瑜伽師地論 聞所成地 · 因明處 · 七因明

The science of reasoning is not the flaunting of one's tongue but the real capacity to "examine meaning-and-principle." The seven members of reasoning set forth in full how one sets up a discourse in accordance with principle, debates, decides victory and defeat, and knows when to advance and when to withdraw; true debate returns to discourse in accord with the right and instructive discourse — debate carried on to cut off doubt, to reach the deep meaning, and to bring one to liberation.

In one line: The Site of the Science of Reasoning, through the seven members of reasoning (the essential nature · the settings · the grounds · the adornments · the defeats · the deliverance · the things that greatly further debate), sets up the norms of debate in accordance with principle; the backbone of "that which establishes" is the three means of knowing — direct perception, inference, and authoritative teaching; and the three examinings of the deliverance in debate raise the science of reasoning from "flaunting argument" to "compassion and self-knowledge."

Three Points of the Eye

1. The seven members of reasoning · debate has its true and its false: among the six kinds of essential nature of debate, discourse in accord with the right and instructive discourse are "true and real, able to draw out benefit-and-profit, and to be cultivated," while disputatious discourse and slanderous discourse are "untrue and unreal, to be kept far off," and plain discourse and esteemed discourse are judged case by case 〔this treatise 0356b〕. The true body of the science of reasoning is debate for cutting off doubt, reaching the deep sense of the phrases, and making knowing-and-seeing pure — not the flaunting of one's tongue.

2. The three means of knowing are the backbone of "that which establishes": the eight factors that establish (the setting-up of the thesis · the arguing of the reason · the adducing of the example · the like class · the unlike class · direct perception · inference · authoritative teaching). Direct perception must be non-errant — shown by contrast through five errors: seeing water in a mirage, seeing a wheel in a whirling fire, seeing yellow in the kāmalā disease, and the rest 〔0357c〕; inference reckons from an aspect — inferring fire from smoke, a chariot from a banner, a lion from a roaring 〔0358a〕; authoritative teaching must "not contradict the characteristics of phenomena" — refuting the clinging to a self, the clinging to the permanent and the annihilated, and the false judging of "all formations are impermanent" as "a part permanent, a part impermanent" 〔0358c〕.

3. Character and deliverance: the five adornments of debate plus the twenty-seven merits (well guarding one's own mind so that it is without anger, well according with another's mind so that it is without resentment); the defeats of debate (yielding the word · bending the word · faults of the word) portray to the full the aspects of losing composure when principle is exhausted and words run dry; and the deliverance in debate, by the three examinings (gain-and-loss · the time and the assembly · the skilled and the unskilled), decides whether the mouth ought to be opened at all — "could this discourse be a harm to myself and to others … could it fail to have pity on the world?" — the mouth that need not be opened is left shut 〔0360b〕.

The seven members of reasoning (the ancient Yogācāra teaching) ↔ Dignāga's new science of reasoning, the eight gates and two benefits (Śaṅkarasvāmin's Introduction to Logic T1630 · Kuiji's Great Commentary T1840) — the earlier and later forms, recorded only to mark their inheritance-and-change, not to appraise which is better. The full exposition of the meaning is opened up in the 〈Exposition〉.

The third of the five sciences, the Site of the Science of Reasoning (因明處, hetuvidyā) — the discipline of examining meaning-and-principle and of adjudicating through debate. It is expounded through the seven members of reasoning: the essential nature of debate, the settings of debate, the grounds of debate, the adornments of debate, the defeats of debate, the deliverance in debate, and the things that greatly further debate. The technical terms are kept as of old, rendered clause by clause into present-day language, with no added exposition and no cited treatises; where the source abbreviates, the sense is supplied within 〔 〕.

Setting the Theme

What is the Site of the Science of Reasoning? It is "all the various matters that fall within the examining of meaning-and-principle." And what is this? The summary verse says: the essential nature of debate, the settings of debate, the grounds of debate 〔the basis on which a debate stands〕, the adornments of debate, the defeats of debate 〔the losing of a debate〕, the deliverance in debate, and the things that greatly further debate. One should know that, in brief, there are seven kinds: first, the essential nature of debate; second, the settings of debate; third, the grounds of debate; fourth, the adornments of debate; fifth, the defeats of debate; sixth, the deliverance in debate; seventh, the things that greatly further debate.

One · The Essential Nature of Debate (the Six Kinds of Discourse)

What is the essential nature of debate? There are six kinds: plain discourse, esteemed discourse, disputatious discourse, slanderous discourse, discourse in accord with the right, and instructive discourse.

Plain discourse — this is all speech, all vocal sound, all wording. Esteemed discourse — this is the various discourse that people in the world listen to, each according to what is fitting for him. Disputatious discourse — it arises sometimes in dependence on "the desires": one's own desired object is seized by another, one seizes another's desired object, the desired objects of the sentient beings one loves are seized from one another, or one merely wishes to seize them. One may also contend over desired objects possessed by no one, such as song, dance, sport, and laughter, or over those associated with courtesans and servants, whether in order to watch or to enjoy them. Those not yet freed from desire, stained by the greed of the desire-realm, out of firm clinging, bondage, indulgence, and craving, grow indignant and set at odds, and, being fond of contention, raise all manner of discourses and injurious discourses — hence it is named disputatious discourse.

