中論 白話全本

The Treatise on the Middle consists of five hundred verses composed by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. It bears the name “Middle” in order to illuminate the true mark of all dharmas, and it is called a “treatise” in order to articulate fully what can be said. Since the true mark is difficult to awaken to without recourse to words, the name “Middle” is provisionally entrusted with pointing it out. Since discourse cannot exhaust its meaning without explanation, reasoned exposition is used to make it clear. Once the true mark has been shown and the meaning of the words explained, the sphere in which bodhisattvas practice and the place of awakening illumines can be understood in full clarity.

Sentient beings become mired in delusion because inverted views arise, and so they sink within the three realms. Some gain a measure of understanding, yet the narrow wisdom of aversion leaves them standing aloof and alone, still estranged from the great Way. From this we can see that great awakening lies in a vast and unobstructed illumination, whereas lesser wisdom is bound by the confines of a constricted mind. Unless illumination is vast, it cannot comprehend existence and nonexistence, the Way and the conventional, on equal terms. Unless understanding is thorough, it cannot travel the Middle Way and dissolve both extremes. That the Way and the conventional are not level with one another, and that the two limits do not disappear, is precisely what concerns the bodhisattva.

The great Nāgārjuna therefore analyzes all dharmas through the Middle Way, so that those who follow delusion may glimpse the hidden purport and turn around. He also gathers everything into the teaching of the present moment, so that those of deep understanding need not pursue it through further questions but can penetrate it here and now. The road opened by this treatise is broad and level: one might say that it lays a straight path across the most hidden stages and throws open the subtle gate between heaven and earth. It sends the wind of wisdom through withered branches and pours ambrosia into those who have grown faint.

Once a lofty terrace of a hundred beams has been built, the crampedness of a thatched hut becomes obvious. In the same way, encountering the breadth of this treatise reveals the poverty of a narrow understanding. Happily, China has suddenly received this Dharma gate from Vulture Peak as a firm stronghold, and even those whose dispositions are crooked, perilous, and confined receive the lingering benefit of its flowing light. From this time onward, worthy people who speak of the Way can at last investigate the true mark together.

It is said that throughout the lands of India, no one counted among the learned fails to ponder the Treatise on the Middle repeatedly and regard it as essential. Many have also taken up the brush to explain it. The commentary translated here was written by the Indian brahmin Piṅgala, known in Chinese as Qingmu. Although Qingmu had deep faith in and understanding of the true Dharma, his phrasing was not always elegant or well judged. Wherever the meaning was defective or the wording cumbersome, Master Kumārajīva edited and supplemented it, making its communication of the sūtra’s meaning comprehensive, though the composition still occasionally falls short of perfection from one passage to the next.

The Hundred Treatise chiefly counters the erroneous teachings of non-Buddhists, bringing external deviations to rest. The Treatise on the Middle removes obstructions within the Buddha’s teaching, allowing its meaning to flow freely. The Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom is vast in learning, while the Twelve Gate Treatise is profound and exact. To trace these four treatises is like having the sun and moon shine into one’s breast: nowhere remains obscure. I turned them over in my mind again and again and could not put them down. Forgetting my own coarseness and clumsiness, I therefore entrusted what I gained from reading the treatise to this preface and placed a statement of each chapter’s purport at the head of the scroll. How would I dare claim that I can explain the Treatise on the Middle? I merely rejoice that my mind has found a point of accord.

Composed by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, commented upon by the brahmin Qingmu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin: Treatise on the Middle, scroll one, “Examination of Conditions,” Taishō canon T30n1564. Markers at the beginnings of passages, 〔T30 …〕, give Taishō page, column, and line anchors.

I. Verse of Homage

〔T30 0001b14〕Neither arising nor ceasing; neither permanence nor annihilation; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going forth.

To the Buddha, who can teach dependent origination in this way and skillfully bring all conceptual proliferation to rest, I bow with my head at his feet. Among all teachings expressed in words, what the Buddha teaches is foremost.

II. Question: Why Was This Treatise Composed?

The questioner asks: Why was this treatise composed?

The respondent says: Some maintain that all things are produced by Maheśvara; some say they are produced by Viṣṇu; some say by conjunction; some by time; some by primordial nature; some by transformation; some by spontaneity; and some by atoms. Because of such varied and erroneous claims, people fall into wrong views of no cause, a wrong cause, annihilation, or permanence. They expound self and what belongs to self in many ways and do not know what the true Dharma is.

Wishing to end such wrong views and enable people to know the Buddha’s teaching, the Buddha first taught the twelve links of dependent origination within the śrāvaka teaching. For those who had practiced and cultivated for a long time, possessed the great resolve, and were capable of receiving the profound Dharma, he also taught through the Mahāyāna the mark of causes and conditions: all dharmas neither arise nor cease, are neither identical nor different, and so forth; they are ultimately empty and have no possession of their own. As stated in the Prajñā-pāramitā, the Buddha told Subhūti that when a bodhisattva sits at the place of awakening and contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination, they are inexhaustible like space.

After the Buddha’s passing, during the Semblance Dharma in the latter five-hundred-year period, people’s faculties became dull. They clung deeply to dharmas, seeking a fixed and unchanging mark in the twelve links of dependent origination, the five aggregates, the twelve sense fields, the eighteen elements, and so forth. Unable to understand the Buddha’s intent, they clung only to words. When such people heard the Mahāyāna teaching that all is ultimately empty, they did not understand the causes and conditions on account of which emptiness was taught. They therefore formed a view of doubt: If everything is ultimately empty, how can demerit, merit, karmic results, and the like still be distinguished? On that account, there would be neither conventional truth nor ultimate truth. Grasping the mark of emptiness, they grew attached to it and instead produced many faults within ultimate emptiness. The bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed the Treatise on the Middle for people such as these.

III. In Praising the Buddha with These Two Verses, the Ultimate Meaning Has Already Been Stated in Brief

Neither arising nor ceasing; neither permanence nor annihilation; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going forth.

To the Buddha, who can teach dependent origination in this way and skillfully bring all conceptual proliferation to rest, I bow with my head at his feet. Among all teachings expressed in words, what the Buddha teaches is foremost.

These two verses praise the Buddha and at the same time state the ultimate meaning in brief.

IV. Question: Why Use Only These Eight Matters to Refute?

The questioner asks: Dharmas are limitless and boundless. Why use only these eight matters to refute them?

The respondent says: Although dharmas are limitless, stating these eight matters in brief is sufficient to refute all dharmas comprehensively.

First comes non-arising. The masters of various treatises describe the mark of arising in many ways. Some say cause and effect are identical; some say cause and effect are different; some say the effect already exists in the cause; some say it does not yet exist in the cause; some say a thing arises from itself; some that it arises from another; some that it arises from both; some that there is arising; and some that there is no arising. All such claims about the mark of arising fail to stand, as will be explained at length below. Because no fixed mark of arising can be found, the text says “non-arising.”

Next comes non-ceasing. If there is not even arising, where could ceasing occur? Because there is neither arising nor ceasing, the other six matters are likewise absent.

V. Question: If the Comprehensive Refutation Is Complete, Why State the Other Six Matters?

The questioner asks: Non-arising and non-ceasing already refute all dharmas comprehensively. Why state the other six matters as well?

The respondent says: They establish the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing.

Some people reject non-arising and non-ceasing but accept neither permanence nor annihilation. If one investigates neither permanence nor annihilation deeply, however, it is precisely non-arising and non-ceasing. Why? If a dharma truly existed, it should not turn into nonexistence. To have existed before and not exist now is annihilation. If a nature was already there before, that is permanence. Thus, teaching neither permanence nor annihilation leads into the meaning of neither arising nor ceasing.

Some, although they have heard these four modes of refutation, still use four gateways to establish dharmas. This too is incorrect. If things are identical, there is no condition capable of acting. If they are different, there is no continuity between earlier and later. These claims will be refuted in many ways below, so neither identity nor difference is stated next.

Some, although they have heard these six modes of refutation, still use the two gateways of coming and going forth to establish dharmas. “Coming” means that dharmas come from Maheśvara, primordial nature, atoms, and so forth. “Going forth” means that they return to their original place.

VI. Explaining the Eight Matters through What Is Visibly Evident in the World

Moreover, all things are unarisen. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that the grain from the beginning of the eon does not arise. Why? Apart from the grain at the beginning of the eon, the grain of the present could not be found. Only if there were present grain separate from the grain at the beginning of the eon would arising be possible. But that is not so; therefore the text says “non-arising.”

〔T30 0002a11〕The questioner says: If there is no arising, there should be ceasing.

The respondent says: There is no ceasing. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that the grain from the beginning of the eon does not cease. If it had ceased, grain should not still exist now. Yet grain certainly does exist; therefore the text says “non-ceasing.”

The questioner says: If there is no ceasing, things should be permanent.

The respondent says: They are not permanent. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things are impermanent. For example, when a grain produces a sprout, the seed changes and breaks down at once. Therefore the text says “not permanent.”

The questioner says: If things are not permanent, they should be annihilated.

The respondent says: They are not annihilated. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things are not cut off. For example, a sprout comes from a grain. Therefore the text says “not annihilated”; if continuity were cut off, there should be no succession.

The questioner says: If that is so, all things are identical.

The respondent says: They are not identical. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things are not identical. A grain, for example, does not make the sprout, nor does the sprout make the grain. Only if the grain made the sprout and the sprout made the grain should they be identical. But that is not so; therefore the text says “not identical.”

The questioner says: If things are not identical, they should be different.

The respondent says: They are not different. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things are not different. If they were different, why would we distinguish a grain sprout, a grain stalk, and a grain leaf, rather than calling them a tree sprout, a tree stalk, and a tree leaf? Therefore the text says “not different.”

The questioner says: If things are not different, there should be coming.

The respondent says: There is no coming. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things do not come. The sprout in a grain, for example, has no place from which it comes. If there were coming, the sprout should arrive from elsewhere, like a bird flying in to perch on a tree. But that is not so; therefore the text says “no coming.”

The questioner says: If there is no coming, there should be going forth.

The respondent says: There is no going forth. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things do not go forth. If there were going forth, one should see a sprout emerge from the grain as a snake emerges from its hole. But that is not so; therefore the text says “no going forth.”

VII. Arising Cannot Be Found through Any of the Four Gateways

The questioner says: Although you have explained the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing, I want to hear what the treatise author himself has said.

The respondent therefore cites the verse: Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from another; they do not arise from both self and other, nor do they arise without a cause. Thus we know that there is no arising.

“Not arising from itself” means that no thing can arise from its own body; it must depend upon a multiplicity of causes. Moreover, if a dharma arose from itself, one dharma would contain two bodies: one called arising and one called that which arises. If it arose from itself apart from all other causes, it would arise without causes or conditions. Furthermore, that which produces would itself have to be produced; arising would then produce further arising without end.

Since there is no self, there is also no other. Why? Because an other exists only in relation to a self. If arising is neither from self nor from other, arising from both contains both faults, because arising from both is simply self-arising plus arising from another.

If all things existed without a cause, they would be permanent, which cannot stand. Without a cause there is no effect. If effects existed without causes, giving, keeping precepts, and the like should lead to hell, while the ten evil acts and the five heinous offenses should lead to birth in heaven, since there would be no cause at all.

The respondent further cites a verse: The intrinsic nature of dharmas is not present in the many conditions. Because there is no intrinsic nature, there is likewise no other-nature.

The intrinsic nature of dharmas is not present in the many conditions; a name is obtained only because the many conditions come together. Intrinsic nature means a thing’s own body, yet the many conditions contain no intrinsic nature. Because intrinsic nature is absent, there is no self-arising. Because intrinsic nature is absent, there is also no other-nature. Why? Other-nature exists only in relation to intrinsic nature, while the nature of an other, relative to itself, is itself intrinsic nature. Refuting intrinsic nature therefore also refutes other-nature, so one should not say that things arise from other-nature. Once intrinsic nature and other-nature have both been refuted, the meaning of arising from both is also refuted. Arising without a cause entails an enormous fault: if arising with a cause can be refuted, how much more arising without one! Arising cannot be found within any of the four alternatives; therefore the text says “non-arising.”

VIII. Establishing the Four Conditions

The questioner says: Abhidharma proponents say that dharmas arise from four conditions. How can you say there is no arising? What are the four conditions?

The verse is then cited: The causal condition, the immediately preceding condition, the object condition, and the dominant condition—these four conditions produce all dharmas; there is no fifth condition.

Every condition there is falls within these four, and through these four conditions all things are able to arise. “Causal condition” refers to all conditioned dharmas. “Immediately preceding condition” refers to all past and present mental events and mental factors except the final mental event and mental factors of an arhat in the past or present. “Object condition” and “dominant condition” refer to all dharmas.

IX. Comprehensive Refutation of the Four Conditions

The respondent cites a verse: Does the effect ultimately arise from conditions or from what are not conditions? Do these conditions possess an effect, or do they lack one?

If an effect exists, does it arise from conditions or from what are not conditions? If conditions exist, do they possess an effect or lack one? Neither side can stand. Why?

The verse says: Only because this dharma can produce an effect is it called a condition. Before the effect has arisen, why is it not called a non-condition?

Conditions have no fixed and unchanging position. Why? Before an effect has arisen, something cannot at that time be called a condition. It is only because the physical eye sees an effect arise from it that it is given the name “condition.” A condition is a condition because of the effect, for the effect comes afterward and the condition comes first. Without an effect, how can the name “condition” be obtained? A jar, for example, arises because water and clay come together. Only on seeing the jar does one know that water, clay, and so forth are its conditions. Before the jar arises, why not call the water, clay, and so forth non-conditions? Therefore the effect does not arise from conditions. If even conditions cannot produce an effect, how much less can non-conditions do so.

The respondent further cites a verse: Whether the effect already exists or does not exist in the conditions, neither assertion is possible. If it did not previously exist, for whom would they serve as conditions? If it already existed, what need would there be for conditions?

The effect neither already exists nor does not exist in the conditions. If the effect already existed, they would not be called conditions, because the effect would already be present. If the effect did not already exist, they likewise would not be called conditions, because they would not produce some other thing.

X. Refuting the Four Conditions One by One

The questioner says: You have comprehensively refuted all causes and conditions. Now I wish to hear you refute each of the four conditions one by one.

〔T30 0003a01〕The respondent says:

The verse says: If an effect is produced neither as existent, nor as nonexistent, nor as both existent and nonexistent, how can there be a causal condition?

If conditions can produce an effect, there should be three possibilities: it is existent, nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent. As the preceding verse said, if the effect already exists in the conditions, one should not speak of its production, because it already exists. If the effect does not exist in the conditions, one should likewise not speak of its production, because it is entirely absent beforehand; moreover, conditions would then be no different from non-conditions. Production as both existent and nonexistent also fails, because “both existent and nonexistent” means half existent and half nonexistent, entailing the faults of both sides. Furthermore, existence and nonexistence contradict one another, just as nonexistence and existence do. How could a single dharma possess both marks? Since the mark of an effect’s production cannot be found through any of these three possibilities, how can there be a causal condition?

Next comes the immediately preceding condition. The verse says: Before an effect has arisen, there should be no ceasing. How could a dharma that has already ceased serve as a condition? Therefore there is no immediately preceding condition.

Mental events and mental factors arise sequentially throughout the three times. The present mental event and mental factors cease and serve as the immediately preceding condition for a future mental event. Yet the future dharma has not arisen: for what can it serve as an immediately preceding condition? If the future dharma already exists, it has already arisen; what need would it have for an immediately preceding condition? The present mental event and mental factors have no moment in which they abide. If they do not abide, how can they serve as an immediately preceding condition? If they did abide, they would not be conditioned dharmas. Why? Because every conditioned dharma always bears the mark of ceasing. Once they have ceased, they cannot serve as the immediately preceding condition for anything. If one says that a dharma that has ceased still exists, it would be permanent; if it were permanent, demerit, merit, and the like could not be spoken of. If one says that it can serve as the immediately preceding condition while it is ceasing, then at the time of ceasing it is half ceased and half not yet ceased, and there is no third dharma apart from these that could be called the time of ceasing.

Moreover, the Buddha taught that all conditioned dharmas cease from moment to moment, with no moment in which they abide. How, then, can one say that among present dharmas some are about to cease and others are not yet about to cease? If one says that within a single moment there is no distinction between being about to cease and not yet being about to cease, one refutes one’s own doctrine. Your Abhidharma teaches that there are dharmas that cease and dharmas that do not cease, dharmas intending to cease and dharmas not intending to cease. A “dharma intending to cease” is a present dharma that is about to cease. A “dharma not yet intending to cease” comprises all other present dharmas apart from present dharmas about to cease, together with past, future, and unconditioned dharmas. These are called dharmas not intending to cease. Therefore there is no immediately preceding condition.

Next comes the object condition. The verse says: In the true and subtle Dharma taught by the buddhas, how could there be an object condition with regard to dharmas that have no object?

The Buddha teaches all Mahāyāna dharmas: whether material or immaterial, formed or formless, contaminated or uncontaminated, conditioned or unconditioned, and so forth, when their varied marks enter dharma-nature, all are empty, signless, and objectless. It is like the many rivers entering the sea and becoming a single flavor. The true Dharma is worthy of trust, whereas teachings adapted to people’s capacities must not be grasped as ultimately true. Therefore there is no object condition.

Next comes the dominant condition. The verse says: Dharmas have no intrinsic nature, and so no mark of existence can be found. The claim that because this exists, that exists therefore cannot stand.

The sūtra speaks of the twelve links of dependent origination as “because this exists, that exists.” That statement cannot stand here. Why? Because dharmas arise from many conditions, they have no fixed nature of their own. Because they have no fixed nature of their own, no mark of existence can be found. Since there is no mark of existence, how can one say that because this exists, that exists? Therefore there is no dominant condition—the Buddha spoke in this way in accommodation to ordinary people’s distinctions between existence and nonexistence.

XI. Concluding Refutation: Because No Effect Exists, Neither Conditions nor Non-conditions Exist

The respondent further cites a verse: Whether sought in the conditions collectively or separately, an effect cannot be found. If no effect exists within causes and conditions, how can one say that an effect emerges from conditions?

“Collectively” means that no effect is present within causes and conditions in combination. “Separately” means that no effect is present within any individual condition. If no effect exists in causes and conditions either collectively or separately, how can one say that an effect emerges from causes and conditions?

The respondent further cites a verse: If an effect absent from conditions could nevertheless emerge from conditions, why would that effect not emerge from non-conditions?

If an effect cannot be found when sought within causes and conditions, why does it not emerge from non-conditions? A jar, for example, is not present in clay; why, then, does it not emerge from milk?

The respondent further cites a verse: If an effect arises from conditions, those conditions themselves lack intrinsic nature. How can something produced from what lacks intrinsic nature be said to arise from conditions? An effect arises neither from conditions nor from non-conditions. Because there is no effect in the first place, neither conditions nor non-conditions exist.

Since an effect arises from many conditions, those conditions lack intrinsic nature. If they lack intrinsic nature, no dharma is present there. If no dharma is present there, how could it produce anything? Therefore an effect does not arise from conditions. As for not arising from non-conditions, “non-condition” is spoken of only after “condition” has been refuted; in reality there is no dharma called a non-condition, so the effect does not arise from non-conditions either. If it arises from neither side, there is no effect. Since there is no effect, neither conditions nor non-conditions exist.

Composed by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, commented upon by the brahmin Qingmu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin: Treatise on the Middle, scroll one, “Examination of Going and Coming,” Taishō canon T30n1564. Markers at the beginnings of passages, 〔T30 …〕, give Taishō page, column, and line anchors.

I. Question: There Is Activity in the Three Times, So Dharmas Exist

〔T30 0003c06〕The questioner says: People in the world can see with their own eyes that activity occurs in all three temporal phases—what has already gone, what has not yet gone, and what is presently going. Since activity occurs, one should know that various dharmas exist.

The respondent answers as follows.

II. There Is No Going in Any of the Three Times

Verse: There is no going in what has already gone, nor any going in what has not yet gone. Apart from these two phases, the time presently going contains no going either.

Commentary: There is no going in what has already gone, because it has gone already. The claim that an act of going remains there separately from the going cannot stand. What has not yet gone likewise contains no going, because the dharma of going has not yet occurred there. As for “the time of going,” that name denotes what is partly already gone and partly not yet gone; it does not exist as a separate phase apart from the already gone and the not yet gone.

III. Question: Going Exists Wherever the Activity Is Present

Verse: Going occurs wherever activity is occurring; within this is the time of going. Since it is neither already gone nor not yet gone, going exists at the time of going.

Commentary: Wherever an activity occurs, going should occur there. The eye can see that activity is present at the time of going, that activity has ceased in what has already gone, and that no activity has yet occurred in what has not yet gone. One should therefore know that going exists at the time of going.

IV. The Time of Going Cannot Be Found Apart from the Dharma of Going

〔T30 0004a01〕The respondent answers.

Verse: How can another dharma of going be placed within the time of going? Apart from the dharma of going, the time of going cannot be found at all.

Commentary: The claim that a dharma of going exists at the time of going cannot stand. Why? Apart from the dharma of going, the time of going cannot be found. If another time of going existed apart from the dharma of going, another going would have to be contained within that time, as fruit is contained in a vessel.

Furthermore:

V. If the Time of Going Could Go by Itself, It Would No Longer Depend on Going

Verse: Whoever says that going exists at the time of going incurs a fault: a time of going would exist apart from going, and the time of going itself would be going.

Commentary: Whoever maintains that going is absent in what has already gone and what has not yet gone, but truly exists at the time of going, incurs a fault. If a time of going existed apart from the dharma of going, the two would no longer depend on one another. Why? To say that going exists at the time of going yields two goings, which is not the case. Therefore one cannot say that a time of going exists apart from going.

Furthermore:

VI. Going at the Time of Going Produces Two Goings

Verse: If going exists at the time of going, there are two goings: one by which something is called the time of going, and another going contained within that time.

Commentary: To maintain that going exists at the time of going incurs the fault of two goings: one is the going on account of which there is a time of going; the other is the going present within that time.

Question: Even if there are two goings, what fault follows?

VII. Two Goings Force Out Two Goers

Answer:

Verse: If there are two dharmas of going, there are two goers, because apart from a goer the dharma of going cannot be found.

Commentary: If there are two dharmas of going, there must be two goers. Why? Because a goer exists on account of the dharma of going. Two goings and two goers in a single person cannot stand. Therefore there is no going at the time of going.

Question: We can accept that no dharma of going exists apart from a goer, but goers certainly exist in the three times.

VIII. With No Dharma of Going, Where Could a Goer Come From?

Answer:

Verse: If the dharma of going cannot be found apart from a goer, how could there be a goer when no dharma of going exists?

Commentary: Apart from a goer, the dharma of going cannot be found. How, then, can one say that goers certainly exist in the three times where no dharma of going exists?

Furthermore:

IX. There Is No Third Kind Apart from the Goer and the Non-goer

Verse: The goer does not go, nor does the non-goer go. Apart from the goer and the non-goer, there is no third goer.

Commentary: There is no goer. Why? If a goer existed, there would be only two possibilities: a goer or a non-goer. Apart from these two, there is no third goer.

Question: What fault lies in saying that the goer goes?

X. Apart from the Dharma of Going, the Goer Cannot Be Found

Answer:

Verse: How can the statement “the goer goes” make sense? Apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found at all.

Commentary: The claim that a real goer employs the dharma of going cannot stand. Why? Because apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found. Only if a dharma of going truly existed apart from the goer could the goer employ it, but that is not the case.

Furthermore:

XI. If the Goer Uses the Dharma of Going, There Are Again Two Goings

Verse: If the goer possesses going, there are two goings: the going through which one is called a goer, and the going belonging to the dharma of going itself.

Commentary: To say that the goer employs the dharma of going entails a double fault: one goer would contain two goings, the dharma of going that establishes the goer and the dharma of going established by the goer. It cannot be the case that the goer is established first and only afterward employs the dharma of going. Thus, the earlier claim that a real goer employs going in the three times cannot stand.

Furthermore:

XII. A Goer Existing Before the Dharma of Going Reverses Their Sequence

Verse: Whoever says that the goer goes incurs a fault: a goer would exist apart from going, and then this goer would be said to possess going.

Commentary: Whoever says that the goer can employ the dharma of going incurs a fault, because a goer would exist before and apart from that dharma. Why? To say that a goer employs the dharma of going means that the goer exists first and the dharma of going later. This cannot stand. Therefore there is no goer in the three times.

Moreover, if going and a goer truly existed, there should be an initial setting in motion. Yet when this beginning is sought within the three times, it cannot be found. Why?

XIII. There Is No Initial Setting Forth in Any of the Three Times

Verse: There is no setting forth in what has already gone, none in what has not yet gone, and none at the time of going. Where, then, could setting forth occur?

Why is there no setting forth in any of the three times?

Verse: Before setting forth, there is neither the time of going nor what has already gone. If setting forth should occur in those two, where could it occur within what has not yet gone? There is neither going nor what has not yet gone, and likewise no time of going. If there is no setting forth anywhere, what remains to distinguish?

Commentary: Before a person sets forth, there is neither a time of going nor something already gone. If setting forth existed, it would have to occur in one of two places: at the time of going or in what has already gone. Neither can stand, because no setting forth has yet occurred in what has not yet gone. Where could setting forth occur in the not yet gone? Without setting forth, there is no going; without going, there is no goer. How, then, could there be what has already gone, what has not yet gone, or the time of going?

XIV. Question about Standing Still: Then Standing and a Stander Should Exist

Question: If there is neither going nor a goer, standing and a stander should exist. Answer:

Verse: The goer does not stand still, nor does the non-goer stand still. Apart from goer and non-goer, where could a third kind of standing occur?

Commentary: If standing and a stander existed, either the goer or the non-goer would have to stand. Apart from these two, a third kind of standing would be required, which cannot stand. The goer does not stand, because their going has not ceased, while “standing” names what opposes going. The non-goer does not stand either. Why? Standing is spoken of because the dharma of going has ceased; without going, there is no standing. Apart from goer and non-goer there is no third stander. If a third existed, it would still fall within goer or non-goer. For this reason, one cannot say that the goer stands.

Furthermore:

XV. If the Goer Stands, Going and Standing Contradict One Another

〔T30 0005a05〕Verse: How can the statement “the goer stands still” make sense? Apart from going, the goer cannot be found at all.

Commentary: Your statement that the goer stands cannot stand. Why? Apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found. If the goer is presently within the mark of going, how could standing exist at the same time? The marks of going and standing contradict one another.

Furthermore:

XVI. The Same Reasoning Applies to Continuation and Cessation

Verse: There is no standing in what has already gone or what has not yet gone, nor any standing at the time of going. Every dharma of continuation and cessation follows the same reasoning as going.

Commentary: If someone says the goer stands, that person must stand at the time of going, in what has already gone, or in what has not yet gone. Standing exists in none of the three, so the claim that the goer stands cannot be established. As the dharmas of going and standing are refuted, so too are continuation and cessation. “Continuation” is like the succession from grain to sprout, stalk, leaf, and so forth. “Cessation” is the ceasing of the grain, through which the sprout, stalk, and leaf also cease. Succession is called continuation; interruption is called cessation. It is also like ignorance conditioning volitional formations, and so on through aging-and-death: this is called continuation. When ignorance ceases and formations and the rest cease, this is called cessation.

XVII. What the Physical Eye Sees Is Insufficient as Proof

Question: You have refuted going and goer, standing and stander, through many gateways, yet the eye plainly sees going and standing.

Answer: What the physical eye sees is not trustworthy. If going and a goer truly existed, would they be established as one dharma or as two? Both sides entail faults. Why?

Verse: That the dharma of going is the goer cannot stand; that the dharma of going differs from the goer likewise cannot stand.

Commentary: To say that the dharma of going and the goer are identical cannot stand; to say they are different also cannot stand.

Question: What faults follow respectively from identity and difference?

XVIII. The Faults in the Two Gateways of Identity and Difference

Answer:

Verse: If the dharma of going were itself the goer, agent and action would be one. If a goer different from going existed within the dharma of going, going would exist apart from the goer and the goer apart from going.

Commentary: Both sides entail faults. Why? If the dharma of going were the goer, confusion would follow and causes and conditions would be destroyed: originally, the goer exists because of going and going exists because of the goer. Moreover, going is called a dharma and the goer a person; the person is permanent and the dharma impermanent. If they were one, both should be permanent or both impermanent. Identity entails faults of this kind. If they were different, the claim would contradict itself: a goer should exist before there is a dharma of going, and a dharma of going before there is a goer. They would no longer depend on one another, and when one ceased, the other should remain. Difference entails faults of this kind.

Furthermore:

XIX. If Neither Identity nor Difference Can Establish Them, How Else Could They Be Established?

Verse: If going and the goer cannot be established either as one dharma or as different dharmas, how can they be established at all?

Commentary: If the goer and the dharma of going existed, they would be established either as one dharma or as different dharmas. Neither can be obtained. As already explained, there is no third dharma through which they could be established. Anyone who still maintains that they are established should state the causes and conditions on which that establishment depends. Since there is neither going nor a goer, the inquiry now continues.

XX. The Goer Cannot Reuse the Going That Established the Goer

Verse: The goer known through going cannot employ this same going, because before the dharma of going existed, no goer went.

Commentary: No matter which dharma of going is used to identify a goer, that goer cannot employ the same dharma. Why? Before that dharma existed, there was neither goer nor time of going, already gone, or not yet gone. A person and a city, for example, exist before an act of departure can occur. The dharma of going and the goer are not like this, because the goer is established through going and going is established through the goer.

Furthermore:

XXI. Employing Another Going Does Not Work Either

Verse: The goer known through going cannot employ another going either, because two goings cannot be found within one goer.

Commentary: No matter which dharma of going is used to identify a goer, that goer cannot employ another dharma of going. Why? Because two dharmas of going cannot be found within one goer.

Furthermore:

XXII. Neither the Fixed nor the Unfixed Can Employ Going in the Three Times

Verse: A goer with a fixed body of its own cannot employ going in the three times; a goer without a fixed body of its own cannot employ it either. Whether the dharma of going is said to possess or lack a body of its own, the goer cannot employ this threefold going. Therefore going, the goer, and the place gone to are all absent.

Commentary: “Fixed” means that something truly exists from the beginning and does not arise through the dharma of going. “Dharma of going” names the body’s activity. “Threefold” means what has not yet gone, what has already gone, and the time of going. If a goer with a real body of its own existed, the goer should exist apart from the dharma of going and should never stand still. Therefore a goer with a fixed body cannot employ the threefold going. If the goer is not fixed—meaning that it did not truly exist beforehand and obtains the name goer only through the dharma of going—then without that dharma it cannot employ going in the three times. A goer exists through the dharma of going; without a prior dharma of going there is no goer. How, then, can an unfixed goer employ going in the three times? What holds for the goer holds for the dharma of going as well. If a real dharma of going existed before and apart from the goer, it would not need the goer in order to exist. Thus the goer cannot employ the three kinds of going. If no dharma of going truly exists, what could the goer employ?

Contemplate and examine in this way: the dharma of going, the goer, and the destination are three dharmas that depend on one another. The goer exists because of going, going exists because of the goer, and the place that can be gone to exists because of both. They cannot be called determinately existent or determinately nonexistent. One can therefore know with certainty that these three dharmas are false, empty, and without possession of their own; they exist only as provisional designations, like an illusion or transformation.

Composed by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, commented upon by the brahmin Qingmu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin: Treatise on the Middle, scroll one, “Examination of the Six Faculties,” Taishō canon T30n1564. Markers at the beginnings of passages, 〔T30 …〕, give Taishō page, column, and line anchors.

I. Question: The Sūtra Plainly Says That Six Faculties Exist

〔T30 0005c16〕The questioner says: The sūtra teaches that there are six faculties, as stated below:

The eye and ear, together with nose, tongue, body, and mind, are the six faculties. These six, beginning with the eye, operate in relation to the six objects, beginning with form.

Here the eye is the internal faculty, form the external object, and the eye sees form. The same applies in sequence until mind is the internal faculty, dharmas are the external object, and mind knows dharmas.

II. Answer: No. The Eye Cannot See Itself

The respondent says: No. Why?

This eye cannot see its own body. If it cannot even see itself, how could it be said to see other things?

The eye cannot see its own body. Why? A lamp, for example, illuminates both itself and other things. If the eye truly bore the mark of seeing, it too should see itself and other things. Yet that is not so. The verse therefore says: “If the eye cannot see itself, how can it see other things?”

III. Question: Fire Burns Other Things but Not Itself; the Eye Is the Same

The questioner says: Although the eye cannot see itself, it can see other things, just as fire can burn other things but cannot burn itself.

IV. Answer: The Fire Analogy Fails; Nothing Exists in Any of the Three Times

The respondent says:

The analogy of fire cannot establish that the eye possesses a dharma of seeing. What has gone, what has not gone, and the time of going have already answered this matter comprehensively.

Although you offer the analogy of fire, it cannot establish a dharma of seeing in the eye. “Examination of Going and Coming” already answered this: there is no going in what has already gone, in what has not yet gone, or at the time presently going. Likewise, no burning can be found in what has burned, what has not yet burned, or what is presently burning. In the same way, no mark of seeing can be found in what has been seen, what has not yet been seen, or what is presently being seen.

Next:

Before seeing has seen, it cannot be called seeing. The claim that this seeing can see therefore makes no sense.

Before the eye faces form, it cannot see and is not then called seeing. It is called seeing because it faces form. Thus the verse says, “Before seeing, there is no seeing.” How, then, can seeing be used to see?

Next, no dharma of seeing can be found either in seeing or in what is not seeing. Why?

V. Seeing Exists in Neither Seeing nor Non-seeing, So a Seer Cannot Be Established

Seeing cannot possess seeing, nor does what is not seeing see. Once seeing has been refuted, the seer is refuted with it.

Seeing cannot see because its faults have already been explained. What is not seeing does not see because it lacks the mark of seeing. Without the mark of seeing, how could it see? Since there is no dharma of seeing, there is no seer. Why?

If a seer existed apart from seeing, a person without eyes should be able to see through another faculty. If one says that seeing is used to see, the mark of seeing would reside in seeing, while the seer itself would lack that mark. Thus the verse says: “Once seeing has been refuted, the seer is refuted with it.”

Next:

Whether apart from seeing or not apart from seeing, the seer cannot be found. Since there is no seer, where could seeing and the visible exist?

