瑜伽師地論 有尋有伺等三地 · 不如理作意施設建立

The fourth gate, standing to the third gate, "attention in accord with principle," as one paired contrast. The sixteen heterodox theories = the specimens of wrong view, the demon-revealing mirror for discerning wrong views.

In one line: Attention contrary to principle is the root of every wrong view; the treatise takes the wrong views of sixteen heterodox schools as its specimens and refutes them one by one by "thesis → reason (teaching and reasoning) → breaking by principle" — and in the breaking shows forth the right: the consciousness-only no-self of persons, the doctrine of seeds, and the Middle Way of the threefold nature are precisely what stand upright at the place where wrong views are broken through and through.

Three Points of the Eye

1. The sixteen heterodox theories = the full typology of heterodox views: a fruit already present within its cause (Sāṃkhya) · a manifesting-forth from conditions · the real existence of the past and future (Sarvāstivāda) · the reckoning of a self · the reckoning of permanence · the cause of former deeds (Jaina) · a sovereign maker · harm as the right Dharma (killing in sacrifice to reach heaven) · the bounded and boundless · the deathless and equivocation · no cause · annihilation · emptiness · the supreme (the brahmin caste) · purity (pleasure-taking / bathing / austerities) · auspiciousness (astrology). From speculation to superstition, caught in one net.

2. The method of refutation = right reasoning (the science of reasoning): set out the assertion → ask its ground (teaching and reasoning) → "which side, in the end? If A [the reason] will not go through; if B [the reason] will not go through either," blocking off every line of retreat one by one. Relying not on authority but on principle alone — the practitioner's eye for discerning the Dharma.

3. Three crucial consciousness-only refutations (showing forth the right in the breaking):

   • Refuting the reckoned self → the real self is unobtainable; "self" is only posited by convention upon the phenomena; the Buddha's four reasons for saying there is a self (convenient speech · according with the world · removing the dread of annihilation · expounding merits and faults) = the no-self of persons.
   • Refuting the real existence of the past and future → "past karma" is a designation posited in dependence on the latent impression / the seed; there is no need to grasp the three times as really existent = the lifeblood of the doctrine of seeds.
   • Refuting the view of emptiness (the wrongly-grasped emptiness) → breaking the repudiation-into-nothing by the perfectly-accomplished, other-dependent, and wholly-imagined threefold nature: what one calls non-existent is the wholly-imagined nature, what one calls existent is the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished = the consciousness-only Middle Way, drawn distinctly apart from obstinate emptiness.

Appended · Pointers

The no-self of persons · the four reasons for the conventional self → the "self as characterized by the ultimate meaning" of the Stage of the Mental · the two kinds of no-self in the Cheng Weishi Lun; the latent impression and the seed → the all-seeds consciousness of the Stage of the Mental · the six senses of the seed in the Cheng Weishi Lun; the Middle Way of the threefold nature → the Chapter on the Meaning of Reality of the Bodhisattva Stage · the threefold nature in the Cheng Weishi Lun. For the doctrinal exposition, see the Exposition.

This is the fourth of the five gates, and it is the exact opposite of the third gate, "attention in accord with principle." "Attention contrary to principle" means "thinking pointed in the wrong direction," and it bears fruit in every kind of mistaken view. Here the treatise takes the "sixteen heterodox theories" (the erroneous doctrines of sixteen schools of outsiders) as its specimens and works through them one by one: first it sets out what each school asserts, then it states on what grounds they assert it (on the authority of a received teaching, and on their own reasoning), and finally it refutes them, point by point, by principle.

Opening: The Sixteen Heterodox Theories

What is "the establishment of attention contrary to principle"? The summary verse (uddāna) states: the theory that the effect pre-exists in the cause; the theory of manifestation; the theory that past and future really exist; the theory of a self; the theory of permanence; the theory of a former deed as the cause; the theory of a creator such as the Sovereign God; the theory that killing is the true Dharma; the theory of the finite and the infinite; the theory of endless equivocation; the theory of the view of no-cause; the theory of annihilation; the theory of emptiness; the theory that falsely reckons some caste supreme; the theory that falsely reckons some practice to be purity; and the theory that falsely reckons some sign to be auspicious — sixteen heterodox theories in all. By the distinctions among these sixteen heterodox theories, one can see what "attention contrary to principle" is. Which sixteen? First, the theory that the effect pre-exists in the cause; second, the theory of manifestation through conditions; third, the theory that past and future really exist; fourth, the theory that reckons a self; fifth, the theory that reckons permanence; sixth, the theory of a former deed as the cause; seventh, the theory that reckons a Sovereign God and the like to be the creator; eighth, the theory that killing is the true Dharma; ninth, the theory of the finite and the infinite; tenth, the theory of endless equivocation regarding the deathless; eleventh, the theory of the view of no-cause; twelfth, the theory of the view of annihilation; thirteenth, the theory of the view of emptiness; fourteenth, the theory that falsely reckons some caste supreme; fifteenth, the theory that falsely reckons some practice to be purity; sixteenth, the theory that falsely reckons some sign to be auspicious.

1. The Theory That the Effect Pre-exists in the Cause (the effect is already hidden within the cause all along)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: at all times, always and forever, the "cause" already fully possesses the character of the "effect" within it. (This is the reckoning of the Vārṣagaṇya outsiders — the Sāṃkhya school.) Question: on what grounds do they hold this view and set up this doctrine? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching, and on reasoning. The "teaching" is the body of doctrine handed down by their former masters, passed on from generation to generation right up to the present, which says that the effect is originally there within the cause. The "reasoning" is that people of this sort are by nature fond of pondering and fond of examining, yet they stop at the level of an ordinary person's pondering, and so they think this way: since "this thing" can arise from "that thing," the world commonly agrees to set up "this" as the cause of "that"; one who seeks the effect takes up only this cause and no other; one who acts, too, applies effort only upon this cause; and that effect arises only from this cause and not from anywhere else — therefore the effect is already there within the cause all along. Otherwise, one would have to say that "everything is the cause of everything," that to seek a single effect one should take up everything, that one should apply effort upon everything, and that every effect should arise from everything (which would throw it all into chaos).

One should question them closely: what exactly do you assert? What is the character of a cause? What is the character of an effect? Are the character of the cause and the character of the effect the same, or different? If the two characters, of cause and effect, have no difference, then there are no longer these two distinct things, cause and effect — and with no distinction, "the effect pre-exists in the cause" cannot be maintained. If the two characters, of cause and effect, do differ, then tell us: the character of the effect within the cause — is it the character of "not yet arisen," or the character of "already arisen"? If it is the character of not-yet-arisen, then since the effect within the cause has not yet arisen, to say it "exists" cannot be maintained; if it is the character of already-arisen, then since the body of the effect has already arisen, to say further that it arises from the cause cannot be maintained. Therefore the effect does not pre-exist within the cause; rather, there must be a cause, and then, awaiting the completing of conditions, the effect arises. Furthermore, for a thing that has a character to be discerned within another thing that has a character, five situations are required: first, it is found in a location (like water in a jar); second, it is found in a support (like eye-consciousness in the eye); third, it is recognized by its own character (like the very substance of a cause, without inference); fourth, it is recognized by its own activity; fifth, when the cause alters the effect alters along with it, or when the condition alters the effect alters along with it. But your "the effect exists in the cause forever" does not match a single one of these five situations. Therefore this school's doctrine cannot be maintained — whether one says cause and effect are non-different, or says cause and effect differ, or says the effect is not yet arisen, or says the effect is already arisen, none of it can be maintained.

2. The Theory of Manifestation Through Conditions (the effect exists all along, and the conditions only "manifest" it)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: the essential nature of all dharmas exists all along, and it is only "manifested by the assembly of conditions," not "produced from conditions." (This is the reckoning of those who hold the theory that the effect pre-exists in the cause, and of those who hold the theory of sound-character.) Question: on what grounds do those who hold that the effect pre-exists in the cause say that the effect is already there within the cause and is only manifested by conditions? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The teaching is as stated before. The reasoning is this — they think: if the effect exists all along, yet one still says it arises from the cause, this cannot be maintained; but making the effect really does require the application of effort, so what is the effort for? Is it not precisely in order to "manifest the effect"? And so they set up the "theory of manifestation."

One should question them closely: what do you assert? Is it that there is a "condition without any obstruction," and yet there is obstruction; or is it that there is a "condition with obstruction"? If you say there is a condition without any obstruction and yet there is obstruction, this cannot be maintained; if you say there is a condition with obstruction, then that cause which belongs to the effect — why is it not obstructed? (Cause and effect are equally "existent.") This cannot be maintained. Take a comparison: darkness can obstruct the water in a jar, and it can obstruct the jar itself. If you say the obstructing condition obstructs the cause as well, then it ought to manifest the cause along with it (since both cause and effect are obstructed); but you insist that it manifests only the effect within the cause and does not manifest the cause — this cannot be maintained. Again ask: is it "existence-nature" that serves as the obstructing condition, or "effect-nature" that serves as the obstructing condition? If it is "existence-nature" that obstructs, then "existence" ought never to be manifested at all (which cannot be maintained, for the cause too is "existent" — how is it not obstructed?); if it is "effect-nature" that obstructs, then one and the same thing is both cause and effect (as a sprout is the effect of the seed and the cause of the stalk and so forth), so one and the same dharma would be both manifested and not manifested — this cannot be maintained. Again ask, and answer as you will: are the original dharma and its "manifestation" the same, or different? If they are not different (one and the same thing), then the dharma ought to be manifest forever, manifested and manifested again — this cannot be maintained; if you say they are different (two separate things), then is this "manifestation" without a cause, or with a cause? To say it is manifested without a cause cannot be maintained; to say it is with a cause — then what can do the manifesting is effect-nature, not cause-nature, and to manifest the effect by means of "that which does not manifest the cause" cannot be maintained. Therefore your saying — "if the nature of a dharma is absent, then it has no character; if the nature of a dharma is present, then it has a character; if absent, it cannot be manifested; if present, only then can it be manifested" — cannot be maintained. Now I will tell you: even though a thing "exists," its character is not necessarily grasped right away — perhaps because it is too far off (though existing, it cannot be grasped), or because it is obstructed by the four kinds of obstruction, or because it is too subtle, or because the mind is distracted, or because the faculties are impaired, or because one has not yet attained the cognition that would apprehend its character — and so it cannot be grasped. It is not that "not being grasped is the same as not existing, so that only what is manifested counts as existing." (This also refutes in passing "those who hold the theory of sound-character" — who assert that "the character of sound is permanent, without arising or ceasing, and is only made manifest by being uttered" — which, like the theory of manifestation, cannot be maintained.)

