中論 觀作作者品第八

Someone acts, something is acted upon, and a tool is in hand—these three are the questioner’s firmest evidence in the world. Once all three gather, karmic fruition follows. The respondent says that the preceding chapters have already refuted everything, but “because your clinging is deep, you ask again; I will now answer again.” The principle has been explained, but the hand has not released it, so the answer is given once more.

Neither Determinate nor Indeterminate Can Act

“A determinately existent agent does not perform a determinate action; a determinately absent agent does not perform an indeterminate action.”

“Determinate” means that this end has already been established by itself before acting. If already established, acting is superfluous; if wholly absent, acting has nowhere to begin. Qingmu separates the matter again: if the action is determinate first, it should exist apart from the agent; if the agent is determinate first, the agent should exist apart from action—“But this is not so.” The name agent depends upon action, and the name action upon agent. They are originally a pair.

The More Real, the More Causeless

“If the agent determinately exists and the action also determinately exists, agent and action fall into causelessness.”

Once each side stands by itself, it need not await the other. If it does not await the other, “it does not exist through causes and conditions.” Trying to give action a secure owner instead sends causes and conditions away. Follow causelessness through, and what disappears is precisely what the questioner most wants to preserve: cause and fruit, demerit and merit, karmic fruition, and the path to nirvāṇa.

Leaving both ends empty fares no better. “Like a conjured person taking space as a house: there is only something said, without agent or action.” The sentence can be spoken, but the deed cannot be done.

Three Kinds of Agent, Three Kinds of Action

Determinate and indeterminate do not merely fail on their own sides; cross-pairing them also fails:

“An agent, whether determinate or indeterminate, cannot perform the two kinds of action; because existence and nonexistence contradict one another, one place cannot contain both.”

Determinate is existence and indeterminate nonexistence: “How can one person and one matter possess both existence and nonexistence?” Continue the division: “What exists cannot act upon what does not; what does not exist cannot act upon what exists.” If the action exists first, the agent has nothing to do; if no action exists first, there is nothing on which to act.

Thus, determinate, indeterminate, and both-determinate-and-indeterminate actions are refuted together; set the three kinds of agent against them and not one cell can be filled: “In this way, agent and action are sought everywhere but cannot be found.”

This Is How the Meaning of Action Is Established

“Because of action there is an agent; because of the agent there is action; this is how the meaning of action is established, and there is no further matter.”

The respondent first draws the boundary: “This action arises from many conditions and is provisionally said to exist; it has no fixed determination.” What is refuted is fixity, not existence. Qingmu says, “Action is initially unfixed and arises because of a person.” When a person moves, action arises; only the person who does it is then called the agent. “Through the conjunction of the two, action and agent are established.” What arises through conjunction lacks intrinsic nature. Conventionally, action and agent are still spoken of; “within the ultimate meaning, there is neither action nor agent.”

A person becomes that agent in the very act of doing, not by receiving the identity first and then acting.

The Same Measure Also Examines the One Who Experiences

“As action and agent are refuted, experience and experiencer are the same; all dharmas whatsoever should likewise be refuted in this way.”

“Experience means the body of the five aggregates, and experiencer the person”; yet “apart from the person there are no five aggregates, and apart from the five aggregates there is no person.” It is easy to nod when told that agent is a provisional name, but harder to release the self who experiences pleasure and pain. The final verse says the same measure reaches there too.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Two, “Examination of Action and Agent, Chapter Eight,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Because Three Things Conjoin, Agent and Action Should Exist

〔T30 0012b06〕The questioner says: Action, an agent, and the various means used in acting plainly exist now. Because these three things conjoin, there is karmic fruition. Therefore, agent and action should exist.

II. Answer: Earlier Chapters Have Refuted Everything; the Question Is Answered Again Only Because Clinging Runs Deep

The respondent says: In the preceding chapters, all dharmas have been refuted without remainder. As in the refutation of the three marks: because the three marks are absent, there is no conditioned; because the conditioned is absent, there is no unconditioned. Since neither conditioned nor unconditioned exists, among all dharmas there is no action and no agent. If what you speak of is conditioned, it has already been refuted among conditioned dharmas; if unconditioned, it has already been refuted among unconditioned dharmas. You should not ask again. But because your clinging is deep, you ask once more; I will now answer you again.

III. Verse: Neither Determinately Existent nor Determinately Absent Can Act

A determinately existent agent does not perform a determinate action; a determinately absent agent does not perform an indeterminate action.

Qingmu explains: If agent and action are already determinately existent, there should be no acting. If agent and action are already determinately absent, there likewise should be no acting. Why?

IV. Verse: Whichever End Is Fixed First Makes the Other Superfluous

A determinate action is not performed, and such an action has no agent; a determinate agent does not act, and such an agent has no action.

