in fact "the kind of discernment that has gotten tangled up with the defilements" (discernment itself become defiled is improper-knowing).

〔Second view · a portion of "delusion"〕 Another view: improper-knowing counts only as a small portion of "delusion" (muddle-headedness). The ground is that the Yogācārabhūmi says it is a portion of delusion; it is muddle-headedness that twists what one knows awry, and so it is called "improper-knowing."

〔It should be known · the correct view · a portion of both "discernment" and "delusion"〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): improper-knowing is a small portion of "discernment" and "delusion" combined. How so? Those two earlier passages (one speaking only of discernment, one only of delusion) are in fact "each taking one side, speaking by abridgement, supplementing each other"; besides, the treatise also says improper-knowing is present in every defiled mind — and for this one must reckon in both portions, "discernment" and "delusion," to make it pervade all defiled mind.

〔Beyond the twenty · the name-sense of the secondary defilements〕

The verse used the three connectives "together with," "and," "and also" precisely to point out: the secondary defilements are not only these twenty — the Kṣudraka-vastu and the like also speak of many kinds of secondary defilement such as greed. Further, the name "secondary defilement" takes in the "root defilements" too (for the root defilements themselves also have this layer of "flowing out into their own kind," and so, broadly, count as secondary defilements as well); while as for the remaining defiled dharmas that are of one kind with the defilements, these can only be called "secondary defilements," and do not enter the circle of those six "root defilements."

Then why are just these twenty singled out as the secondary defilements here? Because they "are not root defilements" (they were not set up among those six roots), but are merely defiled dharmas, coarse and conspicuous. As for the remaining defiled dharmas, some are the distinct guises (positional differentiations) of these twenty in differing situations, some are the outflow-kind of these twenty, and all are gathered in under these twenty. Each is to be sorted by its class (the three classes minor, middling, major), and so, going by the principle, one can make it out.

〔The several gates of the secondary defilements〕

〔The gate of conventional and real〕

Among these twenty secondary defilements, which are "conventional" (having no substance of their own, merely set up by other dharmas combined) and which are "real" (having a substance of their own) is told cleanly apart: the minor ten (anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, harming, arrogance) and three of the major (heedlessness, loss-of-mindfulness, improper-knowing) are definitely conventional; lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread, lack-of-faith, indolence — these four are definitely real (this stands firm whether by the sacred teaching or by reasoning). The remaining three, agitation, torpor, distraction, one party calls conventional, one party calls real — the reasoning and teaching each side adduces have already been told in the three earlier sections on agitation, torpor, and distraction (that dispute over "whether or not it has a substance of its own").

〔The gate of innate and discriminated〕

These twenty are all of both modes of arising, "innate" and "discriminated" — that is, they may arise by the force of the "innate defilements" (defilements one is born with, present of themselves as a matter of course), and may arise by the force of the "discriminated defilements" (defilements perfumed in later by wrong views and wrong teaching), either way.

〔The gate of mutual co-arising〕

Among these twenty: the minor ten definitely do not arise together one with another (when one of them arises, the others do not). Why? Because, first, they are mutually opposed and cannot agree; second, their mode is coarse and fierce; third, each must "be its own master" — and one mind cannot hold two masters, so they can only arise one at a time.

The middling two (lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread) arise together with every unwholesome mind, and may also, as the case allows, arise together with the minor and the major. The treatise further says, "the major eight are present in every defiled mind"; and so the major, among themselves, and likewise with the minor and the middling, may all arise together at once.

The accounts of the treatises, however, run broad or narrow. Some places say "of the major, only six are present in every defiled mind," because torpor and agitation, when either swells, cannot arise together (one sinks down, one stirs up, just at cross purposes), and so these two are taken out, leaving six that pervade. And some places say outright "five pervade defiled mind," because torpor, agitation, and the like are at odds with pliancy and the rest, which exist "only in a wholesome mind" (on that footing one more is taken out, leaving five). In any case these major dharmas are all of defiled nature, and so none of them arises together with the eighth, the ālaya-consciousness (which is unobscured-and-unmarked, neither defiled nor pure).

In the seventh, the manas-consciousness, there are only the major eight; and as for which of these is taken and which left out in the fine distinctions, one can make it out by what was told above (innate, of defiled nature only, and so on). The sixth, the mental consciousness, is broad: all twenty entire may arise together with it.

The minor ten are coarse and fierce (they can only arise by way of discriminating and calculating), and so they are not present in the first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body — which do not discriminate or calculate); but the middling and the major are open to the five consciousnesses, and may be present in them. And just on this account, the middling and the major can be "associated with the five feelings" (the five feelings of pain, pleasure, sorrow, joy, equanimity) — for the first five consciousnesses are by nature open to the feelings of pain, pleasure, and the rest.

〔The gate of association with feeling〕

〔Which feelings the minor [defilements] go with · first view〕 One view: of the minor ten, setting aside the three flattery, deceit, arrogance, the remaining seven, anger and the rest (anger, enmity, concealment, vexation, envy, stinginess, harming), match up only with the three feelings "joy, sorrow, equanimity." As for the three flattery, deceit, arrogance, they match up with "four feelings" (that is, setting aside "pain," the other four joy, sorrow, pleasure, equanimity all do).