If seeing exists, the seer cannot be established; if seeing does not exist, the seer likewise cannot be established. Since there is no seer, how can there be seeing and the visible? With no seer, who could use the dharma of seeing to distinguish external forms? Thus the verse says: “Since there is no seer, where could seeing and the visible exist?”

VI. Without Consciousness, Contact, Feeling, and Craving, the Four Kinds of Clinging and Other Conditions Are Also Absent

Next:

Because seeing and the visible do not exist, the four dharmas beginning with consciousness do not exist. How, then, could the four kinds of clinging and the other conditions exist?

Since neither seeing nor the visible exists, consciousness, contact, feeling, and craving are all absent. Because craving and the rest are absent, the four kinds of clinging and the other links of dependent origination are also absent.

VII. The Same Meaning Applies to the Other Five Faculties

Next:

The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, together with sound, the hearer, and so forth—know that their meaning is entirely the same as explained above.

Seeing and the visible are empty because they belong to many conditions and therefore have no fixed nature. Know that the other five faculties beginning with the ear, and the other five objects beginning with sound, are the same as seeing and the visible. Because the meaning is the same, they are not explained separately.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll One, “Examination of the Five Aggregates, Chapter Four,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: The Sūtra Teaches Five Aggregates—How Is This to Be Understood?

〔T30 0006b19〕The questioner says: The sūtra teaches that five aggregates exist. What exactly does this mean?

The respondent answers with the following verse.

II. Verse: Form and the Cause of Form Cannot Be Found Apart from Each Other

If one departs from the cause of form, form cannot be found;

if one departs from form, the cause of form cannot be found either.

III. Explanation: Cloth and Threads

The cause of form is like the threads that cause cloth: remove the threads and there is no cloth; remove the cloth and there are no threads. Cloth is like form, and threads are like its cause.

IV. Question and Answer: Form Apart from Its Cause Would Be an Uncaused Dharma

The questioner says: If form existed apart from the cause of form, what fault would there be?

The respondent says in verse:

If form existed apart from the cause of form, that form would be without a cause;

that a dharma should exist without a cause does not make sense.

It would be like cloth existing apart from threads: the cloth would have no cause. The world has never contained a dharma that exists without a cause.

V. Question and Answer: Are There Uncaused Dharmas in the World?

The questioner says: Buddhism, non-Buddhist teachings, and worldly teachings all contain uncaused dharmas. Buddhism has three unconditioned dharmas; because the unconditioned is permanent, it is uncaused. Non-Buddhist teachings have space, time, direction, spirit, atoms, nirvāṇa, and so forth. Worldly teachings have space, time, direction, and so forth. These three kinds of dharma are found everywhere and are therefore called permanent; because they are permanent, they are uncaused. On what grounds do you say that the world contains no uncaused dharma?

The respondent says: These uncaused dharmas exist only as things said. Once examined and distinguished in thought, none has any footing. If a dharma exists through causes and conditions, it should not be called uncaused; if it truly has no causes and conditions, then it is precisely as I have said.

The questioner says: There are two kinds of cause: an operative cause and a cause in speech. Although these uncaused dharmas have no operative cause, they still have a cause in speech, because such a cause enables people to know them.

The respondent says: Even if there is a cause in speech, the claim still does not stand. Space is refuted later among the six elements, and the other items will each be refuted in what follows. Moreover, even things visibly present before us can be refuted; how much more so atoms and other dharmas that cannot be seen at all? Thus, the world contains no uncaused dharma.

VI. Question, Answer, and Verse: A Cause of Form Apart from Form Would Be a Fruitless Cause

The questioner says: If the cause of form existed apart from form, what fault would there be?

The respondent says in verse:

If a cause existed apart from form, it would be a cause without a fruit;

to claim a cause without a fruit makes no sense.

If one removes form as the fruit and leaves only a cause of form, it is a cause without a fruit.

The questioner says: What fault is there in a cause existing without a fruit?

The respondent says: The world has never contained a cause without a fruit. Why? It is in relation to a fruit that something is called a cause. If there is no fruit, how can it still be called a cause? Moreover, if the cause contains no fruit at all, why should a thing not arise from what is not its cause? This principle was explained in “Examination of Conditions.” Thus, there is no cause without a fruit.

Again:

If form already existed, it would have no need of a cause of form;

if form did not exist at all, it likewise would have no need of a cause of form.

In neither case can a cause of form be established. If form already exists within the cause, it is not called the cause of form; if form does not yet exist within the cause, it is likewise not called the cause of form.

VII. Question, Answer, and Verse: Uncaused Form Ultimately Cannot Stand

The questioner says: If neither of those cases can stand, what fault would there be in accepting only an uncaused form?

The respondent says in verse:

That form should exist without a cause ultimately cannot stand.

Therefore, a person of wisdom should not discriminate form.

Neither a fruit existing in its cause nor a fruit not existing in its cause can be found—how much less form without a cause? Thus it is said: that form should exist without a cause ultimately cannot stand; therefore, a person of wisdom should not discriminate form. “Discrimination” refers to ordinary people: through ignorance and the defilement of craving they covet and cling to form, then through wrong views produce all kinds of discriminative proliferation, claiming that the fruit exists in the cause, that it does not exist in the cause, and so forth. Here, form is sought but cannot be found. Therefore, a person of wisdom should not discriminate.

Again:

VIII. Verse and Explanation: Fruit Like the Cause and Fruit Unlike the Cause Both Fail

〔T30 0007a05〕If the fruit resembles the cause, that cannot stand;

if the fruit does not resemble the cause, that cannot stand either.

To say that fruit resembles cause cannot stand, because the cause is fine while the fruit is coarse. Cause and fruit differ in color, efficacy, and so forth: if cloth really were just like its threads, it could not be called cloth, for the threads are many while the cloth is a single whole. Thus, cause and fruit cannot be said to resemble one another.

To say that cause and fruit do not resemble one another also cannot stand. Hemp threads cannot be woven into silk, and coarse threads cannot produce fine cloth. Thus, neither can cause and fruit be said not to resemble one another. Since both positions fail, there is neither form nor a cause of form.

IX. Verse and Explanation: The Other Four Aggregates and All Dharmas Are Like the Form Aggregate

The aggregate of feeling, together with the aggregates of perception, formations, and consciousness,

and all other dharmas are the same as the aggregate of form.

The other four aggregates and all dharmas should likewise be contemplated and refuted in this way.

X. Verse: Questions and Answers Apart from Emptiness Remain Equal to the Original Doubt

Now the treatise author, wishing to praise the meaning of emptiness, speaks further in verse:

If someone asks a question and one tries to answer apart from emptiness,

it does not constitute an answer but remains caught in the very same doubt.

If someone poses a challenge and one states another’s fault apart from emptiness,

it does not constitute a challenge but remains caught in the very same doubt.

XI. Explanation: The Example of the Jar’s Impermanence

When people debate, each holds to a position. If their questions and answers depart from the meaning of emptiness, they do not constitute questions or answers, and both sides remain caught in the same doubt. Suppose someone says, “A jar is impermanent.” The questioner asks, “On what grounds do you call it impermanent?” The answer is, “Because it arises from an impermanent cause.” That does not count as an answer. Why? Because the cause and condition itself remains in doubt: it is not known whether it is permanent or impermanent. This is called remaining equal to the other person’s doubt.

If the questioner tries to point out the other person’s fault but, without relying on emptiness, declares all dharmas impermanent, that also does not count as a challenge. Why? You use impermanence to refute my permanence, but I can use permanence to refute your impermanence. Moreover, if impermanence really existed, karmic retribution would be impossible; the eyes, ears, and other dharmas would perish moment after moment; and no discrimination could be spoken of. With these and many other faults, the challenge cannot stand and remains equal to the other person’s doubt.

If permanence is refuted by relying on emptiness, there is no fault. Why? Because this person does not grasp the mark of emptiness. Thus it is said: even one who wishes to conduct questions and answers should rely on the dharma of emptiness—how much more one who wishes to seek the mark of freedom from suffering and quiescent cessation?

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll One, “Examination of the Six Elements, Chapter Five,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Each of the Six Elements Has Its Fixed Mark

〔T30 0007b06〕The questioner says: Earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness each have their own fixed marks; because there are fixed marks, the six elements exist.

The respondent answers as follows.

II. Verse: Before the Mark of Space Exists, the Dharma of Space Does Not Exist

Before the mark of space exists, no dharma called space exists; if space already existed beforehand, it would be something without a mark.

III. Explanation: A Place without Form Is Called the Mark of Space

Suppose the mark of space did not yet exist but a dharma of space existed first. Space would then be without a mark. Why? A place without form is called the mark of space. Form is a fabricated and impermanent dharma. If form has not yet arisen, then, because it has not arisen, its destruction cannot be spoken of either; at that time there is no mark of space. Only because form exists can there be a place without form; a place without form is called the mark of space.

IV. Question: What Fault Is There If Space Exists without a Mark?

The questioner says: What fault would there be in simply allowing space to exist without a mark?

V. Verse: A Markless Dharma Exists Nowhere

The respondent says:

This markless dharma exists nowhere at all; within a markless dharma, a mark has nothing that it can mark.

VI. Explanation: No Markless Dharma Can Be Found among Permanent or Impermanent Dharmas

Search among permanent and impermanent dharmas for a dharma without a mark, and none can be found. As the debater says, this exists and that does not; without relying on marks, how could one know that each has its own mark? Thus, arising, abiding, and ceasing are the marks of conditioned dharmas, while the absence of arising, abiding, and ceasing is the mark of unconditioned dharmas. If space had no mark, there would be no space. If one says that it first lacked a mark and was only later marked by a mark that arrived, that also is incorrect. Since it initially had no mark, there was no dharma that could be marked. Why is this?

VII. Verse: A Mark Abides in Neither the Marked nor the Unmarked

Within a dharma that has a mark or one that has no mark, a mark has nowhere to abide; apart from the marked and unmarked, it likewise abides nowhere else.

VIII. Explanation: The Mark of an Ox, Water and Fire, and the Fault of Being Uncaused

A fleshy hump, horns, hair at the end of the tail, and a dewlap hanging beneath the neck are called the marks of an ox. Apart from these marks, there is no ox. Since there is no ox, these marks have nowhere to abide. Thus it is said: within a markless dharma, a mark has nothing it can mark. A mark likewise cannot abide within a dharma that already has a mark, because the dharma already possesses its own mark. The mark of fire cannot abide within the mark of water, for water already possesses its own mark. Moreover, if a mark could abide within a markless dharma, it would be uncaused. “Uncaused” means that a mark exists although no such dharma originally existed. Mark, marked, and permanent mark are all established through dependence. Apart from the two classes, dharmas with a mark and dharmas without a mark, there is no third place that could be marked. Thus the verse says: apart from the marked and unmarked, it likewise abides nowhere else. Again:

IX. Verse: If Either Mark or Marked Fails, the Other Fails as Well

Because there is no dharma of marking, there is no dharma that is marked; because there is no dharma that is marked, there is likewise no dharma of marking.

X. Explanation: The Two Depend upon Each Other

Since a mark has nowhere to abide, there is no dharma that is marked; because there is no dharma that is marked, there is no mark either. Why? The marked exists because of a mark, and a mark exists because of the marked. The two depend upon one another.

XI. Verse: Apart from Mark and Marked, There Is No Further Thing

Thus, there is now no marking mark, nor anything that is marked; apart from mark and marked, there is no further thing.

XII. Explanation: All Dharmas Are Included within Mark and Marked

When causes and conditions are examined from beginning to end, mark and marked are definitively unfindable. Since these two cannot be found, all dharmas are absent as well. All dharmas are included within these two, mark and marked: sometimes this one functions as the mark and that one as the marked; at other times the roles reverse, and that one functions as the mark and this one as the marked. Fire, for example, has smoke as its mark, while smoke in turn has fire as its mark.

XIII. Question: Since Existence Is Absent, Nonexistence Should Exist

The questioner says: If there is no existence, then nonexistence should exist.

XIV. Verse: If Even Existence Is Absent, Where Could Nonexistence Be?

If existence itself does not exist, how could nonexistence exist? Since both existence and nonexistence are absent, who is it that knows existence and nonexistence?

XV. Explanation: Nonexistence Does Not Exist on Its Own but Comes from Existence

When a thing either destroys itself or is destroyed by another thing, it is called nonexistent. Nonexistence does not exist on its own but comes from existence. Thus it is said: if existence itself does not exist, how could nonexistence exist? Even what the eye sees and the ear hears cannot be found—how much less a nonexistent thing.

XVI. Question: Then There Should Be Someone Who Knows Existence and Nonexistence

The questioner says: Since nonexistence is also absent because existence is absent, there should then be someone who knows existence and nonexistence.

The respondent says: If such a knower existed, would this person be within existence or within nonexistence? Since existence and nonexistence have been refuted, the knower is refuted together with them.

XVII. Verse: Space Is Neither Existent nor Nonexistent; the Other Five Are Like Space

Thus one should know: space is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither marking mark nor marked; the other five elements are like space.

XVIII. Explanation: However Its Mark Is Sought, It Cannot Be Found

Just as the mark of space cannot be found however it is sought, so too with the other five elements.

XIX. Question: Space Is Neither First nor Last—Why Refute It First?

The questioner says: Space is neither first nor last among the six elements. Why is it refuted first?

The respondent says: Earth, water, fire, and wind are formed through the conjunction of many conditions and are therefore easy to refute. Because consciousness takes suffering and pleasure as causes, it can be seen to be impermanent and changing and is likewise easy to refute. Space has no such mark; ordinary people merely hope that it exists, and so it is refuted first. Moreover, space is said to support the four great elements, while consciousness exists through the four elements as causes and conditions. Thus, refute the root first, and the others are refuted of themselves.

XX. Question: Everyone in the World Sees Existence and Nonexistence—Why Do You Alone Oppose the World?

〔T30 0008a03〕The questioner says: Everyone in the world sees dharmas as existent or nonexistent. Why do you alone oppose the world and say that nothing is seen?

XXI. Verse: Those of Shallow Wisdom See Existence and Nonexistence and Cannot See the Secure Dharma That Ends Views

The respondent says:

When those of shallow wisdom see dharmas, they see only the marks of existence or nonexistence; such people cannot see the secure dharma in which views are brought to an end.

XXII. Explanation: Seeing Arising, the Wise End the View of Nonexistence; Seeing Cessation, They End the View of Existence

If a person has not yet attained the path and does not see the true mark of dharmas, craving and views condition the arising of all kinds of proliferation. Seeing a dharma arise, such a person calls it existent, grasps that mark, and asserts existence; seeing a dharma cease, such a person calls it annihilated, grasps that mark, and asserts nonexistence. Seeing dharmas arise, a wise person at once ends the view of nonexistence; seeing dharmas cease, a wise person at once ends the view of existence. Thus, although all dharmas are seen, they are like illusions and dreams. Even the view of the uncontaminated path is to be ended, how much more other views. Therefore, one who does not see the secure dharma in which views are brought to an end falls into the two extremes of seeing existence and seeing nonexistence.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll One, “Examination of Defilement and the Defiled, Chapter Six,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Since the Three Poisons Are the Root of the World, Must Defilement and the Defiled Not Exist?

〔T30 0008a15〕The questioner says: The sūtra teaches that craving, anger, and delusion are the root of the world. Craving has many names: first it is called love, next attachment, next defilement, next sexual desire, and next covetous desire—there are many such names. This is a binding affliction. When it rests upon a sentient being, that being is called the defiled, while craving is called the defiling dharma. Because there are a defiling dharma and a defiled person, craving exists. The other two, anger and delusion, are the same: where anger exists there is an angry person, and where delusion exists there is a deluded person. The three poisons condition the arising of three kinds of action; those three kinds of action condition the arising of the three realms. Thus, all dharmas exist.

II. Answer: Although the Sūtra Teaches the Names of the Three Poisons, Their Reality Cannot Be Found

The respondent says: Although the sūtra teaches the names of the three poisons, their reality cannot be found. Why?

III. Verse: One Already Defiled Need Not Be Defiled Again; without a Defiled Person, No One Receives Defilement

If, apart from the defiling dharma, a defiled person already existed independently, then because this person was already in desire, defilement would have to arise again;

if there were no defiled person, how could there be defilement?

Whether defilement is said to exist or not exist, examination of the defiled proceeds in the same way.

IV. Explanation: Neither Prior Existence nor Prior Nonexistence of Defilement and the Defiled Can Stand

If it is already determined that a defiled person exists, no further defilement is needed, because that person has already been defiled. If it is already determined that there is no defiled person, defilement likewise should not arise: there must first be a person who can be defiled before defilement can arise. If there is initially no defiled person, there is no one to receive defilement.

The defiling dharma is the same. If a defiling dharma determinately existed before and apart from a person, it would be without a cause—how could it arise? It would be like fire without fuel. If it is already determined that there is no defiling dharma, there is no defiled person. Thus the verse says: “Whether defilement exists or does not exist, the defiled is the same.”

V. Question: Then Say That the Defiling Dharma and the Defiled Arise Simultaneously

The questioner says: If it cannot be found that the defiling dharma and the defiled arise in sequence and dependence, what fault would there be in saying that they arise simultaneously?

The respondent answers as follows.

VI. Verse: If Both Are Established Simultaneously, No Dependence Can Be Spoken Of

That the defiled person and the defiling dharma are established together cannot stand;

if the defiled and defilement exist simultaneously, neither side depends on the other.

VII. Explanation: without Dependence They Become Permanent Dharmas Existing without Causes

If the defiling dharma and the defiled were established simultaneously, they would not depend upon each other: the defiling dharma would not exist because of the defiled, nor the defiled because of the defiling dharma. They would then have to be permanent, because each was already established without a cause. If they were permanent, many faults would follow—there would be no dharma of liberation.

Next, defilement and the defiled should be refuted through the two gates of identity and difference. Why?

VIII. Verse: Identity Cannot Conjoin, and Difference Cannot Conjoin Either

If the defiled person and the defiling dharma were one, how could one dharma conjoin with itself?

If the defiled person and the defiling dharma were different, how could different dharmas conjoin?

IX. Explanation: If One, There Is No Conjunction; If Different, No Further Conjunction Is Needed

The defiling dharma and the defiled are said to conjoin either as one dharma or as different dharmas. If they are one, there is no conjunction. Why? How could one dharma conjoin with itself? A fingertip cannot touch itself. If different dharmas are said to conjoin, that also cannot stand. Why? Because each is already established as different. Since each has already been fully established, no further conjunction is needed; even if they are said to conjoin, they remain different.

Next, neither the gate of identity nor the gate of difference can stand. Why?

X. Verse: Conjunction Should Exist Even Apart from a Companion

If what is one can still conjoin, then conjunction should exist apart from a companion;

if what is different can still conjoin, it likewise should conjoin apart from a companion.

XI. Explanation: Identity Throws Person and Dharma into Confusion; Difference Would Let Even the Most Distant Things Conjoin

If defilement and the defiled are one but are forcibly called conjoined, then defilement and the defiled should exist apart from all other causes and conditions. Moreover, if they are one, there should not be two names, defilement and the defiled—defilement is a dharma, while the defiled is a person. If person and dharma were one, there would be utter confusion.

If defilement and the defiled are each different yet said to conjoin, then they should conjoin without any other causes and conditions. If what is different can conjoin, even things separated by a vast distance should conjoin.

XII. Question: The Eye Sees Different Dharmas Conjoin

The questioner says: It may be granted that one thing cannot conjoin, but the eye sees different dharmas conjoining.

The respondent answers as follows.

XIII. Verse: If They Are First Called Different and Then Conjoined, What Does Conjunction Do for Them?

If what is different can conjoin, what does conjunction do for defilement and the defiled?

The marks of these two are already different, and only afterward is a mark of conjunction asserted.

XIV. Explanation: Once They Are Already Different, the Later Conjunction Is Forcibly Added

If defilement and the defiled first possess fixed marks of difference and conjoin only afterward, this does not constitute conjunction. Why? The marks of these two were already different, yet afterward conjunction is forcibly asserted.

Next:

XV. Verse: Once Each Has Established a Different Mark, How Can Conjunction Still Be Asserted?

If defilement and the defiled have each already established a different mark,

once their different marks have been established, how can they be said to conjoin?

XVI. Explanation: Once Each Has Its Separate Mark, Why Forcibly Assert a Mark of Conjunction?

If defilement and the defiled have each already established a separate mark, why do you now forcibly assert a mark of conjunction?

Next:

XVII. Verse: When Difference Fails, Conjunction Is Brought In; When Conjunction Fails, Difference Is Brought Back

Because the mark of difference has not been established, you wish to speak of conjunction;

when the mark of conjunction is ultimately not established, you turn back and speak of the mark of difference.

XVIII. Explanation: You Believe You Have Settled It, Yet What You Say Is Unsettled

Because the different marks of defilement and the defiled are not established, you change to asserting a mark of conjunction. But the mark of conjunction contains faults, so defilement and the defiled remain unestablished. In order to establish the mark of conjunction, you then turn back and assert a mark of difference. You yourself believe the matter settled, but what you say is unsettled. Why?

XIX. Verse: If the Mark of Difference Is Unestablished, Conjunction Has Nothing on Which to Depend

Because the mark of difference has not been established, the mark of conjunction cannot be established;

within which mark of difference do you intend to assert a mark of conjunction?

XX. Explanation: without a Mark of Difference to Depend upon, Conjunction Cannot Be Spoken Of

Because the different marks of defilement and the defiled are not established here, the mark of conjunction is likewise unestablished. Within which mark of difference do you intend to assert a mark of conjunction?

Next:

XXI. Verse: Neither Conjunction nor Nonconjunction Can Stand; All Dharmas Are the Same

Thus, defilement and the defiled are established through neither conjunction nor nonconjunction;

all other dharmas are the same, established through neither conjunction nor nonconjunction.

XXII. Explanation: From Craving and Defilement the Examination Extends to All Dharmas, Which Remain Conditioned Arisings

As with defilement, so too with anger and delusion. As with the three poisons, so too with all afflictions and all dharmas. Neither before nor after, neither conjoined nor dispersed—such things are all established through causes and conditions.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Two, “Examination of the Three Marks, Chapter Seven,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Since the Three Marks Exist, All Things Exist

〔T30 0009a07〕The questioner says: The sūtra teaches that conditioned dharmas have three marks: arising, abiding, and ceasing. All things arise through the dharma of arising, abide through the dharma of abiding, and cease through the dharma of ceasing. Because these three marks exist, the many dharmas truly exist.

The respondent says: This is not so. Why? Because the three marks have no fixed determination. One must ask whether the three marks are conditioned dharmas that can mark conditioned dharmas, or unconditioned dharmas that can mark conditioned dharmas. Neither can stand. Why?

II. If Arising Is Conditioned, It Must Have Another Three Marks

The verse says: If arising is conditioned, it too should possess the three marks; if arising is unconditioned, on what grounds is it called a mark of the conditioned?

Qingmu explains: If arising is conditioned, it should itself possess the three marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing. That cannot stand. Why? Because the operations of the three contradict one another. “Contradictory” means that the mark of arising should attend a dharma that is arising, the mark of abiding one that is abiding, and the mark of ceasing one that is ceasing. While a dharma is arising, the contradictory marks of abiding and ceasing should not be present simultaneously. The three cannot coexist in one time, just as light and darkness cannot coexist. Therefore, arising should not be a conditioned dharma; the marks of abiding and ceasing should be examined in the same way.

The questioner says: If arising is not conditioned, what fault is there in taking it as unconditioned?

The respondent says: If arising is unconditioned, how can it mark a conditioned dharma? Why? Because an unconditioned dharma has no intrinsic nature. The name unconditioned is applied only once conditioned dharmas have ceased. Thus, not arising and not ceasing are called the mark of the unconditioned, but it has no distinct mark of its own. Since it is no dharma, it cannot mark a dharma, just as a rabbit’s horn or turtle’s hair cannot mark a dharma. Thus, arising is not unconditioned; abiding and ceasing are the same.

III. Neither Gathered nor Dispersed Can Stand

Further, the verse says: Whether gathered together or dispersed separately, the three marks cannot mark anything; how could three marks occupy one place at one time?

Qingmu explains: Do arising, abiding, and ceasing each separately mark conditioned dharmas, or do the three mark them only after conjoining? Neither can stand. Why? If each marks separately, then in the same locus some marks will be present and others absent: at the time of arising, abiding and ceasing are absent; at the time of abiding, arising and ceasing are absent; at the time of ceasing, arising and abiding are absent. If the three mark by conjoining, how could mutually contradictory dharmas all be present at one time?

If one says that another three marks exist above these three, that also cannot stand. Why? The verse says: If arising, abiding, and ceasing possess further conditioned marks, the regress is endless; if they possess no further marks, they are not conditioned.

Qingmu explains: If further conditioned marks exist above arising, abiding, and ceasing, then arising itself must again have an arising, an abiding, and a ceasing. Another layer of marks should exist above that layer, and in this way there would be no end. If there are no further marks, then these three cannot be called conditioned dharmas and cannot mark conditioned dharmas.

IV. Seven Dharmas Arise Together: Primary Arising and Secondary Arising Produce Each Other

The questioner says: You claim that the three marks produce an infinite regress. That is not so. Although arising, abiding, and ceasing are conditioned dharmas, the regress is not endless. Why? The verse says: What secondary arising produces is precisely primary arising; what primary arising produces is, in turn, that secondary arising.

Qingmu explains: When one dharma arises, seven dharmas arise together, including its own body: first, the dharma itself; second, arising; third, abiding; fourth, ceasing; fifth, secondary arising; sixth, secondary abiding; and seventh, secondary ceasing. Among these seven, primary arising, excluding itself, can produce the other six dharmas. Secondary arising produces primary arising, while primary arising produces secondary arising. Therefore, although the three marks are conditioned, no infinite regress follows.

The respondent says: The verse says: If this secondary arising is said to produce primary arising, secondary arising itself is produced by primary arising—how can it produce primary arising?

Qingmu explains: If secondary arising can produce primary arising, then secondary arising should not be said to be produced by primary arising. Why? Since secondary arising is produced by primary arising, how can it in turn produce primary arising?

Further, the verse says: If this primary arising is said to produce secondary arising, primary arising itself is produced by that secondary arising—how can it produce secondary arising?

Qingmu explains: If primary arising can produce secondary arising, then primary arising should not be said to be produced by secondary arising. Why? Since primary arising is produced by secondary arising, how can it in turn produce secondary arising? According to that account, the dharma of secondary arising should produce primary arising; yet secondary arising cannot produce primary arising. Secondary arising does not yet possess its own body—how can it produce primary arising? Therefore, primary arising cannot produce secondary arising either.

The questioner says: At the very time secondary arising is arising, neither before nor after, it can produce primary arising.

The respondent says: This is not so. Why? The verse says: If secondary arising, while arising, can produce primary arising, secondary arising does not yet exist—how can it produce primary arising?

Qingmu explains: If secondary arising could produce primary arising while it is arising, the claim might be made; but in fact it does not yet exist, so secondary arising cannot produce primary arising while arising.

Further, the verse says: If primary arising, while arising, can produce secondary arising, primary arising does not yet exist—how can it produce secondary arising?

Qingmu explains: If primary arising could produce secondary arising while it is arising, the claim might be made; but in fact it does not yet exist, so primary arising cannot produce secondary arising while arising.

V. The Lamp Analogy: Illuminating Itself and Another

The questioner says: The verse says: Just as a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate another, the dharma of arising is likewise: it produces itself and another.

Qingmu explains: A lamp entering a dark room illuminates all the objects and can also illuminate itself. Arising is the same: it can produce another dharma and also produce itself.

The respondent says: This is not so. Why? The verse says: There is no darkness in the lamp itself, nor darkness where the light abides; only dispelling darkness is called illumination; where there is no darkness, there is no illumination.

Qingmu explains: The lamp’s body itself has no darkness, and the place reached by its light likewise has no darkness, because light and darkness oppose one another. Dispelling darkness is called illumination; where there is no darkness, there is no illumination. How, then, can one say that a lamp illuminates itself and another?

The questioner says: The lamp does not illuminate before it has arisen or after it has arisen, but can illuminate itself and another precisely while arising.

The respondent says: The verse says: How can a lamp, at the time it is arising, dispel darkness? When the lamp first arises, it cannot yet reach darkness.

Qingmu explains: A lamp at the time of arising is called half-arisen and half-not-yet-arisen. The lamp’s body is not yet established—how can it dispel darkness? Moreover, the lamp does not reach darkness, just as a person must catch a thief before it is called defeating the thief. To say that the lamp can dispel darkness without reaching it also cannot stand. Why? The verse says: If a lamp can dispel darkness before reaching it, 〔T30 0010a01〕then a lamp burning here should dispel darkness everywhere.

Qingmu explains: If a lamp possessed the power to dispel darkness without reaching it, then lighting a lamp in this one place should dispel the darkness in every place, because it equally fails to reach them all.

Further, the lamp should not illuminate itself or another. Why? The verse says: If a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate another, darkness should likewise darken itself and also darken another.

Qingmu explains: If the lamp can illuminate itself and another because it opposes darkness, then darkness, which opposes the lamp, should likewise be able to obscure itself and obscure another. If darkness opposes the lamp yet cannot obscure itself or another, then the lamp, though opposed to darkness, likewise should not illuminate itself or another. Thus, the lamp analogy is incorrect. The many reasons refuting arising have not yet been exhausted, so the discussion continues.

VI. Arising Sought in What Has Arisen, What Has Not Arisen, and the Time of Arising

The verse says: If this arising has not yet arisen, how can it produce itself? If it produces itself after arising, once it has arisen, what use is further arising?

Qingmu explains: When arising produces itself, does it arise after already arising, or before it has arisen? If it arises before arising, it is a non-dharma; how can a non-dharma produce itself? If one says it arises after arising, it is already established and has no need to arise again, just as an act already performed should not be performed again. Neither what has arisen nor what has not arisen arises; therefore, there is no arising. Your earlier claim that arising, like a lamp, can produce itself and another cannot stand. Abiding and ceasing are the same.

Further, the verse says: Arising does not arise within what has arisen, nor within what has not arisen; it does not arise at the time of arising either—this was already answered in “Examination of Going and Coming.”

Qingmu explains: “Arising” means that arising exists through the conjunction of many conditions. Within what has arisen, there is no activity of arising, so there is no arising; within what has not arisen, there is no activity of arising, so there is no arising there either. The time of arising likewise cannot stand: apart from the dharma of arising, the time of arising cannot be found; apart from the time of arising, the dharma of arising cannot be found. Where, then, could arising at the time of arising occur? This was already answered in “Examination of Going and Coming.”

A dharma that has arisen cannot arise again. Why? If it arose again after arising, then by successive repetition there would be no end, just as a deed already done would be done again. Moreover, if what has arisen arises again, through which dharma of arising does it arise? This mark of arising has not itself arisen. Yet by saying that what has arisen then arises, you contradict your own claim. Why? The mark of arising has not arisen, yet you call it arisen. If what has not arisen can be called arisen, a dharma could arise after arising or before arising. Your earlier claim that it arises after arising then becomes indeterminate. Moreover, just as what has burned should not burn again and what has gone should not go again, for these and other such reasons what has arisen should not arise again.

A dharma that has not arisen likewise does not arise. Why? If a dharma has not arisen, it should not conjoin with the conditions of arising; if it does not conjoin with those conditions, there is no dharma that can arise. If a dharma arose without conjoining with the conditions of arising, an unperformed dharma should perform, a dharma that has not gone should go, an undefiled dharma should become defiled, one without anger should become angry, and one without delusion should become deluded. The dharmas of the world would all be destroyed, so what has not arisen does not arise. Moreover, if a not-yet-arisen dharma could arise, then all not-yet-arisen things in the world should arise: all ordinary people in whom bodhi has not arisen should now give rise to bodhi; arhats who abide in the indestructible dharma and have no afflictions should now produce afflictions; rabbits and the rest, which have no horns, should now produce horns. None of these things occurs. Therefore, a dharma that has not arisen does not arise.

VII. Can It Arise Once the Conditions Are Complete?

The questioner says: A not-yet-arisen dharma does not arise because conditions, action, agent, time, place, and so forth are not yet present. If conditions, action, agent, time, place, and the rest conjoin, the not-yet-arisen dharma arises. Therefore, the claim that no not-yet-arisen dharma ever arises is incorrect.

The respondent says: If a dharma arises when conditions, time, place, and the rest conjoin, then what already existed does not arise, what originally did not exist does not arise, and what both existed and did not exist does not arise. These three cases have already been refuted. Therefore, what has arisen does not arise; what has not arisen does not arise; and the time of arising does not arise. Why? The part already arisen does not arise, and the part not yet arisen does not arise, as previously answered. Moreover, if a time of arising existed apart from arising, one could say that arising occurs at the time of arising. But no time of arising exists apart from arising, so the time of arising does not arise. Further, saying that arising occurs at the time of arising incurs the fault of two arisings: one because it is called the time of arising on account of arising, and one because another arising is placed within the time of arising. Neither can stand. There are not two dharmas—how could there be two arisings? Thus, the time of arising does not arise. Moreover, before the dharma of arising has begun to operate, there is no time of arising; without a time of arising, upon what can arising depend? Thus, arising cannot be said to occur at the time of arising. Sought in this way, there is no arising in what has arisen, what has not arisen, or the time of arising. Since there is no arising, arising is unestablished; since arising is unestablished, abiding and ceasing are unestablished; since arising, abiding, and ceasing are unestablished, conditioned dharmas are unestablished. Thus the verse says that the matter was already answered with what has gone, what has not gone, and the time of going.

The questioner says: I do not insist that what has arisen arises, what has not arisen arises, or arising occurs at the time of arising. I only say that arising exists because many conditions conjoin.

The respondent says: Although you speak this way, the claim still cannot stand. Why? The verse says: If arising at the time of arising has already failed, how could arising be obtained when many conditions conjoin at that time?

Qingmu explains: Arising at the time of arising has already been refuted through many reasons. On what grounds do you now say again that arising exists because many conditions conjoin? Whether the conditions are complete or incomplete, the claim is refuted in the same way as arising.

Further, the verse says: If a dharma arises from many conditions, its nature is quiescent cessation; therefore, arising and the time of arising are both quiescent cessation.

