成唯識論 白話全本 · 冊2

〔Verse expounded〕

The two words "self" and "dharmas" are in fact only a name we set up provisionally, said this way for convenience — there is no actual thing standing there. Precisely because [they are] thus conventionally set up, manifold differing appearances show forth, turning forth one after another. This whole passage is out to break thoroughly the two attachments of "there really being a self, there really being a dharma," and thereby to establish the principle that "there is only consciousness; outside the mind there is no object."

A. Refuting the Self-Attachment

1. General statement: a real self and real dharmas cannot be found

How can we be sure that outside the mind there is in fact no real object — that what there is, is only the inner consciousness manifesting something that "looks as if it were outside the mind"? The reason is just this: go looking for a real "self" or a real "dharma," and you simply cannot find one — and so it is said, "a real self and real dharmas cannot be found."

2. Refuting the three kinds of "measure of self" (permanent-and-pervasive / indeterminate / utterly fine)

Why is it that a real self cannot be found? First look at the "self" that worldly people hold to; it falls roughly into three kinds. The first kind maintain: this self is "permanent and pervades everything"; its size is boundless, just like space, and it can go everywhere making karma and everywhere undergoing pain and pleasure. The second kind maintain: this self, though permanent and undying, is "of no fixed size" — it shrinks and stretches with the body's size, now contracting, now expanding. The third kind maintain: this self is permanent but "utterly tiny," small as a single atom (極微, the smallest unit matter can be divided down to), hidden within the body where it moves to and fro and carries out its various tasks.

Take first the first kind (those who maintain the self is "both permanent and pervasive, vast as space"); this account fails right at the outset. Why? If you say the self is permanent, pervades everything, and is as vast as space, then this self ought, like space, not to follow the body in undergoing pain and pleasure (how would space undergo pain and pleasure?). Moreover, since it is permanent and pervasive, everywhere at once, it cannot move or turn at all; and if it cannot so much as move, how could it follow the body in making all sorts of karma?

Press the question further: this "self" you speak of — across all sentient beings, is it "one and the same," or "a separate one for each"? Take first the road of "one and the same": if all beings under heaven share a single self, the trouble is great — when one person makes karma, everyone should make karma along with him; when one person undergoes the fruit, everyone should undergo it; when one person attains liberation, everyone should attain it. This is plainly an untenable, gross fault.

Now take the road of "a separate one for each": you say each person has his own self — but each such self also pervades everything, so they overlap and spread together; your self spreads over to where I am, mine spreads over to where you are, all stirred together and inseparable. And when this person makes karma and undergoes the fruit, the place where that karma and fruit sit is in fact the very same place as where everyone else's selves sit (all of them pervade, all in the one place); so one is forced to say that this karma and this fruit are made and undergone by everyone's selves together (back to all sharing the load).

At this point the opponent may plead: "Making karma and undergoing the fruit each has its own owner — this karma belongs to this self, that karma to that self — so the above fault does not arise." But this still does not work. Why? This karma and fruit, together with this body, are already joined with "every one of the pervasive selves" (each self spreads over to here); so to insist that "it belongs to this self alone, not that one" makes no sense — when all pervade and all sit in the one place, how could you still tell them apart? And again, when one person attains liberation, everyone should attain it too, since the path he cultivates and the truth he realizes are likewise joined with all the pervasive selves (being all joined, they are liberated all at once).

Take next the second kind (those who maintain "the self is permanent, but its size is unfixed, stretching and shrinking with the body"); this too fails. Why? Since this self is permanent and unchanging, it ought not to stretch open and shrink shut along with the body. And since it does stretch and shrink, it is like the air in a bellows, swelling and shrinking with the bag — how could such a thing still count as permanent? Moreover, since this self [changes size] along with the body, it ought to be divisible, cuttable apart; so how can you insist that "the self is a seamless one, indivisible"? Hence this account is just like children's make-believe prattle.

Take next the third kind (those who maintain "the self is utterly tiny, like a single atom"); this likewise fails. Why? Your self is small as a single atom — so how could it set this whole great body moving all over? The opponent may plead: "Though the self is small, it patrols swiftly back and forth within the body, just as a torch whirled fast is seen as one whole ring of fire, so it looks as if the whole body were moving." But this very plea turns his own self into something "not one, and not permanent" — for anything that comes and goes, that runs back and forth, is necessarily not permanent-and-unchanging and not a seamless one (what moves has change, has parts).

3. Refuting the three kinds of "self and aggregates" (identical / apart / neither-identical-nor-apart)

From another angle — looking at the relation between the "self" and the five aggregates (色受想行識, the five heaps of form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, the five classes of things that make up body-and-mind) — the "self" worldly people hold to again falls into three kinds. The first says "the self just is the five aggregates" (there is no self apart from the aggregates), called "identical with the aggregates." The second says "the self is something else, outside the five aggregates," called "apart from the aggregates." The third says "the self is neither one and the same as the five aggregates nor two separate things from them," called "neither-identical-nor-apart."

Take first the first kind, "the self just is the five aggregates"; this one does not hold up at the very start. If you say the self just is the five aggregates, then the self ought to be exactly like the aggregates — impermanent, and many heaps (the aggregates are by nature impermanent and several in kind) — yet you say the self is permanent and one; that is a contradiction. Then, testing it heap by heap: the "form" within the body (that is, the five sense-faculties — eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) is definitely not a real self, because, like things outside the body, it has shape and obstructs, taking up space (how could such a thing be the self?); "mind and the mental factors" (the mind-king and the various mental activities) are likewise not a real self, because they are not unbrokenly continuous and need a confluence of conditions to arise (now arising, now ceasing, dependent on conditions — how could they be the permanent, unitary self?); and the remaining "formations-aggregate" (the various shaping forces) and certain other "forms" (such as the invisible "unmanifest form") are also not a real self, because, like space, they have no capacity for awareness at all (how could something without awareness be the self?). Test the aggregates heap by heap in this way, and not one heap is the self — so "the self just is the five aggregates" cannot stand at all.

Take next the second kind, "the self is something else outside the five aggregates"; this too does not hold. If you say the self exists separately, apart from the five aggregates, then it ought, like space, to be able to do nothing at all — neither make karma nor undergo the fruit (apart from the body-mind aggregates it has no means to act and no means to experience; so what kind of self is that?).

Take next the third kind, "the self is neither identical with nor apart from the five aggregates"; this still does not hold. Since you concede that this self is "set up in dependence on the aggregates" (neither apart from them nor identical with them), it is then just like a pot or a basin — a pot too is assembled in dependence on the four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind), and you can say neither that the pot just is the four elements nor that the pot is apart from them; the pot is a conventional thing "provisionally set up in dependence on the four elements," not a really-existent pot. Your self is the same — a provisionally set-up conventional name, not a real self.

There is a further layer. This self of yours that is "neither identical nor apart" — by your own account, it cannot be called "conditioned" (有為; for to say "it just is the aggregates" makes it a conditioned thing that arises and perishes) and cannot be called "unconditioned" (無為; for to say "it is apart from the aggregates" makes it an unconditioned thing that neither arises nor perishes); you refuse to grant either side. But by the very same reasoning, you can then no longer even say whether it "is a self" or "is not a self" — since you have sealed off both sides and will affirm nothing, you cannot so much as pin the label "self" onto it. Hence the real self you hold simply cannot be established.

4. Interrogation by three considerations (cogitation / function / the object of the self-view)

Now to put the question another way: this "real self" you hold — does it "cogitate" (does it think things over) or not? There are only two possibilities. If you say it "does cogitate," then it must be impermanent — for cogitation is not present at all times; it now arises, now stops (what arises and stops has change, and so is not the permanent self). If you say it "does not cogitate," then it is like space, sitting dully unable to do anything, neither making karma nor undergoing the fruit (so what kind of self is that?). Neither road — cogitating or not — works, so the self you hold cannot stand.

Again, to put it another way: this real self you hold — does it "have function" (can it act, can it get things done) or not? Again only two roads. If you say it "has function," then it is just like hands and feet — hands and feet can function, but hands and feet are impermanent, so your self too must be impermanent (not the permanent self you claim). If you say it "has no function," then it is just like a hare's horn — a hare's horn does not exist at all, so your self too must be non-existent, not a real self. Neither road — having function or not — works, so the self you hold cannot stand.

Again, to put it another way: this real self you hold — is it the object that the "self-view" (我見, the view that grasps body-and-mind as a "self") refers to? Again only two roads. If you say "it is not the object the self-view refers to," then on what basis do you know there is such a real self at all? — if it is not something any view can reach, you have no way to know it exists. If you say "it is the object the self-view refers to," then there ought to be a kind of "self-view" that does not count as deluded — for on your account it really does refer to a real self (and since what it refers to is genuinely there, that view would not count as mistaken).

But follow this road (that the self-view is not deluded, that it really did see a real self) and it falls apart: if the self-view really were faithful and undeluded, then why do even the highest sacred teachings that you self-graspers yourselves revere all, without exception, condemn the self-view and praise "no-self" — all saying that only the view that sees "no-self" can realize nirvāṇa, while clinging to the view of "there being a self" only makes one sink in birth-and-death? On your account the "self-view" becomes the correct view and the "no-self view" becomes the wrong one — which would make it so that the wrong view (no-self view) actually realizes nirvāṇa, while the correct view (the self-view) actually dooms one to sink in birth-and-death. Where under heaven is there such a logic? (Clearly the self-view must be deluded; it never referred to any real self at all.)

Next this is proved by inference. Step one: the various "self-views" do not refer to a real self — the reason being that a self-view "has an object" (it has something it refers to), and in this it is just like any other mind that refers to its various objects; and those minds refer to what is not a real self, so the self-view too refers to what is not a real self. Step two: "the thing the self-view refers to" is definitely not a real self — the reason being that it is "a referred-to object," and in this it is just like all other referred-to dharmas; those referred-to dharmas are none of them a real self, so this one is not a real self either. Joining the two steps gives the conclusion: the self-view never refers to any real self at all; it merely refers to "the aggregates (the body-mind phenomena) that the inner consciousness manifests," and then each person, following his own deluded fancy, guesses this way and that and takes it to be "the self" (wrongly grasping it as a self).

5. The two self-attachments (innate · discriminated) and their stages of severance

Now the various "self-attachments" (the fault of grasping a self) fall roughly into two kinds. One is called "innate" (俱生) — present from birth, carried inborn. The other is called "discriminated" (分別) — arising later, after one has been influenced and has gone through a round of discriminating and reckoning.

Take first the "innate self-attachment." It is perfumed by deluded habit-energy, time after time, from beginningless time; relying on this inner force, it is ever present with the body, accompanying life itself. It need not wait for any false teacher to instruct it, nor pass through a round of mistaken discriminating reckoning; spontaneously it shows forth and turns — and so it is called "innate" (carried inborn).

This "innate self-attachment" itself divides into two. The first is "ever-continuous": it occurs in the seventh, the manas consciousness (the consciousness that lies between the sixth and the eighth and is in charge of grasping a self), which refers to the eighth, the ālaya consciousness (the root consciousness that stores all things) — manifesting an image in its own mind and grasping it firmly as a real self. The second is "intermittent": it occurs in the sixth, the mental consciousness, which refers to the appearance of the "five grasping-aggregates" (五取蘊, the five heaps of body-mind phenomena seized and held) that consciousness manifests — sometimes referring to them all together (taking the five aggregates lumped together as a self), sometimes singling one heap out (grasping a self in one particular aggregate) — likewise manifesting an image in its own mind and grasping it as a real self.

These two innate self-attachments, being subtle and deeply hidden, are hard to sever; they can be removed only later, in the stage of "the path of cultivation" (修道, the long stage of repeated practice that follows after one has seen the truth), by cultivating again and again the excellent "contemplation of the emptiness of persons" (生空觀, also called the contemplation of person-emptiness — contemplating that "there is no real personal self").

Take next the "discriminated self-attachment." It comes about through present, acquired outer conditions (the people one meets and the words one hears in this very life); it is not inborn. It must first have a false teacher to instruct it, plus a round of one's own mistaken discriminating reckoning, and only then does it arise — and so it is called "discriminated." It occurs only in the sixth, the mental consciousness (the seventh and eighth consciousnesses do not raise this kind of discriminating reckoning).

This "discriminated self-attachment" also divides into two. The first: referring to the "appearance of the aggregates" that a false teacher describes (how he portrays the five aggregates), it manifests an image in its own mind, then discriminates and reckons over it, and grasps it as a real self. The second: referring to the "appearance of a self" that a false teacher describes (what the self set up by the heterodox is portrayed to be like), it likewise manifests an image in its own mind, discriminates and reckons, and grasps it as a real self.

These two discriminated self-attachments, being coarser and more conspicuous, are easy to sever. At the first moment of "the path of seeing" (見道, the very first time one truly sees the truth), one need only contemplate the "person-emptiness suchness" (生空真如, the true principle disclosed on the side of "there being no personal self") shown forth by all dharmas, and they can be removed.

6. The object of the self-attachment is definitely the impermanent five grasping-aggregates

Take all the self-attachments described above, in terms of "what it is they refer to." Those "aggregates" outside one's own mind (that is, outer objects) are sometimes present and sometimes not (they are not necessarily really set out there); but those "aggregates" that one's own mind manifests (that is, the inner mental image) are every one of them present, always there (whenever self is grasped, this inner image is there to be referred to). And so it is said: every self-attachment refers to this "appearance of the impermanent five grasping-aggregates" (that is, what the inner consciousness manifests), and then mistakes it for a "self."

Yet two things must be kept distinct here. The appearances of the aggregates, since they arise from a confluence of conditions, are "existent as a magician's conjuring is existent" — they are not utterly nothing, but neither are they really existent; they are merely illusion-like existents. But the "self" that deluded fancy grasps, being something rigged up out of thin air by wild guessing and reckoning, is "simply non-existent" — it does not so much as reach the level of illusory existence; it is utterly nonexistent.

And so a scripture spoken by the Buddha contains this passage: "Monks, you should know: whatever self-views the ascetics, brahmins, and the like of this world hold, all of them arise with reference to the five grasping-aggregates." (This precisely proves that the self-view refers only to the five aggregates, and that there is no real self standing there.)

7. Interrogation: with no real self, how do memory, recognition, recitation, practice, etc. come about?

〔Q〕 The opponent rejoins: if there is no real self, then how can there be such things as remembering, recognizing, reciting, growing practiced, and bearing gratitude or grudge? (These all seem to require some unchanging self, the same one throughout, threaded through the middle — otherwise who is it that remembers, who grows practiced, who bears a grudge?)

〔A〕 Turn it back on him: this real self you hold, since it is permanent and forever unchanging, runs into trouble — "later" ought to be exactly like "earlier" (since it does not change). But memory and the like are precisely things that "only crop up later": since you say the self never changes, where would any newly cropped-up memory come from? These later-arising things ought not to occur at all. Conversely, "earlier" ought to be exactly like "later": so "what earlier was not yet present" ought not to count as "not present" either (since earlier and later are forever the same, there is no this-moment-arising or that-moment-ceasing). At bottom this is because, on your account, the self at "later" and at "earlier" has not the slightest difference in substance (forever one and the same, unchanging). Reasoned out this way, memory, recognition, and such cannot be established at all — setting up a permanent, unchanging self is exactly what seals these things off.

If the opponent then pleads, "What changes is the self's function, shifting from earlier to later; the self's substance does not change" — this too does not work. For "function" is inseparable from "substance," so the function ought to be as permanent as the substance (being joined to the substance, the function ought to stay just so, with no change); and conversely, "substance" is inseparable from "function," so the substance ought to be as changeable as the function (being joined to the function, the substance ought to change along with it, and not stay permanent). Substance and function are one inseparable affair; you cannot say in one breath that the substance is permanent and the function changes, splitting them into one-permanent-and-one-changing.

So how should it be put according to right principle? Every sentient being has his own "root consciousness" (本識, the eighth ālaya consciousness, the root consciousness that stores all things); it is ever of one and the same kind, unbrokenly continuous, spontaneously holding the seeds, and serving reciprocally as cause with all dharmas; precisely because of this force of repeated perfuming, there come to be such things as memory and recognition. So the challenge you posed in fact lands on "yourself" (the one who posits a real self) and pokes at your own fault, not at the fault of "our consciousness-only school" — it is your positing of a permanent self that fails to work, whereas our account of the continuity of consciousness works perfectly well.

8. Interrogation: with no real self, who makes karma and undergoes the fruit, who transmigrates and goes to nirvāṇa?

〔Q〕 The opponent asks again: if there is no real self, then who makes karma, and who undergoes the fruit? 〔A〕 Again turn it back on him: this real self you hold, since it is forever unchanging and sits there like space, how could it make any karma or undergo any fruit (space can do nothing)? And if you say it does change, then it has become impermanent, no longer the permanent self you first claimed. So how should it be put according to right principle? Each being's mind and mental factors, by the force of various causes and conditions, are continuous and unbroken, thought succeeding thought; it is precisely on this continuity that karma gets made and the fruit gets undergone — not the slightest contradiction in principle, and no need at all to set up a separate real self.

〔Q〕 The opponent asks once more: if there really is no self, then who is it that transmigrates round and round through the destinies in birth-and-death? And who is it that, wearied of suffering, seeks to reach nirvāṇa? 〔A〕 Still turn it back on him: this real self you hold, since it neither arises nor perishes, how can you say it "transmigrates in birth-and-death" (a thing that neither arises nor perishes cannot be spoken of as transmigrating at all)? Since it is forever like space, untroubled by suffering, why would it weary of anything or seek nirvāṇa (not suffering at all, it has nothing to weary of and nothing to seek)? So the opponent's whole account keeps landing back on himself — positing a permanent self is exactly what makes both transmigration and liberation impossible to account for.

So how should it be put according to right principle? Beings, as a class, have body and mind in unbroken continuity; it is just by being driven by the two forces of affliction and karma that they transmigrate through the destinies; and it is just because they have wearied of the various sufferings that they seek nirvāṇa — all of which the continuity of body and mind is enough to account for, with no need to set up a separate real self.

9. Resolving into "there is definitely no real self"

Through this whole train of refutations it can be settled: there is definitely no real self. There are only the various consciousnesses, which from beginningless time "perish in the prior moment and arise in the later," so that cause is succeeded by fruit and fruit becomes cause again, thought after thought in unbroken continuity; and with the added force of deluded habit-energy perfumed time after time, they manifest an appearance that "looks as if it were a self." The deluded then, upon this "self-resembling" image, forcibly take it to be a real self — when in fact, go looking, and not one real self can be found.

〔Verses commented〕Unfolding verse 1 · refuting the dharma-attachment

B. Refuting the Dharma-Attachment

1. General statement: dharmas, too, cannot be found

It has already been shown that "a really-existent 'self' outside the mind cannot be found"; what, then, of "really-existent 'dharmas of every kind' outside the mind, which likewise cannot be found"? Because the "dharmas outside the mind" maintained by the heterodox and by the other schools (the Hīnayāna) are, in principle, none of them really existent. (Below, the refutation falls into two great blocks: first the four heterodox schools, then the form and other dharmas held by the Hīnayāna.)

2. Refuting the dharmas held by the heterodox

Why is it said that the dharmas outside the mind maintained by the heterodox are not really existent? (Below, the first school refuted is the Sāṃkhya.)

(i) Refuting the Sāṃkhya (the twenty-three principles · the three constituents combined)

Take first the Sāṃkhya masters. They maintain: there is a "self" (the puruṣa, the "spirit-self," which they call a pure experiencer), and the nature of this self is "thought" (it receives and enjoys); the objects it enjoys are the twenty-three principles — "the great one" (mahat, i.e. intellect, buddhi) and the rest — which are composed of the three root constituents "sattva, rajas, tamas" (together the "three qualities," guṇa, corresponding to the brightening, the stirring, and the darkening). They maintain further: since "the great one" and its class are all composed of these three qualities, it is really existent, not conventional, and is grasped by "direct perception" (現量, what is seen at first hand, not got by inference).

This position does not hold. Why? Since "the great one" and its class come to be only by several things (the three qualities) put together, it is on the same footing as an "army" or a "forest" — an army is many soldiers put together, a forest is many trees put together, both being assembled conventional things with no separate real substance of their own. That being so, "the great one" too must be conventional, not really existent; and then how can you say it is got by "direct perception" (seen at first hand)? (An assembled conventional thing, made of many things, is precisely not an object that direct perception can grasp directly.)

Again, here a two-pronged attack is possible. From one side: if "the great one" and its class were really existent, then they ought, like the "root things themselves" (the three qualities), to be not composed (since you take the three qualities as the uncomposed root, whatever is really existent ought to be likewise) — yet you say it is composed; self-contradiction. From the other side: the three qualities, sattva and the rest, since you say they "just are the substance of the great one and the rest" (the qualities and the great one are not two separate things), ought conversely, like the great one and the rest, to be "composed of three, changeable, and impermanent." Set the two sides against each other (each pressing the other), and it is plain that the three qualities too cannot be established as "a really-existent, permanent root."

Again, each of these three qualities possesses several functions of its own (for instance, sattva governs joy, rajas governs sorrow, tamas governs darkness, and so on). Yet you also maintain that "function and substance are one and the same" (not separate); then since one quality has several functions, its substance too ought to split into several (no longer a single whole). Further, you say the substance of these three qualities is all "pervasive" (everywhere without exception); since it is everywhere, then when it changes in one place, everywhere else ought to change at the same time too — for one and the same pervasive substance cannot change only in one place and not in others. (This forces out all manner of absurdities.)

Since you have already conceded that the "substance" and the "appearance" of these three qualities are each distinct (the three told cleanly apart), how could they get put together and compose "a single appearance" (the single appearance of "the great one")? It surely cannot be that the moment they combine they suddenly turn into a single appearance — for at the time of combining and the time of not combining, their "substance" has not changed at all (and if the substance has not changed, the appearance ought not suddenly to become one either).

You may then shift your plea and say: "The 'substance' of the three qualities is distinct, but their 'appearance' is the same; and just because the appearance is the same, they can compose one." But this plea slaps its own face. First, it contradicts your own school's thesis that "substance and appearance are one and the same" (if substance and appearance are one, then since substance is distinct, how could appearance be the same?). Second, follow out your "substance and appearance are one" further: the substance ought, like the appearance, to compose blurredly into one (so the substance becomes one too); and the appearance ought, like the substance, to split clearly into three (so the appearance becomes three too) — wrong either way. So you simply cannot say "three combine into one."

Again, the three qualities are the "particulars," "the great one" and the rest the "whole"; yet you maintain that "whole and particular are one and the same" (since you say substance and appearance are one). Since whole and particular are thus made one, it can be fixed neither as "one" nor as "three" (once made one, it cannot even be told whether it counts as one or as three). Further: when these three qualities show forth, if they do not combine into a single appearance, then it ought to be just as before they showed forth (still three) — so how could you see at first hand that "the great one" and the rest are "one"? Conversely, if the three qualities do combine into a single appearance, then their original separate "particular appearances" ought to be lost (the three appearances gone); and since you maintain that substance and appearance are one, once the appearance is lost, their substance is lost along with it (appearance lost, substance lost too).

Nor can you escape by saying: "Each of the three qualities has two appearances — one a 'whole-appearance,' one a 'particular-appearance'; by the whole-appearance one sees a single thing, by the particular-appearance one sees three." This too fails: for on your own "substance and appearance are not two" account, "the whole-appearance just equals the particular-appearance"; and since the whole-appearance is the particular-appearance, the whole-appearance too must be three — so how could you see "one"?

You shift your plea again: "The substance of each of the three qualities has three appearances; they are mixed together and hard to tell apart, and so are seen as one." This carries two faults. First, since you have already conceded there are three appearances, how could they be seen as one (three is not one)? Second, since you say they are mixed and hard to tell apart, how then do you know that the three qualities are distinct from one another (if they are hard to tell apart, on what basis do you judge them different)?

Moreover, if each one of these three qualities already possesses three appearances in full (sattva itself holds three, rajas itself holds three, tamas itself holds three), then each single quality could on its own complete form and the rest (one quality already has all three appearances within it, so why wait for three to combine?) — that being so, what is it short of, that it must wait for the three qualities to combine? Furthermore, since each quality has three appearances, then by your "substance just is appearance" account, its substance too ought to split into three each.

Again, since "the great one" and its class are all composed of the same three qualities, then compared one against another they ought to have no difference (the constituents being the same, no rank can be told apart). And so the very grading that the Sāṃkhya themselves draw up — "cause" (i.e. the root nature, prakṛti), "fruit" (the great one and the rest), "the bare-essences" (the five subtle elements, tanmātra: form, sound, smell, taste, touch), "the great elements" (the five gross: earth, water, fire, wind, space), "the faculties" (the various sense-organs) — all these differences fail to be established (the constituents being identical, no such differences can be drawn).

Were it really so (all dharmas without any difference), a heap of absurdities would follow: one sense-organ ought to grasp every object, or one object ought to be grasped by every sense-organ (the eye could hear sound, the ear could see form, organ and object no longer to be told apart); the very things the world plainly sees — "the sentient (beings) and the insentient (grass, trees, tiles, stones)," "the clean and the filthy" — and even the modes of cognition, "direct perception (seeing at first hand) and inference (reasoning)," ought all to have no difference — which is plainly a colossal fault. So the "real dharmas" the Sāṃkhya maintain cannot be established at all; they are merely things that deluded feeling guesses and reckons up and supposes to be real. (The refutation of the Sāṃkhya ends here.)

(ii) Refuting the Vaiśeṣika (the six categories · substance and the rest)

Next, the second school refuted: the Vaiśeṣika masters. They sort all things into six classes, called the "six categories" (六句義, the six great divisions): substance (實, a thing's body), quality (德, attribute), motion (業, movement), the common (同, the universal), the distinct (異, the particular), and inherence (和合, the relation that binds the foregoing together). They maintain that these six classes are mostly really existent, and got by "direct perception" (seen at first hand). This position does not hold. Why?

Take first, among the six classes, those that are "permanent and unchanging" (such as their permanent substances, the atoms, and so on). Press from two sides: either it can produce a fruit, and then it must be "impermanent" — for whatever has function and produces a fruit undergoes change, just like the fruit it produces (the fruit being impermanent, what produces it is impermanent too); or it cannot produce a fruit, and then it is simply not something really existent apart from consciousness, just like a "hare's horn" (no function, yet said to be outside the mind — that is empty as a hare's horn). Either way, a "really-existent permanent dharma" cannot be established.

Take next, among the six classes, those that are "impermanent"; press them likewise from two sides: either they have "obstruction" (take up space, mutually block), and then they have spatial position and parts, and can be cut apart and analyzed, just like an army or a forest (what can be taken apart is not a really-existent whole); or they have no obstruction, and then they are on the same footing as "mind and the mental factors," and so must be inseparable from this "consciousness," unable to be really existent apart from the mind (what has no obstruction is inseparable from consciousness). Either way, a real dharma outside the mind cannot be established.

Here their own classification is turned against them. The Vaiśeṣika place "earth, water, fire, wind" under the class "substance," and place "the hard, the wet, the warm, the moving" (hardness, wetness, warmth, flow — felt qualities) under the class "quality"; they also say the "substance" class has obstruction and the "quality" class has none. But both groups are plainly "felt by the body (the body-faculty)" — and since on this point, being felt, they are exactly alike, their nature ought to be alike too. So faults break out on both sides: on one side, earth-water-fire-wind (the substance class) ought, like the hard-wet-warm-moving (the quality class), to "have no obstruction" (since both are felt by the body, and the quality class you say has none); on the other side, the hard-wet-warm and the rest (the quality class) ought, like earth-water-fire-wind (the substance class), to "have obstruction" (both being felt by the body, and the substance class you say has it). Furthermore, the three — earth, water, fire — are, like "blue" and the other colors, all seen by the eye; by the same reasoning they can be pressed the same way (earth, water, fire being seen by the eye just as blue is, their nature ought to fall in with color too) — your whole classification does not match up.

So it can be known: there is no such thing as "real earth, water, fire, wind" and "the hard, wet," and so on, each standing apart with a nature of its own (your "substance" class and "quality" class cannot each be really existent); and the eye does not in fact truly see real earth, water, fire (what the eye sees is only colors like blue and yellow).

Again, those things in the Vaiśeṣika "substance" class that are "both obstructive and permanent" (such as their permanent atoms): since they have obstruction, they ought, like a coarse, plain clod of earth, to be "impermanent" (whatever has obstruction is impermanent) — which contradicts your calling them "permanent." And again, those things among the six classes that are "grasped by a sense-organ yet without obstruction" (such as the colors and tastes in the "quality" class) ought by rights all to "have obstruction" — for since you concede they are grasped by a sense-organ, they are on the same footing as earth-water-fire-wind (grasped by a sense-organ, and having obstruction); whatever is grasped by a sense-organ ought to have obstruction — which clashes with your saying they have none.

Again, those Vaiśeṣika items that "do not count as substance-class qualities" and so on (things not subsumed under the category "substance") ought by rights to have no nature of their own apart from consciousness — for since they are "not subsumed under the 'substance' class," they are like "a barren woman's son" (a barren woman cannot bear, so this son simply does not exist). And again, those things "not subsumed under the 'being' class" (not falling under the category "being," 有) ought to have no nature apart from consciousness either — for since they are "not subsumed under the 'being' class," they are like "a flower in the sky" (a flower seen by dazzled eyes, which in fact is not there).

The Vaiśeṣika also set up an overarching "being" (called "being-ness," or "the great category of being," meaning the universal ground by which all things come to count as "existent"). Against it, press from two sides: on one side, this "being," apart from substance, quality, and the rest, ought to have no nature of its own — for you concede it "is not non-existent, it is existent," and so it is on the same footing as substance, quality, and the rest (whatever is existent is inseparable from concrete dharmas like substance and quality). On the other side, if you insist this "being" exists separately, apart from substance and the rest, then it ought conversely to "not be existent" — for you concede it is other than substance and the rest, and so it is on the same footing as "utter nothing" (apart from every concrete dharma, it amounts to nothing at all).

Refute it further by a symmetrical question: take "being" itself — it is on its own "not non-existent" (it is itself existent), and needs no further "being-ness" added on top ("being" itself need not rely on some other "being" to count as existent); that being so, what need have substance, quality, and the rest of a further "being-ness" (the great being) added on, to count as "existent"? Furthermore, if you maintain that "apart from the 'being-things' (concrete existents) there is a separate 'being-ness,'" then by the same reasoning there ought also to be, "apart from the 'non-being-things' (concrete non-existents), a separate 'non-being-ness'" — yet you Vaiśeṣika do not concede this latter (you do not admit a separate independent "non-being-ness"); and since you reject the latter, how can the former (a separate independent "being-ness") stand? So your "being-ness" is purely guessed up out of nothing. (The refutation of the "great being" category ends here.)

The Vaiśeṣika maintain further that there are such things as "substance-ness, quality-ness, motion-ness" (the common ground by which a thing comes to count as a "substance," a "quality," a "motion" — falling under the category "the common"), and that these "-nesses" are a separate matter from "substance, quality, motion" themselves (the -ness lying outside the body). This account is bound to fail. Why? Because following out the road of "the -ness lies outside the body, the -ness is other than the body" leads to an endless regress. First, this "substance-ness" itself would also need yet another "-ness" (a -ness beyond the -ness), or else it would not itself count as a "substance-, quality-, or motion-ness" — for by your logic it is a separate matter from substance and the rest, just as quality and motion are a separate matter from substance (and so, layer upon layer, with no end). Second, "substance" itself would then no longer count within the class "substance," for by your account it is a separate matter from "substance-ness" (since body and -ness are two separate matters, the body is shut out of the -ness and not taken in). And likewise the "-ness" of earth and the rest, set against the "body" of earth and the rest, can be pressed the same way layer by layer — the rest is understood by this same reasoning. (The refutation of the "-ness" of the category "the common" ends here.)

Refute it by a symmetrical question: take "substance-ness" — it does not need yet another "substance-ness-ness" perched on top (a -ness needs no further -ness); that being so, substance and the rest need no separate "substance-ness" perched on them either (the body needs no further -ness). Furthermore, if you maintain "apart from substance and the rest there is a separate substance-and-the-rest-ness," then by the same reasoning there ought also to be, "apart from the not-substance-and-the-rest, a separate not-substance-and-the-rest-ness" — yet you Vaiśeṣika do not concede this latter; and since you reject the latter, how can the former stand? So the two "-nesses," "the common" and "the distinct," are merely conventionally posited names. (The refutation of the two categories "the common" and "the distinct" ends here.)

Next, refute the sixth category, "inherence" (the relation that binds the foregoing classes together). It is bound to be not really existent — for it is not subsumed under "being, substance," and the rest (it counts as neither substance, nor quality, nor being), and so is like "utter nothing" (what no class can take in amounts to nothing at all). Moreover, even those items the Vaiśeṣika themselves concede are "seen by direct perception" (substance, quality, etc.) have already been refuted by reasoning and cannot be established as really existent; how much less can "inherence," which even the Vaiśeṣika themselves concede is "not seen by direct perception," be really existent? And even if you insist "inherence" too is an object seen at first hand, then by the reasoning already given (an assembled conventional thing, made of many things, is not really existent) it is not really existent all the same.

To sum up: the Vaiśeṣika "substance" and the rest are not got by perceiving "a substance really existing apart from consciousness" at first hand — for you concede they "are objects of cognition (the known)," and whatever is an object of cognition is not really existent apart from consciousness, just like "tortoise-fur" (fur on a tortoise, which simply does not exist). And taking it apart: your "cognition that refers to 'substance'" is not a genuine direct perception "referring to a substance-body apart from consciousness" — for it "arises from a confluence of conditions," just like the "cognition that refers to 'quality'" (assembled into arising, not directly facing some real substance). Following this out all the way, even the "cognition that refers to 'inherence'" is not a genuine direct perception "referring to an inherence-body apart from consciousness" — for it too arises from a confluence of conditions, just like the "cognition that refers to 'substance'" (every cognition that arises from a confluence of conditions refers to no substance existing apart from consciousness). So the Vaiśeṣika masters' six categories, substance and the rest, are likewise posited following their own feeling, out of nothing. (The refutation of the Vaiśeṣika ends here.)

(iii) Refuting Maheśvara and the like (one cause producing all dharmas)

Next, the third school. One school of heterodox maintains: there is a "Maheśvara" (the Great Sovereign God), whose body is real, all-pervading, and permanent, and who can produce all dharmas. This position does not hold. Why? Here three statements chain one to the next: whatever "can produce things" is necessarily not permanent (since it can produce, it has change — how could it be permanent and unchanging?); whatever "is not permanent" is necessarily not all-pervading (since it changes, it is confined to certain times and places, and cannot be everywhere); and whatever "is not all-pervading" is not the "real" you speak of (the very thing you set up was "real-pervading-permanent" bound together, so not-pervading does not fit your own definition). Pressed down this chain, your "real, pervading, permanent" is dismantled point by point.

Press from the other side: since his body is at once permanent, all-pervading, and possessed of the power to produce all dharmas, he ought to produce all dharmas all at once, in every place and at every time (being permanent, pervading, and able, there is nothing to wait for). If you plead, "He must still wait until Maheśvara raises the wish to produce, or until various conditions are assembled, before he can produce," then this contradicts your own thesis that "all dharmas are produced by Maheśvara as the single cause" (for if he must wait on a wish and on conditions, then he is not the only cause). And again, that "wish to produce" and "the various conditions" ought, by rights, to be produced by him all at once, without before or after (for the cause that produces them — Maheśvara — is permanently present, and a permanent cause should yield its effects permanently, all at once). So the road of "waiting on a wish, waiting on conditions" does not work either.

Besides this, there are heterodox who take "Brahmā, time, space, the primal limit (the first starting-point of all things), nature, the void, the spirit-self," and the like, to be the one permanent, really-existent source, possessed of the power to produce, that produces all things. These positions are all refuted by the very same reasoning used against Maheśvara, and are all dismantled one by one. (Every position of this type — "all dharmas produced by some single cause" — is hereby refuted in full.)

(iv) Refuting the sound-is-permanent school (the Vedic sound is permanent · all sound is permanent)

Next, the fourth school — those who maintain "sound is permanent." Within this there are two accounts. One, a narrow attachment: the sound of the "Vedic treatises" (the Veda, the brahmins' sacred scripture) is permanent and unchanging, can serve as an absolutely reliable standard, and can be used to express and designate all dharmas. The other: not only the Veda but all sound is permanent, only ordinarily hidden, becoming manifest — and so coming to have its designating, expressing function — when conditions are met (for instance, when someone opens his mouth). Both accounts fail. Why?