〔Second view〕 Another view: the seven, anger and the rest, match up with "four feelings" (this time setting aside "pleasure"); the three flattery, deceit, arrogance match up with all "five feelings." Why can flattery, deceit, arrogance reach the feeling of pain? Because "in the mind (the sixth mental consciousness) there is the feeling of pain too" — this point was already told in the earlier chapter on the root defilements. As for the fine marks of "which goes with which feeling," one may understand them by what was told in the earlier chapter on the root defilements.

The foregoing is the reckoning "by the exact principle." If one goes loosely "by the coarsest mark," then: anger, enmity, vexation, envy, harming go with "sorrow, equanimity"; concealment, stinginess go with "joy, equanimity"; the remaining three (flattery, deceit, arrogance) add to this a "pleasure" feeling besides. As for the middling and the major, even told only by the coarse mark, they are just as by the exact principle (there is no separate account of them).

〔The gate of association with the object-determined [factors]〕

These twenty secondary defilements may all arise together with the "five object-determined" (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, discernment); they are not mutually at odds. 〔Someone raises a doubt〕 Should not defiled mindfulness (that is, loss-of-mindfulness) and defiled discernment (that is, improper-knowing) be at cross purposes with the good "mindfulness" and "discernment"? How can they then arise together? 〔A〕 Loss-of-mindfulness and improper-knowing, though they do not arise side by side with mindfulness and discernment by taking those as their very substance, can yet, as regards the "delusion portion" they contain (their muddle-headed side), arise together with mindfulness and discernment all the same (it is not required that the substances be identical for them to go together). Besides, "mindfulness" as a mental factor can by nature take both the present object and an object of a kind formerly habituated; and "anger" can take an object just one instant past — both reaching to the past, and so anger and mindfulness can go together too. And the defiled "concentration" (the sort of concentration in a distracted state), when it arises, also has a restless, stirring mind, and so "distraction" arising together with "concentration" is no problem either.

〔The gate of association with the [root] defilements〕

The middling two and the major eight can all arise together with the ten root defilements. The minor ten, however, definitely do not arise together with "[wrong] view" (the several evil views) or "doubt" — because the look of the minor [defilements] is coarse and restless, while the look of [wrong] view and doubt is one of fine, careful investigation; one being coarse, one fine, they cannot be brought together.

Here they are matched one by one again: the five, anger and the rest (anger, enmity, vexation, envy, harming), can arise together with "conceit, delusion," but do not arise together with "greed, ill-will" — because they themselves are a portion of "ill-will" (first, ill-will to begin with does not arise together with greed; second, of course a thing does not arise together with itself, [ill-will]). Stinginess can arise together with "delusion, conceit," but not together with "greed, ill-will" — because it is a portion of "greed" (by the same token, greed does not arise with ill-will, nor with itself, [greed]). Arrogance arises together with "delusion" only; though it resembles "conceit," its sense is different (arrogance is being carried away by leaning on one's own glory, conceit is wanting to bully others), and besides arrogance is a portion of "greed" (and so it does not arise with greed). Concealment, deceit, flattery, these three, can arise together with "greed, delusion, conceit" — because their look does not clash with these, and because they themselves are a portion of "greed, delusion."

〔The gate of the three natures〕

Seven of the minor (anger, enmity, vexation, envy, harming, concealment, stinginess), together with the middling two, belong only to "the unwholesome" (purely bad). The other three of the minor (flattery, deceit, arrogance), together with the major eight, besides the unwholesome, also reach "the unmarked" (that neither-good-nor-bad register — not the unwholesome alone).

〔The gate of binding to the realms〕

Seven of the minor (anger, enmity, vexation, envy, harming, concealment, stinginess), together with the middling two, belong to the desire-realm only. Deceit and flattery, then, reach both the desire-realm and the form-realm; the rest (arrogance, plus the major eight, nine in all) reach all three realms — desire, form, and formless. "One born in a lower stage can give rise to the eleven [defilements] of an upper stage" — these eleven are the three arrogance, deceit, flattery plus the major eight; why? Because, clinging in greed to the concentration-state of the upper realms, he then, over that, gives rise to arrogance, deceit, flattery toward others. Conversely, "one born in an upper stage can also give rise to the latter ten of a lower stage" (that is, the major eight, plus the middling two lack-of-shame and lack-of-dread) — because when his wrong view rises up together with greed-and-craving, it will draw along those lower-stage [defilements].

As for the minor ten: one born in an upper stage has no way to give rise to the minor [defilements] of a lower stage — because the minor are neither the kind of affliction that "truly moistens and draws on rebirth," nor the kind that "slanders nirvāṇa" (these two kinds are what would, in an upper stage, take a lower-stage object and arise; the minor are neither, and so cannot arise). The middling two and the major eight: one in a lower stage can also take an upper-stage object — because they arise together along with "the greed that takes an upper-stage object" and the like.

