唯識二十論 偈二十二 他心智
偈二十一末世親自己向唯識設一道難：佛教有「他心智」——聖者能知別人心裡在想什麼。這「知別人的心」算不算數？兩頭都像有麻煩：說不知，還配叫「知他心的智」嗎？說知，「別人的心」豈不成了被知的對象、像心外真有個境，唯識不就破了？
世親的解只在一個詞的分寸——「雖知他心，然不如實」。他心智確實知道別人的心，但知得不如其真實；「知」不假，可這知帶著一層未淨的膜，並非如實照見。唯識無傷：所知的不是離識實有的「他心」，而是帶虛妄外現、被自己的識所現的相。最妙的是他拿什麼來證——回頭一指「如自心智」：你知別人的心不如實，那你知自己的心難道就如實嗎？一樣不如實。為什麼連自知都不如實？「由無知故」——一層根本無明覆在那裡。他心智、自心智同被這層無知覆蓋，都照不見佛清淨智所照的「不可言之境」（離言法性）。
不如實卡在兩處：一是「似外境虛妄顯現」（所知總帶一副像在外面的虛妄樣貌），二是「所取能取分別未斷」（能知與所知這對二取還沒斷）。要等成佛、二取永斷，知才真正如實。於是兩難圓解：他心智知他心不違唯識（所知是帶二取的似現），它不如實正因二取未斷——反而又一次印證唯識。一道看似攻向唯識的難題，被接成了唯識的又一證。末句世親自抑「唯識理趣無邊…非佛誰能具廣決擇」，引出偈廿三結頌。回馬槍一句：你說聖者讀心像心外有境？可你連自己的心都讀不如實——不如實，正因你我心裡那對「能、所」還沒放下。
At the close of Verse 21, Vasubandhu sets a difficulty for consciousness-only with his own hand: Buddhism has "the knowledge of others' minds" (para-citta-jñāna) — a noble one can know what is in another's mind. Does this "knowing another's mind" count for anything or not? Both horns look like trouble: say it does not know, and does it still deserve to be called "the knowledge that knows others' minds"? Say it does know, and has not "another's mind" become an object known, as though there really were an object outside the mind — and is consciousness-only not thereby broken?
Vasubandhu's solution turns on a single careful word — "though it knows another's mind, it is yet not as it really is." The knowledge of others' minds does know another's mind, but it knows it not as it truly is; the "knowing" is not false, yet it carries a film not yet cleansed away, and is not an illumination of things as they really are. Consciousness-only is unharmed: what is known is not an "other's mind" existing really apart from consciousness, but a mark bearing a false external appearance, presented by one's own consciousness. Most ingenious is what he reaches for to prove it — he turns and points back, "just like the knowledge of one's own mind": you do not know another's mind as it really is — but do you, then, know your own mind as it really is? Just the same: not as it really is. Why is even self-knowledge not as it really is? "By reason of not-knowing" — a film of root ignorance lying covering it there. The knowledge of others' minds and the knowledge of one's own mind alike are covered over by this same film of not-knowing, and neither can illumine the "ineffable object" (the marklessness beyond speech) that the Buddha's pure knowledge illumines.
"Not as it really is" gets stuck at two points: first, "appearing falsely as though external" (what is known always carries a guise of being out there); second, "the discrimination into grasped and grasper not yet cut off" (the two graspings of knower and known not yet cut off). Only upon becoming a Buddha, the two graspings forever cut off, does knowing truly become knowing as it really is. So the dilemma is resolved whole: the knowledge of others' minds knows another's mind without running against consciousness-only (what is known is a semblance bearing the two graspings), and its not being as it really is is precisely because the two graspings are not yet cut off — which is, once more, a confirmation of consciousness-only. A difficulty that looked like an attack on consciousness-only is caught and turned into yet one more proof of it. The closing line restrains the author — "the doctrinal import of consciousness-only is without bound… apart from the Buddha, who could discern it fully and at large" — leading into the concluding verse of Verse 23. A backhand stroke: you say a noble one's reading of minds is as though there were an object outside the mind? Yet you do not even read your own mind as it really is — and "not as it really is" is precisely because that pair of "grasper and grasped" in your mind and mine has not yet been set down.