3. The Theory That Past and Future Really Exist (past and future are as really existent as the present)

There is a certain kind of renunciant, or brahmin, or one who, though within the Buddha's teaching, reflects incorrectly, who asserts: there is a past and there is a future, and their characters are fully accomplished, just like the present — really existent, not merely nominal. (This is the reckoning of the Sarvāstivāda.) Question: on what grounds? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The one within the Buddha's teaching has misconstrued the Tathāgata's sūtras — as when a sūtra says "all that exists is the twelve sense-fields," and he takes the real character of these twelve sense-fields to be existent; and as when the Buddha says "there is past action," and says "there is past form, there is future form," down through consciousness likewise. The reasoning is this — he thinks: if a dharma has its own character abiding, then it is truly existent; if this dharma were nonexistent in the time of the future, then at that time it should not yet have its character; if it were nonexistent in the time of the past, then at that time it should have lost its own character; and in that case the own-characters of dharmas would not be established — therefore past and future are really existent.

One should question them closely: the two characters, past and future, and the character of the present — are they one, or different? If you say their character is one, then the distinction of the "three times" cannot be established, which cannot be maintained; if you say their character is different, then "past and future really exist" cannot be maintained. Ask again: a dharma that falls within the three times — is it of permanent character or impermanent character? If it is of permanent character, yet it falls within the three times (undergoing transition), this cannot be maintained; if it is of impermanent character, yet it really exists forever throughout the three times, this cannot be maintained. Ask again, and answer as you will — what do you suppose: (i) does a future dharma "come" to the present? (ii) or does it die in the future and arise in the present? (iii) or does it abide in the future and, being taken as a condition, produce the present? (iv) or is it originally without activity, and only now has activity? (v) or is its character originally incomplete, and only now complete? (vi) or is it originally of a different character, and now of another character? (vii) or is there already, within the future, a component of the present? Refuting them one by one: (i) if the future dharma comes to the present, then it possesses a spatial position, and moreover is no different from the present, and moreover ought to be permanent — this cannot be maintained; (ii) if it dies in the future and arises in the present, then the future does not arise in the now, and the present dharma originally-nonexistent now arises, and moreover the future, not yet arisen, is said to have died and perished — this cannot be maintained; (iii) if it abides in the future and, as a condition, produces the present, then it ought to be permanent, and moreover it ought to be originally-nonexistent now arising, and it is not the future dharma that arises — this cannot be maintained; (iv) if it is originally without activity and now has activity, then this is "originally nonexistent, now existent," which incurs the fault stated before — this cannot be maintained. And ask further: is this "activity" of a different character from that original dharma, or of no different character? If of a different character, then this activity-character was nonexistent in the time of the future — this cannot be maintained; if of no different character, then "originally without activity, now having activity" cannot be maintained. (v) The completeness of character, (vi) the different character, and (vii) the future having a present component — these three are refuted in just the same way. The difference is that they incur one additional fault, the fault of "confusion of own-nature," so they cannot be maintained. Just as the future rushing toward the present is refuted in this way, so too the present falling into the past is refuted in just the same way. Therefore, to say that the substance of past and future really exists cannot be maintained.

Next, someone raises an objection: if past and future are nonexistent, how can a cognition arise that "takes the nonexistent as its object"? And if a cognition can arise taking the nonexistent as object, does this not contradict the teaching that "all that exists is the twelve sense-fields"? One should question in return: a worldly cognition that "grasps the nonexistent" (as when one recognizes "no-self, a hare's horns, the child of a barren woman") — does it arise, or not arise? If it does not arise, then cognitions grasping no-self and the like ought all to be nonexistent, which cannot be maintained; and the Buddha also said, "My unflattering disciples, when there is existence know it as existence, when there is nonexistence know it as nonexistence." If you say it does arise, then this cognition that grasps the nonexistent — does it take the aspect of "existent," or the aspect of "nonexistent"? If it takes the aspect of existent, then "a cognition grasping the nonexistent yet taking the aspect of existent" cannot be maintained; if it takes the aspect of nonexistent, then ask further: this cognition of the nonexistent aspect — does it operate "with reference to an existent object," or "with reference to a nonexistent object"? To operate with reference to an existent object — then "a cognition of the nonexistent aspect yet operating with reference to an existent object" cannot be maintained; to operate with reference to a nonexistent object — then "with no object there is no cognition" cannot be maintained. Further: although the sūtra says "all that exists is the twelve sense-fields," this means "for existent dharmas, it says with hidden intent that they possess the existent character; for nonexistent dharmas, it says with hidden intent that they possess the nonexistent character" — existent-character dharmas bear the existent character, and nonexistent-character dharmas bear the nonexistent character; both are called dharmas and both are called existent, and it is not that past and future really exist. Again, "there is past action" is a nominal statement of existence made with hidden intent in reliance upon "habit-energy" — within the movements there was once a pure or impure action arising and ceasing, and by this that stream of movements continues in a specially distinct manner, which is called habit-energy, and by relying on this habit-energy the agreeable or disagreeable effect is produced; so "past action" is nominally spoken of in reliance upon habit-energy, and there is no fault on my side, whereas your view cannot be maintained. Again, "there is past form, future form, present form," down through consciousness, is spoken with hidden intent in reliance upon three kinds of character: in reliance upon the "cause-character" it says with hidden intent that there is a future; in reliance upon the "own-character" it says with hidden intent that there is a present; in reliance upon the "effect-character" it says with hidden intent that there is a past — so there is no fault. Again, one should not say that past and future have a really-existent character. Why? One should know that the future has twelve characters: first, the character of being displayed by the cause; second, the character of the substance being not yet arisen; third, the character of awaiting the assembly of conditions; fourth, the character of an already-arisen kind; fifth, the character of being a producible dharma; sixth, the character of being a non-producible dharma; seventh, the character of not-yet-arisen defilement; eighth, the character of not-yet-arisen purity; ninth, the character of what ought to be sought; tenth, the character of what ought not to be sought; eleventh, the character of what ought to be examined; twelfth, the character of what ought not to be examined. One should know that the present too has twelve characters: first, the character of being displayed by the effect; second, the character of the substance being already arisen; third, the character of the assembling of conditions; fourth, the character of an already-arisen kind; fifth, the character of a single instant; sixth, the character of a dharma that will not arise again; seventh, the character of present defilement; eighth, the character of present purity; ninth, the character of what may be delighted in; tenth, the character of what may not be delighted in; eleventh, the character of what ought to be examined; twelfth, the character of what ought not to be examined. One should know that the past too has twelve characters: first, the character of a cause already passed; second, the character of a condition already passed; third, the character of an effect already passed; fourth, the character of the substance already destroyed; fifth, the character of an already-ceased kind; sixth, the character of a dharma that will not arise again; seventh, the character of stilled defilement; eighth, the character of stilled purity; ninth, the character of a place worth looking back upon with longing; tenth, the character of a place not worth looking back upon with longing; eleventh, the character of what ought to be examined; twelfth, the character of what ought not to be examined. — These are all designations of "character"; they are not a really-existent substance.

4. The Theory That Reckons a Self (there is a real, permanently abiding "self")

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: there is a "self, a sentient being (sattva), a living one, a born one, a nourished one, a soul that runs through the courses of rebirth," and these are real and permanently abiding. (This is the reckoning of the outsiders.) Question: on what grounds? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The reasoning has two strands: first, "without prior deliberation, a feeling-awareness of a sentient being suddenly arises"; second, "only after having deliberated can there be action." He thinks: if there were no self, then upon seeing five kinds of thing one ought not to give rise to the five "there-is-a-self" awarenesses — first, upon seeing color-and-shape, one ought only to give rise to the awareness of "color," not to the awareness of a "sentient being (sattva)"; second, upon seeing conduct that accords with pain and pleasure, one ought only to give rise to the awareness of "feeling," not to the awareness of a "superior or inferior sentient being"; third, upon seeing conduct associated with an assigned name, one ought only to give rise to the awareness of "perception," not to the awareness of a "kṣatriya, a brahmin, a vaiśya, a śūdra, one-granted-by-the-Buddha, a friend-in-virtue," and such sentient beings; fourth, upon seeing conduct associated with the pure and impure, one ought only to give rise to the awareness of "volitional formation," not to the awareness of a "foolish one or a wise one" as sentient beings; fifth, upon seeing consciousness following along after an object, one ought only to give rise to the awareness of "mind," not to the awareness of "I am able to see" and such sentient-being awarenesses. Since with regard to these five things one does give rise to the awareness of a "sentient being," there must be a real self. He also thinks: if there were no self, one ought not, within the movements, to first give rise to deliberation and then have action — as in "I shall see forms with the eye; I am now seeing forms; I have seen forms; or I give rise to the thought, I shall not see" — these functions all take the "self-awareness" as their guide; and it is likewise for ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; the performing and the ceasing of wholesome and unwholesome action, too, all take deliberation as their guide before there is function — therefore there is a self.

Now I question you, and answer as you will: do you give rise to the awareness of a sentient being "right upon the thing seen," or do you give rise to the awareness of a sentient being "apart from the thing seen"? If you give rise to it right upon the thing seen (color and so forth), then you ought not to say that "to reckon a self, a sentient being, upon color and so forth is an inverted awareness" (for that would just be color and so forth themselves); if you give rise to it apart from the thing seen, then the "self" would have shape and size, would have superiority and inferiority, would be a kṣatriya and so forth, would be foolish or wise, would be able to grasp objects such as color — and these cannot be maintained (apart from color and so forth, where would these come from?). Ask again: does this awareness arise "by the own-substance of this dharma alone," or "by another substance as well"? If it arises by the own-substance of this dharma alone, then "giving rise to a self-awareness upon the thing seen" ought not to be called inverted; if it arises by another substance as well, then it would follow that "every object is the cognitive cause of every object," which cannot be maintained. Ask again: with regard to the insentient does an awareness of the sentient arise; with regard to the sentient an awareness of the insentient; with regard to one sentient being an awareness of "another sentient being" — do these arise or not? If they arise, then the insentient would have to be sentient, the sentient would have to be insentient — this cannot be maintained; if they do not arise, then you are repudiating direct perception, which cannot be maintained. Ask again: does this awareness of a sentient being grasp the object of "direct perception," or grasp the object of "inference"? If it grasps direct perception, yet direct perception has only the aggregates of color and so forth — the "self" is not an object of direct perception — this cannot be maintained; if it grasps inference, yet even a foolish infant, not yet able to reason, suddenly gives rise to a self-awareness — this cannot be maintained.