Or it arises in dependence on "wrong conduct": one's own bodily and verbal wrong conduct is reviled by another; another's wrong conduct is reviled by oneself; or the wrong conduct of sentient beings one loves is reviled back and forth. Among people engaged in such conduct are those who wish to perform evil conduct not yet performed. Not yet freed from the greed, hatred, and delusion of the desire-realm and heavily enclosed by them, out of firm clinging, bondage, indulgence, and craving they grow indignant at one another, harbor defiled minds, and set themselves mutually at odds. Being fond of contention, they raise all manner of discourses and injurious discourses.

Or it arises in dependence on "the views": the view of a real self in the aggregates, the view of annihilation, the view of no cause, the view of unequal causes, the view of permanence, the view held by the Rain-Crowd, and immeasurable other classes of evil view. One's own view may be blocked by another, another's view may be blocked by oneself, the view held by a sentient being one loves may now be blocked or may already have been blocked by another, or one may wish to take up a view not yet taken up. For these reasons, those not yet freed from desire, as explained above, raise all manner of discourses and injurious discourses. This is named disputatious discourse. Slanderous discourse — the discourse of those who, harboring indignation and letting it break out, with defiled minds rouse up their power and demean one another (drawn on by coarse and harsh speech, drawn on by shamelessness, drawn on by frivolous speech); and further, in an ill-spoken doctrine and discipline, they expound that doctrine for sentient beings, investigate and adjudicate it, and give instruction and admonition — such discourses as these are named slanderous discourse. Discourse in accord with the right — in a well-spoken doctrine and discipline, one expounds the right Dharma for sentient beings, investigates and adjudicates it, and gives instruction and admonition, so as to cut off doubt and confusion, so as to reach the deep sense of the phrases, and so as to make knowing-and-seeing utterly pure, in accord with right conduct and in accord with liberation — hence it is named discourse in accord with the right. Instructive discourse — the discourse that teaches the person who cultivates the training in the higher mind and the training in the higher wisdom, causing the mind not yet settled to become settled and the mind already settled to attain liberation, causing him to awaken and to open up the knowledge of what is real — hence it is named instructive discourse.

Question: Among these six discourses, how many are real, able to draw out benefit-and-profit, and to be cultivated? How many are unreal, able to draw out what is without profit, and to be kept far off? Answer: the last two discourses (in accord with the right, and instructive) are true and real, able to draw out benefit-and-profit, and to be cultivated; the middle two discourses (disputatious and slanderous) are untrue and unreal, able to draw out what is without profit, and to be kept far off; the first two discourses (plain and esteemed) are to be distinguished case by case 〔judged according to the use to which they are put〕.

Two · The Settings of Debate (the Six Settings)

What are the settings of debate? These too are of six kinds — the occasions on which a debate is set up: first, before the royal house; second, before those charged with adjudicating principle 〔before magistrates〕; third, in the midst of a great assembly; fourth, before the worthy and the wise; fifth, before the śramaṇas and brahmins who well understand the doctrine and its meaning; sixth, before those who delight in the doctrine and its meaning.

Three · The Grounds of Debate (the Two Meanings to Be Established · the Eight Factors That Establish)

What are the grounds of debate? There are ten kinds: the meanings to be established are of two kinds, and the factors that establish are of eight kinds.

The two kinds of meaning to be established: first, the intrinsic nature; second, the particular distinction. "The intrinsic nature to be established" — what is is set up as being, and what is not is set up as not being. "The particular distinction to be established" — what has a superior is set up as having a superior, and what has none is set up as having none; the permanent is set up as permanent, the impermanent as impermanent; and likewise the having-form and the formless, the visible and the invisible, the resistant and the unresistant, the contaminated and the uncontaminated, the conditioned and the unconditioned, and so on — through immeasurable gateways of distinction; this is named the particular distinction to be established.

The eight factors that establish: first, the setting-up of the thesis; second, the arguing of the reason; third, the adducing of the example; fourth, the like class; fifth, the unlike class; sixth, direct perception; seventh, inference; eighth, authoritative teaching.

The setting-up of the thesis — depending on the two kinds of meaning to be established, one takes up, each separately, what is granted within one's own school, or takes up the school-tenet of a treatise (relying either on one's own eloquence, or out of contempt for the other, or from having heard it from another, or from having awakened to what is real), and, in order to establish one's own school, or to demolish another's school, or to subdue and break down the other, or out of compassion for the other, one sets up the meaning of the thesis. The arguing of the reason — in order to accomplish the meaning of the thesis set up, one relies on the example, the like class, the unlike class, direct perception, inference, and authoritative teaching that have been adduced, and sets up the discourse of the principle that furthers and benefits. The adducing of the example — also in order to accomplish the meaning of the thesis set up, one adduces a phenomenon that the "reason" rests upon — one habitually practiced in the world, commonly granted, and easily understood — and makes of it a discourse of comparison.

The like class — of any given phenomenon in relation to the remaining phenomena, its characteristics resemble them, one within another, in some small part; there are five kinds: resemblance of aspect, resemblance of self-substance, resemblance of function, resemblance of doctrinal gateway, resemblance of cause-and-effect. Resemblance of aspect — the aspects seen at present, or seen before, are mutually connected and resemble one another, one within another; resemblance of self-substance — their characteristics, one within another, resemble one another; resemblance of function — their functions, one within another, resemble one another; resemblance of doctrinal gateway — their doctrinal gateways, one within another, resemble one another (as the impermanent and the suffering, suffering and no-self, no-self and birth, birth and aging, aging and death, and the having-form and the formless, and so on, through immeasurable doctrinal gateways, resemble one another, one within another); resemblance of cause-and-effect — their being cause or being effect, being that which establishes or that which is established, one within another, resemble one another. The unlike class — of any given phenomenon in relation to the remaining phenomena, its characteristics, one within another, are dissimilar only in some small part, rather than being wholly dissimilar; this too is of five kinds, contrary to the above (the five of the like class), and their characteristics are to be understood accordingly.