Take first the Vedic sound. Since you concede it "can designate" (can express meaning), it must be not permanent — for every sound that can express meaning is impermanent, just like all the other sounds. And the other sounds, too, must be not "a permanent sound-body," on the same footing as a pot or a garment — for they all sound forth only when various conditions (mouth, tongue, breath, and so on) are met, and whatever requires conditions in order to be is impermanent. (So "sound is permanent" cannot stand; the refutation of the sound-is-permanent school ends here.)

(v) Refuting permanent, real atoms producing coarse form

One school of heterodox maintains: the "atoms" (極微, the smallest motes) of earth, water, fire, wind are real and permanent, and can produce "coarse form" (gross, plainly visible bodies); they say further that the coarse form produced does not exceed the measure of its cause (the atom), and that this coarse form, though impermanent, has a really-existent body. This position too does not hold. Why?

This atom you speak of, press from two sides: either it has "spatial division" (has position, has parts — up, down, left, right), and then it is like a line of ants strung out, which can be taken apart one by one, so its body is not real (what can be taken apart is not an indivisible real thing); or it has no spatial division, and then it is on the same footing as "mind and the mental factors" (which also have no spatial parts), and so it could not gather together with others to produce a coarse fruit-body (what has no position cannot lie side by side and pile up into something large). Furthermore, since it can produce a fruit, it ought, like the fruit it produces, to be impermanent (whatever produces a fruit undergoes change); so how can you say the atom is permanent and unchanging?

Again, since the fruit produced does not exceed the measure of its cause (the atom), it ought to be as tiny as an atom, and so cannot count as "coarse form" (gross, plainly visible); and being this tiny, this fruit-form ought then not to be graspable by the eye and the other sense-organs (an atom is too small to be a sense-object) — which clashes with your own thesis that "the atom produces coarse form."

You may shift your plea: "Though the fruit-form is as tiny as the atom, it has combined with a 'measure-quality' (an attribute that makes a thing appear coarse), so that, while not truly coarse, it appears coarse, and the sense-organ can grasp it." This too fails, pressing from two sides: since this fruit-form you speak of is as large as its cause (the atom), it ought, like the atom, to have "no combination with a measure-quality" (the atom having no measure-quality, the fruit of the same size should have none either); or else, conversely, the atom too ought, like the fruit, to "have combination with a measure-quality" (the fruit having it, the cause should have it too) — for the fruit and its cause are in no different place at all (being the same size and in the same place, whether or not there is a "measure-quality" should be the same for both).

You may plead again: "The fruit-form spreads over the whole heap of its causes (the many atoms); the causes being not one but a whole heap, the fruit-form can be called 'coarse.'" This too fails: on this account, the body of this fruit-form ought to be "not one" (scattering into many along with the heap of causes), just like the heap of atoms it spreads over, each in its own place, apart from one another. And since the fruit-form has scattered into many (spread out over atom after atom), it still does not amount to "coarse" (scattered and not gathered, it cannot be coarse); and so it is, once again, not graspable by a sense-organ.

If you say "the fruit becomes coarse by many parts (many small portions of the fruit) combining," then "the whole heap of atoms acting as cause," once assembled, ought likewise to be no longer tiny (many atoms put together are coarse too), so the atoms themselves would already suffice as the sense-object — and what need then of a separate "fruit"? (A heap of causes already serves as the object; setting up a fruit besides is redundant.) Moreover, since the fruit is composed of many parts put together, it ought to be not really existent (what many things are put together into is an assembled conventional thing); and so your thesis "the body of the fruit is really existent" contradicts itself, front and back.

Again, since the fruit and the cause both have "obstruction" (take up space, mutually block), they ought not to be in the same place (two things that both take up space cannot crowd into one spot), just as two atoms cannot admit each other. If you plead, "The bodies of fruit and cause penetrate and admit each other, as sand admits water, or as medicine enters molten copper," then this is refuted thus: who concedes that "the bodies of sand and copper" truly admit the "water and medicine" into themselves (water held in the gaps of sand, medicine mixed into copper — these are just things mingling in the interstices; it is not that the bodies truly penetrate each other)? Furthermore, if fruit and cause truly penetrate each other's bodies, then they ought either to "come apart" or to "be altered," becoming "not one, and not permanent" (once they penetrate each other, the body is changed — which contradicts your "permanent, and one").

Again, this fruit of coarse form — if its body is "one" (a single whole), then when you touch a small part of it you ought to touch the whole (to touch one place is to have touched the entire thing), for this place and that place are originally one whole, and that place ought to be just like this one (touch one place, and the whole is touched, the whole moves at once). This forces you into a dilemma: if you do not concede that "touching a part is touching the whole," you contradict your own principle that "the body of the fruit is a single whole"; if you do concede it, you contradict the plain fact the world sees (one can plainly touch a small patch and not the whole). So your thesis cannot be established, whether you concede or refuse; it is merely guessing and reckoning following your own feeling. (The refutation of "atoms producing coarse form" ends here.)

(vi) General refutation of the four heterodox positions (the dharma-thing and being-ness · one, other, both, neither)

Though the heterodox are many in their sects, on the relation between "the dharma-thing" (有法, the concrete dharmas of every kind) and "being-ness" (有等性, the shared nature by which those dharmas come to count as "existent"), all their accounts come down to just four positions:

First position: "the dharma-thing and being-ness are definitely one in substance," as with the Sāṃkhya and the like. This does not hold. Why? On this account, every dharma would just equal that "being-ness"; and since all equal the one being-ness, their substances would have no difference — which then contradicts the Sāṃkhya's own thesis that "the three qualities, the spirit-self, and the rest are each distinct in substance," and contradicts as well the plain phenomenon that the world's many dharmas are each different. Further, if "form and the rest just equal the nature of form and the rest," then form and the rest ought to have no differences such as "blue, yellow" (the substance being one single nature, blue and yellow could not be told apart).

Second position: "the dharma-thing and being-ness are definitely other in substance," as with the Vaiśeṣika and the like. This does not hold. Why? On this account (the -ness lying outside the dharma, the dharma itself not being the -ness), every dharma would then not be "being-ness"; and since the dharma itself does not count as "existent," it would be like "what has already perished into nothing," with no substance to be found at all — which contradicts the Vaiśeṣika's own thesis that "the substance of substance and the rest is not non-existent," and contradicts as well the plain fact that the world sees there are things. Further, if "form and the rest do not equal the nature of form and the rest" (body and -ness being two separate matters), then form and the rest ought, like sound, to not be an object of the eye (the -ness having parted from form, form would no longer count as something the eye can see).

Third position: "the dharma-thing and being-ness are both one and other," as with the Nirgrantha ("the Shameless") and the like. This does not hold. Why? Here are three faults. First, its "being one" and "being other" each incur the very faults already laid out in refuting the first and second positions (what was said there against "one" and against "other" applies here just the same). Second, "being one" and "being other" are by nature mutually opposed, so their substances ought to be distinct (the two substances of one and other cannot be crammed onto the same dharma). Third, since the substances of "one" and "other" are held to be the very same (you insist they sit together on one dharma), neither "being one" nor "being other" can be established (two mutually opposed things cannot both stand at once). And surely you cannot say all dharmas are alike one single substance (take only the "being one" side, and you fall into the fault of the first position). Otherwise, this "both one and other" can only be conventional, not real; yet you insist on grasping it as real — and this is bound to fail. (The refutation of "both one and other" ends here.)

Fourth position: "the dharma-thing and being-ness are neither one nor other," as with the Ājīvika ("the wrong-livelihood heterodox") and the like. This does not hold. Why? This "neither one nor other" account incurs the same faults as the "other" and "one" positions before it (say "not one" and you fall to the "other" side; say "not other" and you fall to the "one" side). Press it further: is your statement "neither one nor other" a "warding-off" (a sheer denial, blocking the words away) or a "positing" (positively setting up a claim)? This walls you in on four sides: if it is purely a positing, you ought not to deny both "one" and "other" outright (if you are setting something up, you cannot reject both sides); if it is purely a warding-off denial, then you have set up no claim at all (sheer denial that posits nothing cannot serve as your thesis); if you say it is "both denying and positing," then denying and positing are themselves mutually opposed; and if you say it is "neither positing nor denying," then it becomes an empty, meaningless phrase.

Further, "neither one nor other" contradicts the common knowledge of all the world that "some things are one and the same, some are different," and contradicts as well their own thesis that "form and the other dharma-things are definitely really existent." So this account is merely a trick to dodge others' challenges (an evasive, empty phrase with no real content); let those who have wisdom not muddle-headedly grant it. (The refutation of these four heterodox positions ends here.)

〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verse 1 · refuting the dharma-attachment

3. Refuting the form and other dharmas held by the other vehicles (the Hīnayāna)

The heterodox now refuted, next come the other schools (the Hīnayāna). They maintain "there really exist, apart from the mind, dharmas of every kind such as form"; why is it said that these too cannot be found, that they are not really existent? Because the three classes they maintain — "form," "the non-concurrent formations," and "the various unconditioned dharmas" — are, in principle, none of them really existent. (Below, the refutation runs in this order, class by class: first form, then the non-concurrent formations, last the unconditioned.)

(a) Refuting form — refuting atoms (resistant form)

Take first form. The form they maintain falls into two kinds: one is "resistant form" (有對色, form with obstruction, that mutually blocks), composed of atoms; the other is "non-resistant form" (無對色, form without obstruction), not composed of atoms. First the refutation of the first kind: "resistant form" is definitely not really existent, because the "atom" that composes it is simply not really existent.

Take these atoms, press from two sides: either it has obstruction (takes up space, blocks the way), and then it is like a pot and its class, which can be taken apart — assembled and conventional, not really existent (what has obstruction can all be taken apart); or it has no obstruction, and then it is on the same footing as "what is not form" (such as mind and the mental factors), and how then could it gather and assemble into things with obstruction, like a pot or a garment (what has no obstruction cannot add up to a body with obstruction)?

Again, these atoms, still pressed from two sides: either it has "spatial division" (has position, has parts), and then it can necessarily be cut and analyzed further, and so is not really existent (what can be taken apart is not an indivisible real unit); or it has no spatial division, and then it is on the same footing as "what is not form," and how then could they gather and "catch the light on one side and cast a shadow on the other"? Look: when the sun has just risen and shines on a pillar and such things, the pillar's east side and west side each show forth light (the face toward the sun) and shadow (the face away from the sun); and since "the place that catches the light" and "the place that casts the shadow" are not the same spot (one thing has a sun-facing side and a sun-away side to be told apart), the atom that composes it must have spatial division (a side facing, a side turned away).

Again, when we look at or touch a wall and such things, we get only the side that faces us, not the side turned away. And since "this assembled thing" is, in the end, just "that heap of atoms" (an assembled thing is nothing but the many atoms), this atom must have spatial division (a side facing me, a side turned away).

Again, these atoms, wherever they sit, must have the differences of up, down, and the four directions; if they did not, they would have no way to lie side by side and assemble into a heap (without position, there is no piling up one against another). Otherwise (granting it truly had no spatial division), atom upon atom would overlap and crowd into the very same spot, and so could not pile into anything large (all stacked in one place, how could they make something big?). From this it is known: the atom must have spatial division.

Since you maintain "resistant form just is that heap of atoms," press one layer more: if the atom had no spatial division, it ought not to "block and bar" (without spatial division there is no mutual blocking); and if it does not block, then it is not "resistant form" (which has obstruction, mutually blocks) at all — yet "resistant form" is precisely what you posited. So the atom you maintain must have spatial division; and since it has spatial division, it can be cut and analyzed, and so is definitely not really existent. And thus the thesis "resistant form is really existent" cannot stand. (The refutation of resistant form ends here.)

(b) Refuting non-resistant form — the form the five consciousnesses rest on and refer to is consciousness's own transformation

〔Q〕 Someone asks: do the first five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness through body-consciousness) then have no "form they rest on" (the five faculties) and no "form they refer to" (the five objects)? 〔A〕 It is not that there is no form; only, that form is all manifested by consciousness. That is: when a consciousness arises, by the force of the causes and conditions within it (the seeds), it manifests images that look like "the five faculties, eye and the rest" and "the five objects, form and the rest," and it takes just these (images manifested by the inner consciousness) as the form it rests on (the faculty) and refers to (the object).

Yet note: "the five faculties, eye and the rest" are not got by direct perception, seen at first hand (the faculty itself is not visible); it is "because it can set a consciousness going" that we know by inference it exists. This faculty is only a "function" (the power to set a consciousness going, a force borne on the seeds), not a really-existent form made out of something outside the mind (atoms).

Since "resistant form outside the mind" cannot be established in principle (the atom having already been refuted above), the faculty rested on must be only a function manifested by the inner consciousness — this function, which can set the eye-consciousness and the rest going, is what is named "the eye-faculty and the rest"; it is taken (this faculty manifested by the inner consciousness) as the rest, and the eye-consciousness and the rest are produced.

The eye-consciousness and the rest taking "a real object outside the mind as their object-condition" cannot be established in principle; so one must concede that "the appearance consciousness itself transforms" is its object-condition — that is, the thing that "can draw forth an image resembling the consciousness itself" is the "object-condition of this consciousness" that you too must concede (the object-condition must be that appearance upon consciousness which can draw forth an image like the consciousness itself).

To be the "object-condition," it is not enough merely that something "can produce this consciousness" (it must also carry an appearance, able to draw forth an image like the consciousness itself); otherwise, the "causal condition (the seeds)" and such, which can also produce a consciousness, would all have to be called this consciousness's object-condition too (the seeds can produce the consciousness, yet they are not what the consciousness refers to — so "able to produce" alone is not enough).

When the five consciousnesses, eye and the rest, cognize form and the like, they refer only to the "aggregated appearance" (the whole-appearance that many atoms put together make), because there shows forth upon consciousness an image resembling that aggregated appearance; it is not that the "aggregated appearance" has a real body of its own apart from that heap of atoms. When you break that (aggregated) thing apart and analyze it, the consciousness that "shows forth an image resembling it" definitely does not arise (break it apart and the whole-appearance does not show, so the consciousness does not arise either) — which shows the "aggregated appearance" is not really existent at all, and so cannot be said to be the object-condition the five consciousnesses refer to. Otherwise, "a second moon" (the false moon seen when rubbing the eyes, which in fact does not exist) and such things could produce the five consciousnesses too (such a false image can produce a consciousness, yet it is not a real object — exactly like the aggregated appearance).

Nor can it be said that "when the heap of atoms is gathered together, each atom serves one by one as the object of the five consciousnesses" — for what shows forth upon the five consciousnesses is the whole-appearance, with no "appearance of single atoms" at all (what shows on consciousness is the total appearance, not the atom-appearance). Nor can it be said that "the heap of atoms (each) carries the aggregated appearance" — for when they have not yet gathered, this "aggregated appearance" is not there (the aggregated appearance is not something the atoms have of themselves).

Nor can it be said that "at the time of gathering" and "at the time of not gathering" the substance and appearance of these atoms are in any way different (the atom's substance-and-appearance is unchanged before and after); so "the time of gathering" is just like "the time of not gathering," and the atoms of form and the rest are not the object of the five consciousnesses (gathered or not, the atom-appearance is not the object consciousness refers to).

(c) Refuting the "collected appearance" (the rescue offered by another school)

Another school comes forward to rescue the position (the "combined appearance" having just been refuted, they shift their account): the single atoms of form and the rest, while they are "not yet collected together," are indeed not an object of the five consciousnesses; but once they reach the state of "being collected together with one another," these atoms mutually reinforce one another, and a "coarse appearance" arises, which serves as the object of the five consciousnesses; and they hold that this coarse appearance is really existent, taking it as what this consciousness refers to. (This is the rescue called "the collected appearance is really existent.")

This rescue does not hold either; here it is refuted point by point. First: an atom in the state of "being collected together" and in the state of "not yet collected" has one and the same substance and appearance (collecting changes nothing in a single atom's substance-and-appearance) — so where would the "coarse appearance" spring from? Second: a pot and a clay basin and such things — supposing the atoms composing them were equal in number — then the consciousness that refers to their two appearances ought to have no difference (the atom-appearance being the same, the consciousness could not tell them apart), yet we plainly see a pot and a basin as different. Third: at the moment of collecting, if a coarse appearance really arose, then each single atom ought to "cast off its original tiny, round appearance" (turning coarse, the tiny-round appearance would be gone), yet the atoms do not in fact cast off their tiny round appearance. Fourth: a "consciousness referring to a coarse appearance" ought not to go and refer to "an object of tiny appearance" (what shows on consciousness is coarse, but the object is only tiny atoms — the two sides do not match); otherwise it would amount to "a consciousness referring to this object going off and referring to that object" (mistaking the one for the other). Fifth: (if you drop the requirement that consciousness and object must match) then one consciousness ought to be able to refer to every object (once the "appearance must match" restriction is gone, anything could be referred to).

That school still concedes there are atoms, and tried to use them to rescue the "collected appearance" — and already it has brought this whole heap of faults down upon itself; how much more so when (on the consciousness-only view) there are simply no real atoms outside the mind at all, so that the "collected appearance" can the less be established. (The refutation of the collected appearance ends here.)

(d) Conclusion: every form-with-obstruction is consciousness's own transformation · "atom" is a conventional designation

From this it can be settled for certain: the true object-condition is "the form-resembling appearance that consciousness itself transforms into" — for the "seeing-part" (the apprehending side) arises in dependence on it (the image-part) and carries its (the image-part's) appearance. And when consciousness transforms, it manifests "a single whole appearance" all at once, according to the size of the object, large or small (one whole image-part); it does not separately transform out a multitude of atoms and then assemble them into one thing (consciousness manifests the whole appearance at a stroke, with no need to piece it together out of atoms).

Then why did the Buddha himself speak of "atoms"? It was for the sake of those who cling to "coarse form having a real substance" that the Buddha set out the teaching of "atoms," telling them to analyze form away layer by layer (so as to break the clinging to "coarse form is really existent"); he did not mean that there is really such a thing as an atom inside form (the atom is an expedient way of speaking, not a really existent dharma). The yoga-practitioners, with a "cognition of imagined supposition" (an analytic supposing carried out in contemplation), break the appearance of coarse form down step by step, and where it "can be broken down no further" they conventionally give it the name "atom." This atom still does have spatial division; only it is no longer (in the contemplative cognition) divided further — for were it divided yet further, there would show forth an appearance like "empty space," no longer counting as form. And so the atom is said to be "the very last limit of form" (the extreme reached when form is analyzed to the end, not a real existing mote).

From this it should be understood: every "form-with-obstruction" is a manifestation transformed by consciousness, and is not composed of (real) atoms.

(e) Refuting the reality of "form-without-obstruction" (無對色)

As for the other kind, "form-without-obstruction" (無對色, the form gathered under the dharma-base that offers no physical resistance) — since it belongs to the very same class as the foregoing (the consciousness-transformed form just dealt with), it too is not really existent; and besides, being by its very nature "without obstruction," it is just like mind and the mental-associates (which likewise offer no resistance), and so is certainly not a real form-dharma. Only consider: that "form-with-obstruction," which does plainly show forth a form-appearance and does resist, when pressed by reasoning turns out not even to exist apart from consciousness — how much less can this "form-without-obstruction," which by its nature shows forth no form-appearance at all (inconspicuous, obstructing nothing), be called a true form-dharma (if even form-with-obstruction does not stand, form-without-obstruction stands the less)?

(f) Refuting expressive form (表色) and non-expressive form (無表色)

〔Q〕Someone asks: is "expressive form" (表色, the karma displayed by body and speech — visible, audible) and "non-expressive form" (無表色, the hidden karma-form that does not show itself outwardly) not really existent? 〔A〕This too is not really existent. Why so?

First take "bodily expressive form" (身表色, the karma-form that is the body's performing of an action). If it is really existent, what does it take for its own substance? If you say it is just "shape," then it is not really existent — for shape can be analyzed further (what can be broken apart is not unitarily real); and besides, for "long, short" and such shapes one can find no "atom" at all (there is no such thing as "a tiny bit of length" or "a tiny bit of shortness" — which shows that shape is not composed of real motes).

If you say "bodily expressive form" is just "motion" (the moving), that too is not really existent — for every dharma is born and perishes in the very instant, so there is no such thing as "moving across" at all (instant by instant things arise and perish; nothing actually travels from here to there). Moreover, the "perishing" of a conditioned dharma waits upon no other cause (a dharma perishes of itself; there is no separate cause that "makes it perish"); and if "perishing" still had to wait upon a cause (say, had to wait upon "motion" before it perished), then it would not be true "perishing" at all (what perishes only by relying on a cause is not a dharma perishing of its own nature).

You might then say: "There is a kind of form that is neither display-color (the blues and yellows) nor shape-color (the longs and shorts); it is drawn forth by mind, can set the hands and so on in motion, and this is what is called 'bodily expressive karma.'" This too will not stand, and pressed it falls apart: if this (form) is just "motion," it was already refuted above (there is no moving-across at all); if it is "the cause that makes things move," then it would have to be the "wind-element" (among the four great elements it is wind that governs motion) — yet the wind-element has no function of "expressing, displaying (the inner mind)," and so should not be called "expressive" at all (wind blowing a thing into motion is not expressing any karma). Furthermore (since the wind-element belongs to the tangible base), the tangible does not range over good and evil natures (the tangible is karmically neutral, yet expressive karma divides into good and evil — the two sides do not match up); and as for what is "not display-color," together with smell and taste and the like, they may be understood on the model of "the tangible" (none of them can serve as the substance of expressive karma). Therefore "bodily expressive karma" is certainly not really existent.

What, then, is really going on, rightly understood? It is mind that serves as cause, making "the form-appearances of hands and so on that consciousness transforms into" arise-and-perish moment by moment in succession and shift toward another quarter, so that there seems to be an action (in fact it is a string of fresh form-appearances arising and perishing in succession — not one same thing actually moving its place); and because this can "express the inner mind," it is given the borrowed name "bodily expression" (bodily expression is only a conventional designation).

"Verbal expression" (語表, the karma that is spoken speech) likewise is not a really existent sound-substance, for three reasons: first, a single instant of sound expresses no meaning (one instant cannot make up the sense of a sentence); second, sound made up of many successive instants is a conventional composite, not really existent (what is many joined together is a conventional dharma); third, the external form-with-obstruction (sound belongs to form-with-obstruction) was already refuted above. Rightly understood, then: because of mind, consciousness transforms into an appearance resembling "sound," arising-and-perishing moment by moment in succession, so that there seems to be an expressing — and so it is given the borrowed name "verbal expression," with no offense to reason (verbal expression too is only a conventional designation).

If "expressive form" is not really existent, how should "non-expressive form" be really existent? Yet, rightly understood, in dependence on the good-and-evil bounds of "volition-and-resolve" (思願, the constructing mind, the resolving mind) a "non-expressive" is conventionally set up, and this too offends no reason. That is to say: this "non-expressive" is in some cases set up in dependence on "the good or evil volition that can issue in superior bodily and verbal karma," at the stage when its seed is growing (this is called the non-expressive of the dispersed state); and in other cases set up in dependence on "the volition that, within meditative absorption, halts the evils of body and speech" (this is called the non-expressive of absorption); and so it is conventionally existent (the non-expressive too is only a conventional designation).

(g) Reconciling the three kinds of karma and the paths of action (三業·業道)

〔Q〕Someone asks: in the scriptures the World-Honored One plainly speaks of three kinds of karma — "bodily, verbal, mental" — yet you now call "bodily karma and verbal karma" not real form; does this not run counter to the scriptures? 〔A〕We are not striking them out as nonexistent (the three kinds of karma are still granted); we say only that they are "not form" (not a real form-dharma, but simply a phase of "volition," 思).

That very "volition" (思, the constructing will) which "can set the body in motion" is what is called "bodily karma"; that "volition" which "can issue speech" is what is called "verbal karma"; and as for the two volitions, "deliberating volition" (審慮思) and "deciding volition" (決定思), because they are associated with the mental faculty (意) and can construct and rouse this faculty, they are called "mental karma" (which shows that the substance of all three kinds of karma is, in fact, just "volition").

Now the "volition that initiates bodily and verbal action," since it does some constructing, is called "karma" (業, action); and because it is "the road traveled" by the deliberating and deciding volitions (those volitions journey upon it), and because it can lead to and produce the maturation-fruits of suffering or pleasure, it is also called "a path" (道). Hence the foregoing seven paths-of-action (the three of body, the four of speech) also take "volition" for their substance; or, put another way, bodily expression and verbal expression are issued by volition, and so are given the borrowed name "karma," and because they are the road traveled by volition, they are called "paths of action" (in the end the paths of action are still just "volition").

From this it should be understood: outside the mind there is no form at all; there is only inner consciousness transforming so as to give rise to appearances resembling form. (The refutation of the form-dharmas ends here in full.)

(h) Refuting the non-concurrent formations — general statement (不相應行·總標)

The form-dharmas refuted, we come next to the second class — the "non-concurrent formations" (不相應行, the formations not concurrent with mind) — and it too is not really existent. Why so? Take such non-concurrent formations as "acquisition and non-acquisition" (得、非得): first, unlike form, mind, and the various mental-associates, they have no "substance-and-appearance" of their own that can be found; second, neither do they have, "apart from form, mind, and the mental-associates," any function of their own that can be found. From these two points it is known that they are certainly not really existent, but are merely names conventionally set up in dependence on the "phases" (分位, the various differentiated states) of form and the rest.

This is established by reasoning, viewed under three heads. First: this non-concurrent formation is certainly not something that, "apart from form, mind, and the mental-associates, has a real substance and function" — it is just like form and mind and so on (form and mind have real substance-and-function and are all subsumed under the aggregates), since it too is conceded to be subsumed under the formations-aggregate (a dharma likewise subsumed under an aggregate should not have a real substance-and-function apart from form and mind). Second: because "the four — form, mind, mental-associates, and the unconditioned — cannot take it in," it is just like "utter nonexistence" (畢竟無, sheer nothing) and is certainly not really existent. Third: because "the remaining real dharmas cannot take it in," it is just like the remaining conventional dharmas, having no real substance. (The general statement on the non-concurrent formations ends here.)

(i) Refuting acquisition and non-acquisition (得·非得)

〔Q〕First the refutation of "acquisition and non-acquisition" (得、非得). How does that school (the Sarvāstivāda) know that "acquisition and non-acquisition" have a real substance and function apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so. For instance the scripture says, "such-and-such a sentient being (補特伽羅, pudgala, a living being) has attained good and evil," and "the noble one has attained the ten dharmas of the adept"; and again it says, "the ordinary person has not attained the noble dharmas," and "the arhats have not attained the defilements" — they argue that these very words "attained / not attained" are precisely declaring "acquisition and non-acquisition" (and so acquisition and non-acquisition are really existent).

〔A〕But the scripture does not say that this "attaining / not-attaining" has a real substance and function apart from form, mind, and the rest (the scripture only speaks of "attaining / not attaining"; it never speaks of some separate, real "acquisition"); so to take this as proof does not hold.

The scripture also says, "the wheel-turning king has attained the seven treasures" — does the king then (by some real "acquisition") attain to himself even the bodies of others and the insentient things as well (for the seven treasures include other persons and include insentient things)? If you say, "the king has a power of free disposal over the treasures, and so it is only conventionally said that he has attained them" (there being no real "acquisition" at all), then why not concede the very same for good and evil dharmas — that "attainment" is conventionally said — instead of insisting on a real "acquisition"?

You might object: "The seven treasures are present things; because the thing is present, one may 'conventionally say' it is attained (the implication being: but good and evil dharmas lie in the past or future, so one needs a real 'acquisition' to bind them fast)." Then this refutes you: how do you know that the good and evil dharmas you have attained exist "apart from the present" (off in the past or future)? Apart from the present, a real dharma, by reason, does not exist (past and future dharmas have no substance); and besides, there must be present in you a "seed of good" and the like (a good dharma takes the present seed for its substance, and on that basis one may conventionally say it is attained — what need of a real "acquisition"?).

Further: what excellent function does "acquisition" have with respect to a dharma? If you say "acquisition can make a dharma arise," then take it point by point. First, it ought to be able to make the unconditioned arise as well (acquisition being no respecter of objects — yet the unconditioned does not arise). Second, "all the insentient things" (which have no acquisition in them) ought never to be able to arise (yet insentient things plainly do arise). Third, a dharma "not yet acquired, or already lost" ought never to be able to be born (yet a thing lost and then re-acquired plainly does happen). And if you shift and say "the acquisition that is born together with the dharma" is the cause that makes it arise, then the "two births" you separately posit (the birth-mark and the birth-of-birth, those two non-concurrent formations whose whole office is to make dharmas arise) become useless (if you take acquisition for the cause of arising, what need of those two births?). Furthermore, if in one being there are at once the "acquisitions" of all three natures — good, evil, and neutral — then the good, evil, and neutral dharmas ought to come present all at once (all three acquisitions being there); and if you say they must still await some other cause (to come present one by one), then "acquisition" is again useless (since some other cause is needed anyway, acquisition is plainly not the cause of a dharma's arising).

If you shift again and say "acquisition" is, with respect to a dharma, a "cause of not-losing" (the dharma is not lost, and stays attained, by relying on it), this too will not pass: those "attainable dharmas" are inseparable from sentient beings to begin with (a dharma rests, from the first, upon the body-and-mind of a being), and were they apart from the being there would be nothing to attain at all (apart from the body, nothing is attained); and so "acquisition," with respect to a dharma — whether you call it the cause of a dharma's arising or the cause of its not being lost — is in every way useless (without positing this acquisition, the dharma quite naturally cleaves to the being's body). And since "acquisition" in truth does not exist, "non-acquisition" (its reverse) does not exist either. (The refutation of acquisition and non-acquisition ends here.)

Rightly understood, then, it is in dependence on the phase "a sentient being's capacity to attain the various dharmas" that three kinds of "attainment" are conventionally set up: first, seed-attainment; second, mastery-attainment; third, present-activity-attainment. Reversing these three, the name "non-attainment" (that is, non-acquisition) is conventionally set up. This "non-acquisition" is of many kinds, yet the most important of them is this: at the stage when "the seeds eradicable only on the path of seeing" within the three realms have not yet been forever destroyed, a "non-acquisition" is conventionally set up, and this is called "the ordinary-being nature" (異生性, the very constitution of the unenlightened) — because such a one has not yet attained any of the noble dharmas. (The refutation of acquisition and non-acquisition ends here in full.)

(j) Refuting the generic-similarity (同分·眾同分)

〔Q〕Next the refutation of "generic-similarity" (同分, the shared class-nature of beings — that which makes a god a god and a human a human, the common phase they share). How does that school know that "generic-similarity" has a real substance and function apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so. For instance the scripture says, "this is the god generic-similarity, this is the human generic-similarity," and so on at length (each destiny having its own generic-similarity — therefore generic-similarity is really existent).

〔A〕But this scripture does not say that "generic-similarity" has a real substance apart from form, mind, and the rest (the scripture only speaks of "being of one class"; it never speaks of some separate substance); so to take this as proof does not hold.

The school says again: "Toward beings we form a like cognition and use a like designation — 'this is a human, that too is a human' — and this can arise only on the basis of 'generic-similarity'; hence we know generic-similarity is really existent." This is refuted on two heads. First: by this account, grass and trees and the like (toward which we likewise form the like cognition and use the like designation, 'this is grass, that too is grass') ought also to have a "generic-similarity" (yet the school itself does not concede that grass and trees have generic-similarity). Second: since you can form a like cognition and use a like designation toward "generic-similarity" itself (generic-similarity having become a referent in turn, and drawing forth a like designation), then "generic-similarity" itself ought to have yet another "generic-similarity" over its head (and so layer within layer, without end); but the school does not concede that "generic-similarity has a further generic-similarity" either — and since it denies this latter point, how can the former point stand (how can the like cognition and like designation prove generic-similarity really existent)?

The school says again: "'Generic-similarity' can serve as a cause that gives rise to 'like undertakings and like desires' (everyone does what a person should do, has the desires a person should have), and so we know it is really existent." This too will not stand: in fact it is "the habituation of former lives" (the accumulated latent tendencies) that, serving as cause, gives rise to these like undertakings and like desires — what need to posit, besides, a real "generic-similarity"? Rightly understood, then, it is in dependence on the phase-difference "the mutual resemblance of beings in body and mind" that a "generic-similarity" is conventionally set up. (The refutation of generic-similarity ends here.)

(k) Refuting the life-faculty (命根)

〔Q〕Next the refutation of the "life-faculty" (命根). How does the school know that the life-faculty has a real substance apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so. For instance the scripture says, "the three — vital span (壽, āyus), warmth (煖, uṣman), and consciousness (識, vijñāna) (together, a being stays alive)"; and they argue that the "life-faculty" within this is precisely what is called "vital span" (and so the life-faculty is really existent).

〔A〕But this scripture does not speak of a "real vital-span-substance apart from form, mind, and the rest" (the scripture only speaks of the three, vital span, warmth, and consciousness; it never says that "vital span" is a separate substance); so to take this as proof does not hold. Moreover, it was already established earlier that "form is inseparable from consciousness," so this (the life-faculty) too should be inseparable from consciousness, with no separate life-faculty besides. And pressing the point by reasoning: if the life-faculty were really existent apart from consciousness, it would have to be like the mental-associate "feeling" and the rest (which, though they too are something other than consciousness, are not called the life-faculty) — in short, what is apart from consciousness is not the true life-faculty.

〔Q〕If so, why does the scripture speak of three dharmas (does that not show the three are each distinct)? 〔A〕They are spoken of as three according to a difference of sense, much as with "the four right exertions" (which are at bottom one single energy, only spoken of as four according to a difference of sense). 〔Q〕But in the "mindless state" (like the no-thought absorption, when mind does not function), since consciousness is then inoperative, vital span and warmth ought to be absent (for if you say vital span just is consciousness, then in the mindless state there would be no vital span)? 〔A〕Have you not heard the scripture say "consciousness does not leave the body" (in the mindless state there is, in fact, still consciousness)? 〔Q〕Since (there is still consciousness in the mindless state), how then can it be called the "mindless state"? 〔A〕What is extinguished in that mindless state is only the "evolving consciousnesses" (轉識, the first six), and not the "store-consciousness" (阿賴耶, the eighth still remaining — so vital span and warmth remain, while the first six do not operate, and so it is called the mindless state). As for the proof that "there is this eighth consciousness," the later text will treat it in full. This eighth consciousness suffices to be the substance of "realm (the three realms), destiny (the six paths), and birth (the four modes of birth)"; it is pervasive, enduring, and continuous, and is a maturation-fruit — so there is no need to posit, besides, a real "life-faculty."

Rightly understood, then, it is in dependence on "the seed that directly generates this eighth consciousness," and by reason of "the differentiated capacities drawn forth by karmic force," that "the duration of its abiding is fixed" (how long this one life can last is settled); and in dependence on just this a "life-faculty" is conventionally set up. (The refutation of the life-faculty ends here.)

(l) Refuting the two mindless absorptions and the no-thought maturation (二無心定·無想異熟)

〔Q〕Next the refutation of the "two mindless absorptions" (二無心定, the no-thought absorption and the cessation absorption) and the "no-thought maturation" (無想異熟, the fruit of the no-thought heaven). How does the school know these have a real self-nature apart from form, mind, and the rest? Their ground is this: if these had no real nature, they could not block mind and the mental-associates so as to keep them from coming present (since they do block mind, this shows they have a real nature). 〔A〕This is refuted by turning it around: if you say "in the mindless state there is a real dharma, distinct from form, mind, and the rest, that can block mind, and this is what is called the mindless absorption," then by the very same reasoning "in the formless state (the formless realm) there ought likewise to be a real dharma, distinct from form and the rest, that can block form, called the formless absorption" (yet in the formless realm there is no such real dharma whose special office is to block form); and since that side (the formless absorption) is not so (there being no real dharma there to block form), how can this side (the mindless absorption having a real dharma to block mind) stand?

Further: to block mind, what need of a real dharma? Just as a dam and the like (which are themselves but conventional composites), a conventional thing can block all the same. What is really going on here? At the time of cultivating absorption, in the preparatory effort toward absorption, the practitioner wearies of the "coarse, agitated mind and mental-associates," and so raises up an excellent "aspiring resolve" (a yearning to enter the mindless state) and uses it to suppress mind and the mental-associates; this makes mind and the mental-associates grow gradually finer and gradually subtler, and at the moment of "the faintest mind" (微微心, the most extremely subtle instant of mind) it perfumes the "maturation-consciousness" (the eighth), forming a "seed of supremely intensified weariness-of-mind and the rest"; and because this weariness-seed suppresses the active seeds of mind and the rest, the coarse, agitated mind and the rest temporarily do not come present — and it is in dependence on just this phase of "not coming present" that the "two mindless absorptions" are conventionally set up (these two absorptions too are only conventional designations).