Ask again: is worldly action caused by "awareness," or caused by "the self"? If it is caused by awareness, then "grasping that the self acts" cannot be maintained; if it is caused by the self, yet you also say "one must first deliberate before there is action," this cannot be maintained. Ask again: is the cause of the deed done permanent or impermanent? If impermanent, then this cause undergoes alteration, and "grasping that the self acts" cannot be maintained; if permanent, then it undergoes no alteration, and "acting without alteration" cannot be maintained. Ask again: is it "a self that has motion" that can act, or "a self without motion" that can act? If a self that has motion can act, then it ought to be acting forever and need not act again; if a self without motion can act, then "having the nature of no motion, yet having action" cannot be maintained. Ask again: is there action because there is a cause, or without a cause? If with a cause, then this self must be spurred by some other cause before it can act, which cannot be maintained (for then the self would not be autonomous); if without a cause, then it ought to be doing everything at all times, which cannot be maintained. Ask again: does this self act in dependence on itself, or act in dependence on another? If in dependence on itself, then this self would be producing for itself the sufferings of old age, sickness, and death, and defilement and so forth, which cannot be maintained; if in dependence on another, then "reckoning that the self acts" cannot be maintained.

I ask you further: is the "self" designated "right upon the five aggregates," is it "within the aggregates," is it "in some place outside the aggregates," or is it "not belonging to the aggregates"? If it is designated right upon the aggregates, then the self and the aggregates would be no different, yet you say there is a real, permanently abiding self — this cannot be maintained. If it is within the aggregates, then is this self permanent or impermanent? If permanent, then a permanently abiding self is harmed and benefited by pain and pleasure, which cannot be maintained; and if it is neither harmed nor benefited, then it cannot give rise to dharma and non-dharma (in which case the aggregate-body would ultimately never arise, and without any effort the self would be permanently liberated). If impermanent, then apart from the substance of the aggregates a separate dharma that has arising and ceasing and continues in transmigration cannot be found — this cannot be maintained. If it is in some place outside the aggregates, then the self you reckon would be unconditioned (having no function), which cannot be maintained; if it does not belong to the aggregates, then the self would be forever without defilement, and moreover the self and the body would have no connection — this cannot be maintained.

Ask again: the self you reckon — is it "the very character of the seer and so forth" (the seer, the hearer... the very one who can see and hear), or "the character apart from the seer and so forth"? If it is "the very character of the seer and so forth," then is it "the seer and so forth nominally set up right upon seeing, hearing, and so forth," or "the seer and so forth set up apart from seeing, hearing, and so forth"? If it is "nominally set up right upon seeing and so forth," then seeing and so forth themselves are the seer and so forth, yet you set up the "self" as the seer and so forth — this cannot be maintained (for the seer and so forth are no different from seeing and so forth, so the "self" would just equal seeing and so forth, not a separate permanent-and-real self); if it is "set up apart from seeing and so forth," then is this dharma of seeing and so forth "the deed produced by the self" or "the implement used by the self"?

If you say seeing and so forth is "the deed produced by the self": if it is like a seed (a seed producing a sprout), then the self ought to be impermanent, which cannot be maintained (you say the self is permanent); if it is like a potter's making a pot, a "nominally set-up person," then the self ought to be impermanent and nominally set up, yet you say the self is permanent and real, which cannot be maintained; if it is like a person with supernormal powers who nominally sets up a person and is freely autonomous over what is made, then the self too ought to be impermanent and nominally set up, which, like the foregoing, cannot be maintained; if it is like "earth," then it too ought to be impermanent, and moreover the self you reckon does not have the conspicuous function that the great element earth has — for the world can see the function of the earth-element (it can hold up the ten thousand things and keep them from falling), whereas your self has no such visible function — this cannot be maintained; if it is like "space," then it ought not to be really existent — for "space" is merely "nominally set up in the place where there is no matter," yet even though space is nominally existent it still has a clearly discernible function (it is by relying on space that going, coming, bending, and stretching and such motions can occur), whereas your self lacks even this — this cannot be maintained. Therefore "seeing and so forth is the deed produced by the self" cannot be maintained.

If you say seeing and so forth is "the implement used by the self": if it is like a sickle (using a sickle to cut a thing), then apart from the sickle other things too have the function of cutting, whereas apart from seeing and so forth the function of seeing and so forth cannot be found upon any other thing — this cannot be maintained; if it is like fire (using fire to burn a thing), then reckoning a self is useless — for the world's fire, apart from "one who can burn," can of itself burn — which cannot be maintained. If you say "apart from the character of the seer and so forth there is a separate self," then the self you reckon runs counter to every means of knowledge (neither direct perception nor inference can reach it), which cannot be maintained.

Ask again: the self you reckon — does it "have defilement and purity only because it is associated with defilement and purity," or does it "have defilement and purity without being associated with defilement and purity"? If it has them only because it is associated with defilement and purity, then within the movements there are already found affliction, calamity, and mishap (defilement), and their stilling and beneficial ordering (purity), so one can see that although the movements have no self, they may still be spoken of as having association with defilement and purity (as it is with outer things, so with the inner body — without a self, the meaning of defilement and purity is established all the same); therefore the self you reckon cannot be maintained. If it has defilement and purity without being associated with defilement and purity, then "apart from the character of defilement and purity, the self yet has defilement and purity" cannot be maintained. Ask again: the self you reckon — does it "have transmigration only because it is associated with the character of transmigration," or does it "have transmigration and its ceasing without being so associated"? If it has transmigration only because it is associated with the character of transmigration, then within the movements there are found five characters of transmigration — first, having a cause; second, capable of arising; third, capable of ceasing; fourth, arising in unbroken mutual succession; fifth, having alteration; and since the movements (like a body, a sprout, a river, a lamp, a cart, and such), in the very functioning of transmigration, have no self and yet of themselves have transmigration and its ceasing, what need is there to reckon a self? If it has transmigration and its ceasing without being associated with the character of transmigration, then "the self has no character of transmigration, yet has transmigration and its ceasing" cannot be maintained. Ask again: the self you reckon — is it called the one who feels, the one who acts, the one who is liberated "by reason of the alterations produced by objects, whether painful or pleasant, and by deliberate action, and by the afflictions, the secondary afflictions, and so forth," or "not by those alterations"? If by those alterations, then it is the movements (undergoing the alterations of feeling) that are the one who feels, the one who acts, and the one who is liberated — what need is there to reckon a self? And even granting it is the self, the self would then be impermanent, which cannot be maintained; if not by those alterations, then "the self, having no alteration, is yet the one who feels, acts, and is liberated" cannot be maintained. Ask again: is "the agent" spoken of only upon the self, or spoken of upon other dharmas as well? If only upon the self, then the world ought not to say "fire is that which burns" or "light is that which illuminates" (fire and light too are taken as agents); if also upon other dharmas, then just speak of an agent upon the faculties of seeing and so forth, and reckoning a self on top of that is a needless extra — this cannot be maintained. Ask again: is "a self" established only upon the self, or established upon other dharmas as well? If only upon the self, then the world ought not to call that "nominally posited person's body" a "friend-in-virtue, one-granted-by-the-Buddha," and so on (those names are all placed upon the five-aggregate body); if also upon other dharmas, then it is merely "nominally speaking of a self upon the movements" — what need to grasp separately at a self? Why? Worldly people merely give rise to the notion of "a sentient being" upon the nominally posited person's body, set up the name "sentient being," and speak of a distinction between self and other, that is all. Ask again: is the view that reckons a self wholesome or unwholesome? If wholesome, then why does the most utterly deluded person deeply give rise to the view of self — not by any method, but suddenly? and why can it make sentient beings dread liberation and cause every kind of evil to grow? — this cannot be maintained (how could a wholesome dharma be like this?); if unwholesome, then it ought not to be called "right and non-inverted." Ask again: is the view of no-self wholesome or unwholesome? If you say it is wholesome, then to see "there is no self" upon a "permanently abiding, really existent self" would be wholesome (inverted yet wholesome) — this cannot be maintained; if you say it is unwholesome, yet all the wise proclaim it, and it is generated by diligent skillful means, and it can make sentient beings not dread liberation, swiftly realize the pure-and-clean fruit, and truly counteract every evil and fault — to call it unwholesome cannot be maintained. Ask again: does "self-nature itself reckon a self," or does one reckon a self "by reason of the view of self"? If self-nature itself reckons a self, then there ought never at any time to be an awareness of "no-self" (yet people can indeed give rise to the awareness of no-self); if it is by reason of the view of self, then although there is no real self, it is merely by the force of the view of self that one falsely supposes there is a self within the movements — so your firm conclusion that a self really exists cannot be maintained. In this way — from "that awareness arising without prior deliberation," from "seeing that there is action with deliberation as its guide," from "being nominally designated upon the aggregates," from "being established as existent in reliance upon that character," from "the setting up of defilement and purity," from "the setting up of transmigration and its ceasing," from "the nominal positing of a feeler, an agent, and one liberated," from "the designating of an agent," from "the designating of verbal expression," and from "the designating of a view" — from every angle, to reckon that there is a real self cannot be maintained.

