唯識二十論 偈一 立宗·答四難
這部論一開頭就立下宗旨：欲界、色界、無色界這整個世界，說到底只是識的顯現，沒有一個跟心無關、自己擺在外面的實在外境。這話不是世親自創，是佛經本來就說的「三界唯心」。要緊的是那個「唯」字——它只否認「心外另有實物」，並不否認心理活動本身的豐富。識生起時自會現出「好像有外境」的樣子，就像害眼病的人看見空中飄頭髮、飛蒼蠅，看得清清楚楚，外面卻什麼都沒有。
立場一立，最有力的反問就來了，而且整整齊齊四項：世界若只是心，為什麼還這麼有規矩——地點固定、時間固定、眾人共見同一境、東西還能起真實作用？這四難，是對一切「唯心」立場最自然的攻擊。世親毫不迴避，把它原原本本擺出來——而且在反問裡順手丟出三個「看得見卻沒有實用」的例子（眼病的髮、夢裡的飯菜刀杖、海市蜃樓的幻城），等於把答案的種子先埋進了問題裡。
他只回一句「這四件事並不是都不能成立」，就把全論前半的答題綱目立了起來：往下用夢喻、地獄喻、業力，一一證明——一個「只是識」的世界，照樣可以有固定的時空、公共的對象、真實的效用。讀懂這開局的四難，就拿到了通讀全論的地圖。
Right at its opening, this treatise sets down its thesis: the whole world — the realm of desire, the realm of form, the formless realm — is, in the last analysis, nothing but the presenting of consciousness; there is no real external object standing on its own, out there, independent of mind. This is not Vasubandhu's own invention; it is what the scriptures already say — "the three realms are nothing but mind." What matters is that little word "only": it denies only that "there is some thing outside the mind standing on its own"; it does not deny the richness of mental life itself. When a cognition arises, it of itself takes on the look of "as though an object were there" — the way a person with an eye-disease sees hairs floating and flies darting in the air, plain as day, while outside there is nothing at all.
No sooner is the thesis set down than the most forceful objection arrives — and in four neat parts: if the world is only mind, why is it still so orderly — fixed in place, fixed in time, seen in common by many beings, and made of things that still do real work? These four objections are the most natural attack on any "mind-only" position. Vasubandhu does not dodge them; he lays them out exactly as they stand — and, in the very stating of them, he slips in three examples of things "seen plain yet doing no work" (the eye-patient's hairs, the food and knives of a dream, the mirage-city), as if planting the seed of the answer inside the question itself.
He replies with just one line — "it is not that these four all fail to hold" — and with that he raises the whole table of answers for the first half of the treatise: from here on, with the dream illustration, the hell illustration, and the force of karma, he proves it point by point — that a world that is "nothing but consciousness" can have, all the same, a fixed space and time, public objects, and real efficacy. Read this opening set of four objections through, and you hold the map for reading the whole treatise.
§序（立宗）
安立大乘三界唯識，以契經說三界唯心，心、意、識、了，名之差別。此中說心，意兼心所，唯遮外境，不遣相應，內識生時似外境現，如有眩瞖見髮蠅等，此中都無少分實義。即於此義，有設難言。頌曰：
§頌
若識無實境，則處時決定， 相續不決定，作用不應成。
§論（世親自註）
論曰：此說何義？若離識實有色等外法，色等識生不緣色等，何因此識有處得生，非一切處？何故此處有時識起，非一切時？同一處時有多相續，何不決定隨一識生？如眩瞖人見髮蠅等，非無眩瞖有此識生。復有何因，諸眩瞖者所見髮等無髮等用，夢中所得飲食、刀杖、毒藥、衣等無飲等用，尋香城等無城等用。餘髮等物其用非無，若實同無色等外境，唯有內識似外境生，定處、定時、不定相續、有作用物皆不應成。非皆不成。頌曰：
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
§序 白話（立宗）
這部論一開頭，就正面立下一個主張：我們所經驗的整個世界——欲界、色界、無色界這三層存在——說到底，都只是「心當下呈現出來的東西」，並沒有一個跟心無關、自己擺在外面的實在世界。
這不是世親自己發明的，他是引佛經本來就講的話：「三界唯心」。
