唯識二十論 偈十 三難

心要Essence

§壹 答難、§貳 還原十二處,世親一直在守與收;從偈十起轉守為攻,正面拆「外境離識實有」。攻法很硬:你說外面真有個被看見的「色」,那它的體到底是什麼樣?數來數去只有三種可能,世親一口氣全堵死。

第一,它是「一塊」(一)——像勝論的「有分色」(整體之色)。破:那個整體若離開各部分還能單獨抓到才算數,可你抓不到——「有分色體異諸分色不可取」。第二,它是「一堆各別原子」(多極微)。破:單一極微根本不是眼睛抓得到的——「極微各別不可取」。第三,它是「原子拼合的」(和合、和集)。破:這要成立,前提是「一顆實在的極微」先得站住,可這前提恰恰不成立——「一實極微理不成」,地基塌了拼出來的也塌。

三難看似三條路,其實全繫在同一根柱子上:極微到底能不能成立?「和合」乾脆不另立理、直接指向「極微不成」。末句「云何不成」把全部重量交給下面三偈(十一破合、十二堵聚色退路、十三破方分、十四以走路象馬水虫等例打回多分、結成唯識)。要守的分寸:破的是「色為離識實有外境」這個哲學立場,不是破佛說的色處(§貳 已明色處是密意、是識變外那張臉)。偈十是 §參 的開戰宣言。

Through §I (answering the objections) and §II (recovering the twelve sense-fields), Vasubandhu has been guarding and gathering in; from Verse 10 on he turns from defence to attack, dismantling head-on the claim that "the external object exists really, apart from consciousness." His method is hard: you say there really is, out there, a "colour-and-form" (色) that is being seen — then what exactly is its substance? Count as you may, there are only three possibilities, and Vasubandhu blocks them all in one breath.

First, it is "one block" (one) — like the Vaiśeṣikas' "whole-possessing form" (有分色, the integral form). Refuted: that whole would count only if it could be grasped on its own apart from the parts, but you cannot grasp it — "the substance of a whole-possessing form is other than the form of the parts, and so cannot be grasped" (有分色體異諸分色不可取). Second, it is "a heap of separate atoms" (many atoms). Refuted: a single atom is simply not something the eye can grasp — "the atoms, each on their own, cannot be grasped" (極微各別不可取). Third, it is "atoms pieced together" (aggregated, assembled). Refuted: for this to hold, the premise must be that "a single real atom" first stands firm — yet this very premise does not hold: "the principle of a single real atom is not established" (一實極微理不成), and once the foundation collapses, what is pieced up on it collapses too.

The three objections look like three roads, but all are tied to a single pillar: can the atom be established at all? "Aggregate" does not even set up a fresh argument — it points straight to "the atom is not established." The closing line "how can it not be [thus]?" (云何不成) hands the whole weight to the three verses below (v.11 refutes combining, v.12 closes off the retreat of assembled form, v.13 refutes directional parts, v.14 drives "one whole stretch of object" back into many parts — with walking, elephants and horses, water-insects, and the like — and seals it into consciousness-only). The measure to keep: what is refuted is the philosophical position "form as an external object existing really apart from consciousness," not the Buddha-taught colour-and-form sense-field (§II has already made plain that the colour-and-form sense-field is by hidden intent, the outward face of what consciousness transforms). Verse 10 is §III's declaration of war.

原典Canonical · verbatim

§頌

以彼境非一,亦非多極微, 又非和合等,極微不成故。

§論(世親自註)

論曰:此何所說?謂若實有外色等處與色等識各別為境,如是外境或應是一,如勝論者執有分色。或應是多,如執實有眾多極微各別為境,或應多極微和合及和集,如執實有眾多極微皆共和合和集為境。且彼外境理應非一,有分色體異諸分色不可取故。理亦非多,極微各別不可取故。又理非和合或和集為境,一實極微理不成故。云何不成?頌曰:

The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.