〔Whether the minor [defilements] can take an upper-stage object · first view〕 One view: as for the minor ten, one in a lower stage cannot take an upper-stage object — because their look is coarse and fixed on what is near, and they cannot reach far off to seize an upper-stage object. 〔Second view〕 Another view: envy and the like can take an upper-stage object too — say one gives rise to envy and the like toward the dharmas of that superior, higher stage; is that not to take an upper-stage object?

The major eight, together with flattery and deceit: one in an upper stage can take a lower-stage object too — because they arise together along with "the conceit that takes a lower-stage object" and the like; just as the Great Brahmā gave rise to flattery and deceit toward the disciples of Śākya (this is taking a lower-stage object from an upper stage). Only "arrogance" cannot take a lower-stage object — because a lower stage is not the kind of glory one takes to be self-satisfied and self-reliant over (arrogance leans only on one's own present points of glory, and has no occasion to reach down below).

〔The gate of the trainee and the non-trainee〕

These twenty are neither "trainee" nor "non-trainee" ("trainee" means the noble one still on the path of cultivation; "non-trainee" means the arhat whose practice is complete) — because the secondary defilements are merely defiled dharmas, while these two states, trainee and non-trainee, hold only pure dharmas and cannot hold the defiled secondary defilements.

〔The gate of what is severed by seeing or by cultivation〕

The latter ten (agitation, torpor, lack-of-faith, indolence, heedlessness, loss-of-mindfulness, distraction, improper-knowing, plus lack-of-shame, lack-of-dread) are of these two kinds only, "severed by seeing" and "severed by cultivation" — ("severed by seeing" means severed on the path of seeing; "severed by cultivation" means severed bit by bit on the path of cultivation.) Why are they of both kinds? Because they arise associated with the "discriminated defilements" and also arise associated with the "innate defilements." That portion which is "severed by seeing" arises along with the defilements following the mark of the "truth" it deludes — now deluding the whole expanse at one stroke, now deluding it point by point one item at a time — and so, as the case allows, it may attach to any of the four truths, suffering, origin, cessation, path. And as for the fine distinctions of whether, in deluding a truth, it deludes "directly" or "indirectly," one may understand them by what was told in the earlier chapter on the root defilements.

The former ten (that is, the minor ten) 〔severed by seeing or by cultivation · first view〕 One view: they belong to "severed by cultivation" only (severed only on the path of cultivation) — because the minor cling to coarse, plainly-laid-out object-matters and arise of themselves as a matter of course (being of the innate defilements, and so falling to severance by cultivation).

〔Second view〕 Another view: the minor are of both kinds, "severed by seeing" and "severed by cultivation" — because they arise by the force of the discriminated defilements and also by the force of the innate defilements; say one gives rise to anger and the like by taking another's wrong view as object (this is arising by the force of a discriminated defilement, falling to severance by seeing). That portion which is severed by seeing, going by what it takes as object, by the force of "deluding the whole expanse" or "deluding point by point," may attach to any of the four truths, suffering, origin, cessation, path.

Here there is a further layer of divergence. 〔Whether the minor [defilements] "directly delude a truth" · first view〕 One view: anger and the rest arise only "following along the defilement that deludes a truth," and do not themselves "directly delude the truth-principle" — because their look is coarse and shallow, unable to bore into the depths of the truth-principle. 〔Second view〕 Another view: envy and the like can directly delude a truth too — say one gives rise to envy toward the truth of cessation, the truth of the path, and so forth; is that not directly taking the truth-principle as object? One thing must be added, though: anger and these ten can take only "an existent matter" (an object with a real footing under it), and must have a real "underlying substance" to bear them up before they can arise at all. As for the gates of whether they "take a contaminated object or an uncontaminated one" and the like, one may understand them by what was told in the earlier chapter on the root defilements.

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〔Verses commented〕Verse 14 · the four indeterminate

A. The Four Indeterminate

The marks of the twenty secondary defilements have already been told above. Next come the "indeterminate" (this class of mental factors whose nature is not fixed) — there are four of them, and what are their marks? The verse answers: the indeterminate are these four, regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought, plus the one line "the two, each in two."

The treatise says: these four dharmas, regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought, are "undecidable" as to whether they count as wholesome, defiled, or unmarked (not fixed in any one nature, but shifting as the case may be); further, they are not, like the omnipresent factors "contact" and the rest, "definitely spread through every single mind," nor, like the object-determined factors "desire" and the rest, "definitely spread through every single stage (of the realms)." Precisely because they are "undecidable" on all these heads, they are given the name "indeterminate."

1. Regret (悔 · remorse)

"Regret" is also called "remorse" (惡作), and the sense is: one feels aversion at a thing one has done, and so "regrets it afterward" — this after-regret is its nature. Its function: it blocks "calm-abiding" (śamatha, the practice of settling the mind down). This name "remorse" is a case of "giving the name of the 'cause' to the 'effect.'" How so? "Remorse" (惡作, the aversion-deed) originally refers to "the very thing one feels aversion at" (this is the cause, the prior thing); first there is this aversion-rousing thing (the cause), and only afterward does the after-regret arise (the effect); yet now the name of the prior "cause" (惡作) is taken to name the latter "effect" (the after-regret) — and this is "giving the cause's name to the effect." Further, "regretting that one did not do a certain thing at the time" is also counted under "remorse," as when someone repents and says: "I did not go and do that thing at the time — this is my remorse (I fret that I did not do it)."