Qingmu explains: A dharma arising from many conditions lacks intrinsic nature and is therefore quiescent cessation. “Quiescent cessation” means neither this nor that, without marks; the path of speech is cut off and all proliferations cease. “Many conditions” means, for example, that cloth exists because of threads and a mat because of rushes. If threads had a fixed mark of their own, they should not come from hemp; if cloth had a fixed mark, it should not come from threads. Yet cloth actually comes from threads, and threads from hemp. Therefore, neither threads nor cloth possess fixed nature. Fire and fuel likewise form through the conjunction of causes and conditions and lack intrinsic nature: when fuel is absent, fire is absent; when fire is absent, fuel is absent. All dharmas are the same. Thus, a dharma arising from many conditions lacks intrinsic nature; because it lacks intrinsic nature, it is empty, like a mirage without reality. Therefore, the verse says that arising and the time of arising are both quiescent cessation, and one should not say that arising occurs at the time of arising. Although you try through many causes and conditions to establish the mark of arising, all are proliferations, not marks of quiescent cessation.

VIII. Is There a Dharma in the Future Waiting to Arise?

The questioner says: The three times are determinately different. A future dharma can arise, and when causes and conditions arrive, it arises. Why say there is no arising?

The respondent says: The verse says: If a not-yet-arisen dharma exists and is said to arise, since this dharma already existed, what further use is arising?

Qingmu explains: If a not-yet-arisen dharma exists within the future and later arises, then the dharma already existed. Why should it arise again? A dharma already existent should not arise again.

The questioner says: Although it exists in the future, it does not bear the same mark as the present. Because it acquires the mark of the present, it is said to arise.

〔T30 0011a01〕The respondent says: The mark of the present does not exist within the future. If it does not exist, how can one say that a future dharma will arise? If it exists, the dharma is not called future but should be called present; what is present should not arise again. Neither side contains arising, so it does not arise.

Moreover, you say that arising occurs at the time of arising and that it can also produce another. This will now be examined further. The verse says: If one says arising occurs at the time of arising and can produce something, where is there another arising capable of producing this arising?

Qingmu explains: If arising can produce another while it is arising, then who can produce this arising?

The verse says: If one claims a further arising, arising upon arising is endless; if arising exists apart from the arising that produces it, all dharmas should produce themselves.

Qingmu explains: If another arising exists above arising, arising is endless. If no further arising exists above this arising and it produces itself, then all dharmas should likewise be able to produce themselves, but in fact they do not.

Further, the verse says: An existent dharma should not arise, nor should a nonexistent dharma; what both exists and does not exist likewise does not arise—this principle was already explained.

Qingmu explains: When arising is spoken of, does arising occur in an existent dharma, a nonexistent dharma, or a dharma both existent and nonexistent? None can stand, as already explained. Apart from these three possibilities there is no further arising. Therefore, there is no arising.

IX. A Dharma Bearing the Mark of Ceasing Cannot Arise, and No Nonceasing Dharma Exists

Further, the verse says: While dharmas are ceasing, they should not arise; that a dharma should not cease ultimately never occurs.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma bears the mark of ceasing, it should not arise. Why? Because the two marks contradict one another. By one mark, ceasing, it is known that the dharma is ceasing; by the other, arising, it is known that the dharma is arising. Two contradictory marks cannot occupy one time. Therefore, a dharma bearing the mark of ceasing should not arise.

The questioner says: If a dharma bearing the mark of ceasing should not arise, then a dharma bearing a mark of nonceasing should arise.

The respondent says: Every conditioned dharma ceases moment after moment, so there is no nonceasing dharma. Apart from the conditioned, there is no fixed unconditioned dharma; “unconditioned dharma” is merely a name. Thus, a dharma that does not cease ultimately never occurs.

X. Abiding Cannot Be Found Either

The questioner says: Even if a dharma has no arising, surely it abides.

The respondent says: The verse says: A nonabiding dharma does not abide, nor does a dharma already abiding; it does not abide at the time of abiding either—without arising, how can there be abiding?

Qingmu explains: A nonabiding dharma does not abide because it lacks the mark of abiding. A dharma already abiding likewise does not abide. Why? Because it already possesses abiding. Abiding is spoken of in contrast to going. If the dharma of abiding already exists, it should not abide again. Nor does it abide at the time of abiding, because apart from abiding and nonabiding there is no distinct time of abiding. Thus, it does not abide. When abiding is sought everywhere in this way and cannot be found, that is no arising. Since there is no arising, how can there be abiding?

Further, the verse says: While dharmas are ceasing, they should not abide; that a dharma should not cease ultimately never occurs.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma bears the mark of ceasing, it does not bear the mark of abiding. Why? Because one dharma would contain two contradictory marks: first ceasing and second abiding. The marks of abiding and ceasing cannot occupy one time and place. Thus, a dharma bearing the mark of ceasing cannot be said to abide.

The questioner says: If a dharma does not cease, surely it abides.

The respondent says: There is no nonceasing dharma. Why? The verse says: All dharmas whatsoever bear the marks of aging and death; one never sees any dharma abide apart from aging and death.

Qingmu explains: When all dharmas arise, impermanence constantly follows. Impermanence has two forms, called aging and death. Thus, aging and death are constantly present in every dharma, and there is no time of abiding.

Further, the verse says: Abiding does not abide through its own mark, nor through a different mark; just as arising does not produce itself, nor arise through a different mark.

Qingmu explains: If the dharma of abiding exists, does it abide through its own mark or through another? Neither can stand. If it abides through its own mark, it is permanent. Every conditioned dharma arises from many conditions; if abiding abides by itself, it is not called conditioned. If abiding abides through its own mark, then a dharma too should abide through its own mark—but just as the eye cannot see itself, abiding is the same. If it abides through a different mark, then abiding itself must have another abiding, producing an infinite regress. Moreover, one sees a different dharma produce a different mark, and the different mark cannot exist without depending on that different dharma; yet the different mark itself is not fixed. Therefore, that abiding should occur through a different mark cannot stand.

XI. Ceasing Cannot Be Found Either

The questioner says: If there is no abiding, surely there is ceasing.

The respondent says: No. Why? The verse says: A dharma already ceased does not cease again, nor does one not yet ceased; it does not cease at the time of ceasing either—without arising, where could there be ceasing?

Qingmu explains: A dharma already ceased does not cease again because it ceased before. What has not ceased likewise does not cease, because it is apart from the mark of ceasing. Nor does it cease at the time of ceasing, because apart from these two there is no distinct time of ceasing. Sought in this way, the dharma of ceasing is no arising; since there is no arising, where can there be ceasing?

Further, the verse says: If a dharma abides, it should not cease; if a dharma does not abide, it likewise should not cease.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma determinately abides, there is no ceasing. Why? Because the mark of abiding is present. If a dharma that abides were ceasing, it would have two marks, abiding and ceasing. Thus, ceasing cannot be said to exist within abiding, just as arising and death cannot occur at one time. If a dharma does not abide, it likewise does not cease. Why? Because it is apart from the mark of abiding. Apart from the mark of abiding there is no dharma; how can no dharma cease?

Further, the verse says: This dharma does not cease at the time that belongs to it; this dharma does not cease at a different time either.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma bears a mark of ceasing, does it cease through its own mark or through a different mark? Neither can stand. Milk, for example, does not cease while it is milk: as long as milk exists, the mark of milk remains determinately present. Nor does it cease at a time when it is not milk: if it is not milk, one cannot say that milk ceases.

Further, the verse says: Just as the mark of arising cannot be found in any dharma, because there is no mark of arising, there is no mark of ceasing either.

Qingmu explains: As sought before, the mark of arising in all dharmas cannot be found; at that time there is no mark of ceasing. Arising has been refuted, and therefore there is no arising; without arising, how can there be ceasing? If your mind is still unwilling to stop, the many reasons refuting ceasing will now be given.

The verse says: If a dharma exists, it has no ceasing; one dharma should not possess the marks of both existence and nonexistence.

Qingmu explains: While dharmas exist, the mark of ceasing cannot be found when sought. Why? How could one dharma possess both the mark of existence and the mark of nonexistence? Light and shadow do not occupy the same place.

Further, the verse says: If a dharma does not exist, it likewise has no ceasing; 〔T30 0012a01〕like a second head: because it does not exist, it cannot be cut off.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma does not exist, it has no mark of ceasing, just as a second head or a third hand cannot be cut off because it does not exist.

Further, the verse says: A dharma does not cease through its own mark, nor through another mark; just as it does not arise through its own mark, nor through another mark.

Qingmu explains: As stated when the mark of arising was examined, arising does not produce itself and does not arise from another. Arising through one’s own body cannot stand, because all things arise from many conditions, just as a fingertip cannot touch itself. Arising from another also cannot stand. Why? Because that arising does not yet exist, it cannot be said to arise from another. Since arising is absent, it has no body of its own; since its own body is absent, another is absent as well. Thus, arising from another cannot stand. Ceasing is the same: it neither ceases through its own mark nor through another mark.

XII. If the Conditioned Cannot Stand, Where Does the Unconditioned Come From?

Further, the verse says: Because arising, abiding, and ceasing cannot stand, there is no conditioned; since there are no conditioned dharmas, how can there be the unconditioned?

Qingmu explains: You previously said that the existence of the marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing establishes the conditioned, and the existence of the conditioned establishes the unconditioned. Now, when examined in accord with reason, the three marks cannot be found. How could there be the conditioned? As previously stated, there is no markless dharma. Since conditioned dharmas do not exist, how can the unconditioned exist? The mark of the unconditioned means not arising, not abiding, and not ceasing. Because the marks of the conditioned cease, it is called the mark of the unconditioned. The unconditioned has no separate mark of its own; it is through these three marks that the mark of the unconditioned exists. Fire, for example, has heat as its mark, earth hardness, and water cold; the unconditioned is not so.

XIII. Like an Illusion, a Dream, and a Gandharva City

The questioner says: If arising, abiding, and ceasing ultimately do not exist, how can the treatise still speak their names?

The respondent says: The verse says: Like an illusion, like a dream, like a gandharva city— the marks of the arising, abiding, and ceasing that are spoken are likewise.

Qingmu explains: The marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing have no fixed determination; ordinary people, through craving and attachment, call them fixed. The noble ones, moved by compassion and wishing to stop their inversion, teach them using the very names to which they cling—although the words are the same, the minds are different. Statements of the marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing should therefore not be taken as objections. For what is made by illusion, one should not demand its source. One should not form thoughts of sorrow or joy within it, but simply regard it as something seen by the eye. What is seen in a dream should not be sought as real. A gandharva city appears at sunrise but has no body; it is merely provisionally given a name and soon disappears. Arising, abiding, and ceasing are the same: ordinary people discriminate them as existent, while the wise investigate them and cannot find them.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Two, “Examination of Action and Agent, Chapter Eight,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Because Three Things Conjoin, Agent and Action Should Exist

〔T30 0012b06〕The questioner says: Action, an agent, and the various means used in acting plainly exist now. Because these three things conjoin, there is karmic fruition. Therefore, agent and action should exist.

II. Answer: Earlier Chapters Have Refuted Everything; the Question Is Answered Again Only Because Clinging Runs Deep

The respondent says: In the preceding chapters, all dharmas have been refuted without remainder. As in the refutation of the three marks: because the three marks are absent, there is no conditioned; because the conditioned is absent, there is no unconditioned. Since neither conditioned nor unconditioned exists, among all dharmas there is no action and no agent. If what you speak of is conditioned, it has already been refuted among conditioned dharmas; if unconditioned, it has already been refuted among unconditioned dharmas. You should not ask again. But because your clinging is deep, you ask once more; I will now answer you again.

III. Verse: Neither Determinately Existent nor Determinately Absent Can Act

A determinately existent agent does not perform a determinate action; a determinately absent agent does not perform an indeterminate action.

Qingmu explains: If agent and action are already determinately existent, there should be no acting. If agent and action are already determinately absent, there likewise should be no acting. Why?

IV. Verse: Whichever End Is Fixed First Makes the Other Superfluous

A determinate action is not performed, and such an action has no agent; a determinate agent does not act, and such an agent has no action.

Qingmu explains: If action is already determinately existent, there should not be a separate agent; moreover, action should exist apart from the agent—but this is not so. If an agent is already determinately existent, there should not be a separate action; moreover, an agent should exist apart from action—but this too is not so. Therefore, a determinate agent and determinate action should not act. An indeterminate agent and indeterminate action likewise should not act. Why? Because they are originally absent. Even existent agent and action cannot act, how much less absent agent and action. Further:

V. Verse: If Both Ends Are Fixed First, They Fall into Causelessness

If the agent determinately exists and the action also determinately exists, agent and action fall into causelessness.

Qingmu explains: If agent and action are already determinately existent and you still say that the agent acts, they become causeless. An agent exists apart from action and action apart from the agent; neither then exists through causes and conditions.

VI. Question: What Fault Is There If They Do Not Exist through Causes and Conditions?

The questioner says: What fault is there if agent and action do not exist through causes and conditions?

VII. Verse: Follow Causelessness through, and Demerit, Merit, and Nirvāṇa All Disappear

If they fall into causelessness, there is neither cause nor fruit, neither action nor agent, nor any means used in acting.

If action and related dharmas are absent, demerit and merit are absent; since demerit, merit, and the rest are absent, their karmic fruits are absent.

If the karmic fruits of demerit and merit are absent, nirvāṇa too is absent; every matter that could be acted upon is empty and bears no fruit.

Qingmu explains: If they fall into causelessness, all dharmas lack both cause and fruit. A dharma capable of producing is called a cause, and a dharma produced is called a fruit; both would be absent. Since both are absent, there is neither action nor agent, nor any means used in action, nor demerit and merit. Since demerit and merit are absent, the karmic fruits of demerit and merit and the path to nirvāṇa are absent. Thus, things cannot be said to arise without a cause.

VIII. Question: What Fault Is There If an Indeterminate Agent Performs an Indeterminate Action?

The questioner says: What fault is there if the agent is indeterminate and the action performed is likewise indeterminate?

The respondent says: If one thing is absent, action cannot arise; how much less if both are absent. It would be like a conjured person taking space as a house: there is only something said, with neither agent nor action.

IX. Question: Since Agent and Action Exist Now, Acting Should Exist

The questioner says: If no agent and no action existed, there could be no acting. Since agent and action exist now, acting should exist.

X. Verse: Existence and Nonexistence Contradict Each Other; One Place Cannot Hold Both

An agent, whether determinate or indeterminate, cannot perform the two kinds of action; because existence and nonexistence contradict one another, one place cannot contain both.

Qingmu explains: An agent, whether determinate or indeterminate, cannot perform a determinate or indeterminate action. Why? Because existence and nonexistence contradict one another and should not occupy the same place. Existence is determinate; nonexistence is indeterminate. How can one person and one matter be both existent and nonexistent? Further:

XI. Verse: What Exists Cannot Act upon What Does Not; What Does Not Exist Cannot Act upon What Does

What exists cannot act upon what does not exist; what does not exist cannot act upon what exists. If action and agent are asserted, the faults are as previously explained.

Qingmu explains: If an agent exists but no action exists, how can there be acting? If no agent exists but an action exists, there likewise can be no acting. Why? As previously explained. On the side of existence, if the action already exists, what remains for the agent to do? If the action does not exist first, how can it be acted upon? In this way, the causes, conditions, and fruits of demerit, merit, and the rest are destroyed. Thus the verse says: what exists cannot act upon what does not; what does not exist cannot act upon what exists. If action and agent are asserted, the faults are as previously explained. Further:

XII. Verse: Three Kinds of Action Are Refuted Together at Once

〔T30 0013a04〕An agent performs neither determinate action, indeterminate action, nor action both determinate and indeterminate; the faults are as previously explained.

Qingmu explains: Determinate action has been refuted, indeterminate action has been refuted, and action both determinate and indeterminate has been refuted. The verse is spoken to refute all three at once. Therefore, an agent cannot perform these three kinds of action. The three kinds of agent likewise cannot perform action. Why?

XIII. Verse: Three Kinds of Agent Likewise Cannot Perform Action

An agent, whether determinate, indeterminate, or both determinate and indeterminate, cannot perform action; the faults are as previously explained.

Qingmu explains: An agent, whether determinate, indeterminate, or both determinate and indeterminate, cannot perform action. Why? Because of the three kinds of fault already explained. The matter should be set out fully here. In this way, agent and action are sought everywhere but cannot be found.

XIV. Question: Does Saying There Is No Action and No Agent Not Fall into Causelessness Again?

The questioner says: If one says that there is no action and no agent, does that not fall once again into causelessness?

The respondent says: This action arises from many conditions and is provisionally said to exist; it has no fixed intrinsic nature. It is not as you claim. Why?

XV. Verse: Because of Action There Is an Agent; Because of the Agent There Is Action

Because of action there is an agent; because of the agent there is action. This is how the meaning of action is established, and there is no further matter.

Qingmu explains: Action initially has no fixed intrinsic nature but arises because of a person; because action exists, there is an agent, and the agent likewise has no fixed intrinsic nature. Because there is an action performed, one is called an agent. Through the conjunction of these two matters, action and agent are established. What arises from conjunction lacks intrinsic nature; because it lacks intrinsic nature it is empty, and because empty it is unarisen. Agent and action are spoken of only in conformity with ordinary people’s memories and discriminations. Within the ultimate meaning, there is neither action nor agent. Further:

XVI. Verse: Experience and Experiencer, through All Dharmas, Are Refuted in the Same Way

As action and agent are refuted, experience and experiencer are the same; all dharmas whatsoever should likewise be refuted in this way.

Qingmu explains: Action and agent cannot be separated from one another; because they are inseparable, they are not fixed, and because unfixed, they lack intrinsic nature. Experience and experiencer are the same. “Experience” means the body of the five aggregates, while “experiencer” means the person. Apart from the person there are no five aggregates, and apart from the five aggregates there is no person. They only arise from many conditions, just like experience and experiencer. All other dharmas should likewise be refuted in this way.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle two, “Examination of a Prior Abider, Chapter Nine,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Question: To Whom Do the Faculties Such as Eye and Ear and Dharmas Such as Pleasure and Pain Belong?

〔T30 0013b04〕The questioner says: Someone teaches as follows—

The various faculties such as eye and ear, and the various dharmas such as pain and pleasure: who possesses such things? That one is called the prior abider. If there were no prior abider, who would possess the dharmas such as the eye? For this reason, one should know that a prior abider already existed before the faculties.

Qingmu then explains: the faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, vitality, and so forth are called the faculties such as eye and ear. Painful experience, pleasant experience, neither-painful-nor-pleasant experience, and such mind and associated mental dharmas as perception, volition, and recollection are called the dharmas such as pain and pleasure. One treatise master says: before the dharmas such as the eye existed, a prior abider should have existed. By virtue of this prior abider, the faculties such as the eye are able to grow. If there is no prior abider, through what cause are the body and the faculties such as the eye born and enabled to grow?

The respondent answers as follows.

2. Answer: Apart from the Faculties and Dharmas, How Could a Prior Abider Be Known?

If a prior abider existed first, apart from the faculties such as the eye and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure, by what could it be known?

Qingmu explains: if a prior abider existed first, apart from the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure, by what could it be spoken of? By what could it be known? External dharmas such as jars and robes are known through faculties such as the eye; internal dharmas are known through faculties such as pain and pleasure. As a sūtra says: susceptibility to destruction is the mark of form; the capacity to experience is the mark of experience; the capacity to cognize is the mark of consciousness. You say that a prior abider existed first, apart from eye, ear, pain, pleasure, and the rest. By what could it be known and such a dharma be said to exist?

3. Question: Breathing and the Rest Are Marks of a Self

The questioner says: One treatise master says that inhalation and exhalation, looking and blinking, vitality, thinking, pain and pleasure, hate and love, initiating movement, and so forth are marks of a self. If there were no self, how could there be such marks as inhalation and exhalation? Therefore, one should know that a prior abider existed first, apart from the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure.

4. Answer: Sought in Five Places, the Self Has Nowhere to Stand

The respondent says: If this self existed, it should be inside the body, like a pillar within a wall, or outside the body, like a person wearing armor.

If it were inside the body, the body should be indestructible, because the self always remains within it. Thus, saying that the self is inside the body is nothing more than a statement, false and without reality.

If it were outside the body and covered it like armor, the body should be invisible, because the self would envelop it densely; it should also be indestructible. Yet we plainly see the body destroyed. Therefore, one should know that no other dharma exists prior to and apart from the dharmas such as pain and pleasure.

If one says that when an arm is cut off, the self contracts inward so that it cannot be severed, then when the head is cut off it likewise should contract inward and the person should not die; yet death plainly occurs. Thus, to say that a self existed first, apart from the dharmas such as pain and pleasure, is nothing more than a statement, false and without reality.

Further, if one says that when the body is large the self is large, and when the body is small the self is small—just as a large lamp gives a large light and a small lamp gives a small light—then the self would change with the body and should not be permanent. If it follows the body, then when the body is absent the self is absent, just as when the lamp goes out its light goes out. If the self is impermanent, it is of the same kind as the eye, ear, pain, pleasure, and the rest. Therefore, one should know that no separate self exists prior to and apart from the dharmas such as eye and ear.

Further, a person afflicted by madness is not in control and does what should not be done. If a self existed as the master of every action, how could the person be said not to be in control? If the illness of madness does not afflict the self, then there should be some other agent, apart from the self.

Sought in all these ways, no prior abider exists before and apart from the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure. If one insists that a prior abider exists apart from those faculties and dharmas, there is no such thing. Why?

5. If Separation Works, It Should Work at Both Ends

If a prior abider exists apart from eye, ear, and the rest, then eye, ear, and the rest should likewise exist apart from the prior abider.

Qingmu explains: if the prior abider exists first, apart from the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure, then the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure should now likewise exist apart from the prior abider.

6. A Person Is Known through Dharmas; Dharmas Are Known through a Person

The questioner says: The two things may indeed be separate from one another, so long as a prior abider exists.

The respondent says:

Through dharmas, one knows that a person exists; through a person, one knows that dharmas exist. Apart from dharmas, where is the person? Apart from the person, where are the dharmas?

Qingmu explains: “dharmas” means eye, ear, pain, pleasure, and the rest; “person” means the prior abider. You say that because dharmas exist, a person is known, and because a person exists, dharmas are known. But apart from dharmas such as eye and ear, where is a person? Apart from a person, where are dharmas such as eye and ear? Further:

7. Each Faculty Discriminates through Its Different Mark

All the faculties such as the eye in truth have no prior abider; the faculties such as eye and ear are discriminated through their different marks.

Qingmu explains: the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure in truth have no prior abider. Eye-consciousness arises with the eye faculty as cause and visible form as condition. The faculties such as eye and ear are known through causes and conditions in conjunction, not through a prior abider. Therefore, the verse says: all the faculties such as the eye in truth have no prior abider—the faculties such as eye and ear can each discriminate.

8. Question: Without Thought, How Can Each Faculty Know Its Object?

〔T30 0014a04〕The questioner says:

If the faculties such as the eye have no prior abider, how can each individual faculty such as the eye know an external object?

Qingmu explains: if all the faculties such as eye and ear and all the dharmas such as pain and pleasure have no prior abider, how can each individual faculty now know an external object? The faculties such as eye and ear do not think and should therefore have no knowing. Yet they plainly know external objects. One should know that apart from the faculties such as eye and ear, there is another knower of objects.

9. Answer: One Knower and Many Knowers—Both Ways Have Faults

The respondent says: If so, is there a separate knower in each faculty, or is there one knower within all the faculties? Both have faults. Why?

The one who sees would be the very one who hears, and the one who hears would be the very one who experiences. In that case, these faculties should have a prior abider.

Qingmu explains: if the seer is the hearer and the hearer is the experiencer, there is one self. In that case, the faculties such as the eye should have a prior abider existing before them. Visible forms, sounds, odors, and the rest would then have no determinate knower: perhaps one could hear a sound with the eye, as though a person had six directions in which to see or hear at will. If the hearer and seer are one, one could see and hear at will through any faculty such as the eye—but this is not so.

If seeing and hearing are distinct, and the experiencer too is distinct, then while seeing one should also hear; in that case, there would be many selves.

Qingmu explains: if seer, hearer, and experiencer are each distinct, then while seeing one should also hear. Why? Because a hearer exists apart from the seer. In the same way, the selves within nose, tongue, and body should operate simultaneously. If so, there would be one person but many selves, because all the faculties would know their various objects at the same time. Yet this is not so. Therefore, seer, hearer, and experiencer should not operate together. Further:

10. There Is No Self in the Four Great Elements from Which the Faculties Arise

The faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure arise from the great elements—and in those great elements too there is no self.

Qingmu explains: the claim that a separate prior abider exists apart from the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure has already been refuted. Now consider the four great elements upon which eye, ear, and the rest depend: there is no prior abider in those four great elements either.

11. Without a Prior Abider, the Dharmas Such as Eye and Ear Are Likewise Absent

The questioner says: It may be so that the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure have no prior abider; but the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure should still exist.

The respondent says:

If the faculties such as eye and ear and the dharmas such as pain and pleasure have no prior abider, then the dharmas such as the eye should likewise be absent.

Qingmu explains: if the dharmas such as eye, ear, pain, and pleasure have no prior abider, then who possesses this eye, ear, and the rest? Through what conditions do they exist? Therefore, eye, ear, and the rest are likewise absent. Further:

12. Sought through the Three Times, Conceptual Proliferation Ceases

Before the faculties such as the eye there is no prior abider; in the present and future there likewise is none. Because it is absent in all three times, that discrimination too is absent.

Qingmu explains: when the prior abider is considered and sought, it is absent before the faculties such as the eye, absent now, and absent afterward. If it is absent in the three times, this is nonarising and quiescence. One should no longer object: if there is no prior abider, how are there dharmas such as the eye? Such questions and answers and conceptual proliferation then cease. Because conceptual proliferation ceases, dharmas are empty.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle two, “Examination of Fire and Fuel, Chapter Ten,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Question: Since Fire and Fuel Exist, Experience and the Experiencer Should Also Exist

〔T30 0014b15〕The questioner says: There should be experience and an experiencer, just as there are fire and fuel. Fire is the experiencer, while fuel is experience—that which is called experience means the five aggregates.

The respondent says: This is not so. Why? Because neither fire nor fuel can be established. Fire and fuel might be said to be established as one dharma or as two dharmas, but neither route succeeds.

2. Question: By Refuting Them through Identity and Difference, You Have Already Admitted That They Exist

The questioner says: Set aside for now the claims of identity and difference. If fire and fuel do not exist at all, on what basis do you now refute them through the marks of identity and difference? The horn of a hare and the hair of a tortoise do not exist in the first place, so there is nothing there to refute. Only after people in the world plainly see that a thing exists can they reflect upon it. For example, gold must first exist before one can fire and hammer it. If fire and fuel did not exist at all, one should not reflect upon them through identity and difference. Since you allow talk of identity and difference, one should know that fire and fuel exist. Once you allow that they exist, they are thereby already existent.

3. Answer: Speaking in Accordance with Convention Does Not Mean Accepting Something in the Mind

The respondent says: There should be no fault in speaking in accordance with worldly convention. Whether fire and fuel are said to be identical or different, neither statement is called acceptance. Apart from conventional speech, there would be no ground for discussion. If one did not even speak of fire and fuel, how could anything be refuted? If nothing were said, the meaning could not be made clear. Suppose a dialectician wished to refute existence and nonexistence: that person would necessarily have to speak of existence and nonexistence, but would not thereby accept them merely by naming them. Thus there is no fault in speaking in accordance with the speech of the world.

If merely uttering something counted as accepting it, then by uttering the word “refute,” you would at once refute yourself. The same applies to speaking of fire and fuel. Although there is speech, there is likewise no acceptance. Thus when fire and fuel are examined through identity and difference, neither route succeeds. Why?

4. Verse and Commentary: If Identical, Act and Agent Become One; If Different, Fire Exists Apart from Fuel

The verse says: If fire were fuel, act and agent would become one; if fire were different from fuel, then there should be a fire apart from fuel.

Qingmu explains: Fire is flame, and fuel is wood. The agent is a person; the act is the deed produced. If fire and fuel were one, act and agent should also be one. If act and agent were one, the potter would be one with the jar. The agent is the potter, and the act is the jar; the potter is not the jar, and the jar is not the potter. How could they be said to be one? Thus act and agent are not one, and therefore fire and fuel are likewise not one.

If one says that since identity is impossible, they must be different, that too is wrong. Why? If fire and fuel were different, there should be a fire apart from fuel; one should be able to point distinctly and say, “This is fuel, and that is fire,” and wherever there was no fuel a fire should still be present. But that is not in fact so. Therefore difference is also impossible. Further:

5. Verse and Commentary: Perpetual Burning, Human Effort in Vain, and a Fire without an Act

The verse says: Fire should then burn forever, without being born through fuel; there would be no labor of kindling and tending it, and it would also be called a fire without an act.

Qingmu explains: If fire and fuel were different, fire would burn forever without waiting for fuel. If it burned forever, it would abide in its own substance and would not wait for causes and conditions; human effort would then be in vain. Human effort means tending and protecting a fire so that it burns. Such effort is plainly present, and therefore one knows that fire is not different from fuel.

Further, if fire were different from fuel, fire would have no act. Apart from fuel, what could fire burn? If that were so, fire would perform no act. There is no such thing as a fire without an act.

6. Question and Answer: Why Say That Fire Does Not Arise from Causes and Conditions and Human Effort Is in Vain?

The questioner says: Why do you say that fire does not arise from causes and conditions and that human effort is in vain?

The respondent answers in verse: If fire does not wait for fuel, then it does not arise from conditions; if fire burns forever, human effort should be in vain.

Qingmu explains: If fire and fuel were different, fire would exist without waiting for fuel. If fire existed without waiting for fuel, there would be no dharmas mutually serving as causes, so it would not arise from causes and conditions. Further, if fire were different from fuel, it should burn forever. If it burned forever, fire should be seen apart from fuel and there would be no need for human effort. Why?

7. Verse and Commentary: If It Is Called Fuel Only While Burning, at That Time There Is Only Wood

The verse says: If you claim that it is called fuel only while it is burning, then at that time there is only wood—what is it that burns the fuel?

Qingmu explains: If one says that wood exists first and is called fuel only when it burns, this is not so. If fuel exists separately apart from fire, how can one also say that it is called fuel only when it burns? Further:

8. Verse and Commentary: No Reaching, No Burning, No Extinction, and Permanent Abiding

The verse says: If they are different, fire does not reach fuel; if it does not reach fuel, it cannot burn it; if it does not burn it, it is not extinguished; if it is not extinguished, it abides forever.

Qingmu explains: If fire were different from fuel, fire should not be able to reach fuel. Why? Because they would not be established in mutual dependence. If fire were established without mutual dependence, it would abide in its own substance. What use would it have for fuel? Therefore, it could not reach it. If it could not reach it, it could not burn the fuel. Why? Because nothing can burn what it does not reach. If it did not burn, there would be no extinction, and it should abide forever in its own mark. This is not so.

9. Question and Answer: The Analogy of a Man and a Woman Coming Together

The questioner says in verse: Although fire and fuel are different, fire can reach fuel, just as this person goes to that person and that person comes to this one.

He explains: Fire and fuel are different, yet fire can reach fuel, just as a man goes to a woman and a woman comes to a man.

The respondent answers him in verse: If fire and fuel could each be established separately apart from the other, only then could fire reach that fuel.

Qingmu explains: If fuel existed apart from fire, if fire existed apart from fuel, and each could be established on its own, then fire should be able to reach fuel. But that is not in fact so. Why? Because apart from fire there is no fuel, and apart from fuel there is no fire. Yet a woman still exists apart from a man, and a man still exists apart from a woman, so your analogy is wrong. Because the analogy does not hold, fire cannot reach fuel.

10. Question and Answer: Then Let Us Say That the Two Exist in Mutual Dependence

The questioner says: Fire and fuel exist in mutual dependence—fire exists because of fuel, and fuel exists because of fire; the two dharmas are established by waiting upon one another.

The respondent says in verse: If fire exists because of fuel, and fuel exists because of fire, which dharma is first determinately present, thereby allowing fire and fuel to exist?

Qingmu explains: If fire is established because of fuel, fuel should likewise be established because of fire. Here, if fuel is first determinately present, fire can be established because of fuel; if fire is first determinately present, fuel can be established because of fire. Now, if one says that fire is established because of fuel, fuel exists first and fire later; one should no longer say that fuel must wait upon fire in order to exist. Why? Because fuel comes first and fire afterward. Yet if fire does not burn the fuel, the fuel does not become fuel; nor is fuel found anywhere else, since it is not apart from fire. If fuel is not established, fire is likewise not established. Conversely, if fire existed first and fuel afterward, fire would incur the same fault. Therefore, neither fire nor fuel is established. Further:

11. Verse and Commentary: Established and Then Established Again, While Fuel Instead Contains No Fire

The verse says: If fire exists because of fuel, then after fire is established it must be established again; consequently, there would instead be no fire within the fuel.

Qingmu explains: If one wishes to establish fire because of fuel, fire would be established after already having been established. Why? Because fire originally abides by itself within fire. There is no such thing as fire that does not abide in its own substance yet gains establishment from fuel. Thus if one says there is a fire established from fuel, it is now established all over again after having been established, and this fault follows. There is also the further fault that fuel contains no fire. Why? Because fuel abides in its own substance apart from fire. Thus there is no such thing as fire and fuel existing in mutual dependence. Further:

12. Verse and Commentary: Neither the Dependent Nor What It Depends On Is Determinate

The verse says: If a dharma is established because of what it depends on, and this dharma in turn establishes that on which it depends, there is then no real ground of dependence that serves as cause, nor any real dharma being established.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma is established because of what it depends on, this dharma in turn establishes the original ground of dependence. Once matters are settled in this way, neither of those two determinate things remains. Just as fire is established because of fuel and fuel in turn because of fire, neither side is determinate. Because they are not determinate, they cannot be found. Why?

13. Verse and Commentary: How Can the Unestablished Depend? Why Must the Established Depend?

The verse says: If a dharma must depend on something to be established, how can it depend while still unestablished? If it depends only after it has been established, once established, what use has it for dependence?

Qingmu explains: If a dharma is established because of what it depends on, that dharma was not yet established beforehand. What is unestablished is nonexistent; how can what is nonexistent depend on something? If that dharma was already established beforehand, once established, what need has it to be established through dependence? Along neither route can there be mutual dependence. Thus there is no such thing as your previously asserted fire and fuel being established through mutual dependence. Therefore:

14. Verse and Commentary: Cause and Noncause Gathered Together

The verse says: There is no fire because of fuel, and none without fuel; there is no fuel because of fire, and none without fire.