This (weariness-of-mind and the rest) seed is good, and so the absorption that is set up upon it is also called "good." Then for the no-thought maturation: before cultivating the "no-thought absorption," the practitioner single-mindedly yearns for the "no-thought fruit" (the maturation of being born into the no-thought heaven), and so the seed he perfumes can summon that "maturation-consciousness" (the one-life retribution-body of the no-thought heaven); relying on the (no-thought heaven's) absorptive power, the coarse, agitated conceptions and the rest do not operate, and it is in dependence on just this phase that a "no-thought (maturation)" is conventionally set up. It is set up in dependence on the maturation (the retribution), and so gets the name "maturation." Therefore these three dharmas (the two mindless absorptions and the no-thought maturation) are likewise not really existent. (The refutation ends here.)

(m) Refuting the marks of the conditioned (有為相·生住異滅·fascicle two)

(Here begins fascicle two, continuing the refutation of the non-concurrent formations with "the marks of the conditioned.")

〔Q〕Next the refutation of "the marks of the conditioned" (有為相, that is, the four marks: arising, abiding, decay, and perishing). How does the school know that these conditioned-marks have a real self-nature apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so — for instance the scripture says, "there are the three conditioned-marks of conditioned dharmas (arising, decay, perishing; or, taken together, the four: arising, abiding, decay, perishing)," and so on at length. 〔A〕But this scripture does not say that (the conditioned-marks) have a real self-nature apart from form, mind, and the rest (the scripture only sets out these marks; it never says they have some separate substance); so to take this as proof does not hold.

Now to state the matter positively: these four marks and the dharma they mark (form, mind) are not two separate things, viewed under three heads. First, in the expression "the marks of the conditioned," the genitive "of" (非第六聲, the Sanskrit sixth-case "of") does not signify that mark and substance are two different things — just as in "the substance of form-and-mind" the word "of" is at bottom form-and-mind itself (the "of" signifying no two things). Second, the substance of the "marker" (the four marks of arising and so on) is not necessarily other than the "marked" (form, mind) — otherwise the "mark of solidity and the like" would have to be other than "earth" and so on (yet earth takes solidity for its very mark; the mark of solidity is not other than the substance of earth). Third, if "the conditioned-marks" were really other than the substance of the "marked," then "the marks of the unconditioned" would have to be other than what they mark (yet the marks of the unconditioned are not other than the unconditioned; and by this model it is known that the conditioned-marks too are not other than the conditioned).

Further, the four marks — arising, abiding, decay, perishing (which the Sarvāstivāda hold to be all present at once) — when pressed yield faults. Their substances being all present at once, their functions ought to break forth all together at every time (the substances being present, the functions should be too); and if you say the (four marks) mutually conflict, so that their functions cannot all break forth at once, then their "substances" ought likewise to mutually conflict (the functions conflicting, the substances should conflict too) — so how can they be said to be "all present at once" (if even the functions cannot be simultaneous, neither should the substances)? Further, the functions of "abiding, decay, perishing" especially ought not to be simultaneous (abiding makes a dharma stay, perishing makes it perish — flatly opposed). Pressing one layer deeper: the substances of "marker (the four marks)" and "marked (form, mind)" being all originally existent (the Sarvāstivāda holding that dharma-substance exists for all time), their "functions" too ought to be there originally and always (substance and function being not two), for substance and function are one and the same; and if you say "those four marks' functions must still await conditions (before they can break forth)," then the very "conditions" they await ought not to be originally existent (what must await conditions in order to arise is not originally existent — and this in turn clashes with your own thesis that "dharma-substance exists for all time").

Further, pressing the Sarvāstivāda thesis "dharma-substance is originally existent," the faults come one upon another. First: since dharma-substance is originally existent, then to posit "arising" and the other marks besides becomes useless (the dharma being there already, what is "arising" for?). Second: the "marked" (form, mind) being always there from the first, and "arising" and the rest yet joined to it (you say arising makes the already-existent dharma come present), then "the unconditioned" too ought to have "arising" and the rest (the unconditioned is a dharma too — why should it not be arisen?), for one can find no reason "the unconditioned and the conditioned should be reckoned apart" (there is no warrant for arising the conditioned only and not the unconditioned). Third: (the Sarvāstivāda concede that) the dharma-substance of the past and future worlds is neither present nor permanent — so it ought to be like a flower in the sky, not really existent (past and future dharmas have no substance). Fourth: "arising" is what "makes a dharma become existent" — so how can it sit in the "future" (the future not yet being, how can there be a making-existent there)? "Perishing" is what "makes a dharma become nonexistent" — so it ought not to be in the "present" (the present dharma being existent, how can there be a making-nonexistent there)? Fifth: if "perishing" is not "the nonexistent" (the Sarvāstivāda insisting that perishing too has substance), then "arising" ought not to be "the existent" either (arising and perishing run by the same reasoning — here you contradict yourself). Sixth: "perishing" and "abiding" are flatly opposed — so how can you insist they are simultaneous (abiding and perishing being opposed, they should not be present at once)? Yet "abiding" and "arising" are not opposed — so how can you allow them to sit in different worlds (abiding and arising being not opposed, yet the Sarvāstivāda assign arising to the present, assign abiding to the present, and still rank the four marks in sequence — self-contradiction)? Therefore the thesis the Sarvāstivāda cling to (the four marks really existent and all present at once) is, whether you call them "all present at once" or "sitting in different worlds," contrary to reason.

What, then, is rightly the case? A conditioned dharma, by the force of conditions, is ever "originally not, now existent" and "for a moment existent, then again not"; and to display how it differs from "the unconditioned" (which has none of these four marks), the four marks "arising, abiding, decay, perishing" are conventionally set up. "Originally not, now existent" — the stretch of its being existent is called "arising"; this stretch of "arising" pauses for a moment, and that is called "abiding"; within this stretch of "abiding" there is a difference of before and after (the later no longer as the earlier), and so a further name, "decay," is set up; "for a moment existent, then again not" — the while of its being nonexistent is called "perishing." The first three marks (arising, abiding, decay) are "existent," and so are all in the present; the last mark (perishing) is "nonexistent," and so is in the past. (All four marks are conventionally set up in dependence on the present dharma.)

〔Q〕Someone asks: "perishing," being "what has already become nonexistent," how can it serve as a "mark" of a conditioned dharma (how can what is already gone serve as a mark)? 〔A〕That "mark of perishing" serves to display "this dharma's becoming nonexistent afterward"; what fault in taking it as a (conditioned dharma's) mark? — "Arising" displays that the conditioned dharma "was formerly not"; "perishing" displays that it "is afterward not"; "decay" displays that this dharma "is not frozen-fast"; "abiding" displays that this dharma "for a moment still has function." So these four marks, with respect to a conditioned dharma, though all called "display," yet differ in what they display.

The foregoing sets up the four marks conventionally in dependence on the "instant" (the briefest single moment); but in dependence on the phase of "one life-span" (一期, a single stretch of a life), the four marks may likewise be conventionally set up: the first being is called "arising"; the final nonbeing is called "perishing"; after arising, the similar continuance is called "abiding"; and the transformation within just this continuance is called "decay." Therefore all four marks are conventionally set up. (The refutation of the conditioned-marks ends here.)

(n) Refuting the name-group, phrase-group, and syllable-group (名身·句身·文身)

〔Q〕Next the refutation of "name-group, phrase-group, and syllable-group" (名身、句身、文身, that is, names, sentences, and letters — the three sets of meaning-expressing entities). How does the school know that these have a real, meaning-expressing substance apart from form, mind, and the rest? They answer: because the scriptures say so — for instance the scripture says, "the Buddha attained the rare name-group, phrase-group, and syllable-group" (and so name, phrase, and syllable are really existent). 〔A〕But this scripture does not say that (name, phrase, syllable) have a real "name"-substance and the rest apart from form, mind, and the rest (the scripture is only praising the Buddha's merits; it never says they have some separate substance); so to take this as proof does not hold.

If "name, phrase, syllable" were really existent apart from "sound," they ought, like form and the rest, to be unable really to express meaning (once cut off from sound into a separate thing, they would be like form — just sitting there, conveying nothing). And you say "sound can produce name, phrase, syllable" — but then this sound itself must carry "the bending of intonation" (the rise and fall of tone), and this is already enough to express meaning, so what need of name and the rest besides (sound by itself can convey meaning; name, phrase, syllable are then superfluous)? And if you protest, "the very bending of intonation upon the sound is name, phrase, syllable, and it is really existent apart from sound," then this refutes you: by that account, "the bending of shape-and-size that we see upon form" (the curving outline of a thing) ought also to be apart from "form" and to have a real substance of its own (the bending upon form sets up no separate substance — so by what right does the bending upon sound get to set up one?).

You may protest again: "the bending of intonation upon sound is like the sound of strings and pipes — it cannot of itself express meaning (instrumental sound too has its rise and fall, yet conveys nothing; that is just why one needs, besides, a meaning-expressing name, phrase, syllable)." Then this refutes you: by that account, this (the speaking sound) ought to be like that (instrumental sound) and produce no name and the rest besides (both alike having intonation and both alike conveying nothing, this too would produce no name, phrase, syllable). And besides, who says that instrumental sound certainly cannot express meaning? If (intonation-bearing) sound can express meaning, then the sound of wind-chimes and the like ought to have an expressing function too (they too have their rise and fall); and conversely, if instrumental sound and wind-chime sound cannot express meaning, then this (the speaking sound) ought, like those (instrumental and chime sound), to produce no real name, phrase, syllable besides (the speaking sound being of the same class as instrumental sound, it cannot be that the one produces them and the other does not).

If you say "only the 'speaking sound' can produce name and the rest (instrumental and chime sound cannot)," then why not simply concede that "only the speaking sound can express meaning" (since only the speaking sound produces that meaning-expressing name, that comes to saying only the speaking sound expresses meaning — why interpose a name, phrase, syllable in between)? And besides, by what reasoning do you settle that "what expresses meaning just is the speaking sound" (since you do know the meaning-expresser is the speaking sound, that very point establishes "only the speaking sound expresses meaning")? And again, how do you know that "apart from the speaking sound there is a separate meaning-expresser (a name, phrase, syllable)"? That "the speaking sound is not other than the meaning-expresser" is a thing humans and gods alike understand; only a "darling of the gods" (天愛, a mocking epithet for a fool) — and no one else — would cling to "the meaning-expresser being other than the speaking sound" (setting up a separate name, phrase, syllable); the wise will not allow it.

Rightly understood, then, it is in dependence on the phase-differences of "the speaking sound" that "name-group, phrase-group, and syllable-group" are conventionally established. "Name" expresses a thing's "what-it-is-in-itself" (its own-nature — names like "form," "smell"); "phrase" expresses a thing's "various differentiations" (strung into a sentence, as in "form is impermanent"); "syllable" is just the "letter" (the letters, the phonemes), serving as the support for the other two, name and phrase. These three, apart from "sound," have indeed no separate substance; yet (name, phrase, syllable being conventional, and sound being real) conventional and real do after all differ, and so (name, phrase, syllable) are not simply identical with sound (neither one with sound nor other than it).

Just because (name, phrase, syllable are neither one with sound nor other than it), the two analytic-knowledges, "dharma-analytic-knowledge" (法無礙解, which takes name, phrase, syllable for its object) and "diction-analytic-knowledge" (詞無礙解, which takes sound for its object), differ in their objects; and "sound" and "name" and the rest differ too in their subsumption under aggregate, base, and element (sound falls under the form-aggregate and the sound-base; name and the rest fall under the formations-aggregate and the dharma-base). One further point: this (the conventional setting-up of name, phrase, syllable in dependence on sound) is said with respect to "our world" (the Sahā world), and does not hold of every world; for in the other buddha-lands too there are those that set up the three — name, phrase, syllable — in dependence on "light, fine fragrance, taste," and the like (which shows the three are not confined to sound). (The refutation of name, phrase, syllable ends here.)

(o) Refuting the latent dispositions · warding off the remaining non-concurrent formations (隨眠·遮餘不相應行)

One school holds that the "latent dispositions" (隨眠, the seeds of the defilements) are apart from mind and the mental factors, subsumed under the aggregate of non-concurrent formations. This too does not hold: because the latent dispositions are still called "greed" and the rest (the latent greed, hatred, and so on), they are just like the active greed and the rest (all concurrent with mind), and are not non-concurrent formations (the latent dispositions, being the seeds of the defilements, belong on the side of the mind-dharmas, not among the non-concurrent formations).

And whoever grasps that there are yet other "non-concurrent formations" besides (such as speed, sequence, and the property of combination — 勢速、次第、和合性) — these are all to be refuted, one by one, by the same line of reasoning as before (the refutation of acquisition, the life-faculty, and the rest). (The refutation of the non-concurrent formations ends here in full.)

4. Refuting the unconditioned dharmas

Some maintain that those "unconditioned dharmas" (dharmas that neither arise nor perish, made by no activity — such as space and cessation-through-discrimination) exist really and on their own, apart from form, mind, and the rest. This claim, in principle, cannot stand. (What follows will show that the unconditioned is not some real thing existing apart from form and mind.)

First: whatever "definitely exists" falls, broadly, into three kinds. The first is called "a dharma presently cognized" — what one can directly know here and now, such as form and mind (no inference needed; right before you, you know it is there). The second is called "a dharma presently made use of" — what one can put to use here and now, such as a pot or a cloth. These first two kinds everyone in the world knows to exist; no further reason need be set up to prove them. The third is called "a dharma having function" — such as the eye-faculty or the ear-faculty: invisible, yet from the various functions they can exert one infers that they really are there.

But what of the "unconditioned"? It is not, like the first two kinds, commonly known by all to exist; nor does it, like the third kind, exert any function. Take the eye-faculty or ear-faculty for comparison: those are known to exist by their function — and the unconditioned, precisely, has none. And even granting, for argument's sake, that the unconditioned did have a function, it would then turn out to be "impermanent" (anything with a function changes, and is impermanent). So one cannot say the unconditioned definitely and really exists.

Now to put it positively: those unconditioned [dharmas], first, "are objects that get cognized," and second, "are disclosed only by means of form, mind, and the rest" — and on just these two counts they are on a par with form and mind (both get cognized; both must rely on something else to be disclosed). That being so, one should not grasp them as "an unconditioned nature existing really and apart from form and mind."

Below, "space" is taken up and refuted on its own: this so-called "space"-type unconditioned — is it "one," or is it "many"? (Both roads are dead ends; each is refuted in turn below.)

Take first the road "it is one." Suppose space is a single whole, pervading every place. But since space contains forms and the like, it must divide up following each thing it contains (each thing occupying its own place) — and then space's "substance" turns out, on the contrary, to be "many." Why? Because "the patch of space conjoined with the thing in this place" is not the same patch as "the space conjoined with things in other places" (space, parceling out among the several things, becomes many patches).

If you refuse to put it this way and insist that space stays a single whole, not dividing among the several things, then an absurd conclusion is forced: all things would have to interpenetrate and overlap one another (for one single whole of space pervades all things, and all things conjoin with this one whole, so they too would all run together into one — which plainly does not fit the facts).

You might then plead again: "Space simply does not conjoin with those things at all." But once you say that, space turns out to be "unable to contain anything" (without conjoining, there is no containing) — and then it would be just like the other unconditioned [dharmas] (cessation-through-discrimination and the like never did contain forms; if space too fails to conjoin, it is no different from them, having lost even the capacity to contain).

One further question: within forms and the rest, is there space inside them, or not? Here too it is blocked both ways. If you say "there is" (space sits inside form), then space and form get jumbled together in one spot (two space-occupying things crammed into the same place — incoherent). If you say "there is not" (no space inside form), then space is not "pervading every place" after all (wherever there is form there is no space — so where is the pervasion?).

Pressing the same fault of "the unconditioned has but one substance," bring in cessation-through-discrimination and cessation-not-through-discrimination and refute them together. Cessation-through-discrimination is the unconditioned attained when, by the power of discriminating wisdom, the defilements are extinguished; cessation-not-through-discrimination is the unconditioned disclosed not through discrimination but when, a condition lacking, some dharma simply cannot arise. Now if cessation-through-discrimination had but one substance, then when you sever "one particular division, one particular class" of defilement and attain that share of cessation-through-discrimination, you ought at the same time to attain the cessation-through-discrimination of "all the remaining divisions and classes" as well (one substance: win a share, and you have won the whole). Likewise, if cessation-not-through-discrimination had but one substance, then when "one particular dharma," a condition lacking, attains its "non-arising" (cessation-not-through-discrimination), you ought to attain the cessation-not-through-discrimination of "all dharmas" as well (one substance: a share is the whole). Why does so strange a conclusion follow? Precisely because you grasped the unconditioned as having "but one substance"; carry that premise through, and this is what it comes to. (But in fact, severing this one class of defilement does not bring with it the cessation-through-discrimination of other classes — which shows the unconditioned is not "one substance" after all.)

Take next the road "it is many." Suppose the unconditioned is many: then it has its sorts and classes, its various differences — and that puts it on a par with forms and the like (whatever admits of sorts and differences is changeable, impermanent), so it would be no true unconditioned. And if space were many, then it could not "pervade and contain all" either (being many, each patch keeps to its own place, cut off from the rest — where is the pervasion?). As for the "unconditioned existing really and apart from mind and the mental factors" that the remaining schools maintain — these too can all be refuted by the very same reasoning used above against space.

One more refutation, by inference: you yourselves admit that the unconditioned [dharmas] are "without cause and without effect." But whatever is both causeless and effectless is just like "a hare's horn" — a thing that simply is not there. That being so, the unconditioned cannot be something "existing apart from mind and the rest" (the unconditioned is not some real thing standing apart from mind).

At this point someone presses with scripture: scripture plainly says "there are unconditioned dharmas, such as space" — how do you account for that? This must be understood by reconciliation. The "there is" that scripture speaks of, broadly, comes in two senses.

The first is "conventionally set up as existent in dependence on consciousness-transformation." How so? We have at some time heard the names "space" and the like spoken; thereupon we discriminate in the mind the appearances of "space" and the like; and as this is practiced over and over, when the mind and the rest arise, there appears within them an unconditioned-appearance resembling "space." This appearance that shows up looks much the same before and after, with no change about it, and so it is conventionally called "permanent" (this is the unconditioned merely set up for the moment by consciousness-transformation).

The second is "conventionally set up as existent in dependence on the dharma-nature." How so? There is the "suchness" disclosed by "emptiness and no-self" — say it is "existent," and you are wrong; say it is "non-existent," and you are wrong; say it is "neither existent nor non-existent," and that too cannot be pinned down; even the road of thinking it out with the mind or saying it in words is cut off. With respect to all dharmas, to call it "one and the same [as them]" is wrong, and to call it "two [from them]" is wrong; it just is the true principle of all dharmas, and so is called the "dharma-nature."

Upon this one same dharma-nature, viewed from differing angles, five unconditioned names are set up:

viewed as "apart from all obstructions," it is called "unconditioned space";

viewed as "the defilements extinguished by the power of discriminating wisdom, and [suchness] finally realized," it is called "cessation-through-discrimination";

viewed as "not by the power of discrimination — being originally pure of itself, or disclosed merely because some dharma's condition is lacking," it is called "cessation-not-through-discrimination";

viewed as "painful and pleasant feeling both stilled," it is called "the immovable";

viewed as "conception and feeling no longer at work," it is called "the cessation of conception-and-feeling."

These five unconditioned [names] are all set up in dependence on "suchness"; and in the end, even the word "suchness" is itself no more than a name set up for the moment.

Since even the name "suchness" is conventionally set up, why set up a name at all? The reasoning is this: not one of these words describes it positively; each only wards off a particular misunderstanding —

for fear one might "dismiss it outright and say it is simply nothing," it is said to be "existent";

for fear one might turn around and "grasp it as a real thing to be seized," it is said to be "empty";

for fear one might further "suppose it hollow, illusory, like a phantom," it is said to be "real";

and because its principle is not deluded and not inverted, it is called "suchness."

(So the four words "existent, empty, real, suchness" are all conventional names that ward off misunderstanding; they do not positively assign it a substance.) This marks it off from those other schools — who take "suchness" to be "a real, permanent dharma existing apart from form, mind, and the rest." The conclusion, therefore: those unconditioned [dharmas] are none of them definitely and really existent. (The refutation of the unconditioned ends here.)

5. Concluding the refutation of the dharma-attachment · establishing consciousness-only

Now, to wrap up, two inferences round off what was said above in refuting the dharma-attachment.

The first inference: the dharmas maintained by the heterodox and the other vehicles — all those taken to "exist apart from mind and the mental factors" — are in fact not really existent. Why? Because each "is an object that gets grasped"; and this is just like mind and the mental factors themselves (which, when grasped by their own self-witnessing part, are likewise not really existent apart from consciousness) — whatever is a grasped-object is not something existing really and apart from consciousness.

The second inference: the very "act of cognition that grasps those dharmas" (that is, consciousness) does not, in fact, really lay hold of "a dharma existing apart from consciousness, really." Why? Because it "is a grasper"; and this is just like "the later moment of cognition that grasps the immediately preceding moment of cognition" (the later grasping the earlier still grasps only what is on its own side, consciousness) — whatever is a grasper, what it grasps too is never apart from consciousness on its own side.

But this must be added: the very mind and mental factors that do the grasping are themselves "other-dependent" — meaning they arise only when sundry causes and conditions come together; and being so, they too are like something conjured up by illusion, not truly real (even mind and the mental factors are not really existent — said precisely to keep one from hearing "there is consciousness alone" and then turning around to take consciousness as real). So one must realize: "there is only consciousness" is said in the first place to break the deluded grasping at "a really-existent outer object apart from mind and the mental factors"; but if you turn around and grasp this very "there is only consciousness" as "truly and really existent," that is no different from grasping an outer object — it is, just the same, a kind of "dharma-attachment" (not even "consciousness-only" may be grasped as really existent).

6. The two dharma-attachments (innate · discriminated) and where they are severed

Now this "dharma-attachment" falls, broadly, into two kinds: one called "innate" (born with one, arising of itself, naturally there), and one called "discriminated" (stirred up later by mistaken teaching or mistaken thinking).

Take first the "innate dharma-attachment." It comes of false habit-energy perfumed over and over from beginningless time, [working] by the force of an inner cause; and so it stays with this body-and-mind always, never leaving; it needs no mistaken teaching, no deliberate wrong thinking, but turns of itself, ceaselessly — and just for this it is called "innate" (born with one). This kind is itself of two sorts:

The first is called "constantly continuing," the unbroken sort — it lies in the seventh consciousness, takes the eighth consciousness (its perceiving part) as object, raises an appearance within its own mind, and grasps it as a real dharma.

The second is called "intermittent," the sort that breaks off — it lies in the sixth consciousness, takes as object the "aggregate, base, and element" appearances that consciousness has transformed (the five aggregates, the twelve bases, the eighteen elements — the several schemes that break body, mind, and world down), grasping them now all together, now one by one, raising an appearance within its own mind and grasping it as a real dharma.

These two innate dharma-attachments, being very subtle, are hard to sever; only within the later bodhisattva "ten stages," by cultivating again and again the excellent "contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas" (the contemplation that all dharmas are without any real substance of their own), can they be removed.

Take next the "discriminated dharma-attachment." It comes about by the force of present outer conditions (things heard, things thought up), and is not born together with the body-and-mind; only on meeting mistaken teaching, plus mistaken thinking, does it then arise — and just for this it is called "discriminated" (drawn out later by discrimination); and it occurs only within the sixth mental consciousness. This kind too is of two sorts:

The first takes as object the "aggregate, base, and element" appearances spoken of in mistaken teaching, raises an appearance within its own mind, and — discriminating and reckoning — grasps it as a real dharma.

The second takes as object the "self-nature" and like appearances spoken of in mistaken teaching (the permanent, abiding self-nature the heterodox posit for things, or a divine self and the like), raises an appearance within its own mind, and — discriminating and reckoning — grasps it as a real dharma.

These two discriminated dharma-attachments, being coarser and more conspicuous, are easy to sever; the moment one enters the bodhisattva's "first stage," contemplating the "dharma-emptiness suchness" of all dharmas (the suchness disclosed by all dharmas being without real substance of their own), one can remove them.

7. The dharma-attachment's object: only the resembling-dharma of one's own mind

Of all the dharma-attachments just spoken of, looking to their objects: as for the dharmas outside one's own mind, some are there and some are not (they need not really be there); but as for the dharmas appearing within one's own mind, every one of them is there. This shows that every dharma-attachment refers, in fact, to "the resembling-dharma appearance that one's own mind manifests," and then grasps that appearance as really existent.

That said, this "appearance resembling a dharma" arises from the coming-together of sundry conditions, and so is "existent the way a phantom is" (it has its appearance, but is not really existent); while the "real dharma" that gets grasped is sheer deluded reckoning, and so is, flatly, not there at all.

Hence the World-Honored One said: "Maitreya (that is, the bodhisattva Maitreya), know this: what each consciousness takes as object is only what consciousness itself manifests — it is the other-dependent nature (arising only through the assembly of conditions), like something conjured by illusion." And so it is clear: the "self and dharmas apart from consciousness" that the heterodox and the other vehicles maintain are none of them really existent.

8. Resolving into consciousness-only · warding off the other-cluster and same-cluster as direct object

Therefore mind and the mental factors definitely do not take "forms and the like outside the mind" as their "object-support condition" (the very object they reach out to and cognize). Why? Because "the function of reaching out and cognizing" must have a "really-existent substance" to support it; and the outer dharmas apart from consciousness have no real substance at all, and so cannot serve as object-support condition.

Again, the mind and mental factors of "some other cluster" present now (the set of mind-dharmas in another person, or in another moment) are also not what "this cluster" of consciousness can "directly take as object" — they are just like dharmas one "cannot reach as object" at all (utterly unrelated things), because they belong within "that other cluster" (the mind in another's cluster my consciousness cannot directly lay hold of).

Furthermore, even the mental factors "within this same cluster of mine" (the feeling, conception, and the rest that arise together with the mind-king) are not what the mind-king can "directly take as object" — because the mental factors' own substance is, after all, a different thing from the mind-king (and from the perceived-part it transforms); they are just like the other dharmas one cannot reach. From these several points it should be clear: there is, in fact, no object outside the mind at all; there is only the inner consciousness transforming so as to "resemble" an outer object, so that it merely looks as though an outer object had arisen. (Here the conclusion "the myriad dharmas are consciousness-only" stands firm.)

And so a verse (gāthā) in scripture says: "The outer objects that the foolish discriminate are, every one, simply not there; it is only that habit-energy stirs and muddies the mind, and the mind therefore manifests a semblance of them and turns on so."

C. Reconciling the objection that "the conventional must rest on the real" (establishing the conventional positing of self and dharmas)

1. The outsider's objection: if self and dharmas do not exist, on what does conventional positing rest?

Someone presses this challenge: "You say there is no real self or real dharmas apart from consciousness; then even 'conventional positing' ought to be nil. Why? Because to draw a comparison — to posit something conventionally — three things must come together before it can stand: first a 'real thing' (the thing truly being there), second a 'resembling-thing' (something else that looks like it), and third a 'shared property' (the quality both things have in common).

"Take 'calling a certain man fire': there must first truly be 'fire' (the real thing), and truly be 'a man whose temper is fierce like fire' (the resembling-thing), and these two must share the quality 'fierce-and-red' (the shared property) — the three together, and only then may one say by comparison 'this man is fire.' Likewise conventionally calling 'a certain fool an ox' is the same: there must be a real ox, a man resembling an ox, and the property shared by both, before it can be said.

"Look back, then, by this principle: now you say 'self and dharmas' simply are not there — on what, then, can 'conventional positing' stand? And since 'conventional positing' cannot stand, even the 'resembling' (the appearance the mind transforms so as to look like an outer object) fails along with it. That being so, on what ground do you say 'the mind transforms into the semblance of an outer object and so turns'?"

2. The general answer: a self and dharmas apart from consciousness were already refuted

This challenge in fact cannot stand. First, a word in general: you take "a real self and real dharmas apart from consciousness" as your premise — but that premise was already demolished above (in segments A and B); there is no such thing at all, so there is nothing to "rest on."

And your line "conventional positing must rest on a real thing" does not get through either. Consider: to say by comparison "a man is fire" can go only two ways — either in dependence on the "class" (the common nature of the fire-kind), or in dependence on the "real" (the one real substance of fire). Below, each is taken in turn: both roads, in fact, fail to stand.

3. Refuting "conventional positing in dependence on the class"

Take first the road "in dependence on the class" — that is, saying "a man is fire" by leaning on "the common nature of the fire-kind." This fails at the outset. Why? Because the qualities you take for your bridge, "fierce, red," and the like, do not belong to the "class" itself (the class-nature shared by everything of the fire-kind) — "fierce, red" are only the particular traits of some individual thing, not the class-nature of "the fire-kind."

Someone might say: even without a shared quality, one can still say by comparison "a man is fire." But to say this throws everything into confusion: by that logic, one ought to be able to point at "water" and call it "fire" too — though water plainly shares nothing with fire. So "one can conventionally posit anything at will, even without a shared quality" will not stand.

The opponent may retreat a step and plead: "Granted 'fierce, red,' and the like are not the qualities of the 'class' itself; still, they are stuck together with the 'class,' inseparable from it — and being inseparable, one can still lean on the 'class' to draw the comparison." This too is wrong.

The reasoning is plain: look at the plain facts before us — "the human kind" and the quality "fierce" can in fact come apart (some people are not fierce; some things are very fierce yet do not belong to the fire-kind). So the "class" and the qualities "fierce, red" are neither one and the same nor inseparable — they come apart. And yet, all the same, the world does have the conventional positing "point at a man and call him fire," and it stands. This proves, conversely, that conventional positing is not accomplished in dependence on the "class" at all.

4. Refuting "conventional positing in dependence on the real substance"

Take next the road "in dependence on the real" — that is, saying "a man is fire" by leaning on "the one real substance of fire." This road too cannot stand. Why? Because the qualities "fierce, red" are not one same thing "shared in common" by both fire and man.

To put it more exactly: the "fierce, red" on fire and the "fierce, red" on a man are each their own substance — fire's fierceness grows on the body of fire, the man's fierceness grows on the body of the man, and the substances they attach to (one the fire-body, one the man-body) are simply two different things. Since each side has its own, no truly "shared" quality can be found to serve as the bridge for the comparison. So this road's fault is the same as the "in dependence on the class" road above: it does not get through.

The opponent may plead again: "Granted each has its own substance; still, the man's fierceness and fire's fierceness do 'look very much alike,' and on the strength of that resemblance, surely one can draw the comparison?" This too is wrong.

You need only look at how the world actually speaks, and it is clear: when people draw the comparison they say "fire is in this man" (taking the man outright to be fire), not "fire's quality is in this man" (pointing out that the qualities on the two sides resemble each other). So conventional positing really points at "the substance fire," and does not land on "the resemblance of qualities." From this it can be seen: conventional positing is not accomplished in dependence on a "real substance" either.

5. Refuting "the conventional must rest on a real thing"

Step back yet further, to the very root, and take your line "conventional positing must be set up in dependence on a 'real thing'" — this line itself does not get through.

First, what is the "real"? Here "real" means the "particular characteristic" — the substance-mark each thing has of its own, unique to it, that nothing else has. But you must realize: drawing a comparison relies on two tools — one the "conventional cognition" (the conventionally-set-up cognition in the mind when one draws the comparison), the other the "conventional expression" (the conventionally-set-up name-and-word on the lips when one draws it). And these two tools, precisely, never touch the "particular characteristic."

How do they not touch it? The "conventional cognition" and the "conventional expression" alike, in the object they reach out to, never get as far as the "particular characteristic"; they only turn upon a thing's "general characteristic" (the common mark abstracted across many things). And besides this "general characteristic," there is no other clever route by which one could set up the "particular characteristic" and hand it over to serve as the conventional's support — the "particular characteristic" is simply beyond the reach of conventional cognition and conventional expression, and so cannot be the conventional's support.

And to confirm it from the other end: the "conventional cognition" and the "conventional expression" must both arise in dependence on "sound" (the sound of spoken name-and-word); wherever "sound" cannot reach, this conventional cognition and expression cannot turn and can do nothing. But look: the expressing side (sound, name-and-word) and the expressed side (the general characteristic) — neither side is the "particular characteristic." Since from start to finish it never touches the "particular characteristic" (that is, the "real thing"), this proves that conventional positing is not accomplished in dependence on a "real thing" at all.

6. Conclusion: the conventional turns in dependence on a resembling-thing

With these several refutations done, the positive conclusion comes out of itself: "conventional positing" in fact turns only in dependence on a "resembling-thing," resting on no "real thing" whatever. And what does this "resembling" mean? It means a "superimposed" mark — a mark that one adds on and sets up upon the "general characteristic," which is not a really-existent mark. The "sound" of speech turns precisely in dependence on this "superimposed, resembling mark." So one simply cannot say "conventional positing must rest on a real thing." And with that, the earlier challenge turns out to be contrary to right principle.

7. The closing verse

To put it the other way round, then: why did the Buddha speak this whole language of "the conventional and the resembling" (that is, the conventional positing of a self and dharmas)? He spoke it standing on the principle of "what consciousness transforms" — in order to counter and break sentient beings' grasping that "clings to self and dharmas as dead-real," he expediently spoke the "conventional, resembling" words. Just for this, a verse (gāthā) in scripture says:

　　"In order to counter and break the 'real self, real dharmas' that the fool clings to as dead-real, the Buddha, upon the appearances that consciousness transforms, expediently sets up the two names 'self' and 'dharmas.'"

Glossing the first transformer

Up to now only the three names of "the transformer" have been touched on in brief — the first transformer, the second transformer, the third transformer; but how each of these three transformers "looks" (its mark) has not yet been set out in full. Let us ask first about the foremost: what does the first transformer (which is just the eighth, the ālaya-consciousness) look like? The verse below answers:

〔所釋頌〕

In a single breath this verse points to all that the eighth consciousness looks like; taking it line by line, it comes to this — the first transformer, this consciousness, is named the "ālaya-consciousness," and is also named "maturation" and "all-seeds." The way it operates (its mode of activity) is so fine that we cannot detect it (unknowable); the objects it refers to are "appropriation" (the embodied body and the seeds it appropriates-and-holds) and "place" (the outer receptacle-world); it is always together with the mental factor "contact," and is also concomitant with attention, feeling, conception, and volition (these together called "the five omnipresent," the five mental factors that accompany any mind that arises); and the "feeling" concomitant with it is forever only "neutral feeling" (the kind of feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant). The nature of this consciousness is "unobscured-indeterminate" (neutral — neither defiled, nor to be told off as wholesome or unwholesome), and the "contact" and the rest of the factors that go with it are likewise all unobscured-indeterminate. This consciousness continues on without a moment's pause, transforming moment by moment, unbroken like the water of a torrent; and it is only on reaching "the arhat stage" that it casts off this name "ālaya."

A. The three marks of the ālaya-consciousness

1. The self-mark — the ālaya (the storing · the stored · the appropriated-as-store)

The treatise says: the first transformer, this consciousness, is in the teachings of both the Great and the Lesser Vehicle called "ālaya" (which means just "store," a storehouse). Why is it called "store"? Because this consciousness has three layers of meaning: "the storing, the stored, the appropriated-as-store." Take the first two layers first: this consciousness is a mutual condition with the "defiled dharmas" (the manifold defiling dharmas) — it stores the defiled dharmas away (the storing), and it is itself perfumed by the defiled dharmas, as if it were stored (the stored); the storer and the stored prop each other up, and so it bears both senses, the storing and the stored. The third layer, "the appropriated-as-store," is this: "sentient beings" (living beings, and the seventh consciousness in particular) constantly take this consciousness to be that "self" inside themselves, and clutch at it, not letting go. These three layers display the "self-mark" of the first transformer (that most fundamental side of it) — namely, "embracing-and-holding cause and effect": with one hand it holds the cause, "seeds," and with the other it produces the effect, "manifest-activity," gathering both cause and effect into itself; this is precisely its self-mark.