2. Drowsiness (眠 · sleep)

"Drowsiness" is "sleep": it makes the body not at its own command, and has "dimness, abridgement" (the mind dim and dull, the mode coarse and brief) for its nature. Its function: it blocks "insight" (vipaśyanā, the practice of seeing clearly into the principle of things). How so? In sleep the body is not its own master, the mind is in the extreme dim and feeble, and only "one door" (the mind-door) is still in operation, the five doors of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body being out of use. Here the two words "dimness" and "abridgement" each have their point: the word "dimness" (dim) is to set aside "being in concentration" — for in concentration the mind too is focused on a single object, yet it is clear and bright, not dim; the word "abridgement" (the mode coarse and brief) is to set aside "the waking state" — for when awake the mode is clear, not coarse-and-brief. With these two words set down, it comes out that sleep has a substance and a function of its own (it is not a sheer blank). Moreover, in the "no-mind state" (states like swoon or a death-faint where there is no conscious activity) this name "drowsiness" is conventionally pinned on all the same, because it is, just like the other secondary-defilement mental factors such as the "covers" and the "fetters," by nature associated with mind (this is speaking conventionally by following the mark of something else).

〔The substance of regret and drowsiness · first view · taking only delusion for substance〕 One view: these two, regret and drowsiness, take only "delusion" (muddle-headedness) for their substance — the ground being that the treatise says these two are "secondary defilements" and also "a portion of delusion."

〔Second view · the defiled portion takes delusion, the pure portion takes non-delusion〕 Another view: not so, for regret and drowsiness also reach the wholesome (they are not defiled alone). One should sort it thus: the "defiled portion" of these two takes delusion for its substance, and the "pure portion" takes non-delusion for its substance; the treatise's calling them secondary defilements and a portion of delusion was said only with respect to "the defiled portion," not that they are, entire, only delusion.

〔Third view · taking volition-and-discernment / volition-and-conception for substance〕 Another view: the foregoing view does not hold either — because regret and drowsiness also reach "the unmarked" (that neutral, neither-good-nor-bad state), yet the unmarked is neither delusion nor non-delusion (it falls on neither side), so the scheme "the defiled takes delusion, the pure takes non-delusion" cannot sort it cleanly (it leaves out the unmarked portion). One should say: "remorse (regret)" takes "volition and discernment" for its substance (for the after-regret requires that one clearly think over and sift the thing one has done, and this is just volition and discernment at work); and "sleep" combines "volition and conception" for its substance (for in dreams one thinks and conceives all manner of dream-images, and this too is volition and conception at work); the treatise also says both are "conventionally existent." As for the defiled portion of them, it is of one kind flowing out of delusion (the outflow-kind, just like "lack-of-faith" and the rest), and so is spoken of as a portion of delusion.

〔It should be known · the correct view · regret and drowsiness each have a substance of their own〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): the foregoing view's reasoning does not stand either — regret and drowsiness are not just "volition, discernment, conception" turned into a "fetter" (a "fetter" is a secondary defilement, yet volition, discernment, conception are not themselves fetters, so how could they be made the substance of regret and drowsiness?). One should say: regret and drowsiness each have a substance of their own, with a look unlike that of any other mental factor; and as for the treatise's saying they are "spoken of, by following the mark of delusion, as conventionally existent," that too is a convenient way of speaking by following something else's mark (not that their substance is truly conventional).

3. Applied-thought · sustained-thought (尋 · 伺)

"Applied-thought" means seeking-out: it makes the mind, upon the "mental-speech object" (that object one thinks over in the mind by means of names and concepts), "deliberate coarsely" in a hurry — this is its nature. "Sustained-thought" means investigating: it makes the mind, upon the same mental-speech object, "deliberate finely" in a hurry — this is its nature. Both take "the basis of the state in which body and mind are at ease or not at ease" for their function: if applied-thought and sustained-thought are gentle, body and mind are at ease; if applied-thought and sustained-thought are restless, body and mind are not at ease. Both take "a portion of volition and discernment" for their substance; the difference lies only in this: upon the mental-speech object, applied-thought "does not push in deep" and sustained-thought "pushes in deep" — these two bearings can be told apart. Yet that said, were one to take away volition and discernment, just where the substances of applied-thought and sustained-thought differ could no longer be found at all (which shows that, in the end, their substance is still volition and discernment).

What do the three words "the two, each in two" in the verse mean? 〔First view〕 One view: it means that applied-thought and sustained-thought, these two, each further divide into the two classes "defiled" and "pure" (the one "two" refers to the pair applied-thought and sustained-thought, and "each in two" to each of them again dividing into the two classes defiled and pure — hence "the two, each in two").

