唯識二十論 偈十四 破極微四
偈十–十三把抽象的原子拆光，偈十三末把問題挪到你眼前那片青色：它是「一整塊不可分的東西」還是「多」？偈十四破「它是一整塊」，破法極接地氣，只擺四件你天天經驗的小事。一、走路：地若是一整塊，一抬腳就該踩到整片，可你得一步步走（漸次行）。二、同時的到與沒到：同一時刻走到這頭沒到那頭，一物怎能既得又未得？三、有縫隙的象馬：一塊地上多匹象馬有空隙，若是「一」就分不出這匹那匹、看不見間隙。四、難見的小水虫：細小水虫與粗物同處，若是「一」、大小該相等，可小虫偏細小難見。四件小事件件證明：眼前那片青絕不是一整塊。
既不是一，就得是多，可分到極微——而極微偈十–十三早證明不是實在的。兩頭落空：說一被四事打回、說多則極微非實。結論只剩一個：離心識而實有的「根」與「境」統統立不起來，「由此善成唯有識義」。§參 五偈至此圓滿。
世親收尾留個尾巴：對方還有最後一句「可我現在親眼就看見外境啊（我今現證如是境）」。世親先點規矩——「諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝」，承認這詰難夠重；再撂三字「此證不成」，把正面破留給 §肆。偈十四一手收網（破完外境、立起唯識）、一手開新局（把現量推到台前）：抽象原子論用走路水虫破完，活生生的「我看見了」留給夢來破（偈十五 現量如夢）。
Verses 10–13 took the abstract atom apart; the end of Verse 13 shifted the question to that patch of blue before your eyes: is it "one indivisible solid block" or is it "many"? Verse 14 refutes "it is one solid block," and the refutation is utterly down-to-earth — it lays out four small matters you experience every day. One — walking: if the ground were one solid block, lifting a foot should tread on the whole expanse at once, yet you have to cross it step by step (walking in sequence). Two — "arrived" and "not yet arrived" at the same time: at one moment you have reached this end and not that one — how can one thing be both reached and not reached? Three — elephants and horses with gaps: on one patch of ground many elephants and horses stand with spaces between them; if it were "one," this one and that could not be told apart and no gap would be seen. Four — the hard-to-see little water-insect: a tiny water-insect shares a place with a coarse thing; if it were "one" and so equal in size, they should be the same size — yet the little insect is small and hard to see. Four small matters, each one proving: that patch of blue before your eyes is by no means one solid block.
Being not one, it must be many — divisible down to the atom; yet the atom was already proved, in Verses 10–13, not to be real. Both ends come up empty: say "one," and the four matters knock it back; say "many," and the atom is unreal. Only one conclusion is left: the "faculty" and the "object" that would exist as real apart from consciousness cannot be established at all — 「由此善成唯有識義」 ("by this, the principle that there is consciousness only is well established"). The five verses of §III come here to their fullness.
Vasubandhu closes by leaving a loose end: the opponent still has one last word — "but I see the external object with my own eyes right now (我今現證如是境, 'I now realize, by direct perception, an object like this')." Vasubandhu first points out the rule — 「諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝」 ("dharmas are settled as existing or not by means of knowing; among all means of knowing, direct perception carries the most weight") — granting the challenge is weighty enough; then he lays down three words, 「此證不成」 ("this proof does not hold"), leaving the head-on refutation to §IV. Verse 14 with one hand draws in the net (the refutation of external objects complete, consciousness-only set up) and with the other opens a new round (pushing direct perception to the front of the stage): the abstract atom-theory is refuted with walking and water-insects; the living "I saw it!" is left for the dream to refute (Verse 15, direct perception is like a dream).