Finally, the treatise states "the character of the self in the ultimate sense": what is called "self" is merely "nominally set up as existent" upon dharmas, and there is no really existent self; and this nominal self cannot be said to be either different from or non-different from the dharmas (do not suppose it to be a really existent substance, or that the dharmas are themselves the character of the self). This nominal self is of the character of impermanence, of non-constancy, of what cannot be kept secure, of the perishable, of what is a dharma that arises, of old age, sickness, and death — it is merely the character of dharmas, merely the character of suffering and distress. Therefore the Buddha said: "Bhikṣus, you should know! Within dharmas a self is nominally set up; this self is impermanent and inconstant, cannot be kept secure, and is a perishable dharma." The reason for nominally setting up "a self" is fourfold: first, for the sake of ease in worldly speech; second, in order to accord with the world; third, in order to dispel the dread of "there is decidedly no self"; fourth, in order to proclaim the accomplishments-of-merit and faults of self and other, and to make people give rise to a settled faith and understanding. Therefore, clinging to the doctrine of a real self cannot be maintained.

5. The Theory That Reckons Permanence (both the self and the world are permanently abiding)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: the self and the world are both real and permanently abiding — not made by anyone, not transformed by anyone, incapable of being damaged, standing as an accumulation, like the iṣīkā reed (a tough, resilient reed). (Those who reckon regarding the prior limit that "all is permanent" or that "a part is permanent," those who reckon regarding the later limit "one who has perception," "one who has no perception," or "one who is neither-perceiving-nor-non-perceiving," and further those who reckon that the subtle particles are permanently abiding — all reckon in this way.) Question: on what grounds do they say the self and the world are permanently abiding? Here, the one who reckons regarding the prior limit either relies on the meditative absorption to give rise to "recollection of former abodes" (remembering former lives), yet is not skilled in dependent origination, and merely on the basis of recollection, without knowing as it really is, takes the past to be the prior limit and gives rise to the view of permanence; or he relies on the divine eye to take the present as the prior limit, and not knowing as it really is the momentary arising-and-ceasing transmigration of the movements, and seeing the stream of consciousnesses continuing unbroken from this world to that world, gives rise to the view of permanence. The one who reckons regarding the later limit, though he sees a difference between "perception" and "feeling," does not see the difference in their own-characters, and so gives rise to the view of permanence. The one who reckons the subtle particles to be permanent relies on worldly meditative absorption to give rise to his view, and because he does not know dependent origination as it really is, supposes that "first there is a cause, and afterward the aggregating-arising of an effect; first there is a dispersing, and afterward a perishing," and so says that from the aggregation of many particles a coarse thing is formed, and then the coarse thing is analyzed down until one reaches the subtle particle as the limit — therefore the coarse thing is impermanent and the subtle particle is permanent.

(Reckoning permanent abiding regarding the prior and later limits comes down, in truth, to a distinctive character of the grasping-at-self; the grasping-at-self has already been refuted, so this is refuted along with it.) Ask again: your "recollection of former abodes" — does it recall "the aggregates" or "a self"? If it recalls the aggregates, then "grasping that the self and the world are permanent" cannot be maintained; if it recalls a self, yet what you recall is "a sentient being of such-and-such a name, such-and-such a lineage, in the past," this cannot be maintained (what you recall is plainly a named, lineaged aggregate-character). Ask again: when eye-consciousness arises taking as its object the present, assembled color-object, the remaining consciousnesses — those not present, not assembled — do they cease, or turn into this one? If you say they cease, then a consciousness that perishes is being reckoned permanent, which cannot be maintained; if you say they turn into it, then "by reliance on a single object all consciousnesses at all times arise" cannot be maintained. Ask again: the self you grasp — as it is produced by "perception" and produced by "feeling," does it have alteration or no alteration? If you say it has, then "the world and the self are permanently abiding" cannot be maintained; if you say it has none, yet people plainly first have one perception and then have manifold perceptions, and then a small perception and an immeasurable perception (and feeling too changes through pain, pleasure, and so forth), which cannot be maintained.

Here the treatise also points out several related reckonings together: those who reckon "the life-principle is the very body" reckon the self as material; those who reckon "the life-principle differs from the body" reckon the self as non-material; those who reckon "the self pervades all, without duality and without lack" reckon the self as both material and non-material; those who, in order to counter this, give rise to a grasping that merely changes the phrasing and the wording, reckon the self as neither material nor non-material. Again: those who see only a small portion of matter and a small portion of the non-material reckon it "finite"; those who see it as immeasurable reckon it "infinite"; those who see it throughout, yet with the material portion small and the non-material portion immeasurable (or the material portion immeasurable and the non-material portion small), reckon it "both finite and infinite"; those who, in order to counter this, give rise to a grasping that merely changes the wording without changing the meaning, reckon it "neither finite nor infinite"; or they reckon a liberated self that is remote from both the finite and the infinite.

Now to refute "the subtle particle is permanently abiding." Question them in return: do you reckon the subtle particle permanent "after having examined it," or reckon it permanent "without examining it"? If without examining, then to decide it is permanent apart from the examination of wisdom cannot be maintained; if you say you have examined it, then it runs counter to every means of knowledge (neither direct perception nor inference can reach a permanent subtle particle), which cannot be maintained. Ask again: do you reckon it permanent "because it is extremely subtle," or reckon it permanent "because its character differs from that of the coarse effect-thing"? If because it is subtle, then the more it is dispersed, diminished, and made feeble, the more you call it permanent, which cannot be maintained; if because its character differs, then the subtle particle exceeds the character of earth, water, fire, and wind, being of an unlike kind, yet you say it can produce the effect of that kind (the coarse thing), which cannot be maintained — and moreover no other character of the subtle particle can be found, which cannot be maintained. Ask again: the coarse thing that arises from the subtle particle — is it of "non-different character" from the subtle particle, or of "different character"? If of non-different character, then since it is no different from its cause, the subtle particle, it too ought to be permanent, and this makes there be no fixity of cause and effect, which cannot be maintained; if of different character, then does the coarse thing arise "from the dispersed subtle particles" or "from the aggregated subtle particles"? If from the dispersed, then every effect ought to arise at all times (with no fixity of cause and effect), which cannot be maintained; if from the aggregated, then when the coarse effect-thing arises, does it "not exceed the measure of the subtle particles' form-substance," or "exceed it"? If it does not exceed, then "producing a thing with form-substance-parts from a thing with form-substance-parts" (with no increase of measure) cannot be maintained; if it exceeds, then since the substance of the subtle particle has no fine parts and cannot be further analyzed, the coarse thing produced ought also to be permanent, which cannot be maintained. If you then say "there are some subtle particles that, being originally nonexistent, now arise," then "reckoning the subtle particle permanent" cannot be maintained. Ask again: when the subtle particles arise and construct the coarse thing, is it "like a seed" or "like a potter"? If like a seed, then it ought to be impermanent like a seed; if like a potter, then the subtle particles ought to have deliberation (like a potter who reflects), which cannot be maintained; if it is like neither seed nor potter, then no corresponding example can be found, which cannot be maintained. Ask again: the arising of outer things — is it "by sentient beings" or "not"? If by sentient beings, then the outer coarse thing is produced by sentient beings while the fine thing it depends on (the subtle particle) is not produced by sentient beings, which cannot be maintained (who then assigned the subtle particle its capacity?); if not by sentient beings, then "with no use, and yet outer things arise" cannot be maintained. Therefore "the subtle particle is permanently abiding" also cannot be maintained.

In this way, those who reckon permanent abiding regarding the prior and later limits — on the grounds of "recollecting the aggregates and sentient beings, the unbroken stream of all consciousnesses upon one object, and the altering or non-altering of perception and feeling" — cannot be maintained; and those who reckon the subtle particle permanent — on the grounds of "examining or not examining, the general character and the own-character, the constructing, and the fundamental use" — also cannot be maintained. Therefore the theory that reckons permanence cannot be maintained. At the close the treatise states how "the character of permanent abiding" should properly be spoken of: if at all times there is no alteration, if in every kind there is no alteration, if of itself there is no alteration, if by another too there is no alteration, and moreover if there is no arising — this alone is the character of permanent abiding (and this is precisely the unconditioned dharma, not that self and world which the outsiders reckon).

6. The Theory of a Former Deed as the Cause (all suffering is drawn on by the actions of former lives, and one wears out old actions through austerities)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts (as the sūtra sets out at length): all the suffering that people in the world undergo has "the deeds of former lives" as its cause (that is, the evil action of former lives as cause); by diligently cultivating austerities one "vomits out the old action" (that is, by extreme self-mortification in the present life), and by not committing new action-causes in the present life (that is, by not doing any unwholesome actions), thereafter one has no further outflows — because one has been wholesome throughout, it is said that afterward there are no outflows; being without outflows, action is exhausted (meaning evil action); action being exhausted, suffering is exhausted; suffering being exhausted, one realizes the end of suffering (meaning the exhaustion of the suffering of the remaining continuum of births). (This is the reckoning of the Unbound outsiders — the Nirgranthas, the Jainas.) Question: on what grounds? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The reasoning is this: he sees that "in the present life, human effort does not determine the result" — plainly some who use right methods draw suffering, and some who use wrong methods obtain pleasure; he thinks, if present-life action were the cause of suffering, this would be inverted; but since what is seen is not inverted, one can see that all suffering has the action of former lives as its cause.

One should question him in return: the suffering drawn on by present-life austerity — does it have "the action of former lives" as its cause, or "present-life austerity" as its cause? If it has the action of former lives as its cause, then your saying "one wears out old action by diligent austerity, so that no new action is committed in the present life and thereafter there are no outflows" cannot be maintained (since the suffering is the fruit of old action, unrelated to your present austerity); if it has present-life austerity as its cause, then your saying "all suffering has the action of former lives as its cause" cannot be maintained. Therefore both alternatives cannot be maintained. The treatise then states "the true character of the cause": the causes of suffering are in fact of three kinds — some suffering is purely by the action of former lives (as when one, by the dominant force of one's own action, is born into an evil destiny or a poor family); some suffering arises from mixed causes (as when, through wrongly serving a king, engaging in commerce, farming, robbery, or harming others, the one with merit obtains wealth and pleasure, while the one without merit, though he exerts effort, achieves nothing); and some is obtained purely by present-life effort (as with newly created inducing-action, hearing the Dharma and awakening to it through examination, cultivating the deportments, or learning a craft).