Direct perception — there are three 〔conditions〕: it is not the not-presently-seen; it is not the already-considered or the to-be-considered; and it is not an errant object-field.

〔a〕 Direct perception that is not the not-presently-seen further has four kinds: the faculties being unimpaired and attention being present — of like-realm arising, of transcendent arising, unobstructed, and not extremely far. Of like-realm arising — the faculties of the desire-realm take as object an object of the desire-realm, and the faculties of a higher ground take as object an object of that higher ground, already arisen, already occurring; of transcendent arising — the faculties of a higher ground take as object an object of a lower ground. "Unobstructed" further has four kinds: not veiled (not covered by darkness, by the darkness of ignorance (avidyā), or by an unclear, murky matter); not screened (not screened by the power of herbs, the power of spells, or the power of supernormal ability); not overwhelmed (a small, slight thing overwhelmed and taken away by a vast, abundant thing, so that it cannot be got at — as a drug or a hair's tip in food and drink; as a lesser light overwhelmed by a greater, sunlight overwhelming the stars and moon, moonlight overwhelming the host of stars; and again, as an antidote overwhelming what it counteracts — attention to the impure overwhelming the appearance of the pure, attention to the impermanent, the suffering, and the no-self overwhelming the appearances of permanence, joy, and self, and attention to signlessness overwhelming all signs); and not deluded (produced by illusion or conjuration, the form-appearance being surpassingly excellent or resemblant; or produced within — dizziness of the eye, faintness, dream, swoon, drunkenness, heedlessness, or madness). Being unobstructed by these four is named "unobstructed." Not extremely far — not held off by the three kinds of extreme farness: extreme farness of place, extreme farness of time, and extreme farness through diminution. All of this together is named "not the not-presently-seen," and hence is named direct perception.

〔b〕 Direct perception that is not the already-considered or the to-be-considered further has two kinds: first, that which, upon a mere grasping, becomes the object-field on which the grasping rests; second, that which sets up an object-field as the object-field on which the grasping rests. "That which, upon a mere grasping, becomes" — the object-field can serve as that upon which the grasping rests "as soon as it is grasped" (as when a good physician hands over a drug whose color, scent, savor, and touch are complete, and which has great potency, so that upon a mere grasping it becomes that on which grasping rests; and as for the drug's efficacy, while the illness is not yet healed it is named "to be considered," and once the illness is healed it is named "already considered").

"That which sets up an object-field as the object-field on which the grasping rests" — as when a yoga practitioner, upon the earth, meditates on the water, fire, and wind elements. Abiding upon the earth, he meditates on water, and the notion of earth turns into the notion of water; abiding upon the earth and meditating on fire or wind, the notion of earth likewise turns into the notion of fire or wind. The notion of earth is precisely the grasping that sets up the object-field, and earth itself is that on which this grasping rests. What applies when one abides on earth applies accordingly when one abides on water, fire, or wind. This is named the object-field on which the grasping that sets up an object-field rests. That supporting object-field itself is neither already considered nor to be considered; rather, while one's understanding of earth and the other elements is not yet accomplished, it is named "to be considered," and when that understanding is accomplished, it is named "already considered." Hence this is direct perception that is not the already-considered or the to-be-considered.

〔c〕 Direct perception that is not an errant object-field — either of five kinds or of seven kinds. The five kinds are precisely the not being the five kinds of errant object-field: error of notion (upon what is not the appearance of something, the notion of that something arises — as, in the appearance of a mirage or of a deer's thirst, the notion of water arises); error of number (upon a small number, the overweening notion of a great number — as one with a film-clouded, dizzy eye sees, where there is one moon, the images of many moons); error of shape (upon one shape-form, the overweening notion of another shape-form — as in a whirling fire the shape of a wheel is seen); error of color (upon one color, the overweening notion of another color — as when the kāmalā disease impairs the eye-faculty, so that upon what is not yellow one sees the appearance of yellow throughout); error of function (upon what has no function, the overweening notion that there is a function — as when, clenching the fist and running, one sees the trees rushing in flood). The seven kinds are the former five plus two "pervasive errors": error of mind (that very delighting-and-rejoicing that the mind gives rise to over the five errant meanings); and error of view (the enduring, the openly declaring, the giving rise to the notion of the auspicious, and the firm clinging that will not let go, over the five errant meanings). If it is not such an errant object-field, it is named direct perception.

Question: whose is such direct perception? Answer: in brief, of four kinds — the direct perception of the material faculties (the object-fields ranged over by the five material faculties); the direct perception of mental reception (the object-field ranged over by the mental faculty); worldly direct perception (the former two, spoken of together as one); and pure direct perception (all worldly direct perception is also named pure direct perception; and there is besides a pure direct perception that is not worldly direct perception, namely: the supramundane knowledge, over the object-field it ranges over, knowing what is as being, what is not as not being, what has a superior as having a superior, and what has none as having none — this is named the pure direct perception uncommon to the world).