Qingmu explains: If action is already determinately existent, there should not be a separate agent; moreover, action should exist apart from the agent—but this is not so. If an agent is already determinately existent, there should not be a separate action; moreover, an agent should exist apart from action—but this too is not so. Therefore, a determinate agent and determinate action should not act. An indeterminate agent and indeterminate action likewise should not act. Why? Because they are originally absent. Even existent agent and action cannot act, how much less absent agent and action. Further:

V. Verse: If Both Ends Are Fixed First, They Fall into Causelessness

If the agent determinately exists and the action also determinately exists, agent and action fall into causelessness.

Qingmu explains: If agent and action are already determinately existent and you still say that the agent acts, they become causeless. An agent exists apart from action and action apart from the agent; neither then exists through causes and conditions.

VI. Question: What Fault Is There If They Do Not Exist through Causes and Conditions?

The questioner says: What fault is there if agent and action do not exist through causes and conditions?

VII. Verse: Follow Causelessness through, and Demerit, Merit, and Nirvāṇa All Disappear

If they fall into causelessness, there is neither cause nor fruit, neither action nor agent, nor any means used in acting.

If action and related dharmas are absent, demerit and merit are absent; since demerit, merit, and the rest are absent, their karmic fruits are absent.

If the karmic fruits of demerit and merit are absent, nirvāṇa too is absent; every matter that could be acted upon is empty and bears no fruit.

Qingmu explains: If they fall into causelessness, all dharmas lack both cause and fruit. A dharma capable of producing is called a cause, and a dharma produced is called a fruit; both would be absent. Since both are absent, there is neither action nor agent, nor any means used in action, nor demerit and merit. Since demerit and merit are absent, the karmic fruits of demerit and merit and the path to nirvāṇa are absent. Thus, things cannot be said to arise without a cause.

VIII. Question: What Fault Is There If an Indeterminate Agent Performs an Indeterminate Action?

The questioner says: What fault is there if the agent is indeterminate and the action performed is likewise indeterminate?

The respondent says: If one thing is absent, action cannot arise; how much less if both are absent. It would be like a conjured person taking space as a house: there is only something said, with neither agent nor action.

IX. Question: Since Agent and Action Exist Now, Acting Should Exist

The questioner says: If no agent and no action existed, there could be no acting. Since agent and action exist now, acting should exist.

X. Verse: Existence and Nonexistence Contradict Each Other; One Place Cannot Hold Both

An agent, whether determinate or indeterminate, cannot perform the two kinds of action; because existence and nonexistence contradict one another, one place cannot contain both.

Qingmu explains: An agent, whether determinate or indeterminate, cannot perform a determinate or indeterminate action. Why? Because existence and nonexistence contradict one another and should not occupy the same place. Existence is determinate; nonexistence is indeterminate. How can one person and one matter be both existent and nonexistent? Further:

XI. Verse: What Exists Cannot Act upon What Does Not; What Does Not Exist Cannot Act upon What Does

What exists cannot act upon what does not exist; what does not exist cannot act upon what exists. If action and agent are asserted, the faults are as previously explained.

Qingmu explains: If an agent exists but no action exists, how can there be acting? If no agent exists but an action exists, there likewise can be no acting. Why? As previously explained. On the side of existence, if the action already exists, what remains for the agent to do? If the action does not exist first, how can it be acted upon? In this way, the causes, conditions, and fruits of demerit, merit, and the rest are destroyed. Thus the verse says: what exists cannot act upon what does not; what does not exist cannot act upon what exists. If action and agent are asserted, the faults are as previously explained. Further:

XII. Verse: Three Kinds of Action Are Refuted Together at Once

〔T30 0013a04〕An agent performs neither determinate action, indeterminate action, nor action both determinate and indeterminate; the faults are as previously explained.

Qingmu explains: Determinate action has been refuted, indeterminate action has been refuted, and action both determinate and indeterminate has been refuted. The verse is spoken to refute all three at once. Therefore, an agent cannot perform these three kinds of action. The three kinds of agent likewise cannot perform action. Why?

XIII. Verse: Three Kinds of Agent Likewise Cannot Perform Action

An agent, whether determinate, indeterminate, or both determinate and indeterminate, cannot perform action; the faults are as previously explained.

Qingmu explains: An agent, whether determinate, indeterminate, or both determinate and indeterminate, cannot perform action. Why? Because of the three kinds of fault already explained. The matter should be set out fully here. In this way, agent and action are sought everywhere but cannot be found.

XIV. Question: Does Saying There Is No Action and No Agent Not Fall into Causelessness Again?

The questioner says: If one says that there is no action and no agent, does that not fall once again into causelessness?

The respondent says: This action arises from many conditions and is provisionally said to exist; it has no fixed intrinsic nature. It is not as you claim. Why?