〔Second view〕 Another view: the foregoing reading does not hold — regret and drowsiness likewise have the two classes defiled and pure, so on what ground does "the two classes defiled and pure" refer to applied-thought and sustained-thought alone (on this reading, ought not regret and drowsiness to be reckoned in too)? One should say: just as among the earlier defiled mental factors some are of the "root-defilement" nature and some of the "secondary-defilement" nature, told apart, so too these two, applied-thought and sustained-thought, each divide into the two classes "unwholesome" and "unmarked," or each divide into the two classes "fetter" (the active mode, at work in the present) and "latent disposition" (the seed, lying dormant) — this is "the two, each in two" (the pair applied-thought-and-sustained-thought, each again dividing into two classes).

〔It should be known · the correct view〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): the foregoing view does not hold either — the phrase "the two, each in two" is placed after "the four indeterminate" have all been told (it is a summing-up of these four dharmas), not said of applied-thought and sustained-thought alone. One should put it thus: the first word "two" discloses "two sets, each of two": the "two" of the first set refers to regret and drowsiness, the "two" of the second set to applied-thought and sustained-thought. These two sets are each of a different kind, and so the single word "two" gathers them up to point out, all at once, this "two-sets-each-of-two." And each one of these dharmas "has two," namely "defiled" and "non-defiled" (and herein they differ from the wholesome mental factors and the defiled mental factors — those wholesome ones are purely wholesome, those defiled ones purely defiled, with only the one nature; whereas these four run both defiled and pure). Or, put another way: "each in two" is said solely to clear away "the defiled" side — it is to bring out that they are not defiled alone but also run "indeterminate" — and so this line is specially spoken; for regret, drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought have also been spoken of as secondary defilements, and lest one then doggedly take them to be defiled only, this "each in two" is set down to bring out that their nature is in fact indeterminate. In sum, this phrase "the two, each in two" is spoken to make plain the sense of "indeterminate," and so its placement is deeply useful (it is no idle word).

〔The several gates of the four indeterminate〕

〔The gate of conventional and real〕

Among these four dharmas: applied-thought and sustained-thought are definitely conventional (having no substance of their own) — because they are put together out of "volition" and "discernment," and this is what the sacred teaching says. As for regret and drowsiness 〔conventional or real · first view〕 One view: they too are conventional — the Yogācārabhūmi calls these two "conventionally existent." 〔Second view〕 Another view: regret and drowsiness "are really, substantially existent, having a thing of their own" — because the Yogācārabhūmi said only that "the latter two (applied-thought and sustained-thought)" are conventional, and did not say the former two (regret and drowsiness) are definitely conventional. Then does not the Yogācārabhūmi also call regret-and-drowsiness "conventionally existent"? That "conventionally existent" is merely spoken conventionally by following something else's mark, and does not show that the former two (regret-and-drowsiness) are definitely conventional; take a comparison: the "inner seed" (the seed within the store-consciousness) has a substance that is plainly real, yet the treatise also calls it "conventionally existent" — which shows that to be called "conventionally existent" does not necessarily mean the substance is conventional.

〔The gate of not being mutually associated〕

Among these four dharmas, applied-thought and sustained-thought definitely do not arise together (do not run side by side at one time) — for though their substance is alike "volition and discernment," the one is coarse and the other fine, and one mind cannot hold a coarse and a fine running side by side. Scripture, going by the "presence" and "absence" of applied-thought and sustained-thought, marks off the "three stages" (that is, the three tiers "the stage with applied-thought and sustained-thought," "the stage without applied-thought but with sustained-thought," "the stage without applied-thought and without sustained-thought"); and note, this marking-off looks only to the coarseness or fineness of applied-thought and sustained-thought when they are "actively present," and not to whether their "seeds" are actively present or not — and so these three stages are marked off cleanly, without getting jumbled. Further, applied-thought and sustained-thought may each arise together with the former two (regret, drowsiness); and the former two (regret, drowsiness), among themselves, also have the case where they may arise together.

〔The gate of association with which consciousness〕

These four dharmas all do not arise together with the seventh and eighth consciousnesses (the principle was told in an earlier chapter); regret and drowsiness arise together with the sixth, the mental consciousness, only — because they are not "dharmas of the first five consciousnesses" (the five consciousnesses eye, ear, nose, tongue, body have no such modes as after-regret or sleep).

〔Applied-thought and sustained-thought, with which consciousness · first view · they arise with the five consciousnesses too〕 One view: applied-thought and sustained-thought arise together with the first five consciousnesses too. Three citations from the treatises are adduced as grounds: first, the treatise says "the five consciousnesses too have applied-thought and sustained-thought"; second, it further says "applied-thought and sustained-thought just are the seven [kinds of] discrimination" (such as "discrimination of marks" and the like); third, the Vyākhyā also says "spontaneous discrimination refers to the five consciousnesses" (the spontaneous, of-themselves discrimination of the five consciousnesses just is applied-thought and sustained-thought).