「心、意、識、了」這四個詞，在這裡其實講的是同一回事，只是換個角度叫它而已。這部論用「心」這個字時，也把「意」（會思量、判斷的那部分）和「心所」（伴著心一起生起的各種心理活動，像感受、注意、念頭）都包進去了。
那「唯」——「只是」——這個字要排除的是什麼？只排除一件事：「外面有一個跟心無關、自己存在的東西」。它並不否認心和心所這些心理活動是一起配著生起的。
我們心裡的識生起的當下，它本身就會現出一個「好像有外境在那裡」的樣子——就像害了眼病的人，會看見空中飄頭髮、飛蒼蠅一樣。你以為外面真有，其實是心自己現出來的；看見的內容裡，沒有一絲一毫真實的外境。
就針對這個主張，有人提出強烈的反問。世親用一首偈來回答：
§頌 白話
如果心識本來就不是靠真實的外境才生起， 那它為什麼偏偏只在某個地點、某個時間才生起？ 為什麼那麼多人會同時看見同一樣東西？ 為什麼夢裡的東西不能像現實的東西那樣起作用？
§論 白話
世親解釋這首偈在說什麼。
他先替反對的人把話講足。對方說：假如離開心識，外面真有顏色這些實在的外境，而你（世親）又說色等的心識不是靠外境生起的——那好，下面四件事你就講不通了：
第一，為什麼這個心識只在某個特定地點才生起，而不是哪裡都能生？
第二，為什麼就算在這個地點，心識也只在某個特定時刻才生起，而不是隨時都生？
第三，同一個地點、同一個時刻，當場有許多人，各有各的心識在運作；為什麼不是隨便哪一個人先看到就算，而是大家都一起看見同一樣東西？——你看，害眼病的人才看得到空中的頭髮、蒼蠅，沒病的人就看不到，可見心識本來是可以只限於某一個人的。那為什麼平常大家又會共同看見同一個東西呢？這在「唯識」的立場下怎麼說得通？
第四，再說，為什麼害眼病的人看到的那些頭髮，不能當真頭髮用？夢裡得到的飯菜、刀杖、毒藥、衣服，為什麼不能填飽肚子、砍傷人、毒死人、遮住身體？神話裡那座看得清清楚楚的「乾闥婆城」（海市蜃樓般的幻城），為什麼沒有真城市的作用？可是現實裡看到的頭髮、飯菜、刀杖，作用樣樣都是真的。
對方總結說：要是真像你講的——外面沒有實在的外境，只有心識現得好像有外境——那麼「地點固定、時間固定、眾人共見同一境、東西能起真實作用」這四件事，全都不該成立才對。
世親聽完這四個反問，一步不讓，只回了一句：「這四件事，並不是都不能成立。」 接著就用下一首偈來說明。
§Prologue — plain reading (establishing the thesis)
Right at its opening, this treatise states a thesis head-on: the whole world we experience — the three realms of existence, the realm of desire, the realm of form, and the formless realm — is, in the last analysis, nothing but "what mind presents in the very moment." There is no real world standing on its own, out there, independent of mind.
This is not something Vasubandhu invented. He is citing what the scriptures themselves already say: "the three realms are nothing but mind" (三界唯心).
The four words "mind, thought, consciousness, cognition" (心、意、識、了) here all name one and the same thing; they only call it by different aspects. When this treatise uses the word "mind" (心), it folds in "thought" (意 — the part that deliberates and judges) and the "mental associates" (心所 — the various mental activities that arise together with mind: feeling, attention, the play of thoughts) as well.
And the word "only" (唯) — what does it rule out? It rules out just one thing: "that there is, outside the mind, some thing standing on its own, independent of mind." It does not deny that mind and its associates arise together, in mutual accord.
In the very moment a cognition arises within us, it itself takes on the look of "as though an external object were there" — just as a person afflicted with the eye-disease taimira (眩瞖) sees hairs floating and flies darting in the air. You take it that something is really out there; in fact it is mind presenting it to itself. In what is seen there is not the slightest bit of real external object.
It is against just this thesis that someone raises a forceful challenge. Vasubandhu answers with a verse:
§Verse — plain reading
If cognition does not in fact arise from a real external object, then why does it arise only at this particular place, why do so many beings see one and the same thing at once, and why can what is dreamt not function the way real things function?
§Auto-commentary — plain reading
Vasubandhu explains what the verse is saying.