白話Plain reading

§頌 白話

因為那個(外)境既不是「一」(一個整體), 也不是「多」(許多各別的極微), 又不是「和合、和集」之類—— 因為「極微」本身根本立不起來。

§論 白話

世親解釋這首偈。

這是在說什麼呢?假如真有離開心識的色等處、作為色等識各別所緣的境,那麼這個外境,要嘛應該是「一」——就像勝論派所執著的「有分色」(一個整體的色);要嘛應該是「多」——就像有人執著實有許多極微,各別作為境;要嘛應該是「許多極微和合、和集」——就像有人執著實有許多極微,全都一起和合、和集而作為境。

可是:那個外境,照理不可能是「一」,因為「有分色」的體和各個部分的色不一樣,是抓不到的。照理也不可能是「多」,因為一個一個各別的極微是抓不到的。照理也不可能是「和合或和集而為境」,因為「一顆實在的極微」這件事本身根本就立不起來。

為什麼極微立不起來呢?世親用下一首偈來說明。

§Verse — plain reading

Because that (external) object is neither "one" (a single whole), nor "many" (a host of separate atoms), nor again something of the "aggregated, assembled" sort — because "the atom" (paramāṇu) itself simply cannot be established.

§Auto-commentary — plain reading

Vasubandhu explains this verse.

What is this saying? Suppose there really were a colour-and-form sphere (and the rest) apart from cognition, serving as the separate object of the cognition of colour-and-form. Then this external object would have to be one of three things: either it should be "one" — like the "whole-possessing form" (有分色, a single integral form) that the Vaiśeṣikas cling to; or it should be "many" — as some cling to there really being many atoms, each separately serving as the object; or it should be "many atoms aggregated and assembled" — as some cling to there really being many atoms, all of them together aggregated and assembled and serving as the object.

But: that external object, by rights, cannot be "one," because the substance of a "whole-possessing form" is other than the form of each of the parts, and so cannot be grasped. By rights it cannot be "many" either, because the atoms taken one by one, each on its own, cannot be grasped. And by rights it cannot be "an aggregate or assemblage serving as the object," because "a single real atom" — that very thing — simply cannot be established.

Why is it that the atom cannot be established? Vasubandhu makes this clear with the verse that follows.

義疏Exposition

換戰場:從「答難」到「正攻外境」

§壹 答四難、§貳 還原十二處,世親一直在「守」與「收」。從偈十起,他轉守為攻,正面拆「外境離識實有」這個立場。攻法很硬:不跟你含糊,直接逼問——你說外面真有個被看見的「色」,那我問你,它的體到底是什麼樣的? 數來數去只有三種可能,世親一口氣把三條路全堵死。

三條路,條條死

第一條:它是「一塊」(一)。 像勝論派講的「有分色」——一個整體的色,不分零件。世親破:那個「整體」如果真存在,它應該離開各個部分還能被你單獨抓到;可你抓不到一個「離開部分的整體」——「有分色體異諸分色不可取故」。這條路不通。

第二條:它是「一堆各別的原子」(多)。 就是無數個極微(原子)各自為境。世親破:單一個極微,根本不是眼睛抓得到的——「極微各別不可取故」。你眼前明明是一片顏色,不是一顆顆孤立的原子。這條也不通。

第三條:它是「原子拼合起來的」(和合、和集)。 既不是純整體、也不是純散沙,而是許多極微和合、和集成的。世親破:這條路要成立,前提是「一顆實在的極微」先得站得住;可這個前提恰恰不成立——「一實極微理不成故」。地基塌了,拼出來的樓自然塌。

三難其實收成一問

你看世親布局之嚴:一、多、和合,看似三條獨立的路,其實全繫在同一根柱子上——極微到底能不能成立? 「一」破完、「多」破完,「和合」乾脆不另立新理,直接指向「極微不成」。所以這一偈表面三難,骨子裡只逼一個問題。末句「云何不成?」不是修辭,是把全部重量交給下面三偈——偈十一、十二、十三,就是來把「一顆實在的極微」一寸一寸拆掉的。

一個要先講清的分寸

要留意:世親破的是「色為離識實有的外境」,不是破佛說的「色處」。佛說色處,§貳 已講明是依密意、是識變的外那張臉。所以 §參 不跟佛唱反調,只跟「把色處讀成心外實有原子」的部派較真。破的是「實有極微」這個哲學立場,不是破現象、不是破佛語——這條界線,整段 §參 都要守住。