The self-mark of this consciousness has to be sorted into several "phase-positions" (different stages) — the stage of the ordinary being, the stage of the sage, the stage of the Buddha, and so on; the names are in fact not few. Yet of all these stages, the one called "the store-consciousness" (that is, the stage in which it is grasped as a "self") carries the heaviest fault, the gravest defect. Just because this stage is the most crucial, the name "ālaya" is singled out from among these many names to stand for its self-mark.

2. The fruit-mark — maturation

This consciousness is able to draw forth the "maturation-fruit" (the fruit of karmic retribution) summoned by wholesome and unwholesome karma; whatever place you are reborn into — among the three realms (the desire realm, the form realm, the formless realm), the five destinies (gods, humans, animals, hungry ghosts, hell-beings), or the four births (womb-born, egg-born, moisture-born, transformation-born) — all of it is drawn forth by this consciousness. And so it is given the name "maturation" — a name that has three layers of meaning: "maturing by transformation" (changing from cause to effect, maturing only after it has altered its form), "maturing at a different time" (the karma is made earlier, the retribution received later, the times being different), and "maturing into a different class" (the karma made is wholesome or unwholesome, yet the retribution it matures into is the neither-wholesome-nor-unwholesome indeterminate — the nature-class differing). Why must it be this consciousness that serves as this fruit? Because apart from it, things like "the life-faculty" (the continuance of one span of life) and "the homogeneity of the multitude" (the likeness that beings of one kind share) — these "superior maturation-fruits" that continue on without a moment's pause — could never again find anything to bear them: only the eighth consciousness can shoulder this constantly-continuing, superior fruit of karmic retribution. This displays the "fruit-mark" of the first transformer (that side of it which is the fruit of karmic retribution).

The fruit-mark of this consciousness also runs through several stages and several kinds of fruit (the outflow-fruit, the dominant-effect, and so on all count as fruit). But the single sense "maturation" has two distinguishing traits: first, it is "broad" — reaching across the realms and destinies, holding sway everywhere; second, it is "uncommon" — only the eighth consciousness, alone, shoulders this "general retribution" (the total retribution-fruit of one span of life), and the other consciousnesses have no part in it. Just because it is both broad and exclusive, "maturation" is singled out from among these many fruits to stand for its fruit-mark.

3. The cause-mark — all-seeds

This consciousness is able to appropriate-and-hold the "seeds" of all dharmas (the latent power by which the various dharmas can arise), keeping them from being scattered and lost, and so it is named "all-seeds." Why must it be this one? Because apart from this consciousness, among the rest of the dharmas (such as the first seven transforming consciousnesses) there is none that can thus universally appropriate-and-hold all the seeds — only the eighth consciousness can stand as this substance that "holds the seeds." This displays the "cause-mark" of the first transformer (that side of it which is the cause of all the seeds). The cause-mark of this consciousness in fact also has several kinds (it can produce manifest-activity, and so on); but the single sense "holding seeds" is its alone — no other dharma can do it — and so this is singled out to stand for its cause-mark.

The first transformer, this consciousness, has, when spoken of, many names of substance and mark; but boiled down to its essentials, it has only the above three marks: the self-mark (the ālaya), the fruit-mark (maturation), and the cause-mark (all-seeds).

B. The all-seeds mark — the sense of seed broadly examined

This side, the "all-seeds," must be further sorted out. Ask first: herein, what thing is it that is called a "seed"? The answer is: within the "root consciousness" (that is, the eighth, the ālaya-consciousness), that "differentiated capacity" which can directly produce its own particular "manifest-activity fruit" — put plainly, the powers, each lying latent, each different from the rest, each able to grow into its own result.

1. The conventionality-or-reality of seeds — neither identical nor different, yet really existent

This seed, with respect to "the root consciousness" and to "the fruit it produces," stands in a relation of "neither identical nor different" — it can be called neither one and the same nor two separate things. Why? Because this is a relation of "substance" to "function," and of "cause" to "effect," and such by rights ought to be so (substance-and-function, cause-and-effect, are inherently neither identical nor different). But note: though the seed is "neither identical nor different," it is nonetheless "really, truly there" (really existent). For a conventional thing (like "fur on a tortoise, horns on a hare," which has no being at all) is as good as "nothing," and "nothing" cannot serve as a "causal condition"; the seed, since it must itself serve as the very "causal condition" that produces manifest-activity, cannot but be really existent.

〔Q〕 Someone counters: since the seed is "neither identical nor different" from all dharmas, then it ought, like a "pot," to be conventional and not really existent — for a pot too is neither identical nor different from the four great [elements] (earth, water, fire, wind) that compose it, yet a pot is plainly conventional (take it apart and there is no pot). 〔A〕 The reply is this: if your principle were carried through (that whatever is "neither identical nor different" is uniformly conventional), then "suchness" would be dragged down with it too — for suchness too is, in the very same way, "neither identical nor different" from all dharmas; would suchness then not also have to be conventional? Yet if you concede that suchness is conventional, then even "the true ultimate truth" (the most ultimate reality) is gone, turned into empty words with no substance behind them — how can that be? So it is clear: being "neither identical nor different" does not necessarily make a thing conventional. That said, the "real existence" of the seed must also be told apart precisely: it is "really existent only on the conventional level," unlike the "real existence" of "suchness" — suchness is real in the "ultimate sense" (the ultimate dimension), while the seed is real only in the "conventional sense" (the dependently-arising dimension).

2. The seed is the eighth consciousness's image-part (not the seeing-part · not anything else)

Though the seed rests upon the very substance of the eighth consciousness, which part of the eighth consciousness does it after all count as? The answer is: it is this consciousness's "image-part" (that side of it which is referred to, the object referred to), not any other part. Why is it not the "seeing-part" (that side which refers, which cognizes)? Because the seeing-part is forever "taking the seed as its object and referring to it"; since the seed is "that which is referred to," it of course falls on the side of "what is referred to," the image-part, and not on the side of "what does the referring," the seeing-part (the referrer and the referred-to are two distinct matters, and the seed is on the referred-to side).

3. The three natures of seeds — contaminated seeds · uncontaminated seeds

Take first the "contaminated seeds" (the kind of seed that still carries defilement and will leak away). They are no different in substance from the "maturation-consciousness" (the eighth consciousness), and so they go along with the nature of the eighth consciousness and fall into the class of "indeterminate nature" (the neither-wholesome-nor-unwholesome neutral). But viewed from another angle: as "cause," and as the "fruit" they produce, they can indeed carry a wholesome or unwholesome nature (a wholesome seed, for instance, produces a wholesome manifest-activity); on just this point, they may also be called "wholesome" seeds and the like (whatever they produce, that is what they are named).

Take next the "uncontaminated seeds" (the kind of pure seed that carries no defilement and will not leak away). They no longer fall under that "indeterminate" nature of the maturation-consciousness; because, as "cause" and as "fruit," they are wholly of the "wholesome nature," they can only be named "wholesome," and do not, like the contaminated seeds, carry indeterminate [nature] alongside.

〔Q〕 Someone challenges: if the uncontaminated seeds count only as wholesome and not as indeterminate, then why does the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī (a part of the Yogācārabhūmi) say that "the twenty-two faculties all alike have maturation-seeds, all are maturation-born"? These twenty-two faculties include the uncontaminated faculties (such as the uncontaminated wholesome faculties of faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) — so by this saying, even the uncontaminated faculties would belong to "maturation," belong to "indeterminate"; does this not clash with what was just said?

〔A〕 The reply can take two roads. The first: those uncontaminated seeds, though named "maturation," are in fact not of the indeterminate nature. They are called "maturation-seeds" because they "rest upon" the maturation-consciousness and dwell there — it is only that they borrow the name "maturation" by this; this is called "different-natures resting on each other" (things of different nature resting upon one another): the uncontaminated wholesome seeds rest and dwell upon the indeterminate maturation-consciousness, and the two, though different in nature, can rest together. This is just like "the eye-consciousness and the rest" — the eye-consciousness itself may be wholesome or unwholesome, yet it all the same arises in dependence on the indeterminate maturation-consciousness (different in nature, they can still rest in one place). The second road: or one may say that the uncontaminated seeds, by the force of "perfuming," gradually transform and ripen, and so also borrow the name "maturation (maturing by transformation-and-ripening)"; but this is only a borrowed name, and does not say that they really are "that kind of maturation which is of the indeterminate nature."

C. The dispute of innate-and-newly-perfumed — three positions on seeds

Where, after all, do seeds come from? On this the treatise-masters of old held differing accounts; the three schools are laid open below. 〔The innate position〕 The first school maintains: all seeds are "innately there" (from beginningless time, so by [their very] nature, possessed from birth), and are not produced from perfuming; the force of perfuming can at most make these innate seeds "grow and strengthen," but cannot perfume new seeds out of nothing. They have seven grounds —

First ground: scripture (the Buddha's word) has said that "all sentient beings have, from beginningless time, sundry 'elements,' which, like a 'cluster of akṣa-fruit,' are there by [their very] nature." (The "cluster of akṣa-fruit" is a kind of fruit that grows three to a single stem, used here to liken the seeds of the three natures — wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate — likewise clustering together in just such a bunch.) Here "element" is just another name for "seed"; since scripture says it is "there by nature" (existent by [its very] nature), does this not prove seeds are innate?

Second ground: scripture again says, "the 'element' that has been from beginningless time is the equal support of all dharmas." Here "element" means "cause" (the seed is the cause); since it has been, from beginningless time, that on which all dharmas rest, evidently it is innately there.

Third ground: the Yogācārabhūmi also says, "the substance of the various seeds, from beginningless time — though its nature is innately there, yet it is, by the defiled and the pure, newly perfumed-and-aroused." Evidently "innate" says that its substance is inherently present, and "perfumed-and-aroused" only draws out its function.

Fourth ground: sentient beings, from beginningless time — if one is "of the nirvāṇa-attaining type" (the type with the capacity to realize nirvāṇa), then all his seeds are complete; if one is "not of the nirvāṇa-attaining type" (the type without the capacity for liberation), then he lacks the seeds of the three [kinds of] enlightenment (the śrāvaka's, the pratyekabuddha's, and the unsurpassed Buddha-fruit's). Look — that some have their seeds complete and others lack them: this difference of "having / not having" precisely shows that seeds are innately there (for else how could there be, from the very start, some complete and some wanting?). Texts of this sort are no single proof but many.

Fifth ground: again, since the teaching speaks of sentient beings as innately having the distinction of "five natures" (the śrāvaka-nature, the pratyekabuddha-nature, the bodhisattva-nature, the indeterminate-nature, the no-nature), there must definitely be "by-nature seeds" (that is, innate seeds) to uphold these five distinctions, rather than their being produced by later perfuming (for else where would these five distinctions come from?).

Sixth ground: again, the Yogācārabhūmi says, "the beings in hell, too, accomplish the three uncontaminated faculties." This statement is spoken of in terms of "seeds," not of "manifest-activity" (the activity that actually arises) — for the beings in hell cannot possibly give rise here and now to uncontaminated wholesome dharmas, and so what they "accomplish" can only be the innately-there uncontaminated seeds (the seeds present, the manifest-activity not yet arisen).

Seventh ground: again, there is what is called "the nature abiding by [its own] nature" (that is, the lineage abiding by [its own] nature) — this is "handed down through transmissions from beginningless time, obtained by [its very] nature," and is itself innately there. Taking these several points together: "the uncontaminated seeds" are innate by nature, not produced by perfuming; and "the contaminated seeds" ought by rights to be likewise innate by nature, only later grown by perfuming, rather than perfuming separately producing new seeds out of nothing. Established in this way, "cause and effect" do not fall into disorder (the innate seed serving as cause, perfuming-and-growing being but an assisting condition, the two sides told cleanly apart and not mixed up).

〔The newly-perfumed position〕 The second school maintains the very opposite: seeds are all produced by "perfuming." Someone might worry: would the seeds then come to be only later? No. Because "the side that is perfumed" (the perfumed, namely the eighth consciousness) and "the side that does the perfuming" (the perfumer, namely the first seven transforming consciousnesses) are both there from beginningless time, the seeds too are "perfumed-into-being from beginningless time" — for though they are said to be perfumed-out, it is not that they must await some later point in time to be, but that, from beginningless time, the perfuming has always gone on and they have always been there. They have five grounds —

First ground: a seed is also called "habit-energy," and "habit-energy" is a thing that must come to be by perfuming — to draw a comparison: sesame has of itself no fragrance, and "the fragrance on the sesame" is perfumed out by taking "flowers" and perfuming the sesame; plainly the fragrance is not innate to the sesame. Since a seed is also called habit-energy, it too ought likewise to be perfumed out.

Second ground: scripture says that "the minds of sentient beings, being perfumed by the sundry defiled and pure dharmas, have heaped up immeasurable, countless seeds." Since the seeds are "heaped up by perfuming," they are perfumed-into-being.

Third ground: the treatise says, "the inner seeds (the seeds within consciousness) definitely have perfuming; the outer seeds (such as the outer grain and wheat) — as for perfuming, sometimes there is, sometimes there is not." It says further that the three perfumings — "the name-and-word perfuming, the self-grasping perfuming, the existence-member perfuming" — embrace all the seeds of the contaminated dharmas; and since these three all come to be by perfuming, the contaminated seeds must arise by perfuming.

Fourth ground: even the arising of the uncontaminated seeds is by perfuming — this is the so-called "hearing-perfuming": when one hears the right Dharma that flows forth from "the pure dharma-realm" (that is, suchness), the very hearing perfumes up a seed, and this seed is precisely the seed of the "supramundane mind." Evidently the uncontaminated seeds too are perfumed out.

Fifth ground (this ground rebuts the fourth and fifth grounds of the innate school, the account that "the distinction of natures is fixed by whether the seeds are present or not"): the distinction of sentient beings' innate natures is not fixed by "whether the uncontaminated seeds are present or not," but by whether "the obstructions (the affliction-obstruction, the cognition-obstruction) can or cannot be severed."

They cite the Yogācārabhūmi to prove it; the Yogācārabhūmi divides it thus: facing the object suchness, (1) if a person's "seeds of both obstructions, the affliction-obstruction and the cognition-obstruction, can never be severed" (ultimate = utterly unseverable), then he is fixed as "of the not-nirvāṇa-attaining nature" (a being without the capacity for liberation); (2) if "only his seeds of the cognition-obstruction can never be severed, while his affliction-obstruction can still be severed," then he is divided in two — one fixed as "of the śrāvaka-nature," one fixed as "of the pratyekabuddha-nature"; (3) if "his seeds of both obstructions are not unseverable" (both can be severed to exhaustion), then he is fixed as "of the Tathāgata-nature" (one who can attain Buddhahood).

So (the newly-perfumed school concludes) it can be known that the distinction of innate natures is fixed "by whether the obstructions can be severed," not by "whether the uncontaminated seeds are present." As for the line spoken by the innate school earlier, "[the hell-beings, etc.] accomplish the uncontaminated seeds," the newly-perfumed school glosses it thus: that is spoken only in the sense of "the future possibility that uncontaminated seeds may arise" (resting on "they can arise in the future"), and does not say that there is, here and now, the substance of an uncontaminated seed already present.

〔The joint establishment of both kinds, innate and newly-perfumed (the correct sense)〕 It should be put this way (this is the correct account): seeds in fact "have both kinds," and one need not lean to either side. The first kind is called "innate": that is, from beginningless time, the differentiated capacity within the maturation-consciousness (the eighth consciousness) that is "innately there" and able to produce the aggregates, bases, and elements (the dharmas that make up the world of body-and-mind). It was in dependence on these innate seeds that the World-Honored One said, "sentient beings have, from beginningless time, sundry elements, which, like a cluster of akṣa-fruit, are there by nature"; the remaining proofs are those listed at the head of 〔the innate position〕 above and are not copied out again here. This kind is named "the seeds abiding by [their own] nature" (the seeds that dwell within the [original] nature).

The second kind is called "newly-arisen": that is, from beginningless time, the seeds that have arisen by manifest-activity (the sundry activities) perfuming them over and over. It was in dependence on these newly-arisen seeds that the World-Honored One said, "the minds of sentient beings, being perfumed by the defiled and pure dharmas, have heaped up immeasurable seeds"; the various treatises too say, "the defiled and pure seeds arise by being perfumed by the defiled and pure dharmas." This kind is named "the seeds completed by practice" (the seeds nurtured into being by perfuming).

〔Refuting the only-innate〕— if only innate, the transforming consciousnesses could not be a causal condition with the ālaya

〔Refuting the side of "only innate"〕 First, refute the account "seeds are only innate, with no newly-arisen": if all seeds were innate (none later perfumed up), then "the transforming consciousnesses" (the manifest-activity of the first seven consciousnesses) would have no "causal condition" relation with "the ālaya" (the eighth) at all. Why? Because only with this back-and-forth — "the transforming consciousnesses perfume the seeds into being, and the seeds in turn produce the transforming consciousnesses" — can there be talk of being mutual causal conditions; but if you say all seeds are innate and take in no perfuming at all, this "mutual causal condition" relation cannot be set up. Yet scripture plainly says: "The sundry dharmas [the seven transforming consciousnesses] [perfume] into the consciousness-store [the eighth], and the consciousness[-store] toward the dharmas is likewise [producing them]; mutually they are each other's 'effect,' and constantly too they are each other's 'cause.'" (This proves that the transforming consciousnesses and the eighth are mutual causal conditions.)

The sense of this verse is to say: the ālaya-consciousness and those transforming consciousnesses, at all times, "produce each other, you give rise to me and I to you, mutually being each other's cause and effect" — the consciousness producing the dharmas, the dharmas in turn perfuming the consciousness, this cycle without cease.

The Mahāyānasaṃgraha also says: the ālaya-consciousness and the defiled dharmas are "mutual causal conditions" — drawing two comparisons: one like a "wick and flame," you give rise to me and I burn you, turn upon turn producing-and-burning (the wick produces the flame, the flame in turn burns the wick); the other like a "bundle of reeds," two sheaves of reeds leaning on each other, neither able to leave the other, and only so does it stand. The true "causal condition" can be set up only between these two, "the ālaya and the defiled dharmas," and apart from this no other thing can be found that would count as a causal condition.

(Returning to the straight principle:) if seeds did not arise by perfuming, how could the transforming consciousnesses and the ālaya have any "causal condition" relation? Moreover, the kind of thing the innate school speaks of — that "perfuming only nurtures the innate seeds a little larger" — does not amount to a "causal condition" either; for if "a bit of perfuming, a bit of nurturing-larger" could be called a causal condition, then would not wholesome karma and unwholesome karma (which are only "dominant conditions") have to count as a "causal condition" with the maturation-fruit they summon? Yet between wholesome-and-unwholesome karma and the maturation-fruit the relation is plainly not a causal condition but only a dominant condition. Evidently "perfuming-and-nurturing-larger" is not a true causal condition; only "perfuming a new seed out" counts as a true causal condition.

Again, the various holy teachings all plainly and clearly say that "there are seeds that arise by perfuming," and these all run dead against the account that "seeds are only innate." So the account "seeds are only innate" does not get through, whether reckoned by principle or by the teachings.

〔Refuting the only-newly-arisen〕— if only newly-arisen, the conditioned uncontaminated would arise without a cause

〔Refuting the side of "only newly-arisen"〕 Turning about, refute next the account "seeds are only newly-arisen, with no innate": if all seeds were later perfumed up (with no innate ones), then "the conditioned uncontaminated" (that is, the uncontaminated holy path cultivated into being) would find no causal condition and could by rights not arise — for "the contaminated" (the defilement-bearing dharmas) ought not to be taken as the seed of "the uncontaminated" (the contaminated and the uncontaminated, being of opposite nature, how could the uncontaminated be perfumed out from the contaminated?). Why not? Think it through: if you permitted "the contaminated to produce the uncontaminated," then conversely "the uncontaminated seed too ought to be able to produce the contaminated"; and then even the Buddhas would have to produce contaminated [dharmas] again out of some residual contaminated (yet a Buddha has long severed the contaminated to exhaustion — how could this be?); and even "the wholesome" would have to serve as the seed of "the unwholesome" — and so wholesome, unwholesome, and uncontaminated would breed each other in a tangle, with faults without end. So the conclusion is: the uncontaminated holy path must have a share of "innate uncontaminated seed" as its cause, and cannot rely wholly on being later perfumed up.

〔Refuting the Vibhajyavādins' "the nature of mind is originally pure"〕

Here there is an outside school called "the Vibhajyavādins," who rescue the newly-perfumed account thus (seeking some way out for "the uncontaminated needs no innate seed"): they say, "the nature of the mind is originally pure; it is only that it has been defiled by 'adventitious-dust afflictions' (like a guest, like dust — not innate to the mind), and so is called defiled; and when it leaves the afflictions, the mind turns into the uncontaminated. Evidently the uncontaminated dharma does not arise from nowhere without a cause — its cause is just that originally pure mind." 〔A challenge〕 But one must ask: this term you speak, "the nature of the mind" — what exactly does it refer to? (Below it is refuted under two possibilities.)

〔Refuting the first possibility · if "the nature of the mind" means the principle of emptiness〕 If the "nature of the mind" you speak of means "the principle of emptiness" (the emptiness-nature of suchness), this road does not get through: the principle of emptiness cannot serve as the "cause" of the mind (the emptiness-nature is an unarising, unperishing permanent dharma, and a permanent dharma produces nothing); and moreover a permanent dharma absolutely cannot serve as the seed of any dharma — for its substance does not budge from first to last, and since it does not budge, it cannot be said to have the function of "producing anything else" (whatever produces things must first itself undergo change).

〔Refuting the second possibility · if "the nature of the mind" means the substance of the mind〕 If the "nature of the mind" you speak of means "the substance of the mind" (meaning that the substance of this mind is originally pure, and moreover permanently one-and-the-same), then the fault is greater still. First, a general fault: this comes out the same as the heterodox "Sāṃkhya" — the Sāṃkhya maintain that "though the surface appearance changes, the substance inside is forever one-and-the-same, unchanging," and your "the substance of the mind is permanently one" falls into just this trap. Then, pressing your point that "the substance of the mind is originally wholesome (pure)" in detail: (1) if the substance of the mind is originally wholesome, then even an unwholesome mind and an indeterminate mind would have to be wholesome (since they are all the same one mind-substance); (2) if you concede they are wholesome, then the unwholesome mind and the indeterminate mind ought to be concomitant with the wholesome mental factors such as "faith" — yet in fact they are not concomitant with the wholesome mental factors at all; (3) if you do not concede them concomitant, then that amounts to saying they "are not the substance of a wholesome mind" — and if the substance of the mind cannot even be called "wholesome," how could it ever be spoken of as "uncontaminated"? (The uncontaminated is one tier higher still than the wholesome.)

Again, "a contaminated wholesome mind," since it carries contamination, also falls into the class of "the defiled," and is of a piece with an unwholesome mind and the like; its nature is not uncontaminated; so it ought not to be taken as the "cause" of the uncontaminated — for if it could be the cause of the uncontaminated, would not wholesome and unwholesome then have to be able to serve as each other's cause too? (Things of opposite nature ought not to serve as each other's direct cause.)

If you stubbornly insist that "the nature of the contaminated mind is just uncontaminated," then conversely "the nature of the uncontaminated mind too ought to be just contaminated" — for you can produce no ground for "on what basis one is judged uncontaminated and the other contaminated" (since there is no other ground by which to keep the two apart, the two could just as well be said in reverse, and this becomes a grave fault).

Again, if "the mind of the ordinary being (that is, the worldling)" were uncontaminated, then at the worldling stage there would be "uncontaminated manifest-activity" already at work; and in that case would not the worldling have to be called a "sage"? (For a worldling to turn into a sage in a stroke is far too great a fault.)

The Vibhajyavādins might rescue it with a line like this: "the worldling's mind, though its 'nature' is uncontaminated, has a 'mark' (its outward showing) that still carries defilement, and so it is not called uncontaminated" — they want to use this to dodge the fault above of "the worldling turning into a sage." But this very rescue strikes back at them: by their own logic (nature uncontaminated, mark defiled, therefore not counting as uncontaminated), "the seed of the mind" too ought (being likewise nature-uncontaminated, mark-defiled) not to count as uncontaminated — then why do you (the Vibhajyavādins) yourselves say in your own treatise that "there are worldlings who alone accomplish uncontaminated seeds" (conceding those seeds to be uncontaminated)? Mark that "a seed and its manifest-activity" are of one piece in nature and mark: since you say the manifest-activity, because its mark is defiled, is not called uncontaminated, the seed, being equally mark-defiled, ought likewise not to be called uncontaminated — yet you all the same own that seed to be uncontaminated; is this not slapping your own face, contradicting yourself front and back?

Then how should the scripture's "the nature of the mind is originally pure" be rightly understood? There are two correct readings: first, "the nature of the mind is pure" refers to "the suchness disclosed by the mind's principle of emptiness" — for suchness is the mind's true nature (so "the nature is pure" speaks of suchness, and does not say the contaminated mind itself is uncontaminated). Second, it says that "the substance of the mind (its self-mark) is not just the same as the afflictions," and so is called "originally pure of nature" (meaning the mind does not take the afflictions as its own nature); this too does not say that "the nature of the contaminated mind is uncontaminated" and so call it originally pure.

By this one ought to believe: sentient beings have, from beginningless time, "uncontaminated seeds," and these seeds are not by perfuming but innately accomplished by [their very] nature (this is the "innate"); later, at the stage of advancing progress, they are by perfuming nurtured larger, and the uncontaminated holy path arises, with just this innate uncontaminated seed as its cause. And the moment the uncontaminated holy path arises, it in turn perfumes a new seed into being (this is the "newly-arisen"). As for the seeds of the contaminated dharmas, the principle is the same — they too are jointly established as the two kinds, innate and newly-arisen; reason by analogy from the uncontaminated side and you will understand.

〔Reconciling "the inner seeds definitely have perfuming"〕

〔Reconciling · resolving the proofs the newly-perfumed school cited〕 (Since the correct sense maintains the joint establishment of the two kinds, it must turn back and settle properly with the teachings the newly-perfumed school cited, not clashing with them.) The newly-perfumed school cited the line "the inner seeds definitely have perfuming" to prove all seeds are perfumed-into-being. But see clearly: though the holy teaching says "the inner seeds definitely have perfuming," it does not at all flatly assert that "all seeds are perfumed out" — how can you, on the strength of this one line, wipe out "the innate seeds" altogether? Moreover, the innate seeds too must be nurtured-flourishing by perfuming before they can bear fruit; so when the holy teaching says "the inner seeds definitely have perfuming," it means that even the innate seeds are perfumed and nurtured-flourishing, not that the seeds are all newly produced out of nothing. (Glossed thus, this teaching-line matches up with "the joint establishment of the two kinds.")

(The newly-perfumed school further cited "hearing-perfuming" to prove the uncontaminated seeds too are perfumed-into-being; this too must be reconciled.) In fact, "hearing-perfuming" does not perfume out only the contaminated: when one hears the right Dharma, it is at the same time perfuming "the innate uncontaminated seeds," making them flourish bit by bit, and so on turn by turn, on up to giving rise to "the supramundane mind"; and so this work of "perfuming-flourishing the uncontaminated seed" is likewise named "hearing-perfuming." (Evidently hearing-perfuming on one hand perfumes new contaminated seeds and on the other nurtures-flourishing the innate uncontaminated seeds, and cannot be taken to prove that the uncontaminated seeds are all perfumed out of nothing.)

Within hearing-perfuming there are in fact two kinds: one is "of the contaminated nature," which is severed only at "the path of cultivation," which can summon a superior maturation-fruit, and which serves the supramundane dharma as a "superior dominant condition" (a powerful assisting condition); the other is "of the uncontaminated nature," which does not fall among "what is to be severed," and which is precisely what serves the supramundane dharma as its "causal condition" (that is, its true direct cause).

The trouble is: that which truly serves as the direct causal condition (the innate uncontaminated seed nurtured-flourishing by the uncontaminated hearing-perfuming) is very subtle, very hidden, not easy to make out; and so the teaching lodges it upon that "coarser, more conspicuous superior dominant condition (that is, the contaminated hearing-perfuming)," and conveniently speaks of that dominant condition as "the seed of the supramundane mind." In fact the true direct causal condition is the innate uncontaminated seed nurtured-flourishing by the uncontaminated hearing-perfuming — to say "the dominant condition is the seed" is only an expedient way of speaking.

〔Reconciling "natures established in dependence on obstruction"〕

〔Reconciling the newly-perfumed school's "natures established in dependence on obstruction"〕 (The newly-perfumed school's fifth ground maintained that "the distinction of natures is fixed by the obstructions, not by the uncontaminated seeds"; this too must be reconciled.) In fact the so-called "dividing natures by the obstructions" is meant precisely to "disclose whether the uncontaminated seeds are present or not"; it is not a separate scheme of fixing that sets the uncontaminated seeds aside. How so? (1) If a person "has no uncontaminated seed whatever," then his seeds of the two obstructions can never be severed, and so he is fixed as "of the not-nirvāṇa dharma" (a being without the capacity for liberation);

(2) if a person "has only the uncontaminated seed of the two vehicles (the śrāvaka, the pratyekabuddha)," then his seeds of the cognition-obstruction can never be severed (he can sever only the affliction-obstruction), and so he is divided in two — one fixed as "of the śrāvaka-nature," one fixed as "of the pratyekabuddha-nature"; (3) if a person "has the uncontaminated seed of the Buddha (the bodhisattva) as well," then his seeds of both obstructions can both be severed to exhaustion, and so he is fixed as "of the Tathāgata-nature" (one who can attain Buddhahood).

Evidently: it is precisely because of "whether the uncontaminated seeds are present" that the obstructions come to have the distinction of "severable / not severable" (the seed is the root, the obstruction the surface). It is only that the uncontaminated seeds are too subtle, too hidden, not easy to make out, and so one borrows "whether the obstruction can be severed," which is more visible, to disclose the distinction of natures. Think about it — were it not so, by what other cause would the obstruction come to have this distinction of "severable / not severable" at all? (Apart from the uncontaminated seeds there is no way to judge whether the obstruction can be severed; evidently the obstruction's severability or not has its root, after all, in whether the uncontaminated seeds are present.)

The newly-perfumed school might rescue it again with a line like this: "this distinction of whether the obstruction can be severed is 'innately there by nature,' and has nothing to do with whether the uncontaminated seeds are present." But this saying will not do: (1) since you grant "the distinction of obstructions is innately there by nature," then on what ground do you, conversely, refuse to grant that "the uncontaminated dharma-seeds" too are innately there by nature? Both being "innately there by nature," how can you own only the obstruction and not the seed? (2) Again, if there were originally no uncontaminated dharma-seed whatever, then the holy path could never arise; and the holy path not arising, who then would sever those seeds of the two obstructions? — since there is not even the holy path that could sever the obstructions, what do you mean by "dividing natures according to whether the obstruction can be severed" (with no path that could sever, the obstruction's "severability" is sheer empty words)? (3) And since that holy path of which you (the newly-perfumed school) speak must definitely not arise, then the line you spoke earlier, "(the uncontaminated seed) is spoken of in the sense of the future possibility of arising," must definitely fail to stand too (with no holy path that could arise in the future, "can arise in the future" becomes empty talk as well).

Again, the various holy teachings everywhere speak of "there being innate seeds," and these all run dead against the account that "seeds are only newly-arisen." So the account "seeds are only newly-arisen" does not get through, whether reckoned by principle or by the teachings. By this it ought to be understood (this is the correct sense): the seeds of all dharmas have both kinds, "innate" and "newly-arisen" — jointly established as the two kinds, leaning to neither side.

D. The six senses of seed

What, after all, counts as a true seed? It must meet six conditions, and lacking even one it fails to be a seed. Below, one condition at a time —

First, momentary perishing — this says that the moment the seed's substance is produced, immediately, without interval, it perishes (moment by moment arising, moment by moment perishing); and it is right at this "about-to-perish" instant that it has a superior force (the force able to produce a fruit), and only this counts as a seed. This condition is to rule out "permanent dharmas" (things forever unchanging): a permanent dharma, never budging, cannot be said to have the function of "producing anything" (so a permanent dharma cannot serve as a seed).

Second, coexisting with the fruit — this says that the seed must arise at the same time as the "manifest-activity fruit" it produces, joined and conjoined with it, and only this counts as a seed. This condition is to rule out two mistaken notions: first, "before-and-after" (supposing the seed is earlier and the fruit later, the two parted in time); second, "definitely apart" (supposing the seed and the fruit each sit in their own place, the two definitely separated). In fact, though the seed and the manifest-activity are two things of different kind, the two do not clash with each other, and can, on the same body and at the same time, one be the seed and one give rise to the manifest-activity then and there (seed-producing-manifest-activity is simultaneous). Note: this "coexisting with the fruit" speaks of the one kind, "seed producing manifest-activity," not the kind "seed producing seed" — for a seed producing a seed of its own class (an earlier seed producing a later seed) is a before-and-after continuance, and definitely not at the same time.

Here a further word is added: though the relation of "cause and effect" divides into two kinds — one "simultaneous" (seed producing manifest-activity), one "non-simultaneous" (seed producing seed) — yet in neither kind can there be talk of "the cause's function" except in "the present" instant alone; for "what is not yet arisen" (the future) and "what has already perished" (the past) both have no substance (past and future are both empty, with no real substance that could exert a function). And the name "seed" is precisely established in dependence on the sense "producing the simultaneous manifest-activity fruit," not in dependence on "drawing forth a non-simultaneous seed of its own class"; and so this second condition speaks only of "being present-together with the (manifest-activity) fruit."

Third, constantly accompanying [the consciousness] as it turns — this says that the seed must "continue on of one kind for a long time" (turning along together with the eighth consciousness all the way), continuing right up to "the ultimate stage" (that is, just before the vajra-like concentration), and only this counts as a seed. This condition is to rule out "the transforming consciousnesses": the transforming consciousnesses both transform and break off, not continuing on of one kind, and so they do not match this dharma of "being able to appropriate-and-hold seeds" (that is, the transforming consciousnesses cannot serve as the support of seeds). This condition also displays, at the same time, the seed's "producing seeds of its own class" (an earlier seed drawing forth a later seed, continuing on of one kind).

Fourth, fixity of nature — this says that the seed, following the force of "the cause's own [nature]," produces a wholesome fruit, an unwholesome fruit, and the like, and this nature-class in which it produces fruit is "locked" (a wholesome seed produces only the wholesome, an unwholesome seed only the unwholesome, never crossing over), and only this counts as a seed. This condition is to rule out the account of "the remaining schools" (other sects) — they hold that "a cause of one nature can also produce a fruit of a different nature, and that this still counts as a causal condition"; in fact, where the nature differs there is no causal condition, and a seed produces its fruit always of the same nature-class.

Fifth, awaiting the various conditions — this says that the seed must further await its own "various conditions" (the sundry assisting conditions) to gather and conjoin before its capacity flourishes and it can produce a fruit, and only this counts as a seed. This condition rules out two mistaken notions: first, that of "the heterodox" — they suppose there is a "spontaneous cause" that needs to await no condition at all and at any time, in a flash, produces all its fruit; second, that of "the remaining schools" — they suppose the "conditions are forever present, never lacking." In fact this condition displays precisely that the conditions the seed awaits are "not forever present," and so the seed too "will not, at any time, in a flash, produce its fruit" (the conditions not being gathered, it does not produce).

Sixth, drawing forth its own fruit — this says that the seed, with respect to its own several fruits, the form-fruit, the mind-fruit, and the like, severally draws forth only "its own share" of fruit (a form-seed draws forth only form, a mind-seed only mind, each minding its own), and only this counts as a seed. This condition too rules out two errors: first, that of "the heterodox" — they suppose "a single cause alone can produce all fruits" (one cause producing the myriad fruits); second, that of "the remaining schools" — they suppose "form and mind can serve as each other's causal condition." In fact form and mind each draw forth their own fruit, and do not serve as each other's causal condition.

Taking these six conditions together: only the differentiated capacity within "the root consciousness" (the eighth consciousness) is, at one and the same time, complete in these six conditions, and counts as a true seed; no other dharma can do it. As for the outer grain, the wheat, and the like — these "outer seeds" — they are in fact things that consciousness has transformed-and-manifested, given the name "seed" only by borrowing, and are not true seeds (for they are not complete in these six conditions).