First he states the opponent's case for them, in full. The opponent says: suppose that, apart from cognition, there really are external objects out there such as colour-and-form; and suppose you (Vasubandhu) also hold that the cognition of colour-and-form does not arise from any such object — then there are four things you cannot account for:
First, why does this cognition arise only at one particular place, rather than anywhere at all?
Second, why, even at this place, does the cognition arise only at one particular time, rather than at any time at all?
Third, at one and the same place and time, where many beings are present, each with their own cognition at work — why is it not that just whichever one of them happens to see it first settles the matter, but rather that everyone sees one and the same thing together? Look: only a person with the eye-disease sees the hairs and flies in the air; one without the disease does not — which shows that cognition can perfectly well be confined to a single individual. So why, ordinarily, do everyone's cognitions converge on one and the same object? How can that be made sense of on the consciousness-only position?
Fourth, and further: why can the hairs a sufferer of the eye-disease sees not be used as real hairs? Why can the food and drink, the knives and staves, the poison, the clothes one obtains in a dream not fill the belly, wound a body, kill with poison, cover a frame? Why does the city of the gandharvas (尋香城 — that mirage-like phantom city), seen plain as day in the old stories, have none of the workings of a real city? Whereas the hairs, the food, the knives one sees in waking life — their workings are real, every one.
The opponent sums up: if it really were as you say — that there is no real external object out there, only cognition presenting itself as though an object were there — then those four things, "fixity of place, fixity of time, many beings seeing one and the same object together, and things having real efficacy," ought, every one of them, not to hold at all.
Having heard out these four objections, Vasubandhu yields not an inch. He answers with a single line: "It is not that these four all fail to hold." And he goes on to make it good with the verse that follows.
先把宗立起來：三界唯識
整部《二十論》只為一件事：證成「三界唯識」——欲界、色界、無色界這整個世界，說到底只是識的顯現，沒有離識而實有的外境。世親一開卷就把話說清楚，而且立刻聲明：這不是他的私見，是契經本來就說的「三界唯心」。「心、意、識、了」四個名字，講的是同一事，只是角度不同；說「心」時，連思量的「意」和伴心而起的「心所」都收進來。最關鍵的是那個「唯」字——它只遮外境之實有，不遮識與心所的相應。這一句界限，後面整部論都靠它：唯識不是否認心理活動的豐富，只是否認「心外另有實物」。
一個眼疾人的譬喻，立起整個立場
世親立宗，靠的不是空論，而是一個你我都懂的譬喻：害了眼病（眩瞖）的人，會看見空中飄著頭髮、飛著蒼蠅。那髮、那蠅，看得清清楚楚，可外面根本沒有。識生起時自己現出「像有外境」的樣子，正是如此——「此中都無少分實義」。這個眩瞖喻是全論的眼睛，§序立宗用它，下面答難還會反覆用它。記住這個畫面，唯識的立場就有了著力處。
開局之問：世界這麼有規矩，你唯識怎麼解釋
立場一立，最強的反問立刻來了。對方不跟你玩抽象，他指著經驗世界的「秩序」發難——而玄奘的譯筆，把這反問清清楚楚切成四項並列（這四難之顯題化，是玄奘譯本勝過真諦、般若流支二譯的結構特點，東亞唯識也以此譯為準）：
- 處決定：心識若不靠外境，為什麼偏偏只在某個地點生起？
- 時決定：為什麼只在某個時刻生起，而非隨時？
- 相續不決定：同一處同一時，這麼多人各有各的心識，為什麼大家共見同一境，而不是各見各的？
- 作用不成：若都是心現的假象，為什麼現實的飯菜能充飢、刀杖能傷人——假象怎麼會有真實作用？
這四問合起來其實是一個常識的詰難：一個「只是心」的世界，憑什麼還能有固定的時空、公共的對象、真實的效用？這是對一切「唯心」立場最自然、最有力的攻擊。世親把它原原本本擺出來，毫不迴避。
譬喻已經埋好了答案的種子
但請注意：世親在陳述第四難（作用不成）時，順手把三個譬喻並排丟了出來——眩瞖人所見的髮、夢中所得的飲食刀杖毒藥衣、乾闥婆城。這三者全是「看得見卻無實用」的東西：眼病的髮綁不成辮，夢裡的飯填不飽肚，幻城住不了人。對方本想用「現實之物有真用」來反證外境實有；世親卻早把「有相而無實境、卻仍歷歷現前」的現成例子擺在桌上了。開局之問的答案種子，已經藏在問句裡——這正是偈一的精巧：設局即埋伏。
立在八識之上
要留意：「三界唯識」的「識」不是單薄的一個念頭，而是一整套識的體系——前六識（眼識到意識）、末那、到根本的阿賴耶識（百法 #8，含藏種子、共業所依）。四難裡「處時決定」靠誰判斷？靠意識（百法 #6）。眾人何以共見一境？這要等到後面講「業力」「共業」時，才由阿賴耶識這層說透。所以偈一立的宗，是要靠 baifa 心王前八識整套展開才撐得住——這也是為什麼這個立場只有在唯識的識體系裡才講得圓。
承衍
順著偈一往下看：這設下的四難，不是世親立完就算，而是後面整個 §壹 的答題綱目——偈二以夢喻＋餓鬼喻答前三難（處時定、共見），偈三以地獄喻統答，偈四至七再以業力、共業收束。古德也接著釋：護法《成唯識寶生論》卷一詳釋本偈，把這「立宗答難」的開局展開為唯識無境的系統論證。讀通偈一這一局四難，等於拿到了通讀全論前半的地圖。