承衍

偈十立下「外境非一、非多、非和合」的總難,把全部火力聚到「極微能否成立」這一點。接下來世親兵分三路逐一拆:偈十一破極微的「合」(原子怎麼黏在一起都矛盾),偈十二堵住「聚色能合」的退路,偈十三破極微的「方分」(有沒有方向面都不行),偈十四再用走路、象馬、水虫等日常例子把「一整片境」打回多分、結成唯識。讀偈十,記住它是 §參 的開戰宣言:三條路一起堵,逼你回答那唯一的問題。

Switching battlefields: from "answering objections" to "attacking external objects head-on"

Through §I (answering the four objections) and §II (recovering the twelve sense-fields by hidden intent), Vasubandhu has been on the defensive — "guarding" and "gathering in." From Verse 10 on, he turns from defence to attack, dismantling head-on the position that "the external object exists really, apart from consciousness." His method of attack is hard: he will not let you stay vague but presses you directly — you say there really is, out there, a "colour-and-form" (色) that is being seen; then I ask you, what exactly is its substance like? Count as you may, there are only three possibilities, and Vasubandhu blocks all three roads in one breath.

Three roads, every one a dead end

First road: it is "one block" (one). Like the "whole-possessing form" (有分色) the Vaiśeṣikas speak of — a single integral form, not divided into parts. Vasubandhu refutes it: if that "whole" really existed, it ought to be graspable on its own apart from the several parts; but you cannot grasp any "whole apart from the parts" — "the substance of a whole-possessing form is other than the form of the parts, and so cannot be grasped" (有分色體異諸分色不可取故). This road does not go through.

Second road: it is "a heap of separate atoms" (many). That is, countless atoms (paramāṇu), each on its own serving as the object. Vasubandhu refutes it: a single atom is simply not something the eye can grasp — "the atoms, each on its own, cannot be grasped" (極微各別不可取故). What is before your eyes is plainly a stretch of colour, not isolated atoms one by one. This road too does not go through.

Third road: it is "atoms pieced together" (aggregated, assembled). Neither a pure whole nor pure loose sand, but many atoms aggregated and assembled. Vasubandhu refutes it: for this road to hold, the premise must be that "a single real atom" first stands firm; but this very premise does not hold — "the principle of a single real atom is not established" (一實極微理不成故). The foundation has collapsed, so the building pieced up on it collapses of itself.

The three objections in fact gather into one question

See how tight Vasubandhu's layout is: one, many, aggregate — seemingly three independent roads, yet all of them tied to a single pillar — can the atom be established at all? Once "one" is refuted and "many" is refuted, "aggregate" does not even set up a fresh argument; it simply points straight to "the atom is not established." So although this verse has three objections on its surface, at its core it presses only a single question. The closing line "how can it not be [thus] established?" (云何不成?) is no rhetorical flourish; it hands the whole weight to the three verses below — Verses 11, 12, and 13 come precisely to take "a single real atom" apart inch by inch.

A measure that must be made clear first

Take care: what Vasubandhu refutes is "form as an external object existing really apart from consciousness" — it is not a refutation of the Buddha's teaching of the "colour-and-form sense-field" (色處). The Buddha taught the colour-and-form sense-field, and §II has already made clear that this is by hidden intent, the outward face of what consciousness transforms. So §III does not sing against the Buddha; it contends only with the schools that "read the colour-and-form sense-field as real atoms outside the mind." What is refuted is the philosophical position of "really existing atoms," not a refutation of the phenomenon, nor a refutation of the Buddha's word — this boundary-line the whole of §III must hold.

Carried forward (承衍)

Verse 10 sets down the master-objection "the external object is neither one, nor many, nor an aggregate," concentrating all the firepower onto the single point "can the atom be established?" Next, Vasubandhu splits his forces into three columns and dismantles it one by one: Verse 11 refutes the "combining" of atoms (however atoms might stick together, it is contradictory), Verse 12 closes off the line of retreat that "assembled form can combine," Verse 13 refutes the "directional parts" (方分) of the atom (whether or not it has directional faces, neither works), and Verse 14 then uses everyday examples — walking, elephants and horses, water-insects, and the like — to drive "one whole stretch of object" back into many parts, sealing it into consciousness-only. Read Verse 10 remembering that it is §III's declaration of war: block all three roads at once, and force you to answer the one and only question.