〔The producing-cause · the drawing-cause〕

The force of a seed divides into two uses: one can produce "the near fruit, the principal fruit" (the fruit that follows immediately and serves squarely in its place), and this is called "the producing-cause"; the other can draw forth "the far fruit, the residual fruit," keeping it from being cut off all at once, and this is called "the drawing-cause" — for instance, after a person dies the corpse still lingers there a while ("the person," the principal fruit, is already gone, yet the leftover corpse is still drawn along, not vanishing at once); this is the drawing-cause at work.

"The inner seeds" (the seeds within consciousness) are definitely produced-and-nurtured by perfuming, and they can directly produce a fruit, and so they are of the "causal condition" nature. "The outer seeds" (the grain, the wheat) — as for their perfuming, sometimes there is, sometimes there is not; they can only serve as a "dominant condition," merely helping bring about the fruit produced. And the fruit that the outer seeds produce must, at root, still take "the inner seeds" as its causal condition — for the outer things are in fact fruits transformed-and-manifested by the "common-mark seeds" (those seeds that, in common, transform-and-manifest the outer world); the outer realm being produced by the common-mark seeds, in the last reckoning it is still the inner seeds that are at work.

E. The sense of perfuming — the four senses of the perfumed · the four senses of the perfumer

On what principle is the name "perfuming" established? It is thus: "the side that is perfumed" (the perfumed, namely the eighth consciousness) and "the side that does the perfuming" (the perfumer, namely the first seven transforming consciousnesses) must each possess four conditions, and only so can the seeds be made to "arise" (perfume new seeds out) and to "grow" (nurture the innate seeds larger), and so it is named "perfuming."

1. The four senses of the perfumed

Speak first of which four conditions "the side that is perfumed" (the perfumed) must possess —

First, the quality of firm abiding — a dharma that continues on of one kind from first to last and can hold the habit-energy (the seeds) firmly is one that can serve as the side perfumed. This condition rules out "the transforming consciousnesses" and "sound, wind," and the like: their nature does not stand firm, and is besides broken and intermittent, and scattering and unsettled (a gust of wind, a sounding tone, and it is past), and so they cannot serve as the side perfumed.

Second, the quality of indeterminacy — a dharma whose nature is even and unopposing (leaning neither toward the wholesome nor toward the unwholesome) and can make room for the habit-energy is one that can serve as the side perfumed. This condition rules out "the wholesome dharmas and the defiled dharmas": their force is too strong, too overbearing, and makes no room for anything else (just as one strong, heavy fragrance can have no other fragrance perfumed into it), and so they cannot serve as the side perfumed. Just for this reason, "the Tathāgata's eighth pure consciousness" (the uncontaminated wholesome eighth consciousness at the Buddha-fruit stage) only carries the old seeds and no longer takes in fresh perfuming — for the Buddha's pure consciousness is of the "wholesome" nature, not of the "indeterminate" nature, and so it cannot take perfuming.

Third, the quality of being perfumable — a dharma whose own substance is its own master (not depending on anything else), whose nature is not tightly sealed shut (it must be loose-and-open, that perfuming may get in), and which can receive the habit-energy is one that can serve as the side perfumed. This condition rules out "the mental factors" and "the unconditioned dharmas": the mental factors arise only in dependence on something else (the mind-king), and are not their own master; the unconditioned dharmas are both tight-sealed and unchanging, and perfuming cannot get in; and so neither can serve as the side perfumed.

Fourth, the quality of conjoining together with the perfumer — a dharma that is at the same time and in the same place as the perfumer, and "neither identical nor apart" (not melded into one, nor parted into two places) from it, is one that can serve as the side perfumed. This condition rules out "another's body" (not the same body) and "the preceding moment, the succeeding moment" (not at the same time): they cannot come together with the perfumer, cannot conjoin, and so cannot serve as the side perfumed.

Taking these four conditions together: only "the maturation-consciousness" (the eighth consciousness) is, at one and the same time, complete in these four conditions and able to serve as the side perfumed; the mental factors and the rest all cannot.

2. The four senses of the perfumer

Speak next of which four conditions "the side that does the perfuming" (the perfumer) must possess —

First, having arising-and-perishing — a dharma that is not permanent (that arises and perishes), that can exert function, and that can produce-and-grow the habit-energy is one that can serve as the perfumer. This condition rules out the "unconditioned" dharmas: an unconditioned dharma does not change before or after, and has no function of "producing-and-growing," and so it cannot serve as the perfumer.

Second, having superior function — a dharma that arises and perishes, whose force is moreover flourishing, and which can draw forth the habit-energy is one that can serve as the perfumer. This condition rules out "the maturation mind and mental factors" (that is, the eighth consciousness and the mental factors concomitant with it): their force is too feeble (being of the indeterminate nature, and turning of themselves spontaneously, their strength is very soft), and so they cannot serve as the perfumer.

Third, having increase-and-decrease — a dharma that has superior function, that can moreover increase and decrease (waxing and waning), and that can gather-and-plant the habit-energy is one that can serve as the perfumer. This condition rules out "the perfect wholesome dharmas of the Buddha-fruit": the wholesome dharmas of the Buddha-fruit neither increase nor decrease (already perfect to the utmost, nothing can be added, nothing taken away), and so they cannot serve as the perfumer. Moreover, if that Buddha-fruit could still perfume (that is, could still increase and decrease), then it would not deserve to be called perfect, and would not the Buddha-fruit of one Buddha after another have to have higher and lower, better and worse? — yet the Buddha-fruit is equal and perfect, with no division of higher or lower, better or worse.

Fourth, conjoining with the perfumed and so turning — a dharma that is at the same time and in the same place as the side perfumed, and "neither identical nor apart" (not melded into one, nor parted into two places) from it, is one that can serve as the perfumer. This condition rules out "another's body" and "the preceding moment, the succeeding moment": they cannot come together with the perfumed, cannot conjoin, and so cannot serve as the perfumer.

Taking these four conditions together: only "the seven transforming consciousnesses" and the mental factors concomitant with them — having a superior force-and-function and moreover increasing and decreasing — are, at one and the same time, complete in these four conditions and able to serve as the perfumer.

3. The three dharmas turn upon each other, cause and effect at the same time

In just this way, "the perfumer" and "the perfumed consciousness" arise together and perish together (arising at the same time, perishing at the same time), and only then does this matter of perfuming hold. It can make the seeds within the perfumed consciousness both "arise" (perfume new seeds out) and "grow" (the innate seeds nurtured larger), just as one takes flowers and perfumes "sesame" (that is, hemp-seed) — the sesame, perfumed by the flowers, takes on the fragrance; and so it is named "perfuming."

The perfuming consciousnesses, from the very instant they are produced from a seed (becoming manifest-activity), can right then turn about and serve as a cause, perfuming a new seed into being once more — "the seed produces manifest-activity, and the manifest-activity in turn perfumes a seed," these three things (the original seed, the manifest-activity, the newly-perfumed seed) linking one into the next, and "cause and effect at one and the same time." It is just like "the wick produces the flame, and the flame in turn burns the wick black" (at the same time you give rise to me and I burn you), and like "two sheaves of reeds leaning each on the other" (the two sheaves leaning together, and only so standing up); cause and effect being at the same time — this principle does not budge.

Here there are in fact two kinds of cause-and-effect. The first: "the perfumer perfuming a seed out (the manifest-activity perfuming into a seed)" and "the seed giving rise to manifest-activity (the seed producing manifest-activity)" — these two acts are "a simultaneous cause-and-effect," just like "the coexisting cause" attaining "the manly-deed fruit" (the kind where cause and effect stand together at the same time). The second: "the seed producing on, of one kind, before-and-after (seed producing seed)" is "a non-simultaneous cause-and-effect," just like "the homogeneous cause" drawing forth "the outflow-fruit" (the kind of before-and-after continuance). These two (seed-and-manifest-activity simultaneous, seed-and-seed before-and-after), with respect to their fruit, are both of the "causal condition" nature; apart from these two, no other dharma counts as a causal condition — and even if one now and then calls it a causal condition, one knows it to be only an expedient conventional saying, not a true causal condition.

The above is to have spoken in brief, in full, of this side, "the all-seeds" (the six conditions of a seed, the dispute of innate and newly-perfumed, plus the principle of perfuming — all have, by here, been gone through).

〔Verses commented〕Verse 3, first half

〔Verses expounded〕

(v3) Unknowable [are its] appropriation, location, and discerning; it is ever concurrent with contact, attention, feeling, conception, and volition — and only with equanimity-feeling. (v4) It is unobstructed-indeterminate, and contact and the rest are likewise so. Constant-yet-turning like a torrent, at the arhat stage it is relinquished.

A. The gate of object-support and mode of activity

This passage answers two questions: what exactly are the ālaya-consciousness's "mode of activity" (how it works, the way it cognizes) and its "object-support" (the object it takes hold of)? The answer lies in that one line of the verse, "unknowable appropriation, location, and discerning." Take it one word at a time. "Discerning" just means "discernment" (sorting out and taking hold) — and this is its "mode of activity," for this consciousness takes precisely "discernment" as the way it works. "Location" just means "place," that is, the "receptacle-world" (the material world outside our bodies, the mountains, rivers, and the great earth), which is the place where all sentient beings settle their lives and rely. "Appropriation" falls into two classes: one is "seeds," the other is "the body-with-faculties" (this body equipped with the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body faculties). By "seeds" is meant the three classes of habit-energy — "appearance, name, discrimination" (the seeds perfumed in and stored up); by "the body-with-faculties" is meant the "material faculties" (the pure-form of the five faculties, the very portion that can actually give rise to seeing, hearing, and the rest) and the "locus on which the faculties rest" (the supporting-faculty dust, the lump of flesh that holds up the faculties). Both of these are what this consciousness "appropriates" — the consciousness takes them in as a part of itself, sharing safety-and-peril with them (the body safe, the consciousness too is safe; the body hurt, the consciousness too is pained). So both "appropriation" and "location" are objects this consciousness has as object-support. Now as to how it comes about: by force of cause and condition, in the very moment of its own arising, the ālaya-consciousness transforms inwardly into "seeds" and "the body-with-faculties," and transforms outwardly into "the receptacle-world"; then it takes these things it has itself transformed as the objects it has as object-support, and that "discerning" function of its can arise only in reliance on these objects (the consciousness transforms into objects, then takes as object the very objects it transformed).

The "discerning" here spoken of means that the "maturation-consciousness" (the name set up for the ālaya-consciousness from its side of requiting the fruit of karma) has, with respect to the object it has as object-support, a "discerning" function; and this discerning function is gathered under the "perceiving-part" (the side of the consciousness that does the cognizing). One should know: whenever a contaminated consciousness arises, it puts forth two seemings — one "resembling the object had as object-support," one "resembling the cognizing function"; and the mental factors that arise along with it are likewise so, putting forth these same two seemings. Of these, the side "resembling the object had as object-support" is called the "appearance-part" (the image taken hold of); the side "resembling the cognizing function" is called the "perceiving-part" (the function that takes hold).

This passage uses reductio to show that mind and mental factors must have both the appearance-part and the perceiving-part. First suppose it had no "appearance-part" (that image had as object-support): then it should not be able to take hold of its own object; failing that, an absurd conclusion follows — any one consciousness should be able to take hold of all objects whatever. Why? Because they would all alike lack an appearance-part and be all of one sort, "one's own object being no different from another's, and another's object no different from one's own" — there would be no telling which object should be cognized by which consciousness, and everything would fall into confusion. Conversely, suppose it had no "perceiving-part" (that cognizing function): then it should be utterly unable to cognize anything, no more aware than empty space; failing that, even empty space and such lifeless things should be able to cognize objects — which is of course absurd. Pressed from both ends, it is clear that mind and mental factors must possess both these sides, "appearance-part and perceiving-part," at once, neither being dispensable.

This is just as a scripture (the Ghanavyūha-sūtra) says: all there is is the consciousness that does the perceiving ("perceiving" being the perceiving consciousness); the outer objects perceived are, in fact, simply not there; in truth it is only the perceiving side and the perceived side within the consciousness, each turning of its own accord.

First, look at one faction who maintain that "apart from consciousness there is a real outer object" (this is the road of the Hīnayāna who hold real objects). They line it up thus: the outer object alone counts as the object had as object-support; they call the "appearance-part" the "mode of activity," and call the "perceiving-part" the "substance" (that is, the own-substance side of mind and mental factors). On their view: the mind-king and the mental factors rely on the same "basis" (that is, the faculty) and have as object-support the same "object" (that is, the object); their "mode of activity" (which, for them, refers to the appearance-part) resemble one another; while their "substance" (the own-substance), though the mind-king and mental factors are equal in number, each has its own different mark — for the dharmas of consciousness, feeling, conception, and the rest each have, by nature, their own several marks.

Next, look at the road that penetrates "there is no object at all apart from consciousness" (this is the orthodox sense of consciousness-only). They line it up thus: the "appearance-part" alone is the object had as object-support, the "perceiving-part" is called the "mode of activity," and the substance on which both appearance-part and perceiving-part rely is called the "substance," that is, the "self-witnessing-part" (the part by which the consciousness witnesses itself). Why must there be this self-witnessing-part? Because, were it lacking, a person should be unable to recall his own past mind and mental factors — the principle is like this: an event one has never undergone at all, one cannot afterward recall; in the same way, were that earlier discernment never witnessed by the self-witnessing-part, one could not afterward recall it (there must first have been a self-witnessing-part witnessing it in the present, for it to be recalled later). On the view of the consciousness-only masters: the mind-king and the mental factors rely on the same "basis-faculty," the "object had as object-support" (the appearance-part) resemble one another, yet their "mode of activity" (here meaning the perceiving-part) each differs — for the functions of discerning, receiving, and the rest are by nature each its own; while the "substance" (the self-witnessing-part), though equal in number, each has its own different mark — for the own-substances of the dharmas of consciousness, feeling, and the rest are by nature distinct.

A step further: when mind and mental factors arise, each and every one, then, examined closely by reason, each has "three parts," that is, the appearance-part, the perceiving-part, and the self-witnessing-part. Why say there are three parts? For two reasons: first, in any single act of cognition there is, by nature, the distinction of "the measured, the measurer, and the result of measuring" (the measured is the object that gets measured, the measurer is the function that does the measuring, the result of measuring is the result that the measuring yields); second, the two sides, appearance-part and perceiving-part, must have a substance to underlie them (that is, the self-witnessing-part) before they can stand. This is just as Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya says in a verse: that "image resembling the object" (the appearance-part) is the "measured," that "function that grasps" (the perceiving-part) and the "self-witnessing-part" are the "measurer" and the "result"; and these three are, in fact, one and the same substance of the consciousness, having no several separate substances.

Going on to a still finer division, one can mark off a fourth part: were mind and mental factors divided more finely still, there should be "four parts" — the first three the same as above, and a fourth "witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part" set up besides (the part that witnesses the self-witnessing-part). Why must there be a fourth? Take it in several points. First, were it lacking, then "who witnesses the third part (the self-witnessing-part)?" — one surely cannot say no one does; for since these several parts of the mind all belong to the class "the cognizing," by rights they should all have an object they witness. Second, were there no fourth part, the self-witnessing-part would be left with no "result of measuring" (the result it measures would have nowhere to land); but whatever is a "measurer" must always have a "result of measuring." Could one then say "the perceiving-part is the self-witnessing-part's result of measuring"? — no; for the perceiving-part is at times "non-veridical" (like a mistaken or astray cognition, the erroneous sort), and relying on it to witness the self-witnessing-part would be unreliable. From these two points it is clear: the perceiving-part cannot witness the third part (the self-witnessing-part), and so a fourth part must be set up besides to witness it — for whatever can witness one's own substance must be "veridical perception" (cognition that is direct, immediate, and never mistaken).

How these four parts divide into inner and outer, and how they take one another as object-support, is here laid out point by point. First, inner and outer: the first two parts (appearance-part, perceiving-part) count as "outer" (the coarser, the outward-facing), the latter two parts (self-witnessing-part, witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part) count as "inner" (the inward-facing witnessing). Next, what each part can take as object-support: the first part (appearance-part) is only "an object that gets had as object-support," not itself taking hold of anything else; the latter three parts have both sides, "being had as object-support" and "the cognizing." Look closely — the second part (perceiving-part) only takes the first part (appearance-part) as object-support, and this taking is at times veridical (veridical perception) and at times non-veridical (non-veridical), at times direct seeing here-and-now (perception) and at times knowing by inference (inference); the third part (self-witnessing-part) can take the second part (perceiving-part) as object-support, and likewise takes the fourth part as object-support; the fourth part (witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part) only takes the third part (self-witnessing-part) as object-support, and no longer takes the second part (perceiving-part) as object-support — for taking the perceiving-part as object-support is a task it does not need (the self-witnessing-part's taking the perceiving-part as object-support is enough). And both the third and fourth parts belong to "veridical perception" (direct seeing here-and-now, never mistaken). In this way, mind and mental factors are composed of these four parts, possessing both "being had as object-support" and "the cognizing" (the self-witnessing-part and the witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part taking one another as object-support, witnessing one another, witnessing and witnessing without break), yet not falling into the fault of "cognizing without end" (once the third and fourth parts witness one another, it stops, with no need to add a fifth part); these four parts are, with one another, not identical (neither-identical) and yet not apart (neither-apart). The principle of consciousness-only stands firm just so.

So a scripture (the Ghanavyūha-sūtra) says in a verse: sentient beings' mind has these two sides, "grasper and grasped"; all the parts, whether inner or outer, are bound up by "grasped and grasper," and what is thereby "seen" comes out in manifold differences.

The verse means: sentient beings' mind-nature is composed of these two parts, "grasper and grasped"; whether inner (the latter two parts) or outer (the first two parts), all are bound by the grasped and the grasper; and what is thereby "seen" comes out every which way — at times veridical, at times non-veridical, at times direct seeing here-and-now, at times knowing by inference, with many differences. Note: this word "seen" in the verse refers precisely to the "perceiving-part."

These four parts, depending on how you gather them, can be gathered into fewer still. Gathered into "three parts" — by drawing the fourth (witnessing-of-self-witnessing-part) into the self-witnessing-part; gathered into "two parts" — since the latter three parts all are of the cognizing sort, simply gathering them all into the "perceiving-part," in which case the word "perceiving" takes the sense "the cognizing"; gathered into "one part" — since the four parts are, by nature, one and the same substance of the consciousness, having no several separate substances. This is just as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says in a verse: it is because of that grasping within one's own mind that the mind manifests as though there were an outer object turning out there; in truth, the outer object it sees is simply not there, and so it is said that "all is mind-only."

Scriptures everywhere say "the one mind alone," and these words "the one mind" in fact gather in the mental factors too (the mind-king as the head, the mental factors following the mind-king; naming the head brings the factors along). Gathering up this whole long stretch above, the conclusion is: the consciousness's "mode of activity" just is "discernment," and "discernment" just is the consciousness's "perceiving-part."

1. Location — the receptacle-world

That word "location" in the verse speaks of the receptacle-world. It means: by the force of the maturing of "common-mark seeds" (the seeds left by the karma all beings have done in common, the kind they sense in common), the maturation-consciousness (the ālaya-consciousness) transforms into the appearance of a "receptacle-world" that seems to have form-dharmas — that is, the outer "great elements" (earth, water, fire, wind, the four great elements) and the form they produce. Here is a key point: each sentient being's transformed receptacle-world is in fact transformed separately, each its own, not one another's; yet what is transformed resemble one another in appearance, and the place they occupy is no different — much as many lamps, the light of each in fact shining its own and pervading the whole room, yet looking as though it had fused into one sheet of brightness (each pervading its own, yet looking as though combined into one).

Whose maturation-consciousness, then, is it that transforms into this appearance of the receptacle-world? On this question there are three positions below.

〔One view: every sentient being transforms it〕 The first position says: it is the maturation-consciousness of every sentient being that transforms into this receptacle-world. On what ground? Because a scripture says: the receptacle-world is jointly arisen by all sentient beings through the "force of dominant karma" (the force of past karma upholding it from behind).

〔Another view: those now dwelling here and those to be born here transform it〕 The second position comes forward to refute: were one to say, as above, that "every sentient being transforms it," it would force two untenable conclusions. One, the buddhas and bodhisattvas too should really transform into this filthy, foul land (which is plainly wrong); two, ordinary beings too should really transform into the worlds of other quarters, and into the pure, marvelous buddha-lands within our own realm (which is wrong too). Besides, those noble ones who, weary of and detached from the body-with-form, are born into the formless realm, never again come down to be born in this realm — that being so, if you still say they too transform into this land, of what use is the transforming? So one should put it this way instead: only those "now dwelling in this realm" and those "to be born hereafter into this realm" — their maturation-consciousness transforms into this realm. As for the word "all" that scripture speaks, it is said "with respect to a portion" (not really counting in every single sentient being) — meaning that those whose karma is the same all jointly transform this receptacle-world.

〔The orthodox view: whatever the body can hold and use, it transforms〕 The third position (this is the orthodox sense) says: the second position's "only those now dwelling and to be born here transform it" is also not thorough. First catch one gap in it: when the receptacle-world is "about to be destroyed," there is in this realm neither anyone now dwelling nor anyone about to come and be born — whose maturation-consciousness, then, transforms into this realm at that time? (In the eon of destruction there are plainly no sentient beings, yet the receptacle-world is still there — which shows the second position does not cover the whole.) Then press a line by the second position's own words: on its account, when an ordinary being, weary of and detached from the body-with-form, is born into the formless realm and has already manifested a formless body, he yet beforehand transforms into this land — of what use is that? Grant, a step back, that a being of the formless realm did have a form-body: this form-body and the receptacle-world of "another realm" (not the realm it is in) are, one fine and one coarse, too far apart, simply unable to rely on and uphold one another; to take this body and transform that receptacle, what good is it? Once these several layers are thought through, the orthodox sense comes out: the land transformed is, in the first place, for the form-body to "rely on" and to "make use of"; so the criterion is simple — wherever a land has the use of being relied on and made use of by some body, that body's consciousness transforms into it. By this criterion, even a being born into another quarter, or born in its own locale, its consciousness can all the same transform into this realm's land; and just for this reason, the receptacle-world, when it is "about to be destroyed" and when it "first comes to be," though no sentient being dwells within it, is still ready and there (for there is always the sort of consciousness that "still has the use of it" transforming it). What has been spoken of above is "common use" (the receptacle-world of common karma, commonly transformed); as for "separate use" (the object each senses by its own separate karma), understand it by the same principle — for ghost, human, and god see the same one thing each differently (the same pool of water a ghost sees as a river of pus and blood, a god as a ground of lapis lazuli).

2. Appropriation — seeds and the body-with-faculties

The first item of "appropriation" is "seeds." The seeds spoken of here mean all the seeds of "contaminated dharmas" (those dharmas still bound with affliction, not yet out of birth-and-death) that the maturation-consciousness holds; these seeds are of the same nature as this consciousness (both contaminated-indeterminate), and so they are an object this consciousness can have as object-support. But the seeds of "uncontaminated dharmas" (those pure dharmas that get out of birth-and-death) are otherwise: though they too cling to this consciousness, their nature differs from this consciousness's (they are uncontaminated, not indeterminate), and so they are not an object this consciousness can have as object-support. That said, though the uncontaminated seeds cannot be had as object-support, they too are inseparable from this consciousness, ever clinging to it — much like the substance-nature of "suchness," which, though not an object the consciousness has as object-support, is yet inseparable from consciousness; to say this in no way contradicts the principle of "consciousness-only."

The second item of "appropriation" is "the body-with-faculties." This means: by the force of the maturing of "uncommon-mark seeds" (the seeds drawn by each one's separate karma, given over to its own use alone), the maturation-consciousness transforms into the seeming of "material faculties" (the pure-form of the five faculties) and "the locus on which the faculties rest" (the lump of flesh that holds up the faculties) — that is, the great elements within the body and the form they produce. Besides this, by the force of the maturing of "common-mark seeds," it transforms even the locus of "another's body" into the seeming of another's body. Why transform another's body too? Because, were it not so, there would be no accounting for "being able to make use of others" (we plainly see others' bodies and can rely on and use one another).

〔One view: it also transforms into the seeming of another's faculties〕 Here a divergence arises again: when the ālaya-consciousness transforms another's body, does it or does it not also transform another's "pure-form faculties"? The first position says: it also transforms into the seeming of the "faculties" (pure-form faculties) on another's body. His ground is: the Madhyāntavibhāga says "the consciousness transforms so as to seem to have the five faculties of self-body and other-body."

〔Another view: it transforms only into the seeming of the locus〕 The second position disagrees, saying: when the ālaya-consciousness transforms another's body, it can transform only into the seeming of the "locus on which the faculties rest" (the supporting-faculty dust, that is, the lump of flesh), and cannot transform another's pure-form faculties — for another's pure-form faculties are simply of no use to oneself, and there is no reason one should transform them. Then how to read the Madhyāntavibhāga's line "transforms so as to seem to have the five faculties of self-body and other-body"? The second position says: that speaks of "one's own consciousness and another's consciousness each transforming the faculties on its own body" (not that my consciousness transforms another's faculties). Putting it this way also conveniently accounts for one phenomenon: when a person has been born elsewhere, or has entered nirvāṇa, why his left-behind corpse still lies there and does not at once vanish — for that body of flesh (the locus) was, in the first place, jointly transformed by everyone's common-mark seeds, and though the rightful owner's pure-form faculties have already been relinquished, this lump of locus all the same remains.

3. Concentration-fruit form · brief summary of the objects transformed

What has been spoken of above is said with respect to the outer receptacle and inner body transformed by "karma-force," and the distinctions of which realm (the three realms) and which locale (the nine locales) they belong to. But change to the receptacle, body, realm, locale, self, and other transformed by "concentration-force and the like" (the excellent powers of meditative concentration and such), and then it is not so fixed (one with the power of concentration can, by concentration-force, transform into the objects of another locale). One more point: the body and receptacle transformed are for the most part constant and continuous, while sounds, lights, and the like transformed are for the most part of a passing moment — for they arise as the present condition, at a single spur, sets them off (and once the condition passes, they are gone).

To round off briefly the objects this consciousness transforms, there are in all just these few: first, "contaminated seeds"; second, "the ten form-bearing bases" (that is, the ten form-dharmas, the five faculties plus the five objects); third, "the real form manifested at the dharma-base that falls [under it]" (this is, within that kind of form gathered under the dharma-base, the form that really and truly is there — for instance, the "concentration-fruit form" transformed by meditative concentration).

〔Q〕Here, then, someone is bound to ask: why can this maturation-consciousness not transform into objects that "seem to have mind and mental factors" to have as object-support (since it can transform form, why does it not transform mind)? 〔A〕To answer this, one must first tell apart: the transforming of a contaminated consciousness is, broadly, of two kinds. The first is "transforming by the force of cause and condition" — that is, transforming of itself, naturally, following the seeds; what is so transformed must have a real use. The second is "transforming by the force of discrimination" — that is, the sixth consciousness thinking and reckoning, forcibly throwing something together; this is but an image, a mere object given you to look at. The former always has a real use, the latter can only serve as an object. And the maturation-consciousness's transforming belongs precisely to the former, the "by-cause-and-condition" transforming; so the form and the rest it transforms must have a real use (able to appropriate, able to be made use of). But were it to transform into mind and mental factors, there would be no real use — for then the mind and mental factors are taken as the "appearance-part" (an image had as object-support), and the appearance-part can only be had as object-support, and cannot turn back and have an object as object-support; while that real function of "having an object as object-support" must be born separately from the seeds of the present-active mind and mental factors themselves, and is not something the appearance-part transformed by the maturation-consciousness can take on. Likewise, transforming into the unconditioned dharmas and such has no real use either. So the conclusion is: the maturation-consciousness does not take mind and mental factors and the like as object-support.

That said, the above holds only for the "contaminated stage." When one comes to the "uncontaminated stage" (the stage where this consciousness is transformed into the great-perfect-mirror wisdom), things are otherwise: then this consciousness is concurrent with the most excellent wisdom, and though it raises no discrimination, its substance-nature is clear and pure, so that even if the mind and mental factors transformed have no real use, it can all the same manifest the images of those mind and mental factors. Were it not so, would the buddhas not then fail to be "all-knowing" (knowing all without exception)? Having made this boundary clear, turn back and round off the contaminated stage: in the "contaminated stage" this maturation-consciousness has as object-support only three things — "the receptacle-world, the body-with-faculties, and the contaminated seeds." In the desire-realm and the form-realm, all three of these objects-of-object-support are complete; in the formless realm, it has as object-support only "the contaminated seeds" — for the beings of the formless realm, weary of and detached from form-dharmas, have no "karma-fruit form" (the form-body drawn by karma); yet it still has "concentration-fruit form" (the form transformed by meditative concentration), and this is in no way contrary to principle, the formless-realm consciousness likewise having this concentration-fruit form as its object.

4. The unknowable

What does that "unknowable" in the verse mean? Here it is told in two halves. One half is that its "mode of activity" (that is, the discerning function of the perceiving-part) is too subtle, hard to detect; the other half is that the object it has as object-support is also hard to detect — inwardly, that inner "appropriated" object (seeds, the body-with-faculties) is likewise so subtle as to be hard to know; outwardly, that outer "receptacle-world" is again so boundlessly vast that its measure cannot be taken. Mode of activity and object-support alike, both so hidden and hard to detect — and so it is named "unknowable."

〔Q〕Someone finds it incredible: how can there be such a consciousness — one that plainly takes hold of the object it has as object-support, yet whose working is so subtle as to be undetectable? 〔A〕A comparison makes it clear: in the "cessation-attainment" (that deep concentration in which the first six consciousnesses are all stilled), there is a "consciousness that does not leave the body" (that is, the ālaya-consciousness); though you cannot detect it, you should believe it is there; and one must grant that "in the cessation-attainment there is still a consciousness" — for the one entered into the concentration is, after all, a "sentient being" (a living person), and whatever is a sentient being must have a consciousness holding body and life, just as in his ordinary times of having mind (were even this consciousness gone, the body would perish). The cases of the "no-conception concentration" and the "no-conception heaven" and the like should all be understood likewise (within them too there is the subtle, hard-to-know ālaya carrying on).

〔Verses commented〕Verse 3 (latter half) through Verse 4

A. The gate of concurrence of mental factors (the five omnipresent)

〔Scroll 3〕

With how many mental factors is this ālaya-consciousness bound up? The answer is that it is ever bound up with these five: "contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition." From beginningless time, and right up until it is transformed into the uncontaminated (that is, before it has "transformed consciousness into wisdom"), the ālaya-consciousness is, in every stage, ever concurrent with these five mental factors. Why precisely these five? Because these five are precisely those gathered under the "omnipresent mental factors" (the class that, whenever there is any mental stirring, omnipresently arises along with it).

1. Contact

First, the first one, "contact." It arises by "discriminating the alteration" upon the basis of the "three concurring" (faculty, object, consciousness coming together); its nature is "to make mind and mental factors touch the object," and its function is "to serve as the basis for feeling, conception, volition, and the rest." Take it word by word. By "three concurring" is meant faculty, object, and consciousness following one another and coming together into one — hence "three concurring." Contact is born in reliance on this "three concurring," and conversely it binds these three together more tightly, so the treatise simply states the cause by way of the effect, saying contact "just is that three-concurring" (in fact it brings the three-concurring about). Next, "alteration" — when the three come together there is, by nature, a momentum of "following-along so as to give rise to the mental factors," and this momentum is called "alteration"; lastly, "discriminating" — contact arises precisely by "modeling itself on that momentum, resembling it," and so is called "discriminating" (following it, resembling it, just this is called discriminating).

Of these three, faculty, object, and consciousness, the "faculty's" momentum of alteration, in giving rise to contact, is mightier than either object or consciousness; so the Abhidharma-samuccaya and such texts pick out only the "faculty" to speak of, saying "contact discriminates the faculty's alteration" (citing the mightiest, the rest passed over with it). Next, what is contact's own nature: just this — "to bind together all mind and mental factors, making them touch one and the same object" — this is contact's own nature. And since contact models itself on, and resembles, that momentum of "following-along so as to give rise to the mental factors," its function is therefore "to serve as the basis for feeling and the rest."

The Udaya-astamgama-sūtra says: the aggregates of feeling, conception, and formations, every one of them, arise only with contact as their condition. Following this one can lay out a line from few to many: consciousness is born from "two" (faculty, object) coming together, contact is born from "three" (the three-concurring of faculty, object, consciousness), and feeling and the rest are born from "four" (faculty, object, consciousness, plus contact) coming together. Then it explains why several treatises speak differently. The Yogācārabhūmi says only "contact is the basis for feeling, conception, volition," and that is because "volition" is the head in the "formations aggregate," the weightiest, so citing the one "volition" brings all the other formation-factors along. The Abhidharma-samuccaya and such say only "contact is the basis for feeling," and that is because contact's giving rise to feeling is the nearest, the most direct — you see, the "agreeable (favorable), disagreeable (contrary)" mark that contact takes hold of is too close to the "favorable-and-beneficial, adverse-and-harmful" mark that feeling takes hold of, and so contact gives rise to feeling most mightily, and feeling alone is singled out.

Lastly, one point to clear up: this thing contact is "really existent," not "conventional" (not a mere empty name with nothing behind it). On what ground is it really existent? Three reasons: first, within the "six sixes" (the six sets of six — the six faculties, six objects, six consciousnesses, six contacts, six feelings, six cravings) it is precisely one "mental factor"; second, it belongs to the "touch-food" among the "four foods" (the four sustenances that uphold body and life); third, it can serve as the condition for feeling and the rest — and just on these three counts, it is as really existent a dharma as feeling and the other mental factors. In other words, contact is a dharma that arises separately upon the three-concurring; it itself is not the same as the "three-concurring."

2. Attention

The second is "attention." Its nature is "to rouse and stir the mind," and its function is "to draw the mind toward the object it has as object-support." Put plainly: this mental factor can rouse and alert "the seed of the mind that is about to arise," give it a pull and lead it on toward the object, and so is called "attention" (stirring the thought up). Though it can also incidentally rouse the other mental factors, since the "mind-king" is the head, it is the head alone that is cited, speaking of "drawing the mind" (citing the head brings the factors along).

〔A divergent view: turning toward and holding fast〕 Someone gives it another reading, saying: attention is "making the mind turn its head toward a different object," or "pinning the mind onto a single object and making it settle," and so is called attention. Both these readings cannot stand. Take just the line "pinning the mind onto a single object": were it really so, attention would not be an "omnipresent" factor (since pinning onto one object happens only on entering concentration, and is not at all the ordinary case, whereas the omnipresent factors are there at all times); and reading it this way, attention would become indistinguishable from "concentration" (pinning the mind one-pointedly and settling it), the two muddled into one and the same.

3. Feeling

The third is "feeling." Its nature is "to receive the marks of the favorable, the contrary, and the neither-favorable-nor-contrary (both-not) object" — that is, to taste whether the object is sweet, bitter, or bland; its function is "to be able to stir up craving" — for the moment it receives, it gives rise to three impulses in turn: with a pleasant feeling, "the wish to draw near"; with a painful feeling, "the wish to get away"; with the bland, "neither drawing near nor getting away."

〔A divergent view: the own-nature feeling is feeling's own mark〕 Someone puts forward a division, saying: feeling is of two kinds — one called "object-feeling" (receiving that outer object it has as object-support), one called "own-nature feeling" (receiving the contact that arises together with it); and only the "own-nature feeling" counts as the mark feeling truly has of its own, while the "object-feeling" is a mark feeling shares in common with others and counts as no distinctive feature of feeling itself (since contact and the rest are all receiving that object too).

This division cannot stand; it is refuted below point by point. First point: feeling simply does not have as object-support "the contact that arises together with it" (the co-temporal contact is not an object feeling has as object-support — so where is this "receiving contact"?). Second point: were you to say "feeling is born modeling itself on contact, resembling contact, and so call it 'receiving contact,'" then by that logic, whatever effect resembles its cause should count as "feeling-nature" (which is of course absurd); besides, since contact is feeling's cause, it ought rather to be called "cause-feeling" — how does it instead come to be called "own-nature feeling"? Third point: were you to say "just as a king collects and uses the taxes of the several prefectures and counties, so feeling can collect the feeling-substance born of contact, and this is called own-nature feeling" — this too does not get through, for it runs squarely against their own thesis that "feeling cannot witness itself" (since feeling cannot have itself as object-support, how could it collect its own feeling-substance?). Fourth point: were you to say "whatever does not throw away its own nature is called own-nature feeling," then no dharma whatever throws away its own nature — would not every dharma then become "feeling's own nature" (which is more absurd still)? So this whole account of theirs is but words to coax an infant, with no real principle to it.