§頌
一應無次行，俱時至未至， 及多有間事，并難見細物。
§論（世親自註）
論曰：若無隔別，所有青等眼所行境執為一物，應無漸次行大地理，若下一足至一切故。又應俱時於此於彼無至未至。一物一時，理不應有得未得故。又一方處，應不得有多象馬等有間隙事，若處有一亦即有餘，云何此彼可辯差別？或二如何可於一處有至不至中間見空？又亦應無小水虫等難見細物，彼與麁物同一處所，量應等故。若謂由相此彼差別即成別物，不由餘義。則定應許此差別物展轉分析成多極微，已辯極微非一實物，是則離識，眼等色等、若根若境皆不得成。由此善成唯有識義。諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝。若無外境寧有此覺：我今現證如是境耶。此證不成。頌曰：
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
§頌 白話
（眼前的色若是「一」，就有四件事說不通：） 一、就不該能一步步行走； 二、不該能同時「這裡到了、那裡還沒到」； 三、不該能在一處有許多（象馬等）帶著間隙的東西； 四、也不該有小水虫等難看見的細物（與粗物分得開）。
§論 白話
世親解釋這首偈。
假如把所有青等、眼睛所見的境，當作「沒有隔別的一個東西」，那麼：應該就沒有「一步一步走過大地」這回事了——因為只要踏下一腳，就該到達一切（整片）。又應該同一個時刻，在這裡、在那裡沒有「到了」和「還沒到」的分別——因為是一個東西、一個時刻，照理不該有「已得」和「未得」。又在同一個地方，應該不會有許多象、馬等帶著間隙的情形——如果一處有了一個就等於有其餘，那此一彼一怎麼分得出差別？或者兩個東西，怎麼可能在同一處有「到、沒到」，中間還看得見空檔？又應該也沒有小水虫等難看見的細物了——因為它和粗大的東西在同一處所，大小就該相等（可它偏偏細小難見）。
如果說「靠著相上的此彼差別，就成了不同的東西，不是靠別的理由」——那就一定得承認：這些有差別的東西可以一層層分析下去，分成許多極微。可是前面已經辨明，極微並不是一個實在的東西。這樣一來，離開心識的「眼等（根）」「色等（境）」，無論是根是境，都立不起來。由此就很好地成立了「唯有識」的道理。
諸法是靠「量」（認識的方法）來刊定它有或沒有的；而一切量當中，「現量」（現前親證）最有分量。（對方會說：）如果沒有外境，怎麼會有這樣的覺知——「我如今分明現量證得這樣的境」呢？（世親說：）這個「現量為證」也是不成立的。用下一首偈來說明。
§Verse — plain reading
(If the colour-and-form before your eyes were "one," four things would not hold:) First, there could be no walking step by step; second, there could be no being "arrived here, not yet arrived there" at the same moment; third, there could be no many things (elephants, horses, and the like) with gaps between them in one place; fourth, there could be no tiny water-insects and other hard-to-see fine things (set apart from coarse things).
§Auto-commentary — plain reading
Vasubandhu explains this verse.
Suppose one takes all the blue-and-the-rest, the objects the eye sees, to be "one thing with no division within it." Then: there ought to be no such thing as "walking step by step across the ground" — because the moment you set one foot down, you should arrive at everything (the whole expanse). And at one and the same moment there ought to be no distinction of "arrived" and "not yet arrived" here and there — because, it being one thing at one moment, there ought by rights to be no "already reached" and "not yet reached." And in one place there ought to be no situation of many elephants, horses, and the like with gaps between them — for if having one in a place is the same as having the rest, then how could this-one and that-one be told apart? Or, with two things, how could there be "arrived, not arrived" in one place, with a gap visible in between? And there ought also to be no tiny water-insects and other hard-to-see fine things — because, being in the same location as the coarse, large thing, they should be equal in size to it (yet they are in fact small and hard to see).
If one says, "it is by the this-and-that difference in their appearance that they become different things, and not for any other reason" — then one must concede this: these things-with-differences can be analysed down layer by layer, divided into many atoms (paramāṇu). But it has already been made clear above that an atom is not a real thing. With that, the "eye and the rest" (the faculties) and "colour-and-form and the rest" (the objects) apart from consciousness — whether faculty or object — cannot be established at all. By this, the principle that "there is consciousness only" is well established.