First, set up the thesis: the three realms are nothing but consciousness
The whole of the Viṃśatikā exists for a single purpose: to establish "the three realms are nothing but consciousness" (三界唯識) — that the realm of desire, the realm of form, and the formless realm, this entire world, is in the last analysis only the manifestation of consciousness, with no real external object existing apart from consciousness. Vasubandhu makes this plain from the very first line, and immediately declares: this is not his private opinion — it is what the scriptures themselves already say, "the three realms are nothing but mind" (三界唯心). The four names "mind, thought, consciousness, cognition" (心、意、識、了) all name one and the same thing, only from differing angles; and when he says "mind," he folds in both deliberating "thought" (意) and the "mental associates" (心所) that arise alongside mind. Most decisive of all is that word "only" (唯) — it negates only the reality of external objects; it does not dismiss the concord of mind with its associates. This one boundary-line carries the whole treatise that follows: consciousness-only is not a denial of the richness of mental life, but only a denial that "outside the mind there is some further real thing."
A single image of a person with an eye-disease sets the whole position in place
Vasubandhu establishes his thesis not by abstract argument but by an image you and I both understand: a person afflicted with the eye-disease taimira (眩瞖) sees hairs floating and flies darting in the air. Those hairs, those flies, are seen plain as day — yet outside there is nothing there at all. This is exactly how it is when a cognition arises and of itself takes on the look of "as though an object were there" — "in this there is not the slightest bit of real meaning" (此中都無少分實義). This eye-disease image is the eye of the whole treatise: the §Prologue uses it to set up the thesis, and the answers to the objections below will return to it again and again. Hold this picture in mind, and the consciousness-only position has something to stand on.
The opening question: the world is so orderly — how does your consciousness-only account for that?
The moment the position is set down, the most forceful objection arrives. The opponent will not play at abstractions; he points to the very "orderliness" of the experienced world and presses the challenge — and Xuanzang's brushwork cuts this challenge cleanly into four parallel items (this making-explicit of the four objections is a structural strength of Xuanzang's version over those of Paramārtha and Prajñāruci; East Asian Yogācāra likewise took this version as its standard):
- Fixity of place: if cognition does not depend on an external object, why does it arise only at one particular place?
- Fixity of time: why does it arise only at one particular time, rather than at any time?
- Non-determinacy of the mind-stream: at one place and one time, with so many beings each having their own cognition, why do all see one and the same object together, rather than each seeing their own?
- Failure of efficacy: if all of it is an appearance presented by mind, why does real food fill the belly and a real staff wound a body — how could a mere appearance have real efficacy?
Taken together, these four questions are really one challenge from common sense: what entitles a world that is "only mind" to have, all the same, a fixed space and time, public objects, and real effects? This is the most natural and most powerful attack on any "mind-only" position whatsoever. Vasubandhu sets it out exactly as it stands, dodging nothing.