What, then, is the correct account? In fact "object-feeling" is not a mark shared in common with the other mental factors — it is "the receiving of the marks of the favorable, the contrary, and the rest, and this receiving is feeling's own exclusive doing," and so it is called "object-feeling," not shared in common with the others (receiving the marks of the favorable and the contrary is feeling alone doing the receiving; contact and the rest only bind faculty, object, and consciousness together and do not receive this mark).

4. Conception

The fourth is "conception." Its nature is "to take an image upon the object" (capturing the object's likeness, seizing an outline of it), and its function is "to set up various names for it." How does it work? It must first set up the "boundary-mark of the object" (that is, first fix where this thing ends and what it looks like); only with that fixed can it then go on to set up various names for it (first the outline, then, following the outline, the name can be uttered).

5. Volition

The fifth is "volition." Its nature is "to make the mind do and make" (pushing the mind to set to work, to make karma), and its function is "to deploy and drive one's own mind upon good deeds and the rest." How does it work? It first seizes accurately the mark of "what should or should not be done" (the right cause) upon the object, then drives its own mind to do and make good karma and the rest (this business of making karma is led by volition).

To round off these five: since contact, attention, feeling, conception, and volition all are gathered under the "omnipresent," they are necessarily concurrent with the store-consciousness (the ālaya-consciousness); and as to just how the "omnipresent" is omnipresent, that will be expounded at length later. Here one must make clear on what ground they count as "concurrent": these five mental factors and the maturation-consciousness, though their several modes of activity differ (the consciousness handles discerning, feeling handles receiving, each its own task), are yet equal in four respects — first, "time" (arising at one and the same time); second, "basis" (resting on the same faculty); third, "object-support" (having one and the same object as object-support); fourth, "substance" (their own substances matching in number). Just because these four are equal, they are therefore called "concurrent" (matching one another, coming together).

B. The gate of concurrence with the five feelings (equanimity-feeling alone)

This ālaya-consciousness, in its working (mode of activity), is exceedingly unclear and muddy; it cannot tell apart whether what is before it is a "favorable object" or an "adverse object" (that is, it does not know pain, does not know pleasure); it turns subtle and faint, of one taste from start to finish (it is not bitter today and pleasant tomorrow, nor does it mix in joy or sorrow), continuous all along. Just because it is of this character, it is concurrent only with "equanimity-feeling" (that bland feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant).

Look again from another angle: the feeling concurrent with this consciousness is pure "maturation" (that is, true maturation, which requites precisely that "projecting karma" that drew you to take this birth); it turns following "the projecting karma of a former life," not awaiting any present condition to set it off, turning on the sheer momentum left by good and evil karma. So it can only be "equanimity-feeling." What of the two feelings, painful and pleasant? They belong to "maturation-born" (the kind of completing-karma fruit added on top of the maturation-fruit, which arises only on awaiting a present condition), not "true maturation" — and precisely because they cannot show up but on awaiting a present condition, they are not concurrent with this consciousness.

There is a further reason: precisely because this consciousness is ever changeless (not now painful, now pleasant), sentient beings can grasp it without break as "the self within" (the inner self); were it concurrent with the two feelings, painful and pleasant, it would go up and down, rise and fall — and how would a thing that is forever changing ever be taken by anyone as a "constant, uniform self"? So this consciousness is concurrent only with "equanimity-feeling" (just because it does not change, it can bear being deludedly grasped as a self).

〔Q〕Someone is not satisfied: on your account it is matched only with equanimity-feeling, yet it is plainly also a fruit drawn by "evil karma" — should not evil karma draw a painful fruit? How is it that it has instead drawn a neither-painful-nor-pleasant equanimity-feeling? 〔A〕Consider first: everyone grants that "good karma too can draw equanimity-feeling" (good karma need not draw only pleasant feeling); and since good karma can draw equanimity-feeling, evil karma can all the same draw an ālaya bearing equanimity-feeling — there is nothing strange in it. The principle is this: "equanimity-feeling" does not run counter to the two classes, painful and pleasant (equanimity is neutral, and pain or pleasure alike can be gathered up into equanimity) — just as an "indeterminate dharma" (that nature which is neither good nor evil) can be drawn by both good and evil karma alike.

C. The gate of the mental factors' parallel (contact and the rest are likewise so · the gate of the three natures)

1. Not concurrent with the object-specific, the good, or the defiled

〔Q〕Someone asks: why is this consciousness not concurrent with the "object-specific" mental factors (the five — aspiration, resolve, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom — the class that arises only when each has its own respective object)? 〔A〕Because this consciousness's temper is at odds with those five at every turn. Take them one by one and it is clear. "Aspiration" turns by raising a longing toward something liked, but this consciousness turns of itself, naturally, harboring no longing for anything — so it does not keep company with aspiration. "Resolve" turns by biting down hard and not letting go of something settled, but this consciousness is dim and muddled, simply unable to bite down on anything — so it does not keep company with resolve. "Mindfulness" turns only by clearly and distinctly bearing in mind something once practiced and remembered, but this consciousness is dim and feeble and remembers nothing clearly — so it does not keep company with mindfulness. "Concentration" can pin the mind one-pointedly upon a single object, unmoving, but this consciousness turns of itself, naturally, and moment by moment shifts to a different object as object-support (simply cannot settle) — so it does not keep company with concentration. "Wisdom" turns only by picking and choosing, telling right from wrong, upon such things as virtue, but this consciousness is subtle and dim and simply cannot pick and choose — so it does not keep company with wisdom. Since it is at odds with all five at every point, this consciousness is not concurrent with these five object-specific factors.

Further, this consciousness is purely of "maturation" nature (that is, unobstructed-indeterminate, neither hindering the path nor good nor evil), and so the "good" mental factors and the "defiled" mental factors (the afflictions and secondary afflictions) are also not concurrent with it. And what of the indeterminate side among "remorse (that is, regret), torpor, applied thought, sustained thought" (these four)? — though they are indeterminate, they are "intermittent" (not continuous all along), and this settles that they do not count as "maturation" (maturation must be continuous all along, unbroken), so they too are not concurrent with this consciousness.

2. The gate of the three natures — unobstructed-indeterminate

Dharmas fall, in all, into four kinds: good, non-good, obstructed-indeterminate, and unobstructed-indeterminate. Under which kind, then, does the ālaya-consciousness fall? The answer is that it belongs only to "unobstructed-indeterminate" (neither veiling the noble path nor good nor evil), because it is of "maturation" nature. Below are three reasons why it must be unobstructed-indeterminate. First reason: were maturation good or defiled, then "flowing-on (birth-and-death), reverting (nirvāṇa)" — both of these — would fail to be accomplished, for a good nature ought not to flow on into birth-and-death, and a defiled nature ought not to be able to revert and become nirvāṇa. Second reason: this consciousness is the "backing" (basis) of the good and the defiled, and were it itself to become good or defiled, trouble would come — like natures accord, unlike natures clash: leaned to the good side, it would clash with the defiled and could not uphold the defiled; leaned to the defiled side, it would clash with the good and could not uphold the good; in short, it could not be the backing for both good and defiled at once. Third reason: this consciousness is of "perfumable" nature (able to receive perfuming, able to store seeds), and were it itself already good or defiled, it would be like a thing "extremely fragrant" or "extremely foul," its smell fixed dead, so that no other smell could be perfumed into it; and since nothing could be perfumed in and no seeds stored, the cause-and-effect of the defiled and the pure would all fail to be established. Putting these three together, the conclusion is: this consciousness can only be "unobstructed-indeterminate."

Lastly, unpack the name "unobstructed-indeterminate" word by word. What does "obstructed" mean? Just that a defiled dharma can block the noble path, and further can veil the mind and make it foul; this consciousness is not defiled, and so is named "unobstructed" (without the fault of veiling). What does "determinate" mean? Just "able to be marked off and distinguished" — the two dharmas, good and evil, the one drawing a lovable fruit, the other an unlovable fruit, each having its own vivid substance, can be told clearly apart; this consciousness is neither good nor evil (drawing no such lovable or unlovable fruit), and no good-or-evil can be distinguished in it, and so it is named "indeterminate."

3. Contact and the rest are likewise so

What does the verse's line "contact and the rest are likewise so" mean? Just this: since the ālaya-consciousness belongs only to "unobstructed-indeterminate," those five — "contact, attention, feeling, conception, volition" — are along with it likewise unobstructed-indeterminate — for whatever dharmas are concurrent must take their nature from the head (the mind-king being indeterminate, the mental factors too must be indeterminate). And not only is the nature the same; there are several other respects all the same: contact and these five, like the ālaya-consciousness, are also "maturation," their object-support and mode of activity likewise both "unknowable," having as object-support the same "three objects" (seeds, body-with-faculties, receptacle-world), being "five dharmas (the mind-king together with these five omnipresent)" concurrent together, and likewise all "unobstructed-indeterminate" — and it is just on this point-by-point sameness that it is said "contact and the rest are likewise so" (these contact and the rest too are just like the ālaya).

〔A divergent view: contact and the rest are also the all-seeds〕 Here someone stretches "likewise so" too far, saying: contact and these five, like the ālaya-consciousness, are also "maturation," and also "all-seeds" (that is, they too can hold all the seeds), and so on right down, all of it, to being unobstructed-indeterminate — the ground being that these three words "likewise so" make no discount, do not say which respect does not count, and so every respect ought to be just like the ālaya's. This account is wrong.

Why is it wrong? It is plain once refuted point by point below. First point: these mental factors, contact and the rest, "turn following the consciousness and cannot be their own master" — just as the mental factors greed, faith, and the like all cannot receive perfuming, so how could they have the face to hold seeds like the consciousness? (Unable even to receive perfuming, what talk is there of holding seeds.) Second point: grant, for argument, that contact and the rest really could receive perfuming and hold seeds — then would not a single sentient being have "six substances that hold seeds" (the mind-king one, the five mental factors one each)? Were it really so, trouble comes at once — when a present-active fruit arises, from which of the six sets of seeds, after all, is it born? Saying "all six together give birth to it" will not do, for one has never seen "several seeds growing up one sprout in common" (several causes crowding to give birth to one fruit — there is no such principle); saying "the fruit is born from one set only" will not do either, for would not the other five sets then become mere ornaments, set idle with no use? Saying "the six sets give birth to fruit by taking turns" will not do still more, for the perfuming was perfumed in all at once, and the six sets' momenta are equally strong, so no before-and-after order can be laid out among them; and saying "the six fruits spring up all at once" still will not do, for then would not a single sentient being, in one and the same instant, have six eye-consciousnesses and the like leaping up together (which is of course absurd)?

〔Orthodox counter-question〕 In fact no one ever said "contact and the rest can also receive perfuming and hold seeds" (that is the opponent's own addition). 〔Q〕Then someone presses: since contact and the rest cannot hold seeds, why does the treatise then say "contact and the rest are called 'all-seeds' just like the consciousness"? 〔A〕The sense of this is: within the appearance-part of these five mental factors, contact and the rest, there shows "the shadow that resembles seeds" (the resembling-seed mark), and it is just on this that they are said to be called "all-seeds" — for contact and the rest "have as object-support the same objects" as the consciousness (likewise having seeds and the rest, those three objects, as object-support), and even the contact and the rest in the formless realm have an object they have as object-support, and mind and mental factors must always have a "direct object-support condition" (that is, their close-fitting appearance-part). But it must be told apart: this "shadow that resembles seeds" is only an image, and it cannot really serve as a "cause-condition" to give birth to the present-active consciousness and the like (this is a wholly different matter from real seeds giving birth to the present-active); just as "the shadow that resembles the eye-faculty" upon contact's appearance-part is not the eye-faculty the consciousness really rests on, and just as drawing "a shadow that resembles fire" cannot really set a thing alight. So if someone wishes to take this "resembling-seed" to rescue the earlier account of "contact and the rest holding seeds," it cannot be brought back to life — for those "resembling-seed" marks that contact and the rest have as object-support are something to be compared with the consciousness only later, where "appropriation and location" are treated (where what is spoken of is the consciousness transforming into the shadow that resembles the object, not that contact and the rest can really hold seeds).

Gathering up this stretch, the conclusion comes out. First, those three words "all-seeds" in the earlier verse certainly point only to the sense of "able to receive perfuming, able to hold seeds" (a thing only the eighth consciousness is fit for); were it not so read, the root verse would commit the fault of "saying the same thing twice" — for the line "maturation, all-seeds" has already stated the eighth consciousness, and were "contact and the rest are likewise so" to assign the seed-sense to contact and the rest again, would that not be a repeat? Second, the opponent's saying "'likewise so' makes no discount, so every respect is copied straight across wholesale" can serve as no proof at all; for otherwise, are contact and these five then also able to "discern" (which is the consciousness's own task alone)? Are contact and the rest then concurrent with contact and the rest themselves (whoever heard of a thing being concurrent with itself)? These of course cannot stand. It can be seen, then, that "likewise so" is said "with respect to that same part" (taking the small part in which they resemble), and is not to say "every sense is one and the same."

D. The gate of the cause-and-effect simile (constant-yet-turning like a torrent · neither severed nor permanent)

Is the ālaya-consciousness "severed" (does it cut off and perish), or is it "permanent" (forever fixed and changeless)? The answer is: neither severed nor permanent, because it is "constant-yet-turning." These two words must be told apart. First, "constant" — meaning that this consciousness, from beginningless time, is of one taste (one and the same indeterminate nature throughout), continuous all along, never broken off; precisely because it is so steady and unbroken, it is fit to be the foundation by which "realm (the three realms), destiny (the five destinies), birth (the four births)" — all this — can be set up, and it is on its firm-natured strength that the seeds are held fast and not let scatter. Next, "turning" — meaning that this consciousness, from beginningless time, again arises and perishes thought after thought, altering on and on before and after, the former thought perishing and the latter thought at once arising, which shows it to be not forever fixed, nor dead-set as one (not permanent, not one); precisely because it is thus renewed thought by thought, it can be the very ground where the "evolving consciousnesses" (the first seven) perfume and store seeds.

So the word "constant" serves to ward off "severance," and the word "turning" serves to point out "non-permanence." Being thus at once constant and turning, turning and constant, it is just like a "torrent" (a great water rushing on without stop), the principle of cause-and-effect being, of its very nature, just so. Look at the water of a torrent: it is not severed (linked all along, never broken) and not permanent either (the water ahead and the water behind ever renewing), flowing on long and long, sweeping things in and drowning them as it goes; this consciousness is just so, from beginningless time arising-and-perishing on and on, unbroken, neither permanent nor severed, sweeping sentient beings up within it, drowning them, so they cannot get out of birth-and-death.

This simile of the torrent can be carried two layers further. One layer: though a torrent be struck by wind and the like, raising one wave-crest after another, that body of water flows on without stop; this consciousness too is so — though it meet sundry conditions, raising the eye-consciousness and the like (just as wave-crests are raised one after another), it carries on all the same unbroken. The other layer: a torrent sweeps along too the fish, the grass, and such things bobbing up and down in the water, carrying them with it and not letting go; this consciousness too is so, ever turning along together with the inner "habit-energy" (seeds) and the outwardly arising "contact" and such dharmas. Setting the "dharma" (the ālaya) against the "simile" (the torrent) in this way, what it means to point out is just this principle of the consciousness's "cause-and-effect, from beginningless time, being neither severed nor permanent."

Put plainly: the nature of this consciousness, from beginningless time, "effect arising and cause perishing" instant by instant (the former thought as cause, perishing; the latter thought as effect, arising). Because "the effect is ever arising," it is not severed (there is always something behind to take up); because "the cause at once perishes," it is not permanent (the former thought passes the very instant it comes). This being-neither-severed-nor-permanent is precisely the principle of "dependent-arising," and so it is said that this consciousness "is constant-yet-turning like a torrent."

〔Below, the home thesis refutes the other schools' clinging that "past and future are both really existent" (such as the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika), so as to bring out the consciousness-only dependent-arising.〕 〔Q · first someone comes at consciousness-only〕 The opponent first presses: on your consciousness-only account, past and future are both not really existent, so "non-permanence" is of course easy to say (past and future are both substanceless, so of course not permanent); but how does your "non-severance" stand up (with past and future both substanceless, are not the before and after thereby cut apart)? And once it becomes "severance," what talk is there of the right principle of dependent-arising? 〔Consciousness-only turns it back on him〕 Very well, then turn the question on you: you say past and future are really existent, so "non-severance" can of course be granted (with all three times having substance, they link up well enough); but how does your "non-permanence" stand up (with the three times all really existent, is not that being permanently-abiding)? In which case "permanence" too fails to establish the right principle of dependent-arising. 〔Someone worries on consciousness-only's behalf〕 — But does merely picking out the opponent's fault count as establishing one's own principle? 〔A〕It is not to be put that way: unless the crooked principles are first broken, the right principle can hardly come out (breaking the crooked principles is precisely for the sake of bringing out the right).

〔Setting up the consciousness-only account head-on〕 At the very instant "the former cause is perishing," "the latter effect" arises at the same moment — this is like the two ends of a steelyard: one end sinks down, one end tips up, the two events happening at one and the same time. Cause and effect link up just so, one ahead and one behind, joined like flowing water — so where is there any need to borrow that "past and future are really existent" before "non-severance" can be put together? 〔Now turn the question once more on the one who clings to the three times' real existence〕 As for your side — at the time when the "cause" is still present, the latter "effect" has not yet been born, so whose cause is this cause (with no effect, this cause has nothing to match)? And by the time the "effect" is present, the former "cause" has already perished, so whose effect is this effect (with no cause, this effect has nothing to match)? Since you maintain that cause and effect are not at one and the same time, cause and effect simply cannot be matched into a pair; and with no matched pair of cause and effect at all, what talk is there of who can get free of severance and permanence?

〔The opponent shifts to another rescue, saying "cause and effect are there together from the start," and this too must be broken〕 The opponent changes his words: "When there is the cause, the latter effect was already there long since" (that is, cause and effect coexisting all along, at the same time). This too does not get through: since the effect was already there from the start, what does it still wait on the former cause for (the effect need not lean on the cause at all)? And since the sense of the cause's being a cause is gone, whence the sense of the effect's being an effect? With no cause and no effect, again there is no getting free of severance and permanence. 〔Gather up the home thesis〕 On this consciousness-only side, the sense of cause and effect is established only "by the present-active dharma's here-and-now function" (the former thought perishing, the latter arising, the two momenta lending strength to one another); so those earlier challenges, leveled at "the three times' real existence" and "cause and effect there from the start," touch the home school of consciousness-only not at all.

〔Press the "there from the start" account again〕 Since you maintain "the substance is there from the start," then carried right through, the "function" too should be there from the start; and the function being there from the start, the "cause and condition" it waits on should also be there from the start, with no need to arise anew — and on this road of "there from the start" all the way down, everything just sits dead-set, with no function left to speak of. It can be seen, then, that within your account cause and effect surely cannot be established, and so one should after all receive in faith the Mahāyāna's right principle of dependent-arising. What is this right principle? It is deep and marvelous, and again is not a thing words can pin down; the words "cause, effect," and the rest are all "set up for the moment" (conventionally set up). Seeing that a present dharma has the function of "drawing out the dharma to come after," one sets up for the moment a "future effect," and conversely calls this present one "the cause"; seeing that a present dharma has the mark of "requiting the dharma before it," one sets up for the moment a "past cause," and conversely calls this present one "the effect." By "set up for the moment" is meant that all this is the present-active consciousness transforming so as to "seem to have the marks of cause and effect" (cause and effect are in fact all transformed by the consciousness, the names set up for the moment).

Cause and effect put this way, the principle is plain and clear, free of the two extremes of "severance" and "permanence," squarely meeting the middle way; and all who have wisdom should, in accord with this, take it up and train.

〔A remaining school: the one-substance-two-times account〕 Yet another school (one line within the Sautrāntika) comes forward and says: we do not set up past and future as really existent, yet all the same there is the principle of "cause and effect carrying on continuously." How so? A present dharma, fast as it is, can yet be told apart into the two times "before, after" and "arising, perishing" — at the time of arising it requites its cause, at the time of perishing it draws out its effect; the times are two, but the substance is one and the same; the former cause is just perishing, the latter effect is just arising, and though they are two in appearance, both of these "really and truly are." Put this way, cause and effect are not merely set up by a name (not conventionally set up), and again they are free of severance and permanence, and again they dodge that whole pile of challenges leveled at "the three times' real existence" — what man of wisdom would let this go and instead believe your account of "setting up by a name"?

〔Refute him〕 This too is but a string of empty words, with no real principle in it at all. How can you allow "two times (the time of arising, the time of perishing) crammed into one thought"? "Arising" and "perishing" are by nature at odds — how can they crowd together into "the present" at once? If you say "perishing" is the present, then "arising" should be pushed off to "the future" (and the two would no longer be at the same time). Again: only what "is" is called "arising," and it being present, it is; only what "is not" is called "perishing," so should it not be that past which is not? Press from the reverse, and it is the same: if "perishing" is not a not-being, then "arising" should be not a being; yet since "arising" is present and is, "perishing" should be present and is not — and since arising and perishing are thus at odds, how can you say "the substance is one and the same"? Even of such mutually-at-odds dharmas as pain and pleasure, one never sees "one and the same substance." Tightening it up: if arising and perishing are one and the same, the times should not divide into two (what further dividing into time-of-arising, time-of-perishing); if arising and perishing are two, on what ground do you say the substance is the same? So your account, "both the time of arising and the time of perishing are present and are, and both rest on one substance," surely cannot be established.

As for the "cause and effect carrying on continuously" set up by the Sautrāntika masters and the rest, it too fails to be established — for they simply do not admit that there is "an ālaya-consciousness that can hold seeds"; and with no seed-holding substance, the before-and-after cause and effect have nowhere to lodge, so the so-called "carrying-on continuously" cannot link up. Having refuted all these roads, one should turn back and receive in faith the right principle of dependent-arising — "cause and effect carrying on continuously" — that the Mahāyāna teaches.

E. The gate of the stages of subduing-and-severing (relinquished at the arhat stage)

This consciousness, from beginningless time, is "constant-yet-turning like a stream"; up to what stage, then, does it count as having thoroughly "relinquished" this name "ālaya"? Only at the "arhat stage" is it thoroughly relinquished. The meaning is: the moment a noble one severs the "affliction-hindrance" clean and bare, not a trace left, he is named an arhat; at that moment, the "affliction-grossness" within this consciousness (that is, the coarse, heavy habit-residue left by the affliction-seeds) has forever departed, and so it is said to "relinquish" (to relinquish this name ālaya).

The "arhat" spoken of here gathers in together the "stage of the fruit of no-more-training" across the three vehicles (śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva / buddha), and is not the śrāvaka sort of arhat alone. On what ground may all three vehicles' no-more-training [stages] be called arhat? Because the very name "arhat" contains three senses, and all three vehicles' no-more-training are fit for each: first, "slayer of the bandit" — they have all forever rid themselves of the "affliction-bandit"; second, "the worthy of offerings" — they should all receive the world's finest offerings; third, "no-[further]-birth" — they all never again undergo "apportioned birth-and-death" (taking birth and a body in installment after installment).

How is it known that arhat runs through the three vehicles' no-more-training? Two places in scripture and treatise bear witness. The Viniścaya[-saṃgrahaṇī] says: the arhats, the pratyekabuddhas, and the tathāgatas — these three — all "do not accomplish the name of the ālaya-consciousness" (which shows all three have already relinquished the ālaya-name and are all fit to be called arhat). The Abhidharma-samuccaya says again: when the bodhisattvas attain bodhi, they sever at one stroke both the affliction-hindrance and the knowable-hindrance, and so "become arhats, and also become tathāgatas" — which shows the bodhisattva-fruit too is counted within arhat.

〔Q〕Someone seizes on a contradiction and asks: on your account, arhat is reckoned by "the afflictions severed to exhaustion"; then since the bodhisattva's affliction-seeds are not yet severed clean, he is not yet an arhat, and by rights should all still "accomplish the ālaya-consciousness." Yet how does that same Viniścaya[-saṃgrahaṇī] then say "the non-retrogressing bodhisattva too does not accomplish the ālaya-consciousness" — the afflictions not yet severed clean, yet the ālaya-name already relinquished, is this not a self-contradiction?

〔A〕In fact there is no contradiction; the key is which sort the "non-retrogressing bodhisattva" that Viniścaya[-saṃgrahaṇī] speaks of refers to. It refers to the sort who "was already a two-vehicle no-more-trainer, and then turned from the small toward the great, turning to seek the great bodhi" — they severed the affliction-hindrance to exhaustion long since, will surely never again retrogress, never again raise an affliction, and turn single-mindedly toward bodhi, and so are given a new name, "non-retrogressing bodhisattva." This sort of bodhisattva, being himself a two-vehicle no-more-trainer with afflictions already exhausted, does not accomplish the ālaya-consciousness, and is gathered precisely within that earlier "three-vehicle arhat." Seen thus, that treatise-text does not clash with the earlier principle at all — it speaks of "the two-vehicle [adept] who has turned his mind around," and not of the still-afflicted ground-stage bodhisattvas of the ordinary-position who still bear affliction-seeds.

There is another sort of "non-retrogressing bodhisattva" that must also be counted in: namely the bodhisattva of the eighth "immovable stage" and above. Why is he fit to be called non-retrogressing? Because in him no affliction whatever any longer becomes present-active; within that "swift dharma-stream" (the markless dharma-flow) he turns on of itself, naturally, forward; he can raise "the myriad practices" amid "the myriad practices," instant by instant advancing without stop — having reached this point, he is named "non-retrogressing bodhisattva." This sort of bodhisattva — though the affliction-seeds within his maturation-consciousness are not yet severed clean — yet the "view-of-self, love-of-self" and the rest that arise having this consciousness as object-support no longer "grasp-and-store this consciousness as the self within" (that is, the self-grasping of the seventh consciousness is forever subdued and no longer becomes present-active), and just on this he has forever relinquished the name "ālaya," and so it is said he "does not accomplish the ālaya-consciousness"; this too names him "arhat" (said with respect to that side of "having already relinquished the ālaya-name").

〔A divergent view: relinquished from the first stage and above〕 Here again someone draws the line earlier, saying: in fact a bodhisattva from the first stage and above already counts as a "non-retrogressing bodhisattva." He lists a string of reasons: the first-stage bodhisattva has already realized the principle disclosed by the "two emptinesses, of self and of dharmas"; has already gained the two excellent wisdoms, the "root-wisdom and the subsequently-attained wisdom"; has already severed the two hindrances "discriminated self-grasping and discriminated dharma-grasping"; can raise "the myriad practices" amid "a single practice"; and though for the benefit of beings he deliberately raises some afflictions, those afflictions do not truly bring about the faults of affliction (do not bind and defile him) — and on these counts the first-stage bodhisattva too should be called "non-retrogressing." This sort of bodhisattva — though the "innate afflictions" are not yet severed clean — yet the "discriminated view-of-self, love-of-self" and the rest that arise having this consciousness as object-support no longer grasp-and-store it as the self within, and just on this he too has relinquished the name "ālaya," and so it is said he "does not accomplish the ālaya-consciousness"; this too names him "arhat."

〔This first-stage account further hauls in the Abhidharma-samuccaya to prop itself up〕 He cites the Abhidharma-samuccaya's words, saying: the ten-stage bodhisattva, though he has not yet forever severed all afflictions, yet these afflictions are like the poisonous snakes held down by "spell and medicine," unable to stir up a single affliction-calamity; in any of the stages, he is just like an "arhat with afflictions already severed," and so they too are named "arhat."

〔Refute this "relinquished from the first stage" account, and set up the "relinquished only at the immovable stage" orthodox sense〕 This "relinquished from the first stage" in fact cannot stand. Look: a bodhisattva before the seventh stage still bears the "innate view-of-self, love-of-self," and still grasps-and-stores this consciousness as the self within all the same — how then can it be said he "has already relinquished the ālaya-name"? Besides, were you to maintain "the moment the discriminated view-of-self and love-of-self no longer grasp-and-store, that counts as relinquishment," then trouble comes — the noble ones in the training-positions, the "stream-enterer" (srotaāpanna) and the rest, severed their discriminated self-grasping long since, and by your standard they too should have already relinquished the ālaya-name; but to grant this is to clash head-on with the plain text of several treatises (those treatises plainly say: those in the training-positions still have the ālaya).

〔Now block off, too, his move of rescuing himself by hauling in the Abhidharma-samuccaya〕 You cite the Abhidharma-samuccaya meaning to say "the ground-stage bodhisattva's afflictions are kept in check by right knowing and bring about no faults, so they are equal to already-severed"; but this rescues you not. The afflictions a ground-stage bodhisattva raises are all "raised under the watch of right knowing" (not deluded by them, not letting them ripen into calamity), a skill the stream-enterer and the rest simply do not have — how then can you take the Abhidharma-samuccaya's line "like poison held down by spell and medicine" and fit that principle onto "the first-stage bodhisattva having already relinquished the ālaya"? And worse: even granting the afflictions raised within the "sixth consciousness" of a first-to-seventh-stage bodhisattva are watched by right knowing and bring about no faults, his "seventh consciousness," in the contaminated-mind stage, all the same "turns present-active of itself, naturally, grasping-and-storing this consciousness as the self within" — is not this very point equal to those, the stream-enterer and the rest, who "still bear innate self-grasping"? From this it can be seen that the earlier "relinquished from the first stage" account is wrong.

The correct account, then, is this: the arhat severs the "affliction-grossness" within this consciousness clean and bare, no longer grasps-and-stores the ālaya-consciousness as the self within, and so forever loses the name "ālaya" — this is what is called "relinquishment." The crucial thing: what is relinquished is only this "name," and it is not that the whole "substance" of the eighth consciousness is relinquished along with it. Were it otherwise, it would go ill — for then it would amount to "the arhat having no consciousness to hold seeds," and at that very moment he would have to enter "nirvāṇa-without-remainder" (body and mind alike extinguished). But in fact the arhat still in the world lives on still, still holding seeds by the eighth consciousness — which shows the substance of the eighth consciousness has not been relinquished.

〔The eighth consciousness's several names · the times of relinquishment in three positions〕

To turn back, then: though every sentient being has this eighth consciousness, it bears various names according to differing angles. Below, each of these names is listed in turn.

The first batch is the names both ordinary beings and noble ones bear. It is named "mind" — because it is the layer-on-layer accumulation of the seeds perfumed by sundry dharmas ("mind" taking the sense of "accumulation"). It is named "ādāna" (this transliteration just means "appropriating") — because it grasps fast the seeds and the several material faculties, not letting them be destroyed. It is named "basis of the knowable" — because it can serve as the backing for the defiled and the pure, all the "dharmas that are knowable." It is named "seed-consciousness" — because it can hold fast, omnipresently, all the seeds of the worldly and the supraworldly. These several names run through "all stages" (whether ordinary being or noble one, all bear them).

It is named "ālaya" (this transliteration just means "store") — first, because it can take in and store all dharmas of the defiled class so they are not lost; second, because it is grasped-and-stored as the self within by the view-of-self, love-of-self, and the rest. This name is only in the "ordinary being (the unenlightened), the one in training" positions, and not in the "no-more-training position, the non-retrogressing bodhisattva" position — for only the former two still have this sense of "grasping-and-storing the defiled dharmas"; the no-more-trainer and the non-retrogressing bodhisattva grasp-and-store no longer, and so this name is relinquished.

It is named "maturation-consciousness" — because it can requite that good and non-good karma which draws birth-and-death, ripening it into a maturation-fruit. This name is only in the "ordinary being, the two vehicles, and the bodhisattvas still in the causal positions"; in the "tathāgata-stage" it is no longer there — for only the tathāgata-stage no longer has this dharma "maturation-indeterminate" (the buddha-fruit has been transformed into the pure and undefiled, and only when the maturation-fruit is utterly exhausted is this name relinquished).

It is named "undefiled-consciousness" (also transliterated "amala-consciousness") — because it is most utterly pure, the backing of all uncontaminated dharmas. This name is only in the "tathāgata-stage"; the bodhisattva, two-vehicle, and ordinary-being positions, since they all still hold the contaminated seeds and can still receive perfuming, have all not yet realized that "good and pure" eighth consciousness, and so do not bear this name. This is just as a scripture (the Tathāgata-guṇa-alaṃkāra-sūtra) says: the tathāgata's undefiled-consciousness is the pure, uncontaminated realm, liberated from all hindrances, concurrent with the great-perfect-mirror wisdom.

With these several names set out side by side, one can answer a question: why does the verse-text single out "relinquishing the ālaya-name" alone to speak of? Because the name ālaya's fault is the heaviest, and it is also the earliest to be relinquished, so it is purposely taken to speak of. The remaining names each have their own time of relinquishment: the "maturation-consciousness" substance, the bodhisattva relinquishes "when he is about to attain bodhi," and the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha relinquish "when they enter nirvāṇa-without-remaining-basis"; the "undefiled-consciousness" substance, by contrast, "is never relinquished" — for there is no time when the buddha-fruit's benefiting and gladdening of sentient beings is exhausted (the consciousness is there all along). As for the names "mind, ādāna, basis of the knowable, seed-consciousness," these run through all stages (with no special time of relinquishment), and one should understand and speak of them following each one's respective sense.

〔The eighth consciousness in two positions · the twenty-one mental factors〕

Lastly, divide into two phases and make clear which mental factors the eighth consciousness is concurrent with. The eighth consciousness has, in all, two phases. The first is the "contaminated position": in this it belongs to the indeterminate nature, is concurrent only with "the five, contact and the rest," and has as object-support only the objects spoken of earlier, "appropriation and location" (seeds, body-with-faculties, receptacle-world). The second is the "uncontaminated position" (that is, when it is transformed into the great-perfect-mirror wisdom): in this it belongs purely to the "good" nature, and is concurrent with "twenty-one mental factors" — namely the five omnipresent, the five object-specific, and the eleven good — because these twenty-one are ever concurrent with all pure minds. Below, each is explained one by one: why, in the uncontaminated position, even the five object-specific and the eleven good are all complete.

First, how the five object-specific are each, one by one, complete. It has "aspiration" — because the buddha ever delights in taking the realizing-wisdom to contemplate the object contemplated (he has that wish-and-longing). It has "resolve" — because it ever bites down on the object contemplated and does not let go. It has "mindfulness" — because it ever bears in mind, clearly and distinctly, the object once received. It has "concentration" — because the buddha has no unconcentrated mind (never scattered). It has "wisdom" — because it ever discerns clearly all dharmas. The five object-specific are thus all complete. Next, the eleven good mental factors are likewise all complete: because the "utterly-pure faith" and the other good factors are ever concurrent with it; and because it has not a trace of defilement, not a trace of agitation (so non-heedlessness, equanimity-of-mind, and the rest of the good factors are all complete as well) — and thus the eleven good are, each and every one, fully present.

Lastly, the feeling and the object-support of this eighth consciousness in the uncontaminated position. It too is concurrent only with "equanimity-feeling" — because it turns of itself, naturally, at all times, in one even taste (the buddha-fruit being apart from pain and pleasure, forever of one taste). It takes "all dharmas" as the object it has as object-support — because the great-perfect-mirror wisdom can have all dharmas as object-support throughout (which is just where it differs from the contaminated position, which has only those three objects as object-support).

〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verses 2–4 · proving the eighth

〔The verse expounded〕

"First, the ālaya-consciousness, the maturation [consciousness], the all-seeds [consciousness]…" (v2) … "ever turning like a torrent, at the arhat stage it is relinquished." (v4)

A. General statement: scriptural teaching and right principle are the deciding measures

How do we know that the eighth consciousness (the ālaya-consciousness) has a substance of its own apart from the eye-consciousness and the rest of the consciousnesses? We go by two things as our standard: one is "scriptural teaching" (the sūtras the Buddha himself spoke), the other is "right principle" (sound reasoning). Look first at the scriptural side: the Mahāyāna-abhidharma, a sūtra, sets down a verse — "the element from beginningless time, the equal basis of all dharmas; because of this there are the destinies, and the attaining of nirvāṇa." This verse means: from beginningless time there has been this "element" (that is, the eighth consciousness), on which all dharmas alike rest; precisely because there is this consciousness, there is the turning of beings round through the six destinies, and there is also a nirvāṇa to be attained.

