唯識二十論 偈十六 憶念非證
偈十五破了「我正看見」，對方退一步搬「記憶」：當下不算，可我後來記得啊——既記得，先前必有被領受過的外境，所以「先受後憶」能證外境實有。偈十六拆這條退路。
世親一句點破：「如說似境識，從此生憶念」。眼識本就會「現得像有外境」（似外境現），雖然外面無實境；後來那個「我記得剛才看見……」的分別意識，不過順著前一刻那個「似境識」留下的相再現得像那個境而已。整條鏈——前識似境、後念似前境——從頭到尾都在識內完成，不需外境插進來當源頭。所以「我記得」只證「先前有過一個似境的識」，證不了「先前有過一個外境」。拿記憶證外境，源頭就接錯了。
對方換招拿夢反將：夢醒會自知剛才是假，醒著的世界若也識變無實，為什麼醒著的人不會自知眼前也是假？既不自知是假，憑什麼說它如夢境般實境皆無？世親先按下「此亦非證」——「醒著不能自知是假」不是因為境真，而是人還沒醒到那一步（要等真覺現前才自知非實），正面留給偈十七。要抓的鑰匙：追問「記憶到底從哪裡來」——你以為記憶是外境蓋的章，其實它只是識自己留下的回聲。
Verse 15 broke "I am seeing it right now." The opponent steps back and brings out "memory": the present moment may not count, but I do remember it afterwards — and since I remember, there must have been, before, a real external object that was experienced; so "experienced first, recalled later" (先受後憶) can prove the reality of an external object. Verse 16 takes this fallback apart.
Vasubandhu pierces it in one line: "Just as with the object-seeming cognition, from this arises memory" (如說似境識，從此生憶念). Eye-consciousness of itself "appears as though an external object were there" (似外境現), even though outside there is no real object; and the later discriminating mind-consciousness that says "I remember just now seeing…" is nothing more than the trace left by that "object-seeming cognition" (似境識) of the previous moment, appearing again as though it were that object. The whole chain — the earlier cognition seeming to have an object, the later recollection seeming to have that earlier object — is completed from start to finish within consciousness, with no need for an external object inserted as its source. So "I remember" proves only "there was previously an object-seeming cognition," not "there was previously an external object." To prove an external object by memory is to plug into the wrong source.
The opponent switches tactics and uses the dream to turn the tables: on waking one knows for oneself that the dream just now was unreal — so if the waking world too is consciousness transforming with nothing real, why does the waking person not know for themselves that what is before them is also unreal? Since one does not know it for oneself, on what grounds say it is, like a dream-object, wholly without real object? Vasubandhu first holds it down with "this too is no proof" (此亦非證) — "while awake one cannot know it for oneself" is not because the object is real, but because the person has not yet woken up to that point (only when true awakening is present does one know for oneself that it is unreal), leaving the head-on resolution to Verse 17. The key to grasp: press the question "where does memory actually come from" — you take memory to be a stamp pressed by an external object; in fact it is only an echo that consciousness has left of itself.
§頌（半頌）
如說似境識，從此生憶念。
§論（世親自註）
論曰：如前所說，雖無外境，而眼識等似外境現，從此後位與念相應，分別意識似前境現，即說此為憶曾所受，故以後憶證先所見實有外境，其理不成。若如夢中雖無實境而識得起，覺時亦然。如世自知夢境非有，覺時既爾，何不自知？既不自知覺境非有，寧如夢識實境皆無？此亦非證。頌曰：
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
§頌 白話（半頌）
就像前面所說的「似外境而現的識」， 後來的憶念，就是從這個（似境識）生起的。
§論 白話
世親解釋這首偈。
就像前面所說的，雖然沒有外境，可是眼識等卻會「現得像有外境」。從這以後，在後一個位次上，（識）與「念」相應，分別意識也「現得像先前那個境」，這就叫作「憶念曾經領受過的（境）」。所以，想用「後來的憶念」去證明「先前所見的是實在的外境」，這個道理是不成立的（憶念是從似境識生的，不是從外境生的）。
如果像夢中那樣，雖然沒有實境而識照樣生起，那麼醒著時也是一樣。（對方詰難說：）就像世人自己知道「夢裡的境是沒有的」；醒著時既然也（被你說成）是這樣（識變無實），為什麼（醒著的人）不自己知道（眼前是假的）呢？既然不自己知道「醒著所見的境是沒有的」，又怎能像「夢中的識其實境都沒有」那樣（說醒境也都無）呢？
（世親說：）這也不能作為證據。（為什麼，）用下一首偈來說明。
§Verse — plain reading (half-verse)
Just as with the "cognition that appears as though there were an external object," spoken of before, the later memory arises from this (object-seeming cognition).