The image has already buried the seed of the answer
But notice this: as he states the fourth objection (the failure of efficacy), Vasubandhu, in passing, sets three images side by side — the hairs a sufferer of the eye-disease sees, the food and drink, knives, staves, poison, and clothes obtained in a dream, and the city of the gandharvas (乾闥婆城). All three are things "seen yet without real use": the eye-disease's hairs cannot be braided, the dream's food cannot fill the belly, the phantom city cannot be lived in. The opponent meant to use "real things have real use" to argue back to the reality of external objects; but Vasubandhu has already laid on the table the ready-made examples of "having an appearance, with no real object, yet still vividly present." The seed of the opening question's answer is already hidden inside the question — and this is precisely the artistry of Verse 1: to set the trap is already to lay the ambush.
Standing on the eight consciousnesses
Take care: the "consciousness" of "the three realms are nothing but consciousness" is not some thin single thought, but a whole system of consciousness — the first six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness through mind-consciousness), the manas, down to the foundational storehouse consciousness (阿賴耶識 ālaya-vijñāna; baifa #8, the holder of seeds and the basis of shared karma). Within the four objections, on what does "fixity of place and time" rest for its judgment? On the mind-consciousness (意識; baifa #6). Why do many beings see one and the same object? That must wait until "the force of karma" and "shared karma" are expounded below, where it will be made fully clear by this storehouse-consciousness layer. So the thesis Verse 1 sets up needs the whole array of the first eight mind-kings of the baifa to be unfolded before it can stand — which is also why this position can be made fully coherent only within the consciousness-system of Yogācāra.
Carried forward (承衍)
Read on from Verse 1: these four objections it sets up are not something Vasubandhu raises and then drops; they are the very table of contents for the answers across the whole of §I — Verse 2 answers the first three objections (fixity of place and time, common seeing) with the dream illustration and the hungry-ghost illustration; Verse 3 gives a unified answer with the hell illustration; Verses 4 through 7 round it off with the force of karma and shared karma. The ancient masters take it up in turn: Dharmapāla's Cheng weishi baosheng lun (成唯識寶生論, T31n1591), fascicle one, expounds this verse in detail, unfolding this "establishing the thesis, answering the objections" opening into a systematic argument for consciousness-without-object. Read this opening set of four objections through, and you have in hand the map for reading the whole first half of the treatise.
考據Apparatus
一、科判定位
| 系統 | 此偈之位 |
|---|---|
| 全論五段 | §壹 立宗·答四難（偈一–七）之開卷立宗偈。§序 立「三界唯識」宗 → 偈一 設四難 → 偈二–七 次第答難 → §貳 密意（偈八–九）→ §參 破極微（偈十–十四）→ §肆 破現量·夢覺·教證（偈十五–廿一）→ §伍 他心智·結頌（偈廿二–廿三） |
| §序–偈一 關係 | §序 為全論之立宗總綱（三界唯識·心意識了·唯遮外境）；偈一承之，借對方四難開出全論論辯之局 |
| 玄奘段位 | §序〔p0074b27–c02〕· §頌〔p0074c03–04〕· §論自註〔p0074c05–14〕 |
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
§序立宗三句眼：(一)「三界唯識」依「契經三界唯心」立；(二)「心意識了名之差別」——四名一事；(三)「唯遮外境，不遣相應」——遮詮之界限。
§頌四句出四難：處決定／時決定／相續不決定／作用不應成——皆對方就「唯識若無外境，何以世界仍有秩序」之詰。自註於陳第四難時並列三喻（眩瞖見髮蠅·夢中飲食刀杖毒藥衣·尋香城），即「有相而無實境」之現成例，已伏答難之機。末「非皆不成」一轉，啟偈二以下之答。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