7. The Theory That Reckons a Sovereign God and the Like to Be the Creator (the Great Sovereign God and the like create everything)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: all that people in the world undergo has, in its entirety, "the transformation of the Great Sovereign God" as its cause, or "the transformation of some other person (deity)" as its cause. (This is the reckoning of those who hold the theory of an unequal cause such as the Sovereign God.) Question: on what grounds? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The reasoning is this: he sees that sentient beings in the world, in the matter of cause and effect, "do not turn according to their own wishes" — wishing to cultivate pure action they instead do evil, wishing to be born in a good destiny and pleasant place they fall into an evil destiny, wishing to experience pleasure they experience suffering; from this he thinks: the myriad things of the world must have some other maker, producer, and transformer as their "father," namely the Great Sovereign God, or some other deity.

Now question him in return (by the summary rubric: function, no substance-nature, subsumed or not-subsumed, useful or useless, being a cause, incurring faults): the transforming-function of the Great Sovereign God — does it have "action and skillful means" as its cause, or is it "without a cause"? If it has action and skillful means as its cause, then "only this function has action and skillful means as its cause, while the other things of the world do not" cannot be maintained; if it is without a cause, then "only this function exists without a cause, while the things of the world are not so" cannot be maintained. Ask again: is the Great Sovereign God "subsumed within the world" or "not subsumed"? If subsumed within the world, then it is the same as worldly dharmas, yet it can pervasively produce the world, which cannot be maintained; if not subsumed, then it is liberated, yet you say it can produce the world, which cannot be maintained. Ask again: does it produce and generate the world "having a use," or "having no use"? If having a use, then it is not autonomous with respect to that use, yet you say it is autonomous over the world, which cannot be maintained; if having no use, then with nothing required it yet produces the world, which cannot be maintained. Ask again: the world it produces — does it have "only the Great Sovereign God" as cause, or "take something else too" as cause? If it has only the Great Sovereign God as cause, then wherever there is the Great Sovereign God there is production, and wherever there is production there is the Great Sovereign God (the two being simultaneous), yet you say production has the Great Sovereign God as its cause, which cannot be maintained; if it takes something else (a desire-wish) too as cause, then what in turn is the cause of this "desire-wish"?… (The treatise presses on, layer upon layer, refuting each in turn.) Therefore this school cannot be maintained.

8. The Theory That Killing Is the True Dharma (sacrificial slaughter can produce rebirth in heaven)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: if in a sacrifice one first recites the spells and then slays living creatures, then the one who performs the sacrifice, the one who is slain, and the assistants all attain rebirth in heaven. Question: on what grounds? Answer: this runs counter to principle; it arises from flattery and deceit, and is not established by examining principle. In truth, it is that in the decadent age of strife and contention, the brahmins, going against the law of the ancient brahmins, falsely gave rise to this reckoning for the sake of eating meat.

One should question him in return: this spell-craft sacrificial method — is it in itself "Dharma (wholesome)" or "non-Dharma (unwholesome)"? If it is wholesome in its own substance, then "apart from killing one cannot draw on the fruit one loves oneself, yet it can turn non-Dharma into true Dharma" cannot be maintained; if it is unwholesome in its own substance, then "being itself a dharma that draws on unloved fruit, yet it can dispel another's unloved-fruit dharma" cannot be maintained. If he then rescues his view by saying "just as a worldly poison, when subdued by spell-craft, can do no harm, so this spell-craft is likewise," one should question him in return: can this spell-craft, which can quell outer poison, also quell the inner poisons of greed, hatred, and delusion? If it can quell them, then there ought nowhere and never be a single person in whom greed, hatred, and delusion have been stilled, which cannot be maintained; if it cannot quell them, then your saying "just as a spell can quell poison, so it can also quell non-Dharma action" cannot be maintained. Ask again: is this spell's function "universally operative" or "not universally operative"? If universally operative, then why does one not first take one's own beloved kin to be sacrificed? — this cannot be maintained; if not universal, then this function is not determinate, which cannot be maintained. Ask again: does this spell transform only the cause, or transform the effect as well? If it transforms only the cause, it has no power over the effect, which cannot be maintained; if it transforms the effect as well, then it ought right away to transform the sheep and the like into a lovely, wondrous form — why must one slay the sheep's body before taking on a heavenly body? — this cannot be maintained. Ask again: the one who makes this spell — has he the power and the compassion, or not? If he has, then "apart from slaying the creature, he cannot send the slain to rebirth in heaven" cannot be maintained; if he has not, then "the spell he makes can accomplish anything" cannot be maintained. Therefore it cannot be maintained. At the close the treatise states "the character of non-Dharma": whatever harms others and does not remedy a present fault; whatever those who cultivate the path commonly know to draw on unloved fruit; whatever all the wise decisively declare to be unwholesome; whatever one does not oneself desire; whatever arises from a defiled mind; whatever requires a wrongful spell before its efficacy is seen; and whatever is by nature indeterminate — all these are non-Dharma.

9. The Theory of the Finite and the Infinite (the world is finite / the world is infinite)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who, relying on worldly meditative absorptions, gives rise, regarding the world, to "the notion of the finite, the notion of the infinite, the notion of both the finite and the infinite, the notion of neither the finite nor the infinite" (as the sūtra sets out at length), and so asserts: the world is finite, the world is infinite, the world is both finite and infinite, the world is neither finite nor infinite. Among these: one who seeks the world's limit by "the terminus of time" — when he recollects back to the "eon of decay" he gives rise to the notion of the finite, and when he recollects back to the "eon of formation" he gives rise to the notion of the infinite; one who seeks it by "the breadth of space" — descending, having passed the Avīci hell there is nothing further to be found, and ascending, having passed the fourth meditative absorption there too is nothing further to be found, and so he gives rise to the notion of the finite regarding above and below, and to the notion of the infinite regarding the surrounding quarters; and one who, in order to counter this, merely changes the wording (the meaning being no different), gives rise to the notion of neither the finite nor the infinite.

One should question him in return: since the previous eon of decay, has any world arisen further, or not? If you say there has, then "the world is finite" cannot be maintained; if you say there has not, then "the world no longer exists, yet you are recollecting the world's limit" cannot be maintained. Therefore it cannot be maintained.

10. The Theory of Endless Equivocation Regarding the Deathless (when questioned, they answer vaguely and never directly)

There are four kinds of outsiders who "endlessly equivocate regarding the deathless" (as the sūtra sets out at length). When someone questions them about the wholesome and unwholesome, or about suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path, they call themselves "those who do not equivocate regarding the deathless," and, clinging everywhere to "the pure heaven of the deathless" so as not to be pinned down under questioning, they equivocate with vague words, or evade by turning to some other matter, or merely echo the questioner's words. Among them: the first is "one who has not yet awakened himself" (fearing false speech, and fearing that others will know his lack of wisdom, so he does not plainly say "I do not know"); the second is "one who has given rise to overweening conceit about his own realization" (fearing to be pinned down, fearing false speech, fearing wrong view, so he does not plainly say "I have a realization"); the third is "one who has awakened yet is not yet decided" (fearing wrong view, false speech, and being pinned down, so he does not plainly say "I am undecided") — these three all equivocate in words by turning to some other matter; the fourth is "one who is feeble, foolish, and dull" (fearing to be pinned down, unable to penetrate either the path to the most excellent rebirth or the path to the decisive good, and not even understanding worldly letters, so he does not plainly say "I am foolish and dull, I understand nothing at all," but only questions the other in return and equivocates by echoing the other's words). The occasions that give rise to these four, the persons who so reckon, and the principles that refute them are all as the sūtra states. Because these outsiders have many fears, they abide in this view; when someone comes and questions, they equivocate through flattering evasion. One should know this is subsumed under evil view, and therefore it cannot be maintained.

11. The Theory of the View of No-Cause (everything arises without a cause)

There are two kinds — those who rely on meditative absorption, and those who rely on pondering (as the sūtra sets out at length). Question: on what grounds do the outsiders who rely on pondering assert "the self and the world both arise without a cause"? Answer: in brief, it is that they "first see a lack of continuity" — the inner and outer things have measureless differences and arise in every kind of way; and moreover they sometimes see "conditions empty of any fruit-result," as when in the world a great wind sometimes suddenly springs up and in a moment stills again, a torrential river sometimes suddenly swells and in a moment dries up, fruit-trees sometimes flourish and in a moment wither — and from this they give rise to the view of no-cause.

One should question him in return: your "recollection of former abodes" — does it recall "something without substance" or "the self"? If it recalls something without substance, then a substanceless dharma has never been practiced-into and never been experienced-in-cognition, so how could it be recollected? — this cannot be maintained; if it recalls the self, yet you also reckon "the self was originally nonexistent and afterward suddenly arose," which cannot be maintained. Ask again: the manifold arising, or the sudden arising, of all the inner and outer things in the world — is it without a cause, or with a cause? If without a cause, then they arise suddenly yet also sometimes do not arise, which cannot be maintained (what is causeless ought to arise always or never); if with a cause, then "the self and the world arise without a cause" cannot be maintained. Therefore it cannot be maintained.

12. The Theory of the View of Annihilation (at death one is annihilated and nothing at all remains)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: so long as this coarse "body made of the four great elements" of mine holds together and is not destroyed, at that time there is sickness, there is a boil, there is an arrow (every kind of suffering); but once I die, the body is severed and destroyed and there is nothing at all, and at that time I am skillfully annihilated. The gods of the desire realm, the gods of the form realm, on up through the sphere of infinite space… the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception in the formless realm, are all like this too (seven kinds of annihilationist view in all). Question: on what grounds? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The reasoning is this — he thinks: if there were still a body after I die, then "one would obtain a fruit-maturation without having done the action"; if my substance-nature were entirely and forever nonexistent, then there would be no "undergoing the fruit-maturation of action" at all; and since both of these are wrong, he asserts "once my body dies it is severed, destroyed, and nonexistent, like a tile or stone which, once broken, cannot be joined again."

One should question him in return: is it "the aggregates" that are annihilated, or "the self" that is annihilated? If you say the aggregates are annihilated, yet the substance of the aggregates is impermanent, with cause and effect arising in unbroken succession, to say it is annihilated cannot be maintained; if you say the self is annihilated, then all that you said before — "the coarse form-body has sickness, boil, and arrow; the desire realm, the form realm, the formless realm…" — all cannot be maintained (those are the aggregates, not the self). Therefore it cannot be maintained.

