瑜伽師地論 菩薩地 · 真實義品

In one line: Reality is four-layered according to knowledge, and the supreme is the ineffable — the ineffable intrinsic nature (the other-dependent + the true) and the provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature (the wholly-imagined) of all phenomena, ranged over by non-discriminating knowledge, are the Middle Way of the threefold nature; to empty the wholly-imagined and to keep the bare thing is the well-grasped emptiness.

Three points of the eye:

1. The four realities · the fourth is supreme: the reality established by consensus in the world / the reality established by reasoning / the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the afflictive obstruction (the two vehicles' four truths · emptiness of self) / the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the cognitive obstruction (the bodhisattvas and buddhas · the no-self of phenomena, the ineffable); the first two are inferior, the third middling, the fourth supreme. The fourth = the ineffable intrinsic nature / the provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature, the sphere of non-discriminating knowledge = the treatise-anchor of the threefold nature (the Saṃdhinirmocana's three characters and threefold naturelessness · the Cheng Weishi Lun's threefold nature · the perfectly-accomplished = the suchness shown forth by the twofold emptiness).
2. The non-dual Middle Way · the well-grasped emptiness: being (the provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature · over-affirmation) / non-being (the absence of any thing · under-denial), the two of them alike far removed = the Middle Way. The well-grasped emptiness = "because here that is nothing at all, one accordingly, by that, rightly contemplates it as empty; and because here the remainder is in truth present, one accordingly, by that remainder, knows just as it is that it is present" (empty the wholly-imagined · keep the other-dependent bare thing · like the provisionally-established person upon the aggregates); the wrongly-grasped emptiness = dismissing the bare thing as absent = the utterly-nihilistic one, "better to raise the view of a self than wrongly to grasp emptiness." The other-dependent resembles being yet is not real = the eight similes (magical creation / reflected image / echo / play of light and shadow / the moon in water / mirage-water / dream / illusion).
3. The resolute conviction in emptiness · abiding in neither of the two extremes: the bodhisattva dwells in birth-and-death and cultivates the resolute conviction in emptiness, knowing birth-and-death just as it is yet not growing weary of it, and toward nirvāṇa neither afraid nor desirous → abiding neither in birth-and-death nor in nirvāṇa = the vast skillful means for realizing awakening (unlike the two vehicles, who swiftly enter quiescent cessation). The eight discriminations give rise to three things (the ground-and-object thing of idle proliferation · view and the conceit "I am" · greed, hatred, delusion) → the four investigations and the four kinds of knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real extinguish idle proliferation → the great parinirvāṇa of the Great Vehicle · the five benefits and five deeds.

Appended pointers:

• Read together with the Chapter on Lineage (15-01-01) — the fruit-sphere of the bodhisattva-lineage's "furthermore realizing the purification of the cognitive obstruction" is this chapter's fourth "reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the cognitive obstruction"; lineage is the cause, the true reality is what it realizes.
• The assignment of the ineffable / the provisionally-spoken ↔ the threefold nature: the ancient masters have two readings (Jing: the ineffable = the other-dependent and the true · the provisionally-spoken = the wholly-imagined / the first Western gloss: the provisionally-spoken = the other-dependent · Nanda's separate judgment); see the Apparatus, Heading IV, both set out without adjudication.
• The boundary between the wrongly-grasped emptiness and the "ultimate emptiness" of the three treatises: Jing's refutation · Dunlun's judgment · Wŏnhyo's reconciliation, only recorded, not adjudicated (Apparatus, Heading IV).
• The Section on Ascertainment re-ascertains the true reality by the "five events" (character · name · discrimination · suchness · right knowledge), which and this chapter's two axes mutually illumine (Apparatus, Heading II).

The Two Gateways and the Four Kinds of the True Reality

What is the true reality (真實義, tattvārtha)? Stated briefly, there are two kinds. The first is grounded in the nature "just as it is" (如所有性) — the true nature of all phenomena; the second is grounded in the nature "in its full extent" (盡所有性) — the whole range of all phenomena. This "true nature" and this "whole nature" taken together are named, in sum, the true reality.

This true reality, according to differences of category, is again of four kinds. The first is the reality established by consensus in the world; the second is the reality established by reasoning; the third is the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the afflictive obstruction; the fourth is the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the cognitive obstruction.

One: The Reality Established by Consensus in the World

What is the reality established by consensus in the world? It is the single, shared view that all the world, with respect to this or that thing, holds in common — a view following upon provisional positing, upon customary worldly practice, and upon the discerning intelligence by which one enters into it. For example: "earth is just earth, not fire and the rest." As with earth, so too with water, fire, wind, form, sound, smell, taste, and the tangible, and on down to food and drink, carriages, the various ornaments, property and household goods, unguents, flower-garlands, song and dance and instrumental music, the various lights, the service rendered by men and women, fields and gardens, shops and inns, dwellings and houses, and the like — all of these are held so as well. "Suffering is just suffering, not pleasure and the rest; pleasure is just pleasure, not suffering and the rest." In sum: this is just so, and not not-so; it is thus, and not not-thus. This is the object-thing that the world holds by a settled and decisive conviction, handed down in unbroken succession from the beginningless prior limit, established in common by a shared conceiving and discriminating — an object taken up without waiting upon reflection, calculation, or examination before it is grasped. This is called the reality established by consensus in the world.

Two: The Reality Established by Reasoning

What is the reality established by reasoning? It is the meaning laid down through reasoning by those who have understanding. Those who are acute, those who are keen-witted, those able to reason, those able to examine, those who abide on the ground of applied-and-sustained thought, those endowed with their own eloquence, those situated in the state of an ordinary being, those who proceed according to examination — [such ones], relying on direct perception, on inference, and on down to authoritative teaching, by the utmost skillful discrimination and by the knowledge of settled decision, take up as their object and come to know a matter; the meaning built up and set forth through "the reasoning that establishes by proof." This is called the reality established by reasoning.

Three: The Reality Ranged Over by the Knowledge Purified of the Afflictive Obstruction

What is the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the afflictive obstruction? It is the sphere ranged over by these knowledges: the uncontaminated knowledge of all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, the knowledge that can draw forth uncontaminated knowledge, and the worldly knowledge subsequently attained after the uncontaminated. This is called the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the afflictive obstruction. Because, by taking this as object, one thereby attains purity from the afflictive obstruction and abides, in future times, without obstruction, it is called the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the afflictive obstruction. And what, further, is this? It is the four noble truths: first, the noble truth of suffering; second, the noble truth of the origin; third, the noble truth of cessation; fourth, the noble truth of the path. Upon the meaning of these four noble truths one discriminates with the utmost skill and enters into direct realization; and after entering direct realization, the knowledge that accords with the real arises. This "direct realization of the truths" is such that, of all that the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha are able to contemplate, only the aggregates can be found; apart from the aggregates, no "self" can be found. Because one unceasingly cultivates the wisdom that "the arising and ceasing of the dependently-arisen formations correspond [to one another]," and unceasingly cultivates the view that "the person, distinct from the aggregates, has no real nature," there arises such a direct realization of the noble truths.

Four: The Reality Ranged Over by the Knowledge Purified of the Cognitive Obstruction

What is the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the cognitive obstruction? That which, with respect to the objects that are to be known, is able to obstruct knowledge is called the cognitive obstruction; the sphere ranged over by the knowledge liberated from the cognitive obstruction — this, one should know, is called the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the cognitive obstruction. And what, further, is this? It is the sphere ranged over, by the equal-and-even, non-discriminating knowledge, of the bodhisattvas and of the buddhas, the world-honored ones — [the sphere they range over] with respect to the ineffable intrinsic nature (離言自性) and the provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature (假說自性) of all phenomena, after they have entered into the no-self of phenomena and, having entered, become thoroughly purified. This sphere is the very first, is suchness, is the unsurpassed, is the utmost limit of the knowable — up to just here, all discrimination of the right Dharma turns back, unable to pass beyond.