§Auto-commentary — plain reading
Vasubandhu explains this verse.
Just as was said before: although there is no external object, eye-consciousness and the rest do "appear as though an external object were there." Thereafter, at a later moment, (consciousness) is in concord with "recollection" (念), and the discriminating mind-consciousness too "appears as though it were that earlier object" — and this is called "remembering what was once experienced." Therefore, to try to use "later memory" to prove that "what was seen before was a real external object" — this does not hold (memory arises from the object-seeming cognition, not from an external object).
If, as in a dream, cognition arises all the same even though there is no real object, then it is the same in the waking state too. (The opponent challenges:) just as people themselves know that "the object in a dream does not exist," then since the waking state too is (on your account) like this (consciousness transforming, with nothing real), why does (the waking person) not know it for themselves (that what is before them is unreal)? Since they do not themselves know that "the object seen while awake does not exist," how can it be like "the cognition in a dream, where the object really does not exist at all" (and so say that the waking object too is wholly non-existent)?
(Vasubandhu says:) this too cannot serve as proof. (Why — that) is made clear by the next verse.
對方的退路：拿「記得」當證據
偈十五把「我正看見」破了，對方退一步搬出「記憶」：當下不算，可我後來記得啊——既然記得，先前必定真有個被我領受過的外境，否則記什麼？所以「先受後憶」總能證明外境實有。偈十六就來拆這條退路。
記憶的源頭，全在識裡
世親一句點破：「如說似境識，從此生憶念」。回想前面說過的——眼識本來就會「現得像有外境」（似外境現），雖然外面沒有實境。那麼，後來那個「我記得剛才看見……」的分別意識，不過是順著前一刻那個「似境識」留下的相，再現得像那個境而已。整條鏈——前識似境、後念似前境——從頭到尾都在識內完成，根本不需要一個外境插進來當源頭。
所以「我記得」只能證明「我先前有過一個似境的識」，證明不了「我先前有過一個外境」。 拿記憶來證外境，源頭就接錯了。
對方換招：夢醒會自知，醒著為什麼不自知
這條退路斷了，對方換了個更刁的角度，拿夢來反將一軍：你不是老用夢作比方嗎？可夢有個特點——人醒過來，就自己知道「剛才那夢是假的」。那好，如果醒著的世界也像夢一樣是識變無實，為什麼醒著的人不會自己知道「眼前這一切也是假的」？既然醒著時你並不自覺眼前是假，憑什麼說它就像夢中之境那樣「實境皆無」？
這一問挺利：它抓住「夢能自知假、醒不能自知假」的不對稱，反證醒境不同於夢、是實有。
世親先按下，留一句「此亦非證」
世親沒有當場展開，只先標一句「此亦非證」——這也不能拿來當「外境實有」的證據。因為「醒著時不能自知是假」這件事，恰恰有它的道理：不是境真，而是人還沒醒到那一步。這道理，他留到偈十七正面講透（要等「真覺」現前，才自知非實；未真覺，自然不能自知）。
承衍
偈十六做完兩件事：一是斷掉「以記憶證外境」——記憶從似境識生，不從外境生，源頭就在識內；二是接住對方「夢能自知假、醒不能自知假」的反將，按下「此亦非證」，把正面的解留給偈十七。讀偈十六，記住那把鑰匙——追問「記憶到底從哪裡來」：你以為記憶是外境蓋的章，其實它只是識自己留下的回聲。夢喻在這裡從「現覺如夢」推進到「夢覺之別」，偈十七將用「未醒不能自知」一錘定音。
The opponent's fallback: making "I remember" the proof
Verse 15 broke "I am seeing it right now." The opponent steps back and brings out "memory": the present moment may not count, but I remember it afterwards — and since I remember, there must have been, before, a real external object that I experienced; otherwise, what is there to remember? So "experienced first, recalled later" (先受後憶) ought always to prove the reality of an external object. Verse 16 comes to take this fallback apart.