§頌
他心智云何，知境不如實？ 如知自心智，不知如佛境。
§論（世親自註）
論曰：諸他心智云何於境不如實知？如自心智。此自心智云何於境不如實知？由無知故。二智於境各由無知所覆蔽故，不知如佛淨智所行不可言境。此二於境不如實知，由似外境虛妄顯現故、所取能取分別未斷故。唯識理趣無邊決擇，品類差別難度甚深，非佛誰能具廣決擇。頌曰：
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
§頌 白話
「他心智」為什麼說它「知境不如實」呢？ 就像（人）知道自己的心的那種智，（也不如實一樣）； 這兩種智，都不能像佛的境界那樣（如實地知）。
§論 白話
世親解釋這首偈。
各種「他心智」為什麼對於所知的境不能如實地知呢？就像「自心智」（知道自己的心的智）一樣（也不如實）。那這「自心智」又為什麼對所知的境不能如實地知呢？是由於「無知」（根本的無明）的緣故。這兩種智，對於所知的境，各自都被無知所覆蓋遮蔽，所以不能像「佛的清淨智」所照見的那種「不可言說的境」那樣（如實地知）。
這兩種智之所以對境不能如實地知，是由於「（境）似外境而虛妄地顯現」的緣故，以及「能取、所取的分別還沒有斷」的緣故。
「唯識」的義理旨趣，要無邊地抉擇分判，其種類差別之難以測度、深奧，除了佛，還有誰能完整而廣大地抉擇呢？世親用最後一首偈（作結）。
§Verse — plain reading
Why is it said of "the knowledge of others' minds" (para-citta-jñāna) that "it knows its object, but not as the object really is"? It is just like the knowledge by which one knows one's own mind (which is likewise not as it really is); these two kinds of knowledge can neither of them know in the way the Buddha's domain (knows things as they really are).
§Auto-commentary — plain reading
Vasubandhu explains this verse.
Why is it that the various kinds of "knowledge of others' minds" cannot know their object as it really is? It is just like "the knowledge of one's own mind" (the knowledge by which one knows one's own mind, which is likewise not as it really is). And why, then, can this "knowledge of one's own mind" not know its object as it really is? It is by reason of "not-knowing" (ajñāna — root ignorance). Both these kinds of knowledge, with respect to the object known, are each covered over and obscured by not-knowing; and so neither can know in the way the "Buddha's pure knowledge" illumines that "ineffable object."
The reason these two kinds of knowledge cannot know their object as it really is, is by reason of "(the object) appearing falsely as though it were external," and by reason of "the discrimination into grasped and grasper not yet being cut off."
The doctrinal import of "consciousness-only" is to be discerned and adjudicated without bound; the distinctions of its kinds are so hard to fathom, so profound — apart from the Buddha, who could discern it fully and at large? Vasubandhu now (concludes) with the last verse.
世親給自己出的難題
偈二十一末，世親沒讓對方出招，反而自己向唯識設了一道難：佛教裡明明有「他心智」——聖者能知道別人心裡在想什麼。那好，這「知別人的心」到底算不算數？
兩頭都像有麻煩：說它不知——那還配叫「知他心的智」嗎？說它知——那「別人的心」豈不就成了一個被它知道的對象，活像心外真有個境，唯識不就破了？世親把這把刀架在自己脖子上，然後從容拆解。
答案：知，但不「如實」知
世親的解只在一個詞的分寸上——「雖知他心，然不如實」。他心智確實知道別人的心，但它知得不如其真實。所以「知」不假（不違常識），可這「知」帶著一層未淨的膜，並非如實照見。唯識因此無傷：他心智所知的，不是一個離識而實有的「他心」，而是帶著虛妄外現的、被自己的識所現的相。
一個讓人謙卑的旁證：你連自己的心都不如實知
最妙的是世親拿什麼來證明「他心智不如實」——他不往外舉例，而是回頭一指：「如自心智」。你知道別人的心不如實，那你知道自己的心，難道就如實嗎？ 一樣不如實。
為什麼連自知都不如實？世親一句點到底——「由無知故」。一層根本的無明，覆在那裡。他心智也好、自心智也好，同被這層無知覆蓋，都照不見「佛的清淨智」所照見的那個「不可言說的境」（離言法性）。
不如實，卡在哪兩處
世親還點出這層膜的兩道具體成分：一是「似外境虛妄顯現」——所知的境，總還帶著一副「像在外面」的虛妄樣貌；二是「所取能取分別未斷」——「能知的我」與「所知的他」這一對二取分別，還沒斷。只要這兩樣在，知就到不了如實。要等成佛、二取永斷，知才真正如實。
於是兩難圓解：他心智知他心，不違唯識（所知是帶二取的似現，非心外實境）；它之所以不如實，正因二取未斷——這恰恰又一次印證了唯識（境隨二取分別而現）。一道看似攻向唯識的難題，被世親接成了唯識的又一證。
承衍
偈二十二把全論最後一個可能的破口（他心智似證心外有境）也補上了，並借此點出一條更高的地平線——真正的「如實知」唯佛能有，因為唯佛二取永斷、智照不可言境。論末世親由此自抑：「唯識理趣無邊…非佛誰能具廣決擇」——這門道理深廣無邊，不是我能窮盡的，唯佛能徹。這一句謙退，正是偈廿三結頌的引子。讀偈二十二，記住那記回馬槍——你說聖者讀心像是心外有境？可你連自己的心都讀不如實；不如實，正因為你我心裡那對「能、所」還沒放下。