The Middle Way of Non-Duality

Further, this character of the true reality should be understood as that which is shown forth by "non-duality." The "duality" here spoken of is "being" (有) and "non-being" (非有).

The "being" here is the "provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature" that is set up — that is, what the world grasps over long time, and also the root of all the world's discriminating idle proliferation. It is spoken of as form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness; or as eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; or as earth, water, fire, and wind; or as form, sound, smell, taste, the tangible, and phenomena; or as wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; or as arising and ceasing; or as dependently arisen; or as past, future, and present; or as conditioned; or as unconditioned; or as this world; or as another world; or as sun and moon; and on down to what is seen, heard, sensed, and known, what is sought and what is obtained, and what the mind follows in applied-and-sustained thought; and at the last, even as far as nirvāṇa. This class of things is the "provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature" of the phenomena that all the world knows in common, and is called "being."

The "non-being" here spoken of refers to those provisionally-spoken intrinsic natures — of forms, and on down to nirvāṇa — which are in truth without any thing, without any character; being only that upon which provisional speech is grounded, they are, one and all, nothing at all. The provisionally-set-up verbal expressions that turn in dependence on them are, one and all, nothing whatever. This is called "non-being."

The "being" spoken of earlier is now said to be "non-being"; and "being" and "non-being," the two of them alike, are far removed — this true-nature thing subsumed under the character of phenomena is called "non-duality." Because of non-duality, it is named the "Middle Way"; being far removed from the two extremes, it is also named the "unsurpassed." As for the knowledge of the buddhas, the world-honored ones, with respect to this true reality it is already thoroughly purified; as for the knowledge of the bodhisattvas, with respect to this true reality it is shown forth by the path of training.

This Wisdom Is the Bodhisattva's Vast Skillful Means for Realizing Awakening — Abiding Neither in Birth-and-Death nor in Nirvāṇa

Further, this wisdom is the vast skillful means by which the bodhisattvas are able to realize the unsurpassed, perfect, complete awakening. Why? Because the bodhisattvas, dwelling within birth-and-death, in this life and that life cultivate the "resolute conviction in emptiness" (空勝解), and so become well able to bring to maturity all the buddha-dharmas and all sentient beings; and are also able to know birth-and-death just as it is, and yet do not, toward birth-and-death, with a deep heart weary of and turn away from it through the "practices of impermanence and the rest." Were the bodhisattvas not able to know birth-and-death just as it is, they would not be able, with a deep heart, to cast off all afflictions such as greed, hatred, and delusion; not casting off the afflictions, they would receive the successive births-and-deaths with a defiled mind; receiving birth-and-death with a defiled mind, they would not be able to bring to maturity all the buddha-dharmas and all sentient beings. Were the bodhisattvas, toward birth-and-death, with a deep heart to grow weary and turn away through the practices of impermanence and the rest, they would swiftly enter into parinirvāṇa; and having swiftly entered parinirvāṇa, they would not even be able to bring the buddha-dharmas and sentient beings to maturity — how much less would they be able to realize the unsurpassed, perfect, complete awakening.

Further, the bodhisattvas, because they cultivate this resolute conviction in emptiness, are thereby neither deeply afraid of nirvāṇa nor greatly desirous of it. Were the bodhisattvas deeply afraid of nirvāṇa, they would not be able to fulfill the provisions for nirvāṇa — because, being deeply afraid of nirvāṇa, they would not see the excellent benefits and merits of nirvāṇa; and because they did not see them, they would, toward nirvāṇa, be far removed from all pure resolute conviction. Were the bodhisattvas, toward nirvāṇa, to abide much in desirous longing, then again they would swiftly enter into parinirvāṇa; and having swiftly entered, they would not be able to bring the buddha-dharmas and sentient beings to maturity.

One should understand that herein: if one does not know birth-and-death just as it is, one revolves in birth-and-death with a defiled mind; if one, toward birth-and-death, with a deep heart grows weary and turns away, one swiftly enters parinirvāṇa; if one, toward nirvāṇa, is deeply afraid, one cannot fulfill the provisions by which nirvāṇa is realized; if one, toward nirvāṇa, abides much in desirous longing, one swiftly enters parinirvāṇa — these bodhisattvas have no great skillful means for the realizing of the unsurpassed, perfect, complete awakening. Conversely: if one is able to know birth-and-death just as it is, one revolves in birth-and-death with an undefiled mind; if one does not, toward birth-and-death, grow weary and turn away with a deep heart through the practices of impermanence and the rest, one does not swiftly enter parinirvāṇa; if one is not deeply afraid of nirvāṇa, one is able to fulfill the provisions for nirvāṇa, and, though one sees that nirvāṇa has subtle and excellent benefits and merits, does not deeply wish to realize nirvāṇa swiftly — these bodhisattvas do have a great skillful means for the realizing of the unsurpassed, perfect, complete awakening. This great skillful means is grounded upon the supreme "resolute conviction in emptiness"; and so the bodhisattva's cultivation of the supreme resolute conviction in emptiness subsumed under the path of training is named the vast skillful means able to realize the sublime knowledge of a tathāgata.

Taking Only the Thing, Taking Only Suchness — the Equal View, the Supreme Equanimity

Further, the bodhisattvas, because they are able to enter deeply into the "knowledge of the no-self of phenomena," having known just as it is the ineffable intrinsic nature of all phenomena, thereupon penetrate that "there is not the least phenomenon and not the least category upon which discrimination might be raised." They take only its "thing" (事), take only "suchness" (真如); and yet they do not raise the thought that says, "this is only a thing, this is only suchness," but simply course in the meaning. In this way, the bodhisattva, by coursing in the ultimate meaning, is thereby toward all phenomena equal-and-even; contemplating just as it is with the wisdom of suchness, in every place they are furnished with the equal view and the equal mind, and gain the supreme equanimity. Grounded upon this equanimity, when they diligently cultivate skill in all the domains of learning, then even should they meet with every toil and every hardship, they do not turn back, and swiftly are able to make the body free of weariness and the mind free of weariness; they swiftly bring the skills to accomplishment and gain great power of mindfulness; they do not exalt themselves on account of the skills, nor do they, toward others, hoard a hidden secret; toward the skills their mind is without timidity, and they have the capacity for what may be done; what they undertake is unobstructed, and they are furnished with the firm armor of applied effort.

These bodhisattvas, within birth-and-death: just insofar as they revolve in this way and meet with great hardships in this way, are they able, in this way, to grow strong toward the unsurpassed, perfect, complete awakening; just insofar as they obtain honor and distinction in this way, does their arrogant conceit toward sentient beings in this way gradually diminish; just insofar as they realize distinction of wisdom in this way, are they able, in this way — toward others' rebukes, disputes, and clamorous wrangling talk, and toward the active manifestation of the root afflictions, the secondary afflictions, and the transgression of prohibitions — again and again to contemplate them and with a deep heart to cast them off; just insofar as their merits grow forth and increase in this way, do they in this way turn about and conceal their own good, not seeking to have others know it, nor hoping for gain, offerings, or reverence. All the many benefits that this class of bodhisattva possesses are factors of awakening; conforming to awakening, they all depend upon that knowledge. Therefore, all who have already gained awakening, will gain it, or now gain it, all depend upon that knowledge; apart from this there is nothing further, whether inferior or superior.