The substance of the eighth consciousness is truly too subtle to point out to anyone directly, so one can only display it by means of its "function." The first half of this verse ("the element from beginningless time, the equal basis of all dharmas") displays this consciousness's "cause-and-condition function" (its working as the cause of all dharmas, and as the condition of all dharmas); the second half ("because of this there are the destinies, and the attaining of nirvāṇa") displays the "basing-and-upholding function" (the function of bearing up, of providing a basis) that it performs along the two roads of "flowing-and-turning" (the turning of birth-and-death) and "returning-and-ceasing" (returning, through cultivation, to quiescence).

The word "element" in the verse means "cause," and refers to the "seed-consciousness" (the eighth consciousness, which holds all the seeds) — from beginningless time it continues on without break, directly giving birth to all dharmas, and so is called the "cause." The word "basis" in the verse means "condition," and refers to the "appropriating consciousness" (the eighth consciousness, which appropriates all dharmas) — from beginningless time it serves equally as the support for all dharmas, and so is called the "condition."

This is to say: this consciousness, on the one hand, can appropriate all the seeds (this is its being the "cause"), and on the other hand serves as the support for the dharmas already arisen and active (this is its being the "condition"); so this consciousness both "transforms into them" (manifests the dharmas) and "serves as their basis" (provides the dharmas with support). What is meant by "transforms into them" is that it manifests the receptacle-world (the outer mountains, rivers, and great earth) and the body-with-faculties (this body of ours that has the six faculties); what is meant by "serves as their basis" is that it gives support to the several turning consciousnesses (the first seven).

Because this consciousness can appropriate the five form-faculties (the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body — the five subtle pure-form faculties, that invisible layer of subtle form), the five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness and the rest) turn in dependence on it; and because this consciousness gives support to the manas (the seventh consciousness), the sixth, mind-consciousness, turns in dependence on it — the manas and the mind-consciousness both belonging to the class of "turning consciousnesses." Moreover: just as the eye-consciousness and the rest each rest on their own "concurrent faculty" (the supporting faculty that co-exists with them), the eighth consciousness too, being by principle a "consciousness," likewise takes the seventh consciousness as its "concurrent basis" (the co-existing, mutually-supporting support). The foregoing displays this consciousness's "cause function" and "condition function."

The three words "because of this there are" in the verse say "precisely because there is this consciousness"; the three words "the destinies" say "there come to be good destinies and evil destinies" (beings come to have their good and bad goings-forth). The sense is: precisely because there is this eighth consciousness, it appropriates all the dharmas that go along with flowing-and-turning, and so drives beings to flow and turn endlessly in birth-and-death.

As for flowing-and-turning, in fact all three — affliction (the defilements), karma (deeds), and birth (the fruit of taking birth) — count [as it]; but among these three, "destiny" (the goal of taking birth) is the final fruit, and the fruit is the most weighty, so the verse one-sidedly names just the single word "destiny." Or else one may say: this term "the destinies" can take in both "the one who goes" (the side that heads toward the goal) and "that toward which one goes" (the goal itself headed for), and even the various supports-of-life within those destinies count under the word "destiny." In sum, affliction, karma, and birth all stand up only in dependence on this consciousness — this is the "basing-and-upholding function" this consciousness performs along the road of flowing-and-turning.

The line "and the attaining of nirvāṇa" in the verse says: precisely because there is this consciousness, there is a nirvāṇa to be attained. The sense is: precisely because there is this eighth consciousness, it appropriates all the dharmas that go along with returning-and-ceasing (returning to quiescence), and so enables the practitioner to attain nirvāṇa.

These four words "the attaining of nirvāṇa" admit of three readings: (1) speaking only of the "attaining" path — because nirvāṇa (the quiescence attained) does not itself exist in dependence on this consciousness. (2) Speaking only of the "attained" nirvāṇa — because nirvāṇa is precisely the fruit the practitioner single-mindedly seeks. (3) Speaking of both sides together, nirvāṇa (the attained) and the path (the attaining) — because both these belong to the class of "returning-and-ceasing."

This goes by the third reading: the word "nirvāṇa" displays the "cessation" that gets attained; the word "attaining" below displays the "path" that can attain it — by the path that can sever, one severs the affliction to be severed, and reaching the "stage of ultimate exhaustion" (where the defilements are utterly severed), one attains nirvāṇa. Here the whole set — the path that severs, the affliction severed, and the attaining-and-attained — all stand up only in dependence on this consciousness; this is the "basing-and-upholding function" this consciousness performs along the road of returning-and-ceasing.

To put it from yet another angle: the first line of this verse ("the element from beginningless time") displays that this consciousness's substance has existed constantly from beginningless time; the latter three lines display that this consciousness serves as the support for the two classes of "defiled" and "pure" dharmas — serving both as their "whole" (taken together) support and as their "particular" (taken one by one) support.

What are called the "defiled dharmas" are the truth of suffering and the truth of origination — that is, the "birth" headed toward (the fruit of taking birth) and the "karma and affliction" that head toward it (deeds and defilements). What are called the "pure dharmas" are the truth of cessation and the truth of the path — that is, the "nirvāṇa" attained, and the "path" that can attain it. These two classes of dharmas both exist only in dependence on this consciousness; if someone says they exist in dependence on the turning consciousnesses (the first seven), this will not stand to reason — because the turning consciousnesses intermit, and cannot bear up the load of being this support.

Or yet another reading: the first line displays that this consciousness's substance continues on without break from beginningless time; the latter three lines display that this consciousness serves as the support for the "three natures" — that is, the other-dependent nature (what arises in dependence on the conjunction of conditions), the wholly-imagined nature (what is falsely discriminated and reckoned out), and the perfectly-accomplished nature (the perfectly-accomplished reality), to be understood in just that order. In a word: the several senses set forth in this verse, every one of them, cannot stand apart from the eighth consciousness.

B. The five teachings: the sūtras clearly witness the existence of the eighth consciousness

1. The Mahāyāna-abhidharma sūtra (the gathering-and-storing ālaya verse)

In this very Mahāyāna-abhidharma sūtra, there is also set forth a verse — "because it gathers and stores all dharmas, [it is] the all-seeds consciousness; hence it is named the ālaya, which I disclose to the superior ones." This verse means: because it can gather-and-store all dharmas, and is also that consciousness which holds all the seeds, it is named the "ālaya" (the store); and I (the Buddha) disclose it only to the "superior ones" (those of high capacity).

Because this root-consciousness (the eighth) is replete with all the seeds, it can gather-and-store the various defiled dharmas; and just on this score it is given the name "ālaya." But note: this "gathering-and-storing" of its is a different matter from the way the Sāṃkhya heretics' "root-nature" (the self-nature they posit) transforms into "the great one" and the rest — what the Sāṃkhya teach is one single substance turning all the way through (always one and the same thing changing), whereas here it is not so, because the seed is not one and the same as the fruit it grows into, and because both sides — the dependent (the seed) and the depended-on (the consciousness) — arise and perish. Again, this consciousness "mutually gathers-and-stores" with the defiled dharmas (you store me, I store you), and is also "grasped-and-stored" by beings as a "self" (clung to as one's very self and not let go), and so this consciousness is named the "ālaya" (the store).

The word "superior ones" in the verse admits of two readings: (1) Those bodhisattvas who have already entered the "path of seeing" (the first direct seeing of the truth) and gained "true direct realization" (the truly immediate insight) — these are called "the superior ones"; they can directly realize and understand the ālaya-consciousness, and it is just to them that the World-Honored One discloses it. (2) Or one may say that every bodhisattva is called a "superior one" — for even though, prior to the path of seeing, they cannot yet directly realize the ālaya-consciousness, still they can trust and understand it, and single-mindedly seek "the transformation of the basis" (the turning of the defiled into the pure), and so the Buddha teaches it to them too. In all events, this sense — gathering-and-storing, seeds, being grasped-and-stored — belongs only to the eighth consciousness; the rest, the turning consciousnesses (the first seven), do not have it.

2. The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (the ādāna verse)

The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra also sets forth a verse — "the ādāna-consciousness is most deep and subtle, all its seeds [flowing] like a torrent; I do not expound it to the foolish and ordinary, lest they discriminate and grasp it as a self." This verse means: the ādāna-consciousness is deep and subtle, holding all the seeds, continuing on unbroken like the water of a torrent; and I (the Buddha) do not expound it openly to ordinary folk and to those of shallow capacity, for fear that they should raise discriminations and instead grasp it as a "self."

Because this consciousness can appropriate the seeds of all dharmas, can appropriate the form-faculties and their basis (that is, can bear up the body's faculties), and can take up the "linking-of-birth and continuance" (at the moment of taking birth, joining one life onto the next without a break), this consciousness is named the "ādāna" (the appropriating).

The "natureless beings" (those without the Mahāyāna lineage, with no bond to the Buddha-path) cannot touch the bottom of this consciousness, and so it is called "most deep"; the "quiescence-bound lineage" (the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the two vehicles who seek only their own attaining of quiescence) too cannot penetrate it, and so it is called "most subtle." This consciousness is the true seed of all dharmas; the moment a condition strikes and rouses it, it raises the waves of the turning consciousnesses one after another, while it itself is forever unbroken, just like the water of a torrent.

The word "foolish" [literally "ordinary"] in the verse refers to the natureless beings; the word "ordinary" [literally "foolish"] refers to the quiescence-bound lineage. The Buddha, fearing that they should raise a discrimination toward this consciousness and grasp it as a "self," and thereby fall into the evil destinies and also block the arising of the noble path, accordingly does not expound it openly. Such a mark as this — deep and subtle, with seeds as many as a torrent, and liable to be grasped by people as a self — belongs only to the eighth consciousness.

3. The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (the store-consciousness-ocean verse)

The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra also sets forth a verse — "as the ocean, meeting the condition of the wind, raises manifold waves, their workings turning right before one, with no time of interruption; so too the store-consciousness ocean, struck by the wind of objects and the rest, ever raises the waves of the consciousnesses, their workings turning right before one." This verse draws a comparison: the great ocean, the moment it meets the wind, heaves up manifold waves and at once churns up, not pausing for an instant; the ocean of the store-consciousness is just so — struck by the wind of "objects" and the rest, it ceaselessly heaves up the waves of the consciousnesses one by one, churning up right then and there.

The eye-consciousness and the rest (the first seven) cannot, like the great ocean, raise the waves of the consciousnesses continuously and unbroken — they intermit. Plainly, then, there is separately an eighth consciousness, which is the substance of this "store-consciousness ocean." In this manner, countless Mahāyāna sūtras all speak separately of there being this eighth consciousness.

4. Establishing that the Mahāyāna as a whole is Buddha-spoken (the seven reasons + the Sūtrālaṃkāra verse)

〔This passage first sets out to prove that the Mahāyāna sūtras really are Buddha-spoken, so that the Mahāyāna sūtras cited above may stand firm and may serve as warrant.〕 These Mahāyāna sūtras have several traits in common: they all conform to "no-self" and run counter to the "number-taker-of-destinies" (that is, the personal self, the "self" that takes birth and retribution again and again); they all bid one turn one's back on the flowing-and-turning of birth-and-death and head toward returning to quiescence; they all praise the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha — the Three Jewels — and rebuke the various heretics; they all display the dharmas such as the five aggregates as they truly are, and ward off the heretics' false reckonings such as the "root-nature" (the self-nature the Sāṃkhya teach). Whoever delights in the Mahāyāna admits that the Mahāyāna sūtras can display the principle that is without inversion; and since they too belong under "sūtra" (the Buddha-spoken scripture-basket), they are, just like the Ekottara-āgama and the rest, subsumed under "the measure of authoritative teaching" (that is, the measure of the sacred word, that reliable warrant which is the sacred word of the Buddha).

Further, the holy Maitreya (that is, Maitreya Bodhisattva) uses seven kinds of reason to prove that the Mahāyāna sūtras truly are Buddha-spoken:

(1) The Buddha did not foretell it beforehand (not foretold beforehand): Suppose the Mahāyāna sūtras were something that, after the Buddha's passing, others had composed in order to wreck the true Dharma. Then why did the World-Honored One not foretell this beforehand, just as he foretold the other "fearful things that would arise in time to come"? — Since the Buddha gave no advance warning at all that such counterfeit sūtras would crop up, plainly the Mahāyāna sūtras are not a later forgery.

(2) Both ran together from the start (proceeding together from the start): The teachings of the Mahāyāna and of the Hīnayāna circulated together in the world from the very start. That being so, on what ground does one single out the Mahāyāna alone and judge it not Buddha-spoken?

(3) Not a field others could reach (not the field of others' practice): What the Mahāyāna teaches is vast and most deep, plainly not a field those heretics could conceive of; in the heretics' own sūtras and treatises such a doctrine was never set forth, and even were you to teach it to them, they could not accept it. Since this doctrine is not one the heretics could have produced, one cannot say the Mahāyāna sūtras "are not Buddha-spoken."

(4) It is, if anything, thoroughly proved (thoroughly established): Even if someone says the Mahāyāna was spoken by "some other Buddha" and is not the word of "the present Buddha (Śākyamuni)" — that is no objection, for it is, after all, still spoken by a "Buddha"; and thus the doctrine "the Mahāyāna is Buddha-spoken" is, if anything, firmly proved and can never be overturned.

(5) Pressing from both "there is a Mahāyāna" and "there is none" (existent-or-non-existent): This reason presses from two sides. First the side "there is a Mahāyāna": if one grants that there really is this Mahāyāna path to buddhahood, then one ought to believe these Mahāyāna teachings are Buddha-spoken — because apart from the Mahāyāna teaching this Mahāyāna path is simply nowhere to be found. Next the side "there is no Mahāyāna": if one says there is no Mahāyāna at all, then even the śrāvaka-vehicle teaching ought to fail to exist along with it — for apart from the Mahāyāna there is absolutely no such thing as "becoming a Buddha," and if no Buddha came forth, then who appeared in the world to teach the śrāvaka-vehicle? Yet the śrāvaka-vehicle was plainly spoken by a Buddha (come forth into the world), which proves conversely that to say "the Mahāyāna teaching is not Buddha-spoken" simply does not fit reason.

(6) It really counteracts the defilements (counteracting): Those who diligently cultivate in dependence on the Mahāyāna sūtras can all draw forth "non-discriminating wisdom" (the wisdom apart from all discrimination) and truly counteract all the defilements; and since it has so real and tested an effect, one ought to believe the Mahāyāna is Buddha-spoken.

(7) The meaning lies beyond the literal (differing from the literal): What the Mahāyāna teaches has a most deep intent; its real meaning is not to be grasped just by following the letter (beneath the letter there is a further depth); one must not, just because one cannot understand it oneself, turn round and slander it, saying it is not Buddha-spoken. By the seven reasons above, plainly the Mahāyāna truly is Buddha-spoken.

The Sūtrālaṃkāra sums up these seven in a single verse — "because: not foretold beforehand · proceeding together · not the field of others' practice · thoroughly established · existent-or-non-existent · counteracting · differing from the literal." This verse simply lays out, item by item in verse, the seven reasons given above.

5. The hidden intent of the other schools: the four āgamas covertly teach the ālaya

Not the Mahāyāna alone — even the sūtras of the [Hīnayāna] schools (the various other schools) speak, by way of "hidden intent," of the ālaya-consciousness as having a substance of its own. "Hidden intent" means: not naming it openly, but speaking of it covertly under some other name. First the Mahāsāṃghika: in their āgama they covertly name this consciousness the "root-consciousness," because it is the support of the eye-consciousness and the rest — just as a tree-root is the root of the trunk and branches; whereas the eye-consciousness and the rest do not themselves have the capacity of "being the root that is depended on." Plainly, then, they pointed separately to a consciousness that is the root — namely the eighth consciousness.

Next the Sthavira: their sūtras, and the Vibhajyavādin masters too, both covertly name this consciousness the "existence-factor consciousness." Unpacking the name — "existence" refers to the three existences (the desire, form, and formless realms, the three tiers of the world of birth-and-death), and "factor" means "cause"; it is so named because this consciousness alone is both constant and pervading, and can be the cause of the three existences. Plainly, then, the "existence-factor consciousness" they set up is likewise the eighth consciousness.

Next the Mahīśāsaka: they name this consciousness the "aggregate that runs to the end of birth-and-death" (the aggregate that holds out all the way to the very end of birth-and-death) — for apart from the eighth consciousness one can find no other aggregate that can "hold out all the way to the very end of birth-and-death, never breaking in between." Going through them one by one makes it plain: in the formless realm, the various form-dharmas are cut off (there is no form); in places like the no-conception heaven, the rest of mind and the mental factors too are extinguished (there is no mind); as for the non-concurrent formations, apart from form and mind they have no substance of their own (this much has long been commonly conceded). Form, mind, and the non-concurrent formations all fail to hold up; so this consciousness alone deserves to be called the "aggregate that runs to the end of birth-and-death" — which is just the eighth consciousness.

Next the Sarvāstivāda: in their Ekottara-āgama they too covertly name this consciousness the "ālaya," in the four phrases "loving the ālaya, delighting in the ālaya, taking pleasure in the ālaya, rejoicing in the ālaya." Why set up these four names? Because the ālaya-consciousness is precisely the object that "craving" refers to — it is referred to both by "whole-reference" (referring to it as a whole) and by "particular-reference" (referring to it segment by segment), the reference being to the three times, past, present, and future; and so, going by this, the four names — loving, delighting, taking pleasure, rejoicing — were set up.

Beings grasp this consciousness as a real "inner self" (the self within), and so long as this attachment is not severed, they ceaselessly give rise to loving-attachment toward it; hence the ālaya-consciousness is the "true place of loving attachment" (the place beings truly love and cling to with their lives). One ought not to take "the rest, the five appropriating aggregates," and the like, as the true place of loving attachment — the reasons follow, one by one:

(1) Beings born in a "place of unrelieved painful feeling" (such as the hells, those places with only pain and no pleasure) give rise to no loving-attachment toward the rest of the five appropriating aggregates at all; on the contrary, they constantly loathe and recoil from these five appropriating aggregates, thinking moment by moment, "When shall I be rid of this life, rid of this lot-and-station, rid of this suffering body-and-mind, so that I may enjoy pleasure freely?" — Plainly, then, toward the rest of the aggregates they have only loathing; so those aggregates are not the true place of loving attachment.

(2) "The five desires" (the five sensual pleasures — sight, sound, smell, taste, touch) too are not the true place of loving attachment — one who has already left desire (that is, one who has severed desire-realm craving), though he no longer craves and clings to those five fine pleasures, still loves the "self." Plainly, then, this loving-of-self does not rest on the five desires. (3) "Pleasant feeling" (the feeling of pleasure) too is not the true place of loving attachment — one who has already severed the craving of the third meditative absorption (pleasant feeling reaches only as far as the third absorption, and above that there is none of it), though he has left even pleasant feeling behind, still loves the "self."

(4) "The view of the body" (the view that grasps body-and-mind as a self) too is not the true place of loving attachment — take, say, the person who has not yet reached the no-more-learning stage but can already trust-and-understand no-self: he no longer craves and clings to "the view of the body" (that is, the view of the perishable composite, which grasps the five aggregates as a self), yet he still gives rise to love toward "the self within." (5) "The turning consciousnesses" (the first seven) and the like too are not the true place of loving attachment — take, say, the person who has not yet reached the no-more-learning stage but single-mindedly wishes to extinguish the mind (such as one cultivating the cessation-attainment): he has left even the turning consciousnesses behind, yet he still loves the "self."

(6) "The form-body" (this body of form) too is not the true place of loving attachment — one who has already severed form-realm craving, though he has left even the form-body behind, still loves the "self." (7) "The non-concurrent formations" (that class of dharma which belongs neither to form nor to mind), since apart from form and mind they have no substance of their own, are likewise not the true place of loving attachment.

To sum up: when the ordinary being and the one in the stage of learning arouse "self-love," toward the rest of those aggregates they sometimes love, sometimes do not — it is not fixed; but toward this eighth consciousness, "self-love" definitely arises. So this consciousness alone is the true place of loving attachment. By this it is plain that the "ālaya" the Sarvāstivāda speak of refers, for certain, to just this ālaya-consciousness (the eighth). — With this the scriptural side has been cited in full (the five teachings end here); below, the side of right principle (that is, the ten reasons) is to be displayed.

C. The ten principles: right principle displays the existence of the eighth consciousness

Reason 1. The proof from upholding the seeds (a mind able to uphold the seeds must exist separately)

A sūtra says: "That which gathers up and from which arise the seeds of all defiled and pure dharmas — this is named the 'mind.'" — But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "mind able to appropriate the seeds" would not stand to exist.

Why can the turning consciousnesses (the first seven) not bear the load of appropriating the seeds? For several reasons: first, these turning consciousnesses intermit in the cessation-attainment and the like (once cut off, they cannot be joined back on); second, they arise and cease now this way, now that, varying without fixity according to differences of faculty, object, attention, good-or-evil, and so on; third, they are like a lightning-flash that cannot be held, cannot stand firm. Just on this account, the turning consciousnesses can neither receive perfuming nor uphold the seeds, and are simply not the "mind that gathers up and from which arise the defiled and pure seeds" spoken of in the sūtra.

Only this eighth consciousness is "of one kind, continuing on, forever unbroken" — like sesame (jùshèng, which can be used to take in fragrance), it stands firm and so can receive perfuming. This precisely answers to the sūtra's sense of "the mind that gathers up the seeds and from which they arise, and is therefore named the mind." Plainly, then, the mind that gathers them up is the eighth consciousness.

If one refuses to grant that there is such a "mind able to appropriate the seeds," then one runs counter not only to the sūtras but also to reason. How so? The defiled and pure dharmas we arouse, if they had no place to be perfumed, could not be perfumed into seeds; and being unperfumed into seeds, those once-arisen dharmas would be "spent for nothing" (they arose for a moment, left behind no seed, and nothing can carry on from them). Again, since at the time the defiled and pure dharmas arise there would be no cause (no seed serving as cause), it would come to the same thing as the heretics' "arising spontaneously without a cause" (with no cause, things popping up out of nowhere).

Perhaps someone says: then could one not take "form-dharmas" or "the non-concurrent formations" to appropriate the seeds? That too fails. Form-dharmas and the non-concurrent formations are not of mind-nature; like sound or light, they cannot, by reason, be perfumed by the "defiled and pure inner dharmas," so how could they uphold the seeds? Again, the non-concurrent formations, apart from consciousness, have no real substance of their own — how could one forcibly take them to be the support of the "inner seeds" (the inner seeds)?

As for the various mental factors associated with the turning consciousnesses, their faults are just like those of the turning consciousnesses — they intermit, easily arise-and-cease, are not masters of themselves, and are not that constant, uniform mind-nature — and so they can neither uphold the seeds nor receive perfuming. Following the chain of reasoning all the way through, plainly that "mind able to appropriate the seeds" must, by reason, exist separately — namely the eighth consciousness.

〔Refuting: the view that the six consciousnesses' "kind" receives perfuming〕

〔One view · the "kind" of the six consciousnesses can receive perfuming〕 One faction holds: the six consciousnesses, from beginningless time, in dependence on faculty, object, and so on, pass through many phases one after another; the "event" (that is, each particular present activity) keeps changing, yet the "kind" (that uninterrupted strand of one and the same class) does not change. They say that it is just this "kind" that receives perfuming and appropriates the seeds; with it, defiled-and-pure cause-and-effect all stand up, so why must one separately insist that there is an eighth consciousness?

〔A〕 This will not stand. Why? This "kind" is either really existent or conventionally existent, and both roads are blocked off: if one says this "kind" is really and truly existent, then one is on the same footing as the heretics (who too set up a permanent, single "kind"); and if one says this "kind" is merely conventional, then it has no real "preponderant function," and so it cannot uphold "the real seeds of the inner dharmas" — for a conventional thing cannot bear up real seeds.

Again, to press further: this "consciousness-kind" you speak of — under which nature does it fall? Here too there are two roads, neither of them passable. (a) If it is of good nature or evil nature, then it ought not to receive perfuming — because whatever is "determinate" (marked as good or evil) cannot receive perfuming, just like cessation-through-discrimination (an unconditioned dharma). (b) If it is of indeterminate nature, then there is trouble: when a good mind or an evil mind is actually arising, there is no indeterminate mind present — so would not this "kind" then be cut off? And you cannot say "the event is good or evil, but the kind is indeterminate" — for each particular "kind" must be of one nature with its own particular "event": if the event is good, its kind must be good too; if the event is evil, its kind must be evil too.

Again, in the no-mind stage (such as the cessation-attainment), this "kind" is certainly absent; since it intermits and cannot stand firm, how could one hold that it upholds the seeds and receives perfuming? And one further point: the mind of an arhat and the mind of an ordinary being have the same "consciousness-kind"; carry through your account that "same kind means they can perfume each other," and then the ordinary being's defiled dharmas ought to be able to perfume the arhat, and the arhat's uncontaminated dharmas ought to be able to perfume the ordinary being — and to grant this would be a great fault (the defiled and the pure all jumbled into confusion).

And another point: the eye-faculty and the rest, or the rest of the various dharmas, are also of the same "kind" as the eye-consciousness and the rest, whether in "faculty" or in "dharma"; carry through your principle that "same kind means they can perfume each other," and they too ought to perfume each other — yet this very point you yourself refuse to grant. Plainly, then, the view that "the consciousness-kind receives perfuming" cannot stand, and one ought not to cling to it.

And another point: the six consciousnesses, taken either as their "event" or as their "kind," do not have their prior moment and their later moment co-existing (the prior moment ceases, only then does the later moment arise); this is like two things "separated by a moment," which cannot perfume each other — for the perfumer and the perfumed must both be on hand at the same time. Granting even, for argument's sake, that someone holds "only the six consciousnesses, and that the six consciousnesses can turn all at the same time," still, by the reasons given above, since the six consciousnesses are not something able to receive perfuming, they likewise have no power of appropriating the seeds.

〔Refuting: the view that form and mind, succeeding one another without a gap, serve as each other's seeds〕

〔Another position · form and mind serve as their own seeds, one moment onto the next〕 Again, some maintain: form, within its own class of form, [proceeds] "one moment onto the next without a gap," and mind, within its own class of mind, is likewise; the prior moment serves as the seed of the later moment, and so cause-and-effect too stands up — so the foregoing (the proof from upholding the seeds), brought forward as warrant, does not establish anything. 〔A〕 This position is unreasonable, for it has no "perfuming" at all: since within its own class there is no perfuming (no such thing as receiving perfuming), how could one hold that "the prior moment is the seed of the later moment"?

Again, if "the prior moment serves as the seed of the later moment," then whatever is cut off in between ought never to arise again — but this lands you in trouble: the two-vehicle no-more-learner (before he enters nirvāṇa-without-remainder), if his form-and-mind at the instant of death is, as you say, to serve as the seed of the aggregates of the next life, then after his death he ought to have no later aggregates (the body-and-mind of a next life); yet the two-vehicle one, before he has entered nirvāṇa-without-remainder, plainly still has later aggregates — which clashes with your account. Nor should one maintain that form and mind, turning about, serve as each other's seeds to give birth — for the turning consciousnesses, form, and the rest are not able to receive perfuming, as has been said above.

〔Refuting: the view that the three times are really existent, so no seed-upholding consciousness is needed〕

〔Another faction · the three times are all really existent〕 Again, one faction (this is the Sarvāstivāda position) says: the various dharmas of the three times — past, present, and future — are all really and truly existent, so cause-and-effect joins up and is established of itself, and why trouble to insist that there is a "consciousness able to appropriate the seeds"? As for the sūtra's saying "the mind is the seed," that is merely because, when the mind arouses the defiled and pure dharmas, its force is preponderant (so the mind is one-sidedly named, and it is not that there is some separate seed-upholding consciousness).

〔A〕 This will not stand: the past and the future are neither permanent nor present, just like a flower [seen] in empty space (a sky-flower) — they are simply not really existent; moreover they can exert no function, so one cannot forcibly take them to be "cause-and-condition." Therefore, if there were no "consciousness able to appropriate the defiled and pure seeds," then all cause-and-effect would fail to stand up.

〔Refuting: the view that the emptiness-principle of dispelling-marks denies this consciousness〕

〔Another position · taking the "emptiness-principle of dispelling-marks" as the ultimate〕 Again, some maintain: the Mahāyāna's "dispelling-marks" (sweeping away all marks) emptiness-principle is the most ultimate; relying on a "specious inference" (one that looks correct but is in fact fallacious), they wipe out this consciousness, indeed wipe out all dharmas — and by this wiping-out they especially run afoul of the sūtras cited above. They grasp the practice-fruits — knowledge, severance, realization, cultivation — as well as defiled and pure cause-and-effect, all as "not really existent," and this becomes a great wrong view.

〔A〕 This position is even worse than the heretics'. The heretics, in slandering defiled and pure cause-and-effect, still did not say it was "wholly nothing"; they only said it was "not really existent" — and this position is on a par with the heretics, and goes further still. Just think: if no dharma were really existent, then the bodhisattva ought not, for the sake of leaving birth-and-death, to toil and labor at gathering the provisions of awakening — for what wise person, to drive off "an illusory foe," would go seeking "a barren woman's son" (a thing that simply does not exist) to make up his troops?

Therefore one ought to believe that there really is a "mind able to appropriate the seeds," in dependence on which defiled and pure cause-and-effect are established — and this mind is precisely this eighth consciousness. (Here the reason from upholding the seeds is concluded.)

Reason 2. The proof from maturation (a true maturation-mind must exist separately)

A sūtra says further that there is a "maturation-mind" (the retribution-mind called forth by the ripening of past karma), which is called forth by good karma and evil karma — but if there were no this eighth consciousness, that maturation-mind would not stand to exist.

Why can the turning consciousnesses not be the maturation-mind? The eye-consciousness and the rest intermit, and moreover are not at all times the fruit of karma (sometimes when they arise it is not karma that has called them forth); like a lightning-flash, they are unstable and break off, so they are not the true maturation-mind. Note that a true maturation ought not to "break off and then join back on" — look at the maturation-fruit of the sort that is the life-faculty: there is never any such thing as "breaking off and then continuing." Plainly, then, maturation must continue on without break, and the turning consciousnesses cannot bear this.

Among the six consciousnesses, eye-consciousness and the rest, those called forth by karma are like sound (arising only when a condition meets them), not continuing on constantly, and so they are at most "maturation-born" (born from maturation), and do not count as "true maturation." So one must grant that there is a "true maturation-mind" — which requites the "impelling karma" (that is, the karma that calls forth the total retribution and settles the broad direction of a whole lifetime), pervading all and never intermitting, able to manifest the body (the body-with-faculties) and the receptacle (the receptacle-world) to serve as the basis for beings; for if the body and the receptacle were apart from a mind, by reason they could not arise — plainly, then, there must be a mind able to manifest them.

The non-concurrent formations have no real substance and cannot manifest the body and the receptacle; and the turning consciousnesses are not always present, and cannot constantly manifest the body and the receptacle. That being so, if there were no this true maturation-mind, then who, pray, would manifest the body and the receptacle? And in dependence on what dharma could the continuity of beings' lives be "constantly" borne up?

Again, whether in concentration or out of concentration, whether at times of particular cogitation or of no cogitation, by reason there arise many "bodily feelings" (the various sensations in the body). If these bodily feelings did not arise, then afterward one ought not to feel any ease or weariness in the body (ease and weariness are precisely the fruit borne out by bodily feeling). But if there were no constantly-present true maturation-mind, then at those times (of no cogitation, and so on) how could there be such bodily feeling?

Here a word must be added to forestall misunderstanding: it is not that the Buddha too has a true maturation present when he arouses other good minds and the like — note that wherever it is said above that "bodily feeling arises, maturation arises," the reference is to "beings other than the Buddha" (the Buddha already has no maturation, and so is not in this example). By this it is known that there really is, constantly, a true maturation-mind, and this mind is precisely this eighth consciousness.

Reason 3. The proof from the substance of destiny-and-birth (the truly real destiny-and-birth is only the maturation-mind)

A sūtra says further: beings flow and turn through the five destinies (the five goings-forth: the gods, humans, animals, hungry ghosts, and hells) and the four births (the four modes of birth: womb-born, egg-born, moisture-born, transformation-born). But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "substance of destiny-and-birth" would not stand to exist.

How is this to be judged? Only a dharma that is "really existent, constant, pervading, and unmixed" deserves to be the substance of the "truly real destiny-and-birth." If it is not a maturation-dharma, then its destiny-and-birth will be mixed and confused — for while one abides in this destiny, this birth, one can still arouse the dharmas of another destiny, another birth (just as, while in the human destiny, one can arouse the kind of good mind that belongs to the heavens); this is impure, and so does not count as truly real destiny-and-birth.

Checking against this standard one by one: (1) the various maturation form-dharmas, and those among the five consciousnesses that are called forth by karma, are not "pervading" of destiny-and-birth — because in the formless realm form and the five consciousnesses are wholly absent. (2) The various inborn goods, and those among the mind-consciousness that are called forth by karma, though they are "pervading" of destiny-and-birth and arise unmixed, are nonetheless "not always present" (they intermit). (3) And the non-concurrent formations have no real substance. — None of these can serve as the truly real destiny-and-birth.

Only the maturation-mind, together with the mental factors associated with it, is "really existent, constant, pervading, and unmixed," and so can serve as the truly real destiny-and-birth. If there were no this mind, then when someone born in the formless realm arouses a good mind (at that time there is no form, no five consciousnesses, and the inborn good is moreover not always present), would he not then turn out to be "neither destiny nor birth"? — and this lands one in trouble.

Even if you take a step back and broaden "destiny-and-birth" to take in all the contaminated dharmas (hoping by this to patch up the previous hole), that still cannot save you: for when someone born in the formless realm arouses an uncontaminated mind, he still turns out to be "neither destiny nor birth" (the uncontaminated is not subsumed under the contaminated), and this again clashes with reason. So as both to avoid the previous fault and to avoid this fault, only the "maturation-dharma" is the truly real destiny-and-birth.

By this one matter becomes plain: the Tathāgata is not subsumed under "destiny-and-birth" — because the Buddha already has no maturation-indeterminate dharma; the Tathāgata is also not subsumed under "the realm" (the three realms) — because the Buddha is no longer contaminated, the World-Honored One having long since cast off both the truth of suffering and the truth of origination, and the seeds of all conceptual proliferation having all been forever severed.

Since the truly real destiny-and-birth can only be the maturation-mind and its mental factors, and this mind and these mental factors cannot, by reason, stand apart from the eighth consciousness, it is therefore known that there is separately this eighth consciousness.

Reason 4. The proof from appropriation (appropriating the form-faculties is only the maturation-mind)

A sūtra says further: a body with form-faculties (that is, this body equipped with the five form-faculties) is "appropriated" — meaning it is appropriated and received by a mind, and so has sensation, can feel pain and itch. But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "[mind] able to appropriate" would not stand to exist.

This is to say: the five form-faculties and their basis are appropriated only in the "present world" (in the past and future they are not appropriated), and this can come about only if "there is a mind able to appropriate." This mind able to appropriate can only be the maturation-mind — it is drawn forth by past karma, is itself neither good nor defiled, and appropriates this body-with-form-faculties in a manner that is "of one kind, able to pervade, and continuous"; the eye-consciousness and the rest of the turning consciousnesses have no such capacity.

Here a fine point must be made clear: the sense of this passage is only to display that the eye-consciousness and the rest of the turning consciousnesses all lack the capacity to appropriate one's own body-with-form-faculties in a manner "of one kind, able to pervade, and continuous"; it is not to say that "whatever can appropriate must be only the maturation-mind." — Why draw this distinction? Because if one said so across the board, then the Buddha's form-body, having no maturation, would turn out to be appropriated by no one — and that will not do. So one should understand that what is meant here is in fact that "what can appropriate a 'contaminated' form-body is only the maturation-mind"; this is its real intent.

Below, the turning consciousnesses are refuted one by one: (1) the turning consciousnesses all "arise upon a present condition" (they arise only when an object is present before them), like sound or wind, and so cannot appropriate continuously. (2) Among the turning consciousnesses, those that are good or defiled are "not drawn forth by karma," like cessation-not-through-discrimination (an unconditioned dharma, which has no link to karma), and so they too do not appropriate. (3) Among the turning consciousnesses, those that are "maturation-born" are moreover "not true maturation, cannot pervade as a basis, and are not continuous," like a lightning-flash — and these several kinds all cannot appropriate the contaminated form-body.

One further word to add: whenever one speaks of "mind" or "consciousness," one in fact also takes in the "mental factors" associated with it (for a mind-king must have mental factors associated with it — just as the term "consciousness-only" in fact takes in the mental factors). Again, the form-faculties and the non-concurrent formations cannot appropriate the body-with-form-faculties — because they "have no object-support" (no object referred to), like empty space. Therefore there must be separately a "mind able to appropriate," and this mind is precisely this eighth consciousness.