The hard problem Vasubandhu sets for himself
At the close of Verse 21, Vasubandhu does not wait for the opponent to make a move; instead he sets a difficulty for consciousness-only with his own hand: Buddhism plainly has "the knowledge of others' minds" (para-citta-jñāna) — a noble one (ārya) can know what is in another's mind. Very well, then: does this "knowing another's mind" count for anything or not?
Both horns look like trouble. Say it does not know — then does it still deserve to be called "the knowledge that knows others' minds"? Say it does know — then has not "another's mind" become an object that this knowledge knows, exactly as though there really were an object outside the mind, and is not consciousness-only thereby broken? Vasubandhu lays this blade against his own throat, and then, unhurried, takes it apart.
The answer: it knows, but it does not know "as it really is"
Vasubandhu's solution turns on a single careful word — "though it knows another's mind, it does so not as it really is." The knowledge of others' minds does indeed know another's mind, but it knows it not as it truly is. So the "knowing" is not false (it does not run against common sense), yet this "knowing" carries a film not yet cleansed away; it is not an illumination of things as they really are. Consciousness-only is therefore unharmed: what the knowledge of others' minds knows is not an "other's mind" that exists really, apart from consciousness, but a mark that bears a false external appearance, presented by one's own consciousness.
A humbling corroboration: you do not even know your own mind as it really is
Most ingenious of all is what Vasubandhu reaches for to prove that "the knowledge of others' minds is not as it really is" — he does not point outward for an example; he turns and points back: "just like the knowledge of one's own mind." You do not know another's mind as it really is — but do you, then, know your own mind as it really is? Just the same: not as it really is.
Why is even self-knowledge not as it really is? Vasubandhu drives it home in a single phrase — "by reason of not-knowing" (ajñāna). A film of root ignorance lies covering it there. The knowledge of others' minds and the knowledge of one's own mind alike are covered over by this same film of not-knowing, and neither can illumine that "ineffable object" (the marklessness of dharmas beyond speech, anabhilāpya) which the "Buddha's pure knowledge" illumines.
Where, exactly, "not as it really is" gets stuck — at two points
Vasubandhu further points out the two concrete components of this film: first, "falsely appearing as though external" — the object known always still carries a false guise of "as though it were out there"; second, "the discrimination into grasped and grasper not yet cut off" — the paired discrimination of "the I that knows" and "the other that is known," the two graspings (grāhya-grāhaka), is not yet cut off. So long as these two are present, knowing cannot reach things as they really are. Only upon becoming a Buddha, the two graspings forever cut off, does knowing truly become knowing as it really is.
