唯識二十論 偈十五 現量如夢
§參 把外境的「體」拆光了，可對方還攥著最直覺的一張王牌：「道理我辯不過，可我此刻分明親眼看見東西，這『現量』總假不了吧？」§肆 從偈十五起拔這張王牌，世親下兩刀。
第一刀，夢：「現覺如夢等」。你做夢時夢裡也歷歷分明地「看見」，那一刻的現覺一點不含糊，可夢裡根本沒有外境。既然「有現覺」不保證「有外境」（夢就是反例），醒著的「我正看見」憑什麼反證外面真有東西？
第二刀，時間差：說「我正現量證得這顏色」的是意識的判斷，意識下這判斷得等那一刻過去；而按剎那生滅，到意識起念說「我看見了」時，先一剎那真正在看的眼識早已謝、被看的境也早已滅。於是「我看見了」成立時，能看的和被看的其實都已不在——你要的「當下能見所見俱在」兩頭都謝了，「寧許有現量」？
對方退守「先受後憶」（總得先受過、後才憶得起，可見先前有外境），世親只標「理亦不成」，正面破留給偈十六（憶念其實從識生、不從外境生）。偈十五的招法：不爭「你有沒有看見」，只指出「看見不等於外面真有」，再指出「等你說看見時，看見早過去了」。夢喻與「先受後憶」這條退路，是 §肆 接下來要反覆用、正面拆的。
§III took the "substance" of external objects apart, clean and complete; yet the opponent still grips the most intuitive card of all: "The argument I cannot win — but right at this instant I am plainly seeing things with my own eyes; surely this 'direct perception' (現量) cannot be faked?" §IV, beginning from Verse 15, pulls out this card, and Vasubandhu delivers two strokes.
First stroke, the dream: "the present feeling of seeing is like that in a dream" (現覺如夢等). When you dream, in the dream too you "see" vivid and distinct — in that moment your present feeling of seeing is not the least bit vague, yet in the dream there is no external object whatsoever. Since "having a present feeling of seeing" is no guarantee of "having an external object" (the dream being the counter-example), what entitles your waking "I am now seeing" to prove, in reverse, that something is really out there?
Second stroke, the time-gap: what says "I am now attaining this colour through direct perception" is the judgment of mind-consciousness, and mind-consciousness must wait for that moment to go by before it can pass this judgment; yet by momentary arising-and-ceasing, by the time mind-consciousness raises the thought "I saw it," the eye-consciousness that was truly seeing one instant before has long since passed, and the object that was seen has long since ceased too. So at the moment "I saw it" holds good, the seeing and the seen are in fact both already gone — the "seeing and seen both present in the moment" that you want have both passed at both ends, so "how can one grant that there is direct perception?" (寧許有現量)
The opponent falls back on "first undergoing, then recalling" (one must have undergone it first, and only afterward can recall it, which shows there was an external object earlier); Vasubandhu only marks "the reasoning does not hold either," leaving the head-on breaking to Verse 16 (recollection in fact arises from consciousness, not from an external object). The move of Verse 15: do not contest "whether or not you saw it," only point out that "seeing does not equal something really being out there," and then that "by the time you say you saw it, the seeing is long past." The dream illustration, and this retreat of "first undergoing, then recalling," are what §IV will use again and again, and break head-on, in what follows.