13. The Theory of the View of Emptiness (denying cause and effect, denying all dharmas)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: there is no giving, no cherishing, no sacrifice… down to, there is no true arhat in the world; and further asserts: all dharmas whatsoever have no substance-character. Question: on what grounds? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The reasoning is this: relying on worldly meditative absorption, he sees "a donor who gave without ceasing his whole life long, yet after death was born into a poor and lowly family," and thinks "there is decidedly no (fruit of) giving, cherishing, or sacrifice"; he sees "one who practiced good or practiced evil his whole life, yet after death fell into an evil destiny or was born in heaven," and thinks "there is decidedly no good conduct or evil conduct, and no fruit-maturation of good or evil action"; he sees "a kṣatriya reborn after death into a brahmin family" and other such interchanges of caste, sees "one free of desire reborn in a lower ground," sees "a mother who died and was reborn as a daughter, a daughter who died and became a mother again, a father who became a son, a son who became a father again," and thinks "in the world there is decidedly no father and no mother"; he sees "a person who after death was reborn in the heaven of no-perception, or in the formless realm, or entered nirvāṇa, whose place of rebirth cannot be found," and thinks "there are decidedly no spontaneously-born beings"; or he himself gives rise to the overweening conceit "I am an arhat," yet at the point of death sees the signs of (further) birth, and thinks "there must be no true arhat in the world." There is also one who, being unable to awaken as it really is to the "profound, seemingly-profound, expression-transcending" dharma taught by the Tathāgata, and not reflecting according to right principle upon the established character of dharmas, gives rise to the view of emptiness — holding that "there is decidedly no substance-character of any dharma."

One should question him in return: is there "action to be experienced in the present birth, and also action to be experienced in a later birth," or is "everything to be experienced in the present birth"? If both exist, then all that you said — "there is no giving, no cherishing, no sacrifice, no good conduct, no evil conduct, no fruit-maturation of action, no this world, no other world" — cannot be maintained (for since there is action to be experienced later, a wholesome deed of this life is experienced only after death, which precisely explains the donor's rebirth in poverty); if you say there is no action to be experienced later, then those who perform every kind of pure and impure action ought, upon death, to "experience all at once the fruit-maturation of all their pure and impure action," which cannot be maintained. Ask again: whatever is produced from that womb-embryo or from that seed — are they, with respect to it, father and mother, or not father and mother? If you say they are father and mother, then your "no father and no mother" cannot be maintained; if you say they are not father and mother, then "being produced from that womb-embryo and that seed, yet said to be neither father nor mother" cannot be maintained (it is only that "when they are father and mother, they are not man and woman; when they are man and woman, they are not father and mother" — there is no fault of indeterminacy). Ask again: are there sentient beings "born in another place, whom the divine eye does not see," or not? If you say there are, then your "there are no spontaneously-born beings" cannot be maintained; if you say there are not, then you repudiate those "free of the desire for perception, free of the desire for form, free of the desire for the three realms," which cannot be maintained. Ask again: is there "an arhat-nature about which one gives rise to overweening conceit," or not? If you say there is, then "there must be no true arhat" cannot be maintained; if you say there is not, then "the person who has given rise to incorrect reflection and inverted-ly calls himself an arhat" ought instead to be the true arhat — which also cannot be maintained. Ask again: the three-character dharmas — the character of the perfected-real, the character of the dependent-arising, and the character of the wholly-imagined — are they existent or nonexistent? If you say existent, then "there is no substance-character of any dharma" cannot be maintained; if you say nonexistent, then there ought to be no inversion and also no defilement or purity, which cannot be maintained. Therefore the theory of the view of emptiness cannot be maintained.

14. The Theory That Falsely Reckons Some Caste Supreme (the brahmin caste is the most exalted)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: the brahmin is the most exalted caste and the kṣatriya and the rest are inferior castes; the brahmin is of the white-and-pure color-class and the other castes are of the black-and-defiled color-class; only the brahmin can be pure, and the others cannot; the brahmin is the son of the god Brahmā, born from the mouth and belly of the Great Brahmā King, issued forth from Brahmā, transformed by Brahmā, the blood-lineage of the Brahmā King. (This is the reckoning of the brahmins of the eon of strife.) Question: on what grounds? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The reasoning is this: he sees that among the true brahmins of the world some are endowed with moral discipline, and some are greedy for fame, gain, and reverence, and so he reckons in this way.

One should question him in return: is it "only the other castes that are born of father and mother," or "the brahmin too"? If only the other castes, yet the world plainly sees that brahmins too are born of a mother — you contradict what is plainly seen, which cannot be maintained; if the brahmin too is born of father and mother, then your saying "the brahmin is the most exalted caste and the kṣatriya and the rest are inferior" cannot be maintained. Just as they are alike in being born of a mother, so they are alike in performing wholesome and unwholesome action, in undergoing loved and unloved fruit, in being born into good and evil destinies, alike in entering the womb and being born through the completing of the three conditions, alike in practicing crafts and undertaking occupations, alike in having the wholesome and unwholesome, in having kings and ministers, in undergoing old age, sickness, and death, or in cultivating the holy life and realizing awakening — the brahmin has no inborn superiority of caste. Ask again: is one called superior "because born of a superior caste," or "by moral discipline, learning, and so forth"? If by being born of a superior caste, then your own treatises say "in a sacrifice, take the one superior in discipline, learning, and so forth as the standard," so you contradict yourselves; if by discipline, learning, and so forth, then your saying "the brahmin is the most exalted and the others are inferior" cannot be maintained. Therefore it cannot be maintained.

15. The Theory That Falsely Reckons Some Practice to Be Purity (sensual enjoyment, meditative absorption, bathing, or austerity is itself purity and liberation)

There are several schools of outsiders: one school asserts "if I am liberated, my mind attains mastery and my contemplation attains mastery, and I firmly take hold of and receive the subtle, wondrous five sense-pleasures of the gods, sporting, taking my delight, and enjoying them at will — this is to attain nirvāṇa in the present life, the supreme purity"; one school asserts "if one is separated from desire and from evil, unwholesome dharmas, and enters the first meditative absorption, on up to the fourth meditative absorption, this too is to attain nirvāṇa in the present life, the supreme purity"; one school asserts "if sentient beings bathe their bodies in the Sundarikā River (and the Bāhukā River, the Gayā River, the Sarasvatī River, the Ganges River, and so forth), all their evils are removed and destroyed — this is the supreme purity"; and there are still others who hold the "dog-vow, the ox-vow, the oil-and-ink vow, the naked vow, the ash vow, the self-mortification vow, the filth vow" to be purity. Question: on what grounds? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The reasoning is this: he supposes that "attaining unrestrained mastery, mastery over desire, and mastery over contemplative practice is supreme purity," yet does not know the character of these masteries as it really is; and some suppose that "by mortifying one's own body, evil is thereby liberated, or by committing an offense, the offense is thereby liberated."

One should question him in return: the one who sports and takes pleasure in the wondrous five sense-pleasures — has he separated from the greed of desire, or not? If he has separated, then "sporting and taking pleasure in the five sense-pleasures" cannot be maintained (having separated from desire, what pleasure would he crave?); if he has not separated, then "reckoning it liberation and purity" cannot be maintained. Ask again: the one who attains the first meditative absorption on up to fully abiding in the fourth meditative absorption — has he separated from all greed and desire, or not? If you say he has separated from all, then "merely abiding up to the fourth meditative absorption (not reaching the outflow-free)" cannot be maintained; if you say he has not separated from all desire, then "reckoning it the ultimate liberation and purity" cannot be maintained. Ask again: is ultimate purity "by inner purity" or "by outer purity"? If by the inner, then "attaining purity by bathing in a river" cannot be maintained; if by the outer, then "the inner defilements of greed, hatred, delusion, and so forth still remaining, and merely removing the outer stains, yet reckoning it purity" cannot be maintained. Ask again: does one attain purity "by taking hold of a pure thing" or "by taking hold of an impure thing"? If by taking hold of a pure thing, yet the world commonly sees dogs and the like to be impure, and you set up "taking hold of dogs and the like brings purity," which cannot be maintained; if by taking hold of an impure thing, then "being itself impure, yet able to make another pure" cannot be maintained. Ask again: the one who undertakes the dog-vow and the like — does he attain purity "by performing evil conduct of body and so forth," or "by performing right and wondrous conduct of body and so forth"? To reckon purity by performing evil conduct cannot be maintained; if it is by right and wondrous conduct, then holding the dog-vow and the like was for nothing (purity comes from right conduct, not from the dog-vow), which cannot be maintained. Therefore it cannot be maintained.

16. The Theory That Falsely Reckons Some Sign to Be Auspicious (the sun, moon, and constellations foretell fortune)

There is a certain kind of renunciant or brahmin who asserts: if in the world the sun and moon are eclipsed and the constellations lose their courses, then whatever one wishes to do will not be accomplished; if they are favorable, then whatever one wishes will be accomplished. For this reason he diligently makes offerings to the sun, moon, stars, and the like, offers to the fire and recites spells, sets out kuśa grass, and lays out jars full of bimba fruit and śaṅkha shells and the like. (This is the reckoning of the astrologers and diviners.) Question: on what grounds? Answer: on the authority of a received teaching and on reasoning. The reasoning is this: he has attained a worldly meditative absorption, and the people of the world all suppose him to be an arhat; those who wish to gain wealth and pleasure for themselves, or to have their prayed-for aim fulfilled, come to consult him; but he does not know as it really is the principle that "action and fruit correspond, and things arise from conditions," and merely, seeing that at the time when the sun and moon are eclipsed and the constellations run their courses the pure and impure action-retribution of sentient beings happens to ripen, reckons this to be made by the sun, moon, and stars, and sets up and proclaims it for those who put faith in the matter.

One should question him in return: the affairs of the world's rising and declining and the like — are they made "by the eclipse of the sun and moon, the courses of the constellations, and so forth," or made "by pure and impure action"? If you say made by the sun and moon and the like, then it is plainly seen that people, throughout their lives, perform meritorious or non-meritorious action accordingly and draw on these fruits of rising and declining, suffering and pleasure — this cannot be maintained; if you say made by pure and impure action, then "reckoning it made by the sun and moon and the like" cannot be maintained. Therefore it cannot be maintained.