Dharmas are settled as existing or not existing by means of "means of knowing" (pramāṇa, the methods of cognition); and among all means of knowing, "direct perception" (pratyakṣa, present and first-hand realization) carries the most weight. (The opponent will say:) if there were no external object, how could there arise this awareness — "I now plainly realize, by direct perception, an object like this"? (Vasubandhu says:) this "direct perception as proof" does not hold either. The next verse explains it.
收網：從原子轉到你眼前的青
偈十–十三把抽象的「原子」拆光了。偈十三末，世親把問題挪到更切身的地方——你眼前這一片青色（眼等所對的青等實色），到底是「一整塊不可分的東西」，還是「多」？偈十四就來破「它是一整塊」。破法極接地氣，不談玄理，只擺四件你天天經驗的小事。
四件小事，件件證明「不是一塊」
一、走路。 如果你腳下這片大地是「一整塊無隔別的東西」，那你一抬腳踩下去，就該一步踩到「整片」——可你明明得一步一步慢慢走過去（「應無漸次行大地理，若下一足至一切故」）。能漸次行走，就證明它不是一整塊。
二、同時的「到」與「沒到」。 同一個時刻，你走到了這頭、還沒到那頭。可若它是「一物」，一物在同一時刻怎麼可能「既已得、又未得」？（「一物一時，理不應有得未得故」。）有此至彼未至，就證明不是一。
三、有縫隙的象馬。 同一塊地上站著好多匹象、馬，彼此之間有空隙。若這地是「一」，那「有一處就等於有全部」，象和馬怎麼還分得出這匹那匹、中間怎麼還看得見空檔（「有間隙事」）？看得見間隙，就證明不是一。
四、難見的小水虫。 還有極小的水虫之類，難看見的細物，跟旁邊粗大的東西同在一處。若那片境是「一」、大小該相等，那粗物和小虫就該一樣大、一樣顯眼——可小虫偏偏細小難見。粗細不等，又證明不是一。
四件小事，件件指向同一個結論：你眼前那片青，絕不是一整塊不可分的東西。
一錘定音：唯識由此而立
既然不是一，那它就得是「多」——可以一層層分下去，最後分到極微。可極微呢？偈十–十三早已證明「不是一個實在的東西」。於是兩頭落空：說一，被四件小事打回；說多，分到極微而極微非實。結論只剩一個：離開心識而實有的「根」（眼等）與「境」（色等），統統立不起來。「由此善成唯有識義」——唯識之義，到這裡才算正面坐實。§參 五偈，至此功德圓滿。
留個尾巴：那「我明明看見了」呢
世親收尾極有章法。他知道對方一定還有最後一句不服：「道理我說不過你，可我現在親眼就看見外境啊（我今現證如是境）！這現量總假不了吧？」世親先點出規矩——「諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝」（一切認識方法裡，現前直證的『現量』最有分量），承認這一詰難夠重；然後只撂下三個字「此證不成」，把正面的破留給下一段。
承衍
偈十四是 §參 的封頂石，也是全論破外境的總結：四件日常小事把「青等為一」打回原形，連同前四偈破極微，徹底抽掉「離識實有根境」的地基，正面立起「唯有識」。但它同時又是一道轉場門——末句把「現量」推到台前。§肆（偈十五起）接著回答那句「可我明明現量看見」：所謂現量親見外境，其實如夢——夢裡也「現量」歷歷見物，醒來卻知無實。讀偈十四，記住它一手收網、一手開新局：抽象的原子論用走路水虫破完，活生生的「我看見了」留給夢來破。
Drawing in the net: from the atom over to the blue before your eyes
Verses 10–13 took the abstract "atom" apart, piece by piece. At the end of Verse 13, Vasubandhu shifts the question to something far closer to home — that patch of blue before your eyes (the blue-and-the-rest, the real colour-and-form the eye faces): is it "one indivisible solid block," or is it "many"? Verse 14 comes to refute "it is one solid block." And the refutation is utterly down-to-earth: it speaks of no abstruse principle, but lays out four small matters you experience every single day.