§頌
現覺如夢等，已起現覺時， 見及境已無，寧許有現量？
§論（世親自註）
論曰：如夢等時雖無外境，而亦得有如是現覺，餘時現覺應知亦爾，故彼引此為證不成。又若爾時有此現覺，我今現證如是色等；爾時於境能見已無，要在意識能分別故，時眼等識必已謝故。剎那論者有此覺時，色等現境亦皆已滅，如何此時許有現量？要曾現受意識能憶，是故決定有曾受境，見此境者許為現量，由斯外境實有義成。如是要由先受後憶證有外境，理亦不成。何以故？頌曰：
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
§頌 白話
「當下親見」的覺受，就像在夢裡（也有）； 而且當這「我正親見」的覺受生起的時候， 能見（的眼識）和所見的境其實都已經不在了—— 那怎麼還能承認有「現量」呢？
§論 白話
世親解釋這首偈。
就像作夢的時候，雖然沒有外境，卻一樣會有「我正親見」這樣的覺受；那麼其餘（醒著）時候的「親見覺受」也應該知道是一樣的（不保證有外境）。所以對方拿「我現在親見」來作為「有外境」的證據，是不成立的。
再說，假如那時有這個「我如今親見這顏色」的覺受：可是那時候「能見」其實已經沒有了——因為這個「我親見」是要靠意識去分別的，而到意識起分別的時候，眼等識（剎那前真正在看的那個識）必定已經謝滅了。對主張「剎那生滅」的人來說，到有這個覺受的時候，那顏色等所現的境也都已經滅了。既然如此，這時候怎麼還能承認有「現量」呢？
（對方退一步說：）一定是先前曾經親身領受過，意識後來才能憶念；所以決定有過「曾被領受的境」，能見到這境的就算作「現量」，由此「外境實有」就成立了。（世親說：）像這樣，要靠「先領受、後憶念」來證明有外境，道理也是不成立的。為什麼呢？世親用下一首偈來說明。
§Verse — plain reading
The feeling of "seeing it right now, for myself" is there even in a dream; and at the very moment this feeling of "I am now seeing it for myself" arises, the seeing (the eye-consciousness) and the object seen are in fact both already gone — so how can one still grant that there is any "direct perception" (現量)?
§Auto-commentary — plain reading
Vasubandhu explains this verse.
Just as in a dream — where, though there is no external object, there is all the same a feeling of "I am now seeing it for myself" — so too the "feeling of seeing for oneself" at all other (waking) times should be understood to be of the same kind (it is no guarantee that an external object is there). And so, when the opponent brings forward "I am now seeing it for myself" as proof that "there is an external object," it does not hold.
Further: suppose at that moment there is this feeling, "I am now seeing this colour for myself" — yet at that very moment the "seeing" is in fact already gone. For this "I am seeing for myself" relies on mind-consciousness (意識) to discern it, and by the time mind-consciousness arises and discerns, the eye-consciousness and the rest (the consciousness that was truly seeing a moment before) must already have passed away. For one who holds to "momentary arising-and-ceasing," by the time there is this feeling, the colour and the other objects that appeared have also already ceased. That being so, how at this moment can one still grant that there is any "direct perception"?
(The opponent retreats a step and says:) Surely one must first have personally undergone the experience for oneself, and only afterward can mind-consciousness recall it; so there must definitely have been an "object that was undergone," and that which was able to see this object counts as "direct perception" — and by this "the real existence of external objects" is established. (Vasubandhu says:) In this way too — proving that there are external objects by "first undergoing, then recalling" — the reasoning does not hold either. Why? Vasubandhu explains it in the next verse.