Inference — the reckoning-out that is together with deliberation, directed to the object-field of the already-considered and the to-be-considered. There are again five kinds: inference from aspect, inference from substance, inference from function, inference from doctrine, inference from cause-and-effect. Inference from aspect — according to whatever aspect is mutually connected, from what is seen at present or was seen before one reckons out the object-field (as, seeing a banner, one infers the presence of a chariot; seeing smoke, one infers the presence of fire; by the king one infers the country; by the husband one infers the wife; by the horns and the hump one infers the presence of an ox; by soft skin, black hair, and comely complexion one infers a youth; by a wrinkled face and white hair one infers one who is old; by the holding of the distinctive marks one infers a monastic or a layman; by delighting to behold the noble ones, delighting to hear the right Dharma, and being far from stinginess and greed one infers right faith; by good thinking, good speaking, and good doing one infers keen intelligence; by loving-kindness, compassion, kind speech, valor, delight in giving, and good understanding of the deep meaning one infers a bodhisattva; by restlessness, sporting, singing, and laughing one infers one not yet freed from desire, and by deportment ever calm and still one infers one freed from desire; by the Tathāgata's subtle and excellent marks, his wisdom, his calmness, his right conduct, and his supernormal ability one infers that the Tathāgata, the Worthy, the Perfectly Awakened One, possesses omniscience; and by his marks in youth, seen in old age, one infers that it is he).

Inference from substance — presently seeing the self-substance of something, one infers by analogy its substance that is not presently seen, or, presently seeing one part, one infers by analogy the remaining parts. Thus by the present one infers the past, by the past one infers the future, by a present nearby matter one infers what is far away, and by the present one may also infer the future. Observing the marks of gain and loss in one part of food, clothing, ornaments, or conveyances, one infers the whole; and by one part's ripening one infers the remaining parts' ripening.

Inference from function — by the function one infers that on which the function rests (as, seeing a distant thing that does not stir, with a bird perched upon it, one infers it to be a stump; if there is stirring, one infers it to be a person; by a broad track and a resting place one infers an elephant, and by a place where the body has trailed one infers a snake; hearing a neighing one infers a horse, hearing a roaring one infers a lion, hearing a bellowing one infers the bull-king; the seen is inferred to the eye, the heard to the ear, the smelt to the nose, the tasted to the tongue, the touched to the body, and discernment to the mental faculty; seeing something resistant in water one infers the presence of earth, seeing grass and trees moist and green one infers the presence of water, seeing hot ashes one infers the presence of fire, seeing a thicket that stirs one infers the presence of wind; and by one who, eyes shut and staff in hand, stumbles and loses the way one infers a blind man, and by one who raises his voice and cocks his ear one infers a deaf man). Right faith, keen intelligence, freedom from desire, non-freedom from desire, the bodhisattva, and the Tathāgata are likewise inferred from their functions, as in the preceding examples.

Inference from doctrine — by a phenomenon adjoining and connected one infers the remaining phenomena adjoining and connected (as by belonging to the impermanent one infers the presence of suffering, and by belonging to suffering one infers the empty and the no-self; by belonging to birth one infers the presence of aging, and by belonging to aging one infers the presence of death; by belonging to the having-form, the visible, and the resistant one infers a location and a shape-substance; by belonging to the contaminated one infers the presence of suffering, and by belonging to the uncontaminated one infers the absence of suffering; by belonging to the conditioned one infers arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation, and by belonging to the unconditioned one infers the absence of arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation).

Inference from cause-and-effect — by cause and effect one infers, the one from the other, in turn. Seeing a going one, one infers an arrival at another place; seeing an arrival at another place, one infers a prior going. Seeing one who serves the king in accord with the Dharma, one infers that he will obtain rank-and-office; seeing great rank-and-office, one infers that he formerly served the king. Seeing one who has fully performed wholesome actions, one infers that he will obtain great wealth; seeing great wealth, one infers that wholesome actions were fully performed before. Seeing wholesome or evil conduct cultivated before, one infers later flourishing or decline; seeing present flourishing or decline, one infers wholesome or evil conduct performed before. Seeing abundant food and drink, one infers satiety, and seeing satiety one infers abundant food and drink. Seeing unbalanced eating, one infers that there will be illness, and presently seeing illness one infers unbalanced eating. Seeing meditative absorption, one infers freedom from desire, and seeing freedom from desire one infers meditative absorption. Seeing the cultivation of the path, one infers that the fruits of the śramaṇa will be obtained, and seeing those fruits obtained one infers cultivation of the path. Such examples are collectively named inference from cause-and-effect. These five kinds together are named inference.

Authoritative teaching — the verbal teaching spoken by an all-knowing one, whether heard directly from him or received by following his doctrine. It has three characteristics: first, it does not contradict the sages' word (the sūtra-teaching spoken by a noble disciple or by the Buddha himself, transmitted successively down to the present without contradicting the right Dharma or right meaning); second, it is able to counteract defilement (when cultivated well, it can forever subdue all afflictions and secondary afflictions, including greed, hatred, and delusion); third, it does not contradict the characteristics of phenomena.

What is it to "contradict the characteristics of phenomena"? It is to increase what is without a certain characteristic into having that characteristic, as by clinging to a self, a sentient being, a life-holder, or a birth-taker, or to permanence or annihilation, having-form or formlessness; to diminish what has a characteristic into being without it; or to set up as indefinite what is definite. Thus, although all formations are impermanent, all the contaminated is suffering, and all phenomena are empty and without self, one falsely establishes one part as permanent and one part as impermanent, one part as suffering and one part as not suffering, one part as having self and one part as without self. It also includes seeking an answer-and-explanation regarding the unanswerable phenomena the Buddha has set aside.