Conclusion: The Sixteen Heterodox Theories One and All Fail to Stand

These sixteen heterodox theories, examined through the two gateways of "teaching and reasoning," and pursued throughout by right principle, in every single case cannot be maintained. (This is precisely the fruit that "attention contrary to principle" bears — thinking pointed in the wrong direction gives rise to these views that cannot stand.)

The fourth gate, "attention contrary to principle" (不如理作意), stands exactly opposite the third gate, "attention in accord with principle" (如理作意), as one paired contrast. It is the same applied-and-sustained thought throughout: turned in the right direction it binds up merit; turned in the wrong direction it breeds wrong views. The treatise lays out "the sixteen heterodox theories" (十六異論) as specimens and refutes them school by school — this is a demon-revealing mirror by which a practitioner discerns wrong views. This piece first sets out the method of refutation, then treats each school by group — where it errs, and what simile the treatise uses to break it — and finally looks to the consciousness-only right view that shows through the breaking. The hard points are all expounded with similes the treatise itself already holds; nothing is added from thin air.

One: First, a Single Question — Why Must Practice First Learn to "Break Views"?

We always suppose that practice is a matter of "cultivating" — sitting in meditation, keeping the precepts, doing good. Yet this gate reminds us: before cultivating, the "view" must first be right. Because if the view is wrong, the cultivation is wholly wrong — you take yourself to be liberating, when in fact you are deepening a wrong view; you take yourself to be purifying, when in fact you are creating karma. So the treatise, right after "attention in accord with principle," proceeds at once, taking a whole gate and the wrong views of sixteen heterodox schools as its specimens, laying out for you one by one just what "attention contrary to principle" will bind into fruit. These sixteen schools, from philosophical speculation (a fruit already present within its cause; the real existence of the three times) to folk superstition (bathing to wash away sin; astrology fixing fortune and misfortune), all but catch in one net the principal types of human wrong view.

Two: The Method of Refutation Is Itself Worth Learning — Thesis → Reason → Principle

For each school refuted, the treatise uses one and the same procedure, and this procedure is itself a discipline of "right reasoning" (正理): first set out his assertion, then ask on what ground he holds it (the treatise says in every case "by teaching and by reasoning" — "teaching" is the received scriptures of a lineage, "reasoning" is his own inference while dwelling upon the "stage of ratiocination" 尋思地), and finally break it by principle. The engine of the refutation is always the same dilemma: "Which side, in the end, do you assert? If A, then [such-and-such principle] will not go through; if B, then [such-and-such other principle] will not go through either." It blocks off, one by one, every possible line of retreat for the opponent, so that under any interpretation whatsoever he cannot stand.

This is no mere display of eloquence — it does not press people down by authority, but relies on principle alone: laying open every possibility of a statement and testing each one for whether it is reasonable. Once you have learned this discipline, then whatever assertion you read, you can put the one question: "So which meaning, in the end, do you intend? Does this meaning go through?" — this is the very eye for discerning the Dharma (擇法眼) that a practitioner ought to have. Below, in six groups, we look at what each of these sixteen mirrors reflects.

Three: Refuting the Two Schools of "the Fruit Already Present" — A Fruit Already Present within Its Cause; A Manifesting-Forth from Conditions

The theory that the fruit is already present within its cause (因中有果論, the Sāṃkhya "Rain-Multitude heterodox school" 雨眾外道) asserts that "the fruit lies hidden within the cause from the start" — and so from this cause only this fruit is produced, and one seeking the fruit takes only this cause. The treatise first counters with a question: are cause and fruit the same or different? If the same, then there are no two distinct kinds, cause and fruit, to be divided; if different, then is the fruit within the cause "not yet arisen" or "already arisen"? If not yet arisen, yet you call it "present"; if already arisen, then why need it be produced again from the cause? Both ends are blocked. More importantly, the treatise takes the chance to teach one principle of right reasoning: for a thing truly to "be present," it must be known through five characteristics — obtainable in a location (as water within a jar); obtainable in a support (as eye-consciousness within the eye); obtainable through its own characteristic; obtainable through its own operation; and, through the alteration of causes and conditions, its fruit alters accordingly. The fruit within the cause cannot be verified by even one of these five characteristics, and so "a fruit already present within its cause" cannot be established. What is set up is the dependently-arisen right view that "the fruit awaits conditions before it arises — not present before, present now."

The theory of a manifesting-forth from conditions (從緣顯了論) steps back and says: "the fruit is present from the start; it is merely 'manifested forth' by conditions, not 'produced.'" The treatise breaks it with a simile from daily life: darkness can screen off the water within a jar — yet it screens off that very jar together with it — if the obstructing condition truly obstructs, how could it obstruct only the fruit and not the cause? Both being alike "present," on what ground does it manifest the fruit alone and not the cause? At every point it contradicts itself. The treatise also, in passing, clarifies a point easily confused: some things are indeed "present yet unseen," but that is because they are too far off, are screened off, are too subtle, the mind is scattered, the faculty is damaged, or the corresponding knowledge has not yet been attained — not because they "are present, hidden, and awaiting manifestation."

Four: Refuting the Two Schools of "Real Existence" — the Real Existence of the Past and Future; the Reckoning of a Self (Where the Consciousness-Only Color Is Thickest)

The theory of the real existence of the past and future (去來實有論, the Sarvāstivāda) asserts that "the past and the future are really existent just as the present is." This refutation shows the consciousness-only color most of all. The opponent hauls out the Buddha's scriptures — "whatever is existent is just the twelve sense-fields" (一切有者即十二處), "there is past karma" (有過去業) — as his backing, and the treatise dismantles them one by one for him: the so-called "past karma" is not that there really still exists some past karma persisting, but is a designation posited in dependence on the latent impression (習氣); within the conditioned formations, wholesome and unwholesome karma once arose and then ceased, perfuming a force that "continues on, ascending and altering" — this is called the latent impression, and it is in dependence on this latent impression that pleasing and unpleasing fruits arise. Replacing "the really-existent three times" with "the latent impression / the seed" — this stroke cuts right to the lifeblood of the consciousness-only doctrine of seeds: one need not grasp the three times as really existent; cause and effect go through by the continuance of seeds. The treatise further sets up a careful distinction: past and future form and the rest are said to "be present" in dependence on the concealed intent of the three characteristics — the causal characteristic, the intrinsic characteristic, and the resultant characteristic — not that there truly is a self-substance existing within the three times. The opponent has one more counter: if past and future are non-existent, how is it that we can still "think of" them? The treatise's answer is exquisite — we plainly can raise a cognition that "grasps a non-existent," such as "there is no self, no rabbit's horn, no barren woman's child" (沒有我、沒有兔角、沒有石女兒); it is evident that a cognition can arise taking even "the non-existent" as its object, and this "being able to think of it" in no way proves that what is thought of is really existent. In one phrase it breaks the mistaken inference that "we can recall the past, therefore the past is really existent."

The theory that reckons a self (計我論) asserts that "there is a permanently-abiding, really-existent self (a being 薩埵, a person 補特伽羅)." This is the longest engagement; the treatise presses the question from more than a dozen angles. It first breaks two of the opponent's illusions: one, "without any deliberation there arises the cognition 'there is a sentient being'"; two, "in every act one must first have the thought 'I will do it.'" The treatise answers: to see form and shape ought only to raise the cognition "form"; to see suffering and pleasure ought only to raise the cognition "feeling"; to see discerning ought only to raise the cognition "mind"; to force onto these five aggregates an added "being" (薩埵) — that is precisely the inversion. Then it presses the question layer upon layer: this self of yours — is it right upon the five aggregates, or apart from the five aggregates? Is it permanent or impermanent? Is it the "seer" itself, or the "instrument of seeing"? And it blocks off the claim that "the self is able to act" with a string of similes: you say the self is able to cut, like a sickle (鎌刀)? But apart from the sickle, other things too can cut; you say the self is able to burn, like fire (火)? Fire, apart from a "burner," burns of itself — why set up an additional self? You say the self is able to hold things up like the great earth (大地), or to receive and contain like space (虛空)? The operations of earth and space are plainly to be seen, whereas the operation of that "self" of yours is nowhere to be seen at any point. Finally it presses out the conclusion: what is called "self" is only "posited, in dependence on the phenomena, as being present" (在諸法上假立為有), and is not really existent.

And here the treatise is especially compassionate: since there is no self, why does the Buddha nonetheless everywhere say "there is a self"? The treatise sets up the four reasons for positing a self by convention (假立有我四因) — to make worldly speech convenient; to accord with the world; to remove the dread of "annihilation into no-self"; and, as a skillful means, to expound the merits and faults of oneself and others. Breaking the real self and positing a conventional self — this is precisely the root of the consciousness-only "no-self of persons" (人無我), one thread continuous with the "self as characterized by the ultimate meaning" (第一義我相) of the Stage of the Mental.

Five: Refuting the Two Schools of "Permanence and Annihilation" — the Reckoning of Permanence; the View of Annihilation

The theory that reckons permanence (計常論) grasps that "the self and the world are both permanently abiding, incapable of being harmed, accumulated and abiding, like iṣīkā (伊師迦)" (the ancient masters have two Western glosses: it points either to the solid, tall Iṣīkā mountain beside Rājagṛha, or to the true, unwithering iṣīkā reed — both figuring the self and the world as permanently abiding and solid). The treatise asks on what ground it holds this: it turns out that in cultivating concentration it raised "the recollection of former abodes" (宿住隨念), able to recall past lives beyond measure, yet it did not know dependent origination as it really is (不如實知緣起), and so mistook "an unbroken continuance" for "a permanent, unchanging abiding." There is also a school that grasps that "the subtle particle is permanent" (極微是常) — analyzing gross things layer by layer down to the finest subtle particle, it then says gross things are impermanent and the subtle particle permanent; the treatise breaks it: if the subtle particle, once dispersed, is only more feeble, how can it be called permanent? And if it is different from the gross fruit, how can it produce the gross fruit?