道理輸了，還有最後一張王牌
§參 把外境的「體」拆得乾乾淨淨，可對方還攥著一張王牌——也是常人最直覺的一張：「你說的我都辯不過，可我此刻分明親眼看見東西啊！這『現量』（當下親見）總假不了吧？」§肆 從偈十五起，世親就來拔掉這張王牌。他下兩刀。
第一刀：夢裡也「親眼看見」
世親說：「現覺如夢等」。你做夢的時候，夢裡也是歷歷分明地「看見」山、人、事——那一刻你的「現覺」（當下我正看見的感覺）一點不含糊，可夢裡根本沒有外境。
這就夠了：既然「有現覺」並不保證「有外境」（夢就是現成的反例），那你醒著時的「我正看見」，憑什麼就能反過來證明外面真有東西？現覺證不了外境——夢已經替你示範過了。
第二刀：等你說「我看見了」，看見早就過去了
第二刀更細，扣在「時間差」上。請慢動作拆解「我現在正看見這顏色」這個念頭：
說出「我正在現量證得這顏色」的，是意識的分別判斷。可意識要對前一刻的經驗下這個判斷，得等那一刻過去。而按你我都承認的「剎那生滅」：到意識起念說「我看見了」的這一剎那，先一剎那那個真正在看的眼識早已謝滅，那個被看的顏色境也早已滅去。
於是出現一個尷尬：當「我看見了」這個判斷成立時，能看的（眼識）和被看的（境）其實都已經不在了。 你宣稱的「現量」要的是「當下能見、所見俱在」，可一查，兩頭都已謝。覺還在，見和境都沒了——「寧許有現量？」哪還有什麼現量可言？
退一步也堵死
對方會退守：「就算當下這樣，可我總得先現量受過這境，後來才憶得起它；既能憶，可見先前確有被受的外境，現量還是成立、外境還是實有。」——「先受後憶」證外境。世親只先標一句「理亦不成」，把這條退路的正面破留給偈十六（憶念其實是從識生，不是從外境生）。
承衍
偈十五是 §肆 的開刀第一式，專破「我親眼看見」這最頑固的常識據。它埋下兩個將貫穿整段的東西：一是夢喻——夢裡的現覺、夢裡的見物，是 §肆 反覆要用的鏡子（偈十六、十七還會深挖：醒著為什麼不像夢醒後那樣自知是假？因為還沒「真覺」）；二是「先受後憶」這條退路，正是偈十六要正面拆的。讀偈十五，記住世親的招法——不跟你爭「你有沒有看見」，只指出「看見不等於外面真有」，再指出「等你說看見時，看見早過去了」。
The argument is lost, but there is still one last trump card
§III took the "substance" of external objects apart, clean and complete; yet the opponent still grips one last trump card — the most intuitive card any ordinary person holds: "Everything you say, I cannot argue against — but right at this instant I am plainly seeing things with my own eyes! Surely this 'direct perception' (現量, seeing-for-oneself in the present moment) cannot be faked?" §IV, beginning from Verse 15, is where Vasubandhu pulls out this card. He delivers two strokes.
First stroke: in a dream too one "sees with one's own eyes"
Vasubandhu says: "the present feeling of seeing is like that in a dream" (現覺如夢等). When you dream, in the dream too you "see" mountains, people, events, vivid and distinct — in that moment your "present feeling of seeing" (現覺, the feeling of "I am right now seeing it") is not the least bit vague, yet in the dream there is no external object whatsoever.
This is enough: since "having a present feeling of seeing" is no guarantee of "having an external object" (the dream is a ready-made counter-example), what entitles your waking "I am now seeing" to turn around and prove that something is really out there? A present feeling of seeing cannot prove an external object — the dream has already demonstrated this for you.
Second stroke: by the time you say "I saw it," the seeing is long past
The second stroke is finer, hinging on a "time-gap." Take apart, in slow motion, the thought "I am right now seeing this colour":
What says "I am now attaining this colour through direct perception" is the discerning judgment of mind-consciousness (意識). But for mind-consciousness to pass this judgment on the experience of the moment just past, it must wait for that moment to go by. And by the "momentary arising-and-ceasing" that you and I both grant: by the very instant mind-consciousness raises the thought "I saw it," the eye-consciousness that was truly seeing one instant before has long since passed away, and the colour-object that was seen has long since ceased too.
So an awkwardness appears: at the moment the judgment "I saw it" holds good, the seeing (the eye-consciousness) and the seen (the object) are in fact both already gone. The "direct perception" you claim requires that "the seeing and the seen are both present in the moment," yet on inspection both ends have already passed. The feeling is still there; the seeing and the object are both gone — "how can one grant that there is direct perception?" (寧許有現量?) What direct perception is there left to speak of?