Further, the bodhisattvas, wielding this "principle free of idle proliferation," and gaining these many benefits, in order to bring the buddha-dharmas to maturity for themselves and to bring the dharmas of the three vehicles to maturity for others, cultivate the right practice. As they cultivate the right practice in this way: toward their own body and possessions they are far removed from craving, and they learn to be far removed from craving toward all beings, being able to give up body and possessions solely for the benefit of all beings; and they are able to guard, and to guard with the utmost care, cultivating the restraints by means of body, speech, and the rest, by nature taking no pleasure in doing evil, by nature being the utmost worthy and good; and they are able to bear all the violence and harassment of others, learning to be forbearing toward evildoers, by nature thin in anger and wrath, not harassing others; and they are able diligently to cultivate all the domains of learning until skilled therein, in order to cut off all the doubts and difficulties of beings, in order to bestow upon beings the things that benefit them, and in order to gather in, for themselves, the causes of all-knowledge; and they are able, inwardly, to settle their mind and make the mind well concentrated, and, in the settling of the mind, ever diligently to cultivate and train — in order to purify and refine the four divine abidings, in order to be able to sport in the five kinds of superknowledge, in order to be able to establish the affairs that benefit beings, and in order to dispel the weariness born of diligently cultivating all the skills; and they are by nature keen-witted, accomplished in the utmost true knowledge, and, for the sake of the utmost true knowledge, ever diligently cultivate and train, and, for the sake of their own future parinirvāṇa, cultivate the Great Vehicle.

Further, the bodhisattvas, as they cultivate the right practice in this way: toward the sentient beings possessed of merit, they ever take delight in presently making offerings and paying reverence; toward the sentient beings possessed of faults, they ever take delight in presently arousing the supreme mind of compassion and the mind of pity, and, as far as they are able and as their strength allows, cause those beings to cut off all the faults they have; toward the sentient beings who bear enmity against them, they ever arouse the mind of loving-kindness, and, as far as they are able and as their strength allows, without flattery and without deceit, perform for them the various benefits and comforts, causing the various faults in the resolve and applied effort of those enemies, and the mind of grudge and resentment, of themselves to be cut off; toward the sentient beings who have shown them kindness, because they well know the kindness, they presently requite it, whether in equal measure or in still greater measure, and, as far as they are able and as their strength allows, cause those beings' wishes to be fulfilled in accord with the Dharma; and even should they themselves be without strength, if [a being] should ask and request of them, they immediately, in the affairs to be undertaken, display an earnest and grave diligence in managing it, and in the end do not abruptly break off what that being seeks — thinking: how could I let him suppose that I am without strength, rather than that I am without the wish and delight [to help]? This class [of conduct], one should know, is called the bodhisattva's wielding the principle free of idle proliferation and cultivating the right applied practice in reliance upon the utmost true knowledge.

By What Reasoning One Should Know That Phenomena Have an Ineffable Intrinsic Nature

By what reasoning should one know that phenomena have an ineffable intrinsic nature? It is thus: the provisionally-set-up own-character of all phenomena — spoken of as form, or spoken of as feeling, as set forth at length above and on down to nirvāṇa — one should know that it is, one and all, only provisionally set up, and has no intrinsic nature; nor is there, apart from that [provisional positing], any separate intrinsic nature that would be the sphere ranged over by speech and confronted by speech. Such phenomena as these neither have an intrinsic nature just as speech says they do, nor are they, one and all, nothing at all. This kind of "non-being," too, is not that they are one and all nothing at all. Then how is it that they are "being"? It is that, being far removed from the false grasping which "over-affirms what is really absent" (增益實無), and being also far removed from the false grasping which "under-denies what is really present" (損減實有), they are, in this way, "being" — and this is the ultimate intrinsic nature of phenomena, which one should know is solely the sphere ranged over by non-discriminating knowledge.

Were it the case that, following upon the verbal expressions raised with respect to phenomena and their things, that phenomenon or that thing had an intrinsic nature accordingly, then one phenomenon or one thing would have to have many intrinsic natures. Why? Because, with respect to one phenomenon or one thing, many provisional expressions may be set up to designate it. Yet the designations of these many provisional expressions cannot definitely be established: were one to say that, following upon some one provisional expression, that phenomenon or that thing has a substance, has a part, has its intrinsic nature, while the remaining provisional expressions did not do so — then all the provisional expressions (whether furnished or not furnished with them) would, with respect to all phenomena and all things, alike fail to have substance, part, or intrinsic nature. Again, as with such phenomena as form, spoken of above: were they to have an intrinsic nature following upon the provisional expression, then there would have first to be a "thing," and thereafter the provisional expression set up at will; but at the time when that provisional expression has not yet been set up, that phenomenon or that thing ought to be without intrinsic nature; and if it were without intrinsic nature, then to set up a provisional expression to designate it where there is no thing does not accord with reason; and since the designation by provisional expression is nothing whatever, yet that phenomenon or thing should have an intrinsic nature following upon its provisional expression — this too does not accord with reason. Again, were forms, before the setting-up of the provisional expression that designates them, to have first the nature of form, and only thereafter, in reliance on the nature of form, to have the provisional expression set up in order to take hold of form — then, apart from the provisional-expression designation "form," one ought, with respect to "the phenomenon conceived as form" and "the thing conceived as form," to raise the cognition "form" as well; but in fact one does not raise it. By this cause and by this reasoning, one should know that phenomena have an ineffable intrinsic nature. As it is said of "form," so of feeling and on down to nirvāṇa — one should know it is, in every case, thus.

Two Sorts of People Who Ruin the Buddha's Dharma: the Grasping That Over-Affirms and the Grasping That Under-Denies

There are two sorts of people who bring the Dharma and Vinaya spoken by the Buddha to ruin. The first, with respect to phenomena such as form and things such as form, hold that there is the own-character of a "provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature," and toward a thing that is really absent raise the "grasping that over-affirms" (增益執). The second, with respect to the site of the provisionally-spoken character, and with respect to the ineffable intrinsic nature and the ultimate dharma-nature that are the ground of the provisionally-spoken character, hold that in every kind they are nothing at all, and toward a thing that is really present raise the "grasping that under-denies" (損減執).

As for the fault of those who, toward a thing really absent, raise the grasping that over-affirms and falsely set up phenomena, it has already been shown and set forth in detail above — raising the grasping that over-affirms amid the really-absent things such as form is a fault, and so they greatly ruin the Dharma and Vinaya spoken by the Buddha. Now, as for the fault of those who, toward the "really-present bare thing" of phenomena such as form, raise the grasping that under-denies and thereby ruin phenomena — by which fault they greatly ruin the Dharma and Vinaya spoken by the Buddha — this I shall now speak of. It is thus: if, toward that "really-present bare thing" of phenomena such as form, one raises the grasping that under-denies, then there is neither the true nor even the provisional — both these ways of speaking do not accord with reason. For example, just as there must first be aggregates such as form before there is the provisionally-established person, and it is not that there is a provisionally-established person where there is no real thing; so likewise, there must be the "really-present bare thing" of phenomena such as form before there can be the provisional expressions that designate phenomena such as form, and it is not that there are the provisional expressions designating phenomena such as form where there is no "bare thing." Were there only the "provisional" and no "real thing," then, there being no ground for it, even the "provisional" would be gone as well — and this is what is called "one who ruins phenomena."

For example, there is a certain sort of person who, hearing those hard-to-understand, profound scriptures that correspond to the Great Vehicle and correspond to emptiness, whose hidden-intent purport is not yet made fully manifest, is unable to understand just as it is the meaning that is spoken, and thereupon raises an irrational and false discrimination, and, through the reasoning drawn on by lack of skill, raises this view and sets up this thesis: "All is only provisional — this alone is real; if one contemplates in this way, it is named right contemplation." He dismisses even the "really-present bare thing" that is the ground of the provisional as non-being; then all the provisional would be gone as well — and where, then, would there be any "all is only provisional, and this is real"? By this reasoning, he, toward both "the real" and "the provisional," alike defames them and says that they are one and all nothing at all. Because he defames both the real and the provisional, one should know that this is called "the utterly-nihilistic one" (最極無者, the one who most thoroughly denies all). Such a nihilist — all the wise who share the holy life ought not to speak with him, ought not to dwell with him; such a nihilist can ruin himself and can ruin the people of the world who follow his view. It is with this hidden intent that the World-Honored One said: "Better to be like the sort who raises the view of a self than to be like the sort who wrongly grasps emptiness (惡取空)." Why? The one who raises the view of a self is merely confused about the knowable sphere, and does not defame the entire knowable sphere, and does not on that account fall into the evil destinies; toward others who seek the Dharma and seek release from suffering, he practices no fraud and no delay; toward the Dharma and toward the truths he is also able to establish [them]; and toward the points of training he does not raise contempt and laxity. The one who wrongly grasps emptiness is also confused about the knowable sphere, and moreover defames the entire knowable sphere, and on that account falls into the evil destinies; toward others who seek the Dharma and seek release from suffering, he is able to practice fraud and also to work delay; toward the Dharma and toward the truths he is unable to establish [them]; and toward the points of training he raises the utmost contempt and laxity. Such a one who under-denies the really-present thing greatly ruins the Dharma and Vinaya spoken by the Buddha.