The source of memory lies entirely within consciousness
Vasubandhu pierces it in one line: "Just as with the cognition that appears as though there were an external object, from this arises memory" (如說似境識，從此生憶念). Recall what was said earlier — eye-consciousness of itself "appears as though an external object were there" (似外境現), even though outside there is no real object. Then the later discriminating mind-consciousness (分別意識), the one that says "I remember just now seeing…," is nothing more than the trace left by that "object-seeming cognition" (似境識) of the previous moment, appearing once again as though it were that object. The whole chain — the earlier cognition seeming to have an object, the later recollection seeming to have that earlier object — is completed from start to finish within consciousness, and needs no external object inserted at all to serve as its source.
So "I remember" can prove only "I previously had an object-seeming cognition"; it cannot prove "I previously had an external object." To prove an external object by appeal to memory is to plug into the wrong source.
The opponent switches tactics: on waking from a dream one knows it for oneself — why, while awake, does one not?
This fallback cut off, the opponent switches to a craftier angle, using the dream to turn the tables: aren't you the one forever using the dream as your illustration? But the dream has a peculiar feature — a person wakes up and knows for themselves that "the dream just now was unreal." Very well: if the waking world too is, like a dream, consciousness transforming with nothing real, why does the waking person not know for themselves that "all of this before me too is unreal"? Since, while awake, you are not aware that what is before you is unreal, on what grounds do you say it is, like the object in a dream, "wholly without real object"?
This question is sharp: it seizes on the asymmetry "the dream can be known-as-unreal by oneself, the waking state cannot," and argues back that the waking object is unlike a dream — that it is real.
Vasubandhu holds it down for now, leaving one line: "this too is no proof"
Vasubandhu does not unfold it on the spot; he first marks just one line — "this too is no proof" (此亦非證) — this too cannot be taken as proof that "the external object is real." For the fact that "while awake one cannot know for oneself that it is unreal" has its own reason precisely: not that the object is real, but that the person has not yet woken up to that point. This reason he leaves for Verse 17 to expound head-on (only when "true awakening" (真覺) is present does one know for oneself that it is unreal; before true awakening, naturally one cannot know it for oneself).
Carried forward (承衍)
Verse 16 does two things: first, it severs "proving an external object by memory" — memory arises from the object-seeming cognition, not from an external object; its source is within consciousness. Second, it catches the opponent's tables-turning move "the dream can be known-as-unreal by oneself, the waking state cannot," holds it down with "this too is no proof," and leaves the head-on resolution to Verse 17. In reading Verse 16, keep hold of that key — press the question "where does memory actually come from": you take memory to be a stamp pressed by an external object; in fact it is only an echo that consciousness has left of itself. Here the dream-illustration advances from "present awareness is like a dream" to "the difference between dreaming and waking," and Verse 17 will settle the matter with the hammer-blow "while not yet awake, one cannot know it for oneself."