So the dilemma is resolved whole: the knowledge of others' minds does know another's mind, and this does not run against consciousness-only (what is known is a semblance bearing the two graspings, not a real object outside the mind); and the very reason it is not as it really is, is that the two graspings are not yet cut off — which is precisely, once more, a confirmation of consciousness-only (the object appears in accord with the discrimination of the two graspings). A difficulty that looked like an attack on consciousness-only is caught by Vasubandhu and turned into yet one more proof of consciousness-only.
Carried forward (承衍)
Verse 22 mends the last possible breach in the whole treatise (that the knowledge of others' minds might seem to attest an object outside the mind), and by that very move points out a higher horizon — only the Buddha can have true "knowing as it really is," because only the Buddha has the two graspings forever cut off and a knowledge that illumines the ineffable object. At the treatise's close Vasubandhu thereupon withdraws in self-restraint: "the doctrinal import of consciousness-only is without bound… apart from the Buddha, who could discern it fully and at large?" — this principle is profound and boundless, not something I could exhaust; only the Buddha can fathom it through. This phrase of humble withdrawal is the very lead-in to the concluding verse of Verse 23. As you read Verse 22, remember that backhand stroke — you say a noble one's reading of minds is as though there were an object outside the mind? Yet you do not even read your own mind as it really is; and "not as it really is" is precisely because that pair of "grasper and grasped" in your mind and mine has not yet been set down.
考據Apparatus
一、科判定位
| 系統 | 此偈之位 |
|---|---|
| 全論五段 | §伍 他心智·結頌（偈廿二–廿三）之他心智偈。偈廿一末懸「他心智知他心否」之兩難 → 偈廿二正答：他心智雖知他心而不如實，如自心智亦不如實（由無知）；唯佛淨智知不可言境 → 偈廿三 結頌 |
| §肆→§伍 | 偈廿一以「雖知他心，然不如實」收 §肆；偈廿二正解此「不如實」之所以，並標「唯識理趣無邊·非佛不能具決擇」，為結頌張本 |
| 玄奘段位 | §頌〔p0077a22–23〕· §論自註〔p0077a24–b01〕 |
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
§頌四句：「他心智云何，知境不如實？」（設問：他心智何以知境不如實？）·「如知自心智，不知如佛境」（答：如自心智之知，亦不如實；二者皆不如佛境之如實知）。
§論三節：(一)以自例他——他心智於境不如實知，如自心智亦然。(二)究其因——自心智何以不如實？「由無知故」；二智皆為無知所覆，不知「如佛淨智所行不可言境」。(三)根由與收——二智不如實，由「似外境虛妄顯現」「所取能取分別未斷」故；唯識理趣無邊決擇、品類難度甚深，「非佛誰能具廣決擇」——啟結頌（偈廿三）。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
- 經證：佛淨智知一切境一切種、無分別智斷所取能取分別之說，皆佛法共傳之果智義；世親即以「佛境如實·餘智不如實」答他心智之難。
- 論本：世親自註（T1590）以「無知所覆·二取未斷」立他心智·自心智之不如實，並推極於「唯佛能具廣決擇」；論之答，繫二取分別與佛淨智，不增不判。
四、本論釋要（世親自註 T1590）
本偈正解偈廿一末之兩難——他心智究竟知不知他心。世親之答精微：他心智確「知」他心，但不「如實」知。 何以不如實？他以「自心智」為例反證：人連知自己的心都不如實——因「由無知故」（為根本無明所覆）。他心智、自心智二者，同被無知覆蔽，皆不能如「佛之淨智」那樣照見「不可言之境」（離言法性）。其不如實之根，在二事：一者「似外境虛妄顯現」（境相仍帶虛妄外現之貌）、二者「所取能取分別未斷」（能所二取之分別猶在）。故凡未成佛者之知，縱是聖者之他心智，亦未臻如實。如是兩難圓解：他心智知他心，不違唯識（所知非離識實有之他心，乃帶二取之似現）；其不如實，正因二取未斷。末句「唯識理趣無邊…非佛誰能具廣決擇」，既收 §伍、又自抑論主之所成有限，直引偈廿三之謙退結頌。本偈所涉「佛淨智·不可言境·二取分別」皆佛法共傳之果義，論本就之立義，不增不判。