The Wrongly-Grasped Emptiness and the Well-Grasped Emptiness

What is called one who wrongly grasps emptiness (惡取空者)? It is when there is a śramaṇa, or a brahmin, who does not accept in faith "that by which it is empty" (由彼故空), and does not accept in faith "that which is empty here" (於此而空) — such a one is called one who wrongly grasps emptiness. Why? As for "that by which it is empty" — that [which is emptied] is in truth absent; as for "that which is empty here" — this [ground upon which the emptying rests] is in truth present; it is by this reasoning that one may speak of emptiness. If one says that all is one and all nothing at all, then where, and what, and by reason of what, is anything named "empty"? Nor ought one to say that "by this, here" it is named empty. Therefore he is called one who wrongly grasps emptiness.

And what, again, is called one who well grasps emptiness (善取空者)? It is this: because "here, that [certain thing] is nothing at all," one accordingly, by that [absence], rightly contemplates it as empty; and because "here, the remainder is in truth present," one accordingly, by that remainder, knows just as it is that it is present. In this way one is said to enter into emptiness just as it is, and without inversion. It is thus: with respect to all the things-conceived-as-form and the rest spoken of above, and the provisionally-spoken-nature phenomena of form and the rest spoken of above, they are one and all nothing at all; therefore, with respect to these things-conceived-as-form and the rest, one, by that provisionally-spoken-nature phenomenon of form and the rest, speaks of it as empty. Amid all these things-conceived-as-form and the rest, what is the "remainder"? It is the [bare thing which is] the ground of the provisional expressions of form and the rest. Both of these one knows just as they are: namely, that here there is the "really-present bare thing," and that within the bare thing there is also the "merely-provisional"; one does not, toward what is really absent, raise the grasping that over-affirms, and does not, toward what is really present, raise the grasping that under-denies; without over-affirming and without under-denying, without grasping and without rejecting, one knows just as it is the suchness that is the ineffable intrinsic nature — such a one is said to be one who well grasps emptiness, one who, with respect to the dharma-nature that is emptiness, is able, by right wisdom, sublimely and well to penetrate it.

Establishing the Ineffable Intrinsic Nature by Authoritative Teaching

Thus, following upon "the reasoning that establishes by proof," one should know that phenomena have an ineffable intrinsic nature. And, relying upon "authoritative teaching" (至教), one should know that phenomena have an ineffable intrinsic nature.

Thus the World-Honored One, in the Sūtra of Becoming and Existence (轉有經), in order to show forth this meaning, spoke a verse: "By these and those various names, one designates these and those various phenomena; herein those [named natures] are not present — such is the dharma-nature of phenomena." How does this verse show forth this meaning? It is that, with respect to the phenomena-conceived-as-form and the rest, one sets up the phenomena-names "form" and the rest; and by these phenomena-names of form and the rest, one designates the phenomena-conceived-as-form and the rest that follow the speech. It is spoken of as form, or spoken of as feeling, or spoken of as perception, as set forth at length and on down to being spoken of as nirvāṇa. Amid all these phenomena-conceived-as-form and the rest, "the intrinsic nature of form and the rest" is one and all nothing at all; yet neither is there separately any "phenomenon that is the nature of form and the rest"; and yet therein, the "ineffable meaning-nature" (離言義性) of the phenomena-conceived-as-form and the rest is in truth present — one should know that this is the ultimate intrinsic nature, and is also the dharma-nature.

Again, the World-Honored One, in the Chapter on the Meaning (義品), said: "The various worldly conventions of the world, the Sage clings to none of them; being without clinging, who could grasp? He sees, he hears, and yet does not crave." How does this verse show forth this meaning? It is that, with respect to the worldly things-conceived-as-form and the rest, all the various provisional expressions of form and the rest are named "the various worldly conventions." As those provisional expressions have an intrinsic nature with respect to these conceived-things — such conventions the Sage does not cling to. Why? Because there is no view that over-affirms or under-denies, and no manifestly-present inverted view, it is by this reasoning named "without clinging." Being thus without clinging, who could still grasp? Because there is no [inverted] view, one does not, toward things, grasp at over-affirmation or under-denial; being able rightly to contemplate the knowable sphere, this is named "seeing"; hearing the verbal expressions of the knowable sphere, this is named "hearing"; and in reliance upon this seeing and hearing, craving does not arise and does not increase, but, toward that object, is at last utterly cut off, and one abides in the superior equanimity — this is named "not craving."

Again, the World-Honored One said thus to that Sāndha Kātyāyana: "Sāndha, bhikṣu! One cultivates meditation not relying on earth; not relying on water, not relying on fire, not relying on wind, not relying on the base of [infinite] space, not relying on the base of [infinite] consciousness, not relying on the base of nothing-whatever, not relying on the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, not relying on this world, not relying on another world, not relying on the orb of the sun and moon, not relying on the seen-heard-sensed-known, not relying on the sought and the obtained, not relying on what the mind follows in applied-and-sustained thought — one cultivates meditation relying on nothing at all." How is it that "the bhikṣu who cultivates meditation cultivates meditation not relying on earth, as set forth at length and on down to cultivating meditation relying on nothing at all"? Sāndha, bhikṣu! There may be one who, toward "earth," dispels the "conception of earth"; or one who, toward "water," dispels the "conception of water," as set forth at length and on down to one who, toward "all," dispels the "conception of all" — such a bhikṣu who cultivates meditation is one who cultivates meditation not relying on earth, and on down to cultivating meditation relying on nothing at all. Toward such a bhikṣu who cultivates meditation, Indra, Īśāna, the lords of the world together with the hosts of gods, from afar pay him homage and praise him: "Homage to the auspicious one, homage to the most honored among men; we do not now know upon what you cultivate meditation." How does this sūtra show forth this meaning? It is that, with respect to all the things-conceived-as-earth and the rest, the names "earth" and the rest are set forth and provisionally set up, and are named "conceptions of earth and the rest"; and these very conceptions, toward those things-conceived-as-form and the rest that there are, either raise over-affirmation or raise under-denial; if, toward those things, one raises the grasping "the over-affirming, the possessed-of-substance intrinsic nature," it is named the conception that over-affirms; if one raises the grasping "the under-denying, the [reducing to] a bare thing[-less] ultimate," it is named the conception that under-denies; and he, toward these conceptions, is able rightly to dispel them, able to cut them off, able to cast them away, and so it is named "dispelling." Such a class of measureless holy words as this is named "authoritative teaching." By this utmost authoritative teaching of the Tathāgata, one should know that phenomena have an ineffable intrinsic nature.

Why, Toward the Ineffable Intrinsic Nature, One Nonetheless Raises Verbal Expressions

Question: If it is so, then by what cause and condition does one, toward the ineffable intrinsic nature of all phenomena, nonetheless raise verbal expressions? Answer: If one did not raise verbal expressions, one would not be able to proclaim to others the ineffable intrinsic nature of all phenomena, and others too would not be able to hear a meaning such as this; and if there were no hearing, one would not be able to know this ineffable intrinsic nature of all phenomena. In order to cause others to hear and to know the ineffable intrinsic nature of phenomena, one therefore, toward this ineffable intrinsic nature, raises verbal expressions.