XV. Verse: Because of Action There Is an Agent; Because of the Agent There Is Action

Because of action there is an agent; because of the agent there is action. This is how the meaning of action is established, and there is no further matter.

Qingmu explains: Action initially has no fixed intrinsic nature but arises because of a person; because action exists, there is an agent, and the agent likewise has no fixed intrinsic nature. Because there is an action performed, one is called an agent. Through the conjunction of these two matters, action and agent are established. What arises from conjunction lacks intrinsic nature; because it lacks intrinsic nature it is empty, and because empty it is unarisen. Agent and action are spoken of only in conformity with ordinary people’s memories and discriminations. Within the ultimate meaning, there is neither action nor agent. Further:

XVI. Verse: Experience and Experiencer, through All Dharmas, Are Refuted in the Same Way

As action and agent are refuted, experience and experiencer are the same; all dharmas whatsoever should likewise be refuted in this way.

Qingmu explains: Action and agent cannot be separated from one another; because they are inseparable, they are not fixed, and because unfixed, they lack intrinsic nature. Experience and experiencer are the same. “Experience” means the body of the five aggregates, while “experiencer” means the person. Apart from the person there are no five aggregates, and apart from the five aggregates there is no person. They only arise from many conditions, just like experience and experiencer. All other dharmas should likewise be refuted in this way.

A questioner begins by bringing forward the most solid-looking event before our eyes:

“Action, an agent, and the means used in acting now exist; because the three conjoin, karmic fruition exists. Therefore, agent and action should exist.”

The statement seems almost beyond dispute. Someone acts, something is acted upon, and tools and materials are at hand. When the three gather, a result appears—the carpenter, the house, the axe and saw: which is not plainly there?

The respondent’s first answer is cool: “In the preceding chapters, all dharmas have been refuted without remainder.” The chapters before this have already carried out the examination. The three marks fail, so the conditioned fails; when the conditioned fails, the unconditioned cannot be spoken of. If neither conditioned nor unconditioned stands, where can action and agent stand? Strictly speaking, there is no need to ask again.

But the respondent adds a sentence: “Because your clinging is deep, you ask again; I will now answer again.”

This deserves a pause. He does not say, “You do not understand,” but “your clinging is deep”—clinging has struck deep roots. The principle has already been explained, but an explanation’s end is not the heart’s release. Attachment to “I am doing something” does not loosen after a single refutation of marks. The answer is therefore given again. This chapter exists not because something was omitted before, but because the questioner’s hand has not opened.

First See Clearly: What Does “Determinate” Mean?

The first verse establishes the gate of examination:

“A determinately existent agent does not perform a determinate action; a determinately absent agent does not perform an indeterminate action.”

Here “determinate” does not mean making a firm decision in the everyday sense. It means that before action occurs, this end has already been established through itself and does not await the other end.

Once this is clear, the verse is not hard to understand. Qingmu says: “If agent and action are already determinately existent, there should be no acting.” If the agent is already a ready-made agent before acting and the action already a ready-made action before being performed, what use remains for the event of “acting”? Everything that needed establishment is established. Conversely, if both ends are determinately absent before acting, there is no one to act and nothing to act upon.

At one end everything is complete and action is superfluous; at the other everything is absent and action has nowhere to begin.

Fix One End First and the Other Becomes Idle

The second verse separates the matter more finely:

“A determinate action is not performed, and such an action has no agent; a determinate agent does not act, and such an agent has no action.”

Qingmu’s inference is direct: “Moreover, action should exist apart from the agent. But this is not so.”

The principle lies in the names. A person is called an “agent” because that person does something; something is called an “action” because someone performs it. The two names are originally a pair. If action is already determinately action before being done, it must be action without depending on an agent—and therefore action should exist apart from an agent. But on what grounds is an “action” never done by anyone and never awaiting anyone’s doing still called action?

The agent’s side is the same. If a person is already an agent without doing anything, “agent” becomes a designation unrelated to acting.

Qingmu then gathers in the indeterminate side as well: “Even existent agent and action cannot act, how much less absent agent and action.” The reason is only that “they are originally absent.”

When Both Ends Stand First, Conditions Lose Their Place

The third verse states the joint of the examination:

“If the agent determinately exists and the action also determinately exists, agent and action fall into causelessness.”

At first this seems surprising: the claim is that “both sides truly exist,” so how does it become causeless?

Qingmu reveals the point: “They do not exist through causes and conditions.” Because each side is complete by itself in advance, neither needs to await the other; if neither awaits the other, neither arises through causes and conditions. “Causeless” does not mean that nothing at all exists. It means that you have installed both too securely—so securely that no condition is needed.

This is the chapter’s crucial reversal: to make a thing too real does not secure cause and fruit; it sends cause and fruit away. A person looking for an absolutely reliable support for action ends by dismantling the ground on which support could stand.