Reason 5. The proof from life-warmth and consciousness (the consciousness that upholds life and warmth is only the maturation-consciousness)

A sūtra says further: the three — life (the lifespan), warmth (body-heat), and consciousness — mutually rest on and uphold one another, and so get to abide on in succession (a person stays alive). But if there were no this eighth consciousness to uphold life and warmth, that "consciousness able to make life and warmth long-abide" would not stand to exist.

This is to say: the turning consciousnesses "intermit and vary," like sound or wind, and have no constant upholding function, and so cannot be set up as the "consciousness that upholds life and warmth." Only the maturation-consciousness "neither intermits nor varies," just like life and warmth (which too continue on constant and uniform), and has a constant upholding function, and so can be set up as the consciousness that upholds life and warmth.

〔Q〕 Someone asks: the sūtra says these three "mutually uphold one another," yet life and warmth both continue on of one kind without break, while only "consciousness" is not so (if "consciousness" here means the turning consciousness, then it intermits) — would this not then fail to fit reason (with one of the three breaking off, how can they uphold one another)? 〔A · turning the question back〕 Do you not yourself grant that "only warmth does not pervade the three realms" (in the formless realm there is no warmth)? That point does not in the least hinder the account of the three dharmas upholding one another; on what ground, then, do you forbid me to say "consciousness too may, all on its own, intermit and vary"? 〔Further answer〕 Be that as it may, this counter-question in fact poses no real refutation of the foregoing reason —

How so? In any place where "all three — life, warmth, and consciousness — are present and all turn without intermission," there these three can be said to uphold one another constantly; lacking the condition "without intermission," there is no constant mutual upholding. The foregoing passage, on just this principle, points out that the "consciousness" spoken of among the three dharmas is not the turning consciousness (for the turning consciousness intermits, and so has no constant upholding power). As for your refutation by "warmth does not pervade the three realms," that in fact cannot wreck this principle — for "whether warmth pervades the three realms" is one matter, and "consciousness must uphold constantly" is another; the two matters are not to be confounded. So what was said above stands firm in reason.

Again, among the three dharmas, since life and warmth are both only contaminated, plainly the "consciousness" that upholds-and-rests-on them along with them must, like life and warmth, certainly be not uncontaminated (an uncontaminated consciousness cannot uphold contaminated life and warmth). The question then arises: when someone born in the formless realm arouses an uncontaminated mind, which consciousness is upholding his life? (At that time, were the turning consciousness to become uncontaminated, it could not uphold life and warmth, and so there must be separately some other consciousness.) By this it is known that there really is a "maturation-consciousness," of one kind, constant, and pervading, able to uphold life and warmth — and this consciousness is precisely this eighth consciousness.

〔Verses commented〕Continuing: unfolding verses 2–4 · proving the eighth · the latter five reasons

Reason 6. The proof from the mind of birth-and-death (the mind at birth and death is only the maturation-consciousness)

A sūtra says further: the kinds of beings, at the time of taking birth (entering the womb) and of ending life (dying), are certainly abiding in a "distracted mind" (a scattered mind, not in concentration), and not in a "no-mind concentration." But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that mind at the instant of birth and death would not stand to exist.

This is to say: at the instant of birth or death, body and mind are dim and dull, just as in dreamless sleep or in a dead faint, and that clear, distinct turning consciousness certainly cannot arise. Moreover, at this (birth-and-death) time, the "appearance" (the manner of operation) and the "object-support" (the object referred to) of the six kinds of turning consciousnesses cannot be made out (cannot be told apart), and so, just as in the no-mind stage, the six turning consciousnesses certainly do not operate.

The "appearance" and "object-support" of the six kinds of turning consciousnesses are "certainly able to be made out" — because at other times (in ordinary waking moments) they can be made out. Plainly, then, the mind at the instant of birth-and-death whose appearance cannot be made out is simply not the turning consciousness. Only the true maturation-consciousness is so utterly subtle that both its appearance and its object-support cannot be made out; it is the fruit of "impelling karma" (the karma that draws forth the total retribution), continuing on for a whole lifetime, ever unchanging; it is "distracted, a mind present" (not a no-mind concentration), and this is what is called the "mind of birth-and-death" — and put this way it does not clash with reason.

〔A side refutation: the view that the mind-consciousness is the mind of birth-and-death〕

〔One faction · at the time of taking birth there is no mind-consciousness〕 One faction holds: the five consciousnesses are certainly absent at this (birth-taking) time; and the mind-consciousness, to grasp an object, must rely on one of the three — being drawn by the five consciousnesses, being taught by another, or the power of concentration — yet at the instant of taking birth none of these three can be found, so at birth-taking the mind-consciousness too is absent. 〔A〕 If one says so (that the mind-consciousness can arise only by relying on these three), then trouble follows: a being born in the formless realm ought then never again to have a mind-consciousness arise — because the concentrated mind of the formless realm must be drawn by a "distracted mind-consciousness," yet in that realm the five consciousnesses and the teaching of another are certainly both absent, and so the distracted mind that could draw forth concentration would have no way to arise. This plainly will not do.

〔The opponent again rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: the concentrated mind of the formless realm, by the "power of habituation" (the force built up from long practice), comes forth of itself afterward, with no need for a distracted mind-consciousness to draw it. 〔Q〕 Very well, then this throws the question back: by this principle, at the instant he has just taken birth, why does the mind-consciousness not likewise come forth of itself? And again, when those of the desire and form realms have just taken birth, that habituated mind-consciousness ought likewise to come forth (the same principle). 〔Wresting it back〕 If you answer "at the instant of just taking birth one is dim and dull, so the mind-consciousness does not come forth" — but this "dimness" is precisely the reason already given above (the dullness of birth-and-death); why trouble to set up a fresh account? — which goes to show that at the instant of taking birth there really is no turning consciousness operating.

〔Yet another school maintains · there is a subtle mind-consciousness〕 Again, another school maintains: at the times of birth, death, and the like, there is separately a kind of "subtle mind-consciousness," whose appearance and object-support cannot be made out. 〔A〕 It should be known that this "subtle mind-consciousness" is in fact this eighth consciousness — because the commonly-conceded "mind-consciousness" (the sixth) does not have the trait of "appearance and object-support that cannot be made out." Plainly, then, the subtle consciousness they set up is just the eighth consciousness.

〔At the time of death · the cold touch arising by degrees〕

Looking now from the side of "the instant of death": when a person is on the point of dying, then according to whether the karma he made in this life is good karma or evil karma, his body, either from the lower half or from the upper half, gives rise by degrees to a "cold touch" (that is, the body turning cold section by section). 〔When one has made good karma, the warmth retreats from below upward, leaving last from the crown; when one has made evil karma, the warmth retreats from above downward, leaving last from the soles — so the sequence of cold follows just upon the good or evil karma.〕 But if there were no this eighth consciousness, this matter would not stand to reason. How so? The turning consciousnesses (the first seven) cannot bear up this matter of the cold touch arising by degrees — first the eye-consciousness and the rest of the five consciousnesses: they each rest on their own faculty (the eye on the eye-faculty, the ear on the ear-faculty…), and moreover they intermit (sometimes do not arise at all), and so they cannot govern the whole body turning cold section by section. Next the sixth, mind-consciousness: it does not abide fixed at any one place on the body, and its object-support is moreover flitting and unfixed; it is "scattered and lodged throughout the whole body, continuing on without break" (it does not cling to some one section of flesh to appropriate it), and so that cold touch, arising in section-by-section sequence, is likewise not something brought about by degrees through the sixth, mind-consciousness.

Only the "maturation-mind" (the eighth consciousness) can bear up this matter — by the force of past karma, it appropriates each part of the whole body "of one kind, pervadingly, and continuously" (every section of flesh is appropriated by it, every section still having sensation). Wherever it "lets go of appropriation" upon a section of flesh, the cold touch on that section thereupon arises — for life (the lifespan), warmth (body-heat), and consciousness, these three, are originally not to be parted from one another (the moment consciousness lets go, warmth retreats and cold arises). And the place where the cold touch arises becomes, right then, "insentient" (dead flesh without sensation, no different from wood or stone); toward this dead flesh the eighth consciousness still "transforms" (can still manifest its image) and still "refers" (can still take it as object), yet it no longer "appropriates" it (no longer holds it as a part of one's own body with sensation). By this it is known that there must be this eighth consciousness (otherwise this death-mark — "cold following karma, cold arising where appropriation is let go" — would have nothing to ground it).

Reason 7. The proof from the basis of dependent arising (the consciousness in "consciousness conditions name-and-form" is the eighth)

A sūtra says further: "consciousness conditions name-and-form, name-and-form conditions consciousness" (consciousness serves as the condition of name-and-form, and name-and-form in turn serves as the condition of consciousness); these two, turning about, rest on each other, just like two bundles of reeds propping each other up to stand, turning at the same time. But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "consciousness" (the one that rests mutually on name-and-form) would have no substance, and would not stand to exist.

That sūtra itself gives this gloss: "name" refers to the four non-form aggregates (that is, the mind and mental factors within feeling, conception, formations, and consciousness — here "name" especially takes feeling, conception, formations, and the rest, together with what is associated with them), and "form" refers to the kalala (the lump of embryonic matter at the very instant of conception) and the like. These two, name and form, abide resting on consciousness, like two bundles of reeds each serving as the other's condition, ever turning at the same time, never to be parted from each other.

Here is the crux: the eye-consciousness and the rest of the turning consciousnesses are in fact already counted within "name" (for "name" includes the four aggregates, and the turning consciousnesses within the consciousness-aggregate are all within it). That being so, the "consciousness" that rests mutually on name-and-form — if there is no eighth, pray, who is left to serve as this "consciousness"? Nor can one rescue it thus: "the consciousness-aggregate within name refers to the five consciousnesses, while the consciousness that rests on name-and-form refers to the sixth" — because at the instant of the kalala (just after conception) there are as yet no five consciousnesses at all, so within "name" there are no five consciousnesses to speak of, and this rescue cannot stand.

Again, since the turning consciousnesses intermit and vary, they have not the power to appropriate name-and-form "constantly," so how could one say they constantly serve as the condition for name-and-form? Therefore this word "consciousness" in "consciousness conditions name-and-form" displays the eighth consciousness.

Reason 8. The proof from the consciousness-food (the substance of the consciousness-food is only the eighth consciousness)

A sūtra says further: "all beings abide in dependence on food." But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "substance of the consciousness-food" would not stand to exist. A sūtra says that "food" is of four kinds —

(1) Morsel-food (food eaten in morsels, mouthful by mouthful), whose mark is "transformation-and-decay": that is, the three of the desire realm — smell, taste, and touch — can do the work of "food" at the time of being digested (transformed and decayed). Therefore "form-base" (the visible color and shape) is not subsumed under morsel-food, because color and shape can do no nourishing work at the time of transformation-and-decay.

(2) Contact-food (nourishing by contact), whose mark is "contacting the object": that is, contaminated "contact," the moment it contacts an object, draws in feelings of joy and the like, and can do the work of "food." Although this "contact" is associated with every one of the consciousnesses, the contact that "belongs to the six consciousnesses" has the preponderant sense of food — because when the contact of the six consciousnesses meets its object it is markedly coarse and manifest, drawing in joy and pleasure and that conformably-beneficial equanimous feeling, so its nourishing force is strong.

(3) Mental-volition-food (nourishing by the longing of the mind), whose mark is "expectation" (longing): that is, contaminated "volition," turning together with "desire," longs for a lovable object, and can do the work of "food." Although this "volition" is associated with every one of the consciousnesses, the volition that "belongs to the mind-consciousness" has the preponderant sense of food — because when the mind-consciousness faces its object, that force of longing is strong.

(4) Consciousness-food (nourishing by the appropriating of consciousness), whose mark is "appropriating": that is, contaminated "consciousness," growing by the force of the three foods morsel, contact, and volition, can do the work of "food." Although this "consciousness" pervades the substance of every one of the consciousnesses, the "eighth consciousness" has the preponderant sense of food — because it continues on of one kind, and its force of appropriating is strong.

Accordingly the Abhidharmasamuccaya says these four foods are subsumed under "three aggregates, five bases, eleven elements." These four can uphold beings' body and life, keeping them from decay and rupture, and so are named "food."

Among these four foods: morsel-food is of use only in the desire realm; contact-food and mental-volition-food, though they pervade the three realms, must each turn in dependence on "consciousness," existing or not as consciousness exists or not. And the eye-consciousness and the rest of the turning consciousnesses "intermit and vary," and cannot pervade all and constantly uphold body and life — because in the no-mind concentration, sleep, fainting, and the no-conception heaven they all break off; and even at times when a mind is present, they vary about according to their basis, object, nature, realm, stage, and so on. So as for upholding body and life, the turning consciousnesses are neither pervading nor constant, and cannot be the chief agent of the consciousness-food.

Those who maintain that there is no eighth consciousness — one must ask them: when a person is in the no-mind stage, in dependence on what food does he live on? The Sūtra plainly says "all beings abide in dependence on food" (beings in the no-mind stage too must have food). Here you cannot say it is the "past consciousness, future consciousness" of the no-mind stage that serves as food — because past and future consciousness are neither present nor permanent, just like a flower [seen] in empty space, having no substance and able to exert no function.

Even taking a step back and granting that past and future have substance and function, still they "are not subsumed under the present," like empty space, and so are simply not of the nature of food. Nor can one say it is "the mind just before entering concentration" and the like that serve as food for the being in the no-mind stage — because while one abides in no-mind, that mind from just before entering concentration has long since ceased, and "the past is not food" is moreover already commonly conceded.

Nor can one say it is the non-concurrent formations such as the no-conception concentration that serve as that food — because they are not subsumed under the four foods morsel, contact, volition, and consciousness, and because the non-concurrent dharmas are not really existent to begin with. Some may maintain that "in the cessation-attainment and the like there is still a sixth, mind-consciousness," able to do the work of food for the being there — this maintenance is unreasonable, and will be broadly refuted below (Reason 9 · the proof that there is consciousness in the cessation-attainment).

Again, those who maintain there is no eighth consciousness must answer one more question: when someone is born in the upper two realms (the form and formless realms) and arouses an uncontaminated mind, in dependence on what does he have food? The uncontaminated consciousnesses are things that "demolish the [three] existences," and cannot serve as food for that contaminated body-and-life. Nor can one forcibly say that "within the uncontaminated consciousness there are contaminated seeds" that could serve as that food — because the uncontaminated consciousnesses, just like nirvāṇa, cannot appropriate contaminated seeds.

Furthermore one cannot say "the body and life of upper-realm beings uphold each other, and so serve as each other's food" — because these four foods simply do not subsume that body, that life; again, the formless realm has no body at all (with no body, "body and life upholding each other" cannot stand), and its life has nothing able to uphold it; and the like-lot-of-beings and the rest (belonging to the non-concurrent formations) have no real substance.

By this it is settled and known: apart from those turning consciousnesses, there is separately a "maturation-consciousness," appropriating body and life of one kind, constantly, and pervadingly, keeping them from decay and rupture. The World-Honored One, going by just this, accordingly said: "all beings abide in dependence on food."

One word more to add: what is called a "being" is set up only in dependence on the "appropriating aggregates" (the contaminated five appropriating aggregates); the Buddha already has no contamination and is not subsumed under "beings." So if a sūtra should say that the Buddha "too is a being, too abides in dependence on food," it should be known that this is all said in dependence on "manifestation" (the appearance shown in accord with the world). Since the maturation-consciousness is known to be that preponderant "food-nature" (that is, the chief agent of the consciousness-food), this consciousness is precisely this eighth consciousness.

Reason 9. The proof that there is consciousness in the cessation-attainment (for one abiding in the cessation-attainment, the consciousness does not leave the body)

A sūtra says further: when a person abides in the "cessation-attainment" (a deep concentration in which the mind is brought to a stop), his bodily formation, verbal formation, and mental formation (the activities of body, speech, and mind) are, every one of them, extinguished, yet "his lifespan is not extinguished, his warmth has not retreated, his faculties have not decayed, and the consciousness has not left the body." But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that "consciousness that has not left the body of one abiding in the cessation-attainment" would not stand to exist.

This is to say: the eye-consciousness and the rest of these consciousnesses are coarse and stirring in their manner of operation, and the moment they arise toward an object they cannot but toil and fret; the practitioner, wearied of this toil, wishes to bring it to rest for a while, and so layer by layer he subdues and removes it, all the way to the stage of "utter exhaustion" (where all is brought to a stop), and going by this stage he is given the name "one abiding in the cessation-attainment" — and so in this concentration those six turning consciousnesses are all extinguished. But since they are all extinguished, if one refuses to grant that there is still a "subtle, of-one-kind, constant, pervading consciousness able to appropriate life and the rest" remaining, then on what ground does one say "the consciousness has not left the body"?

〔The opponent rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: that (turning) consciousness arises again after the cessation-attainment, and this is like "alternate-day malaria" (a malarial fever that recurs every other day) — though it breaks off in between, it may all the same be called "not having left the body." 〔Wresting it back〕 If so, then the sūtra ought not to say "the mental formation is extinguished" — because consciousness arises and ceases together with conception and the like (born together, ceasing together); since the sūtra says conception and the rest are extinguished, consciousness too ought to be extinguished along with them. Moreover, by your rescue, life, warmth, and the faculties ought too, like that "alternate-day" consciousness, to break off — and this is a great fault (yet the sūtra plainly says life, warmth, and the faculties are unbroken). So one ought to grant that this "consciousness," just like life, warmth, and the rest, truly does not leave the body and is constantly present.

Again: if at this (cessation) time there were no consciousness at all, then this body would be just like a potsherd or a bit of gravel, not to be counted among beings — and how then could it be called "one abiding in the cessation-attainment"? And again: if the maturation-consciousness were absent at this time, then who could appropriate the faculties, the lifespan, and the warmth? With none to appropriate them, these ought all to decay and be extinguished, like a corpse, with even life and warmth gone — yet the person in the cessation-attainment plainly still has his life, warmth, and faculties, and so it is known that there is consciousness within.

That being so (were there no consciousness, the faculties would decay and be extinguished like a corpse), then the later consciousness certainly could never arise again, and so the "consciousness" in the sūtra's saying "the consciousness has not left the body" — to which would it belong? — for note that once the maturation-consciousness has left this body, the body left on its own cannot come back to life. Plainly, then, in the cessation-attainment the maturation-consciousness has not left, and so the body can live again afterward. And again: if at this time there were no "seed-upholding consciousness," then the later consciousness would have no seed of its own, so how could it arise?

(Could one then bring in some other thing to uphold the seeds, as a rescue? Each has already been blocked off above:) past, future, and the non-concurrent formations all have no real substance, and this is long commonly conceded; and form-dharmas and the rest, apart from consciousness, can all neither receive perfuming nor uphold the seeds, and this too has already been refuted. So it follows that in the cessation-attainment and the like, these no-mind times, there is in fact, just as in the with-mind times, certainly really a consciousness — because at these times the faculties, life, and warmth are all present, and [the person] still counts as a being. Following this chain of reasoning, it is known that "one abiding in the cessation-attainment certainly has consciousness, and this consciousness truly does not leave the body."

〔Refuting: the view that there is a sixth, mind-consciousness in the cessation-attainment〕

〔One faction · there is a sixth, mind-consciousness in the cessation-attainment〕 Some say: at this (cessation) time there is a sixth, mind-consciousness present, and this is the "consciousness that has not left the body" the sūtra speaks of — this too is wrong. Why? Because this concentration is also named the "no-mind concentration" (were there a sixth, mind-consciousness within, it would not be no-mind). 〔The opponent rescues: no five consciousnesses is "no-mind"〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: it is called "no-mind" merely if the five consciousnesses are absent (not that even the sixth need be absent). 〔Wresting it back〕 If one says so, then every concentration ought to be called a "no-mind concentration" — because in not one concentration are there any five consciousnesses. Yet in fact only the cessation-attainment and the no-conception concentration are called no-mind concentrations, which shows that "no-mind" does not just mean the absence of the five consciousnesses, simple as that.

Again, the mind-consciousness too is counted among the six turning consciousnesses, and so, like the five consciousnesses, it is absent in the cessation-attainment. Again: the consciousness at this time has an appearance and an object-support that cannot be made out, just like life and warmth (which cannot be made out or told apart), and so it is not the sixth, mind-consciousness (whose appearance can ordinarily be made out). Were there at this time a consciousness "whose appearance and object-support could be made out," then it ought, like at other times, not to be subsumed under this (cessation) concentration — for the practitioner enters this concentration precisely in order to bring to rest that "consciousness whose appearance and object-support can be made out." Plainly, then, there is no sixth, mind-consciousness within this concentration.

Again: if at this time there were a sixth, mind-consciousness, then are the mental factors associated with it present or absent? This must be pressed from two sides. (a) Suppose there are mental factors: then the sūtra ought not to say "the mental formation of one abiding in this concentration is wholly extinguished," nor ought it to name this concentration the "cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration" (since, with mental factors present, feeling and conception would not have been extinguished).

〔The opponent rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: the preparatory practice of the cessation-attainment merely wishes to grow weary of "feeling and conception," and so in this concentration it is merely feeling and conception that are extinguished (the rest of the mental factors, and the consciousness, are all still present); and again, these two, feeling and conception, aid the mind with especial force, and so among the host of mental factors just these two are named "the mental formation," and so when the sūtra says "the mental formation is extinguished" it means just the extinction of feeling and conception — and how does this clash with there being "a sixth, mind-consciousness with its mental factors" within?

〔Wresting it back〕 By your principle, the no-conception concentration grows weary only of "conception," and so it ought to have only conception extinguished — yet this you yourself refuse to grant. Again, since you yourself grant that "only feeling and conception aid the mind with especial force," then when these two are extinguished, the mind too ought to be extinguished along with them. 〔The opponent again wards it off〕 The opponent rescues again: just as "the bodily formation (that is, breathing) is extinguished, yet the body is still there," why must one force the mind too to be extinguished along with the mental formation?

〔Wresting this warding-off back too〕 If one says so (a "formation" being extinguished does not necessarily mean the dharma resting on it is extinguished along with it), then when "the verbal formation (that is, applied and sustained thought)" is extinguished, "speech" too ought not to be extinguished — yet this again you refuse to grant (you plainly grant that the moment applied and sustained thought are extinguished, speech is certainly extinguished). Plainly, then, a "formation," with respect to the dharma resting on it, is to be told into two kinds, "pervasive formation" and "non-pervasive formation": one that is "pervasive," when it is extinguished, the dharma is certainly extinguished along with it; one that is "non-pervasive," when it is extinguished, the dharma may yet remain.

What belongs to the "non-pervasive" is, for instance, breathing (the bodily formation) — you see that when breathing stops, the body is still there. But applied and sustained thought, with respect to "speech," are "pervasive" — the moment they are extinguished, speech is certainly gone. Likewise, feeling and conception, with respect to "the mind," are "pervasive" too — because everyone grants that feeling and conception, just like volition and the rest, alike belong to the "universal-ground factors" (those present along with every mind). So the moment feeling and conception are extinguished, the mind certainly is extinguished along with them; how then can one say "feeling and conception are extinguished, yet the mind is still there"?

Again: since you grant that "volition" and the rest are universal-ground factors, then when feeling and conception are extinguished, volition and the rest ought to be extinguished too. That being so, the mental factors such as faith and the rest are at this time also absent — for it is only when "non-pervasive" [formations] are extinguished that the rest of the dharmas can remain, and since the pervasive volition and the rest are all extinguished, how then can one say that other mental factors remain? Conversely, if you insist that volition and the rest are not extinguished at this time, then feeling and conception ought too to be not extinguished (since they alike belong to the universal-ground factors). 〔This becomes a dilemma blocked at both ends: volition and the rest advance and retreat together with feeling and conception — either they are all present, and then it is not a cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration; or they are all extinguished, and then not one mental factor is left.〕

Again: if in this concentration there were mental factors such as volition, then there ought too to be "contact" — because there is not one of the rest of the mental factors that does not arise by the force of contact. Once you grant there is contact, there ought too to be "feeling" — because contact serves as the condition of feeling. Once you grant there is feeling, "conception" too ought to arise — because feeling and conception are not to be parted. (And so feeling and conception would not have been extinguished, and then it is no cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration.)

〔The opponent rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: just as "feeling serves as the condition of craving," yet not every feeling can arouse craving (there is a selection here), so likewise "contact serves as the condition of feeling," yet not every contact can give birth to feeling. So put, your refutation "if there is contact there must be feeling" does not stand. 〔Wresting it back〕 This rescue is wrong, because the two cases differ —

Where does the difference lie? The Buddha himself made a selection: only "the feelings born of contact-with-ignorance" can serve as condition to give birth to craving (so "feeling gives birth to craving" is selective, not that every feeling gives birth to it); but as for "contact gives birth to feeling," nowhere in the sūtras did he ever make any selection. Therefore wherever there is contact there must certainly be feeling born, and feeling arises together with conception — this principle is settled. Plainly, then, where there is contact there must be feeling and conception; and since within the cessation-attainment there ought to be no contact, there ought too to be no sixth, mind-consciousness.

Or, pressing you to the limit: by your account, the feeling and conception at this time too ought, like at other times, to be not extinguished — for since you insist that there are mental factors such as volition at this time (and volition and the rest advance and retreat together with feeling and conception), to grant that runs afoul of the words "the mental formation is extinguished," and then this concentration too fails to be a "cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration."

Conversely, if you change your tune and say that at this time there are no mental factors, then "consciousness" too ought to be absent — and there are four grounds: (1) one never sees a mind that can exist on its own apart from its mental factors; (2) when the rest of the pervasive [factors] (contact and the like) are extinguished, the dharma resting on them is extinguished along with them; (3) were the mental factors gone yet consciousness still standing on its own, then feeling and the rest ought not to count as "universal-ground factors" (though they plainly are); (4) this consciousness ought then not to count as a "concomitant dharma." And to grant that this consciousness has no basis, no object-support, and the like, then it would be just like form-dharmas, and simply not a mind at all. 〔Conclusion: so within the cessation-attainment there ought not to be a sixth, mind-consciousness.〕

〔Refuting: the view that in the cessation-attainment the mind-consciousness, by the union of three, gives birth to contact〕

A sūtra says further: "with the mind-faculty and the dharma-object as condition, the mind-consciousness is born; the coming-together of the three — [faculty, object, and consciousness] — is contact, and arising together with contact there are feeling, conception, and volition." If within this (cessation) concentration there were a mind-consciousness, then with the coming-together of the three — faculty, object, and consciousness — there must certainly be contact; and since contact certainly arises together with feeling, conception, and volition, how could there be "consciousness yet no mental factors"? — which shows that "there is a mind-consciousness in the cessation-attainment" cannot stand.

〔The opponent rescues〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: at ordinary times the coming-together of the three — faculty, object, and consciousness — has power, and can form contact, give birth to contact, and thereby arouse feeling and the rest; but because, before entering this concentration, one had grown weary of the mental factors, therefore in the concentration the three (faculty, object, consciousness) have no power, cannot come together into contact, cannot give birth to contact, and so there are no feeling and the rest either — and thus one could have "consciousness yet no feeling and conception."

〔Wresting it back〕 If one says so (the coming-together of the three is wholly without power, and not one mental factor can arise), then this concentration ought to be named the "cessation-of-mental-factors concentration"; how is it that one says only "cessation of feeling and conception"? 〔The opponent wards it off again: naming by what is grown weary of〕 The opponent rescues again: on entering the concentration one grows weary only of the two, feeling and conception, and because these two are extinguished, the rest of the mental factors are all extinguished along with them, but in naming it one names it only "after what was grown weary of beforehand (feeling and conception)," and so it is named the cessation-of-feeling-and-conception concentration. 〔Wresting it back〕 That being so (all the mental factors are extinguished), then the "mind" within too ought to be extinguished along with them — for the mind is of a piece with what was grown weary of (feeling and conception), and would, like the rest of the mental factors, be extinguished along with them; and if the mind is not extinguished, then how could it be called a "no-mind concentration"?

Again, to press: what nature is the mind-consciousness in this concentration? — It ought not to be of "defiled" nature, nor of "indeterminate" nature, for four grounds: (1) within a good concentration there is no such thing as "arousing a defiled mind or arousing an indeterminate mind"; (2) the rest of defiled minds and indeterminate minds certainly have mental factors (yet you say there are no mental factors at this time — and this is self-contradiction); (3) one ought not, after growing weary of the good, to arouse the defiled and the rest; (4) the practitioner enters concentration in order to seek quiescence, and ought not on the contrary to arouse distraction (and the defiled and indeterminate are precisely what verge on distraction).

〔The opponent shifts: it is good〕 The opponent may shift his plea and say this mind-consciousness is "good." Then it must be "concomitant-good" (that is, good by being associated with the good roots), and so non-greed and the other good roots ought to be associated with it (and this again makes it have mental factors, the same contradiction). Again, this mind cannot be "intrinsic-good" or "ultimate-good" — for that would clash with your own school's account: this mind is neither of the class of the good roots (so it cannot be intrinsic-good), nor is it nirvāṇa (so it cannot be ultimate-good).

〔The opponent shifts again: equally-arisen-good〕 The opponent may shift again and say this mind is "equally-arisen-good" (that is, good by being drawn forth by the good roots of the preparatory stage before entering concentration). This too will not stand to reason, and again clashes with your own school: for the rest of good minds are not good by being "equally-arisen" but by being "concomitant"; and again, a good mind in the very next moment can arouse a mind of [any of] the three natures (after a good [mind] there can follow a defiled mind or an indeterminate mind), so how could you fix that "this good mind is equally-arisen from the prior preparatory [stage]"? So this mind's being good is, after all, by the force of "concomitance" (that is, of being associated with the good roots). That being so, it must be associated with the good roots, and how then can one say that it alone has no mental factors?

So the conclusion is: with no mental factors, the mind too ought to be absent (mind and mental factors are mutually dependent). Following this chain of reasoning all the way through, the eye-consciousness and the rest of the six turning consciousnesses are all "gone from the body" (all extinguished) within the cessation-attainment; and so the consciousness the sūtra speaks of, the one that "(within the cessation-attainment) has not left the body," is precisely this eighth consciousness — because when one enters the cessation-attainment, one does not bring this "utterly quiescent appropriating consciousness" (that is, the eighth) to rest. As for the no-conception concentration and the like, they too are to be understood after this same principle (within them too only the eighth consciousness remains).

Reason 10. The proof from the defiled and pure mind (the defiled and pure mind — only the eighth can uphold their seeds)

A sūtra says further: "because the mind is defiled, beings are defiled; because the mind is pure, beings are pure." But if there were no this eighth consciousness, that defiled mind, that pure mind (the one able to receive perfuming and able to appropriate the seeds), would not stand to exist.

This is to say: the defiled and pure dharmas all have the mind as their root — they arise only through the mind, abide only in dependence on the mind, while the mind receives their (the defiled and pure dharmas') perfuming and appropriates their seeds. To begin with the defiled side, it falls broadly into three kinds: affliction, karma, and fruit, these three each being one class. Below, one class after another is taken up, [to show] what would follow if there were no eighth consciousness.

(1) The seeds of affliction: if there were no this consciousness to appropriate the seeds of affliction, then after a person has risen and fallen among the three realms and nine stages, or has passed through a stretch of "time with no defiled mind" (such as when a good mind or an uncontaminated mind arises), those afflictions, in arising again, ought all to be without cause — because no other dharma can appropriate the seeds of that affliction, and the past and future are moreover not really existent (and so cannot bear this either).

And if the afflictions could arise without cause, then the "learner's fruit" and "no-more-learner's fruit" of the three vehicles (the fruit-stages of the path) could not stand up — because the afflictions already severed ought too to arise again (severed and then arising again, there would be no real "fruit of severance" to speak of at all). (2) The seeds of karma and fruit: if there were no this consciousness to appropriate the seeds of karma and fruit, then after a person has come and gone among the three realms and nine stages, passing through a stretch of "dharmas of a different class" (a mind of a different class from karma-and-fruit), those karmas and fruits, in arising again, ought too to be without cause — because the other seeds and other causes (form-dharmas, the non-concurrent formations, past and future) have all already been refuted above.

And if karma and fruit could arise without cause, then a great problem follows: a person who has already entered nirvāṇa-without-remainder (where the seeds of karma-and-fruit ought to have been forever extinguished) ought yet to have the karma-and-fruit of the three realms arise again, and affliction too ought to arise again without cause — which is plainly wrong. Again: the link "formations condition consciousness" in the twelvefold dependent arising could too not stand up — because if one says "the formations perfume the turning consciousness, perfuming it into the seed of consciousness," then "the turning consciousness receives perfuming" has already been refuted above.

What is more, the defiled consciousness at the linking-of-birth within "formations condition consciousness" is moreover not something directly called forth by the "formations"; were one to say that what the "formations" condition should be "name-and-form" (rather than consciousness), then "the formations serving as condition" should reach over to name-and-form; and again, the "formations" belong to the prior life and the "consciousness" to the present life, and the two are sundered by a great stretch of time, with no way to serve directly as each other's condition (across this gap, it is only by the eighth consciousness appropriating the seeds that the link can be joined). Plainly, then, if this "formations condition consciousness" cannot stand up, then the whole string of dependent-arising links that follow cannot stand up either — and so the eighth consciousness is indispensable.

Having dealt with the defiled dharmas, now the pure dharmas: they too fall into three kinds — the mundane path, the supramundane path, and the fruit-of-severance, each being one class. (1) The seeds of the mundane and supramundane paths: if there were no this consciousness to appropriate the seeds of the mundane and supramundane pure paths, then after a stretch of "mind of a different class" (a mind of a different class from the pure path), these pure dharmas, in arising again, ought all to be without cause — because the other causes you cling to have all already been refuted above.

And if these two — the mundane path and the supramundane path — could arise without cause, then trouble too follows: a person who has already entered nirvāṇa-without-remainder ought yet to have these two pure paths arise again, and their basis too ought to arise again without cause — which is plainly wrong. Again: the very first moment of the supramundane path could then simply not arise — because there is no dharma able to appropriate that "natural seed" (that is, the uncontaminated seed inherently present); and the contaminated, being of a different class [from the uncontaminated], cannot be the cause of the uncontaminated; while "arising without cause" is, all the more, no principle a disciple of Śākya can grant.

Since the very first moment of the supramundane path cannot arise, the later moments too cannot arise, and so the path-fruits of the three vehicles would all be lost. (2) The fruit-of-severance: if there were no this consciousness to appropriate the seeds of affliction, then "the transformation of the basis and the fruit-of-severance" too could not stand up — how so? At the time the path arises, the present afflictions and their seeds are both absent (there being no place to lodge the seeds of affliction, there is then no object to be severed either): because the defiled mind and the pure mind do not arise together (the path is a pure mind, affliction a defiled mind, and the two do not co-exist); the mind associated with the path moreover cannot uphold the seeds of that affliction, because the two are opposite in nature, just like nirvāṇa (the pure cannot bear up the defiled); while the "past, future, and attainment" and the like (the past, the future, and that "attainment" among the non-concurrent formations) are moreover not really existent; and for any other dharma to uphold the seeds, in reason, cannot stand up either.

Since "what is to be severed" (the seeds of affliction) is simply absent, then "what can sever" too has no opponent left to sever, so on what (what is severed) and by what (what severs) is one to set up this "fruit-of-severance"? 〔The opponent rescues: setting up the fruit-of-severance by the power of the path〕 The opponent may rescue with a word: by the power of the path the afflictions thereafter do not arise again, and this counts as setting up the fruit-of-severance (no real seeds need be there to be severed). 〔Wresting it back〕 If one says so, then the very first moment the path arises one ought to become a no-more-learner (an arhat) — for (since there are no seeds to be severed) the afflictions thereafter would all already be without cause, and forever never arise again (the very first moment of the path would have severed everything, throwing the whole graded order of the path into disorder). Plainly, then, only by granting that there is this consciousness do all these — the three defiled, the three pure — stand up — because this consciousness alone can uphold the defiled and pure seeds.

To prove that this (eighth) consciousness really exists, the principles one could set forth are without end; but for fear that the reader should weary of so great a profusion of words, only the essentials are here stated in brief (that is, the five teachings and ten principles above). That there is separately this consciousness is plain to see, whether one looks from the scriptural teaching or from reason; all those who have wisdom should deeply believe and accept this.