Even the retreat is sealed off
The opponent will fall back: "Even if it is so in the present moment, surely I must first have undergone this object through direct perception, and only afterward can I recall it; and since I can recall it, plainly there was earlier a real external object that was undergone — so direct perception still holds, and external objects are still real." — "First undergoing, then recalling" as proof of external objects. Vasubandhu here only marks the single line "the reasoning does not hold either" (理亦不成), leaving the head-on breaking of this retreat to Verse 16 (recollection in fact arises from consciousness, not from an external object).
Carried forward (承衍)
Verse 15 is the opening stroke of §IV's surgery, breaking specifically the most stubborn commonsense ground — "I saw it plainly with my own eyes." It plants two things that will run through this whole stretch: first, the dream illustration — the present feeling of seeing in a dream, the seeing of things in a dream, is the mirror §IV will use again and again (Verses 16 and 17 dig deeper still: why does waking life not, like waking from a dream, know itself to be false? Because one has not yet "truly awakened"); and second, the retreat of "first undergoing, then recalling," which is exactly what Verse 16 will break head-on. In reading Verse 15, remember Vasubandhu's move — he does not contest "whether or not you saw it"; he only points out that "seeing does not equal something really being out there," and then that "by the time you say you saw it, the seeing is long past."
考據Apparatus
一、科判定位
| 系統 | 此偈之位 |
|---|---|
| 全論五段 | §肆 破現量·夢覺·教證（偈十五–廿一）之開首偈。§參 末以「現量為勝」啟現量難 → 偈十五 破現量（現覺如夢·見境已謝） → 偈十六 破憶念證 → 偈十七 未覺不知 → 偈十八 二識決定 → 偈十九–廿一 夢覺果別·他識轉變·意罰 |
| §參→§肆 | 偈十四末對方執「我今現證如是境」之現量難，偈十五正破：現量之覺如夢、且覺起時見與境已謝，現量不成 |
| 玄奘段位 | §頌〔p0076b18–19〕· §論自註〔p0076b20–28〕 |
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
§頌四句：「現覺如夢等」（現量之覺如夢中之覺，夢無外境亦有現覺）·「已起現覺時，見及境已無」（『我今現證』此一現覺起時，能見之眼識與所見之境皆已謝）·「寧許有現量」（故無所證之現量）。
§論二節：(一)破現量——夢等無外境而有現覺，故現覺不證外境；且「我今現證如是色等」之覺屬意識分別，其起時眼等識必已謝（剎那論者：色等境亦已滅），覺起而見、境俱無，何許有現量。(二)鑒「先受後憶」之救——對方退立：要曾現量受境、意識方能憶，故有曾受之境，現量乃成、外境實有。世親斷「如是要由先受後憶證有外境，理亦不成」，破留偈十六。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
- 經證：夢中現覺、剎那生滅，皆現量／教共許之事；世親即以「夢亦有現覺」「覺起時見境已謝」破現量證外境。
- 論本：世親自註（T1590）以「現覺如夢」及「剎那謝滅」雙破現量，並懸「先受後憶」之救待破；論之破，繫對方自許之現量與剎那義，逐節拆解，不增不判。
四、本論釋要（世親自註 T1590）
本偈破對方最後之經驗據——「現量親證外境」。世親兩刀：(一)如夢——夢中無外境而有歷歷之現覺；既然「有現覺」不保證「有外境」（夢即反例），則醒時之現覺亦不足以證外境。(二)時差——「我今現證」這個判斷是意識的分別，它起來時，先一剎那的眼識（能見）早已謝、所對之境也已滅（依剎那生滅義）；於是「現量」所宣稱的「當下能見、所見俱在」，其實能見與所見都已不在。覺在而見、境不在，現量遂落空。對方退守「先受後憶」（要先現量受過、後方能憶，故必有曾受之外境），世親標「理亦不成」，正破其「憶念證外境」之說留與偈十六。論中「剎那論者」「先受後憶」皆對辯所許之義，論本就之立破，不增不判。
五、諸家異釋（古德 · 標宗）
- 護法《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591（唐·義淨譯·漢有傳本）——釋本偈，展開現覺如夢、見境已謝及先受後憶救之評破。〔標宗：護法於現量如夢及剎那時差處有詳釋；古德讀法之一，此處只記其宗，不判。〕