- 經證：§序自引契經「三界唯心」為立宗所本。古德所共指經據為《華嚴經·十地品》——60 華嚴「三界虛妄，但是心作」〔T09n0278·0558c10〕；80 華嚴「三界所有，唯是一心」〔T10n0279〕。論之「三界唯識」即承此佛說，易「唯心」為「唯識」以顯能變之識。
- 論本：世親自註（T1590）自釋本頌，立四難、埋三喻、判「非皆不成」，即本偈之論本；論之權威接於上引佛說「三界唯心」。
校驗志（2026-06-27 CBETA 對勘）：60 華嚴作「但是心作」（非坊間常引之「但是一心作」）；引用從原文。
四、本論釋要（世親自註 T1590）
世親不正面駁外境，而先全幅復述對方四難，且於第四難自陳三喻（眩瞖髮·夢中物·乾闥婆城）——此三皆「現而無用」者，對方欲以「現實之物有真用」反證外境實有，世親預以「有相無實境」之同類例置於局中。「非皆不成」為轉樞：不否認四事（定處·定時·共見·作用），唯否認「四事必待實外境方成」，故下諸偈一一以唯識義成立之。
五、諸家異釋（古德 · 標宗）
- 護法《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591（唐·義淨譯·漢有傳本）——卷一詳釋本偈，將「立宗答難」開局展為唯識無境之系統論證。〔標宗：護法以系統論證釋開局四難；古德讀法之一，此處只記其宗，不判。〕
- Vinītadeva Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā——藏譯存·漢無傳本，依例僅志其名，內容不入義據。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（三漢譯）
| 漢譯 | 譯本 | 對讀 |
|---|---|---|
| ★ 唐·玄奘 T31n1590 | 「若識無實境，則處時決定，相續不決定，作用不應成」 | 四難以五言四句並列顯題為論辯標題，後接散文自註；此格式成東亞唯識傳承之底本 |
| 陳·真諦 T31n1589《大乘唯識論》 | 「處時定」之表達偏「決定性」之邏輯面，與其攝論一系語境相應（古代漢證·參校） | |
| 後魏·般若流支 T31n1588《唯識論》 | 「唯識無境界，以無塵妄見」——散文體連貫，四難未顯題化為並列（古代漢證·參校） |
四難之四項並列顯題，唯玄奘譯完整呈現——此為玄奘譯成東亞主流之結構性緣由。
七、術語（古德所傳梵 · 發音輔助）
| 漢 | 梵（發音輔助） | 義 |
|---|---|---|
| 三界唯識 | traidhātuka-vijñaptimātra | 三界唯是識之顯現，無離識實境 |
| 心·意·識·了 | citta·manas·vijñāna | 四名一事，角度有別；說「心」兼攝意與心所 |
| 眩瞖 | taimira | 眼疾，見空中髮蠅；全論立宗主喻 |
| 尋香城（乾闥婆城） | gandharva-nagara | 海市蜃樓般之幻城，現而無用 |
梵羅馬字僅作發音輔助；無古德音寫可徵者從闕，不據現代校本補。
八、互讀（唯識系次第）
| 百法明門論 | 唯識三十論 | 二十論內部 |
|---|---|---|
| #1 眼識 cakṣur-vijñāna——本偈四難皆預設識有多別 | 偈一 假說我法「彼依識所變」——三十論開展體系，二十論立宗防難，相為表裏 | 偈二 夢鬼喻——以夢喻＋餓鬼喻答前三難（處時定·共見） |
| #6 意識 mano-vijñāna——「處時決定」判斷之所依 | 偈十七 「故一切唯識」——三十論之證成收結 | 偈三 地獄喻——統答諸難，並收於業力 |
| #8 阿賴耶識 ālaya——共業所依、眾相續共見一境之業力基底 ⭐ | 偈四 恒轉——ālaya 即恒轉相續，共業所依之地 | 偈廿三 結頌——以謙退收束全論論辯 |
九、校本定位
- 漢文立宗（§序）：T31n1590〔p0074b27–c02〕（玄奘譯）
- 漢文正文（§頌）：T31n1590〔p0074c03–04〕（玄奘譯）
- 漢文自註（§論）：T31n1590〔p0074c05–14〕（玄奘譯）
- 經證：60 華嚴 T09n0278〔0558c10〕「三界虛妄但是心作」 · 80 華嚴 T10n0279「三界所有唯是一心」
- 參校漢譯：T31n1589（真諦《大乘唯識論》）· T31n1588（般若流支《唯識論》「唯識無境界，以無塵妄見」）
- 古德釋：T31n1591（護法《成唯識寶生論》卷一·漢有傳本）
1. Doctrinal-outline placement
| System | This verse's place |
|---|---|
| The treatise's five parts | The opening thesis-verse of §I Establishing the Thesis · Answering the Four Objections (vv.1–7). §Prologue establishes the thesis 「三界唯識」 (the three realms are nothing but consciousness) → v.1 sets out the four objections → vv.2–7 answer them in sequence → §II Hidden Intent (密意, vv.8–9) → §III Refuting Atoms (破極微, vv.10–14) → §IV Refuting [the appeal to] Direct Perception · Dream-and-Waking · Scriptural Proof (vv.15–21) → §V Knowledge of Others' Minds · Concluding Verse (他心智·結頌, vv.22–23) |
| §Prologue–v.1 relation | The §Prologue is the thesis-statement for the whole treatise (三界唯識 · 心意識了 · 唯遮外境 — the three realms are consciousness-only; mind-thought-consciousness-cognition; "only" negates external objects); v.1 takes it up, using the opponent's four objections to open the debate of the whole work. |
| Xuanzang's textual loci | §Prologue 〔p0074b27–c02〕· §Verse 〔p0074c03–04〕· §Auto-commentary 〔p0074c05–14〕 |
2. The source-verse · the doctrinal thread
The §Prologue's thesis turns on three points: (i) 「三界唯識」 — "the three realms are nothing but consciousness" — is established upon the scriptural 「契經三界唯心」 ("the scripture's 'the three realms are nothing but mind'"); (ii) 「心意識了名之差別」 — mind, thought, consciousness, cognition are four names for one thing; (iii) 「唯遮外境，不遣相應」 — the boundary-line of negation: "only" rules out the reality of external objects but does not dismiss the [mind's] concord [with its associates].