Qingmu explains: Fire is not now established through dependence on fuel, nor is fire established without depending on fuel. Fuel is likewise not established either through fire or without fire. The faults in both routes have already been explained. Further:

15. Verse and Commentary: It Does Not Come from Elsewhere; the Three Times Are as Explained in the Chapter on Going and Coming

The verse says: Fire does not come from elsewhere, nor is there fire in the place where it burns; fuel is likewise so, and the rest is as explained in the chapter on going and coming.

Qingmu explains: Fire does not come from another place and enter the fuel, nor is there fire within the fuel, because when one splits the wood and searches for fire, it cannot be found. Fuel is likewise so: it does not come from elsewhere and enter the fire, nor is there fuel within the fire. As for what has already burned not burning, what has not yet burned not burning, and what is burning not burning even while it burns, this is as explained in the chapter on going and coming. Therefore:

16. Verse and Commentary: The Five Statements Gather Everything Together

The verse says: Fuel is not itself fire; apart from fuel there is no fire. Fire does not possess fuel; there is no fuel within fire, and there is no fire within fuel.

Qingmu explains: Fuel is not itself fire. Why? Because the fault that act and agent would be one has already been explained. Apart from fuel, there is no fire, because faults such as perpetual burning would follow. Fire does not possess fuel, there is no fuel within fire, and there is no fire within fuel—because the fault of difference would follow, none of these three statements is established.

17. Question and Answer: Why Speak of Fire and Fuel?

The questioner says: Why speak of fire and fuel?

The respondent says: Just as there is fire because of fuel, so there is an experiencer because of experience. Experience means the five aggregates; the experiencer means the person. Because fire and fuel are not established, experience and the experiencer are likewise not established. Why?

18. Verse and Commentary: From Experience and Experiencer to Jars, Robes, and All Dharmas

The verse says: Through the dharmas of fire and fuel, the dharmas of experience and experiencer are explained, as are jars and robes and all such dharmas.

Qingmu explains: Just as fuel is not fire, so experience is not the experiencer, because the fault that act and agent would be one would follow. Nor is there an experiencer apart from experience, because difference cannot be found. Because the fault of difference follows, those three statements are not established. As with experience and the experiencer, all external dharmas such as jars and robes are just as explained above: they do not arise and are ultimately empty. Therefore:

19. Verse and Commentary: Those Who Assert a Self and Fixed Different Marks for Dharmas Cannot Taste the Dharma of the Buddha

The verse says: If someone asserts a self and says that dharmas each possess different fixed marks, one should know that such a person cannot taste the Dharma of the Buddha.

Qingmu explains: Dharmas have never arisen from the very beginning and bear the mark of ultimate quiescence, so this verse is spoken at the chapter’s end. If someone asserts the mark of a self, as the Vātsīputrīyas do, saying that form cannot be said to be the self, nor can the self be said to exist apart from form, but that the self resides in a fifth, inexpressible repository; or if, like the Sarvāstivādins, someone says that dharmas each possess their own marks, being wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate, tainted or untainted, conditioned or unconditioned, and so forth—such people do not attain the quiescent mark of dharmas, but instead use the Buddha’s words to construct all kinds of conceptual proliferation.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle two, “Examination of the Prior Limit, Chapter Eleven,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Question: Since the Sūtra Speaks of Beings and Saṃsāra, Why Does It Also Say That the Prior Limit Cannot Be Found?

〔T30 0016a05〕The questioner says: The Sūtra on the Beginningless Limit says that beings come and go within saṃsāra, while the prior limit cannot be found. Yet the sūtra plainly says that beings and saṃsāra exist. Through what causes and conditions is this claim made?

The respondent then answers as follows.

2. What the Great Sage Taught: Saṃsāra Has No Beginning and Likewise No End

What the Great Sage taught is that the prior limit cannot be found: saṃsāra has no beginning, and likewise has no end.

There are three kinds of sage. The first are non-Buddhists who have attained the five supernormal powers; the second are arhats and pratyekabuddhas; the third are great bodhisattvas who have attained supernormal powers. Among these three kinds, the Buddha is foremost and is therefore called the Great Sage. Not a single word spoken by the Buddha is other than a true statement. Saṃsāra has no beginning. Why? Because neither its first nor its last limit can be found, it is said to have no beginning. If you say that since it has neither beginning nor end, it should have a middle, this too is wrong. Why?

3. Without Beginning or End, From Where Could a Middle Come?

If there is neither beginning nor end, how could there be a middle? Therefore, within this, neither before, after, nor simultaneous occurrence exists.

Only because there are a middle and an end can one speak of a beginning; only because there are a beginning and a middle can one speak of an end. If neither beginning nor end exists, how could a middle exist? In saṃsāra there is no beginning, middle, or end. Therefore, before, after, and simultaneous occurrence cannot be found. Why?

4. Birth and Aging-and-Death: The Three Routes of Before, After, and Simultaneous Occurrence

If birth existed first and aging-and-death only afterward, there would be birth without aging-and-death, and there would also be aging-and-death without birth.

If aging-and-death existed first and birth only afterward, aging-and-death would be without a cause, and there would be aging-and-death without birth.

If a being in saṃsāra were first born, gradually grew old, and only afterward died, then birth would contain no aging-and-death. By principle, birth should include aging-and-death, and aging-and-death should include birth. Further, to have birth without aging-and-death is also wrong, nor does aging-and-death exist without being caused by birth. If aging-and-death existed first and birth afterward, aging-and-death would have no cause because birth comes later. Moreover, before birth, where could aging-and-death come from? If one says that birth and aging-and-death cannot be placed before or after one another, then changes the claim to say they are established at the same time, this incurs the same fault. Why?

Birth and aging-and-death cannot coexist at the same time. If they did, death would already be present at the moment of birth, and both would be without a cause.

To say that birth and aging-and-death occur at the same time is wrong. Why? Because death would already exist at the moment of birth. By principle, there should be existence at the time of birth and nonexistence at the time of death; if death already existed at the time of birth, this could not be established. If the two arose at the same time, they would not mutually serve as causes. Just as a cow’s two horns emerge at the same time and are not causes of one another. Therefore:

5. Since None of the Three Routes Is Established, Why Continue Conceptual Proliferation?

If beginning, end, and simultaneous occurrence are all impossible, why continue conceptual proliferation and assert that birth, aging, and death exist?

Because reflecting upon birth, aging, and death reveals faults in all three, they are unborn and ultimately empty. Why do you now cling to conceptual proliferation about birth, aging, and death and assert that they possess determinate marks? Further:

6. Not Only Saṃsāra: All Dharmas Lack a Prior Limit

All causes and fruits, marks and what bears a mark, experience and experiencer, and every dharma whatsoever—not only is the prior limit of saṃsāra unfindable, but the prior limit of every such dharma is likewise nonexistent.

All dharmas means causes and fruits, marks and what bears a mark, experience and experiencer, and the rest. All lack a prior limit; it is not only saṃsāra that lacks one. Saṃsāra is said to lack a prior limit because the teaching is being disclosed in brief.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle two, “Examination of Suffering, Chapter Twelve,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Someone Proposes Four Explanations

〔T30 0016b21〕Someone says the following:

Suffering is self-made, made by another, jointly made by self and other, or made without a cause. Applied to suffering as a fruit, all these ways of explaining the varieties of suffering are wrong.

Qingmu explains: Some say that suffering is self-made; some say it is made by another; some say it is both self-made and made by another; some say it is made without a cause. Applied to the fruit, none is correct. “Applied to the fruit, none is correct” means this: beings incur suffering through many causes and conditions, and precisely because they are weary of suffering, they wish to seek its cessation. Not knowing that suffering actually exists through causes and conditions, they divide into these four errors. Therefore, the verse says that applied to the fruit, none is correct. Why?

2. If Suffering Were Self-Made, It Would Not Arise from Conditions

If suffering were self-made, it would not arise from conditions; yet this set of five aggregates is present as a condition through which that set of five aggregates arises.

Qingmu explains: If suffering were self-made, it would not arise through many conditions. “Self” means arising from intrinsic nature. This is wrong. Why? Because the later five aggregates arise through the preceding five aggregates. Therefore, suffering cannot be said to be self-made.

3. Question: If These Five Aggregates Make Those Five Aggregates, Is That Not Making by Another?

The questioner says: If one says that this set of five aggregates makes that set of five aggregates, then it is made by another.

The respondent says: This is not so. Why?

Only if one said that this set of five aggregates was different from that set could one then say that suffering was made by another.

Qingmu explains: Only if these five aggregates were different from those five aggregates, and those aggregates different from these, should one say that suffering is made by another. If thread and cloth were different, for example, cloth should exist separately apart from thread. If no cloth exists apart from thread, cloth is not different from thread. By the same principle, if those five aggregates were different from these, those five aggregates should exist separately apart from these five. If no such five aggregates exist apart from these, then these five aggregates are not different from those. Therefore, one should not say that suffering is made by another.

4. Question: The Person Makes and Experiences His Own Suffering

The questioner says: Self-made means that each person makes and experiences his own suffering.

The respondent then answers as follows.

If a person makes suffering himself, where is that person apart from suffering, of whom one could say that he is able to make suffering himself?

Qingmu explains: If one says that a person makes suffering himself, where is there a separate person apart from the suffering of the five aggregates who could make suffering himself? One should be able to point out this person, yet he cannot be pointed out. Therefore, suffering is not made by a person himself. If the claim is changed to say that a person does not make his own suffering, but another person makes suffering and gives it to him, this too is wrong. Why?

5. If Another Person Makes Suffering and Gives It to This Person, Where Is This Person to Receive It?

If suffering is made by another person and given to this person, then apart from suffering, where is this person to receive it?

Qingmu explains: If another person makes suffering and gives it to this person, apart from the five aggregates there is no such person to receive it. Further:

6. If That Person Makes Suffering and Brings It to Give, Where Is That Person?

If suffering is made by that person and brought to be given to this person, then apart from suffering, where is that person who could give suffering to this one?

Qingmu explains: If one says that person makes suffering and gives it to this person, apart from the suffering of the five aggregates, where is that person who makes suffering, brings it, and gives it to this person? If such a person exists, one should state his mark. Further:

7. Once Self-Making Fails, Making by Another Merely Changes Positions

〔T30 0017a02〕If self-making is not established, how can one still say that person makes suffering? If that person makes suffering, from that person’s side it is likewise called self-making.

Qingmu explains: It has already been shown through various causes and conditions that a person’s making his own suffering cannot be established; to change the claim and say that another makes suffering is likewise wrong. Why? Because “this” and “that” exist in mutual dependence. If that person makes suffering, on that person’s side it is also called making one’s own suffering. Self-made suffering has already been refuted. Since the self-made suffering you accept is not established, making by another is likewise not established. Further:

8. A Dharma Does Not Make Itself; “That” Has No Substance of Its Own

Suffering cannot be called self-made; a dharma does not make that very dharma itself. Since “that” has no substance of its own, where is that which could make suffering?

Qingmu explains: Self-made suffering is wrong. Why? Just as a knife cannot cut itself, a dharma cannot make that very dharma itself; therefore, it cannot be self-made. Making by another is also wrong. Why? Apart from suffering, “that” has no intrinsic nature. Only if “that” had an intrinsic nature separately apart from suffering could one say that “that” makes suffering. Yet “that” is itself suffering, so how could suffering make suffering itself?

9. Question: Then There Should Be Joint Making

The questioner says: If self-making and making by another are both wrong, there should be joint making.

The respondent then answers as follows.

Only if the suffering made by this and the suffering made by that were each established should there be jointly made suffering. Neither this nor that makes anything—how much less could there be making without a cause!

Qingmu explains: Self-making and making by another already incur faults; how much more so making without a cause. Causelessness incurs many faults, as explained in the chapter that refutes act and agent. Further:

10. Not Only Suffering: External Things Are Likewise So

It is not only when speaking of suffering that these four theses cannot be established; for all external things, the four theses likewise cannot be established.

Qingmu explains: Although the Buddhadharma says that the five aggregates subject to appropriation are suffering, some non-Buddhists take only painful experience as suffering. Therefore it is said that the four theses are not established only for suffering; for all external things—all dharmas such as earth, water, mountains, and trees—they are likewise not established.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Two, “Examination of Formations, Chapter Thirteen,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: The Buddha’s Teaching Calls Them False and Delusively Grasped, So Formations Must Possess the Mark of Falsity

〔T30 0017a26〕The questioner says:

As the Buddhist scriptures teach, falsity is the mark of delusive grasping; because formations are delusively grasped, they are called false.

The scriptures say: falsity is precisely the mark of delusive grasping; the first truth, namely nirvāṇa, is not the mark of delusive grasping. Because the scripture says this, one should know that formations truly possess the false mark of delusive grasping.

II. Answer in Verse: Within False and Delusive Grasping, What Is Ultimately Grasped?

The respondent says:

Of what is called false and delusively grasped, what within it is there to grasp? The Buddha taught such a matter because he wished thereby to reveal the meaning of emptiness.

If a dharma bearing the mark of delusive grasping is itself false, what is there within these formations to be grasped? Since the Buddha spoke in this way, one should know that what he taught was precisely the meaning of emptiness.

III. Question: How Do We Know That All Formations Are Empty?

The questioner says: How do we know that all formations are empty?

The respondent says: All formations are empty because they bear the mark of falsity. Formations arise, cease, and do not abide; because they lack intrinsic nature, they are empty. “Formations” also names the five aggregates, because the five aggregates arise from formative activity; thus the five aggregates themselves are called formations. These five aggregates are all false and have no determinate mark.

IV. Form: From Infancy to Old Age, Both Identity and Difference Entail Faults

Why? For example, the form of infancy is not the form of crawling; the form of crawling is not the form of walking; the form of walking is not the form of childhood; the form of childhood is not the form of adulthood; and the form of adulthood is not the form of old age. Because form in this way never abides from thought-moment to thought-moment, a determinate essence cannot be distinguished and found.

Is the infant’s form itself the form of crawling and so on through old age, or is it different from them? Both alternatives entail faults. Why?

If the infant’s form were itself the form of crawling and so on through old age, then there would be only one form and every stage would be infancy; there could be no crawling and no old age. It would also be like a lump of clay that forever remained just that lump and could never become a jar. Why? Because form would be permanent and determinate.

If the infant’s form differed from the crawling child’s form, the infant could not become the crawling child, nor could the crawling child have been the infant. Why? Because the two forms would be different. In the same way, the forms of childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age should not exist in continuity. The dharma of kinship would then be lost: there would be neither father nor child. If so, only the infant should have a father; the crawling child and all later stages through old age should have no share in him. Thus both alternatives entail faults.

V. Continuity: Does It Continue Only after Ceasing, or While It Has Not Ceased?

The questioner says: Although form is not determinate, after the infant’s form ceases, another form arises in continuity, and so on until the form of old age arises. This avoids the faults just described.

The respondent says: When you say that the infant’s form gives rise to another in continuity, does it arise in continuity after having ceased, or while it has not ceased? If the infant’s form has ceased, how could continuity exist? There would be no cause. It is like fire: although there may be firewood capable of burning, once the fire is extinguished there is no continuity. If the infant’s form has not ceased and yet continues, then the infant’s form is unceasing and permanently abides in its original mark; here too there is no continuity.

VI. Similar Arising: The Plantain and the Lamp Flame

The questioner says: I do not speak of continuity in terms of either cessation or noncessation. I say only that, without abiding, a similar form arises; therefore I call it continuity.

The respondent says: If so, a determinate form would arise anew, and there should be tens of millions of distinct forms. But this is not so, and thus there is still no continuity. Wherever form is sought, no determinate mark can be found; it is said to exist only by worldly convention. It is like a plantain tree: when one seeks its solid heart, none can be found; there are only layers of sheath and leaf. In the same way, when the wise seek the mark of form, they see it cease thought-moment by thought-moment. No real form can be found beyond this, and it does not abide in any shape or mark of form. Similar instances arise in sequence and are difficult to distinguish, just like a lamp flame: no determinate form can be distinguished and found, nor can one find a determinate form from which a further form arises. Thus form is empty because it has no essence; it is said to exist only by worldly convention.

VII. Feeling, Perception, and Consciousness Are the Same

Feeling is likewise so. The wise examine it in many ways. Because successive instances are similar, their arising and ceasing are difficult to distinguish and know, like the continuity of a stream. It is only because there is felt awareness that three kinds of feeling are said to be present in the body. One should therefore know that feeling is explained in the same way as form.

Perception arises dependent on names and marks; apart from names and marks, it does not arise. Therefore the Buddha said: because it discriminates and knows the marks of names, it is called perception. Perception does not determinately preexist; it arises from many conditions and has no determinate essence. Because it has no determinate essence, it is like a shadow following a form. Because a form is present, a shadow is present; without the form, there is no shadow. A shadow has no determinate essence. If it determinately existed, there should be a shadow apart from the form—but in fact there is not. Thus a shadow arises from many conditions and cannot be found because it lacks intrinsic nature. Perception is the same: it is said to exist only on the basis of external names and marks and through worldly convention.

Consciousness arises dependent on forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangibles, together with the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and so forth. Because the eye and the other faculties each differ, consciousness is also differentiated. Is this consciousness located in form, in the eye, or between them? There is no determination. Once it has arisen, it cognizes an object, this person, and that person. Is the consciousness that knows this person itself the consciousness that knows that person, or is it different? The two are difficult to distinguish. Just as eye-consciousness is difficult to distinguish, ear-consciousness is likewise so. Because distinction is difficult, some say they are one and some say they are different; no determinate distinction exists. Consciousness arises only from many conditions, and because it is differentiated according to the eye and the other faculties, it is empty and lacks intrinsic nature. It is like an entertainer who holds a pearl in his mouth, takes it out, and shows it again: people wonder whether it is the original pearl or another one. Consciousness is the same. After one consciousness arises, another arises: is this the original consciousness or a different one? Thus one should know that because consciousness does not abide, it lacks intrinsic nature and is false like an illusion.

VIII. Formations: Body, Speech, and Mind, Pure and Impure, Increase and Decrease

Formations are likewise so. What are called formations are activities of body, speech, and mind. There are two kinds: pure and impure. What is impure? Harming sentient beings, craving attachment, and the like are called impure. Not harming sentient beings, speaking truthfully, not craving attachment, and the like are called pure. These activities sometimes increase and sometimes decrease. Those who cultivate pure conduct receive karmic fruition among humans or in the heavens of the desire realm, form realm, or formless realm; when its fruition has been received, the activity decreases, and because it is performed again, it is called increasing. Those who perform impure conduct are the same: they receive karmic fruition in hell, among animals, hungry ghosts, or asuras; afterward it decreases, and because it is performed again, it is called increasing. Thus formations do not abide because they increase and decrease.

It is like a person who is ill: with suitable care, the illness is cured; without such care, it gathers again. Formations are the same. Because they increase and decrease, they are not determinate and are said to exist only by worldly convention. Yet precisely by relying on conventional truth, one is able to see the truth of the ultimate meaning.

IX. The Arising and Correct Cessation of the Twelve Links

That is: ignorance conditions formations; from formations comes the attachment of consciousness; because consciousness attaches, name-and-form exists; from name-and-form come the six entrances; from the six entrances, contact; from contact, feeling; from feeling, craving; from craving, grasping; from grasping, existence; from existence, birth; and from birth come aging, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, the suffering of separation from those one loves, the suffering of meeting those one hates, and so forth. All such forms of suffering have formations as their root.

The Buddha taught this on the basis of conventional truth. For one who realizes the truth of the ultimate meaning and gives rise to true wisdom, ignorance ceases. Because ignorance ceases, formations no longer accumulate. Because formations no longer accumulate, the identity-view, doubt, attachment to precepts, and other factors abandoned by seeing the truth are cut off; craving, anger, attachment to the form realm, attachment to the formless realm, agitation, and ignorance abandoned by cultivation are also cut off. Because they are thus cut off, each portion ceases in turn: ignorance, formations, consciousness, name-and-form, the six entrances, contact, feeling, craving, grasping, existence, birth, aging and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, separation from those one loves, meeting those one hates, and so forth all cease. Because of this cessation, the body of the five aggregates is ultimately exhausted without remainder, and emptiness alone remains.

Therefore, because the Buddha wished to reveal the meaning of emptiness, he said that formations are false.

Furthermore, because dharmas have no essence, they are false; because false, they are empty. As the verse says:

X. Verse: Because Dharmas Undergo Change, We Know That All Lack Intrinsic Nature

〔T30 0018a27〕Because dharmas undergo change, we know that all lack intrinsic nature; yet no dharma of non-nature exists either, because all dharmas are empty.

Dharmas have no intrinsic nature. Why? Although dharmas arise, they do not abide in their own nature; therefore they are said to lack intrinsic nature. For example, if the infant determinately abided in an intrinsic nature, it could never become a crawling child and so on through old age. Yet the infant continues in sequence, and differing marks appear as crawling and then the later stages through old age. Thus it is said: by seeing the changing marks of dharmas, we know that they lack intrinsic nature.

XI. Can a Dharma of Non-Nature Exist?

The questioner says: If dharmas undergo change and lack intrinsic nature, then a dharma of non-nature exists. What fault is there in that?

The respondent says: If there is no intrinsic nature, how could there be a dharma? How could there be a mark? Why? Because there is no root. Non-nature is spoken of only to refute intrinsic nature. If this dharma of non-nature existed, one could not call all dharmas empty. If all dharmas are empty, how could there be a dharma of non-nature?

XII. What Has Intrinsic Nature Cannot Change; What Lacks It Cannot Be Made the Thing That Changes

The questioner says:

If dharmas have no intrinsic nature, why do you still say that from infancy through old age there are many different marks?

If dharmas had no intrinsic nature, they could not have different marks. Yet you say that different marks exist, so the intrinsic natures of dharmas must exist. If there were no intrinsic natures of dharmas, how could there be different marks?

The respondent says:

If dharmas possessed intrinsic nature, how could they change? If dharmas lacked intrinsic nature, again how could change belong to them?

If dharmas determinately possessed intrinsic nature, how could change be possible? Intrinsic nature means determinate existence and cannot change. Genuine gold, for example, cannot be changed; likewise, the nature of darkness does not become light, and the nature of light does not become darkness.

Furthermore:

This very dharma does not change, nor does another dharma change; just as adulthood does not become old age, and old age does not become adulthood.

If a dharma changes, it should have a mark of change. Does this very dharma change, or does another dharma change? Neither is so. If this very dharma changed, old age should become old age—but old age does not in fact become old age. If another dharma changed, then because adulthood differs from old age, adulthood should become old age—but adulthood does not in fact become old age. Both alternatives entail faults.

XIII. Verse: Milk Should Itself Already Be Curd

The questioner says: What fault is there if this very dharma changes? We now see with our own eyes that a young person grows old with the passing days, months, and years.

The respondent says:

If this very dharma itself changed, milk should itself already be curd. Apart from milk, what other dharma could become curd?

If this very dharma itself changed, milk should itself already be curd, and no other causes or conditions would be needed. But this is not so. Why? Because milk and curd have many different marks. Milk is not itself curd, so a dharma does not change simply as itself. Yet if one says that another dharma changes, this too is not so: apart from milk, what other thing could serve as curd? Thinking in this way, one knows that neither this very dharma nor another dharma changes; therefore one should not cling one-sidedly.

XIV. Verse: If a Nonempty Dharma Existed, an Empty Dharma Should Exist

The questioner says: You have refuted identity and refuted difference, yet emptiness remains. Emptiness is itself a dharma.

The respondent says:

If a nonempty dharma existed, an empty dharma should exist; but no nonempty dharma truly exists, so how could an empty dharma be found?

If a nonempty dharma existed, then because the two depend upon one another, an empty dharma should exist. But nonempty dharmas have already been refuted above through many causes and conditions. Since a nonempty dharma does not exist, there is no mutual dependence; without mutual dependence, how could there be an empty dharma?

XV. Verse: The Great Sage Taught Emptiness in Order to Abandon All Views

The questioner says: You say that because no nonempty dharma exists, no empty dharma exists either. If so, you are saying only that emptiness has no counterpart and therefore should not be grasped. Where there is an opposite, there should be mutual dependence; where there is no opposite, there is no mutual dependence. Since mutual dependence is absent, there is no mark; since there is no mark, there is no grasping. This itself is to teach emptiness.

The respondent says:

The Great Sage taught the dharma of emptiness so that people might abandon all views; if someone once more sees that emptiness exists, such a person cannot be transformed by any buddha.

The Great Sage taught emptiness in order to refute the sixty-two views and the many afflictions of ignorance, craving, and the rest. If someone again gives rise to a view regarding emptiness, that person cannot be transformed. It is like an illness that must be treated with medicine; if the medicine itself becomes an illness, the person cannot be treated. Or it is like a fire arising from firewood, which can be extinguished with water; if fire arose from water, with what could it be extinguished? Emptiness is like water and can extinguish the fires of the many afflictions. But some people have weighty karmic offenses, deeply grasping minds, and dull wisdom, and so give rise to views about emptiness, saying either that emptiness exists or that emptiness does not exist. Because they fall again into existence and nonexistence, afflictions arise once more. If emptiness is used to transform such a person, he will say, “I have long known this emptiness already; apart from this emptiness there is no path to nirvāṇa.” As the scripture says, to claim that one can attain liberation apart from the three gateways of emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness is nothing but words.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Two, “Examination of Conjunction, Chapter Fourteen,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Opening: Since the Three Matters Are Unestablished, There Is No Conjunction

〔T30 0018c29〕The commentator says: The preceding “Chapter Refuting the Faculties” has already explained that seeing, the visible, and the seer are all unestablished. Since these three matters possess no dharmas that differ from one another, there is no conjunction. The meaning of nonconjunction will now be explained.

The questioner says: Why is there no conjunction among the three matters of the eye and so forth?

II. Verse: The Three Dharmas Each Occupy a Different Place and Never Conjoin

〔T30 0019a02〕The respondent answers as follows.

Seeing, the visible, and the seer each occupy a different place. Since these three dharmas are thus different from one another, there is never a time when they conjoin.

III. Explanation: Different Places, Seeing through Conjunction, and Seeing without Conjunction

Seeing is the eye-faculty, the visible is the form-object, and the seer is the self. These three matters each occupy a different place, so there is never a time when they conjoin. “Occupying different places” means that the eye is inside the body and form is outside it; as for the self, some say it is inside the body, while others say it pervades every place. Thus there is no conjunction.

Furthermore, if one asserts that seeing exists, does one see after conjunction or without conjunction? Neither account can be established. Why? If one sees after conjunction, then wherever a form-object exists, a faculty and a self should exist there at the same time. But this is not so; therefore seeing is not through conjunction. If one can see without conjunction, then although the faculty, self, and form-object each occupy a different place, seeing should occur—but it does not. Why? The eye-faculty is here and does not see a jar in the distance. Thus neither account establishes seeing.

IV. Question and Answer: Self, Mind, Faculty, and Object Conjoin, and Cognition Arises

The questioner says: Because the four matters—self, mind, faculty, and object—conjoin, cognition arises and can know jars, cloth, and all other things. Therefore seeing, the visible, and the seer exist.

The respondent says: This has already been refuted in the “Chapter on the Faculties,” but it should now be explained again. You say that cognition arises because the four matters conjoin. Does this cognition arise after jars, cloth, and other things have been seen, or does it arise before they are seen? If it arises after they have been seen, cognition is useless. If it arises before they have been seen, the four matters have not yet conjoined, so how could cognition arise?

If you say that the four matters conjoin at the same time and cognition arises, this too is wrong. If they arise simultaneously, there is no mutual dependence. Why? The jar exists first, seeing comes next, and cognition then arises. If they are simultaneous, there can be no before and after. Since cognition does not exist, seeing, the visible, and the seer do not exist either. All dharmas in this way are like illusions and dreams and have no determinate marks; how could conjunction exist? Since there is no conjunction, they are empty.

Furthermore:

V. Verse: Defilement, What Is Defiled, and the Defiled One, as Well as the Other Entrances and Afflictions

Defilement, what is defiled, and the defiled one follow the same principle. The other entrances and the other afflictions are all likewise so.

VI. Explanation: Two Lines of Analogy

Just as seeing, the visible, and the seer do not conjoin, defilement, what is defiled, and the defiled one should likewise not conjoin. To speak in this way of the three dharmas—seeing, the visible, and the seer—is also to speak of hearing, the audible, the hearer, and the other entrances. To speak in this way of defilement, what is defiled, and the defiled one is also to speak of anger, what is hated, the angry one, and the other afflictions.

Furthermore:

VII. Verse and Explanation: Conjunction Requires Difference, but the Difference of Seeing and the Rest Is Unestablished

Only dharmas that differ should conjoin, yet seeing and the rest are not different. Since a mark of difference cannot be established, how could seeing and the rest conjoin?

Things are said to conjoin only because they differ from one another, but the mark of difference in seeing and the rest cannot be found; therefore there is no conjunction.

Furthermore:

VIII. Verse and Explanation: No Dharma Possesses a Mark of Difference

It is not only the mark of difference in seeing and the rest that cannot be found; all dharmas whatsoever likewise lack a mark of difference.

It is not only the mark of difference among the three matters—seeing, the visible, the seer, and so forth—that cannot be found. All dharmas lack a mark of difference.

IX. Question and Answer: Difference Exists Dependent on What Is Different

The questioner says: Why is there no mark of difference?

The respondent says:

Difference is different because of another differing dharma; apart from that differing dharma, there is no difference. If a dharma emerges from a cause, that dharma does not differ from its cause.

What you call difference is named difference only because another differing dharma exists. Apart from a differing dharma, it is not called difference. Why? If a dharma arises from many conditions, it does not differ from its cause, because when the cause is destroyed, the fruit is destroyed along with it. It is like a house that exists because of beams, rafters, and the rest. The house does not differ from its beams and rafters, because when the beams, rafters, and the rest are destroyed, the house is destroyed too.

X. Question and Answer: Apart from the Difference upon Which It Depends, No Further Difference Exists

The questioner says: What fault is there if there is a fixed differing dharma?

The respondent says:

If apart from the difference upon which it depends there were still another difference, that difference should exist apart from all other differences as well. Yet apart from the difference upon which it depends, there is no difference; therefore no difference exists.

If a differing dharma existed apart from the difference upon which it depends, then a differing dharma should exist apart from every other difference. In fact, apart from the difference upon which it depends, no differing dharma exists, so no further difference exists. For example, if a difference belonging to a fist existed apart from the difference of five fingers, that difference of the fist should also distinguish it from jars and other things. Yet apart from the difference of the five fingers, a difference of the fist cannot be found. Therefore the fist possesses no differing dharma in relation to jars and the rest.

XI. Question and Answer: A Mark of Difference Cannot Be Found Either in What Differs or in What Does Not Differ

The questioner says: The scripture on which I rely teaches that a mark of difference does not arise from many conditions. A mark of difference exists because a general mark is discriminated, and because a mark of difference exists, differing dharmas exist.

The respondent says:

Within what already differs there is no mark of difference; within what does not differ there is none either. Since there is no mark of difference, there is no difference between this and that.

You say that a mark of difference exists because a general mark is discriminated, and because a mark of difference exists, differing dharmas exist. If so, the mark of difference arises from many conditions. What you describe is therefore precisely a dharma arisen from many conditions, because this mark of difference cannot be found apart from differing dharmas. A mark of difference exists dependent on differing dharmas and cannot be established alone.

No mark of difference now exists within a differing dharma. Why? Since a differing dharma already exists, what use is a further mark of difference? Nor is there a mark of difference within a dharma that does not differ. Why? If a mark of difference existed within a dharma that does not differ, it could not be called a dharma that does not differ. Since the mark exists in neither place, there is no mark of difference. Since there is no mark of difference, there are no dharmas of this and that.

Furthermore, since differing dharmas do not exist, there is no conjunction.

XII. Final Verse and Explanation: Conjoiner, Time of Conjunction, and What Conjoins Are All Absent

This dharma does not conjoin with itself, and a differing dharma does not conjoin either. The one that conjoins, the time of conjunction, and the dharma that conjoins are all absent.

A dharma’s own essence does not conjoin with itself, because it is one, just as one finger does not conjoin with itself. Differing dharmas do not conjoin either, because once they differ, the matter of difference is already established and no further conjunction is needed. When the matter is examined in this way, conjunction cannot be found. Therefore the conjoiner, the time of conjunction, and the dharma that conjoins cannot be found.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Three, “Examination of Existence and Nonexistence, Chapter Fifteen,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Each Dharma Has Its Own Intrinsic Nature

〔T30 0019c20〕The questioner says: Dharmas each possess their own intrinsic nature because each has a distinctive efficacy. A jar, for example, possesses the intrinsic nature of a jar, and cloth the intrinsic nature of cloth. This intrinsic nature appears when the many conditions conjoin.

The respondent answers as follows.

II. Verse and Explanation: What Emerges from Many Conditions Is a Fabricated Dharma

That intrinsic nature exists among many conditions cannot be established. If intrinsic nature emerges from many conditions, it is called a fabricated dharma.

If dharmas truly possessed intrinsic nature, it should not emerge from many conditions. Why? If it emerged from many conditions, it would be a fabricated dharma and would possess no determinate intrinsic nature.

III. Question and Answer: What Fault Is There If Intrinsic Nature Is Fabricated?

The questioner says: What fault is there if the intrinsic nature of dharmas is fabricated from many conditions?

The respondent says:

If intrinsic nature were something fabricated, how could the meaning of intrinsic nature still hold? The very name “intrinsic nature” means what is unfabricated and does not depend upon another dharma for establishment.

Just as gold mixed with copper is not genuine gold, so if intrinsic nature truly existed, it would not require many conditions; if it emerged from many conditions, one should know that no genuine intrinsic nature exists. Furthermore, if intrinsic nature were determinate, it should not await something else before appearing. It is unlike long and short or this and that, which exist only through mutual dependence precisely because they lack determinate intrinsic nature.

IV. Question and Answer: If There Is No Intrinsic Nature, Does Other-Nature Exist?

The questioner says: If dharmas lack intrinsic nature, they should possess other-nature.

〔T30 0020a04〕The respondent says:

If a dharma lacks intrinsic nature, how could other-nature exist? Intrinsic nature, when spoken of in relation to another nature, is itself called other-nature.

Because the intrinsic nature of dharmas would be fabricated by many conditions and established through mutual dependence, it does not exist. Other-nature, for its own part, is itself intrinsic nature; it too arises from many conditions and exists through mutual dependence, and therefore it too is absent. Since it is absent, how can one say that dharmas arise from other-nature? Other-nature is itself intrinsic nature.