It is likewise contradiction to set up as definite what is indefinite: to cling that every pleasant feeling necessarily has greed as its latent tendency, every painful feeling hatred, and every neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling delusion; that every pleasant feeling is contaminated; or that every intentional action accompanied by pleasure will determinately ripen only as suffering. It is also to establish distinction within an undifferentiated characteristic, or no distinction within a differentiated characteristic: for example, to establish the undifferentiated characteristic of the conditioned within the unconditioned, or that of the unconditioned within the conditioned. The same principle applies, as appropriate, to having-form and formlessness, visible and invisible, resistant and unresistant, contaminated and uncontaminated.

Further, contradiction is to set up cause-and-effect contrary to right principle: to claim that fine conduct calls forth an unlovable fruit and evil conduct a lovable fruit, that wrong conduct in an ill-spoken Dharma-and-Vinaya brings purity, or that right conduct in a well-spoken Dharma-and-Vinaya is defilement. It is also, over an unreal characteristic, to use provisional language to establish a real characteristic, or, over a real characteristic, to use provisional language to establish this and that — as by setting up verbal expression over phenomena beyond words and calling that expression itself the ultimate truth. These are contradictions of the characteristics of phenomena. The contrary of each is precisely non-contradiction. A teaching that also meets the first two characteristics is named authoritative teaching.

〔Here questions and answers set forth the sequence of the factors that establish〕 Question: if all phenomena accomplish their own characteristic and are each settled within their own dharma-nature, why set up the two kinds of meaning to be established? Answer: it is in order to give rise to faith-and-understanding in another, not in order to bring into being the nature-and-characteristic of phenomena. Question: why set up the thesis first? Answer: in order first to display the meaning of the thesis that one holds dear. Question: why argue the reason next? Answer: in order, by the definite principle of a presently-seen matter, to make the other take up the meaning of the thesis set up. Question: why adduce the example next? Answer: in order to display the presently-seen matter on which the principle that establishes rests. Question: why speak, last of all, of the like class, the unlike class, direct perception, inference, and authoritative teaching? Answer: in order to open up and show the knowledge of the "contradicting" and "not contradicting" of the two, reason and example. Moreover, "contradicting" is by two causes: because it is indefinite, and because it is of the same thing to be established; and "not contradicting" too is by two causes: because it is definite, and because it is of a different thing to be established. What contradicts cannot serve as a means of knowing toward the accomplishing of the thesis, and hence is not named a means of knowing; what does not contradict can serve as a right means of knowing, and hence is named a means of knowing. This is named the grounds of debate.

Four · The Adornments of Debate (the Five Adornments · the Twenty-Seven Praiseworthy Merits)

The adornments of debate are, in brief, of five kinds: being good at one's own and others' schools, fullness of expression, fearlessness, gravity, and worthiness of reverence. Being good at one's own and others' schools — one who has conceived a deep delight in this doctrine and discipline has, over the tenets of this treatise, recited, upheld, listened to, and reflected on them to full maturity and put them into practice, and has become good at them, expounded them, and made them clear; and one who has no delight in that other doctrine has, over the tenets of that treatise, though he has recited, upheld, listened to, and reflected on them to full maturity, not put them into practice, yet has become good at them, expounded them, and made them clear — this is named being good at one's own and others' schools. Fullness of expression — whatever one says, one says by "sound" and not by "non-sound." What is "sound"? Only that which is complete in five virtues is named sound: not coarse-and-vulgar (free of the crude, rustic speech of the border regions); easy (all in speech in common use in the world); grand-and-clear (speech set up in accord with the meaning, artful and grand); coherent (the doctrine and meaning of what comes before and after agreeing and not scattering); and good in meaning (able to draw out the superior rebirth, the definite excellence, and the freedom from error). Further, this science of sound is, by nine aspects, the fullness of expression: unconfused, not coarse-and-fierce, well-articulated, measured, corresponding to the meaning, timely, definite, made clear, and continuous. Fearlessness — in the midst of a numerous assembly, a mixed assembly, a great assembly, an assembly of authorities, an assembly of the truth-minded, or an assembly of the good, the mind is without base timidity or constant dread, the body without trembling and sweating, the face without a look of terror, the voice without stammering, and the speech without cowering weakness. Gravity — one speaks only when the time is fitting, and is not hasty. Worthiness of reverence — being by nature well-tempered and not vexing others, one does not overstep the ground of those who are well-tempered, but gives rise to speech in accord with the other's mind, timely, in accordance with reality, able to draw out benefit-and-profit, its wording gentle as toward a good friend.