Four small matters, each one proving "it is not one block"
One — walking. If the ground beneath your feet were "one solid block with no division within it," then the moment you lift a foot and set it down, you should tread on "the whole expanse" all at once — yet plainly you have to walk across it slowly, step by step (「應無漸次行大地理，若下一足至一切故」, "there should be no walking the ground in sequence, for setting down one foot would reach everything"). That you can walk in sequence proves it is not one solid block.
Two — "arrived" and "not yet arrived" at the same time. At one and the same moment, you have reached this end and not yet reached that end. But if it were "one thing," how could one thing, at one and the same moment, be both "already reached" and "not yet reached"? (「一物一時，理不應有得未得故」, "one thing at one time should by rights have no reached-and-not-reached.") That there is a reaching-here while that-there is not-reached proves it is not one.
Three — elephants and horses with gaps between them. On one and the same patch of ground stand many elephants and horses, with spaces between them. If this ground were "one," then "having it in one place is the same as having all of it," so how could the elephants and the horses still be told apart, this one from that one — and how could a gap (「有間隙事」, "the matter of there being gaps") still be visible between them? That a gap is visible proves it is not one.
Four — the hard-to-see little water-insects. And there are besides the tiniest of water-insects and the like — fine things hard to see — in the same place as the coarse, large thing beside them. If that object were "one," and so should be equal in size, then the coarse thing and the little insect ought to be the same size, equally conspicuous — yet the little insect is, on the contrary, small and hard to see. That coarse and fine are unequal proves once more it is not one.
Four small matters, each one pointing to the very same conclusion: that patch of blue before your eyes is by no means one indivisible solid block.
The deciding stroke: consciousness-only is established right here
Since it is not one, then it must be "many" — divisible layer by layer, down at last to the atom. But the atom? Verses 10–13 already proved it "is not a real thing." And so both ends come up empty: say "one," and the four small matters knock it back; say "many," and you divide down to the atom, and the atom is unreal. Only one conclusion is left: the "faculty" (eye and the rest) and the "object" (colour-and-form and the rest) that would exist as real apart from consciousness cannot be established at all. "By this, the principle that there is consciousness only is well established" (由此善成唯有識義) — the meaning of consciousness-only is, only here, positively set on its feet. The five verses of §III come, at this point, to their full completion.
Leaving a loose end: but what of "I plainly did see it"?
Vasubandhu closes with great craft. He knows the opponent must still have one last word of protest: "I cannot out-argue you on principle — but I do see the external object with my own eyes, right now (我今現證如是境, 'I now realize, by direct perception, an object like this')! Surely this direct perception cannot be faked?" Vasubandhu first points out the rule — 「諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝」 ("dharmas are settled as existing or not by means of knowing; among all means of knowing, direct perception carries the most weight") — granting that this challenge is weighty enough; and then he lays down only three words, "this proof does not hold" (此證不成), leaving the head-on refutation to the next section.
Carried forward (承衍)
Verse 14 is the capstone of §III, and the summation of the whole treatise's refutation of external objects: four everyday small matters knock "blue-and-the-rest is one" back to its true shape, and together with the preceding four verses' refutation of the atom, they pull out, root and all, the foundation of "faculty and object existing as real apart from consciousness," and positively set up "there is consciousness only." But it is at the same time a turning-door of scene-change — its closing line pushes "direct perception" (現量) to the front of the stage. §IV (from Verse 15 on) goes on to answer that line, "but I plainly did see it by direct perception": so-called direct seeing of an external object is in fact like a dream — in a dream too one "directly perceives" things vividly, plain to see, yet on waking knows there was nothing real. Read Verse 14, and remember that with one hand it draws in the net and with the other opens a new round: the abstract atom-theory is refuted with walking and water-insects; the living "I saw it!" is left for the dream to refute.