V. Question and Answer: Is There a Dharma Apart from Intrinsic Nature and Other-Nature?

The questioner says: What fault is there if dharmas exist apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature?

The respondent says:

Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, how could another dharma exist? Only if intrinsic nature and other-nature existed could dharmas be established.

Your claim that dharmas exist apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature cannot be established. Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, there is no dharma. Why? Only where intrinsic nature and other-nature exist can a dharma be established. For example, a jar’s essence is its intrinsic nature, while the thing upon which it depends is other-nature.

VI. Question and Answer: Since Existence Is Refuted, Does Nonexistence Exist?

The questioner says: If existence is refuted through intrinsic nature and other-nature, then nonexistence should now exist.

The respondent says:

If existence cannot be established, how could nonexistence be established? Only because an existent dharma exists is its destruction called nonexistence.

If you have already accepted that existence cannot be established, you should also accept that nonexistence is absent. Why? It is the destruction of an existent dharma that is called nonexistence; this nonexistence exists only because existence was destroyed.

VII. Verse and Explanation: Those Who See Existence and Nonexistence Do Not See the True Meaning of the Buddha-Dharma

Furthermore:

If someone sees existence and nonexistence and sees intrinsic nature and other-nature, that person does not see the true meaning of the Buddha-Dharma.

If someone deeply grasps dharmas, that person will insist upon finding a view of existence. When intrinsic nature is refuted, the person sees other-nature; when other-nature is refuted, the person sees existence; when existence is refuted, the person sees nonexistence; when nonexistence is refuted, the person is bewildered. But those with sharp faculties and slight attachment know that extinguishing all views is peaceful and secure, so they no longer give rise to these four kinds of conceptual proliferation. Such people see the true meaning of the Buddha-Dharma. Therefore the preceding verse was spoken.

VIII. Verse and Explanation: The Buddha Extinguishes Existence and Nonexistence, as When He Transformed Kātyāyana

Furthermore:

The Buddha can extinguish existence and nonexistence, just as when he transformed Kātyāyana; as stated in the scripture, he is free from both existence and nonexistence.

In the Śāṇḍa Kātyāyana Sūtra, the Buddha taught him the meaning of right view, free from existence and nonexistence. If there were the slightest determinate existence among dharmas, the Buddha should not have refuted existence. As for nonexistence, once existence is refuted, people take that refutation to mean nonexistence. Because the Buddha thoroughly comprehends the marks of dharmas, he teaches that neither exists. Therefore you should abandon views of existence and nonexistence.

IX. Verse and Explanation: What Truly Possessed Intrinsic Nature Should Not Later Change

Furthermore:

If a dharma truly possessed intrinsic nature, it should not later change. That intrinsic nature might bear a mark of change can never be established.

If dharmas determinately possessed intrinsic nature, they should never change. Why? If determinate intrinsic nature existed, there should be no mark of change, as in the preceding analogy of genuine gold. Because we now directly see that dharmas possess marks of change, we should know that they have no determinate marks.

Furthermore:

If a dharma truly possessed intrinsic nature, how could it change? If a dharma truly lacked all intrinsic nature, again how could it change?

If a dharma determinately possessed intrinsic nature, how could it change? If it had no intrinsic nature, it would have no essence of its own, so how could it change?

X. Verse and Explanation: Determinate Existence Falls into Eternalism; Determinate Nonexistence Falls into Annihilationism

Furthermore:

Determinate existence means attachment to permanence; determinate nonexistence means attachment to annihilation. Therefore the wise should not cling to existence or nonexistence.

If a dharma determinately possessed a mark of existence, it could never possess a mark of nonexistence; that would be permanence. Why? Consider the account of a person in the three times: a dharma’s mark exists in the future; the dharma then arrives in the present and passes into the past without abandoning its original mark. This is permanence. To say that the fruit already exists within the cause is likewise permanence. If one asserts determinate nonexistence, that nonexistence must mean that something existed before but does not exist now; this is annihilation. Annihilation means the absence of a cause for continuity. Through these two views one departs from the Buddha-Dharma.

XI. Question and Answer: Why Does Existence Produce the View of Permanence and Nonexistence Produce the View of Annihilation?

The questioner says: Why does existence produce the view of permanence and nonexistence the view of annihilation?

The respondent says:

If a dharma has determinate intrinsic nature and is not nonexistent, that is permanence. If it existed before but does not exist now, that is annihilation.

If a dharma’s intrinsic nature were determinately existent, it would bear the mark of existence, not the mark of nonexistence, and should never become nonexistent. If it became nonexistent, it would not be existent and would instead become a nonexistent dharma—the fault of this has already been explained. One would thus fall into the view of permanence. If a dharma existed before and, after destruction, became nonexistent, this is called annihilation. Why? Because existence should not become nonexistence. This follows from your claim that existence and nonexistence each possess a determinate mark. If one holds views of annihilation or permanence, demerit, merit, and other such matters are absent and worldly affairs are destroyed. Therefore these views should be abandoned.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Three, “Examination of Bondage and Release, Chapter Sixteen,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Surely There Must Be Something That Comes and Goes in Saṃsāra

〔T30 0020c06〕The questioner says: Saṃsāra cannot be wholly without a basis. Within it, surely sentient beings come and go, or conditioned activities come and go. On what grounds, then, do you say that sentient beings and conditioned activities are all empty and that there is no coming and going?

The respondent answers as follows.

II. Verse and Commentary: Neither the Permanent nor the Impermanent Comes and Goes

If conditioned activities that come and go are permanent, they should not come and go; if they are impermanent, they likewise should not come and go. The same is true of sentient beings.

Qingmu explains: Are conditioned activities said to come and go in birth and death through the six destinies under the aspect of permanence, or under the aspect of impermanence? Neither is tenable. If they come and go under the aspect of permanence, there can be no continuity of birth and death, because they are determinate and because their intrinsic nature abides unmoving. If they come and go under the aspect of impermanence, there likewise can be no coming and going or continuity of birth and death, because they are indeterminate and lack intrinsic nature. If it is said that sentient beings come and go, the same faults follow.

Next—

III. Verse and Commentary: Seeking the One Who Comes and Goes among Aggregates, Realms, and Entrances

If it is said that sentient beings come and go, then among the five aggregates, the eighteen realms, and the entrances, exhaustive search by the five modes finds nothing at all. Who, then, is the one that comes and goes?

Qingmu explains: Saṃsāra and the aggregates, realms, and entrances have the same meaning here. If a sentient being comes and goes among these aggregates, realms, and entrances, that sentient being has already been sought by the five modes in the “Examination of Fire and Fuel” and found unobtainable. Who, then, comes and goes among aggregates, realms, and entrances?

Next—

IV. Verse and Commentary: From This Body to Another Body

If one goes from this body to another body, the one who comes and goes becomes bodiless in between. If that one has no body, there is no coming and going.

Qingmu explains: If a sentient being comes and goes, does it come and go with a body or without a body? Neither is tenable. Why? If it comes and goes with a body, passing from one body to another, then the one who comes and goes becomes bodiless. Moreover, if it already had a body beforehand, it should not pass again from body to body. If beforehand it had no body, then that person does not exist; if nonexistent, how could there be coming and going in birth and death?

V. Question, Answer, Verse, and Commentary: Does Nirvāṇa Extinguish Conditioned Activities or Sentient Beings?

〔T30 0021a02〕The questioner says: The sūtras say that nirvāṇa exists and can extinguish all suffering. What this extinction extinguishes, then, must be either conditioned activities or sentient beings.

The respondent says: Neither is extinguished. Why?

If conditioned activities were extinguished, this ultimately could not be established; if sentient beings were extinguished, this likewise could not be established.

Qingmu explains: Your claim that either conditioned activities or sentient beings are extinguished has already been answered. Conditioned activities have no intrinsic nature, while sentient beings are unobtainable when sought in every way through the coming and going of birth and death. Therefore, conditioned activities are not extinguished, nor are sentient beings extinguished.

VI. Question, Answer, Verse, and Commentary: Then There Is Neither Bondage nor Release

The questioner says: If so, then there is neither bondage nor release, because the basis is unobtainable.

The respondent says:

Conditioned activities bear the marks of arising and ceasing; they are neither bound nor released. Sentient beings, as explained before, are likewise neither bound nor released.

Qingmu explains: Your claim that conditioned activities and sentient beings undergo bondage and release is not so. Because conditioned activities arise and cease thought by thought, they should not undergo bondage and release. Sentient beings, as already explained, are unobtainable when sought by the five modes; how could they undergo bondage and release?

Next—

VII. Verse and Commentary: If the Body Is Called Bondage

If the body itself is called bondage, then one who already has a body is not bound again, while one without a body cannot be bound. Upon what, then, could bondage occur?

Qingmu explains: If the body of five aggregates is called bondage, then if a sentient being already had the five aggregates, it should not be bound again. Why? Because one person would have two bodies. Nor should one without a body be bound. Why? Without a body, there are no five aggregates; without the five aggregates, there is emptiness—how could that be bound? Beyond these two, no third thing that is bound exists.

Next—

VIII. Verse and Commentary: The Temporal Order of What Can Be Bound and Bondage

If what can be bound must already have bondage before bondage can bind it, then bondage would bind what is already bound. Yet before what can be bound, there is in fact no bondage. The remaining reasoning is as answered in the “Examination of Coming and Going.”

Qingmu explains: If what can be bound already has bondage, bondage should then bind what can be bound. Yet apart from what can be bound, no bondage exists beforehand; therefore one cannot say that sentient beings are bound. Some say that the sentient being is what can be bound and the five aggregates are bondage. Others say that the various afflictions within the five aggregates are bondage and that the remaining aggregates are what can be bound. This is not so. Why? If a sentient being existed before and apart from the five aggregates, the five aggregates should then bind the sentient being. Yet in fact no distinct sentient being exists apart from the five aggregates. If afflictions existed apart from the five aggregates, afflictions should then bind the five aggregates. Yet in fact no distinct afflictions exist apart from the five aggregates. Further, as said in the “Examination of Coming and Going”: what has gone does not go, what has not gone does not go, and during going there is no going. Likewise, what is not bound is not bound, what has been bound is not bound, and during binding there is no binding. Further, there is no release either. Why?

IX. Verse and Commentary: Neither the Bound nor the Unbound Is Released

One who is bound has no release, and one who is not bound likewise has no release. If release existed during binding, bondage and release would occur at the same time.

Qingmu explains: One who is bound has no release. Why? Because that one is already bound. One who is unbound likewise has no release. Why? Because there is no bondage. If one says that release occurs during binding, bondage and release occur at the same time. This is not so, all the more because bondage and release oppose one another.

X. Question, Answer, Verse, and Commentary: The One Who Thinks “I Shall Attain Nirvāṇa”

The questioner says: Some people cultivate the path, enter nirvāṇa here and now, and attain release. How can you say there is none?

The respondent says:

If one gives rise to this thought—“I do not appropriate any dharmas; I shall attain nirvāṇa”—that person is instead bound by this very appropriation.

Qingmu explains: If someone forms this thought—“I depart from appropriation and attain nirvāṇa”—that person is at once bound by appropriation.

Next—

XI. Verse and Commentary: No Separate Nirvāṇa Apart from Saṃsāra

There is no separate nirvāṇa apart from saṃsāra. Such is the meaning of the true character of dharmas—what distinction could remain?

Qingmu explains: In the ultimate meaning of the true character of dharmas, one does not say that a separate nirvāṇa exists apart from saṃsāra. As the sūtra says: nirvāṇa is precisely saṃsāra, and saṃsāra is precisely nirvāṇa. In the true character of dharmas, then, how could one say, “This is saṃsāra; that is nirvāṇa”?

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Three, “Examination of Karma, Chapter Seventeen,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Karma Determinately Exists, So Dharmas Should Not Be Empty

〔T30 0021b21〕The questioner says: Although you have refuted dharmas in many ways, karma determinately exists and can make every sentient being undergo its fruition. As the sūtra says, all sentient beings are born according to the karma they themselves have performed: those who commit evil fall into the hells, those who cultivate merit are born in the heavens, and those who practice the path realize nirvāṇa. Therefore, all dharmas should not be empty.

What is called karma is what follows.

II. Verse: Loving Goodness Is the Seed of Fruition in Two Lives

If people can subdue their own minds and benefit sentient beings, this is called loving goodness; it is the seed of fruition in this and later lives.

III. Commentary: First Extinguish One’s Own Evil, Then Benefit Others

People possess the three poisons of greed, anger, and delusion and, because they wish to trouble others, give rise to various activities. Those who cultivate goodness first extinguish their own evil; therefore it is said that they subdue their minds and benefit others.

Benefiting others means practicing generosity, keeping precepts, patience, and the rest without troubling sentient beings. This is called benefiting others; it is also called the merit of loving goodness and the seed of pleasant fruition in this and later lives.

Next, there is more to say.

IV. Verse: The Two Kinds of Karma Taught by the Great Sage

The Great Sage taught two kinds of karma: volition and what arises from volition. Within karma’s various particular characters, many kinds of analysis can be given.

V. Commentary: The Two Kinds of Karma Come from the Abhidharma

The Great Sage briefly taught two kinds of karma. The first is volition; the second is what arises from volition. These two kinds of karma are extensively explained in the Abhidharma.

VI. Verse: Volition Is Mental Karma; What Arises from Volition Is Bodily and Verbal Karma

The volition spoken of by the Buddha is mental karma. What arises from volition is bodily and verbal karma.

VII. Commentary: Why Volition Is Called Karma

Volition is an associated mental dharma. Among associated mental dharmas, it can initiate and produce action, and therefore it is called karma. Because of this volition, outward bodily and verbal karma arises.

Although other mind-dharmas and associated mental dharmas can also produce action, volition is the basis of everything done; therefore volition alone is called karma.

The character of this karma should now be explained.

VIII. Verse: Seven Dharmas Disclose the Character of All Karma

Bodily karma and verbal karma each have performed and nonperformed karma. Among these four things, some are wholesome and some unwholesome.

There is also merit arising from use, and demerit arises from use in the same way. Together with volition, these make seven dharmas. These seven disclose the character of all karma.

IX. Commentary: Four Kinds of Verbal Karma, Three of Bodily Karma, and Performance and Nonperformance

Verbal karma means the four kinds of verbal karma. Bodily karma means the three kinds of bodily karma.

These seven karmas have two distinctions: performed karma and nonperformed karma. What is done while acting is called performed karma; what constantly follows and arises after the act is called nonperformed karma. Each of these may be wholesome or unwholesome. Unwholesome means not stopping evil; wholesome means stopping evil.

There is also merit arising from use. Suppose a donor gives something to a recipient. If the recipient uses the gift, the donor obtains two kinds of merit: one arises from the giving itself, and the other from the recipient’s use.

Again, suppose someone shoots another person with an arrow. If the arrow kills that person, there are two kinds of demerit: one arises from shooting and the other from killing. If the arrow only strikes but does not kill, the archer incurs only the demerit of shooting and not the demerit of killing.

Therefore the verse says that demerit and merit arise from use. Together these are called six kinds of karma. The seventh is called volition. These seven constitute the analysis of karma’s character.

This karma has fruition in the present life and fruition in later lives. Since karma and fruition determinately exist, dharmas therefore should not be empty.

X. Answer: If It Remains Until Fruition, It Is Permanent; If It Ceases, No Karma Remains

〔T30 0022a05〕The respondent says:

If karma remains until fruition is undergone, this karma becomes permanent. If karma has ceased, cessation leaves no karma—how could it produce fruition?

If karma could remain until fruition is undergone, it would be a permanently abiding dharma. This cannot be established. Why? Karma bears the marks of arising and ceasing and cannot remain for even a single thought, much less until fruition becomes present.

If one says karma has ceased, cessation means absence. How, then, could it produce fruition?

XI. Question: A Continuum Such as Sprout and the Rest (The Grain-Seed Analogy)

The questioner says:

Just as the continuum of sprout and the rest all arises from a seed, from this continuum fruit is produced. Apart from the seed, there is no continuum.

From the seed there is a continuum, and from the continuum there is fruit. The seed comes first and fruit afterward; therefore, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

In the same way, various mind-dharmas arise in continuity from the initial thought. From this continuum there is fruition; apart from mind, there is no continuum.

From mind there is a continuum, and from the continuum there is fruition. Karma comes first and fruition afterward; therefore, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

XII. Commentary: The Grain Seed and the Initial Thought

Just as a sprout grows from a grain, then stalk, leaves, and the rest arise in continuity from the sprout, and fruit grows from this succession: apart from the seed, no continuum arises. Therefore it is said that from the grain there is a continuum and from the continuum there is fruit. Since the seed comes first and fruit afterward, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

As in the grain-seed analogy, so too with karma and fruit. The initial thought that gives rise to demerit or merit is like a grain seed. Because of this thought, other mind-dharmas and associated mental dharmas arise in continuity until fruition becomes present. Because karma comes first and fruit afterward, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

If fruition existed separately from karma, one would fall into annihilation and permanence.

The causal fruition brought about by wholesome karma is as follows.

XIII. Verse: The Ten White Paths of Karma and White Karmic Fruition

What accomplishes merit is these ten white paths of karma. The pleasures of the five desires in this and later lives are the fruition of white karma.

XIV. Commentary: The List of Ten White Paths of Karma and Their Fruit

White means wholesome and pure. The conditions that accomplish merit arise from these ten white paths of karma: not killing, not stealing, no sexual misconduct, no false speech, no divisive speech, no harsh speech, no useless speech, no jealousy, no anger, and no wrong view. These are called wholesome.

The fruition arising from body, speech, and mind is reputation and material benefit in this life and birth in honored stations among humans and devas in later lives.

Although generosity, respect, and the rest include many forms of merit, briefly stated they are all contained within the ten wholesome paths.

XV. Answer: Your Analysis Entails a Great Many Faults

The respondent says:

If one analyzes as you do, the faults are extremely numerous. Therefore, what you say cannot be established in principle.

If you use a grain as analogy because karma and fruition occur in continuity, the faults are extremely numerous and are not explained here in detail.

Your grain analogy cannot be established. Why? A grain can be touched, has form, and its continuum can be seen. Even after considering this, I still do not accept the account—how much less mind and karma, which are intangible, formless, invisible, and arise and cease without remaining. To explain them through continuity cannot be established.

Further, if the continuum of sprout and the rest proceeds from a grain, does it continue after the grain has ceased, or does it continue without the grain ceasing?

If it continues after the grain has ceased, it becomes causeless. If it continues without the grain ceasing, this single grain would constantly produce many grains. If so, one grain seed would produce every grain in the world. This cannot be established.

Therefore, karma and fruition cannot be established through continuity.

XVI. Question: Another Doctrine Congruent with Karma and Fruition

The questioner says:

Another doctrine congruent with karma and fruition should now be explained, one praised by the Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas, and worthy sages.

It is as follows.

XVII. Verse: The Dharma of Nonloss Is Like a Bond; Karma Is Like Property Owed

The dharma of nonloss is like a bond, and karma like property taken on debt. The nature of this dharma of nonloss is indeterminate, and analysis distinguishes four kinds.

It is not severed by seeing the truths but only by cultivation. Because this dharma of nonloss exists, all karmas have fruition.

If it were severed by seeing the truths while karma extended to a similar stage, faults such as the destruction of karma would follow.

Among all karmas of conditioned activities, some are similar and some dissimilar. When one first receives a body in a given realm, fruition arises independently at that time.

These two kinds of karma undergo fruition in the present life. Some also say that after fruition has been undergone, the karma remains as before.

It ceases either after passing beyond a fruit-stage or after death. Within this, outflowing and nonoutflowing are further distinguished.

XVIII. Commentary: The Bond and Property Owed, and the Four Kinds, Two Severances, and Two Cessations

What is called the dharma of nonloss should be understood as like a bond. What is called karma is like taking property.

This dharma of nonloss may be bound to the desire realm, the form realm, or the formless realm, or it may be unbound to the three realms. When distinguished among wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate, it is only indeterminate. The Abhidharma explains this indeterminate character extensively.

It is not severed by seeing the truths. In passing from one fruit-stage to another, it is severed through cultivation. Thus it is by relying on the dharma of nonloss that all karmas produce fruition.

If it were severed by seeing the truths while karma extended to a similar stage, the fault of destroying karma would follow. This is extensively explained in the Abhidharma.

Further, regarding the dharma of nonloss: within one realm, karmas are similar or dissimilar. When one first receives a body, fruition arises independently; and in the present body, karma further gives rise to karma.

This karma is of two kinds and undergoes fruition according to its weight. Some also say that after this karma has undergone fruition it still exists, because it does not arise and cease thought by thought.

As for ceasing after passing beyond a fruit-stage or ceasing after death: stream-enterers and the rest cease it after passing beyond a fruit-stage, while ordinary persons and arhats cease it after death.

As for distinguishing outflowing and nonoutflowing within this: beginning with stream-enterers and the other worthy sages, outflowing, nonoutflowing, and the rest should be distinguished.

XIX. Answer: This Doctrine Still Does Not Escape the Faults of Annihilation and Permanence

The respondent says: On both sides, this doctrine does not escape the faults of annihilation and permanence; therefore it too should not be accepted.

XX. Question: Then There Would Be No Karma and Fruition

The questioner says: If so, then there would be no karma and no fruition.

XXI. Verse: Though Empty, Not Annihilated; Though Existent, Not Permanent

The respondent says:

Though empty, it is not annihilated; though existent, it is not permanent. Karma and fruition are not lost—this is what the Buddha taught.

XXII. Commentary: Ultimately Empty, There Is Nothing to Annihilate or Lose; Arising from Inversion, It Is Not Permanent

The meaning taught in this treatise is free from annihilation and permanence. Why?

Karma is ultimately empty, bears the character of quiescent extinction, and is separate from intrinsic nature. What dharma is there to annihilate? What dharma is there to lose?

Because of inverted causes and conditions, there is coming and going in saṃsāra; this too is not permanent. Why? If a dharma arises from inversion, it is false and unreal. Because unreal, it is not permanent.

Further, because one greedily clings to inversion and does not know true character, it is said that karma is not lost. This is what the Buddha taught.

Next, there is more to say.

XXIII. Verse: Karmas Originally Do Not Arise Because They Have No Determinate Intrinsic Nature

〔T30 0023a01〕Karmas originally do not arise because they have no determinate intrinsic nature. Nor do karmas cease, because they do not originally arise.

If karma had intrinsic nature, it would be called permanent. What is not performed would still be called karma, while a permanent dharma cannot be performed.

If karma could exist without being performed, there would be demerit without commission; pure conduct would not have been broken, yet the fault of impurity would still be incurred.

This would destroy every convention of worldly language; committing wrong and cultivating merit would have no difference.

If karma were determinate and possessed intrinsic nature in itself, after one had undergone its fruition, one should undergo it once again.

If all worldly karma arises from afflictions and these afflictions are unreal, where could reality be found in karma?

XXIV. Commentary: The Many Faults Entailed by Karma with Determinate Intrinsic Nature

In the ultimate meaning, karmas do not arise. Why? Because they have no intrinsic nature. Because they do not arise, they also do not cease—not because they are permanent and therefore do not cease.

Otherwise, karma’s substance would have to be determinately existent. If karma determinately possessed intrinsic nature, it would be permanent. If permanent, it would be karma not performed. Why? Because a permanent dharma cannot be performed.

Further, if karma could exist without being performed, another person could commit a wrong and this person undergo its fruition. Again, another person could break pure conduct and this person incur the offense. This would destroy worldly convention.

If everything existed beforehand, then in winter one should not plan for spring, nor in spring should one plan for summer. Many such faults follow.

Further, there would be no difference between cultivating merit and committing wrong. Giving rise to such karmas as generosity and keeping precepts is called cultivating merit; giving rise to such karmas as killing and stealing is called committing wrong. If karma exists without being performed, no distinction remains.

Further, if this karma determinately possessed intrinsic nature, after undergoing fruition once, one should undergo it again.

Therefore, your claim that karmic fruition exists because of the dharma of nonloss entails these many faults.

Further, if karma arises from afflictions, these afflictions have no determinate intrinsic nature and exist only through conceptual recollection and discrimination. If afflictions are unreal, how could karma be real? Why? Because the cause has no intrinsic nature, karma too has no intrinsic nature.

XXV. Question: The Body of Fruition Plainly Exists Now

The questioner says: If afflictions and karma lack intrinsic nature and are unreal, still the body of fruition plainly exists now. It therefore should be real.

XXVI. Verse: Afflictions and Karmas Are Empty—How Much More the Bodies?

The respondent says:

Afflictions and karmas are said to be the causes and conditions of the body. Afflictions and karmas themselves are empty—how much more the bodies formed from them?

XXVII. Commentary: Craving Moistens Birth; Karma Produces Higher, Middle, and Lower Fruitions

The worthy sages say that afflictions and karma are the causes and conditions of the body. Within these, craving moistens and enables birth, while karma produces higher, middle, and lower, attractive and ugly, noble and base, and other such fruitions.

Now afflictions and karma, when sought in many ways, have no determinate intrinsic nature. How much less could bodies have determinate fruit? They exist according to causes and conditions.

XXVIII. Question: The Sūtras Speak of One Who Originates Karma

The questioner says: Although you have refuted karma and fruition through various causes and conditions, the sūtras say that one who originates karma exists. Because one who originates karma exists, karma and fruition exist. As it is said:

Obscured by ignorance and bound by the fetter of craving, the present undergoer is neither identical with nor different from the original agent.

The Beginningless Sūtra says that sentient beings, covered by ignorance and bound by the fetter of craving, come and go through beginningless saṃsāra and undergo various sufferings and pleasures.

The one who now undergoes fruition is neither identical with nor different from the one who acted before.

If identical, a person who committed wrong and received the form of a cow would entail that the person did not become the cow and the cow did not become the person. If different, karma and fruition would be lost and fall into causelessness; causelessness is annihilation.

Therefore, the one who now undergoes fruition is neither identical with nor different from the one who acted before.

XXIX. Verse: With Neither Karma nor Agent, Where Could There Be One Who Undergoes the Fruit?

The respondent says:

Karma does not arise from conditions, nor does it arise from nonconditions. Therefore, no one exists who can originate karma.

With neither karma nor agent, how could there be fruit arising from karma? If there is no fruit, how could there be one who undergoes the fruit?

XXX. Commentary: The Person Provisionally Named among the Five Aggregates

If neither karma nor the one who performs karma exists, how could fruition arise from karma? If fruition does not exist, how could there be one who undergoes fruition?

Karma is of three kinds. The person provisionally named among the five aggregates is the agent. When this karma produces a fruit in a good or bad destination, it is called fruition.

If even the one who originates karma does not exist, how much less karma, fruition, and one who undergoes fruition?

XXXI. Question: We Plainly See Sentient Beings Perform Karma and Undergo Fruition

The questioner says: Although you have refuted karma, fruition, and one who originates karma in many ways, we now plainly see sentient beings perform karma and undergo fruition. How is this to be explained?

XXXII. Verse: Like a Conjured Person Who Conjures Another Person

The respondent says:

It is like a person whom the World-Honored One conjures through supernormal power: this conjured person in turn conjures another person.

The first conjured person is called the agent. What the conjured person does is called karma.

Afflictions and karmas, agent and fruition, are all like illusion and dream, like a mirage and an echo.

XXXIII. Commentary: A Conjured Person Teaches Dharma and Gives Alms

It is like the conjured person produced by the Buddha’s supernormal power; this conjured person in turn conjures another person. Like a conjured person, it has no real affair and can merely be seen. Moreover, the conjured person uses verbal karma to teach the Dharma and bodily karma to give alms and so forth. Although these karmas are unreal, they can be seen.

In this way, the body in saṃsāra, the agent, and karma should also be understood.

What are called afflictions are the three poisons; distinguished further, there are ninety-eight tendencies, nine fetters, ten enwrapments, six stains, and immeasurable other afflictions.

What is called karma is bodily, verbal, and mental karma. Distinguished according to this and later lives, there are wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; painful fruition, pleasant fruition, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant fruition; karma with fruition in the present life, karma with fruition in the next life, and karma with fruition in a later life—immeasurable kinds such as these.

What is called the agent is the one who can give rise to afflictions and karmas and can undergo fruition.

What is called fruition is the indeterminate five aggregates produced from wholesome and unwholesome karma.

All these various karmas are empty and without intrinsic nature, like illusion, dream, mirage, and echo.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Three, “Examination of Dharmas, Chapter Eighteen,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: If All Is Ultimately Empty, How Does One Enter?

〔T30 0023c16〕The questioner says: If all dharmas are ultimately empty, without arising or ceasing, and this is called the true character of dharmas, how does one enter it?

The respondent says: By extinguishing attachment to self and what belongs to self, one obtains the emptiness of all dharmas. This wisdom of no-self is called entry.

The questioner says: How do we know that dharmas are without self?

The respondent answers with the following verses.

II. Verses: From the Wisdom of No-Self to the Flavor of Ambrosia

If the self is the five aggregates, the self undergoes arising and ceasing. If the self differs from the five aggregates, it does not have the aggregates’ character.

If no self exists, how could there be what belongs to self? Because self and what belongs to self are extinguished, this is called obtaining the wisdom of no-self.

One who obtains the wisdom of no-self is said to contemplate reality. A person who obtains the wisdom of no-self is exceedingly rare.

Because internal and external self and what belongs to self are utterly extinguished and absent, the various appropriations cease. When appropriation ceases, the body ceases.

Because karma and afflictions cease, this is called release. Karma and afflictions are originally unreal; upon entering emptiness, conceptual proliferation ceases.

〔T30 0024a01〕Buddhas sometimes teach self, and sometimes teach no-self. Yet in the true character of dharmas, there is neither self nor nonself.

In what is called the true character of dharmas, the activities of mind and paths of language are cut off. Without arising or ceasing, it is quiescent like nirvāṇa.

All is real; all is unreal; all is both real and unreal; all is neither real nor unreal. This is called the Dharma of the Buddhas.

Known for oneself and not followed from another, quiescent and without conceptual proliferation, without difference or discrimination: this is called true character.

If a dharma arises from a multitude of conditions, it is neither identical with nor different from its cause. Therefore it is called true character, neither annihilated nor permanent.

Neither one nor different, neither permanent nor annihilated: this is called the flavor of ambrosia through which the World-Honored Ones teach sentient beings.

If a Buddha does not appear in the world and the Buddha’s Dharma has already vanished, the wisdom of pratyekabuddhas can still arise from seclusion.

III. Commentary: Whether Self Is Identical with or Separate from the Aggregates, Neither Gate Stands

Some say that a spiritual self exists. There must then be two possibilities: either the five aggregates are the spiritual self, or another spiritual self exists apart from the five aggregates.

If the five aggregates are the spiritual self, that self bears the marks of arising and ceasing, as stated in the verse. If self is the five aggregates, it bears the marks of arising and ceasing. Why? Because once arisen, it deteriorates. Since the five aggregates bear the marks of arising and ceasing, they are impermanent. Since the five aggregates are impermanent, arising and ceasing themselves are likewise impermanent. Why? Because arising and ceasing also deteriorate once arisen and are therefore impermanent. If the spiritual self is the five aggregates, then because the aggregates are impermanent, the self should likewise be impermanent and bear the marks of arising and ceasing. But this cannot be established.

If a spiritual self exists apart from the five aggregates, it has none of the aggregates’ character, as stated in the verse. If the self differs from the five aggregates, it does not have their character; yet apart from the five aggregates there is no further dharma to indicate. If a dharma existed apart from the five aggregates, by what character and as what dharma would it exist?

If one says the spiritual self exists apart from the five aggregates like space, this too cannot be established. Why? The “Examination of the Six Elements” has already refuted it: no dharma exists that can be called space.

IV. The Spiritual Self Cannot Be Found in Any of the Four Kinds of Warrant

If one claims that the spiritual self exists because there is trustworthy warrant for it, this too cannot be established. Why? There are four kinds of trustworthy warrant. First is trust in a present fact. Second is trust in inferential knowledge, as when one sees smoke and knows there is fire. Third is trust in analogy, as when a land has no brass and gold is used to illustrate it. Fourth is trust in what worthy sages teach, as when hells, heavens, and Uttarakuru are said to exist. No one has seen them, but by trusting the words of sages, one knows.

This spiritual self is unobtainable in every trustworthy warrant: it is absent in present facts and absent in inferential knowledge. Why? Inferential knowledge means first having seen and then knowing by analogy. Someone first sees that where there is fire, there is smoke; later, merely seeing smoke, that person knows there is fire. The case of the spiritual self is not like this. Who first saw the spiritual self joined with the five aggregates and then, seeing the aggregates, knew the spiritual self existed?

Suppose one says inferential knowledge has three kinds: as with the original, as with the remainder, and commonly seen. “As with the original” means that one first saw fire with smoke and now, seeing smoke, knows that fire exists as before. “As with the remainder” is like cooking rice: when one grain is cooked, one knows that all the rest are cooked. “Commonly seen” is like seeing a person walk from here to there and thereby seeing that person’s going. The sun is the same: it emerges in the east and reaches the west. Although no one sees it in the act of going, because a person has the appearance of going, one knows the sun also goes. In the same way, suffering, pleasure, hate, love, awareness, and the rest should have something on which they depend—just as seeing subjects lets one know they must depend upon a king.

None of these accounts can be established. Why? The commonly seen warrant is established only because one first saw a person joined with the dharma of going and reaching another place; later, seeing the sun reach another place, one knows there is going. Yet no one has ever first seen the five aggregates joined with a spiritual self and then, seeing the five aggregates, known that self exists. Therefore, the spiritual self is absent from inference through a shared character.

Nor is there a spiritual self in what worthy sages teach. Why? What worthy sages teach, they first saw with their own eyes and then taught. Further, because the other matters taught by worthy sages are trustworthy, one should know that their teachings about hells and the rest are also trustworthy. The spiritual self is not like this: there is no one who first saw the spiritual self and then spoke of it. Therefore, when the spiritual self is sought among the four warrants and every other warrant, it is unobtainable. Because it is unobtainable, it does not exist; hence there is no distinct spiritual self apart from the five aggregates.

V. Cultivating the Noble Eightfold Path and Obtaining Determinate Wisdom of Neither Self nor What Belongs to Self

Further, in the “Examination of the Faculties,” seeing, seer, and visible object have all been refuted; the spiritual self is refuted in the same way. How much less could a spiritual self exist among false conceptual recollections when even coarse dharmas visible to the eye are unobtainable? Thus one knows there is no self.