〔It should be known · the correct view · they arise with the mental consciousness only〕 Another view (and this is the correct reading): applied-thought and sustained-thought arise together with the sixth, the mental consciousness, only. The grounds: first, the treatise says "the dharmas of seeking-out and investigating and the like are all dharmas exclusive to the mental consciousness"; second, it further says "applied-thought and sustained-thought are associated with the two feelings sorrow and joy," and never said they are associated with pain and pleasure (as for "the feeling of equanimity," that belongs to every mind and need not be specially mentioned). 〔Someone asks〕 Then why did the treatise not say applied-thought and sustained-thought are associated with pain and pleasure too? 〔A〕 Though in the first dhyāna there is indeed "pleasure of the mental ground," it is inseparable from "joy," and so it was gathered in under the name "joy" once for all (no separate "pleasure" set up); and though in the place of unmixed suffering (the hells) there is indeed "pain of the mental ground," its look closely resembles "sorrow," and so it was spoken of as "sorrow" once for all (no separate "pain" set up) — this is why pain and pleasure were not separately mentioned. Third, the treatise further says: applied-thought and sustained-thought take "the name-body" (verbal designations) and the like for their object, whereas the first five consciousnesses do not take the name-body and the like for their object (the five consciousnesses cling only to the marks of things themselves, and do not cling to verbal designations) — since applied-thought and sustained-thought must depend on names-and-marks while the five consciousnesses never touch names-and-marks, it is plain that applied-thought and sustained-thought arise together with the mental consciousness only.

Then turning back to the first view's cited line "the five consciousnesses have applied-thought and sustained-thought," what does it really mean? It says only that applied-thought and sustained-thought are "for the most part set going by the five consciousnesses," not that applied-thought and sustained-thought are associated with the five consciousnesses, arising along with them. And as to the Vyākhyā's line "spontaneous discrimination refers to the five consciousnesses" — it and the "discrimination" that the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of are in fact not one meaning: the Vyākhyā's "spontaneous discrimination" refers straight to the five consciousnesses themselves, whereas the "discrimination" the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of refers to "the applied-thought and sustained-thought associated with the discriminating mental consciousness that arises together with the five consciousnesses" (that is, the applied-thought and sustained-thought of the sixth mental consciousness, not that the five consciousnesses have applied-thought and sustained-thought of their own). The word "discrimination" in the two places each refers to its own thing, and so the first view's adducing the Vyākhyā as proof does not stand; from this it is known that the five consciousnesses definitely have no applied-thought or sustained-thought.

〔The gate of association with feeling〕

〔Which feelings the four indeterminate go with · first view〕 One view: remorse (regret) is associated with "sorrow, equanimity" — because it forever runs along with a "sorrowful-distressed" look, and also reaches the unmarked (and so matches the neither-sorrowful-nor-glad "equanimity" too). Sleep arises together with the three feelings "joy, sorrow, equanimity" — because its look may be glad, may be sorrowful, may be neither-glad-nor-sorrowful (glad, distressed, and middling-neutral, all three reach it). Applied-thought and sustained-thought are associated with the four feelings "sorrow, joy, equanimity, pleasure" — because in the first dhyāna they can arise together with "the pleasure of the mental ground" (and so they pick up one more, pleasure).

〔Second view〕 Another view: these four dharmas also arise together with "the feeling of pain" — because in the destinies of unmixed suffering (the hells) they can arise together with "the pain of the mental ground" (and so, on this account, these four dharmas reach all five feelings entire).

〔The gate of association with the object-determined [factors]〕

These four dharmas may all arise together with the "five object-determined" (desire, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, discernment) — because their look and the object they cling to agree with those five and do not clash.

〔The gate of association with the wholesome [factors]〕

Regret and drowsiness can arise together with only "ten wholesome mental factors" — because these two appear in the desire-realm only, and in the desire-realm there is no "pliancy" wholesome factor (take pliancy out, and of the eleven wholesome there remain ten). Applied-thought and sustained-thought, then, can arise together with all "eleven wholesome" — because these two can rise as far as the first dhyāna, and in the first dhyāna "pliancy" arises along with them (the eleven wholesome complete).

〔The gate of association with the [root] defilements and the secondary defilements〕

First, as to pairing with the "root defilements": regret can be associated with only the one root defilement "ignorance (delusion)" — because regret's look is coarse, while root defilements such as greed have a fine look, and a coarse and a fine cannot be brought together. Sleep, applied-thought, sustained-thought, then, can arise together with all ten root defilements — they are mutually not at odds. Next, as to pairing with the "secondary defilements": regret can arise together with the middling and major secondary afflictions, but not with the minor ten, anger and the rest — because anger and the rest must each be its own master, which butts head-on against regret's also "wanting to be master." Sleep, applied-thought, sustained-thought, then, can arise together with all twenty secondary defilements — because in states such as sleep all those secondary defilements can come along too.

〔The gate of the three natures〕

These four dharmas reach all three natures, wholesome, unwholesome, unmarked — to give an instance: one can feel after-regret even over "an unmarked matter" (a matter neither good nor bad), which shows that regret reaches even the unmarked; the other three may be inferred on this pattern.

〔Under which class of wholesome · first view〕 One view: the former two (regret, drowsiness) belong only to "innately-acquired wholesome" (the kind of wholesome one has of birth, effortlessly) — because regret's look is coarse and base, and drowsiness's look is dim and coarse, and they cannot bear up "the applied" (the kind of wholesome worked up by effort in practice). The latter two (applied-thought, sustained-thought), then, also reach "applied wholesome" — because in such wisdoms as "the wisdom born of hearing" (the wisdom worked up by hearing the true Dharma) there is applied-thought and sustained-thought at work.