If one raises up discourse relying on these five adornments of debate, one should know there are further twenty-seven praiseworthy merits: first, being revered by the assembly; second, one's word being surely believed and accepted; third, being altogether without fear in the midst of a great assembly; fourth, knowing deeply the flaws and gaps in others' tenets; fifth, knowing the surpassing merits of one's own tenets; sixth, having no biased clinging, and being without partiality of feeling toward the treatise one has received; seventh, being unable to be led away or wrested aside from one's own right Dharma and discipline; eighth, being able swiftly to comprehend what another says; ninth, being able swiftly to take it in; tenth, being able swiftly to answer and match it; eleventh, being complete in the virtues of speech, so that the assembly is made to delight; twelfth, gladdening and winning the faith-and-understanding of those versed in this treatise of reasoning; thirteenth, being able well to expound the meaning-phrases, sentences, and letters; fourteenth, causing the body to be without weariness; fifteenth, causing the mind to be without weariness; sixteenth, speech being without stammering roughness; seventeenth, eloquence being inexhaustible; eighteenth, the body not suddenly wasting; nineteenth, mindfulness being without loss; twentieth, the mind being without harm or vexation; twenty-first, the throat being without injury; twenty-second, whatever is uttered being clear and easy to understand; twenty-third, well guarding one's own mind so that it is without anger; twenty-fourth, well according with another's mind so that it is without resentment; twenty-fifth, causing the mind of one's opponent in debate to give rise to pure faith; twenty-sixth, whatever one does not calling forth enmity-and-opposition; twenty-seventh, a vast reputation, its renown flowing to the ten directions, so that the world all proclaims this great teacher of the Dharma and reckons him among the great teachers. Just as one who receives desired things adorns himself with adornments of maṇi, true pearl, lapis lazuli, and other jewels, his majestic power blazing and his radiance shining forth everywhere, so does the debater, with these twenty-seven praiseworthy merits set alongside those five kinds of adornments of debate, adorn himself, his majestic power blazing and his radiance shining forth everywhere — and hence it is named the adornments of debate.

Five · The Defeats of Debate (Yielding the Word · Bending the Word · Faults of the Word)

The defeats of debate are of three kinds: yielding the word, bending the word, and faults of the word.

Yielding the word — the proponent, with thirteen phrases, begs pardon of his opponent in debate and abandons the discourse he has set up. What are the thirteen? The proponent says to his opponent: my discourse is unsound, your discourse is sound; my observing is not good, your observing is good; my discourse is without principle, your discourse has principle; my discourse is without power, your discourse has power; my discourse is subdued, your discourse stands established; my eloquence goes only this far, and beyond this I shall consider it better and speak for you; and let this matter be set aside, I shall say no more — with these thirteen phrases he begs pardon of his opponent and abandons the discourse he has spoken. To abandon the discourse is to be broken, to be overcome by the other, to fall behind the other, to be subdued by him; and hence yielding the word is named a place of defeat.

Bending the word — the proponent is subdued by his opponent, and so, whether he draws on some other matter as a pretext to withdraw, or brings in outside talk, or displays indignation, or displays hatred, or displays arrogance, or displays concealment, or displays vexatious harm, or displays impatience, or displays disbelief, or falls silent, or grows sorrowful, or hunches his shoulders and hangs his face, or sinks into thought with his wording exhausted 〔thirteen matters〕. Drawing on some other matter as a pretext to withdraw — he abandons the thesis he set up before and pleads instead some other tenet, abandons the reason, example, like class, unlike class, direct perception, inference, and authoritative teaching he had before, and pleads others instead; bringing in outside talk — he abandons the matter under discussion and speaks of food and drink, kings and ministers, thieves and robbers, streets and thoroughfares, courtesans and filth, and the like, drawing on outside occasions as a pretext to be rid of the other's challenge; displaying indignation — with coarse, fierce, and insolent speech he demeans his opponent; displaying hatred — with words of requiting enmity he upbraids him; displaying arrogance — with words of base lineage, and the like, he reviles him; displaying concealment — with words that lay bare the evil conduct the other has concealed he calls him out; displaying vexatious harm — with harsh and cruel, enmity-laden words he curses him; displaying impatience — he utters enmity-laden words to frighten him; displaying disbelief — with words that ruin his conduct he slanders him; falling silent — his verbal activity is suddenly spent; growing sorrowful — his mental activity smolders in distress; hunching his shoulders and hanging his face — his bodily activity, once dignified, at once withers and wastes; sinking into thought with his wording exhausted — his talent and eloquence are alike drained. Among these thirteen matters: the first two are deceitful and deranging conduct; the middle seven are the setting in motion of wrong conduct; and the last four are the reckoning-conduct of being at the end of one's resources. This is named bending the word, a falling into a place of defeat.

Faults of the word — the proponent's speech is defiled by nine faults: confusion (abandoning the matter under discussion and speaking, in a jumble, of extraneous words); coarseness-and-fierceness (the restlessness of indignation, and the restlessness of hasty impetuosity); lack of articulation (whether in doctrine or in meaning, being uncomprehended by the assembly and by the opponent in debate); want of measure (the wording being repetitive or deficient); non-correspondence with the meaning (of which there are ten kinds: without meaning, contradicting the meaning, harming principle, being of the same import as what is to be established, calling down faults and challenges, gaining no benefit-and-profit, the meaning being out of order, the meaning being indefinite, establishing what already establishes, and going along with the various wrong and evil discourses that do not accord with principle); untimeliness (setting what ought to be said out of its due order, before and after); indefiniteness (setting up and then demolishing, demolishing and then setting up, shifting so swiftly that it can hardly be understood); unclarity (speech that calls forth mockery, answering without comprehending, putting classical language first and vernacular after, or the vernacular first and the classical after); and discontinuity (the wording being cut off in the middle). Whatever discourse commits these nine failings is named faults of the word, a falling into a place of defeat.

Six · The Deliverance in Debate (the Three Examinings)

The deliverance in debate — the proponent first, by three kinds of examining, examines the "prospect of debate," and only then raises up discourse, or else does not raise up discourse; this is named the deliverance in debate. The three kinds of examining: examining gain-and-loss, examining the time and the assembly, and examining the skilled and the unskilled.