Only because there is a self can there be what belongs to self. If there is no self, there is nothing belonging to self. By cultivating the factors of the noble eightfold path and extinguishing the causes and conditions of self and what belongs to self, one obtains determinate wisdom of neither self nor what belongs to self.

VI. Nirvāṇa without Remainder

Further, what is called neither self nor what belongs to self is itself unobtainable in the ultimate meaning. Those without self and what belongs to self can truly see dharmas. Because ordinary people’s wisdom-eyes are obstructed by self and what belongs to self, they cannot see reality. Now worthy sages are without self and what belongs to self, and therefore their various afflictions also cease. Because afflictions cease, they can see the true character of dharmas.

Because internal and external self and what belongs to self cease, the various appropriations cease. Because appropriations cease, immeasurable later bodies also all cease. This is called nirvāṇa without remainder.

VII. Nirvāṇa with Remainder

The questioner says: What, then, of nirvāṇa with remainder?

The respondent says: Because the various afflictions and karmas cease, the mind is said to obtain release. These afflictions and karmas all arise from conceptual recollection and discrimination and have no real substance; the various conceptual recollections and discriminations all arise from conceptual proliferation. When one obtains the ultimately empty true character of dharmas, the various conceptual proliferations cease. This is called nirvāṇa with remainder.

VIII. According to Sentient Beings’ Capacities, Buddhas Teach Either Self or No-Self

Such is the dharma of true character. Because Buddhas observe sentient beings with omniscience, they teach them in many different ways: they teach that self exists, and they teach no-self.

To those whose minds are not yet mature, who have no share in nirvāṇa and do not know to fear wrongdoing, self is taught. Some have already attained the path and know that dharmas are empty; for them self is spoken of only as a provisional name, and teaching self entails no fault. Others cultivate such merits as generosity and keeping precepts and weary of the suffering of saṃsāra, yet fear nirvāṇa as eternal extinction; for them, the Buddha teaches no-self.

Dharmas are merely formed by the conjunction of causes and conditions. At arising they arise emptily; at ceasing they cease emptily. Therefore no-self is taught, while self is spoken of only as a provisional name. Those who have attained the path know that no-self does not fall into annihilation; therefore teaching no-self entails no fault.

Thus the verse says: Buddhas teach self and also teach no-self; within reality, they teach neither self nor nonself.

IX. No-Self Must Not Be Grasped as Determinate Either

The questioner says: If no-self is real and self is taught only according to worldly convention, what fault is there?

The respondent says: No-self is taught precisely to refute the dharma of self. Since self is determinately unobtainable, how could there be a determinate no-self? If one grasps that no-self determinately exists, this is annihilation and instead gives rise to craving attachment. As the Prajñā teaches: for a bodhisattva, grasping self is not practice, and grasping no-self is not practice either.

X. In True Character, the Paths of Language Are Cut Off and All Activities of Mind Cease

The questioner says: If neither self nor nonself, neither empty nor nonempty, is taught, what does the Buddha’s Dharma ultimately teach?

The respondent says: The Buddha teaches the true character of dharmas. In true character, there is no path of language, and the various activities of mind cease. Mind arises through conditions by grasping marks and exists because of the fruition of karma from past lives. It cannot truly see dharmas, and therefore the activities of mind are said to cease.

The questioner says: If ordinary people’s minds cannot see reality, the minds of worthy sages should be able to see it. Why say that all activities of mind cease?

〔T30 0025a01〕The respondent says: The true character of dharmas is nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is called cessation, and because this cessation tends toward nirvāṇa, it too is called cessation. If mind were real, what need would there be for gateways to release such as emptiness? Among the various meditative absorptions, why would the attainment of cessation rank first? Moreover, all ultimately return to nirvāṇa without remainder. Therefore one should know that all activities of mind are false; because false, they should cease.

The true character of dharmas transcends the various associated mental dharmas. Without arising or ceasing, it bears the character of quiescence, like nirvāṇa.

XI. Why Say “Like Nirvāṇa”?

The questioner says: The sūtras teach that dharmas have always borne the character of quiescence, which itself is nirvāṇa. Why say “like nirvāṇa”?

The respondent says: Those attached to dharmas discriminate two kinds of dharma: the world and nirvāṇa. They are willing to say that nirvāṇa is quiescent but not that the world is quiescent. This treatise teaches that all dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature and bear the character of quiescence. Because those attached to dharmas do not understand, nirvāṇa is used as an analogy. Just as you say nirvāṇa’s character is empty, signless, quiescent, and without conceptual proliferation, so too are all worldly dharmas.

XII. The Four Alternatives Are Skillful Means Adapted to Capacity

The questioner says: If the Buddha teaches neither self nor nonself, while the various activities of mind cease and the path of language is cut off, how can people be made to know the true character of dharmas?

The respondent says: Buddhas have immeasurable power in skillful means, and dharmas have no determinate character. To liberate sentient beings, they sometimes teach that all is real, sometimes that all is unreal, sometimes that all is both real and unreal, and sometimes that all is neither real nor unreal.

All is real because, when the real substance of dharmas is sought, everything enters the one equal character of ultimate meaning—namely, no-character. It is like many streams of different colors and flavors that, upon entering the great ocean, become one color and one flavor.

All is unreal because before dharmas have entered true character, each one examined separately has no reality and exists only through the conjunction of many conditions.

All is both real and unreal because sentient beings are of three grades: higher, middle, and lower. Those of the higher grade contemplate dharmas’ character as neither real nor unreal. Those of the middle grade contemplate all dharmas as real and all as unreal. Those of the lower grade have shallow wisdom and contemplate part of dharmas’ character as real and part as unreal: they regard nirvāṇa, an unconditioned dharma, as indestructible and therefore real, and saṃsāra, a conditioned dharma, as false and therefore unreal.

Neither real nor unreal is taught to refute the two extremes of real and unreal.

XIII. Elsewhere One Leaves the Four Alternatives; Here the Four Alternatives Are Taught

The questioner says: Elsewhere the Buddha teaches departure from neither existence nor nonexistence. Why is neither existence nor nonexistence here said to be the Buddha’s teaching?

The respondent says: Elsewhere this is taught to refute four kinds of craving attachment. Here, however, there is no conceptual proliferation within the four alternatives; on hearing the Buddha’s teaching, one can attain the path. Therefore, neither real nor unreal is taught.

XIV. The Character of True Character: Not Following Another, Quiescent, without Conceptual Proliferation

The questioner says: Now that we know the Buddha teaches through the conditions of these four alternatives, by what character can one who has obtained the true character of dharmas be known? What is true character like?

The respondent says: Such a person can refrain from following another. Not following another means that even if non-Buddhists display supernormal power and say this is the path or this is not the path, one trusts one’s own mind and does not follow them. Even if non-Buddhists transform their bodies and one does not know they are not the Buddha, because one well understands true character, one’s mind cannot be turned.

Because no dharma can be taken or rejected in this true character, it is called the character of quiescence. Because it is quiescent, conceptual proliferation cannot proliferate about it. Conceptual proliferation has two kinds: the discourse of craving and the discourse of views. Neither exists here. Because both kinds of conceptual proliferation are absent, there is no conceptual recollection or discrimination and no character of difference. This is called true character.

XV. A Dependently Arisen Dharma Is Neither Identical with nor Different from Its Cause, and Therefore Neither Annihilated nor Permanent

The questioner says: If dharmas are all empty, does this not fall into annihilation? And does nonarising and nonceasing not fall into permanence?

The respondent says: It is not so. As explained before, true character is without conceptual proliferation, the character of mind is quiescent, and the path of language is cut off. You now greedily cling to grasping marks and therefore see the faults of annihilation and permanence in the dharma of true character. One who obtains true character says that dharmas arise from a multitude of conditions and are neither identical with nor different from their causes; therefore, they are neither annihilated nor permanent. If fruit differed from cause, that would be annihilation. If fruit did not differ from cause, that would be permanence.

XVI. Benefit: The Flavor of Ambrosia and Three Ways of Attaining the Path

The questioner says: If one understands in this way, what benefit is ultimately gained?

The respondent says: If practitioners can penetrate this meaning, then regarding all dharmas they are neither one nor different, neither annihilated nor permanent. In this way, they at once extinguish the various afflictions and conceptual proliferations and attain the constant bliss of nirvāṇa. Therefore, the Buddhas are said to teach sentient beings through the flavor of ambrosia. As people in the world say, one who obtains the heavenly draught of ambrosia is without age, illness, death, or any decline and distress. This dharma of true character is the genuine flavor of ambrosia.

The Buddha taught three modes of true character. If one obtains the true character of dharmas and extinguishes the various afflictions, this is called the Śrāvaka teaching. If one gives rise to great compassion and awakens the unsurpassed mind, this is called the Mahāyāna. If a Buddha does not appear in the world and the Buddha’s Dharma is absent, a pratyekabuddha’s wisdom arises from seclusion.

After a Buddha has finished liberating sentient beings, entered nirvāṇa without remainder, and the teaching left behind has vanished, if someone from a past life is due to attain the path, that person briefly contemplates the conditions for disenchantment, enters the mountain forest alone, withdraws from clamor, and attains the path. Such a person is called a pratyekabuddha.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle three, “Examination of Time, Chapter Nineteen,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Question: Because the Three Times Depend upon One Another, Time Should Exist

〔T30 0025c02〕The questioner says: Time should exist, because it is established through mutual causation and dependence. Because past time exists, future and present time exist; because present time exists, past and future time exist; because future time exists, past and present time exist. Dharmas such as upper, middle, and lower and one and different likewise exist through mutual causation and dependence.

The respondent answers as follows.

2. Verse: If the Two Times Exist Because of the Past, They Should Be within the Past

If future and present time exist because of past time, then future and present time should be within past time.

3. Commentary: If They Are within the Past, All Three Times Become Past

If future and present time exist because of past time, then future and present time should be within past time. Why? Whenever a dharma is established in dependence upon a place, that dharma should exist in that place. For example, because light is established through a lamp, wherever the lamp exists, light should exist. In the same way, if future and present time are established because of past time, then future and present time should be within past time.

If future and present time existed within past time, then all three times would be called past time. Why? Because future and present time would be within past time. If every time were entirely past, then future and present time would be absent, because all would be past. If future and present time were absent, past time should likewise be absent. Why? Because past time is called past time only in dependence upon future and present time.

Just as future and present time are established because of past time, past time should likewise be established because of future and present time. Since future and present time are now absent, past time should also be absent. Therefore, the earlier statement that future and present time are established because of past time cannot be established.

If one says that future and present time are absent within past time yet can still be established because of past time, this too cannot be established. Why?

4. Verse: If They Are Not within the Past, How Can They Exist Because of the Past?

If future and present are absent within past time, then how could future and present time exist because of past time?

5. Commentary: If Each Has a Different Mark, They Do Not Depend upon One Another—Like a Jar and a Robe

If future and present time are not within past time, how can future and present time be established because of past time? Why? If the three times each have a different mark, they should not be established through mutual causation and dependence. They would be like such objects as a jar and a robe, each established separately and not dependent upon the other.

Yet without dependence upon past time, future and present time are not established; without dependence upon present time, past and future time are not established; without dependence upon future time, past and present time are not established. You previously said that although future and present time are absent within past time, they can still be established because of past time. This cannot be established.

6. Question: What Fault Is There If They Are Not Established Because of the Past?

〔T30 0026a04〕The questioner says: What fault is there if future and present time are not established because of past time?

The respondent answers as follows.

7. Verse: Without Dependence upon the Past, Both Times Are Absent

Without dependence upon past time, there is no future time and no present time. Therefore, both times are absent.

8. Commentary: Without Dependence upon the Past, Where Could Present and Future Exist?

Without dependence upon past time, future and present time cannot be established. Why? If present time exists without depending upon past time, where does present time exist? The same applies to future time: where does future time exist? Therefore, without dependence upon past time, future and present time are absent. Because time exists only through such mutual dependence, time in truth is absent.

9. Verse: The Other Two Times and Upper, Middle, Lower, One, and Different Are Likewise All Absent

Because of this meaning, one knows that the other two times, together with such dharmas as upper, middle, and lower and one and different, are all absent.

10. Commentary: Apart from Upper There Is No Middle or Lower; One and Different Depend upon Each Other

Because of this meaning, one should know that the other times—future and present—should likewise be absent, and that such dharmas as upper, middle, and lower and one and different should all likewise be absent.

For example, because there is an upper, there are a middle and a lower; apart from upper there is no middle or lower. If middle and lower existed apart from upper, they should not depend upon one another. Because of one, there is different; because of different, there is one. If one truly existed, it should not exist because of different; if different truly existed, it should not exist because of one. Dharmas of this kind should likewise be refuted in this way.

11. Question: Years, Months, Days, and Moments Differ, So Time Is Known to Exist

The questioner says: Since distinctions such as years, months, days, and moments exist, one knows that time exists.

The respondent answers as follows.

12. Verse: Neither Time at Rest nor Time Gone Can Be Found; Time Exists Because of Things

Time at rest cannot be found, and time gone cannot be found. If time cannot be found, how can the mark of time be spoken of?

Time exists because of things; apart from things, where is time? Things themselves have no possession—how much less could time exist!

13. Commentary: Because Things Are Absent, Time Is Absent

If time does not remain at rest, it should not be findable; yet time at rest likewise is absent. If time cannot be found, how can the mark of time be spoken of? If there is no mark of time, there is no time.

Time is named because things arise; apart from things there is no time. In the preceding chapters, things have already been refuted through many kinds of causes and conditions. Since things are absent, where could time exist?

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle three, “Examination of Cause and Fruit, Chapter Twenty,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Whether the Fruit Is Present or Absent within Conjunction, Neither End Can Be Explained

〔T30 0026b02〕The questioner says: When many causes and conditions conjoin, a fruit is visibly seen to arise. Therefore, one should know that this fruit exists from the conjunction of many conditions.

The respondent says:

　　If a fruit arises when many conditions conjoin,
　　it already exists within the conjunction; why would conjunction need to produce it?

If one says that a fruit arises when many causes and conditions conjoin, then this fruit already exists within the conjunction. To say that what already exists is nevertheless produced from conjunction cannot be established. Why? If the fruit already had a determinate body, it should not arise again from conjunction.

The questioner says: Although the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions, the fruit arises from those conditions. What fault is there in saying this?

The respondent says:

　　If the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions,
　　how can one say that it arises from the conjunction of many conditions?

To say that a fruit arises from the conjunction of many conditions means that although the fruit is absent within the conjunction, it nevertheless arises from conjunction. This cannot be established. Why? If a thing lacks intrinsic nature, that thing ultimately does not arise.

Further:

　　If a fruit is present within the conjunction of many conditions,
　　it should be obtainable within that conjunction, yet in fact it cannot be found.

If one says that a fruit exists within the conjunction of many conditions, then if the fruit is form, it should be visible to the eye; if it is not form, it should be knowable to the mind. Yet in fact the fruit cannot be found within the conjunction. Therefore, the claim that the fruit is present within conjunction cannot be established.

Further:

　　If the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions,
　　then those causes and conditions would be the same as noncauses and nonconditions.

If the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions, then those causes and conditions are equivalent to noncauses and nonconditions. For example, milk is a cause and condition for curds. If curds are absent within milk, they are likewise absent within water. If curds are absent within milk, milk is the same as water, and one should not say that curds come only from milk. Therefore, the claim that the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions cannot be established.

2. The Cause Ceases after Serving as Cause for the Fruit, or Ceases without Serving as Cause

The questioner says: The cause ceases only after serving as cause for the fruit. Thus, cause and fruit both exist, and the preceding faults do not arise.

The respondent says:

　　If a cause serves as cause for the fruit and ceases after serving as cause,
　　that cause has two bodies: one gives, and one ceases.

If the cause ceases only after serving as cause for the fruit, that cause has two bodies: one is called the cause that gives the fruit, and one the cause that ceases. This cannot be established, because one dharma does not have two bodies. Therefore, the claim that a cause ceases after serving as cause for the fruit cannot be established.

The questioner says: What fault is there if the cause ceases without having served as cause for the fruit, yet a fruit still arises?

The respondent says:

　　If the cause has already ceased without serving as cause for the fruit,
　　and the fruit arises after the cause ceases, this fruit is causeless.

If this cause ceases without having served as cause for the fruit, the fruit arises only after the cause has ceased and is therefore a causeless fruit. This cannot be established. Why? Among all fruits visibly seen, none arises without a cause. Therefore, your claim that the cause can cease without serving as cause for the fruit and a fruit can still arise cannot be established.

3. Arising Simultaneously, or the Fruit Preceding the Conditions

The questioner says: What fault is there if a fruit arises at the very time when many conditions conjoin?

The respondent says:

　　If a fruit arises at the time when many conditions conjoin,
　　producer and what is to be produced would both exist simultaneously.

If a fruit arises at the time when many conditions conjoin, producer and what is to be produced would both exist simultaneously. But this is not so. Why? A father and son, for example, cannot be born at the same time. Therefore, your claim that a fruit arises at the time when many conditions conjoin cannot be established.

The questioner says: What fault is there if the fruit arises first and the many conditions conjoin afterward?

The respondent says:

　　If the fruit arises first and the many conditions conjoin afterward,
　　it is apart from causes and conditions and is called a causeless fruit.

If a fruit arises before the many conditions have conjoined, this cannot be established. Because the fruit is apart from causes and conditions, it is called a causeless fruit. Therefore, your claim that the fruit arises before the many conditions conjoin cannot be established.

4. The Cause Transforming into the Fruit: A Lump of Clay and Milk-to-Curds Are Not the Same

The questioner says: What fault is there if the cause ceases and transforms into the fruit?

The respondent says:

　　If the cause transforms into the fruit, the cause itself reaches the fruit;
　　then the previously arisen cause arises once more after having arisen.

There are two kinds of cause: one arises before, and one arises together. If the cause ceases and transforms into the fruit, the cause that arose before should turn back and arise once more. But this is not so. Why? What has already arisen should not arise again. Nor is it correct to say that this very cause transforms into the fruit. Why? If it remains identical, it is not called transformation; if it has transformed, it cannot be called identical with the cause.

〔T30 0027a04〕The questioner says: The cause is not wholly extinguished; only its name ceases, while the body of the cause transforms into the fruit—as when a lump of clay becomes a jar, losing the name lump of clay while the name jar arises.

The respondent says: A lump of clay first ceases and then a jar arises; this is not called transformation. Moreover, the body of the lump of clay does not produce only one thing: jars, basins, urns, and the rest all come from clay. If lump of clay is only a name, there is nothing that could transform into a jar. What is called transformation is like milk transforming into curds. Therefore, your claim that although the cause’s name ceases, the cause transforms into the fruit cannot be established.

5. A Cause Already Ceased, and a Cause Already Pervading the Fruit

The questioner says: Although the cause has ceased, it can produce the fruit. Therefore, the fruit exists, and the preceding faults do not arise.

The respondent says:

　　How can a cause that has already ceased still produce a fruit?
　　And if the cause remains within the fruit, how can the cause produce the fruit?

If the cause has already ceased, how can it still produce a fruit? If the cause has not ceased but conjoins with the fruit, how can it produce the fruit again?

The questioner says: This cause pervasively possesses its fruit, and the fruit arises from it.

The respondent says:

　　If the cause already pervasively possesses the fruit, what further fruit would it produce?
　　Whether the cause sees the fruit or does not see it, neither can produce the fruit.

If this cause does not see the fruit, it still should not produce the fruit—how much less if it sees it! If the cause itself does not see the fruit, it should not produce the fruit. Why? If it does not see the fruit, the fruit does not follow the cause. Moreover, since the fruit does not yet exist, how could it produce the fruit? If the cause has already seen the fruit, it should not produce it again, because the fruit already exists.

Further:

　　A past cause, with respect to a past fruit
　　and to future and present fruits, ultimately does not conjoin.

　　A future cause, with respect to a future fruit
　　and to present and past fruits, ultimately does not conjoin.

　　A present cause, with respect to a present fruit
　　and to future and past fruits, ultimately does not conjoin.

A past fruit does not conjoin with a past, future, or present cause; a future fruit does not conjoin with a future, present, or past cause; a present fruit does not conjoin with a present, future, or past cause. Thus, these three kinds of fruit ultimately do not conjoin with causes in the past, future, or present.

6. Whether Conjoined or Not, Empty or Not Empty, the Cause Cannot Produce the Fruit

Further:

　　If cause and fruit are not conjoined, how can the cause produce the fruit?
　　If cause and fruit are already conjoined, how can the cause produce the fruit?

If cause and fruit are not conjoined, there is no fruit; since there is no fruit, how can the cause produce it? If one says that the cause produces the fruit when cause and fruit conjoin, this too is incorrect. Why? If the fruit is within the cause, then the fruit already exists within the cause; how could it arise again?

Further:

　　If the cause is empty and has no fruit, how can the cause produce the fruit?
　　If the cause is not empty and already has the fruit, how can the cause produce the fruit?

If the cause has no fruit, then because it has no fruit the cause is empty. How could the cause produce the fruit? It is like a person who has not conceived: how could that person bear a child? If the cause already has the fruit, because the fruit already exists it should not be produced again.

Going one step further, it is now time to speak of the fruit.

7. The Fruit Itself: Neither a Nonempty Fruit nor an Empty Fruit Arises or Ceases

　　If the fruit is not empty, it does not arise; if the fruit is not empty, it does not cease;
　　because the fruit is not empty, it neither arises nor ceases.

　　Because the fruit is empty, it does not arise; because the fruit is empty, it does not cease;
　　because the fruit is empty, it neither arises nor ceases.

If the fruit is not empty, it should neither arise nor cease. Why? If the fruit already exists determinately within the cause, it need not arise again; because there is no arising, there is no ceasing. Therefore, because the fruit is not empty, it does not arise or cease. If one says that because the fruit is empty it can arise and cease, this too is incorrect. Why? If the fruit is empty, emptiness means having nothing whatsoever; where could arising or ceasing occur? Therefore, because the fruit is empty, it does not arise or cease.

Going one step further, cause and fruit will now be refuted through one and different.

8. Neither One nor Different Is Established: The Fruit Arises Neither from Conjoined nor Unconjoined Conditions

　　To say that cause and fruit are one ultimately cannot be established;
　　to say that cause and fruit are different likewise cannot be established.

　　If cause and fruit are one, producer and what is produced become one;
　　if cause and fruit are different, the cause becomes the same as a noncause.

　　If the fruit determinately has intrinsic nature, what would the cause produce?
　　If the fruit determinately lacks intrinsic nature, what again would the cause produce?

　　If the cause does not produce the fruit, it has no mark of being a cause;
　　if it has no mark of being a cause, who could possess this fruit?

　　If conjunction arises from many causes and conditions,
　　conjunction itself does not arise; how could it produce the fruit?

　　Therefore, the fruit arises neither from conjoined nor unconjoined conditions;
　　if there is fundamentally no fruit, where could a dharma of conjunction exist?

This dharma of the conjunction of many conditions cannot produce its own body. Since its own body is absent, how could it produce the fruit? Therefore, the fruit arises neither from the conjunction of many conditions nor from nonconjunction. If there is fundamentally no fruit, where could a dharma of conjunction exist?

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle three, “Examination of Formation and Dissolution, Chapter Twenty-One,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Question: Ruin Plainly Present before the Eyes

〔T30 0027c12〕The questioner says: All things in the world presently display the mark of ruin. Therefore, destruction exists.

The respondent answers as follows.

2. Verse: No Destruction Apart from or Together with Formation; No Formation Apart from or Together with Destruction

Apart from formation or together with formation, no destruction exists there; apart from destruction or together with destruction, no formation exists there.

Qingmu explains: whether formation exists or is absent, destruction is absent in both cases; whether destruction exists or is absent, formation is absent in both cases. Why?

3. Verse: Examining the Four Gates One by One

If separated from formation, how could destruction exist? As death apart from birth—this cannot be so.

If formation and destruction exist together, how could formation and destruction exist? Like birth and death in the world, they cannot both occur at one time.

If separated from destruction, how could formation exist? Impermanence has never, even for an instant, been absent from dharmas.

4. Commentary: Qingmu Explains Each Gate

Apart from formation, destruction cannot be found. Why? If destruction existed apart from formation, it would not exist because of formation and would be causeless; moreover, no formed dharma would exist to be destroyed. Formation means the conjunction of many conditions; destruction means the dispersal of many conditions. If destruction existed apart from formation, then without formation what would be destroyed? Without a jar, one cannot say that a jar is destroyed. Therefore, apart from formation there is no destruction.

If one says that destruction exists together with formation, this too cannot be established. Why? Dharmas are first separately established and afterward conjoin; a conjoined dharma is not apart from difference. If destruction is apart from difference, destruction is causeless. Therefore, together with formation there is likewise no destruction.

If both apart from destruction and together with destruction there is no formation—first consider separation from destruction. If formation existed apart from destruction, formation would be permanent, and permanence is precisely the mark of indestructibility. Yet in fact no dharma is seen that permanently bears the mark of indestructibility. Therefore, apart from destruction there is no formation.

If formation existed together with destruction, this too cannot be established. Formation and destruction contradict one another; how could both exist at the same time? A person, for example, cannot have hair and have no hair at the same time. Formation and destruction are likewise so. Therefore, formation together with destruction cannot be established. Why? Suppose one who discriminates dharmas says that destruction is constantly present within formation. This too cannot be established. Why? If destruction were constantly present within formation, there should be no mark of remaining; yet remaining does in fact occur. Therefore, whether apart from destruction or together with destruction, formation should not exist.

Further:

5. Verse and Commentary: Neither Together nor Apart Is Possible

〔T30 0028a11〕Together with destruction there is no formation; apart from destruction there is likewise no formation. Since both are impossible, how could formation exist?

Qingmu explains: together with destruction there is no formation, and apart from destruction there is no formation. If together, the two dharmas contradict one another; how could they occur at one time? If apart, formation is causeless. Neither gate is established, so how could formation exist? If one asserts formation, one should explain the reason.

6. Exhaustion and Nonexhaustion

The questioner says: Dharmas displaying the mark of exhaustion and extinction are presently found. Such a dharma may be called exhausted or not exhausted. Therefore, formation and destruction should exist.

The respondent says in verse: if exhausted, there is no formation; if not exhausted, there is likewise no formation. If exhausted, there is no destruction; if not exhausted, there is likewise no destruction.

Qingmu explains: dharmas constantly cease and are exhausted thought by thought, day and night; what is past does not remain, like flowing water. This is called exhaustion. It cannot be appropriated or spoken, like a mirage with no determinate intrinsic nature obtainable. Since no determinate intrinsic nature can be found in exhaustion, how can one discriminate and say that formation exists? Therefore, exhaustion does not establish formation. Since formation is absent, destruction likewise should not exist; therefore, it is said that within exhaustion there is no destruction.

Further, because arising and ceasing continue thought by thought without interruption, this is called nonexhaustion. If such a dharma is determined to be permanently abiding and unbroken, how can one discriminate and say, “Now is the time of formation”? Therefore, within nonexhaustion there is no formation. Since formation is absent, destruction is absent; therefore, within nonexhaustion there is likewise no destruction. When sought in this way, a real thing cannot be found. Thus, there is no formation and no destruction.

7. Can a Dharma and Formation-Destruction Be Separated from One Another?

The questioner says: Set the matter of formation and destruction aside. What fault is there if only the existence of a dharma is established?

The respondent says in verse: apart from formation and destruction, no dharma exists either; apart from a dharma, formation and destruction likewise do not exist.

Qingmu explains the statement that no dharma exists apart from formation and destruction. If a dharma has neither formation nor destruction, that dharma should either be absent or permanent. Yet no permanent dharma exists in the world. Your claim that a dharma exists apart from formation and destruction cannot be established.

The questioner says: What fault is there if one separates from the dharma and retains only formation and destruction?

The respondent says: To have formation and destruction apart from a dharma likewise cannot be established. Why? Apart from the dharma, who forms and who is destroyed? Therefore, formation and destruction apart from a dharma cannot be established.

Further:

8. Empty and Nonempty

If the intrinsic nature of dharmas is empty, who could have formation and destruction? If intrinsic nature is not empty, formation and destruction likewise do not exist.

Qingmu explains: if the intrinsic nature of dharmas is empty, where within emptiness could formation and destruction exist? If the intrinsic nature of dharmas is not empty, nonempty means determinately existent; formation and destruction likewise should not exist.

Further:

9. One and Different

If formation and destruction are one, this cannot be established; if formation and destruction are different, this likewise cannot be established.

Qingmu explains: when formation and destruction are sought as one, they cannot be found. Why? Because their marks differ and because they receive many discriminations. When formation and destruction are sought as different, they likewise cannot be found. Why? Because they have no separate bodies and because there is no cause.

Further:

10. Seeing Arising and Ceasing with the Eye

If one says that because arising and ceasing are seen with the eye, arising and ceasing truly exist, then one sees arising and ceasing through delusion.

Qingmu explains: if one says that arising and ceasing are seen with the eye, how can they be refuted through speech? This cannot be established. Why? Arising and ceasing seen with the eye occur through ignorance and inversion. One should see that the intrinsic nature of dharmas is empty, unfixed, like an illusion and a dream. Ordinary people obtained these eyes through inverted causes and conditions in prior lives; through the causes and conditions of recollection, conception, and discrimination in this life, they say that the eye sees arising and ceasing. Within the ultimate meaning, arising and ceasing in truth do not exist. This has already been explained at length in “Examination of the Marks.”

Further:

11. Dharma and Nondharma Do Not Produce One Another

From a dharma no dharma arises, nor does a nondharma arise; from a nondharma neither a dharma nor a nondharma arises.

Qingmu explains “from a dharma no dharma arises”: whether it is said to lose or to arrive, neither account can be established. If a dharma arises from a dharma, whether through arriving or losing, it becomes causeless; causelessness falls into annihilation and permanence. If what has already arrived arises as a dharma from a dharma, then although this dharma has arrived it is called arising: it becomes permanent; it also arises once more after having arisen; and it likewise arises causelessly. This cannot be established. If what has already been lost arises as a dharma from a dharma, then the cause has been lost and the producer is causeless; therefore, a dharma likewise does not arise through loss.

“From a dharma no nondharma arises”: nondharma means having nothing whatsoever, while dharma means existence. How could a mark of nonexistence arise from a mark of existence? Therefore, from a dharma no nondharma arises.

“From a nondharma no dharma arises”: nondharma means absence. How can absence produce existence? If existence arose from absence, it would be causeless, and causelessness has great faults. Therefore, a dharma does not arise from a nondharma.

“From a nondharma no nondharma arises”: nondharma means having nothing whatsoever. How could having nothing whatsoever produce having nothing whatsoever? A hare’s horn, for example, does not produce a turtle’s hair. Therefore, a nondharma does not arise from a nondharma.

12. Arising from Self, Other, or Both

The questioner says: Although dharma and nondharma do not arise under the many preceding discriminations, at least a dharma should be able to produce a dharma.

The respondent says in verse: a dharma does not arise from itself, another, or self and other together. How, then, could arising exist?

Qingmu explains: before a dharma arises, it has nothing whatsoever; since it cannot produce itself, a dharma does not arise from self. If a dharma has not arisen, another is likewise absent; because another is absent, it cannot be said to arise from another. Further, before arising there is no self; without self there is likewise no other, so both together cannot produce either. If none of these three produces, how could a dharma arise from a dharma?

Further:

13. Appropriated Dharmas and the Two Extremes of Annihilation and Permanence

If there is an appropriated dharma, one falls into annihilation or permanence. One should know that the appropriated dharma is either permanent or impermanent.

Qingmu explains: appropriating a dharma means discriminating, “This is wholesome, this is unwholesome; this is permanent, this is impermanent,” and so forth. Such a person necessarily falls into either the view of permanence or the view of annihilation. Why? The appropriated dharma can only be one of two kinds: permanent or impermanent. Neither can be established. Why? If permanent, one falls into the extreme of permanence; if impermanent, one falls into the extreme of annihilation.

14. Can Continuity of Cause and Fruit Avoid Annihilation and Permanence?

The questioner says: One who appropriates dharmas does not fall into annihilation or permanence; because cause and fruit are continuous, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

〔T30 0029a01〕Qingmu says: Someone may trust, appropriate, discriminate, and explain dharmas without falling into annihilation and permanence. A sūtra, for example, says that the five aggregates are impermanent, suffering, empty, and not-self, yet they are not annihilated; it also says that demerit and merit are not lost through immeasurable kalpas, yet they are not permanent. Why? Because the causes and fruits of these dharmas constantly arise and cease in continuity, coming and going without interruption. Because they arise and cease, they are not permanent; because they are continuous, they are not annihilated.

The respondent says in verse: if cause and fruit arise and cease, continuous and unbroken—because what ceases does not arise again, the cause is annihilated.

Qingmu explains: you say that the causes and fruits of dharmas are continuous, and therefore neither annihilated nor permanent. Yet if a dharma that has ceased is gone and does not arise again, the cause has been cut off. If the cause is cut off, how can continuity exist? What has ceased does not arise.

Further:

15. Abiding in Intrinsic Nature, and Nirvāṇa Falling into Annihilation

If a dharma abides in its intrinsic nature, it should not possess both existence and nonexistence; if nirvāṇa extinguishes continuity, it falls into annihilation.

Qingmu explains: if a dharma is determinately within the mark of existence, at that time it has no mark of nonexistence. If a jar, for example, is determinately within the mark of jar, at that time it has no mark of loss or destruction. When the jar exists, there is no mark of loss or destruction; when the jar is absent, there is likewise no mark of loss or destruction. Why? If there is no jar, there is nothing to destroy. For this reason, ceasing cannot be found. Apart from ceasing, arising is likewise absent. Why? Because arising and ceasing exist through mutual dependence. Further, because the faults of permanence and the rest follow, one dharma should not possess both existence and nonexistence.

Further, you previously said that because cause and fruit arise and cease in continuity, one can appropriate dharmas without falling into annihilation or permanence. This cannot be established. Why? You say that because cause and fruit are continuous, there is continuity of the three modes of existence, and that extinguishing this continuity is called nirvāṇa. If so, at the time of nirvāṇa one should fall into annihilation, because the continuity of the three modes of existence has been extinguished.

Further:

16. First Existence and Later Existence

If the first existence ceases, there is no later existence; if the first existence does not cease, there is likewise no later existence.

Qingmu explains: first existence means existence in this life, and later existence means existence in the next. If the first existence ceases and later existence follows, the later existence is causeless. This cannot be established, so one cannot say that later existence occurs after the first existence ceases. If the first existence does not cease, later existence likewise should not exist. Why? If later existence occurs before the first existence has ceased, there are two existences at one time. This cannot be established, so if the first existence does not cease, there is no later existence.