The Eight Kinds of Discrimination Give Rise to Three Things

Further, the various foolish ordinary beings, because they are unable to know the suchness that is thus shown forth, from this cause and condition the eight kinds of discrimination turn forth, able to give rise to three things, able to give rise to the entire world of sentient beings and the world that is their container. What are called the eight kinds of discrimination? First, discrimination of intrinsic nature; second, discrimination of distinction; third, discrimination of total grasping; fourth, discrimination of self; fifth, discrimination of what belongs to self; sixth, discrimination of the loved; seventh, discrimination of the unloved; eighth, discrimination contrary to both of those.

How do these eight kinds of discrimination give rise to three things? The discrimination of intrinsic nature, the discrimination of distinction, and the discrimination of total grasping — these three discriminations are able to give rise to the "thing that is the ground-and-object of discriminating idle proliferation": that is, taking the things-conceived-as-form and the rest as ground-and-object, it is named the discriminating idle proliferation "subsumed under conception and verbal expression, shown forth by conception and verbal expression" — namely, upon this thing, discriminating and calculating the not-one, the many, category-distinctions. The discrimination of self and the discrimination of what belongs to self — these two discriminations are able to give rise to the root of all the remaining views and the root of conceit — the view of the reifying self (薩迦耶見) — and to give rise to the root of all the remaining conceit — the conceit "I am" (我慢). The discrimination of the loved, the discrimination of the unloved, and the discrimination contrary to both — these are able, as fits each case, to give rise to greed, hatred, and delusion. This is called the eight kinds of discrimination giving rise to three things such as these: namely, "the thing that is the ground-and-object of discriminating idle proliferation," "the thing that is view and the conceit 'I am,'" and "the thing that is greed, hatred, and delusion." One should know that herein, taking the thing that is the ground-and-object of discriminating idle proliferation as the ground, there arise the view of the reifying self and the conceit "I am"; and taking the view of the reifying self and the conceit "I am" as the ground, there arise greed, hatred, and delusion. From these three things, one is universally able to show forth all the phenomena of the categories of the world's revolving.

The Eight Discriminations One by One

What is called the discrimination of intrinsic nature? It is, with respect to all the things-conceived-as-form and the rest, all the applied-and-sustained thought that discriminates the various intrinsic natures of form and the rest — this is called the discrimination of intrinsic nature. What is called the discrimination of distinction? It is, with respect to those things-conceived-as-form and the rest, to say "this has form, this is formless," "this is visible, this is invisible," "this is resistant, this is unresistant," "this is contaminated, this is uncontaminated," "this is conditioned, this is unconditioned," "this is wholesome, this is unwholesome, this is indeterminate," "this is past, this is future, this is present" — by the reasonings of measureless category-distinctions such as these, upon the very ground of the discrimination of intrinsic nature, discriminating the various distinction-meanings of it: this is called the discrimination of distinction. What is called the discrimination of total grasping? It is, with respect to those things-conceived-as-form and the rest, the discrimination drawn on by the conceptual designations, provisionally imagined, of "self, and sentient being, life-holder, being-born," and the like — taking many phenomena and totally grasping them as a cause, the discrimination turns forth; and also the discrimination drawn on by the conceptual designations, provisionally imagined, of "house, army, forest, food and drink, garments and carriages," and the like — this is called the discrimination of total grasping. What is called the discrimination of self and of what belongs to self? It is: whatever things are contaminated and appropriative, accumulated over long time by the repeated practice of the grasping at self and at what belongs to self; because of the customary practice, in former lives, of that wrong grasping, the false discrimination arising in dependence on "the thing that is the ground of one's own view" — this is called the discrimination of self and of what belongs to self. What is called the discrimination of the loved? It is the discrimination arising in dependence on the pure, sublime, and agreeable object-thing. What is called the discrimination of the unloved? It is the discrimination arising in dependence on the impure, unsublime, and disagreeable object-thing. What is called the discrimination contrary to both of those? It is the discrimination arising in dependence on the object-thing that departs from both the pure-sublime and the impure-unsublime, both the agreeable and the disagreeable.

What is spoken of herein is, in brief, of two kinds: the first is "the discrimination that is the intrinsic nature," the second is "the thing that is the ground of discrimination and the object of discrimination." These two, from the beginningless world, one should know, in unbroken succession serve as cause each for the other: that is, the discrimination of a past world serves as cause, able to give rise to the present thing that is the ground and object of discrimination; the present thing that is the ground-and-object of discrimination, having arisen, is again able to serve as cause, giving rise, in the present world, to the discrimination raised in dependence on that ground-and-object; not knowing the present discrimination, one again gives rise to the ground-and-object thing of the future; and that future [ground-and-object], having arisen, then definitely will give rise to the discrimination raised in dependence upon it and in taking it as object.

The Four Kinds of Investigation · The Four Kinds of Knowledge-in-Accord-with-the-Real

How does one come to know discrimination such as this? It is by the four kinds of investigation (四種尋思) and the four kinds of knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real (四種如實智).

What is called the four kinds of investigation? The first is the investigation of the name; the second, the investigation of the thing; the third, the investigation of the provisional positing of intrinsic nature; the fourth, the investigation of the provisional positing of distinction. (For the last character of "the investigation of the name" [名尋思], the base text follows CBETA in reading 思 [investigation]; the Taishō original print reads 想 [conception].) As for the investigation of the name: the bodhisattvas, with respect to the "name," see only that it is name — this is called the investigation of the name. As for the investigation of the thing: the bodhisattvas, with respect to the "thing," see only that it is thing — this is called the investigation of the thing. As for the investigation of the provisional positing of intrinsic nature: the bodhisattvas, with respect to the "provisional positing of intrinsic nature," see only that it is the provisional positing of intrinsic nature — this is called the investigation of the provisional positing of intrinsic nature. As for the investigation of the provisional positing of distinction: the bodhisattvas, with respect to the "provisional positing of distinction," see only that it is the provisional positing of distinction — this is called the investigation of the provisional positing of distinction. These bodhisattvas, toward that "name" and "thing," make either the "contemplation of separated characters" or the "contemplation of joined characters"; grounded upon the contemplation of the joined characters of name and thing, they thereupon penetrate the two — "the provisional positing of intrinsic nature and the provisional positing of distinction."

What is called the four kinds of knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real? The first is the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the name; the second, that drawn on by the investigation of the thing; the third, that drawn on by the investigation of the provisional positing of intrinsic nature; the fourth, that drawn on by the investigation of the provisional positing of distinction.

What is called the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the name? The bodhisattvas, after having, in the investigation of the name, [seen that] "there is only name," thereupon know just as it is, with respect to this name: namely, that "a name such as this is, for the sake of a meaning such as this, provisionally set up upon the thing, in order to cause the world to raise conception, to raise view, to raise verbal expression." If, toward all the things-conceived-as-form and the rest, one did not provisionally set up the names "form" and the rest, then no one would be able, toward the things-conceived-as-form and the rest, to raise the conceptions "form" and the rest; and if there were no conception, no one would be able to raise the grasping that over-affirms; and if there were no grasping, there would be no verbal expression. To be able to know this just as it is is called the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the name.

What is called the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the thing? The bodhisattvas, after having, in the investigation of the thing, [seen that] "there is only thing," thereupon contemplate and see that the "nature" of all the things-conceived-as-form and the rest is far removed from verbal expression, and is not to be expressed in speech. To be able to know this just as it is is called the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the thing.

What is called the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the provisional positing of intrinsic nature? The bodhisattvas, after having, in the investigation of the provisional positing of intrinsic nature, [seen that] "there is only the provisional positing of intrinsic nature," penetrate and know just as it is: that the "provisional positing of intrinsic nature" that there is amid the things-conceived-as-form and the rest is not the intrinsic nature of that thing, and yet appears as though it were the intrinsic nature of that thing; and they are also able to know that the intrinsic nature of that thing appears in a resemblance like a magical creation, a reflected image, an echo, a play of light and shadow, the moon in water, mirage-water, a dream, an illusion — and yet is not the substance of those [things]. To be able to know just as it is this utmost profound meaning that is the sphere ranged over is called the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the provisional positing of intrinsic nature.