〔Second view〕 Another view: the former two (regret, drowsiness) also reach "applied wholesome" — because in the stages of "hearing and reflecting" (when one hears and reflects on the true Dharma) there is regret and drowsiness too. Further, the latter three (drowsiness, applied-thought, sustained-thought) all reach both "defiled unmarked" and "pure unmarked"; only "remorse (regret)" does not reach the defiled unmarked — because its working-understanding is coarse and fierce (the defiled unmarked must be fine; regret is too coarse, and so is left out).

〔The gate of the four unmarked [states]〕

"The unmarked" (the neutral, neither-good-nor-bad state) further divides into four kinds: maturation-unmarked, deportment-unmarked, craft-unmarked, and transformation (mastery)-unmarked. Among these four — regret reaches only "the middle two" (deportment, craft): because its look is coarse and fierce, and it is not "a fruit worked up by concentration" (so the "transformation-unmarked," which requires concentration, is ruled out too), leaving deportment and craft, these two, to match it. Drowsiness, then, "takes out the fourth (transformation-unmarked)" and reaches the former three: because sleep is not drawn forth by concentration, and besides "a maturation-born mind" can have sleep too (and so it reaches all three of maturation, deportment, craft). Applied-thought and sustained-thought, then, "take out the first (maturation-unmarked)" and reach the latter three: because that maturation kind of mind has a working-understanding too feeble, unable to seek-and-investigate the senses of names-and-words (applied-thought and sustained-thought must touch names-and-words, which maturation cannot do, and so maturation is taken out, leaving deportment, craft, transformation, the latter three).

〔The gate of binding to the realms〕

Remorse (regret) and sleep exist in the desire-realm only; applied-thought and sustained-thought exist in both the desire-realm and the first dhyāna; as for the realms and stages further up (the second dhyāna and beyond), their dharmas are every one subtle and still (and cannot hold these four coarse, restless dharmas). And so if one of regret and drowsiness is born into an upper stage, these two definitely cannot become actively present. Applied-thought and sustained-thought, then, are more nimble: "those above and those below" can each rise to act "below or above" (one born above can give rise to applied-thought and sustained-thought below, one born below can give rise to applied-thought and sustained-thought above, upper and lower being mutually open). And whether below or above, applied-thought and sustained-thought can take an upper-stage or a lower-stage object.

〔Whether regret and drowsiness can take an upper-stage object · first view〕 One view: regret and drowsiness cannot take an upper-stage object — because their look is coarse and fixed on what is near, and extremely dim and coarse besides, so that they cannot reach far off to seize an upper-stage object. 〔Second view〕 Another view: these two can take an upper-stage object too — say a person with a wrong view feels after-regret over the fact that "he had cultivated the concentration of an upper realm" (does this regret not then take an upper-stage object?); and in dreams one can dream over all things one has gone through (and among them lies the upper-stage object too — does this drowsiness not then take an upper-stage object?).

〔The gate of the trainee and the non-trainee〕

Regret does not count as "non-trainee" (the arhat register) — because the moment one is parted from desire and attains the non-trainee [state], this dharma regret is cast off then and there (in the non-trainee stage there is no regret). Sleep, applied-thought, sustained-thought, then, reach all three kinds, "trainee, non-trainee, and neither-trainee-nor-non-trainee." Why? Because the conditioned wholesome dharmas of "one still seeking liberation" (the noble one) are all called "trainee," and the conditioned wholesome dharmas of "one whose practice is complete" (the arhat) are all called "non-trainee" — and sleep, applied-thought, sustained-thought are still present in both these stations, and so reach them all.

〔The gate of what is severed by seeing or by cultivation〕

Regret and drowsiness are of these two kinds only, "severed by seeing" and "severed by cultivation" (that is, severed on the path of seeing and on the path of cultivation). Why? First, these two arise being driven by the force of wrong view and the like (and so fall to severance by seeing); second, these two are not directly drawn forth by the uncontaminated path (and so cannot enter the register "not to be severed"); third, these two are not, like "sorrow," able to drive a person deeply to seek liberation ("sorrow" can be reckoned into "not to be severed," but regret and drowsiness cannot). One thing must be added, though: if one reckons by the sense "once severed away it is called not-to-be-severed," then the sleep of the non-trainee stage (the arhat's) may be reckoned into "not to be severed" too (because by that time the defiled has been severed clean away).

Applied-thought and sustained-thought, though they are not themselves the true uncontaminated path, can yet draw forth the uncontaminated (and can also be drawn forth out of the uncontaminated), and so reach all three, "severed by seeing, severed by cultivation, not to be severed."