The questioner says: later existence does not arise after the first existence has ceased or while it has not ceased; it arises precisely at the time of ceasing.

The respondent says in verse: if later existence arises at the time when the first existence ceases, the time of ceasing is one existence and the time of arising is one existence.

Qingmu explains: if later existence arises at the time when the first existence ceases, two existences coexist at the same time: one existence belongs to the time of ceasing and one to the time of arising.

The questioner says: it is not so that two existences coexist at the times of ceasing and arising. Yet one presently sees later existence arise when the first existence ceases.

The respondent says in verse: if arising and ceasing are said to occur at the same time, one should die within these very five aggregates and be born within these very five aggregates.

Qingmu explains: if the times of arising and ceasing are one time without two existences, yet one says that later existence arises as first existence ceases, then one should be born in the very same aggregates in which one dies, not in another set of aggregates. Why? The one who dies is precisely the one who is born. Such contradictory dharmas as death and birth should not occur at the same time and place. Therefore, your earlier statement—that the times of ceasing and arising are one time without two existences, and that one presently sees later existence arise when first existence ceases—cannot be established.

Further:

17. Seeking Continuity through the Three Times

Seeking existence through the three times, continuity cannot be found; if it is absent within the three times, where could continuity of existence exist?

Qingmu explains: the three modes of existence are existence in the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm. Because true wisdom has not been obtained throughout beginningless saṃsāra, continuity of the three modes of existence constantly occurs. Yet now, when carefully sought through the three times, it cannot be found. If existence is absent within the three times, where could continuity of existence exist? One should know that the so-called continuity of existence exists through ignorance and inversion; in reality, it is absent.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle four, “Examination of the Tathāgata, Chapter Twenty-Two,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Question: Can Titles of Honor Prove That a Tathāgata Exists?

〔T30 0029c07〕The questioner says: In all the world, only the Tathāgata is most honored. He is the Perfectly and Completely Awakened One, called the Dharma King and the omniscient person. Such a one should therefore exist.

The respondent says: Now consider the matter in accordance with reality. If he exists, he should be apprehensible; if he does not exist, what is there to apprehend? Why is this said? Concerning the Tathāgata—

2. Verse: The Fivefold Search

The Tathāgata is not the five aggregates and is not apart from the five aggregates; the Tathāgata and the aggregates do not reside within each other.

Nor does the Tathāgata possess the five aggregates. Where, then, is there a Tathāgata?

3. Commentary: Examining Each of the Five Routes

If the Tathāgata truly existed, one would have to ask: Are the five aggregates themselves the Tathāgata? Is there another Tathāgata apart from the five aggregates? Are the five aggregates within the Tathāgata? Is the Tathāgata within the five aggregates? Or does the Tathāgata possess the five aggregates? None of these can be established.

First, the five aggregates are not the Tathāgata. Why? Because the five aggregates bear the mark of arising and ceasing. Since the aggregates arise and cease, if the Tathāgata were the aggregates, the Tathāgata too would bear the mark of arising and ceasing. If he bore that mark, the Tathāgata would incur the various faults of impermanence, annihilation, and so forth. Further, experiencer and experienced dharma would then become one: the experiencer is the Tathāgata, while the experienced dharma is the five aggregates. This is wrong. Therefore, the Tathāgata is not the five aggregates.

Second, there is no Tathāgata apart from the five aggregates. If another Tathāgata existed apart from the five aggregates, he should not bear the mark of arising and ceasing. If so, the Tathāgata would incur faults such as permanent abiding. Moreover, the faculties such as the eye would have no means to see or know him—but this is not in fact so. Therefore, there is no Tathāgata apart from the five aggregates.

Third, the five aggregates are not within the Tathāgata. Why? If the five aggregates were within the Tathāgata, like fruit within a vessel or fish in water, the two would be different things. Being different, they would incur the faults of permanent abiding explained above. Therefore, the five aggregates are not within the Tathāgata.

Fourth, the Tathāgata is not within the five aggregates. Why? If the Tathāgata were within the five aggregates, like a person on a bed or milk within a vessel, the two would be distinctly different and would still incur the faults explained above. Therefore, the Tathāgata is not within the five aggregates.

Fifth, the Tathāgata does not possess the five aggregates. Why? If the Tathāgata possessed the five aggregates, like a person having a son, the two would be distinctly different. If so, they would incur the faults explained above. This is wrong. Therefore, the Tathāgata does not possess the five aggregates.

Sought in these five ways and not found, what then is the Tathāgata?

4. Question: The Tathāgata Exists When the Five Aggregates Combine

〔T30 0030a03〕The questioner says: Sought according to this reasoning, the Tathāgata indeed cannot be found; yet when the five aggregates combine, there is a Tathāgata.

The respondent then speaks the following verse.

5. Verse and Commentary: What Exists through Combination Has No Intrinsic Nature

If the Tathāgata exists through the combination of the five aggregates, then he has no intrinsic nature. Since he has no intrinsic nature, how could he exist by virtue of other-nature?

If the Tathāgata exists because the five aggregates combine, he has no intrinsic nature. Why? Because he exists by virtue of the combination of the five aggregates.

The questioner says: The Tathāgata does not exist through intrinsic nature, but exists only by virtue of other-nature.

The respondent says: Without intrinsic nature, how could he exist by virtue of other-nature? Why? Because other-nature itself has no intrinsic nature. Further, without an opposed ground of mutual dependence, other-nature cannot be found; since it cannot be found, it cannot be called “other.” Further:

If a dharma arises through other conditions, it is not a self. If a dharma is not a self, how could it be the Tathāgata?

If a dharma arises through many conditions, there is no self. Just as a fist exists through five fingers yet has no substance of its own, so the self is named by virtue of the five aggregates and has no substance of its own. The self has many names: being, person, deva, Tathāgata, and so forth. If the Tathāgata exists through the five aggregates, he has no intrinsic nature. Since he has no intrinsic nature, there is no self. Without a self, on what basis can he be named Tathāgata? Thus the verse says: if a dharma arises through another, it is not a self; if the dharma is not a self, how could it be the Tathāgata? Further:

6. Verse and Commentary: Neither Intrinsic Nature nor Other-Nature Exists

Without intrinsic nature, where could other-nature exist? Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, what could be named Tathāgata?

If there is no intrinsic nature, other-nature likewise should not exist. Other-nature is named only in relation to intrinsic nature. Since this does not exist here, that likewise does not exist there. Therefore, intrinsic nature and other-nature are both nonexistent. Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, who is the Tathāgata? Further:

7. Verses: Before and After Appropriating the Aggregates

Only if a Tathāgata already existed before and without depending on the five aggregates could one say that because he now appropriates the five aggregates, he is called the Tathāgata.

In reality, no Tathāgata first exists without appropriating the aggregates, nor is there some other dharma of the Tathāgata. Since one who does not appropriate the aggregates is nonexistent, who now could appropriate them?

If an appropriator has not yet existed, what is appropriated cannot be called appropriated. There is no dharma that does not appropriate the aggregates yet can be named Tathāgata.

If the Tathāgata cannot be found within identity or difference and is absent in the fivefold search, how could he exist within appropriation?

Further, the appropriated five aggregates do not exist through intrinsic nature. Since there is no intrinsic nature, where could other-nature exist?

8. Commentary: Explaining the Preceding Verses Line by Line

If a Tathāgata existed before appropriating the five aggregates, this Tathāgata should now become a Tathāgata after appropriating them. Yet in reality, no Tathāgata first exists before appropriating the five aggregates; who now could appropriate them? Further, if the five aggregates are not appropriated, they are not called what is appropriated; there is no one who can be named Tathāgata without appropriating the five aggregates. Further, the Tathāgata cannot be found when sought through identity and difference, nor can he be found in the fivefold search within the five aggregates. If so, how can one say that the Tathāgata exists within the five aggregates? Further, the appropriated five aggregates do not exist through intrinsic nature. If one says they exist through other-nature—since they do not exist through intrinsic nature, how could they exist through other-nature? Why? Because intrinsic nature does not exist, and other-nature likewise does not exist. Further:

9. Verse and Commentary: Appropriation Is Empty and the Appropriator Is Empty

According to the preceding reasoning, appropriation is empty and the appropriator is also empty. How could an empty appropriation be used to speak of an empty Tathāgata?

Examined according to this reasoning, appropriation and appropriator are both empty. Since appropriation is empty, how could an empty appropriation be used to speak of an empty Tathāgata?

10. Question and Answer: Then Is There Definitely an Emptiness?

The questioner says: You say that appropriation is empty and the appropriator is empty. Does that mean emptiness definitely exists?

The respondent says:

It is not so. Why?

To speak of empty is impossible; to speak of nonempty is impossible. To speak of both empty and nonempty, or neither empty nor nonempty, is likewise impossible—they are spoken only as provisional names.

One should not say that dharmas are empty, nor that dharmas are nonempty; one should not say that dharmas are both empty and nonempty, nor that they are neither empty nor nonempty. Why? These are spoken as provisional names only to dismantle contradiction. In such correct contemplation of the true character of dharmas, the various challenges should not be taken as challenges. Why?

11. Verse and Commentary: The Eight Views Do Not Exist within the Mark of Quiescence

Within the mark of quiescence, there is no tetralemma of permanent, impermanent, and the rest.

Within the mark of quiescence, there is no tetralemma of bounded, unbounded, and the rest.

The true character of dharmas is subtle and quiescent in this way. Beings form four wrong views regarding the past: the world is permanent; the world is impermanent; the world is both permanent and impermanent; the world is neither permanent nor impermanent. None of these exists within quiescence. Why? The true character of dharmas is ultimately pure and cannot be appropriated. Even emptiness is not accepted—how much less the four views! The four views all arise through appropriation, while the true character of dharmas has nothing through which it appropriates. The four views all honor one’s own view and disparage another’s, while the true character of dharmas has neither this side nor that. Therefore, it is said that the four views do not exist within quiescence. Just as four views concerning the past exist, there are likewise four views concerning the future: the world is bounded; the world is unbounded; the world is both bounded and unbounded; the world is neither bounded nor unbounded.

12. Question and Answer: If the Tathāgata Is Refuted in This Way, Does That Mean There Is No Tathāgata?

The questioner says: If the Tathāgata is refuted in this way, does that mean there is no Tathāgata?

The respondent says:

Only those whose wrong views are deeply rooted say that there is no Tathāgata; yet within the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence, to discriminate and say that he exists is likewise wrong.

There are two kinds of wrong view: one destroys worldly well-being, while the other destroys the path to nirvāṇa. The kind that destroys worldly well-being is a coarse wrong view: saying there is no demerit, no merit, and no Tathāgata or other noble one. On forming such a wrong view, one abandons wholesome conduct and does evil, thereby destroying worldly well-being. The kind that destroys the path to nirvāṇa craves and clings to a self and discriminates between existence and nonexistence. Such a person also cultivates good and ends evil, gaining worldly well-being because of cultivating good, yet failing to attain nirvāṇa because of discriminating between existence and nonexistence. Therefore, saying that there is no Tathāgata is a deeply rooted wrong view: one loses even worldly well-being, how much more nirvāṇa! Yet to say that the Tathāgata exists is likewise a wrong view. Why? Because one makes various discriminations about the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence. Therefore, within the mark of quiescence, to discriminate and say that the Tathāgata exists is likewise wrong.

13. Verse and Commentary: After Cessation, One Cannot Conceive Existence or Nonexistence

Within such emptiness of nature, even conception is impossible—the conception that discriminates whether the Tathāgata exists or does not exist after cessation.

Because the true character of dharmas is empty of nature, one should not conceive the Tathāgata after cessation as existent, nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent. The Tathāgata has always been ultimately empty—how much more after cessation!

14. Verse and Commentary: Conceptual Proliferation Covers the Eye of Wisdom

〔T30 0031a01〕The Tathāgata has passed beyond all conceptual proliferation, yet people generate conceptual proliferation. Conceptual proliferation destroys the eye of wisdom, and such people do not see the Buddha.

Conceptual proliferation means recollection, apprehending marks, and discrimination between this and that. Those who say that the Buddha has ceased, has not ceased, and so forth engage in conceptual proliferation; because it covers the eye of wisdom, they cannot see the Tathāgata’s Dharma-body. In this “Examination of the Tathāgata,” contemplating from beginning through middle to end, the determinate nature of the Tathāgata cannot be found. Therefore, the verse says:

15. Verse and Commentary: The Tathāgata’s Nature Is the Nature of the World

Whatever nature the Tathāgata has is the nature of the world. The Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature; the world likewise has no intrinsic nature.

The examination and inquiry in this chapter reveal that the nature of the Tathāgata is the nature of the entire world.

The questioner says: What is the nature of the Tathāgata?

The respondent says: The Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature, just as the world has no intrinsic nature.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle four, “Examination of Inversion, Chapter Twenty-Three,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Question: Since the Three Poisons Arise from Inversion, They Must Truly Exist

〔T30 0031a12〕The questioner says:

From recollection, conception, and discrimination arise greed, anger, and delusion. The inversions of pure and impure all arise from many conditions.

The sūtra says that through inversions of pure and impure, recollection, conception, and discrimination give rise to greed, anger, and delusion. Therefore, one should know that greed, anger, and delusion exist.

2. Answer: Since They Arise from Inversion, They Have No Intrinsic Nature

The respondent answers as follows.

If the three poisons arise through inversions regarding pure and impure, then the three poisons have no intrinsic nature. Therefore, the afflictions are not real.

If the afflictions arise through inversions regarding pure and impure and through recollection, conception, and discrimination, they have no intrinsic nature. Therefore, the afflictions are not real. Further:

Whether the intrinsically existent self is said to exist or not exist, it can never be established. Since there is no self, neither the existence nor the nonexistence of the afflictions can be established.

There are no causes and conditions through which a self can be established as existent or nonexistent. Since there is now no self, how could the afflictions be established through either existence or nonexistence? Why is this said?

3. Who Possesses These Afflictions?

Who possesses these afflictions cannot be established. If afflictions existed apart from this possessor, they would belong to no one.

Affliction means that which afflicts another. The one afflicted should be a being, yet this being cannot be found when sought anywhere. If afflictions alone existed apart from a being, they would have nowhere to belong. If one says that though there is no self, afflictions belong to the mind, this too is wrong. Why?

Just as the view of a body cannot be found through the fivefold search, afflictions likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind.

Just as the view of a body cannot be found through the fivefold search within the five aggregates, the afflictions likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind. Conversely, a defiled mind likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within the afflictions. Further:

The inversions of pure and impure themselves have no intrinsic nature. How, then, could afflictions arise through these two?

Inversions of pure and impure—the word “inversion” means false and delusive. What is false and delusive has no intrinsic nature; without intrinsic nature, there is no inversion. Since there is no inversion, how could afflictions arise through inversion?

4. Question: The Six Objects Are the Root of the Three Poisons

The questioner says:

Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, together with dharmas, make six. These six are the root of the three poisons.

These six entrances are the root of the three poisons: through the six entrances arise inversions of pure and impure, and through those inversions arise greed, anger, and delusion.

5. Answer: The Six Objects Are All Empty, Like Mirage and Dream

The respondent answers as follows.

Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas are six in kind. They are all empty, like a mirage, a dream, or a city of gandharvas. Within these six, where are pure and impure? They are like an illusory person and like an image in a mirror.

Before the substances of form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas combine with mind, they are empty and possess nothing: like a mirage, a dream, an illusion, or an image in a mirror. They merely deceive the mind and have no determinate, unchanging mark. Within these six entrances, where are pure and impure? Further:

Without depending on the mark of pure, impure does not exist. Since impure exists only through pure, there is no impure.

If no impure first existed without depending on pure, on what basis could it be called impure? Therefore, there is no impure. Further:

Without depending on impure, there likewise is no pure. Since pure exists only through impure, there is no pure.

If no pure first existed without depending on impure, on what basis could it be called pure? Therefore, there is no pure. Further:

Without pure, through what could greed exist? Without impure, through what could anger exist?

Because neither pure nor impure exists, neither greed nor anger arises.

6. Question: The Sūtra Speaks of Four Inversions Beginning with Permanence

The questioner says: The sūtra speaks of four inversions beginning with permanence. To see permanence within what is impermanent is called inversion; to see impermanence within what is impermanent is not inversion. The remaining three inversions are likewise so. Since inversion exists, one who is inverted should likewise exist. Why say that all are absent?

7. Answer: Within Emptiness of Nature, Even Permanence Does Not Exist

The respondent answers as follows.

To cling to permanence in what is impermanent is called inversion. Yet within emptiness, there is no permanence. Where could there be an inversion of permanence?

Clinging to permanence within impermanence is called inversion. Within the emptiness of nature of dharmas, there is no permanence. Where within it could there be an inversion of permanence? The remaining three are likewise so. Further:

If one clings to impermanence within impermanence and says that this is not inversion, yet within emptiness there is not even impermanence, where could there be one who is not inverted?

If one clings to impermanence and says “this is impermanent,” and therefore does not call it inversion—within the emptiness of nature of dharmas, there is no impermanence. Since impermanence does not exist, who is the one not inverted? The remaining three are likewise so. Further:

The object of clinging, the one who clings, the act of clinging, and the dharma used in clinging all bear the mark of quiescence. How, then, could there be clinging?

The object of clinging means the thing; the one who clings means the agent; clinging means the act; and the dharma used means the matter employed. All bear the mark of emptiness of nature and quiescence, as explained in the “Examination of the Tathāgata.” Therefore, there is no clinging. Further:

If no dharma of clinging exists, who possesses the distinction that wrong is inversion and right is noninversion?

Clinging means recollection, conception, and discrimination regarding this and that, existence and nonexistence, and so forth. Without this one who clings, who is wrongly inverted? Who is rightly noninverted? Further:

One already inverted does not generate inversion; one without inversion does not generate inversion;〔T30 0032a01〕an inverted person does not generate inversion, nor does a noninverted one. Even at the time of inversion, inversion does not arise. Observe well for yourself: who, in the end, generates inversion?

One already inverted does not generate inversion again, because he is already inverted. One not inverted likewise does not become inverted, because there is no inversion. At the time of inversion, inversion likewise does not arise, because two faults follow. Now remove the mind of arrogance, observe well for yourself, and ask: who is the inverted one? Further:

Since the inversions do not arise, how could there be the meaning of inversion? Since there is no inversion, where is there one who is inverted?

Inversion is refuted through various causes and conditions and thus falls into nonarising. Yet someone then craves and clings to nonarising, saying nonarising is the true character of inversion. Therefore, the verse asks: how can nonarising be called inversion? Even uncontaminated dharmas cannot be named a mark of nonarising, how much less can inversion be such a mark? Since inversion does not exist, where is one who is inverted? One who is inverted exists only through inversion. Further:

8. Permanent, Self, Pleasant, and Pure; Impermanent, Suffering, and Impure

If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure truly existed, then permanent, self, pleasant, and pure would not be inversions.

If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure possessed real intrinsic nature, they would not be inversions. Why? Because determinate real things would exist. How could they be called inversions? If one says that the four inversions—permanent, self, pleasant, and pure—are nonexistent, then impermanent, suffering, selfless, and impure should truly exist and should not be called inversions; because they oppose inversion, they would be named noninversion. This too is wrong. Why?

If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure were truly nonexistent, then impermanent, suffering, and impure should likewise be nonexistent.

If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure were truly absent, because they are absent, the four things beginning with impermanence likewise should not exist. Why? Because nothing remains to serve as their mutually dependent cause. Further:

9. When Inversion Ceases, Ignorance Ceases

When inversion ceases in this way, ignorance likewise ceases. Because ignorance ceases, formations and the rest likewise cease.

“In this way” means in accordance with its meaning. Because all inversions cease, ignorance, the root of the twelve links of dependent arising, likewise ceases. Because ignorance ceases, the three kinds of karmic formation through aging-and-death all cease. Further:

10. Can the Afflictions Be Severed?

If the nature of the afflictions were real and belonged to someone, how could they be severed? Who could sever their intrinsic nature?

If the afflictions were precisely inversion and possessed real intrinsic nature, how could they be severed? Who could sever their intrinsic nature? If one says that the afflictions are all false, without nature, and therefore can be severed, this too is wrong. Why?

If the afflictions are false and delusive, without intrinsic nature and without belonging, how could they be severed? Who could sever what has no intrinsic nature?

If the afflictions are false and without intrinsic nature, they belong nowhere. How could they be severed? Who could sever a dharma without intrinsic nature?

Nāgārjuna composed the root verses, the Brahmin Qingmu commented, and the Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva translated the Treatise on the Middle, fascicle four, “Examination of the Four Truths,” in the Later Qin · Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph openings marked 〔T30 …〕 give page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

1. Objection: If Everything Is Empty, the Four Truths, Four Fruits, and Three Jewels Cannot Be Established

〔T30 0032b12〕The objector says: by eliminating the four inversions, one penetrates the four noble truths; by penetrating the four noble truths, one realizes the four fruits of a renunciant.

(Objector’s verse) If all dharmas are empty, then there is neither arising nor cessation. Consequently, the four noble truths do not exist.

Because the four noble truths do not exist, seeing suffering, severing its origin, realizing cessation, and cultivating the path are all absent.

Because these are absent, the four fruits of the path do not exist. And because the four fruits do not exist, those progressing toward the fruits likewise do not exist.

If the four progressing and the four attained—these eight noble persons—do not exist, the Jewel of the Saṅgha does not exist. And because the four noble truths do not exist, the Jewel of the Dharma does not exist either.

Because the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha do not exist, the Jewel of the Buddha also does not exist. One who teaches emptiness in this way is therefore destroying the Three Jewels.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If every world is empty and wholly nonexistent, there should be neither arising nor cessation. Because there is neither arising nor cessation, there are no four noble truths. Why? The truth of suffering arises from the truth of origin: origin is the cause and suffering the result. That which brings suffering and origin entirely to cessation is called the truth of cessation. That which leads to cessation is called the truth of the path: the path is the cause and cessation the result. Thus the four truths involve causes and results. If there is neither arising nor cessation, the four truths do not exist. If the four truths do not exist, there is no seeing suffering, severing origin, realizing cessation, or cultivating the path. If these four activities do not exist, the four fruits of a renunciant do not exist. If the four fruits do not exist, there are no persons progressing toward or attaining them. If these eight noble persons do not exist, the Jewel of the Saṅgha does not exist. Moreover, because the four noble truths do not exist, the Jewel of the Dharma does not exist. If the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha do not exist, how could there be a Buddha? One is called a Buddha upon attaining the Dharma. Without the Dharma, where could there be a Buddha? You say that all dharmas are empty; this destroys the Three Jewels.

The objection is then pressed further.

2. Objection: Emptiness Also Destroys Cause and Result, Demerit and Merit, and Convention

(Objector’s verse) Emptiness destroys cause and result, and it also destroys demerit and merit; moreover, it destroys every conventional dharma.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If one accepts emptiness, one destroys demerit and merit and their karmic results, and one also destroys conventional dharmas. Because it entails all these faults, dharmas should not be empty.

3. Reply: You Do Not Know Emptiness, Why Emptiness Is Taught, or What Emptiness Means

The respondent now answers as follows.

(Verse) You do not in fact know what emptiness is, the reasons for which emptiness is taught, or the meaning of emptiness. Therefore you create distress for yourself.

(Qingmu’s commentary) You do not understand what the characteristic of emptiness is, the reasons for which emptiness is taught, or the meaning of emptiness. Because you do not know them as they really are, you raise this objection.

The answer is then developed further.

4. The Buddhas Teach Beings by Relying on the Two Truths

(Verse) The Buddhas rely on two truths when teaching the Dharma to beings: first, the conventional truth; second, the ultimate truth.

If someone cannot know and distinguish these two truths, that person cannot know the true meaning of the profound Buddhadharma.

(Qingmu’s commentary) The conventional truth means that the nature of all dharmas is originally empty, yet because the world is inverted, various false dharmas arise and appear real to the world. Noble ones know the nature of that inversion as it really is, and therefore know that all dharmas are empty and unarisen. For noble ones, this is the ultimate truth and is called reality. The Buddhas rely on these two truths when teaching the Dharma to beings. If someone cannot distinguish the two truths as they really are, that person does not know the real meaning of the profound Buddhadharma.

Suppose someone says that the nonarising of all dharmas is the ultimate truth, and that no second level of conventional truth is needed. This too is incorrect. Why?

5. Without Relying on the Conventional Truth, the Ultimate Cannot Be Attained

〔T30 0033a02〕(Verse) Without relying on the conventional truth, the ultimate cannot be attained. Without attaining the ultimate, nirvāṇa cannot be attained.

(Qingmu’s commentary) The ultimate is disclosed through words, and words themselves are conventional. Therefore, without relying on convention, there is no way to articulate the ultimate. If the ultimate cannot be attained, how could nirvāṇa be reached? Thus, although dharmas are unarisen, there are still two truths.

The answer is then developed further.

6. For the Dull-Witted, Contemplating Emptiness Is Like Mishandling a Venomous Snake

(Verse) When emptiness is contemplated incorrectly, the dull-witted harm themselves, like one unskilled in incantations or one unskilled in catching a venomous snake.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If a person is dull-witted and cannot skillfully understand the teaching of emptiness, that person goes astray regarding emptiness and gives rise to wrong views. It is like catching a venomous snake for profit: if one grasps it badly, the snake instead causes harm. It is also like an incantation intended to accomplish something: if one cannot execute it skillfully, it instead harms oneself. The dull-witted person’s contemplation of emptiness is just like this.

The answer is then developed further.

7. The World-Honored One Knew This Dharma Was Profound and Therefore Did Not Wish to Teach It

(Verse) The World-Honored One knew that this Dharma has profound and subtle characteristics beyond the reach of the dull-witted, and therefore did not wish to teach it.

(Qingmu’s commentary) Because this Dharma is profound and subtle and cannot be understood by the dull-witted, the World-Honored One did not wish to teach it.

The answer is then developed further.

8. The Emptiness of Nature That I Teach Is Itself Empty

(Verse) You say that I cling to emptiness and therefore assign me various faults. Yet none of the faults you now allege is present in emptiness.

(Qingmu’s commentary) You say that because I cling to emptiness, you may assign me these faults. I teach that nature is originally empty, and this emptiness is itself empty. Therefore none of the faults you allege applies.

The answer is then developed further.

9. Precisely Because Emptiness Has Meaning, All Dharmas Can Be Established

(Verse) Because emptiness has meaning, all dharmas can be established. If emptiness had no meaning, no dharma could be established.

(Qingmu’s commentary) Because emptiness has meaning, all worldly and world-transcending dharmas can be accomplished. Without the meaning of emptiness, none could be accomplished.

The answer is then developed further.

10. The Fault Is Yours, Yet You Turn It Back upon Me

(Verse) You now possess a fault yourself, yet turn it around and place it upon me, like a rider who forgets the very horse beneath him.

(Qingmu’s commentary) Your thesis of real existence already contains a fault, but you fail to notice it and instead perceive a fault in emptiness. This is like a rider forgetting what he is riding. Why is this so?

11. To Assert Fixed Nature Is to Assert the Absence of Causes and Conditions

(Verse) If you see dharmas as possessing determinate intrinsic natures, you thereby see dharmas as having neither causes nor conditions.

(Qingmu’s commentary) You say that dharmas possess determinate intrinsic natures. If so, you see dharmas as having neither causes nor conditions. Why? If a dharma determinately possessed an intrinsic nature, it should neither arise nor cease. What use would such a dharma have for causes and conditions? If dharmas arise from causes and conditions, they have no intrinsic nature. Thus, if dharmas determinately possess natures, they have no causes and conditions.

The claim that dharmas determinately abide in their intrinsic natures is also incorrect. Why?

(Verse) You thereby destroy cause and result, action, agent, and what is acted upon, and you also destroy the arising and cessation of all things.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas possess determinate intrinsic natures, there can be no cause and result or the other matters just named. As the verse says:

12. Dharmas Born from Many Conditions: Empty, Provisional Names, and the Middle Way

(Verse) Dharmas born from many conditions, I say, are precisely absence; they are also provisional names, and this is the meaning of the Middle Way.

Never has there been a single dharma that did not arise from conditions; therefore no dharma is not empty.

(Qingmu’s commentary) Dharmas born from many conditions, I say, are precisely empty. Why? A thing arises only when many conditions are complete and conjoin. Because this thing belongs to many causes and conditions, it has no intrinsic nature; because it has no intrinsic nature, it is empty. And this emptiness is itself empty. It is only to guide beings that one speaks by means of provisional names. Because this is free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence, it is called the Middle Way. Because this dharma has no intrinsic nature, one cannot say that it exists; and because even emptiness cannot be grasped, one cannot say that it does not exist. If a dharma possessed an intrinsic nature and determinate characteristic, it would not need to await conditions in order to exist. If it did not await conditions, there would be no such dharma at all. Therefore no dharma is not empty.

The fault you earlier alleged—that the teaching of emptiness is defective—now returns instead to you. Why?

13. Conversely, If Everything Were Nonempty, the Four Truths Would Truly Not Exist

(Verse) If all dharmas were nonempty, there would be neither arising nor cessation. Consequently, the four noble truths would not exist.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If every dharma possessed its own intrinsic nature and were nonempty, there would be neither arising nor cessation. Because there would be neither arising nor cessation, the four noble truths would not exist. Why?

(Verse) If suffering did not arise from causes and conditions, how could suffering exist? Impermanence is precisely the meaning of suffering, yet what determinately possesses a nature is not impermanent.

(Qingmu’s commentary) Because suffering would not arise from causes and conditions, suffering would not exist. Why? A scripture says that impermanence is the meaning of suffering. If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, how could it be impermanent? It would never relinquish its own nature.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, why would it still arise from origin? Thus there would be no truth of origin, because the meaning of emptiness had been destroyed.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, it should not arise again, for it would already have existed. If so, there would be no truth of origin, because the meaning of emptiness had been destroyed.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, it should not cease. By clinging to determinate nature, you destroy the truth of cessation.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, it should not cease. Why? What is called a nature does not cease.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, there would be no path to cultivate. If the path can be cultivated, it has no determinate intrinsic nature.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If a dharma determinately existed, there would be no cultivation of the path. Why? If a dharma truly existed, it would be permanent. Being permanent, it could not be increased. If the path can be cultivated, then the path has no determinate intrinsic nature.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) If there were no truth of suffering and no truths of origin and cessation, where could the path that brings suffering to cessation possibly lead?

(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas already determinately possessed natures, there would be no truths of suffering, origin, and cessation. To what place where suffering is extinguished could this path that extinguishes suffering possibly lead?

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) If suffering determinately possessed a nature, how could what was not seen before come to be seen now? Its nature would not have changed.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If, while one was previously an ordinary person, one could not see the nature of suffering, one should not see it now either. Why? The nature of not seeing suffering would already be fixed.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) Just as seeing suffering cannot be established, severing origin, realizing cessation, cultivating the path, and the four fruits likewise cannot be established.

(Qingmu’s commentary) Just as one who did not previously see the nature of the truth of suffering should not see it later, so too there should be no severing origin, realizing cessation, or cultivating the path. Why? The nature of origin was never severed, so it should not be severed now, for a nature cannot be severed. Cessation was never realized, so it should not be realized now, precisely because it was never realized. The path was never cultivated, so it should not be cultivated now, precisely because it was never cultivated. Therefore the four activities of seeing, severing, realizing, and cultivating with respect to the four noble truths should not exist. If the four activities do not exist, the four fruits of the path do not exist either. Why?

14. The Four Fruits, Eight Noble Persons, and Three Jewels All Collapse under Fixed Nature

〔T30 0034a04〕(Verse) The natures of these four fruits of the path have always been unattainable. If the natures of dharmas were determinate, how could they now be attained?

(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas possessed determinate intrinsic natures, the four fruits of a renunciant, never having been attained before, could not be attained now. If they could be attained, their natures would not be determinate.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) If the four fruits do not exist, there are no persons attaining or progressing toward the fruits. Because the eight noble persons do not exist, the Jewel of the Saṅgha does not exist.

(Qingmu’s commentary) Because the four fruits of a renunciant do not exist, there are no persons attaining or progressing toward the fruits. Because the eight noble persons do not exist, the Jewel of the Saṅgha does not exist. The scriptures indeed call these eight noble persons the Jewel of the Saṅgha.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) Because the four noble truths do not exist, the Jewel of the Dharma does not exist. Without the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha, how could there be the Jewel of the Buddha?

(Qingmu’s commentary) The Dharma of nirvāṇa is attained by cultivating the four noble truths. If there are no four truths, there is no Jewel of the Dharma. If the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha do not exist, how could there be the Jewel of the Buddha? By asserting that dharmas possess determinate intrinsic natures on these grounds, you destroy the Three Jewels.

15. Buddha and Awakening: If the Nature Was Absent Before, Refining Iron Cannot Produce Gold

The objector says: although you refute dharmas, the ultimate path—unsurpassed complete awakening—must at least exist. Precisely because this path exists, one is called a Buddha.

The respondent answers as follows.

(Verse) According to your thesis, there could be no Buddha by reason of awakening, nor could there be awakening by reason of a Buddha.

(Qingmu’s commentary) You say that dharmas possess determinate intrinsic natures. If so, there should be neither a Buddha by reason of awakening nor awakening by reason of a Buddha, because the natures of both would be permanently fixed and unchanging.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) Even if one strives diligently and cultivates the path to awakening, if one did not previously possess the nature of a Buddha, one still could not become a Buddha.

(Qingmu’s commentary) This is because that nature was previously absent. Just as iron lacks the nature of gold and therefore never becomes gold despite all manner of refinement, so too here.

The answer is then developed further.

16. Demerit and Merit and Their Results

(Verse) If dharmas were nonempty, there would be no one who performs demerit or merit. Since they are nonempty, what could be done? Their natures would be determinate.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas were nonempty, ultimately no one could perform demerit or merit. Why? The natures of demerit and merit would already be determined, and there would be neither the function of doing nor an agent who does.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) You maintain that karmic results do not arise within demerit and merit. This would mean that various karmic results exist apart from demerit and merit.

(Qingmu’s commentary) You maintain that no karmic results exist within the causes and conditions of demerit and merit. Karmic results should then exist apart from those causes and conditions. Why? A result would appear without awaiting its cause.