考據Apparatus
一、科判定位
| 系統 | 此偈之位 |
|---|---|
| 全論五段 | §肆 破現量·夢覺·教證（偈十五–廿一）之破憶念偈（半頌）。偈十五懸「先受後憶證外境·理亦不成」→ 偈十六正破：憶念從『似境識』生，非從外境 ；末引夢覺對比（覺時何不自知非有）→ 偈十七 未覺不知 |
| 偈十五→偈十六 | 偈十五破現量、懸「憶念證外境」之救；偈十六正破之，並以「夢中無實境而識起，覺時亦然」轉出夢覺難 |
| 玄奘段位 | §頌〔p0076b29〕（半頌）· §論自註〔p0076c01–07〕 |
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
§頌半頌（二句）：「如說似境識」（如前所說，眼識等雖無外境而似外境現）·「從此生憶念」（憶念即從此『似境識』而生）。憶念之源在識，不在外境。
§論二節：(一)正破憶念——眼識等似外境現（無外境），其後位與念相應，分別意識亦似前境現，即名「憶曾所受」；故憶念從似境識生，以後憶證先有外境，其理不成。(二)轉出夢覺難——夢中無實境而識得起，覺時亦然；對方詰：世人醒後自知夢境非有，覺時何不自知（覺境非有）？既不自知覺境非有，豈能如夢識之實境皆無？世親斷「此亦非證」，啟偈十七。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
- 經證：憶念依前識而起、夢覺之別，皆心識共許之事；世親即以「憶念從似境識生」破「憶念證外境」。
- 論本：世親自註（T1590）以「似境識→憶念」之識內相續，斷憶念不證外境，並承對方夢覺難而標「此亦非證」；論之破，繫識內之生起次第，不增不判。
四、本論釋要（世親自註 T1590）
本偈正破偈十五所懸之「先受後憶」。其鑰在憶念之源：能憶之分別意識，所「憶」者乃前位「似外境現」之眼識所留之相，後念與之相應而似前境現——這一整套全在識內相續完成，無須一個外境作中介。故「能憶」只證「先前有過似境之識」，不證「先前有過外境」。對方乃改道，舉夢覺之不對稱為難：人醒後能自知夢假，何以醒著時不能自知「覺境亦假」？若不能自知覺境非有，憑什麼說它如夢識般實境皆無？世親標「此亦非證」——不能自知非有，不等於它就是實有（其正面解在偈十七：未得真覺故不能自知，非境實有）。論中夢覺難為對辯所設，論本就之立破，不增不判。
五、諸家異釋（古德 · 標宗）
- 護法《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591（唐·義淨譯·漢有傳本）——釋本偈，展開憶念從似境識生及夢覺不對稱之難。〔標宗：護法於憶念之識內源及夢覺難有詳釋；古德讀法之一，此處只記其宗，不判。〕
- Vinītadeva Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā——藏譯存·漢無傳本，依例僅志其名，內容不入義據。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（三漢譯）
| 漢譯 | 譯本 | 對讀 |
|---|---|---|
| ★ 唐·玄奘 T31n1590 | 「如說似境識，從此生憶念」（半頌） | 二句，立「憶念從似境識生」；自註破先受後憶並引夢覺難；以此為底本 |
| 陳·真諦 T31n1589《大乘唯識論》 | 散文連展憶念之源與夢覺難（古代漢證·參校） | |
| 後魏·般若流支 T31n1588《唯識論》 | 對應段以散文出之；逐字以 CBETA 為準（古代漢證·參校） |
七、術語（古德所傳梵 · 發音輔助）
| 漢 | 梵（發音輔助） | 義 |
|---|---|---|
| 似境識 | — | 似外境而現之識（眼識等）；憶念之源 |
| 憶念 | smṛti | 念前所受；本偈明其從似境識生、非從外境 |
| 分別意識 | mano-vijñāna | 似前境現而名「憶曾所受」者 |
梵羅馬字僅作發音輔助；無古德音寫可徵者從闕，不據現代校本補。
八、互讀（唯識系次第）
| 百法明門論 | 唯識三十論 | 二十論內部 |
|---|---|---|
| #6 意識 mano-vijñāna——「分別意識似前境現」之能憶 ⭐ | 偈十六 意識——憶念屬意識之分別 | 偈十五 現量如夢——本偈破其末懸之「先受後憶」 |
| #11 念（別境心所）——「與念相應」之念 | 偈十 別境五——念為別境心所之一 | 偈十七 未覺不知——夢覺難之正答 |
| #8 阿賴耶識——似境識留相之所依 | 偈四 種子相續——前識留相、後念相應 | 偈十八 二識決定——識展轉增上 |
九、校本定位
- 漢文正文（§頌·半頌）：T31n1590〔p0076b29〕（玄奘譯）
- 漢文自註（§論）：T31n1590〔p0076c01–07〕（玄奘譯）
- 參校漢譯：T31n1589（真諦《大乘唯識論》）· T31n1588（般若流支《唯識論》）
- 古德釋：T31n1591（護法《成唯識寶生論》·漢有傳本）
1. Doctrinal-outline placement
| System | This verse's place |
|---|---|
| The treatise's five parts | The memory-refuting verse (a half-verse) of §IV Refuting [the appeal to] Direct Perception · Dream-and-Waking · Scriptural Proof (破現量·夢覺·教證, vv.15–21). v.15 leaves hanging 「先受後憶證外境·理亦不成」 ("experienced first and recalled later proves an external object · this reasoning too does not hold") → v.16 refutes it head-on: memory arises from the "object-seeming cognition" (似境識), not from an external object; at its close it introduces the dream-and-waking contrast (why, while awake, does one not know for oneself that [the object] is not real) → v.17 not-yet-awakened-does-not-know |
| v.15 → v.16 | v.15 refutes direct perception and leaves hanging the rescue "memory proves an external object"; v.16 refutes it head-on, and with "even though there is no real object in a dream cognition still arises, and it is the same while awake" turns out the dream-and-waking objection |
| Xuanzang's textual loci | §Verse 〔p0076b29〕(half-verse) · §Auto-commentary 〔p0076c01–07〕 |
2. The source-verse · the doctrinal thread
§The half-verse (two lines): 「如說似境識」 ("just as the object-seeming cognition spoken of [before]" — as said before, eye-consciousness and the rest, though without an external object, appear as though an external object were there) · 「從此生憶念」 ("from this, memory arises" — memory arises precisely from this "object-seeming cognition"). The source of memory is in consciousness, not in an external object.