- Vinītadeva Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā——藏譯存·漢無傳本，依例僅志其名，內容不入義據。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（三漢譯）
| 漢譯 | 譯本 | 對讀 |
|---|---|---|
| ★ 唐·玄奘 T31n1590 | 「現覺如夢等，已起現覺時，見及境已無，寧許有現量？」 | 五言四句，以「如夢」「時差」雙破現量；自註引剎那論者及先受後憶救；以此為底本 |
| 陳·真諦 T31n1589《大乘唯識論》 | 散文連展現覺如夢與見境已謝（古代漢證·參校） | |
| 後魏·般若流支 T31n1588《唯識論》 | 對應偈頌段以散文出之；逐字以 CBETA 為準（古代漢證·參校） |
七、術語（古德所傳梵 · 發音輔助）
| 漢 | 梵（發音輔助） | 義 |
|---|---|---|
| 現量 | pratyakṣa | 現前直證之量；本偈所破之「現量證外境」 |
| 現覺 | — | 「我今現證」之當下覺知；夢中亦有，故不證外境 |
| 剎那論者 | kṣaṇika-vāda | 主剎那生滅者（對辯所許）；覺起時見境已謝之據 |
| 意識 | mano-vijñāna | 「我今現證」之分別主體；其起時眼識已謝 |
梵羅馬字僅作發音輔助；無古德音寫可徵者從闕，不據現代校本補。
八、互讀（唯識系次第）
| 百法明門論 | 唯識三十論 | 二十論內部 |
|---|---|---|
| #6 意識 mano-vijñāna——「我今現證」之分別主體；眼識謝後方起 ⭐ | 偈十六 意識——五俱·獨頭意識之分別，正本偈現覺所屬 | 偈十四 破極微四——本偈承其末「現量為勝」之難 |
| #1 眼識 cakṣur-vijñāna——「能見」；覺起時已謝 | 偈八–十五 識變剎那——剎那生滅，見境已謝 | 偈十六 憶念非證——承本偈破「先受後憶」 |
| #8 阿賴耶識——剎那相續之所依 | 偈四 恒轉如瀑流——剎那相續 | 偈十七 未覺不知——夢覺之喻深化 |
九、校本定位
- 漢文正文（§頌）：T31n1590〔p0076b18–19〕（玄奘譯）
- 漢文自註（§論）：T31n1590〔p0076b20–28〕（玄奘譯）
- 參校漢譯：T31n1589（真諦《大乘唯識論》）· T31n1588（般若流支《唯識論》）
- 古德釋：T31n1591（護法《成唯識寶生論》·漢有傳本）
1. Doctrinal-outline placement
| System | This verse's place |
|---|---|
| The treatise's five parts | The opening verse of §IV Refuting [the appeal to] Direct Perception · Dream-and-Waking · Scriptural Proof（§肆 破現量·夢覺·教證, vv.15–21). At the end of §III the appeal "direct perception is the strongest [proof]"（「現量為勝」）launches the objection from direct perception → v.15 refutes direct perception (the present feeling of seeing is like a dream · seeing and object have already passed) → v.16 refutes the appeal to recollection → v.17 not-yet-awake, not-knowing → v.18 the determinacy of the two consciousnesses → vv.19–21 the differing fruits of dream and waking · transformation by another's consciousness · the harm done by mind |
| §III→§IV relation | At the end of v.14 the opponent holds 「我今現證如是境」 ("I am now directly attesting such an object") — the objection from direct perception; v.15 refutes it head-on: the feeling of direct perception is like a dream, and at the moment the feeling arises the seeing and the object have already passed, so direct perception does not hold |
| Xuanzang's textual loci | §Verse 〔p0076b18–19〕· §Auto-commentary 〔p0076b20–28〕 |
2. The source-verse · the doctrinal thread
The §Verse, in four lines: 「現覺如夢等」 — "the present feeling of seeing is like [that] in a dream and the like" (the feeling of direct perception is like the feeling in a dream; a dream has no external object yet also has a present feeling of seeing); 「已起現覺時，見及境已無」 — "by the time the present feeling of seeing has arisen, the seeing and the object are already gone" (when this present feeling of "I am now directly attesting" arises, the eye-consciousness that does the seeing and the object that is seen have both already passed); 「寧許有現量」 — "how can one grant that there is direct perception?" (so there is no attested object of direct perception).