What is called the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the provisional positing of distinction? The bodhisattvas, after having, in the investigation of the provisional positing of distinction, [seen that] "there is only the provisional positing of distinction," penetrate and know just as it is the "meaning of non-duality" in the provisional positing of distinction amid the things-conceived-as-form and the rest: namely, that those things are "neither of the nature of being nor of the nature of non-being" — the expressible-nature does not come to be truly established, and so they are not of the nature of being; the ineffable-nature is in truth able to be established, and so they are not of the nature of non-being. Thus, by the truth of the ultimate, they are "not-of-form" (therein there are no phenomena of form); by the truth of the conventional, they are "not not-of-form" (therein one speaks of there being phenomena of form). As with "being-nature and non-being-nature, of-form and not-of-form," so too the gateways of the provisional positing of distinction such as "visible and invisible" and the rest are all to be known by reasoning such as this. To be able to know just as it is the meaning of non-duality of the provisional positing of distinction is called the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the provisional positing of distinction.

Relying on the Four Kinds of Knowledge-in-Accord-with-the-Real, One Extinguishes Idle Proliferation, Realizes the Great Nirvāṇa, and Gains Sovereign Mastery

The foolish ordinary being, being deficient in and lacking the presence of these four kinds of knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real, thereupon has the eight kinds of wrong discrimination turn forth, able to give rise to three things, able to give rise to the entire world of sentient beings and the world that is their container. It is thus: through this wrong discrimination the various defilements arise; through the arising of defilement one revolves in birth-and-death; ever revolving within birth-and-death, one has, without cease, the measureless sufferings of birth, aging, sickness, death, and the rest that pursue birth-and-death, revolving without rest. The bodhisattva, relying on these four kinds of knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real, is able rightly to know the eight kinds of discrimination; rightly knowing them in the present life, he thereby causes the "thing that is the ground-and-object subsumed under idle proliferation" not again to arise in a future life; and it not arising, then, in a future life, the discrimination raised in dependence on that ground-and-object also does not again arise. Thus "discrimination" and "the ground-and-object thing," the two of them alike, cease; one should know that all idle proliferation ceases. The bodhisattva, idle proliferation ceasing in this way, is thereby able to realize the great parinirvāṇa of the Great Vehicle. In the present life, because the "knowledge that ranges over the supreme true reality" is utterly pure, he is thereby universally able to gain all sovereign masteries: the bodhisattvas, with respect to the various magical creations, gain the superknowledge-mastery of being able to create; with respect to the various transformations, gain the superknowledge-mastery of being able to transform; over the knowledge of all knowable spheres, they universally gain mastery; if they wish to abide long, they are able to abide sovereignly in accord with what they delight in; if they wish to pass away, they are able to pass away sovereignly, without waiting on a harming condition. Because the bodhisattvas gain measureless masteries such as these, among sentient beings they are the most excellent and unsurpassed.

The Five Kinds of Benefit · The Five Kinds of Deed

The bodhisattva, gaining mastery over all in this way, thereupon gains five kinds of supreme benefit. First, he gains a mind utterly stilled — by abiding in the utmost stillness, and not by a stilling that is [merely] the stilling of the afflictions. Second, he is, with respect to all the domains of learning, without hindrance, and the sublime knowledge-and-vision, pure and clear-white, manifests forth. Third, for the sake of benefiting sentient beings, he revolves in birth-and-death without weariness. Fourth, he well enters into the hidden-intent meaning of the words of all the tathāgatas. Fifth, the resolute conviction in the Great Vehicle that he has gained cannot be drawn away or seized, and does not depend on other conditions.

One should know that these five kinds of benefit have five kinds of deed. First, the bodhisattva accomplishes the supreme blissful abiding in the present life, able to extinguish all the various weariness of body and mind born of the diligent applied effort directed toward awakening — one should know that this is called the deed of the benefit "a mind utterly stilled." Second, the bodhisattva is universally able to bring to maturity all the buddha-dharmas — one should know that this is called the deed of the benefit "the unhindered, pure-white, sublime knowledge-and-vision with respect to the domains of learning." Third, the bodhisattva is universally able to bring to maturity all sentient beings — one should know that this is called the deed of the benefit "revolving in birth-and-death without weariness." Fourth, the bodhisattva is able rightly to dispel all the doubts that arise in the sentient beings to be trained, and to guard and uphold the Tathāgata's sublime true Dharma-eye so that it may long endure, and, with respect to the "counterfeit true Dharma" (像似正法) that is able to make the Tathāgata's holy teaching sink from sight, is able to know it, able to show it forth, and able rightly to extinguish it — one should know that this is called the deed of the benefit "well entering into the hidden-intent meaning of the words of the Tathāgata." Fifth, the bodhisattva is able to crush all the heterodox theories of the outsiders, is firm and solid in vigor, and unmoving in his right vow — one should know that this is called the deed of the benefit "the resolute conviction in the Great Vehicle that cannot be drawn away or seized and does not depend on other conditions."

In this way, all the "bodhisattva-deeds" that the bodhisattva has are subsumed and taken up by these five deeds of benefit. What is all the bodhisattva-deeds? It is: to gain peace and bliss for oneself while yet without defilement; to be universally able to bring to maturity all the buddha-dharmas; to be universally able to bring to maturity all sentient beings; to guard and uphold the Tathāgata's unsurpassed true Dharma; to crush and subdue the theories of others while being vigorous and valiant; and to be unmoving in the right vow.

One should know that of these four kinds of true reality thus [set forth], the first two (the reality established by consensus in the world and the reality established by reasoning) are inferior, the third (the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the afflictive obstruction) is middling, and the fourth (the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the cognitive obstruction) is supreme.

Why "Reality" Must Be Divided into Four Kinds

The Chapter on Lineage set fast the root of becoming a buddha; the Chapter on Arousing the Mind and the Chapter on the Twofold Benefit spoke of the bodhisattva's vow and practice; and now, at the fourth chapter, the treatise suddenly halts and asks a most fundamental question: what is "reality"? This one question is of the utmost weight — a person cultivating the path cultivates precisely in order to see "reality"; yet if he has not even settled "what counts as reality," then the so-called seeing of the path has no place to stand.

The treatise's answer is unexpected: reality is not one but four layers — the reality established by consensus in the world, the reality established by reasoning, the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the afflictive obstruction, and the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the cognitive obstruction 〔the treatise〕. Why divide it into four layers? Because "reality" is shown forth according to "whose knowledge" it is: worldly people hold in common that "earth is earth, suffering is suffering" — this is the reality of the world; those of understanding lay it down by relying on the three means of knowledge (direct perception, inference, and authoritative teaching) and on the reasoning that establishes by proof — this is the reality of reasoning; the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, by their uncontaminated knowledge, contemplate the four noble truths and see that "apart from the aggregates, no self can be found" — this is the reality of the knowledge purified of the afflictive obstruction; while the buddhas and bodhisattvas enter the no-self of phenomena, and, with respect to the ineffable intrinsic nature and the provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature of all phenomena, range over them by an equal-and-even, non-discriminating knowledge — this is the reality of the knowledge purified of the cognitive obstruction. One and the same world: the deeper the knowledge that lights it up, the truer the reality that is seen. The treatise, at the last, ranks the four layers high and low: "the first two are inferior, the third is middling, the fourth is supreme" — the first two are what ordinary beings and those of understanding hold in common; the third is the two vehicles' emptiness of self; and the fourth alone is the bodhisattvas' and buddhas' emptiness-of-phenomena that is ineffable. The whole weight of this chapter is pressed upon this fourth layer.