五、諸家異釋（古德 · 標宗）
- 護法《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591（唐·義淨譯·漢有傳本）——釋本偈，展開他心智·自心智不如實及佛淨智不可言境。〔標宗：護法於二取未斷與佛境如實處有詳釋；古德讀法之一，此處只記其宗，不判。〕
- Vinītadeva Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā——藏譯存·漢無傳本，依例僅志其名，內容不入義據。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（三漢譯）
| 漢譯 | 譯本 | 對讀 |
|---|---|---|
| ★ 唐·玄奘 T31n1590 | 「他心智云何，知境不如實？如知自心智，不知如佛境」 | 五言四句，以自心智例他心智之不如實，歸於佛境如實；自註明二取未斷為其根；以此為底本 |
| 陳·真諦 T31n1589《大乘唯識論》 | 散文連展他心智不如實與佛境義（古代漢證·參校） | |
| 後魏·般若流支 T31n1588《唯識論》 | 對應段以散文出之；逐字以 CBETA 為準（古代漢證·參校） |
七、術語（古德所傳梵 · 發音輔助）
| 漢 | 梵（發音輔助） | 義 |
|---|---|---|
| 他心智 | para-citta-jñāna | 知他人心之智；雖知而不如實 |
| 無知 | ajñāna | 根本無明；二智不如實之因 |
| 所取能取分別 | grāhya-grāhaka-vikalpa | 能所二取之分別；未斷故不如實 |
| 佛淨智·不可言境 | buddha-śuddha-jñāna · anabhilāpya | 佛之清淨智·離言之境；唯佛如實知 |
梵羅馬字僅作發音輔助；無古德音寫可徵者從闕，不據現代校本補。
八、互讀（唯識系次第）
| 百法明門論 | 唯識三十論 | 二十論內部 |
|---|---|---|
| #100 真如 tathatā／離言法性——佛淨智所行不可言境 ⭐ | 偈廿一「圓成實」·偈廿九「無得不思議」——離言·二取斷之佛境 | 偈廿一 意罰大罪——本偈解其末懸之他心智兩難 |
| #6 意識——他心智·自心智之能知（帶二取） | 偈廿八–廿九 通達·究竟位——二取斷乃如實 | 偈廿三 結頌——難思佛所行 |
| #8 阿賴耶識——二取分別習氣之所藏 | 偈三十 轉依——二取永斷、佛智現 | 偈九 二無我——二取分別即所破 |
九、校本定位
- 漢文正文（§頌）：T31n1590〔p0077a22–23〕（玄奘譯）
- 漢文自註（§論）：T31n1590〔p0077a24–b01〕（玄奘譯）
- 參校漢譯：T31n1589（真諦《大乘唯識論》）· T31n1588（般若流支《唯識論》）
- 古德釋：T31n1591（護法《成唯識寶生論》·漢有傳本）
1. Doctrinal-outline placement
| System | This verse's place |
|---|---|
| The treatise's five parts | The knowledge-of-others'-minds verse of §V Knowledge of Others' Minds · Concluding Verse (vv.22–23). The close of v.21 leaves hanging the dilemma "does the knowledge of others' minds know another's mind or not" → v.22 answers directly: the knowledge of others' minds, though it knows another's mind, is not as it really is, just as the knowledge of one's own mind is likewise not as it really is (by reason of not-knowing); only the Buddha's pure knowledge knows the ineffable object → v.23 the concluding verse |
| §IV → §V relation | v.21 closes §IV with 「雖知他心，然不如實」 ("though it knows another's mind, it is yet not as it really is"); v.22 directly resolves the "why" of this "not as it really is," and marks 「唯識理趣無邊·非佛不能具決擇」 ("the doctrinal import of consciousness-only is without bound · apart from the Buddha none can discern it fully"), setting up the concluding verse |
| Xuanzang's textual loci | §Verse 〔p0077a22–23〕· §Auto-commentary 〔p0077a24–b01〕 |
2. The source-verse · the doctrinal thread
The §Verse's four lines: 「他心智云何，知境不如實？」 ("How is it that the knowledge of others' minds knows its object not as it really is?" — posing the question: why does the knowledge of others' minds know its object not as it really is?) · 「如知自心智，不知如佛境」 ("Like the knowledge that knows one's own mind, it does not know as the Buddha's domain knows" — the answer: like the knowing of the knowledge of one's own mind, it too is not as it really is; neither knows as the Buddha's domain knows things as they really are).