§The auto-commentary, two sections: (i) Refuting memory head-on — eye-consciousness and the rest appear as though an external object were there (with no external object); thereafter, at a later moment, [consciousness] is in concord with recollection (與念相應), and the discriminating mind-consciousness too appears as though it were the earlier object, which is called "remembering what was once experienced" (憶曾所受); therefore memory arises from the object-seeming cognition, and to prove a prior external object by later memory does not hold. (ii) Turning out the dream-and-waking objection — even though there is no real object in a dream cognition still arises, and it is the same while awake; the opponent challenges: people, on waking, know for themselves that the dream-object was not real, so why, while awake, does one not know for oneself (that the waking object is not real)? Since one does not know for oneself that the waking object is not real, how can it be like a dream cognition, where the object really does not exist at all? Vasubandhu cuts it off with 「此亦非證」 ("this too is no proof"), launching v.17.
3. Scripture and treatise: the grounding (scriptural proof → treatise-root)
- Scriptural proof. That memory arises in dependence on a prior cognition, and the difference between dreaming and waking, are matters commonly granted concerning mind-and-consciousness; Vasubandhu uses just "memory arises from the object-seeming cognition" to refute "memory proves an external object."
- Treatise-root. Vasubandhu's auto-commentary (T1590), by the within-consciousness continuity of "object-seeming cognition → memory," severs [the claim that] memory proves an external object, and, taking up the opponent's dream-and-waking objection, marks 「此亦非證」 ("this too is no proof"); the treatise's refutation is tied to the order of arising within consciousness — neither adding to it nor adjudicating it.
4. The treatise-root in essence (Vasubandhu's auto-commentary, T1590)
This verse refutes head-on the "experienced first, recalled later" (先受後憶) left hanging by v.15. Its key is the source of memory: the discriminating mind-consciousness that does the remembering — what it "remembers" is the trace left by the eye-consciousness of the prior position that "appeared as though an external object were there," with the later recollection in concord with it and appearing as though it were that earlier object — this whole set is completed within the continuity of consciousness, with no need for an external object as intermediary. So "being able to remember" proves only "there was previously an object-seeming cognition," not "there was previously an external object." The opponent then switches course, raising the asymmetry of dreaming and waking as his objection: a person on waking can know for themselves that the dream was unreal, so why, while awake, can one not know for oneself that "the waking object too is unreal"? If one cannot know for oneself that the waking object is not real, on what grounds say it is, like a dream cognition, wholly without real object? Vasubandhu marks 「此亦非證」 — not being able to know for oneself that [the object] is not real does not amount to its being real (the head-on resolution is in v.17: one cannot know it for oneself because true awakening has not been attained, not because the object is real). The dream-and-waking objection in the treatise is set up for the debate; the treatise-root establishes-and-refutes upon it, neither adding nor adjudicating.