The §Verse's four lines issue the four objections: fixity of place / fixity of time / non-determinacy of the mind-stream / failure of efficacy (處決定／時決定／相續不決定／作用不應成) — each a challenge on the theme "if consciousness-only has no external object, how does the world still have its order?" In stating the fourth objection the auto-commentary sets three images side by side (眩瞖見髮蠅 the eye-patient seeing hairs and flies · 夢中飲食刀杖毒藥衣 the food, knives, staves, poison and clothes of a dream · 尋香城 the city of the gandharvas) — ready-made examples of "having an appearance yet no real object," already laying the ground for the answer. The closing turn 「非皆不成」 ("it is not that these all fail to hold") launches the answers from v.2 onward.
3. Scripture and treatise: the grounding (scriptural proof → treatise-root)
- Scriptural proof. The §Prologue itself cites the scriptural 「三界唯心」 ("the three realms are nothing but mind") as the ground of the thesis. The scriptural source the ancient masters jointly point to is the Avataṃsaka, "Ten Stages" chapter — the 60-fascicle Avataṃsaka: 「三界虛妄，但是心作」 "The three realms are unreal; they are but the making of mind" 〔T09n0278·0558c10〕; the 80-fascicle Avataṃsaka: 「三界所有，唯是一心」 "All that is in the three realms is nothing but the one mind" 〔T10n0279〕. The treatise's 「三界唯識」 inherits this Buddha-word, changing 「唯心」 ("only mind") to 「唯識」 ("only consciousness") to bring out the transforming consciousness.
- Treatise-root. Vasubandhu's auto-commentary (T1590) expounds the verse itself — setting the four objections, planting the three images, and judging 「非皆不成」 — and is the treatise-root of this verse; the treatise's authority joins to the Buddha-word 「三界唯心」 cited above.
Collation note (CBETA collation, 2026-06-27): the 60-fascicle Avataṃsaka reads 「但是心作」 ("but the making of mind") — not the commonly-cited 「但是一心作」 ("the making of the one mind"); the citation follows the original text.
4. The treatise-root in essence (Vasubandhu's auto-commentary, T1590)
Vasubandhu does not refute external objects head-on; he first restates the opponent's four objections in full, and within the fourth objection himself adduces three images (the eye-patient's hairs · the dream's objects · the city of the gandharvas) — all of them "appearing yet without use." The opponent means to argue from "real things have real use" back to the reality of external objects; Vasubandhu pre-empts this by placing the like examples of "having an appearance, with no real object" into the field. 「非皆不成」 is the pivot: he does not deny the four matters (fixity of place · fixity of time · common seeing · efficacy); he denies only that "the four matters require a real external object in order to hold" — and so the verses below establish each one by the principle of consciousness-only.
5. The ancient masters' readings (古德 · stating their position)
- Dharmapāla, Cheng weishi baosheng lun 《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591 (Tang; tr. Yijing 義淨; a transmitted Chinese witness) — fascicle one expounds this verse in detail, unfolding the "establishing the thesis, answering the objections" opening into a systematic argument for consciousness-without-object. 〔Position stated: Dharmapāla reads the opening four objections through a systematic argument; this is one of the ancient masters' readings, recorded here only as to its position, not adjudicated.〕
- Vinītadeva, Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā — extant in Tibetan translation · no transmitted Chinese witness; per convention its name only is recorded, its content not entering as doctrinal ground.