〔Where the "not-to-be-severed" portion of applied-thought and sustained-thought belongs · first view · it counts only as discrimination〕 One view: as for the "not-to-be-severed" portion of applied-thought and sustained-thought, among the "five dharmas" (mark, name, discrimination, right cognition, suchness) it can be reckoned only into "discrimination" — because the Yogācārabhūmi says applied-thought and sustained-thought are "discrimination." 〔Second view · it counts as right cognition too〕 Another view: these two can be reckoned into "right cognition" too. The grounds are several: first, the treatise says "right thought is uncontaminated," and right thought is just what sets the mind to seeking-out and deliberating (which is applied-thought and sustained-thought); second, it further says applied-thought and sustained-thought are "the root of speech (preaching)" — for when a bodhisattva has not yet reached the ultimate stage, he cannot fully know the "medicine" (the methods of counteraction) and the "disease" (the defilements) of sentient beings, and so, in the "subsequently-attained cognition" (the cognition that, on coming out of concentration, discerns the marks of things) he preaches the Dharma for others, he absolutely must lean on applied-thought and sustained-thought to deliberate, unlike at "the Buddha stage" where one "preaches the Dharma effortlessly" (the Buddha preaches of himself, with no need of applied-thought and sustained-thought) — which shows that these two, applied-thought and sustained-thought, reach the uncontaminated too.

So, although it is said that applied-thought and sustained-thought are surely "discrimination," one cannot doggedly insist that these two belong only to the third of the five dharmas (discrimination) — because in "the subsequently-attained right cognition" too there is discrimination (which is to say applied-thought and sustained-thought reach that dharma "right cognition" as well). As for the remaining gates, one may follow the method of the gates of the secondary defilements told above, and think them out for oneself going by the principle.

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B. The general summary of the six classes of mental factors (the dispute over apart-from-mind or being-mind)

These "six classes" of mental factors (omnipresent, object-determined, wholesome, [root] defilements, secondary defilements, indeterminate) — are they "apart from the substance of the mind-king, possessing a nature of their own"? Or are they "the distinct guises the mind-king shows in differing situations" (inseparable from the mind-king)? 〔Q〕 Granting that one tells it either way, what is the fault? 〔A〕 Both ways have a fault. Below, the faults are laid out under two heads.

〔Q · the faults of saying "the mental factors are apart from mind, with a body of their own"〕 If the mental factors are apart from the mind-king, possessing a nature of their own, then there are several things that do not get through: First, how can the teaching still say "there is only consciousness (consciousness-only)"? — since, if the mental factors are another set of things, then there is more than consciousness, and the word "consciousness-only" falls void. Second, how can the teaching still say "mind travels farthest, mind fares alone," "defilement and purity are decided by mind," "the person (a sentient being) is constituted of the six elements" (which include the element of consciousness, where mind is taken to gather the mental factors in along with it)? — these sayings all set the function on the one mind, which shows the mental factors ought not to be apart from mind. Third, how is that passage in the Sūtrālaṃkāra to be made to fit? The sense of that verse is: one must grant that "mind manifests an appearance as if in two aspects, the 'grasper' and the 'grasped,'" and likewise manifests an appearance as if of "defiled dharmas such as greed," or as if of "wholesome dharmas such as faith" — there being no defiled dharma and no wholesome dharma really existent apart from mind. (These several points all prove: the mental factors are not apart from mind.)

〔Q · the faults of saying "the mental factors are mind itself"〕 Conversely, if the mental factors just are the distinct guises of the mind-king in differing situations (being one with the mind-king, no two), then again there are several things that do not get through: First, how can the teaching still say "mind is associated [with the mental factors]"? — for "association" is two different things paired together (association of differing natures), not one thing associated with itself; if the mental factors just are mind, where are the two to be associated? Second, how can the teaching still say "mind and the mental factors arise at one time, like the sun and its light appearing together"? — for if the mental factors just are mind, there is but one dharma, and no two arising together to speak of. Third, how is that passage in the Yogācārabhūmi to be made to fit? It plainly says "the mental factors are not mind itself." The sense of that verse is: (were the mental factors mind itself,) then "the five natures" would not stand (that is, self-nature, basis, object, mode, association — these five could no longer be told apart); further it would incur the fault of "making the mental factors merely the positional distinct-guises of mind"; and besides (on this view) the causes-and-conditions of mind and of the mental factors would have no difference either — and all these run counter to the teaching. (These several points all prove: the mental factors are not mind itself.)

〔A · the correct view〕 Then how is it to be put rightly? One should say: the mental factors are apart from the mind-king, possessing a nature of their own. Yet because "the mind-king is the master, the superior one," the teaching speaks of "consciousness-only" and the like (this is to lift up that master and gather the lesser mental factors in along with it — not that there are no mental factors); and because the mental factors arise by leaning on the force of the mind-king, they are said to "manifest an appearance resembling the mind-king," yet this is not to say the mental factors are mind. Further, the words "consciousness" and "mind" in the teaching of themselves take the mental factors in too (because the mental factors are forever associated with the mind-king). And so the words "consciousness-only" and the rest, and the saying "manifest an appearance resembling the mind-king," all turn out without fault — these being all spoken "from the level of the conventional" (on the conventional level, whether the mental factors are "apart from" or "identical with" the mind-king can still be told apart). But spoken "from the level of the ultimate," the mental factors and the mind-king are "neither-apart-nor-identical" (not one, and not two); and the several consciousnesses, each against another, are to be viewed in just this way too (likewise neither-apart-nor-identical). This is the very subtlety of the great vehicle's two-level principle, "the true (the ultimate)" and "the conventional."