The objector says: apart from demerit and merit, there need be no wholesome or unwholesome karmic results. Wholesome and unwholesome karmic results arise precisely from demerit and merit.

The respondent answers as follows.

(Verse) If karmic results arise from demerit and merit, then since results arise from demerit and merit, how could they be called nonempty?

(Qingmu’s commentary) If wholesome and unwholesome results do not exist apart from demerit and merit, how could results be called nonempty? Likewise, without an agent there can be no demerit or merit. Your earlier claim that dharmas are nonempty therefore cannot be established.

The answer is then developed further.

17. By Refuting Emptiness, You Instead Refute Convention

(Verse) If you refute all dharmas and the meaning of emptiness in what arises through many causes and conditions, you thereby refute convention and every other dharma.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If you refute the primary meaning of emptiness in dharmas of many causes and conditions, you refute every conventional dharma. Why?

(Verse) If you refute the meaning of emptiness, nothing could be done. Yet there would then be doing without any act, and one who does nothing would be called an agent.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If you refute the meaning of emptiness, every result becomes unmade and causeless; there is doing without doing; no agent should perform anything; and karma, karmic results, and recipients would exist apart from an agent. But all these are incorrect. Therefore emptiness should not be refuted.

The answer is then developed further.

18. If There Were Fixed Nature, the World Would Abide Permanently and Never Perish

(Verse) If determinate intrinsic nature existed, the various features of the world would neither arise nor cease, but would abide permanently and never perish.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas possessed determinate intrinsic natures, the world’s various forms—gods, humans, animals, and all things—should neither arise nor cease, but abide permanently and never perish. Why? A real intrinsic nature cannot change. Yet all things presently seen each display transformation, arising, cessation, and alteration. Therefore they should not be said to possess determinate intrinsic natures.

The answer is then developed further.

(Verse) If there were no emptiness, what had never been attained should not be attained; there would be no severing of afflictions and no exhaustion of suffering.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If the teaching of emptiness did not exist, no worldly or world-transcending quality that had not previously been attained could ever be attained. Nor could anyone sever afflictions, and suffering could never be exhausted. Why? Natures would already be determined.

19. To See Dharmas of Causes and Conditions Is to See the Buddha

(Verse) Therefore a scripture says: one who sees dharmas of causes and conditions is able to see the Buddha and sees suffering, origin, cessation, and the path.

(Qingmu’s commentary) If someone sees that all dharmas arise from many conditions, that person can see the Buddha’s Dharma body, develop wisdom, and see the four noble truths—suffering, origin, cessation, and the path. Seeing the four noble truths, one attains the four fruits and eliminates every kind of suffering and distress. Therefore the meaning of emptiness should not be destroyed. To destroy the meaning of emptiness is to destroy dharmas of causes and conditions; to destroy dharmas of causes and conditions is to destroy the Three Jewels; and to destroy the Three Jewels is to destroy oneself.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Four, “Examination of Nirvāṇa, Chapter Twenty-Five,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Challenge: If All Dharmas Are Empty, What Can Be Cut Off or Extinguished?

〔T30 0034c14〕The questioner says:

If all dharmas are empty, neither arisen nor ceased, then what is cut off and what is extinguished that it may be called nirvāṇa?

The questioner elaborates: If all dharmas are empty, there is neither arising nor ceasing. With neither arising nor ceasing, what can be cut off or extinguished and called nirvāṇa? Therefore all dharmas should not be empty. Precisely because dharmas are not empty, the many afflictions can be cut off and the five aggregates extinguished; that is called nirvāṇa.

II. Counteranswer: If Dharmas Are Not Empty, Nirvāṇa Is Equally Inexpressible

The respondent says:

If dharmas were not empty, there would likewise be neither arising nor ceasing. What would be cut off and what extinguished that it might be called nirvāṇa?

That is, if the whole world were not empty, there would be neither arising nor ceasing. What then could be cut off or extinguished and called nirvāṇa? Thus neither the gate of existence nor the gate of nonexistence leads to nirvāṇa. What, then, is called nirvāṇa?

III. The Marks of Nirvāṇa Positively Stated

Nothing is attained and nowhere is reached; it is neither annihilation nor permanence, neither arising nor ceasing. What is spoken of in this way is called nirvāṇa.

“Nothing is attained” means that no object can be acquired either in causal practice or in fruition. “Nowhere is reached” means that no place exists at which to arrive. “Not annihilated” means that because the five aggregates have from the beginning been ultimately empty, when one attains the path and enters nirvāṇa without remainder, nothing is cut off. “Not permanent” means that only if a dharma could be apprehended and discriminated could it be called permanent; nirvāṇa is quiescent extinction, with no dharma to discriminate, and so is not called permanent. The same applies to arising and ceasing. What possesses such marks is called nirvāṇa.

Furthermore, the scripture says that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither both existent and nonexistent nor neither existent nor nonexistent. It receives and grasps no dharma; inwardly quiescent, it is called nirvāṇa. How is this known?

IV. Nirvāṇa Is Not Existent

〔T30 0035a07〕Nirvāṇa cannot be called existent, because whatever exists bears the marks of aging and death. No existent dharma ever exists apart from the marks of aging and death.

Everything seen by the eye arises and ceases; these are the marks of aging and death. If nirvāṇa were existent, it too should bear the marks of aging and death. But this is not so, and therefore nirvāṇa cannot be called existent. Nor can one see some fixed dharma apart from arising, ceasing, aging, and death and call it nirvāṇa. If nirvāṇa were existent, it should bear the marks of arising, ceasing, aging, and death; precisely because it is free from aging and death, it is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore:

If nirvāṇa were existent, it would be conditioned; yet no dharma that truly exists is also unconditioned.

Nirvāṇa is not existent. Why? All things arise from many causes and conditions and are conditioned. No dharma can be called unconditioned. Although so-called permanent dharmas are provisionally named unconditioned, when examined by reason, not even a real impermanent dharma can be found; how much less some permanent dharma that can neither be seen nor attained. Furthermore:

If nirvāṇa were existent, why would it be called nonappropriation? No existent dharma is ever established without appropriation.

If nirvāṇa were an existent dharma, the scripture should not say that nonappropriation is nirvāṇa. Why? No existent dharma comes to exist without appropriation. Therefore nirvāṇa is not existent.

V. Nirvāṇa Is Not Nonexistent Either

The questioner says: If existence is not nirvāṇa, then should nonexistence be nirvāṇa?

The respondent says:

Existence is not nirvāṇa; how much less nonexistence! Nirvāṇa contains no existence—where could nonexistence be?

If existence is not nirvāṇa, how could nonexistence be nirvāṇa? Why? Nonexistence is spoken of only in relation to existence; without existence, whence nonexistence? As the scripture says, what existed before but does not exist now is called nonexistent. Nirvāṇa is not like this. Why? No existent dharma turns into nonexistence. Therefore nonexistence too cannot be nirvāṇa. Furthermore:

If nirvāṇa were nonexistent, why would it be called nonappropriation? No nonexistent dharma is ever named without appropriation.

If nonexistence were nirvāṇa, the scripture should not call nonappropriation nirvāṇa. Why? Nothing is ever called a nonexistent dharma without appropriation. Thus one knows that nirvāṇa is not nonexistent.

VI. What, Then, Is Nirvāṇa?

The questioner says: If nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent, what is nirvāṇa?

The respondent says:

Because one appropriates causes and conditions, one revolves in birth and death. Not appropriating causes and conditions is called nirvāṇa.

Because one does not know inversion as it truly is, one comes and goes through birth and death dependent on the five appropriated aggregates. Once one knows inversion as it truly is, one no longer comes and goes through birth and death dependent on them. Because the five aggregates lacking intrinsic nature no longer continue, this is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore:

Just as the Buddha said in the scripture: both existence and nonexistence are cut off. Thus one knows that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent.

Existence means the three modes of existence; nonexistence means the annihilation of those three. The Buddha says that both are to be cut off. Therefore one should know that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent.

VII. Existence and Nonexistence Together Are Not Nirvāṇa

The questioner says: If neither existence nor nonexistence is nirvāṇa, then are existence and nonexistence conjoined together nirvāṇa?

The respondent says:

If conjoined existence and nonexistence constituted nirvāṇa, existence and nonexistence themselves would be liberation. This cannot be established.

If conjoined existence and nonexistence constituted nirvāṇa, the two matters of existence and nonexistence would together be taken as liberation. This cannot be established. Why? Existence and nonexistence contradict one another; how could they coexist in one place? Furthermore:

If conjoined existence and nonexistence constituted nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa could not be nonappropriation, because both existence and nonexistence arise from appropriation.

If conjoined existence and nonexistence were nirvāṇa, the scripture should not call nirvāṇa nonappropriation. Why? Both existence and nonexistence arise from appropriation and exist dependent upon one another. Therefore they cannot be conjoined to make nirvāṇa. Furthermore:

How could what is jointly constituted by existence and nonexistence be called nirvāṇa? Nirvāṇa is called unconditioned, while existence and nonexistence are conditioned.

The conjunction of existence and nonexistence cannot be called nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is called unconditioned and existence and nonexistence are conditioned; thus they are not nirvāṇa. Furthermore:

How could existence and nonexistence together in one place be nirvāṇa? The two cannot share a place, just as light and darkness do not coexist.

Existence and nonexistence cannot be called nirvāṇa. Why? They contradict one another and cannot be found in one place, just as light and darkness do not coexist. When existence is present, nonexistence is absent; when nonexistence is present, existence is absent. How could one say they conjoin and are called nirvāṇa?

VIII. Neither Existence nor Nonexistence Is Not Nirvāṇa

The questioner says: If conjoined existence and nonexistence are not nirvāṇa, then should neither existence nor nonexistence be nirvāṇa?

The respondent says:

If neither existence nor nonexistence were called nirvāṇa, on what basis would this “neither existent nor nonexistent” be discriminated?

If nirvāṇa were neither existent nor nonexistent, on what basis would this be discriminated? Thus the claim that neither existence nor nonexistence is nirvāṇa cannot be established. Furthermore:

You discriminate neither existence nor nonexistence and call that nirvāṇa. Yet it can be established only if existence and nonexistence are first established.

Your discrimination of neither existence nor nonexistence as nirvāṇa cannot be established. Why? Existence and nonexistence must first be established before their joint negation can be established. What contradicts existence is called nonexistence, and what contradicts nonexistence is called existence; yet this pair was refuted in the third proposition above. Since neither existence nor nonexistence is established, whence neither existence nor nonexistence? Thus nirvāṇa is not the negation of both existence and nonexistence either. Furthermore:

IX. Whether the Tathāgata Is Present or Has Passed Away, None of the Four Propositions Is Appropriated

After the Tathāgata passes away, one does not say that he exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist. While the Tathāgata is present, one does not say that he exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist.

Whether after the Tathāgata’s passing or while he is present, the assertion that the Tathāgata exists is not appropriated; that he does not exist is not appropriated; that he both exists and does not exist is not appropriated; and that he neither exists nor does not exist is not appropriated. Since none is appropriated, nirvāṇa should not be discriminated as existence, nonexistence, and so on. Moreover, apart from the Tathāgata, who would attain nirvāṇa? At what time, in what place, and through what dharma could nirvāṇa be spoken? Thus the mark of nirvāṇa cannot be found when sought at any time or in any way. Furthermore:

X. Nirvāṇa and the World Have Not the Slightest Difference

〔T30 0036a04〕Nirvāṇa and the world have not the slightest difference; the world and nirvāṇa likewise have not the slightest difference.

Because the five aggregates continue, come, and go through causes and conditions, they are provisionally named the world. Yet the intrinsic nature of the five aggregates is ultimately empty, unappropriated, and quiescently extinct; this meaning has already been explained. Because all dharmas neither arise nor cease, the world and nirvāṇa do not differ, and nirvāṇa and the world do not differ. Furthermore:

The reality-limit of nirvāṇa and the boundary of the world—between these two limits there is not a hair’s breadth of difference.

When the world, nirvāṇa, the reality-limit, and the limit of nonarising are ultimately sought, they are equal and unfindable; therefore there is not a hair’s breadth of difference. Furthermore:

XI. Views Each Depend on Something, Yet Their Supports Are Unfindable

Views of the Tathāgata’s existence and nonexistence after passing, views of whether the world has a limit, and views of permanence depend respectively upon nirvāṇa, the future, and the past.

That is: the Tathāgata exists after passing, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist; the world has a limit, has no limit, both has and has no limit, or neither has nor lacks a limit; the world is permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent. These are three groups totaling twelve views. The four views about existence after the Tathāgata’s passing arise dependent on nirvāṇa; the four views about the world’s limit arise dependent on the future; the four views about its permanence arise dependent on the past. Just as the Tathāgata’s existence and nonexistence after passing are unfindable, so is nirvāṇa. Just as the world’s earlier and later limits, finitude and infinitude, permanence and impermanence are unfindable, so is nirvāṇa. Therefore the world and nirvāṇa are equal and undifferentiated. Furthermore:

XII. Conceptual Proliferation Is Exhausted: Neither Person nor Place Remains

Because all dharmas are empty, what could possess a limit or no limit, both a limit and no limit, or neither a limit nor no limit? What is one and what is different? Where are permanence, impermanence, both permanence and impermanence, or neither permanence nor impermanence? Dharmas are all unfindable and all conceptual proliferation ceases: there is neither person nor place, and the Buddha has spoken nothing.

All dharmas, at all times and in all ways, arise from many causes and conditions and are ultimately empty and without intrinsic nature. Among such dharmas, what has a limit, and who has a limit? What is limitless, both limited and limitless, or neither limited nor limitless? Who is neither limited nor limitless? What is permanent, and who is permanent? What is impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent? Who is neither permanent nor impermanent? What means that the body is identical with the self? What means that the body differs from the self? All sixty-two wrong views of this kind are unfindable within ultimate emptiness. Every acquisitive mind ceases and all conceptual proliferation is exhausted. Because proliferation is exhausted, one comprehends the true marks of dharmas and attains the path of peace and security.

From the “Examination of Conditions” onward, dharmas have been discriminated and sought: existence is unestablished, nonexistence is unestablished, both existence and nonexistence are unestablished, and neither existence nor nonexistence is unestablished. This is called the true marks of dharmas; it is also called suchness, Dharma-nature, the reality-limit, and nirvāṇa. Therefore the Tathāgata has never, at any time or place, taught anyone a fixed mark of nirvāṇa. Thus it is said: every acquisitive mind ceases and all conceptual proliferation is exhausted.

Treatise on the Middle, fascicle four, “Examination of the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination,” composed by the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, commented upon by the brahman Qingmu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin · Taishō T30n1564. Markers such as 〔T30 …〕 at the beginnings of passages give Taishō page, register, and line anchors.

1. Question: How Does the Śrāvaka Teaching Enter the Path of Ultimate Meaning?

〔T30 0036b18〕The questioner says: You have explained the path of ultimate meaning through the Mahāyāna. What I now wish to hear is how the śrāvaka teaching enters the path of ultimate meaning.

The respondent then answers as follows.

2. Verses: How the Twelve Links Gather and How They Rightly Cease

Sentient beings, covered by delusion, set the three kinds of volitional formation in motion for the sake of a future body. Because they set these formations in motion, they fall among the six destinies in accordance with their own actions.

With the formations as causes and conditions, consciousness receives a body in one of the six destinies. Because consciousness clings, name-and-form grows.

Because name-and-form grows, the six sense bases arise. Faculty, object, and consciousness come together, and the six kinds of contact arise.

Because of the six kinds of contact, the three kinds of feeling immediately arise. Because there are three kinds of feeling, thirsting craving arises.

Because of craving there are four kinds of clinging, and because of clinging there is existence. If the one who clings no longer clings, there is liberation and no further existence.

From existence comes birth; from birth come aging and death. Because of aging and death, grief, sorrow, and all kinds of suffering and distress arise.

All such things arise from birth. Through this chain of causes and conditions alone, the great aggregate of suffering gathers.

This is called birth and death. The formations that lie at its root are produced by those covered by ignorance; the wise do not produce them.

Because this ceases, that no longer arises. It is only the gathering of the aggregate of suffering, and in this way it rightly ceases.

3. Explanation: Qingmu Explains Each Link in Turn

Ordinary beings are blinded by ignorance. Through bodily, verbal, and mental karma, they therefore set various formations leading toward the six destinies in motion for the sake of a body in a future life. The formations they set in motion differ as superior, middling, or inferior, and consciousness enters the six destinies and receives a body corresponding to the karma performed. Because consciousness clings, name-and-form gathers. Because name-and-form gathers, the six sense bases exist. With the six sense bases as conditions, the six kinds of contact exist; with the six kinds of contact as conditions, the three kinds of feeling exist; with the three kinds of feeling as conditions, thirsting craving arises; and with thirsting craving as condition, the four kinds of clinging exist. While the four kinds of clinging are actively grasping, bodily, verbal, and mental karma again produce demerit and merit, continuing the three modes of existence in the future without interruption. From existence comes birth, and from birth come aging and death. From aging and death come grief, sorrow, suffering, distress, and every kind of affliction—there is only the gathering of the great aggregate of suffering.

It can therefore be known that ordinary beings, lacking wisdom, set in motion the formations at the root of birth and death, while the wise do not. Because they see things as they really are, ignorance ceases; because ignorance ceases, the formations also cease. When the cause has ceased, the effect also ceases. By cultivating the wisdom that observes the arising and ceasing of the twelve links of dependent origination in this way, this ceases; because this ceases, birth, aging-and-death, grief and sorrow, and the great aggregate of suffering all rightly cease in accordance with reality. “Right cessation” means complete cessation.

The meaning of the arising and ceasing of the twelve links of dependent origination is explained extensively in the Abhidharma and the sūtras.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Four, “Examination of Wrong Views, Chapter Twenty-Seven,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: How Does the Śrāvaka Teaching Refute Wrong Views?

〔T30 0036c25〕The questioner says: I have heard how the Mahāyāna teaching refutes wrong views. Now I wish to hear how the śrāvaka teaching refutes them.

The respondent answers as follows.

II. Verse: Two Sets of Views, One Depending on the Past and One on the Future

In the past, did I exist or not? Views that the world is permanent and so forth all arise dependent on the past.

In the future, will I produce another self or not? Views that the world has a limit and so forth all arise dependent on the future.

III. Explanation: The Names of the Two Sets of Four Propositions

In the past, did I exist, not exist, both exist and not exist, or neither exist nor not exist? These four propositions are called the views of permanence and the rest arising dependent on the past.

In the future, will I be produced, not be produced, both be produced and not be produced, or neither be produced nor not be produced? These four propositions are called the views of limit and no limit arising dependent on the future.

Through what causes and conditions are wrong views of this kind called wrong? This will now be explained.

IV. Verse: A Self in the Past Cannot Be Found

That a self existed in the past cannot be found. The self in the past does not become the present self.

If one says that I am identical and only the bodily marks differ, then apart from the body, where does another self exist?

That no self exists apart from the body has already been established. If one says the body is the self, there is no self at all.

Yet the body is not the self either, because its marks arise and cease. How could what is appropriated be taken as the appropriator?

That a self exists apart from the body cannot be established. A self without any appropriation cannot in fact be found.

The present self is neither apart from appropriation nor identical with it; it is neither without appropriation nor entirely nonexistent. This is the settled meaning.

V. Explanation: Neither the Fault of Permanence nor That of Annihilation Provides a Way Through

〔T30 0037a19〕That I existed in the past cannot be established. Why? The former self does not directly become the present self; if they were identical, the fault of permanence would follow, together with immeasurable faults.

Why? A person may first become a deva through meritorious conditions and later become human. If the former self were the present self, the deva would be the human. Again, through evil karma someone may first become a caṇḍāla and later a brahmin. If the former self were the present self, the caṇḍāla would be the brahmin. It would be like the brahmin Devadatta of Śrāvastī going to Rājagṛha and still being named Devadatta; reaching Rājagṛha does not make him another person.

On that account, if one first becomes a deva and later human, the deva should be the human; the caṇḍāla should be the brahmin. But this is not so. A deva is not a human, and a caṇḍāla is not a brahmin. Identity entails such faults of permanence.

If one changes the claim and says the former self does not become the present self—like one person called a washer while washing clothes and a cutter while cutting grass: washer and cutter are not two, yet the washer is not simply the cutter—then likewise I am called a deva when appropriating a deva body and human when appropriating a human body; I do not change, only the body differs. This too cannot be established.

Why? If the two are identical, one should not say a deva becomes human. Moreover, is the present washer different or nondifferent from the cutter? If nondifferent, the washer should directly be the cutter; likewise the former deva would be the human and the caṇḍāla the brahmin, preserving the fault of permanence. If different, the washer does not become the cutter; likewise the deva does not become human, and the self is impermanent. What is impermanent has no mark of self. Thus the earlier and later cannot be said to be identical.

VI. Question: The Self Is One; Deva and Human Differ Only as What Is Appropriated

〔T30 0037b10〕The questioner says: The self is identical; distinctions into deva and human arise only because of what is appropriated. What is appropriated means the body of five aggregates. Through karmic conditions one is distinguished as deva, human, caṇḍāla, or brahmin, while the self itself is neither deva nor human, neither caṇḍāla nor brahmin. Thus the stated faults do not follow.

VII. Answer: If Everything Belongs to the Body, What Use Is the Self?

The respondent says: This cannot be established. Why? If it is the body rather than the self that becomes deva, human, caṇḍāla, or brahmin, a self exists separately from the body.

Now demerit and merit, birth and death, coming and going all belong to the body, not the self. Through demerit one falls into the three evil destinies, and through merit one is born in the three good destinies. If pain, pleasure, anger, joy, sorrow, fear, and the rest all belong to the body rather than the self, what use is the self? It would be like punishing a householder for an offense that does not concern a renunciant.

Moreover, continuity through the causes and conditions of the five aggregates already prevents demerit and merit from being lost and allows liberation to be spoken. If all this belongs to the body rather than the self, what use is the self?

VIII. Question: The Householder Repairs the House—I Am the Agent and the Body My Instrument

〔T30 0037b21〕The questioner says: Demerit and merit depend on me. I possess cognition while the body does not, so the knower should be the self. Karmic conditions are initiated, and demerit and merit are fabricated dharmas; therefore an agent must exist. The agent is the self, while the body is what I use and where I dwell.

For example, a householder repairs a house with grass, wood, clay, plaster, and the rest. Because he repairs it for his own body, the house becomes good or bad according to his work. I am the same: according to the good and evil done, I obtain a good or ugly body. I produce birth and death in the six destinies, so the body experiencing demerit and merit belongs entirely to me, just as a house belongs to its owner rather than another.

IX. Answer: The Analogy Fails—Theories of Self Refuted One by One

〔T30 0037b29〕The respondent says: The analogy fails. Why? A householder has form, touch, and strength and can therefore repair a house. Your proposed self has neither form nor touch and therefore no power to act. Without power to act itself, it cannot make another act.

If some dharma in the world were without form or touch yet able to act, we could trust and know that an agent exists. But this is not so.

Furthermore, if the self were the agent, it should not produce suffering for itself. If it were the rememberer, desirable and pleasant matters should not be forgotten. If the self did not produce suffering yet suffering arose by force, everything else could arise by itself as well and need not be produced by a self.

If the seer were the self, since the eye sees form, the eye should be the self. If the eye sees but is not the self, that contradicts the earlier claim that the seer is the self. If the seer were the self, the self should not also hear sounds and other objects. Why? The eye is the seer and cannot hear sounds and other objects. Thus that the self is the seer cannot be established.

If one says that just as a cutter uses a sickle to cut grass, the self uses the hands and the rest to act, this too cannot be established. Why? Apart from the sickle, a cutter can be found; apart from body, mind, and faculties, no separate agent can be found.

If one says an agent exists although the eye, ear, and other faculties cannot obtain it, then the son of a barren woman could act as well; all the faculties should likewise be without a self.

If one says the right eye sees and the left recognizes, proving a separate seer, this too fails. Work mastered by the right hand cannot be done by the left, so no separate agent exists. If there were one, what the right hand mastered should be possible for the left; in fact it is not, so no further agent exists.

Moreover, proponents of a self say that when one sees another eat fruit, saliva flows in one’s own mouth, and this is a mark of self. This fails. It is the force of memory, not the force of self. Indeed it becomes a reason to refute self: in a crowd one is ashamed when saliva flows, yet it comes out forcibly beyond control. Thus one knows there is no self.

Furthermore, a grave inversion follows. One who was a father in the past becomes his son now. If father and son have one self and only their bodies differ, like moving between houses while the father remains the father, then if a self existed these two persons should be one, an enormous fault.

If one says the same fault applies to continuity of the five aggregates without a self, it does not. Why? Although the aggregates continue, sometimes they can be used and sometimes not. Grape juice may be drunk by one observing precepts; wine may not; when wine turns to vinegar, it may be drunk again. Continuity of the aggregates is the same: there are times of use and nonuse. If one self remained identical throughout, the preceding faults would follow; continuity of the aggregates avoids them.

Only because the five aggregates conjoin is a self provisionally named; nothing determinate exists. It is like a house from conjoined beams and rafters: apart from them, no separate house exists. Because the five aggregates conjoin, a self exists; apart from them, no separate self truly exists. Thus the self is only a provisional name and has no determinate entity.

Your earlier claim that an appropriator exists apart from what is appropriated and is distinguished as deva or human through what it appropriates cannot be established. One should know that only appropriation exists, not a separate appropriator.

If one says a self exists apart from appropriation, this too fails. If it existed apart, how could its marks be stated? If no marks can be stated, there is no self apart from appropriation.

If one says no self exists apart from the body and the body itself is the self, this too fails. Why? The body has marks of arising and ceasing, while the self is claimed not to.

Moreover, how could what is appropriated be directly called the appropriator? If an appropriator existed apart from appropriation, it should be found apart from the five aggregates. The eye and other faculties can be found; the appropriator in fact cannot.

Thus the self is neither apart from appropriation nor identical with it; it is neither without appropriation nor entirely nonexistent. This is the settled meaning. Therefore one should know that a self in the past cannot be established. Why?

X. Verse: Nonproduction Also Fails—Difference Entails Annihilation and Loss of Karmic Fruit

〔T30 0038a20〕That the past self does not become the present self cannot be established either; nor can the past self be different from the present self.

If they differed, a present self should exist apart from the past self. The self would remain in the past while the present self arose by itself.

This would be annihilation and karmic fruition would be lost. What one person did would be experienced by another; such faults would follow.

Prior nonexistence followed by present existence also entails faults: the self would be fabricated and would arise without a cause.

XI. Explanation: The Extreme of Annihilation and Causelessness

That the past self does not become the present self cannot be established. Why? The past and present selves cannot be intrinsically different.

If the present self differed from the past self, the present should exist apart from the former; the former self should remain in the past, while this body arose separately. This falls into annihilation and loses karmic fruits. That person committed the offense while this person receives the result; immeasurable faults follow.

Moreover, such a self would previously not exist but now exist. This too is faulty: the self becomes fabricated and arises without cause. Thus the past self’s nonproduction of the present cannot be established.

Furthermore:

XII. Verse and Explanation: All Four Propositions about the Past Fail

Views that in the past the self existed, did not exist, both, or neither cannot be established.

When wrong views concerning the past—existence, nonexistence, both, and neither—are sought in this way, all fail through the causes, conditions, and faults already explained.

XIII. Verse and Explanation: All Four Propositions about the Future Likewise Fail

Will I be produced or not in the future? Views of this kind are entirely the same as those concerning the past.

For the four propositions about production and nonproduction in the future, each fault from the past should be applied here.

Furthermore:

XIV. Verse and Explanation: If Deva Is Identical with Human, One Falls into Permanence

If the deva is identical with the human, one falls into the extreme of permanence; the deva would be unarisen, because permanent dharmas do not arise.

If deva is identical with human, that becomes permanence. If the deva is not born within the human destiny, on what basis is it called human? Permanent dharmas do not arise. Thus permanence cannot be established.

Furthermore:

XV. Verse and Explanation: If Deva Differs from Human, There Is Impermanence without Continuity

If the deva differs from the human, this becomes impermanence. Since deva and human differ, there is no continuity between them.

If deva and human differ, impermanence follows, together with annihilation and the other faults already explained. If they differ, continuity is absent; conversely, if continuity exists, one cannot call them different.

Furthermore:

XVI. Verse and Explanation: Half Deva and Half Human Gives One Body Two Marks

If one half is deva and one half human, one falls into both permanence and impermanence. This cannot be established.

If a being’s body were half deva and half human, it would contain permanence and impermanence: the deva half permanent and the human half impermanent. This cannot be established because one body would possess two marks.

Furthermore:

XVII. Verse and Explanation: Since the First Two Propositions Fail, the Fourth Fails Too

Only if permanence and impermanence could both be established should neither permanence nor impermanence be established.

Only if both permanence and impermanence were established could their joint negation be established, since the fourth proposition stands in opposition to them. In fact neither is established, so neither permanence nor impermanence is unestablished as well.

Furthermore, the assertion that birth and death are beginningless cannot be established. Why?

XVIII. Verse and Explanation: Without Determinate Coming and Going, Beginninglessness Cannot Stand

Only if a dharma determinately came from somewhere and determinately went somewhere could birth and death be called beginningless; in fact this is not so.

Only with determinate coming and going should birth and death be called beginningless. When this dharma is sought with wisdom, no source of coming or destination of going is found. Thus the assertion of beginningless birth and death cannot be established.

Furthermore:

XIX. Verse and Explanation: The Four Propositions Depend on One Another; Without a Support All Fail

If permanence does not exist, how could impermanence? How could both permanence and impermanence or neither permanence nor impermanence exist?

When wisdom finds no dharma that can be permanent, who could be impermanent? Impermanence exists dependent on permanence. Since neither exists, how could both? Since neither permanence nor impermanence exists, how could their joint negation exist? The fourth proposition depends upon the third.

Thus the four propositions of permanence and the rest arising dependent on the past cannot be found. The four propositions of limit and no limit arising dependent on the future likewise cannot be found and will now be explained. Why?

XX. Verse and Explanation: Neither Limit nor No Limit Can Explain a Future Life

If the world has a limit, how could there be a future life? If the world has no limit, how could there be a future life?

If the world had a limit, there should be no future life; yet a future life exists, so the claim fails. If the world had no limit, there likewise should be no future life; yet one exists, so that claim also fails.

Furthermore, neither extreme can be found. Why?

XXI. Verse and Explanation: Continuity of the Five Aggregates Is Like a Lamp Flame

The five aggregates continually follow one another, like the flame of a lamp. Therefore the world should be called neither limited nor limitless.

〔T30 0039a01〕From five aggregates further aggregates arise in sequence, like a lamp flame from conjoined conditions. If conditions are not exhausted, the lamp is not extinguished; when conditions are exhausted, it is. Thus the world cannot be called limited or limitless.

Furthermore:

XXII. Verse and Explanation: Two Accounts of Destruction and Nondestruction

If the former five aggregates are destroyed and later aggregates do not arise dependent on them, the world would have a limit.

If the former aggregates are not destroyed and later aggregates do not arise dependent on them, the world would be limitless.

If the former aggregates are destroyed and later ones do not arise dependent on them, the world is limited. If no further aggregates arise after their extinction, this is called the limit—the last body.

If the former aggregates are not destroyed and later ones arise without depending on them, the world would be limitless and permanent. This is not so, so the claim of limitlessness cannot be established.

There are two worlds: the world as land and the world of sentient beings. The latter is meant here.

Furthermore, as stated in the Four Hundred Verses:

XXIII. Cited Verse and Explanation: Because True Dharma, Speaker, and Hearer Are Rare, Saṃsāra Is Neither Limited nor Limitless

True Dharma, one who teaches, and one who hears are difficult to encounter. Thus birth and death are neither limited nor limitless.

Because true Dharma is not attained, coming and going in birth and death have no limit. Yet one sometimes hears true Dharma and attains the path, so it cannot be called limitless.

The claim of both limit and no limit will now be refuted.

XXIV. Verse and Explanation: Half Limited and Half Limitless Gives One Dharma Two Marks

If half the world were limited and half limitless, it would be both. This cannot be established.

If the world were half limited and half limitless, one dharma would possess two marks. This cannot be established. Why?

XXV. Verse and Explanation: Neither Appropriator nor Appropriation Can Be Partly Destroyed and Partly Undestroyed

How could the appropriator of the five aggregates be partly destroyed and partly undestroyed? This cannot be established. The appropriated aggregates are the same: how could they be partly destroyed and partly undestroyed?

How could the appropriator be partly destroyed and partly undestroyed? One matter cannot be both permanent and impermanent. The appropriated is the same. The fault of coexisting permanence and impermanence follows, so the world cannot be both limited and limitless.

The view of neither limit nor no limit will now be refuted.

XXVI. Verse and Explanation: Once the Third Proposition Is Refuted, the Fourth Has No Relational Support

Only if both limit and no limit could be established should neither limit nor no limit be established.

No limit exists in opposition to limit, as short exists in opposition to long. Both exists in opposition to existence and nonexistence; neither exists in opposition to both.

If both limit and no limit were established, neither could be established through mutual dependence. Yet the third proposition has already been refuted. Whence the fourth, when nothing remains on which it depends?

Sought in this way, all four views concerning limits that arise dependent on the future are unfindable.

Furthermore:

XXVII. Verse and Explanation: Since All Dharmas Are Empty, Where, When, and by Whom Do These Views Arise?

Because all dharmas are empty, where, when, and by whom do views that the world is permanent and the rest arise?

The preceding refuted views through the śrāvaka teaching; the Mahāyāna teaching now speaks.

Dharmas have from the beginning been ultimately empty in nature. Among such empty dharmas there is neither person nor dharma, so neither wrong nor right views should arise.

“Where” means land, “when” days, months, and years, and “who” a person; these three constitute views. If determinate views of permanence and impermanence existed, a person producing them should exist; after the self is refuted, no person produces them.

If a place should exist, even presently visible form can be refuted, how much more time and direction. If views truly existed, they should possess determinate entities; if determinate, they could not be refuted. They have already been refuted through many causes and conditions, so one should know they lack determinate essence. How could they arise?

As the verse says: where, when, and by whom do these views arise?

XXVIII. Final Verse and Explanation: Homage to the Buddha

The Great Sage and Lord Gautama taught this Dharma from compassion and cut off every view. I now bow my head in homage.

All views are briefly five and extensively sixty-two. The Buddha taught the Dharma to cut them off. The Great Sage and Lord Gautama possesses immeasurable, boundless, inconceivable wisdom; therefore I bow my head in homage.