The theory of the view of annihilation (斷見論) is just the opposite, grasping that "this body of mine, a provisional composite of the four great elements, upon death is annihilated and destroyed into nothing, like a broken tile or stone that cannot be rejoined" (瓦石破了不能再合). The treatise breaks it: is what is annihilated the aggregates, or the self? The aggregates continue on unbroken in cause and effect, so it will not go through to call them annihilated; the self has no real substance to begin with, so still less can annihilation be spoken of. The view of permanence takes continuance for permanence; the view of annihilation takes continuance for a rupture — both ends are biased. What the treatise sets up is the dependently-arisen right view of "neither permanent nor annihilated" (非常非斷).

Six: Refuting the Three Schools of "Cause" — the Cause of Former Deeds; a Sovereign Maker; the View of No Cause

These three schools err, one and all, in the positing of "cause and effect" — and err, fittingly, in three directions: the cause too rigid, the cause lodged in a god, and no cause at all.

The theory of the cause of former deeds (宿作因論, the Jaina "Unbound heterodox school" 無繫外道) grasps that "all suffering is fixed by dead reckoning through the karma of former lives, and can only be exhausted by ascetic austerities spitting out the old karma." The treatise breaks it: if suffering is purely due to former karma, then what cause is your present asceticism? And it sets up the characteristic of cause as it really is (如實因相) — suffering is in fact of three kinds: that summoned purely by former karma; that produced by mixed causes (as suffering summoned by wronging a king); and that got purely by present exertion (as making new karma, hearing the right Dharma, learning a craft). It splits "fatalism" apart into three. The theory of a sovereign maker (自在作者論, that Maheśvara made the world) grasps that "the myriad things are transformed forth by a god." The treatise breaks it item by item with an uddāna outline — is the god's "capacity" to make things caused or uncaused? Does the god himself belong to the world or not? Is what is made of use to the god or of no use? Every fork becomes a fault. The theory of the view of no cause (無因見論) grasps that "the self and the world both arise without cause." Its "grounds" are that it sees the world constantly holding a mark of "discontinuity" — a great wind suddenly rises, then in an instant grows still and stops; a torrential river swells in flood, then in an instant runs dry to a visible bed; flowers and fruit are suddenly luxuriant, then in an instant wither and fall — and so it supposes the myriad things to be without cause. The treatise breaks it: without cause, they ought to arise perpetually, or ought perpetually not to arise; how would they be now present, now absent? This precisely proves that there is a cause. All three schools are broken, and what is set up in each is "dependent arising" (緣生).

Seven: Refuting the Three Schools of "Wrong Dharma and Wrong Practice" — Harm as the Right Dharma; Falsely Reckoning Purity; Falsely Reckoning Auspiciousness

The theory of harm as the right Dharma (害為正法論) grasps that "in sacrifice, killing living beings by incantation lets the one who sacrifices, the one who is killed, and the assisting companions all be reborn in heaven." The treatise does not go by way of principle, but directly exposes its provenance: this is a fawning, deceiving fabrication that the brahmins of the corrupt eon (壞劫) devised for the sake of eating meat (為了吃肉), and is in no way set up by observing principle. And it sets up the characteristic of what is non-Dharma (非法之相): harming others; summoning unpleasing fruit; declared unwholesome by the wise; what one does not oneself wish; and what arises from a defiled mind — all these are non-Dharma. The theory of falsely reckoning purity (妄計清淨論) sees liberation crookedly — some grasp that "sporting and receiving pleasure in the five desires" is nirvāṇa in the present dharma; some grasp that "bathing in the holy rivers, the Sundarikā and the Gaṅgā (孫陀利迦河、殑伽河)" washes clean all evils; some hold the dog-vow, the ox-vow, the oil-and-ink vow, the naked vow, the ash vow, the self-mortification vow, and the filth vow (狗戒、牛戒、油墨戒、露形戒、灰戒、自苦戒、糞穢戒) to be purity. The treatise breaks them with great crispness: the pleasure-taker has not left desire — how speak of liberation? Bathing removes only the outer dirt; the inner dirt of greed, hatred, and delusion it cannot remove; to hold the dog-vow and the rest is to practice a wrong and evil practice — how could it attain purity? The theory of falsely reckoning auspiciousness (妄計吉祥論) takes "eclipses of sun and moon, and the constellations straying from their courses" to be the chief causes of calamity and fortune, and so sacrifices to fire, chants incantations, sets out kuśa grass, and fills jars with bilva fruit to avert misfortune and pray for blessing. The treatise breaks it: the world's rise and decline, its suffering and pleasure, are plainly summoned by the wholesome and unwholesome karma each person creates to the end of his lifespan; to mistake this for "what the sun, moon, and stars have done" is precisely not to know the dependently-arisen principle that karma and its fruit correspond.

Eight: Refuting the Three Schools of "Boundary, Equivocation, and the Supreme"

The theory of the bounded and the boundless (邊無邊論) splits hairs over the "boundary" of time and space: recalling "the eon of dissolution" it feels the world is bounded; recalling "the eon of formation" it feels it is boundless; failing to find a bottom searching up and down it feels it is bounded; failing to find an edge searching in the four directions it feels it is boundless. The theory of the deathless and equivocation (不死矯亂論) simply does not answer straight — asked about good and evil, asked about suffering, its origin, cessation, and the path, it dodges vaguely and turns about with whatever words the questioner uses; the treatise points out that the root of these four equivocations is all dread (怖畏) — fear of false speech, fear of others knowing one's own not-knowing (ajñāna), and fear of wrong view. The theory that falsely reckons the supreme (妄計最勝論) grasps that "the brahmin caste is the most honored, born from the mouth and belly of Great Brahmā." The treatise breaks it plainly and forcefully: is not the brahmin too produced from a mother's womb (從母胎產生)? Does he not likewise make good and evil, receive pleasing and unpleasing fruit, enter a mother's womb and be born? What inborn superiority or inferiority is there in caste — superiority and inferiority lie only in the virtues of discipline, learning, and the like, not in bloodline.

Nine: The Eye of the Whole Piece — Refuting the View of Emptiness, Establishing the Middle Way of the Threefold Nature

Among the sixteen schools, the thirteenth, the theory of the view of emptiness (空見論), is the most crucial, because what it refutes is the wrongly-grasped emptiness (惡取空) — repudiating giving, repudiating the fruits of wholesome and unwholesome karma, and even repudiating the substance-and-characteristic of all phenomena whatsoever (this is precisely the various wrong views above fallen to their worst point). The treatise points out the root of its illness: being unable to awaken as it really is to "the Tathāgata's profound Dharma beyond words," it thrusts everything at once into "there is nothing at all." The treatise finally shows its trump card: you say "there is no substance-and-characteristic of any phenomena whatsoever"? Then I ask you — these three characteristics, the perfectly-accomplished mark, the other-dependent mark, and the wholly-imagined mark (圓成實相、依他起相、遍計所執相), are they present or absent? Say present, and your "no substance-and-characteristic of any phenomena" will not go through; say absent, and then there is no inversion, and no defilement or purity either, which still less will go through. Kuiji's Concise Compendium (《略纂》) matches this "refuting emptiness by the threefold nature" most distinctly (Dunlun's Notes 《論記》 judges the same, giving it as "the inverted-grasped; the defiled other-dependent; the pure perfectly-accomplished"): "In refuting the inner view of emptiness, 'there ought to be no inversion' is the [imagined-]grasped; 'the defiled' is the other-dependent; 'the pure' is the perfectly-accomplished" — the wholly-imagined nature answering to that "inversion," the other-dependent nature answering to that "defilement" (the three defilements), the perfectly-accomplished nature answering to that "purity" (the two purities); if within the ultimate meaning these three were all absent, then "there would be no birth-and-death, and no nirvāṇa either — what to delight in, what to weary of; what to attain, what to relinquish," and that is what truly will not go through. Refuting the wrongly-grasped emptiness by the consciousness-only threefold nature — this one phrase draws a decisive line between the consciousness-only standpoint of "neither existent nor empty, the Middle Way" and the heterodox schools' obstinate emptiness: what consciousness-only calls "non-existent" is the wholly-imagined nature (the falsely-grasped real self and real dharmas); what consciousness-only calls "existent" is the other-dependent nature and the perfectly-accomplished nature. To repudiate all into utter non-existence is a wrong view that ruins cause and effect — it is not consciousness-only.

Ten: The Intent of This Gate

Attention contrary to principle is the root of every wrong view; the sixteen heterodox theories are the sixteen kinds of fruit it binds. The treatise sets up this gate: first, to teach you to discern — hold up these sixteen mirrors, and the world's every wrong view takes on visible form; second, to teach you to break — learn the discipline of discerning the Dharma, "thesis → reason → principle," and you have a demon-revealing mirror of your own; third, to show forth the right by way of breaking: in refuting the reckoned self it establishes the conventional self (the no-self of persons); in refuting the real existence of the past and future it establishes the latent impression and the seed; in refuting permanence and annihilation it establishes dependent arising; in refuting the view of emptiness it establishes the Middle Way of the threefold nature — the right view of consciousness-only is precisely what stands upright at the place where wrong views are broken through and through. And what counters attention contrary to principle is, from first to last, the third gate's "attention in accord with principle" together with the right contemplation of dependent arising; the next gate, "defilement" (雜染), will treat just how these attentions contrary to principle bind into the whole cycle of afflictions, karma, and birth in saṃsāra.

Carrying Forward

Refuting the reckoned self → the no-self of persons · the four reasons for the conventional self (carrying forward the "self as characterized by the ultimate meaning" of the Stage of the Mental, 02-03; opening the way to the two kinds of no-self in the Cheng Weishi Lun); refuting the real existence of the past and future → the doctrine of the latent impression / the seed (carrying forward the all-seeds consciousness of the Stage of the Mental; opening the way to the six senses of the seed in the Cheng Weishi Lun); refuting the view of emptiness → the perfectly-accomplished, other-dependent, and wholly-imagined threefold nature (the consciousness-only threefold nature · the root of the Middle Way · expanded in the Chapter on the Meaning of Reality of the Bodhisattva Stage, the Madhyāntavibhāga, and the Cheng Weishi Lun); refuting permanence and annihilation → the dependently-arisen right view (opening the way to the twelvefold dependent arising, 03-05-03).