考據Apparatus
一、科判定位
| 系統 | 此偈之位 |
|---|---|
| 全論五段 | §參 破極微（偈十–十四）之收束偈。偈十三轉問「青等實性為一為多」→ 偈十四破「青等為一」（四日常難）→ 結「離識根境皆不成」「由此善成唯有識義」；末「一切量中現量為勝」啟 §肆（偈十五 現量如夢） |
| §參→§肆 | 偈十四結成唯識（破畢外境），復以「諸法由量刊定有無，現量為勝」承接對方之現量難（「我今現證如是境」），轉入 §肆 之破現量 |
| 玄奘段位 | §頌〔p0076b02–03〕· §論自註〔p0076b04–17〕 |
二、源頌 · 義理脈絡
§頌列破「青等為一」之四難：「一應無次行」（一則無漸次行地）·「俱時至未至」（一則無同時此至彼未至）·「及多有間事」（一則無一處多象馬有間隙）·「并難見細物」（一則無小水虫等難見細物異於麁物）。
§論三節：(一)四難詳破——青等若為無隔別之一物：① 應無漸次行大地（一足即至一切）；② 應無同時於此於彼之至／未至（一物一時不應有得未得）；③ 一方處應不得有多象馬有間隙事（有一即有餘，此彼無別、中間無空）；④ 應無小水虫等難見細物（與麁物同處則量應等）。(二)結成唯識——若由相之此彼差別即成別物，則此差別物展轉分析成多極微；極微既非一實，則離識之眼等色等、根境皆不成，「由此善成唯有識義」。(三)啟現量——「諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝」，承對方「我今現證如是境」之現量難，斷「此證不成」，啟偈十五。
三、經論宗依（經證 → 論本）
- 經證：行地、象馬、水虫、麁細之別，皆現量共許之日常事；世親即以此四現量事，破「青等為一物」。
- 論本：世親自註（T1590）以四日常難破青等之一，歸「離識根境皆不成·唯識善成」，並以「現量為勝」轉接 §肆；論之破立全繫現量共許之事，不增不判。
四、本論釋要（世親自註 T1590）
本偈為 §參 之總收，亦全論破外境之歸結。世親不再談抽象極微，而把「青等實色是否為一」直接交付四樁日常經驗：人能在地上一步步走（非一足即到一切）、同一時刻此處已至而彼處未至、一片地上有多匹象馬而彼此有間隙空隙、極小的水虫雖與粗物同處而難見——這四事若成立（它們現量俱見），則所對之青等境決非「無隔別之一物」。既非一，則必可析為多分乃至極微；而極微已破為非一實（偈十–十三），於是「離識而實有之根、境」全盤不立——「由此善成唯有識義」。§參 至此功成。末句「諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝」非閒筆，乃預接對方反擊：「可我分明現量證得外境啊（我今現證如是境）！」世親斷「此證不成」，正面破現量之難留與 §肆 偈十五。本偈所破之「青等為一」為論本自設之窮舉支，逐難據現量事破，不增不判。
五、諸家異釋（古德 · 標宗）
- 護法《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591（唐·義淨譯·漢有傳本）——卷三末釋本偈，展開四日常難及「唯識善成·現量為勝」之轉接。〔標宗：護法於四難及結成唯識處有詳釋；古德讀法之一，此處只記其宗，不判。〕
- Vinītadeva Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā——藏譯存·漢無傳本，依例僅志其名，內容不入義據。
六、譯名 · 古譯對讀（三漢譯）
| 漢譯 | 譯本 | 對讀 |
|---|---|---|
| ★ 唐·玄奘 T31n1590 | 「一應無次行，俱時至未至，及多有間事，并難見細物」 | 五言四句，四日常難各列其一；自註結「由此善成唯有識義」並以「現量為勝」啟 §肆；以此為底本 |
| 陳·真諦 T31n1589《大乘唯識論》 | 散文連展四難與結成唯識（古代漢證·參校） | |
| 後魏·般若流支 T31n1588《唯識論》 | 對應偈頌段以散文出之；逐字以 CBETA 為準（古代漢證·參校） |
七、術語（古德所傳梵 · 發音輔助）
| 漢 | 梵（發音輔助） | 義 |
|---|---|---|
| 量 | pramāṇa | 知識之刊定（現量·比量等）；「諸法由量刊定有無」 |
| 現量 | pratyakṣa | 現前直證之量；「一切量中現量為勝」，啟 §肆 |
| 難見細物 | — | 小水虫等難見之細物；四難之一（與麁物同處而量不等，故境非一） |
| 唯有識義 | vijñaptimātratā | 唯識之義；本偈「由此善成」之歸結 |
梵羅馬字僅作發音輔助；無古德音寫可徵者從闕，不據現代校本補。
八、互讀（唯識系次第）
| 百法明門論 | 唯識三十論 | 二十論內部 |
|---|---|---|