5. The ancient masters' readings (古德 · stating their position)
- Dharmapāla, Cheng weishi baosheng lun 《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591 (Tang; tr. Yijing 義淨; a transmitted Chinese witness) — expounds this verse, unfolding both "memory arises from the object-seeming cognition" and the dream-and-waking asymmetry objection. 〔Position stated: Dharmapāla has a detailed exposition of the within-consciousness source of memory and the dream-and-waking objection; this is one of the ancient masters' readings, recorded here only as to its position, not adjudicated.〕
- Vinītadeva, Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā — extant in Tibetan translation · no transmitted Chinese witness; per convention its name only is recorded, its content not entering as doctrinal ground.
6. Rendering and old-translation comparison (the three Chinese translations)
| Chinese translation | Edition | Comparison |
|---|---|---|
| ★ Tang · Xuanzang T31n1590 | 「如說似境識，從此生憶念」（半頌） "Just as with the object-seeming cognition spoken of [before], from this memory arises" (half-verse) | Two lines, establishing "memory arises from the object-seeming cognition"; the auto-commentary refutes "experienced first, recalled later" and brings in the dream-and-waking objection; this is taken as the base text |
| Chen · Paramārtha T31n1589 《大乘唯識論》 | Continuous prose unfolding the source of memory and the dream-and-waking objection (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison) | |
| Later Wei · Prajñāruci T31n1588 《唯識論》 | The corresponding passage is given in prose; verbatim follows CBETA (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison) |
Verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text; what has not been verified against the original is not recorded verbatim.
7. Terms (Sanskrit per the ancient transmission · pronunciation aid)
| Chinese | Sanskrit (pronunciation aid) | Sense |
|---|---|---|
| 似境識 | — | the cognition that appears as though there were an external object (eye-consciousness and the rest); the source of memory |
| 憶念 | smṛti | recollection of what was previously experienced; this verse shows it arises from the object-seeming cognition, not from an external object |
| 分別意識 | mano-vijñāna | that which appears as though it were the earlier object and is named "remembering what was once experienced" |
The Sanskrit roman script is a pronunciation aid only; where no ancient-master transliteration is attested, it is left blank, not supplied from modern critical editions.
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence)
| Baifa (Hundred Dharmas) | Triṃśikā | Within the Viṃśatikā |
|---|---|---|
| #6 mind-consciousness mano-vijñāna — the rememberer in "the discriminating mind-consciousness appears as though it were the earlier object" ⭐ | Triṃśikā v.16 mind-consciousness — memory belongs to the discrimination of mind-consciousness | v.15 direct perception is like a dream — this verse refutes the "experienced first, recalled later" left hanging at its close |
| #11 recollection 念 (an object-specific mental associate, 別境心所) — the "recollection" in "in concord with recollection" | Triṃśikā v.10 the five object-specific [associates] — recollection is one of the object-specific mental associates | v.17 not-yet-awakened-does-not-know — the head-on answer to the dream-and-waking objection |
| #8 storehouse consciousness 阿賴耶識 — the basis on which the object-seeming cognition leaves its trace | v.4 the continuity of seeds — the prior cognition leaves a trace, the later recollection is in concord | v.18 the determination of the two cognitions — consciousnesses in unfolding mutual reinforcement |
9. Witness placement
- Chinese verse-text (§Verse · half-verse): T31n1590 〔p0076b29〕 (Xuanzang)
- Chinese auto-commentary (§Auto-commentary): T31n1590 〔p0076c01–07〕 (Xuanzang)
- Chinese translations collated for comparison: T31n1589 (Paramārtha, 《大乘唯識論》) · T31n1588 (Prajñāruci, 《唯識論》) — verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text
- Ancient master's commentary: T31n1591 (Dharmapāla, 《成唯識寶生論》 · a transmitted Chinese witness)