考據Apparatus

一、科判定位

系統此偈之位
全論五段§參 破極微(偈十–十四)之開首偈。§貳 收於二無我(偈八–九)→ 偈十 立三難(外境非一·非多·非和合) → 偈十一–十三 破極微之合與方分 → 偈十四 結成唯識、啟現量(§肆)
§貳→§參§貳 以密意還原十二處;§參 轉就「外境若實有,其體為何」窮詰,立「一/多/和合」三路俱不成之總難
玄奘段位§頌〔p0075c16–17〕· §論自註〔p0075c18–26〕

二、源頌 · 義理脈絡

§頌立三難總綱:外境「非一、非多極微、又非和合等」,因「極微不成故」。

§論列三路並逐破:(一)——如勝論者執「有分色」(整體之色);破:有分色之體異於諸分色,不可取。(二)——如執眾多極微各別為境;破:極微各別不可取。(三)和合/和集——如執眾多極微共和合和集為境;破:一實極微之理不成(和合所依之單位先不立)。三路皆繫於「極微能否成立」,故末問「云何不成」,啟偈十一正破極微。

三、經論宗依(經證 → 論本)

  • 經證:色等處為佛說(§貳 已明其密意);§參 不破佛說色處,唯破「色處為離識實有之外境」之部派解。
  • 論本:世親自註(T1590)就外境可能之三種體(一/多/和合)窮舉而破,立「外境理不成」之總難;論之破,對所破之部派執(勝論有分色、有部極微)逐一標出,乃論本自具之破立,非別構。

四、本論釋要(世親自註 T1590)

本偈為 §參 之總難綱領:凡主「外境離識實有」者,其外境之體不出三式——整一之「有分色」、眾多之「各別極微」、極微之「和合和集」。世親以「窮舉破盡」法:一者有分色不可取(其體異於分色而無可緣);多者各別極微不可取(單一極微非眼所行);和合者繫於「一實極微」之能否成立,而此正是下三偈所破。故三難實收於一問——極微能否成立——是 §參 全段之樞。所破之「勝論有分色」「有部極微和合」皆論本明標之部派宗,apparatus 如實志其名,不增不判。

五、諸家異釋(古德 · 標宗)

  • 護法《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591(唐·義淨譯·漢有傳本)——卷三開首釋本偈,展開三難之窮舉破。〔標宗:護法於一/多/和合三路之破有詳釋;古德讀法之一,此處只記其宗,不判。〕
  • Vinītadeva Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā——藏譯存·漢無傳本,依例僅志其名,內容不入義據。

六、譯名 · 古譯對讀(三漢譯)

漢譯譯本對讀
★ 唐·玄奘 T31n1590「以彼境非一,亦非多極微,又非和合等,極微不成故」五言四句,三難並列、末標「極微不成」為總因;自註逐路破,明標所破部派(勝論有分色/有部極微);以此為底本
陳·真諦 T31n1589《大乘唯識論》散文連展一/多/和合三難(古代漢證·參校)
後魏·般若流支 T31n1588《唯識論》對應偈頌段以散文連破三式;逐字以 CBETA 為準(古代漢證·參校)

七、術語(古德所傳梵 · 發音輔助)

梵(發音輔助)
極微paramāṇu物質之最小單位(原子);部派執為實有,§參 所破
有分色avayavin勝論所執「整一之色(具分之全體)」;三難之「一」
和合·和集saṃghāta·saṃcaya極微之聚合;三難之「和合」
勝論Vaiśeṣika執有分色之外道宗(論本明標)

梵羅馬字僅作發音輔助;無古德音寫可徵者從闕,不據現代校本補。

八、互讀(唯識系次第)

百法明門論唯識三十論二十論內部
#11 色法(五根五境)——§參 所破「色為離識實有外境」之執;論主攝色入識變 ⭐偈一「彼依識所變」——色等依識變立,非離識實有,正 §參 之歸結偈九 二無我——§貳 收束;偈十轉破外境之體
#8 阿賴耶識 ālaya——色等似境之所變根本偈八「由一切種識…變」——似色現識從自種生(偈八)偈十一 破極微一——正破極微之「合」
#1 眼識 cakṣur-vijñāna——「各別為境」之能緣偈十七「故一切唯識」——§參 破畢之歸結偈十四 破極微四——結成唯識、啟現量