| #11 色法（根·境）——「離識眼等色等根境皆不成」之所破 ⭐ | 偈十七「故一切唯識」——「由此善成唯有識義」之同旨 | 偈十 三難——本偈總收 §參、結成唯識 |
| #1 眼識——「眼所行境青等」之能緣 | 偈一「彼依識所變」——青等根境皆識變 | 偈十三 破極微三——本偈承其「青等為一為多」之轉問 |
| #8 阿賴耶識——根境似現之所變根本 | 偈八「由一切種識…變」——似境從自種生 | 偈十五 現量如夢——承「現量為勝」之難，正破現量（§肆起） |
九、校本定位
- 漢文正文（§頌）：T31n1590〔p0076b02–03〕（玄奘譯）
- 漢文自註（§論）：T31n1590〔p0076b04–17〕（玄奘譯；末「此證不成」b17 接偈十五）
- 參校漢譯：T31n1589（真諦《大乘唯識論》）· T31n1588（般若流支《唯識論》）
- 古德釋：T31n1591（護法《成唯識寶生論》卷三末·漢有傳本）
1. Doctrinal-outline placement
| System | This verse's place |
|---|---|
| The treatise's five parts | The closing verse of §III Refuting Atoms (破極微, vv.10–14). Verse 13 turns to the question 「青等實性為一為多」 ("is the real nature of blue-and-the-rest one or many") → v.14 refutes "blue-and-the-rest is one" (four everyday objections) → concludes 「離識根境皆不成」 ("faculty and object apart from consciousness cannot be established") · 「由此善成唯有識義」 ("by this, the principle that there is consciousness only is well established"); the closing 「一切量中現量為勝」 ("among all means of knowing, direct perception carries the most weight") opens §IV (v.15, direct perception is like a dream) |
| §III→§IV | v.14 establishes consciousness-only (the refutation of external objects complete), and then with 「諸法由量刊定有無，現量為勝」 ("dharmas are settled as existing or not by means of knowing; direct perception carries the most weight") takes up the opponent's direct-perception objection (「我今現證如是境」, "I now realize, by direct perception, an object like this"), turning into §IV's refutation of direct perception |
| Xuanzang's textual loci | §Verse 〔p0076b02–03〕· §Auto-commentary 〔p0076b04–17〕 |
2. The source-verse · the doctrinal thread
The §Verse lists the four objections refuting "blue-and-the-rest is one": 「一應無次行」 (if one, there should be no walking in sequence over the ground) · 「俱時至未至」 (if one, there should be no simultaneous "arrived here, not yet arrived there") · 「及多有間事」 (if one, there should be no many elephants and horses with gaps between them in one place) · 「并難見細物」 (if one, there should be no tiny water-insects and other hard-to-see fine things differing from coarse things).