Examining gain-and-loss — being about to raise up the prospect of debate, one first examines: could this discourse I set up be a harm to myself, a harm to others, or a harm to both? Might it not fail to give rise to fault in this life, in a later life, or in both? Might it not stir up sorrows and pains of body and mind? Might it not be set going by the taking up of knife and staff, by contending, reviling, and quarreling, by flattery, deceit, and false speech? Might it not cause all manner of evil and unwholesome phenomena to grow and increase? Could it fail to benefit and gladden myself and others and the many, fail to have pity on the world, and leave the gods and men without meaning, without profit, and without gladness? When one examines thus: if one knows that one's discourse can be a harm to oneself, and even leave gods and men without meaning and without profit, then one exhorts oneself that one ought not to set up the discourse; if one knows that it is no harm to oneself, and is able to draw out for gods and men benefit-and-profit and gladness, then one exhorts oneself that one ought to set up the right discourse. This is named the first characteristic of the deliverance in debate, "whether to act or not to act." Examining the time and the assembly — being about to raise up the prospect of debate, one should well examine the assembly now present: does it have biased clinging, or is it without clinging? does it have the worthy and upright, or has it none? does it have the skilled, or has it none? If one knows that the assembly has only biased clinging, is not worthy and upright, and is not skilled, then one exhorts oneself that one ought not to set up the discourse; if one knows that it is without biased clinging, has the worthy and upright, and has the skilled, then one exhorts oneself that one ought to set up the discourse. This is named the second characteristic of the deliverance in debate. Examining the skilled and the unskilled — one should examine oneself: am I skilled or unskilled in the essential nature of debate, the settings of debate, the grounds of debate, the adornments of debate, the defeats of debate, the deliverance in debate, and the rest? Have I the power to set up my own discourse and to break down the other's? Can I win free at the places of defeat? If one knows that one is without skill and without power, then one exhorts oneself that one ought not to set up a discourse with one's opponent; if one knows that one has skill and has power, then one exhorts oneself that one ought, together with one's opponent, to set up a discourse. This is named the third characteristic of the deliverance in debate.

Seven · The Things That Greatly Further Debate (the Three Dharmas)

The things that greatly further debate — there are three dharmas that greatly further the discourse one sets up: being good at one's own and others' schools, being valorous and fearless, and being inexhaustible in eloquence. Question: why are these three dharmas named as greatly furthering the discourse one sets up? Answer: because one well understands one's own and others' schools, one is able to raise up discussion regarding all phenomena; because one is valorous and fearless, one is able to raise up discussion in the midst of any assembly; because one is inexhaustible in eloquence, one is able well to answer-and-match whatever questions and challenges come. It is for this reason that these three greatly further the discourse one sets up.

The Site of the Science of Reasoning has now been spoken.

Teaching arc: the science of reasoning is not the flaunting of one's tongue but the real capacity to "examine meaning-and-principle" — the treatise, at its very opening, adjudicates the true and the false in debate. The seven members of reasoning set forth, one by one, how one sets up a discourse in accordance with principle, debates, decides victory and defeat, and knows when to advance and when to withdraw; and its teaching aids are, throughout, the living examples the treatise itself supplies (inferring fire from smoke, seeing water in a mirage, the thirteen aspects of bending the word, the three examinings before a debate). All that is expounded is what the treatise itself has and what the ancient masters have explained; not one meaning is added.

The Science of Reasoning: Not Quarreling, but the Real Capacity to "Examine Meaning"

The third of the five sciences is the science of reasoning — which the treatise defines as "all the various matters that fall within the examining of meaning" 〔this treatise〕. Hearing the words "debate" and "dispute," one is apt to picture a quarrel; but the treatise, at its very opening, divides debate into the true and the false. Among the six kinds of essential nature of debate, discourse in accord with the right and instructive discourse are "true and real, able to draw out benefit-and-profit, and to be cultivated," while disputatious discourse and slanderous discourse are "untrue and unreal, able to draw out what is without profit, and to be kept far off," and plain discourse and esteemed discourse are judged according to the use to which they are put. One sees, then, that the true body of the science of reasoning is not the flaunting of argument, but discourse in accord with the right and instructive discourse — spoken "so as to cut off the doubt and confusion of sentient beings, so as to reach the deep sense of the phrases, and so as to make knowing-and-seeing utterly pure." The seven members of reasoning are just this capacity for "debate in accordance with principle," taken apart and taught one member at a time.

To Set Up a Debate: First There Is the "To Be Established," Then the "That Which Establishes"

The grounds of debate hold ten dharmas: the two kinds of meaning to be established (the intrinsic nature and the particular distinction) plus the eight factors that establish (the setting-up of the thesis, the arguing of the reason, the adducing of the example, the like class, the unlike class, direct perception, inference, and authoritative teaching). First there is "what is to be proved" — the thesis; then there is "what is brought to prove it" — the reason, the example, and the three means of knowing.

The treatise even sets up its own questions and answers to bring out this sequence: Why set up the thesis first? "In order first to display the meaning of the thesis that one holds dear." Why argue the reason next? "In order, by the definite principle of a presently-seen matter, to make the other take up the meaning of the thesis set up." Why adduce the example next? "In order to display the presently-seen matter on which the principle that establishes rests". One layer clasps the next — first make plain the claim, then give the reason, then give an example that can be commonly seen. The whole method of setting up a debate lies just here.

The Three Means of Knowing: What It Takes to "Really Know"

The backbone of "that which establishes" is the three means of knowing — direct perception, inference, and authoritative teaching. This is the epistemological heart of the science of reasoning, and the treatise teaches it with the utmost vividness.