The §Auto-commentary in three movements: (i) arguing from self to other — the knowledge of others' minds does not know its object as it really is, just as the knowledge of one's own mind is likewise so. (ii) investigating the cause — why does the knowledge of one's own mind not know as it really is? 「由無知故」 ("by reason of not-knowing"); both kinds of knowledge are covered over by not-knowing, and do not know 「如佛淨智所行不可言境」 ("the ineffable object that the Buddha's pure knowledge ranges over"). (iii) root cause and closing — the two kinds of knowledge are not as they really are, by reason of 「似外境虛妄顯現」 ("appearing falsely as though external") and 「所取能取分別未斷」 ("the discrimination into grasped and grasper not yet cut off"); the doctrinal import of consciousness-only is discerned without bound, its kinds and degrees most profound, 「非佛誰能具廣決擇」 ("apart from the Buddha, who could discern it fully and at large") — launching the concluding verse (v.23).
3. Scripture and treatise: the grounding (scriptural proof → treatise-root)
- Scriptural proof. That the Buddha's pure knowledge knows every object in every kind, and that non-discriminating knowledge cuts off the discrimination into grasped and grasper — these are alike the sense of the fruit-knowledge jointly transmitted in the Buddha-dharma; Vasubandhu uses just this "the Buddha's domain is as it really is · the remaining knowledges are not as it really is" to answer the difficulty of the knowledge of others' minds.
- Treatise-root. Vasubandhu's auto-commentary (T1590) establishes the "not as it really is" of the knowledge of others' minds and the knowledge of one's own mind upon 「無知所覆·二取未斷」 ("covered over by not-knowing · the two graspings not yet cut off"), and presses it to the limit of 「唯佛能具廣決擇」 ("only the Buddha can discern fully and at large"); the treatise's answer ties to the discrimination of the two graspings and the Buddha's pure knowledge, neither adding nor adjudicating.
4. The treatise-root in essence (Vasubandhu's auto-commentary, T1590)
This verse directly resolves the dilemma left hanging at the close of v.21 — whether the knowledge of others' minds knows another's mind or not. Vasubandhu's answer is subtle: the knowledge of others' minds does "know" another's mind, but it does not know "as it really is." Why not as it really is? He takes the "knowledge of one's own mind" as an example to argue back: a person does not even know his own mind as it really is — because 「由無知故」 ("by reason of not-knowing," being covered over by root ignorance). The knowledge of others' minds and the knowledge of one's own mind alike are covered over by not-knowing, and neither can illumine, as the "Buddha's pure knowledge" does, the "ineffable object" (the marklessness of dharmas beyond speech). The root of its not being as it really is lies in two things: first, 「似外境虛妄顯現」 ("appearing falsely as though external" — the object-mark still bears the guise of a false external appearance); second, 「所取能取分別未斷」 ("the discrimination into grasped and grasper not yet cut off" — the discrimination of the two graspings, grasper and grasped, still abides). And so the knowing of any who has not yet become a Buddha, even the knowledge of others' minds in a noble one, has not reached things as they really are. Thus the dilemma is resolved whole: the knowledge of others' minds knows another's mind, and this does not run against consciousness-only (what is known is not an "other's mind" existing really apart from consciousness, but a semblance bearing the two graspings); and its not being as it really is is precisely because the two graspings are not yet cut off. The closing line 「唯識理趣無邊…非佛誰能具廣決擇」 ("the doctrinal import of consciousness-only is without bound… apart from the Buddha, who could discern it fully and at large") both closes §V and restrains the author as to the limit of what he has achieved, leading directly into the humble withdrawal of the concluding verse of v.23. The "Buddha's pure knowledge · ineffable object · discrimination of the two graspings" that this verse touches upon are all the fruit-sense jointly transmitted in the Buddha-dharma; the treatise-root establishes its meaning upon them, neither adding nor adjudicating.