The §Auto-commentary has three movements: (i) the four objections refuted in detail — if blue-and-the-rest were one thing with no division within it: ① there should be no walking the great earth in sequence (one foot would reach everything); ② there should be no simultaneous arrived/not-arrived here and there (one thing at one time should have no reached-and-not-reached); ③ in one location there should not be the matter of many elephants and horses with gaps between them (if having one is having the rest, then this-and-that have no difference, and there is no gap between); ④ there should be no tiny water-insects and other hard-to-see fine things (being in the same place as the coarse, they should be equal in size). (ii) establishing consciousness-only — if it is by the this-and-that difference in appearance that things become distinct, then this difference-bearing thing, analysed on and on, becomes many atoms; the atom being not one real thing, the eye-and-the-rest and colour-and-form-and-the-rest apart from consciousness, faculty and object alike, cannot be established — 「由此善成唯有識義」 ("by this, the principle that there is consciousness only is well established"). (iii) opening direct perception — 「諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝」 ("dharmas are settled as existing or not by means of knowing; among all means of knowing, direct perception carries the most weight"), taking up the opponent's direct-perception objection 「我今現證如是境」 ("I now realize, by direct perception, an object like this"), pronouncing 「此證不成」 ("this proof does not hold"), and opening Verse 15.
3. Scripture and treatise: the grounding (scriptural proof → treatise-root)
- Scriptural proof. Walking the ground, elephants and horses, water-insects, the difference of coarse and fine — these are all everyday matters commonly granted by direct perception; Vasubandhu uses just these four directly-perceived matters to refute "blue-and-the-rest is one thing."
- Treatise-root. Vasubandhu's auto-commentary (T1590) uses the four everyday objections to refute the oneness of blue-and-the-rest, comes to "faculty and object apart from consciousness cannot be established · consciousness-only is well established," and with "direct perception carries the most weight" turns into §IV; the treatise's refuting-and-establishing rests entirely on matters commonly granted by direct perception, adding nothing and adjudicating nothing.
4. The treatise-root in essence (Vasubandhu's auto-commentary, T1590)
This verse is the overall close of §III, and also the conclusion of the whole treatise's refutation of external objects. Vasubandhu no longer speaks of the abstract atom, but hands "whether the real colour-and-form blue-and-the-rest is one" directly over to four everyday experiences: a person can walk across the ground step by step (not reaching everything with one foot); at one and the same moment one has arrived here while not yet arrived there; on one patch of ground there are many elephants and horses with gaps and spaces between them; the tiniest water-insect, though in the same place as a coarse thing, is hard to see — if these four matters hold (and they are all seen together by direct perception), then the blue-and-the-rest object faced is by no means "one thing with no division within it." Being not one, it must be analysable into many parts and down to the atom; and the atom has already been refuted as not one real thing (vv.10–13), and so "the faculty and object that would exist as real apart from consciousness" are wholly unestablished — 「由此善成唯有識義」 ("by this, the principle that there is consciousness only is well established"). §III, at this point, is accomplished. The closing line 「諸法由量刊定有無，一切量中現量為勝」 ("dharmas are settled as existing or not by means of knowing; among all means of knowing, direct perception carries the most weight") is no idle stroke; it pre-empts the opponent's counter-blow: "But I plainly realize the external object by direct perception (「我今現證如是境」, 'I now realize, by direct perception, an object like this')!" Vasubandhu pronounces 「此證不成」 ("this proof does not hold"), leaving the head-on refutation of the direct-perception objection to §IV, Verse 15. The "blue-and-the-rest is one" that this verse refutes is an exhaustive-enumeration limb the treatise-root sets up for itself, each objection refuted by the matters of direct perception, adding nothing and adjudicating nothing.
5. The ancient masters' readings (古德 · stating their position)
- Dharmapāla, Cheng weishi baosheng lun 《成唯識寶生論》T31n1591 (Tang; tr. Yijing 義淨; a transmitted Chinese witness) — the end of fascicle three expounds this verse, unfolding the four everyday objections and the transition of "consciousness-only well established · direct perception carries the most weight." 〔Position stated: Dharmapāla has a detailed exposition at the four objections and the establishing of consciousness-only; this is one of the ancient masters' readings, recorded here only as to its position, not adjudicated.〕
- Vinītadeva, Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭīkā — extant in Tibetan translation · no transmitted Chinese witness; per convention its name only is recorded, its content not entering as doctrinal ground.