The §Auto-commentary, in two parts: (i) refuting direct perception — a dream and the like have no external object yet have a present feeling of seeing, so the present feeling of seeing does not prove an external object; and the feeling "I am now directly attesting such colour and the like" belongs to the discernment of mind-consciousness, and when it arises the eye-consciousness and the rest must already have passed (for the momentarist: the colour and other objects have likewise already ceased) — with the feeling arisen but the seeing and the object both gone, how can direct perception be granted. (ii) examining the rescue of "first undergoing, then recalling" — the opponent falls back: one must have first undergone the object through direct perception for mind-consciousness then to be able to recall it, so there was an object that was undergone, whereby direct perception holds and external objects are real. Vasubandhu cuts it off — 「如是要由先受後憶證有外境，理亦不成」 ("in this way too, to prove there are external objects by first undergoing and then recalling — the reasoning does not hold either") — leaving the breaking of it to v.16.
3. Scripture and treatise: the grounding (scriptural proof → treatise-root)
- Scriptural proof. The present feeling of seeing within a dream, and momentary arising-and-ceasing, are matters jointly granted by direct perception and by the teaching; Vasubandhu uses just "a dream too has a present feeling of seeing" and "when the feeling arises the seeing and the object have already passed" to refute direct perception as proof of external objects.
- Treatise-root. Vasubandhu's auto-commentary (T1590) refutes direct perception with the double stroke of "the present feeling of seeing is like a dream"（現覺如夢）and "momentary passing-away"（剎那謝滅）, and holds in suspense the rescue of "first undergoing, then recalling" awaiting refutation; the treatise's refutation fastens onto the direct perception and the momentariness that the opponent grants of his own accord, taking them apart point by point — adding nothing, adjudicating nothing.
4. The treatise-root in essence (Vasubandhu's auto-commentary, T1590)
This verse refutes the opponent's last experiential ground — "direct perception personally attests an external object." Vasubandhu's two strokes: (i) like a dream（如夢）— in a dream there is no external object yet a vivid present feeling of seeing; since "having a present feeling of seeing" is no guarantee of "having an external object" (the dream being the counter-example), then the present feeling of seeing while awake is likewise insufficient to prove an external object. (ii) the time-gap（時差）— the judgment "I am now directly attesting" is the discernment of mind-consciousness (意識); by the time it arises, the eye-consciousness (眼識, that which sees) of the instant just before has long since passed, and the object (境) it faced has ceased too (on the principle of momentary arising-and-ceasing); and so the "seeing and seen both present in the moment" that "direct perception" claims turn out, in fact, to be a seeing and a seen both already gone. The feeling is present while the seeing and the object are not — and direct perception thereby falls empty. When the opponent falls back on "first undergoing, then recalling"（先受後憶, one must first undergo through direct perception, and only afterward can recall, so there must have been an external object undergone), Vasubandhu marks 「理亦不成」 ("the reasoning does not hold either"), leaving the head-on breaking of this "recollection proves external objects" claim to v.16. The "momentarist"（剎那論者）and "first undergoing, then recalling"（先受後憶）in the treatise are both positions granted by the opponent; the treatise establishes its refutation upon them — adding nothing, adjudicating nothing.