5. The ancient masters' readings (古德 · stating their position)
- Dharmapāla, Cheng weishi baosheng lun 《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591 (Tang; tr. Yijing 義淨; a transmitted Chinese witness) — expounds this verse, unfolding the "not as it really is" of the knowledge of others' minds and the knowledge of one's own mind, and the ineffable object of the Buddha's pure knowledge. 〔Position stated: Dharmapāla has a detailed exposition at the points of "the two graspings not yet cut off" and "the Buddha's domain is as it really is"; this is one of the ancient masters' readings, recorded here only as to its position, not adjudicated.〕
- Vinītadeva, Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā — extant in Tibetan translation · no transmitted Chinese witness; per convention its name only is recorded, its content not entering as doctrinal ground.
6. Rendering and old-translation comparison (the three Chinese translations)
| Chinese translation | Edition | Comparison |
|---|---|---|
| ★ Tang · Xuanzang T31n1590 | 「他心智云何，知境不如實？如知自心智，不知如佛境」 | A five-character quatrain; it uses the knowledge of one's own mind to exemplify the "not as it really is" of the knowledge of others' minds, returning to the Buddha's domain as that which is as it really is; the auto-commentary makes clear that the two graspings not yet cut off is its root; taken as the base text |
| Chen · Paramārtha T31n1589 《大乘唯識論》 | continuous prose unfolding the "not as it really is" of the knowledge of others' minds together with the sense of the Buddha's domain (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison) | |
| Later Wei · Prajñāruci T31n1588 《唯識論》 | gives the corresponding passage in continuous prose; the verbatim follows CBETA throughout (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison) |
Verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text; what has not been verified against the original text is not recorded verbatim.
7. Terms (Sanskrit per the ancient transmission · pronunciation aid)
| Chinese | Sanskrit (pronunciation aid) | Sense |
|---|---|---|
| 他心智 | para-citta-jñāna | the knowledge that knows another's mind; though it knows, it is not as it really is |
| 無知 | ajñāna | root ignorance; the cause of the two knowledges' not being as it really is |
| 所取能取分別 | grāhya-grāhaka-vikalpa | the discrimination of the two graspings, grasped and grasper; not cut off, hence not as it really is |
| 佛淨智·不可言境 | buddha-śuddha-jñāna · anabhilāpya | the Buddha's pure knowledge · the ineffable object; only the Buddha knows it as it really is |
The Sanskrit roman script is a pronunciation aid only; where no ancient-master transliteration is attested, it is left blank, not supplied from modern critical editions.
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence)
| Baifa (Hundred Dharmas) | Triṃśikā | Within the Viṃśatikā |
|---|---|---|
| #100 suchness tathatā / the marklessness of dharmas beyond speech — the ineffable object that the Buddha's pure knowledge ranges over ⭐ | Triṃśikā v.21 "the perfectly-accomplished nature" (圓成實) · v.29 "the inconceivable of non-attainment" (無得不思議) — the Buddha's domain, beyond speech · the two graspings cut off | v.21 the grave fault of mental violence — this verse resolves the dilemma of the knowledge of others' minds it left hanging |
| #6 mind-consciousness — the knower in the knowledge of others' minds · the knowledge of one's own mind (bearing the two graspings) | Triṃśikā vv.28–29 the stage of penetration · the ultimate stage — the cutting off of the two graspings is being-as-it-really-is | v.23 the concluding verse — what the Buddha ranges over is hard to fathom |
| #8 storehouse consciousness — that which stores the perfuming of the discrimination of the two graspings | Triṃśikā v.30 the turning-about of the basis (轉依) — the two graspings forever cut off, the Buddha's knowledge manifest | v.9 the two selflessnesses — the discrimination of the two graspings is just what is to be refuted |
9. Witness placement
- Chinese verse-text (§Verse): T31n1590 〔p0077a22–23〕 (Xuanzang)
- Chinese auto-commentary (§Auto-commentary): T31n1590 〔p0077a24–b01〕 (Xuanzang)
- Chinese translations collated for comparison: T31n1589 (Paramārtha, 《大乘唯識論》) · T31n1588 (Prajñāruci, 《唯識論》) — verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text
- Ancient master's commentary: T31n1591 (Dharmapāla, 《成唯識寶生論》· a transmitted Chinese witness)