6. Rendering and old-translation comparison (the three Chinese translations)
| Chinese translation | Edition | Comparison |
|---|---|---|
| ★ Tang · Xuanzang T31n1590 | 「一應無次行，俱時至未至，及多有間事，并難見細物」 | A five-character quatrain, each of the four everyday objections set out one to a line; the auto-commentary concludes 「由此善成唯有識義」 ("by this, the principle that there is consciousness only is well established") and opens §IV with 「現量為勝」 ("direct perception carries the most weight"); taken as the base text |
| Chen · Paramārtha T31n1589 《大乘唯識論》 | The four objections and the establishing of consciousness-only unfolded continuously in prose (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison) | |
| Later Wei · Prajñāruci T31n1588 《唯識論》 | The corresponding verse-passage rendered in prose; verbatim per the CBETA original text (an ancient Chinese witness · collated for comparison) |
Verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text; what has not been verified against the original is not recorded verbatim.
7. Terms (Sanskrit per the ancient transmission · pronunciation aid)
| Chinese | Sanskrit (pronunciation aid) | Sense |
|---|---|---|
| 量 | pramāṇa | the settling of knowledge (direct perception · inference, etc.); 「諸法由量刊定有無」 ("dharmas are settled as existing or not by means of knowing") |
| 現量 | pratyakṣa | the means of knowing that is present and first-hand realization; 「一切量中現量為勝」 ("among all means of knowing, direct perception carries the most weight"), opening §IV |
| 難見細物 | — | the tiny water-insects and other hard-to-see fine things; one of the four objections (in the same place as the coarse, yet not equal in size, so the object is not one) |
| 唯有識義 | vijñaptimātratā | the meaning of consciousness-only; the conclusion 「由此善成」 ("by this … is well established") of this verse |
The Sanskrit roman script is a pronunciation aid only; where no ancient-master transliteration is attested, it is left blank, not supplied from modern critical editions.
8. Cross-reading (the Yogācāra sequence)
| Baifa (Hundred Dharmas) | Triṃśikā | Within the Viṃśatikā |
|---|---|---|
| #11 form-dharmas (faculty · object) — what is refuted in 「離識眼等色等根境皆不成」 ("the eye-and-the-rest faculties and colour-and-form-and-the-rest objects apart from consciousness cannot be established") ⭐ | Triṃśikā v.17 「故一切唯識」 ("therefore all is consciousness-only") — the same import as 「由此善成唯有識義」 | v.10 the three objections — this verse's overall close of §III, establishing consciousness-only |
| #1 eye-consciousness — the cognizer of 「眼所行境青等」 ("blue-and-the-rest, the object the eye ranges over") | Triṃśikā v.1 「彼依識所變」 ("that rests on the transformation of consciousness") — blue-and-the-rest, faculty and object, are all consciousness-transformed | v.13 Refuting Atoms (3) — this verse takes up its turning-question "is blue-and-the-rest one or many" |
| #8 storehouse consciousness — the root transformation from which faculty and object seem to appear | Triṃśikā v.8 「由一切種識…變」 ("through the all-seeds consciousness … it transforms") — the seeming-object arises from its own seeds | v.15 direct perception is like a dream — taking up the "direct perception carries the most weight" objection, refuting direct perception head-on (from §IV) |
9. Witness placement
- Chinese verse-text (§Verse): T31n1590 〔p0076b02–03〕 (Xuanzang)
- Chinese auto-commentary (§Auto-commentary): T31n1590 〔p0076b04–17〕 (Xuanzang; the closing 「此證不成」 at b17 joins to Verse 15)
- Chinese translations collated for comparison: T31n1589 (Paramārtha, 《大乘唯識論》) · T31n1588 (Prajñāruci, 《唯識論》) — verbatim comparison follows the CBETA original text
- Ancient master's commentary: T31n1591 (Dharmapāla, 《成唯識寶生論》end of fascicle three · a transmitted Chinese witness)