5. The ancient masters' readings (古德 · stating their position)
- Dharmapāla, Cheng weishi baosheng lun 《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591 (Tang; tr. Yijing 義淨; a transmitted Chinese witness) — comments on this verse, unfolding the present feeling of seeing being like a dream, the seeing and object having passed, and the critique-and-refutation of the rescue of "first undergoing, then recalling." 〔Position stated: Dharmapāla has a detailed exposition at the points of direct perception being like a dream and the momentary time-gap; this is one of the ancient masters' readings, recorded here only as to its position, not adjudicated.〕
- Vinītadeva, Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā — extant in Tibetan translation · no transmitted Chinese witness; per convention its name only is recorded, its content not entering as doctrinal ground.
6. Rendering and old-translation comparison (the three Chinese translations)
| Chinese translation | Edition | Comparison |
|---|---|---|
| ★ Tang · Xuanzang T31n1590 | 「現覺如夢等，已起現覺時，見及境已無，寧許有現量？」 | A five-character quatrain refuting direct perception by the double stroke of "like a dream" and "the time-gap"; the auto-commentary adduces the momentarist and the rescue of "first undergoing, then recalling"; taken as the base text |
| Chen · Paramārtha T31n1589 《大乘唯識論》 | Continuous prose unfolding both "the present feeling of seeing is like a dream" and "seeing and object have passed" (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison) | |
| Later Wei · Prajñāruci T31n1588 《唯識論》 | Renders the corresponding verse-passage as prose; verbatim follows CBETA (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison) |
Verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text; what has not been verified against the original is not recorded verbatim.
7. Terms (Sanskrit per the ancient transmission · pronunciation aid)
| Chinese | Sanskrit (pronunciation aid) | Sense |
|---|---|---|
| 現量 | pratyakṣa | the measure of present, immediate attestation; what this verse refutes is "direct perception as proof of an external object" |
| 現覺 | — | the present awareness of "I am now directly attesting"; present in a dream too, hence no proof of an external object |
| 剎那論者 | kṣaṇika-vāda | one who holds to momentary arising-and-ceasing (granted by the opponent); the ground for "when the feeling arises the seeing and object have passed" |
| 意識 | mano-vijñāna | the discerning subject of "I am now directly attesting"; when it arises the eye-consciousness has already passed |
The Sanskrit roman script is a pronunciation aid only; where no ancient-master transliteration is attested, it is left blank, not supplied from modern critical editions.
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence)
| Baifa (Hundred Dharmas) | Triṃśikā | Within the Viṃśatikā |
|---|---|---|
| #6 mind-consciousness mano-vijñāna — the discerning subject of "I am now directly attesting"; it arises only after the eye-consciousness has passed ⭐ | Triṃśikā v.16 mind-consciousness — the discernment of the five-accompanied and the solitary mind-consciousness, just what the present feeling of seeing in this verse belongs to | v.14 refuting the atom in four ways — this verse follows on its closing objection "direct perception is the strongest" |
| #1 eye-consciousness cakṣur-vijñāna — the "seeing"; already passed by the time the feeling arises | Triṃśikā vv.8–15 the momentariness of consciousness-transformation — momentary arising-and-ceasing, the seeing and object having passed | v.16 recollection is no proof — following on this verse's refutation of "first undergoing, then recalling" |
| #8 storehouse consciousness — the basis of momentary continuity | Triṃśikā v.4 "ever-turning like a torrent"（恒轉如瀑流）— momentary continuity | v.17 not-yet-awake, not-knowing — deepening the illustration of dream and waking |
9. Witness placement
- Chinese verse-text (§Verse): T31n1590 〔p0076b18–19〕 (Xuanzang)
- Chinese auto-commentary (§Auto-commentary): T31n1590 〔p0076b20–28〕 (Xuanzang)
- Chinese translations collated for comparison: T31n1589 (Paramārtha, 《大乘唯識論》) · T31n1588 (Prajñāruci, 《唯識論》) — verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text
- Ancient master's commentary: T31n1591 (Dharmapāla, 《成唯識寶生論》· a transmitted Chinese witness)