The Fourth-Layer Reality: the Ineffable Intrinsic Nature and the Provisionally-Spoken Intrinsic Nature

That supreme fourth reality — what sphere, in the end, is it? The treatise says: it is the sphere ranged over by the buddhas and bodhisattvas, who "enter the no-self of phenomena, and, having entered, become thoroughly purified, with respect to the ineffable intrinsic nature and the provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature of all phenomena, [ranged over] by an equal-and-even, non-discriminating knowledge". These two terms are the pivot of the whole chapter. The ancient masters buckle them back onto the threefold nature. Jing judges: "As for the ineffable intrinsic nature of all phenomena, it is the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished nature, these two natures being by nature apart from names; as for the provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature, it is the wholly-imagined [nature] that is grasped, being what is calculated and grasped as existent following the provisional speech" 〔Dunlun citing Jing〕. (The ancient masters have two readings of the assignment of the "provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature": Jing judges it to be the wholly-imagined nature that is grasped; another, the first Western gloss, judges it to be the other-dependent nature — both are set out, without adjudication; see the Apparatus, Heading IV. Yet by whichever reading, the sense that "ineffable / provisionally-spoken" are the threefold nature does not differ.) Dunlun, discerning the essence of the true reality, further opens seven gateways, one of which is "taking the threefold nature as the essence": the nature "just as it is" takes the true nature as its essence, the nature "in its full extent" takes the other-dependent nature as its essence, and the wholly-imagined [nature] is without essence and is subsumed under neither of the two.

In other words, what the Chapter on the True Reality calls "the ineffable / the provisionally-spoken" are precisely the three characters of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and the three natures of the Cheng Weishi Lun: the provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature = the wholly-imagined mark ("the provisional establishment of the intrinsic nature and distinctions by names" 〔Saṃdhinirmocana〕, "one and all nothing at all" 〔Cheng Weishi Lun〕); the other-dependent subsumed under the ineffable intrinsic nature = the other-dependent mark ("the dependently-arisen intrinsic nature"), the true = the perfectly-accomplished mark ("the equal suchness," "the suchness shown forth by the twofold emptiness" 〔Cheng Weishi Lun〕). The Chapter on the True Reality is the very treatise-ground where the Yogācāra lineage's teaching of the threefold nature resides. Kuiji, opening his exposition, says at once: "As for what is called the true reality: according to what the text makes clear, it is just like the threefold nature — the wholly-imagined is by its very being without essence; the other-dependent and the perfectly-accomplished are, by the two truths, said to be present".

The Shape of Reality Is "Non-Duality": Apart from Over-Affirmation, Apart from Under-Denial

Yet this fourth reality the treatise does not describe head-on; it shows it forth in reverse, from "being apart from the two extremes." It says that this character of the true reality "is that which is shown forth by non-duality," and the "duality" here spoken of is "being" and "non-being".

"Being" refers to that provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature — the world takes form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, takes eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, takes earth, water, fire, and wind, and on down to nirvāṇa, all as really-existent intrinsic natures; this is "what the world grasps over long time, the root of all discriminating idle proliferation." "Non-being" says that these provisionally-spoken intrinsic natures are in truth "without any thing, without any character," and that the ground of the provisional speech is one and all nothing at all. First it is said to be "being," then it is said to be "non-being"; and being and non-being, the two of them alike, are far removed — only this is the true nature subsumed under the character of phenomena — and this is what is called non-duality, the Middle Way, the unsurpassed. Xuanzang's oral gloss puts it bluntly: "'Being' is the other-dependent nature; 'non-being' is the wholly-imagined [nature]; the essence of suchness is apart from being and non-being, and so it is called non-duality" 〔Dunlun citing the Tripiṭaka-master〕.

The difficulty of the Middle Way lies in this: it permits neither end. To grasp the provisional as real is "over-affirmation"; to dismiss the bare thing as absent is "under-denial." Reality is the ultimate intrinsic nature that is "thus present" apart from these two false graspings, and is ranged over by non-discriminating knowledge alone 〔the treatise〕.

The Most Perilous Pass in the Whole Chapter: the Well-Grasped Emptiness and the Wrongly-Grasped Emptiness

And of this "apart from under-denial" side the treatise speaks with especial gravity, because it is the side most apt to go wrong — one who studies the Great Vehicle, who studies emptiness, but studies it crookedly, becomes one who "wrongly grasps emptiness." The treatise uses a word of the World-Honored One, of astonishing weight: "Better to be like the sort who raises the view of a self than to be like the sort who wrongly grasps emptiness". Better that a person grasp the view of a self than that he fall into the wrongly-grasped emptiness. Why? The one who raises the view of a self is merely confused about the knowable sphere; he does not defame all phenomena, does not fall into the evil destinies, and toward the Dharma and the truths can still establish them. But the one who wrongly grasps emptiness defames the entire knowable sphere, falls into the evil destinies, ruins the Dharma and ruins the truths — he is "the utterly-nihilistic one," with whom even a wise fellow in the holy life ought not to speak or dwell.

Then where is the error? The treatise discerns it with the utmost precision: the one who wrongly grasps emptiness "does not accept in faith 'that by which it is empty,' and does not accept in faith 'that which is empty here'" — he dismisses even the very conditions by which "emptiness" is established. True emptiness is that "'that by which it is empty' — that is in truth absent; 'that which is empty here' — this is in truth present": there must be a "this" (the bare thing) as ground before one can speak of the emptiness of "that" (the wholly-imagined). If all is nothing at all, then where, and what, and by reason of what, is anything named empty?

And so the treatise gives the correct explanation of the well-grasped emptiness: "Because here that [certain thing] is nothing at all, one accordingly, by that [absence], rightly contemplates it as empty; and because here the remainder is in truth present, one accordingly, by that remainder, knows just as it is that it is present". Kuiji explains it with clarity: upon the other-dependent nature, the wholly-imagined is empty (when one sees the other-dependent, one knows there is nothing grasped — this is the empty side); and upon the other-dependent mark, the remainder, the perfectly-accomplished, is present (one knows just as it is that it is present — this is the not-empty side). What is emptied is the false grasping of the wholly-imagined; what is kept is the bare thing of the other-dependent and the suchness of the perfectly-accomplished. The treatise draws the matter to a close with a superb simile: just as there must first be aggregates such as form before there is the provisionally-established person, and it is not that there is a provisionally-established self where there is no real thing; so likewise there must be the "really-present bare thing" of phenomena such as form before there are the provisional expressions of form and the rest 〔the treatise〕. Without the aggregates, where is the provisional name "self" to be lodged? Without the bare thing, on what does the provisional expression "form" hang? The well-grasped emptiness is the Middle Way of "without over-affirming and without under-denying, without grasping and without rejecting" — this is the eye by which this chapter teaches the bodhisattva to look at the world.

(The ancient masters also have a dispute at this pass: Jing, on the ground of the sense of cause-and-fruit, refutes the doctrine that "the threefold nature is one and all nothing at all"; Dunlun then, of his own judgment, [says] "it need not necessarily be so," and cites Wŏnhyo's words — that "the three treatises are for the sweeping-away of the clinging to the view of being, provisionally refuting the nature that follows speech" — as capable of standing. Here the ancient masters' divergent explanations are only recorded, without adjudication.)

What Is the Other-Dependent Like: Eight Similes

That other-dependent bare thing which is "kept" — what manner of "being" is it? The treatise, in the "knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real drawn on by the investigation of the provisional positing of intrinsic nature," gives eight most beautiful similes: the provisional positing of intrinsic nature of the things-conceived-as-form and the rest is not the intrinsic nature of that thing, and yet appears as though it were — like a magical creation, a reflected image, an echo, a play of light and shadow, the moon in water, mirage-water, a dream, an illusion 〔the treatise〕. Woncheuk judges it plainly: "And [the words] 'like a magical creation and the rest, resembling but not real' — these are just the eight similes … the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha says: 'the eight similes show forth the other-dependent' — using the other-dependent as a figure for the dependent-arising" 〔Dunlun citing Woncheuk〕. Kuiji, too, points out one: "As for 'mirage-water': it is the sun's shimmer resembling water".