6. Rendering and old-translation comparison (the three Chinese translations)
| Chinese translation | Edition | Comparison |
|---|---|---|
| ★ Tang · Xuanzang T31n1590 | 「若識無實境，則處時決定，相續不決定，作用不應成」 | The four objections are set out as parallel, explicit headings in a five-character quatrain framing the debate, followed by the prose auto-commentary; this format became the base text of the East Asian Yogācāra transmission. |
| Chen · Paramārtha T31n1589 《大乘唯識論》 | The expression of 「處時定」 ("fixity of place and time") leans toward the logical face of "determinacy," consonant with the language-context of his Mahāyāna-saṃgraha line (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison). | |
| Later Wei · Prajñāruci T31n1588 《唯識論》 | 「唯識無境界，以無塵妄見」 "Consciousness-only, without an object-realm; through the objectless [there is] mistaken seeing" — continuous prose; the four objections are not made explicit as parallel headings (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison). |
The four-fold making-explicit of the four objections is presented in full only in Xuanzang's translation — this is the structural reason Xuanzang's version became the East Asian mainstream. Verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text.
7. Terms (Sanskrit per the ancient transmission · pronunciation aid)
| Chinese | Sanskrit (pronunciation aid) | Sense |
|---|---|---|
| 三界唯識 | traidhātuka-vijñaptimātra | the three realms are nothing but the manifestation of consciousness; no real object apart from consciousness |
| 心·意·識·了 | citta · manas · vijñāna | four names, one thing, differing in angle; saying "mind" subsumes thought and the mental associates |
| 眩瞖 | taimira | an eye-disease, [in which one] sees hairs and flies in the air; the treatise's governing image for the thesis |
| 尋香城（乾闥婆城） | gandharva-nagara | a mirage-like phantom city, appearing yet without use |
The Sanskrit roman script is a pronunciation aid only; where no ancient-master transliteration is attested, it is left blank, not supplied from modern critical editions.
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence)
| Baifa (Hundred Dharmas) | Triṃśikā | Within the Viṃśatikā |
|---|---|---|
| #1 eye-consciousness cakṣur-vijñāna — this verse's four objections all presuppose consciousness having multiple distinctions | Triṃśikā v.1 「彼依識所變」, the provisional positing of self and dharmas — the Triṃśikā unfolds the system, the Viṃśatikā sets the thesis and guards against objections; the two are face and back | v.2 dream-and-ghost illustration — answers the first three objections (fixity of place and time · common seeing) with the dream illustration + the hungry-ghost illustration |
| #6 mind-consciousness mano-vijñāna — that on which the judgment of "fixity of place and time" rests | Triṃśikā v.17 「故一切唯識」 "therefore all is consciousness-only" — the Triṃśikā's concluding establishment | v.3 hell illustration — a unified answer to the objections, rounded off in the force of karma |
| #8 storehouse consciousness ālaya — the basis of shared karma, the karmic ground on which many mind-streams see one and the same object together ⭐ | v.4 「恒轉」 ("ever-turning") — ālaya is the ever-turning continuum, the ground of shared karma | v.23 concluding verse — closing the whole treatise's debate with a humble withdrawal |
9. Witness placement
- Chinese thesis-statement (§Prologue): T31n1590 〔p0074b27–c02〕 (Xuanzang)
- Chinese verse-text (§Verse): T31n1590 〔p0074c03–04〕 (Xuanzang)
- Chinese auto-commentary (§Auto-commentary): T31n1590 〔p0074c05–14〕 (Xuanzang)
- Scriptural proof: 60-fascicle Avataṃsaka T09n0278 〔0558c10〕「三界虛妄但是心作」 · 80-fascicle Avataṃsaka T10n0279 「三界所有唯是一心」
- Chinese translations collated for comparison: T31n1589 (Paramārtha, 《大乘唯識論》) · T31n1588 (Prajñāruci, 《唯識論》「唯識無境界，以無塵妄見」)
- Ancient master's commentary: T31n1591 (Dharmapāla, 《成唯識寶生論》fascicle one · a transmitted Chinese witness)