九、校本定位

  • 漢文正文(§頌):T31n1590〔p0075c16–17〕(玄奘譯)
  • 漢文自註(§論):T31n1590〔p0075c18–26〕(玄奘譯)
  • 參校漢譯:T31n1589(真諦《大乘唯識論》)· T31n1588(般若流支《唯識論》)
  • 古德釋:T31n1591(護法《成唯識寶生論》卷三開首·漢有傳本)

1. Doctrinal-outline placement

SystemThis verse's place
The treatise's five partsThe opening verse of §III Refuting Atoms (破極微) (vv.10–14). §II is gathered up in the two selflessnesses (二無我, vv.8–9) → v.10 sets out the three objections (the external object is neither one · nor many · nor an aggregate) → vv.11–13 refute the combining and the directional parts of the atom → v.14 seals it into consciousness-only and opens [the refutation of the appeal to] direct perception (§IV).
§II→§III§II recovers the twelve sense-fields by hidden intent; §III turns to press the question "if the external object exists really, what is its substance?" — setting out the master-objection that the three roads "one / many / aggregate" all fail to hold.
Xuanzang's textual loci§Verse 〔p0075c16–17〕· §Auto-commentary 〔p0075c18–26〕

2. The source-verse · the doctrinal thread

The §Verse sets out the master-frame of the three objections: the external object is 「非一、非多極微、又非和合等」 ("neither one, nor many atoms, nor again something aggregated, and so forth"), because 「極微不成故」 ("the atom is not established").

The §Auto-commentary lays out the three roads and refutes each in turn: (i) one (一) — as the Vaiśeṣikas cling to a 「有分色」 ("whole-possessing form," the integral form); refuted: the substance of a whole-possessing form is other than the form of the several parts, and so cannot be grasped. (ii) many (多) — as some cling to many atoms each separately serving as the object; refuted: the atoms taken one by one cannot be grasped. (iii) aggregated / assembled (和合/和集) — as some cling to many atoms together aggregated and assembled serving as the object; refuted: the principle of a single real atom is not established (the unit on which aggregation depends is not first set up). All three roads are tied to "can the atom be established," so the closing question 「云何不成」 ("how can it not be [thus]?") opens v.11's direct refutation of the atom.

3. Scripture and treatise: the grounding (scriptural proof → treatise-root)

  • Scriptural proof. The colour-and-form sense-field (and the rest) is the Buddha's teaching (§II has already made plain its hidden intent); §III does not refute the Buddha-taught colour-and-form sense-field, but refutes only the schools' interpretation of "the colour-and-form sense-field as an external object existing really apart from consciousness."
  • Treatise-root. Vasubandhu's auto-commentary (T1590) exhaustively enumerates and refutes the three possible substances of the external object (one / many / aggregate), setting out the master-objection that "the external object is not established in principle"; the treatise's refutation singles out, one by one, the schools' positions that it refutes (the Vaiśeṣika whole-possessing form, the Sarvāstivāda atom), and is the treatise-root's own refutation-and-establishment, not a separate construction.

4. The treatise-root in essence (Vasubandhu's auto-commentary, T1590)

This verse is the master-objection outline of §III: for anyone who holds "the external object exists really apart from consciousness," the substance of that external object is exhausted by three forms — the integral 「有分色」 ("whole-possessing form"), the manifold "atoms each separate," and the "aggregation and assemblage" of atoms. Vasubandhu uses the method of "exhaustive enumeration, refuted to the last": the one — the whole-possessing form cannot be grasped (its substance, being other than the form of the parts, has nothing to take as object); the many — the atoms each on their own cannot be grasped (a single atom is not within the range of the eye); the aggregate — this is tied to whether "a single real atom" can be established, and this is precisely what the next three verses refute. So the three objections in fact gather into one question — can the atom be established? — which is the pivot of the whole of §III. The "Vaiśeṣika whole-possessing form" and "Sarvāstivāda atom-aggregation" that it refutes are both schools the treatise-root expressly names; the apparatus records their names faithfully, neither adding to them nor adjudicating.