Direct perception requires that it be "presently seen, not awaiting consideration, and not errant." The treatise does not simply state "what is not errant"; rather, in one breath, it adduces five examples of error to show it by contrast: taking a mirage or a deer's thirst for water (error of notion); one with a film-clouded, dizzy eye seeing many moon-images where there is one moon (error of number); taking a whirling fire for a single wheel of fire (error of shape); the kāmalā disease impairing the eye-faculty, so that one sees everything as yellow (error of color); and, clenching the fist and running, seeing the trees rushing in flood (error of function) — all of these are not direct perception; only a present seeing that does not fall into these errors counts as direct perception. Inference is "reckoning from an aspect," and the treatise's examples are each drawn from ordinary life: seeing a banner, one knows there is a chariot; seeing smoke, one knows there is fire; hearing a roaring, one knows it is a lion; hearing a bellowing, one knows it is the bull-king; seeing a distant thing that does not stir, with a bird perched upon it, one knows it to be a withered stump. Authoritative teaching is the verbal teaching of an all-knowing one, and must be complete in three characteristics: it does not contradict the sages' word, it is able to counteract defilement, and it does not contradict the characteristics of phenomena. Of these, "not contradicting the characteristics of phenomena" is the most exacting — to increase what is without a characteristic into having one (as clinging to a self, a sentient being, a life-holder, or clinging to the permanent and the annihilated), or to take "all formations are impermanent, all the contaminated is suffering, all phenomena are empty and without self" and falsely judge it as "a part permanent, a part impermanent," is called contradicting the characteristics of phenomena. Only when the three means of knowing are set up rightly can a debate stand firm and knock the other down.

Adornment, Defeat, Deliverance: The Character and Measure of the Debater

What is rare is that the science of reasoning speaks not only of "principle" but, more, of "the person" — the character and measure a debater ought to have.

The adornments of debate are five (being good at one's own and others' schools, fullness of expression, fearlessness, gravity, and worthiness of reverence), and to these are added twenty-seven praiseworthy merits: being revered by the assembly, one's word being surely believed and accepted, being without fear in the midst of a great assembly, eloquence being inexhaustible — and, above all, "well guarding one's own mind so that it is without anger, well according with another's mind so that it is without resentment, causing the mind of one's opponent in debate to give rise to pure faith". The treatise even uses a striking simile: as one adorns himself with jewels of maṇi, true pearl, and lapis lazuli, his majestic power blazing and his radiance shining forth everywhere, so does the good debater adorn those five adornments of debate with the twenty-seven merits, and thus too his radiance shines forth everywhere.

The defeats of debate are the reverse side — to lose, and where the loss lies. The treatise portrays it to the very bone: yielding the word (begging pardon and withdrawing with thirteen phrases of surrender); bending the word (when subdued, withdrawing on the pretext of some other matter, bringing in outside chatter to change the subject, displaying indignation, hatred, and arrogance, down to "hunching the shoulders and hanging the face" and "sinking into thought with the wording exhausted" — thirteen aspects in all; and the treatise further judges them finely: the first two are deceitful and deranging conduct, the middle seven are the setting in motion of wrong conduct, and the last four are the reckoning-conduct of being at the end of one's resources); and faults of the word (confusion, coarseness-and-fierceness, lack of articulation … the nine faults that defile speech). The many forms of losing composure that come over a person when his principle is exhausted and his words run dry are here shown with perfect clarity — and this is precisely the self-appearance that the practitioner ought to see through and to still.

Deepest in intent is the deliverance in debate: before opening one's mouth, one first decides, by three kinds of examining, "whether this mouth ought to be opened at all." Examining gain-and-loss — "could this discourse I set up be a harm to myself, a harm to others, or a harm to both? … could it fail to have pity on the world?" If one knows it can harm oneself, and even leave gods and men without meaning and without profit, then one exhorts oneself that one ought not to set up the discourse; only if it can draw out benefit-and-profit and gladness does one set up the right discourse. Examining the time and the assembly — is this assembly biased-and-clinging, or worthy-and-upright, and does it have skill or none? If it has only biased clinging, is not worthy and upright, and is not skilled, one does not set up the discourse. Examining the skilled and the unskilled — am I skilled in the seven members of reasoning, do I have the power to set up my own discourse and break down the other's, can I win free from the places of defeat? If not, one does not enter into debate. These three examinings raise the science of reasoning at a stroke from "flaunting argument" to "compassion and self-knowledge": the mouth that need not be opened is left shut, and only the mouth that ought to be opened is opened — this, precisely, is the mark of deliverance in the science of reasoning.

Carrying Forward

The seven members of reasoning (the essential nature, settings, grounds, adornments, defeats, deliverance, and things that greatly further debate) are the ancient form of Yogācāra reasoning. Later the bodhisattva Dignāga regathered the science of reasoning into "eight gates and two benefits" — that which establishes, that which refutes, the semblance of establishing, the semblance of refuting, direct perception, inference, the semblance of direct perception, and the semblance of inference (the eight gates); and awakening oneself and awakening others (the two benefits); Śaṅkarasvāmin's Introduction to Logic (translated by Xuanzang) transmitted this, and Kuiji's Commentary on the Introduction to Logic (the Great Commentary) became the root commentary of the science of reasoning in the Chinese transmission. The earlier and the later forms are recorded so as to mark their inheritance-and-change, without adjudicating which is the better. As it bears on the wisdom-born-of-hearing, the science of reasoning is a sharp instrument for "examining meaning"; and its right use returns, in the end, to discourse in accord with the right and instructive discourse — debate carried on in order to cut off doubt, to reach the deep meaning, and to bring a person to settling and to liberation.