The excellence of the eight similes lies precisely in the four words "resembling being, yet not real": the moon in water is plainly to be seen, yet one cannot scoop up a single drop of it; mirage-water, gazed at, looks like water, but approach it and it is gone — the myriad phenomena of the other-dependent are just so, appearing vividly and yet utterly without intrinsic nature. This is neither to say they "are not there" (the reflected image truly does appear) nor to say they "really are" (the reflected image is, after all, not the substance). The eight similes are the treatise's transmuting of "the Middle Way of neither-being-nor-non-being" into something the eye can see.

The Resolute Conviction in Emptiness: Why the Bodhisattva Does Not Enter Nirvāṇa

Yet the most moving passage of this chapter is where it joins this "emptiness" view to the very lifeblood of the bodhisattva path — why is it that the bodhisattva, having realized emptiness, does not, like the two vehicles, hasten to enter nirvāṇa?

The treatise says: the bodhisattva "dwells within birth-and-death, and in this life and that life cultivates the resolute conviction in emptiness" 〔the treatise〕, and thereby is able to bring the buddha-dharmas and sentient beings to maturity. The key lies in two "not"s: first, the bodhisattva "knows birth-and-death just as it is, and does not, toward birth-and-death, with a deep heart grow weary and turn away through the practices of impermanence and the rest" — for if he grew deeply weary and turned away from birth-and-death, he would swiftly enter nirvāṇa, and once entered nirvāṇa he could never again deliver beings; second, the bodhisattva "is neither deeply afraid of nirvāṇa nor greatly desirous of it" — neither fearing it nor coveting it, and so "though he sees that nirvāṇa has subtle and excellent benefits and merits, he does not deeply wish to realize it swiftly." This passage is exactly the watershed dividing the bodhisattva from the two vehicles: the two vehicles, by the contemplation of impermanence and suffering, grow weary of birth-and-death and delight in nirvāṇa, and so swiftly enter quiescent cessation; the bodhisattva, by the resolute conviction in emptiness, illumines and breaks through the two characters of birth-and-death and nirvāṇa, and so is neither defiled by birth-and-death nor bound by nirvāṇa — this is the non-abiding of "abiding neither in birth-and-death nor in nirvāṇa," which the treatise names "the vast skillful means able to realize the sublime knowledge of a tathāgata."

This very passage buckles back onto the Chapter on Lineage: there it was said that the bodhisattva-lineage "is furthermore able to realize the purification of the cognitive obstruction," while the two-vehicle lineage "realizes only the purification of the afflictive obstruction" 〔the treatise〕; and now the fourth reality of the Chapter on the True Reality is named precisely "the reality ranged over by the knowledge purified of the cognitive obstruction" — that one portion of "being able to cut off the cognitive obstruction" allowed to the bodhisattva-lineage is here redeemed into the directly-perceived sphere of "the ineffable intrinsic nature, the equal non-discriminating knowledge." Lineage is the cause, the true reality is the fruit-sphere it realizes; head and tail buckle into one ring. And relying on this emptiness-wisdom, the bodhisattva "takes only the thing, takes only suchness, but courses in the meaning," and in every place gains the equal view and the supreme equanimity, meeting great hardships and not turning back 〔the treatise〕 — emptiness does not let him flee the world; it lets him be unburnable within the world.

The Eight Discriminations and the Four Investigations: Where Idle Proliferation Arises, Where It Ceases

At the last the treatise answers a question that goes to the root: this whole "world of sentient beings and world that is their container" — from where, in the end, does it well up? The answer is: from the eight kinds of discrimination that arise from "not knowing suchness" — of intrinsic nature, of distinction, of total grasping, of self, of what belongs to self, of the loved, of the unloved, and contrary to both of those 〔the treatise〕. The first three discriminations give rise to the "thing that is the ground-and-object of discriminating idle proliferation" (that is, the world of faculties and objects); the two discriminations of self and of what belongs to self give rise to "the view of the reifying self and the conceit 'I am'"; and the latter three discriminations give rise to "greed, hatred, and delusion"; from these three things, all the phenomena of revolving are universally shown forth. The whole world is a scaffolding raised up by discriminating idle proliferation.

Since it arises from discrimination, it ceases through knowledge. The treatise sets up the four kinds of investigation and the four kinds of knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real as the counteragent: with respect to the name, to see only name; with respect to the thing, to see only thing; with respect to the provisional positing of intrinsic nature, to see only the provisional positing of intrinsic nature; with respect to the provisional positing of distinction, to see only the provisional positing of distinction 〔the treatise〕 (for the last character of "the investigation of the name," the base text follows CBETA in reading 思 [investigation], while the Taishō original print reads 想 [conception]; reading 思 [investigation] is consistent with the fixed naming of the four investigations). Among them, the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real of the investigation of the thing sees that "the nature of the things-conceived-as-form and the rest is far removed from verbal expression and cannot be expressed in speech"; the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real of the provisional positing of intrinsic nature sees the other-dependent as "resembling being yet not real, like the eight similes"; and the knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real of the provisional positing of distinction sees "neither the nature of being nor the nature of non-being" — by the truth of the ultimate, not-of-form; by the truth of the conventional, not not-of-form 〔the treatise〕, the two truths shining together in non-duality. The bodhisattva, relying on these four kinds of knowledge-in-accord-with-the-real, rightly knows the eight discriminations, causes the future ground-and-object thing of idle proliferation no longer to arise, and, discrimination and the ground-and-object thing both ceasing, "all idle proliferation ceases," so that he is able to realize the great parinirvāṇa of the Great Vehicle, universally to gain all sovereign masteries, and, in the end, to obtain the five kinds of benefit and accomplish the five kinds of deed 〔the treatise〕. Where idle proliferation arises is the very place where idle proliferation ceases; in delusion it is what weaves out the three realms, in awakening it is what returns and ceases into nirvāṇa.

The One Meaning This Chapter Lights Up

The Chapter on the True Reality looks like an abstruse disquisition on "what is reality," but in truth it sets fast, all at once, the bodhisattva's whole standpoint: reality is four-layered according to knowledge, and the supreme is ineffable (the ineffable intrinsic nature / the provisionally-spoken intrinsic nature are the threefold nature, one with the three characters of the Saṃdhinirmocana and the three natures of the Cheng Weishi Lun); the shape of reality is the non-dual Middle Way (apart from over-affirmation, apart from under-denial); the gateway of entering is the well-grasped emptiness (empty the wholly-imagined, keep the bare thing — like the provisional self upon the aggregates); the character of the other-dependent is like the eight similes (resembling being, yet not real); and the fruit of this resolute conviction in emptiness is the great skillful means of abiding neither in birth-and-death nor in nirvāṇa. The Chapter on Lineage said that what makes a bodhisattva a bodhisattva is rooted in "furthermore realizing the purification of the cognitive obstruction"; the Chapter on the True Reality now brings out whole and entire the knowledge-sphere of that "purification of the cognitive obstruction." How a bodhisattva looks at the world — this chapter gives the answer.

Carrying Forward

This chapter's meaning of the threefold nature's ineffability the later treatises carry forward and cross-examine: the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra's Chapter on the Characters of All Phenomena (the three characters), Chapter on the Character of Naturelessness (the threefold naturelessness), and Chapter on the Character of the Ultimate Truth (the ineffable) are its scriptural anchor; the Cheng Weishi Lun's threefold nature in fascicle eight, and the perfectly-accomplished = the suchness shown forth by the twofold emptiness, are its treatise-ground carried forward; the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, showing the other-dependent by the eight similes and discerning the threefold nature of the character of the knowable, is its later-treatise elaboration (Woncheuk cited). The Section on Ascertainment separately sets up a Chapter Ascertaining the True Reality, re-ascertaining it instead by the "five events" — character, name, discrimination, suchness, and right knowledge; the five events are the unfolding of the threefold nature, and they and this chapter's two axes mutually illumine. The threefold nature is one meaning: this chapter sets up its outline, the later treatises spread out its headings.