5. The ancient masters' readings (古德 · stating their position)

  • Dharmapāla, Cheng weishi baosheng lun 《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591 (Tang; tr. Yijing 義淨; a transmitted Chinese witness) — fascicle three opens by explaining this verse, unfolding the exhaustive refutation of the three objections. 〔Position stated: Dharmapāla gives a detailed exposition of the refutation along the three roads of one / many / aggregate; this is one of the ancient masters' readings, recorded here only as to its position, not adjudicated.〕
  • Vinītadeva, Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkāextant in Tibetan translation · no transmitted Chinese witness; per convention its name only is recorded, its content not entering as doctrinal ground.

6. Rendering and old-translation comparison (the three Chinese translations)

Chinese translationEditionComparison
★ Tang · Xuanzang T31n1590「以彼境非一,亦非多極微,又非和合等,極微不成故」A five-character quatrain, the three objections set out in parallel, with 「極微不成」 ("the atom is not established") marked at the close as the master-cause; the auto-commentary refutes road by road, expressly naming the schools refuted (the Vaiśeṣika whole-possessing form / the Sarvāstivāda atom); this is taken as the base text.
Chen · Paramārtha T31n1589 《大乘唯識論》Continuous prose unfolding the three objections of one / many / aggregate (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison).
Later Wei · Prajñāruci T31n1588 《唯識論》The corresponding verse-section refutes the three forms continuously in prose; verbatim per CBETA (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison).

Verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text; what has not been verified against the original is not recorded verbatim.

7. Terms (Sanskrit per the ancient transmission · pronunciation aid)

ChineseSanskrit (pronunciation aid)Sense
極微paramāṇuthe smallest unit of matter (the atom); the schools cling to it as real; what §III refutes
有分色avayavinthe "integral form (the whole that possesses its parts)" clung to by the Vaiśeṣikas; the "one" of the three objections
和合·和集saṃghāta · saṃcayathe aggregation of atoms; the "aggregate" of the three objections
勝論Vaiśeṣikathe non-Buddhist school that holds the whole-possessing form (expressly named by the treatise-root)

The Sanskrit roman script is a pronunciation aid only; where no ancient-master transliteration is attested, it is left blank, not supplied from modern critical editions.

8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence)

Baifa (Hundred Dharmas)TriṃśikāWithin the Viṃśatikā
#11 form-dharmas (the five sense-faculties and five sense-objects) — what §III refutes is the clinging to "form as an external object existing really apart from consciousness"; the treatise's author subsumes form into the transformation of consciousness ⭐Triṃśikā v.1 「彼依識所變」 ("that rests on the transformation of consciousness") — colour-and-form and the rest are established as transformations of consciousness, not real apart from consciousness; precisely the conclusion of §IIIv.9 the two selflessnesses — §II's close; v.10 turns to refute the substance of the external object
#8 storehouse consciousness ālaya — the root that transforms into the seeming-objects of colour-and-form and the restTriṃśikā v.8 「由一切種識…變」 ("through the all-seeds consciousness … it transforms") — the consciousness that manifests as seeming-form arises from its own seeds (v.8)v.11 refuting the oneness of the atom — the direct refutation of the atom's "combining"
#1 eye-consciousness cakṣur-vijñāna — the cognizer for which [the atom] "separately serves as object"Triṃśikā v.17 「故一切唯識」 ("therefore all is consciousness-only") — the conclusion once §III's refutation is completev.14 the fourth refutation of the atom — sealing it into consciousness-only and opening [the refutation of] direct perception

9. Witness placement

  • Chinese verse-text (§Verse): T31n1590 〔p0075c16–17〕 (Xuanzang)
  • Chinese auto-commentary (§Auto-commentary): T31n1590 〔p0075c18–26〕 (Xuanzang)
  • Chinese translations collated for comparison: T31n1589 (Paramārtha, 《大乘唯識論》) · T31n1588 (Prajñāruci, 《唯識論》) — verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text
  • Ancient master's commentary: T31n1591 (Dharmapāla, 《成唯識寶生論》fascicle three opening · a transmitted Chinese witness)

Translator · 釋慧鏡 Shi Huijing — with AI-assisted consistency checking

License · CC BY-NC-SA 4.0