After Causelessness, Everything Gives Way in Sequence

The questioner is unconvinced and asks what fault there is in causelessness. The respondent counts the consequences one by one:

“If they fall into causelessness, there is neither cause nor fruit, neither action nor agent, nor any means used in acting.”

The count continues:

“If the karmic fruits of demerit and merit are absent, nirvāṇa too is absent; every matter that could be acted upon is empty and bears no fruit.”

Qingmu first fixes the definitions: “A dharma capable of producing is called a cause, and a dharma produced is called a fruit.” Once these two names have no footing, everything after them empties in sequence: no action, no agent, no means used in acting, and therefore no demerit or merit; without demerit and merit, no corresponding karmic fruits; without karmic fruits, no path to nirvāṇa.

This sequence must be read as a whole, not by extracting one sentence. The entire chain is the consequence of the questioner’s thesis, and Qingmu concludes: “Therefore, things cannot arise without a cause.”

Notice what has given way: precisely the things that one who asserts a real agent most wishes to preserve—actions bear fruit, good and evil receive recompense, practice reaches a destination. An agent was made real in order to preserve these, yet that real agent carries them all away.

Leaving Both Ends Empty Produces Nothing Either

The questioner changes paths: then let agent and action both be indeterminate.

The respondent is brief: “If one thing is absent, action cannot arise; how much less if both are absent.” He then gives an analogy:

“Like a conjured person taking space as a house: there is only something said, with neither agent nor action.”

A conjured person lives in space as a house. The sentence can be produced, read smoothly, and understood—but from beginning to end there is neither a person nor a house. A sentence’s intelligibility does not make an act possible.

The analogy does not say that all worldly speech is useless. It addresses one specific thought: empty both ends and imagine this avoids the difficulty that prior establishment is superfluous. Once both are emptied, only a string of words remains.

Existence and Nonexistence Cannot Occupy One Place

The questioner infers in reverse: if dual absence cannot act, surely the agent and action plainly present now can act.

The respondent turns the examination toward their combinations:

“An agent, whether determinate or indeterminate, cannot perform the two kinds of action; because existence and nonexistence contradict one another, one place cannot contain both.”

Qingmu is utterly plain: “Existence is determinate, nonexistence is indeterminate; how can one person and one matter possess both existence and nonexistence?” Determinate means existent and indeterminate nonexistent. Placing both existence and nonexistence on the same person or matter forces two contradictions into one position.

Now inspect the cross-pairings:

“What exists cannot act upon what does not; what does not exist cannot act upon what exists.”

Qingmu asks: “If an agent exists but no action exists, how can there be acting?” A person exists with no thing to do; a thing exists with no person to do it. Each side lacks one end. On the side of existence he presses again: “If the action already exists, what remains for the agent to do? If the action does not exist first, how can it be acted upon?” If action exists beforehand, the agent has nothing to perform; if it does not exist beforehand, the agent has nothing to take up.

The verse then gathers all three kinds of action:

“An agent performs neither determinate action, indeterminate action, nor action both determinate and indeterminate; the faults are as previously explained.”

Qingmu says this verse “refutes all three at once.” Determinate, indeterminate, and both-determinate-and-indeterminate exhaust the three gates. Move the same division to the side of the agent, and the result is identical. Qingmu concludes: “In this way, agent and action are sought everywhere but cannot be found.”

Notice where the weight of this sentence falls. What cannot be found is an agent and action standing by themselves outside causes and conditions. It does not mean one cannot say that someone is doing something.

Then How Are Action and Agent Established?

The questioner finally asks the crucial question: “If one says there is no action and no agent, one falls again into causelessness.”

The respondent’s answer is the chapter’s affirmative side:

“This action arises from many conditions and is provisionally said to exist; it has no fixed determination.”

It arises from many conditions, so it is said to exist—an existence spoken through provisional naming. To call it existent does not claim a fixed and unchanging body. What is refuted is “determination,” not “existence.”

Then comes the chapter’s central verse:

“Because of action there is an agent; because of the agent there is action; this is how the meaning of action is established, and there is no further matter.”

The final words are precisely measured—“there is no further matter.” Apart from the names obtained through this mutual dependence, no third thing appears. There is no need to search for an underlying real agent to guarantee the pair of names.

Qingmu unfolds the verse: “Action is initially unfixed and arises because of a person.” When a person moves, action arises; once the action arises, the person who performs it is called the agent. Thus, “Through the conjunction of two matters, action and agent are established.”

What arises from conjunction has no nature of its own: “What arises from conjunction lacks intrinsic nature; because it lacks intrinsic nature, it is empty; because empty, it is unarisen.”

Finally, he clarifies two levels: “Only in conformity with ordinary people’s memories and discriminations are action and agent said to exist; within the ultimate meaning, there is neither action nor agent.”

At the conventional level, speech continues: this deed was done by this person, this action was committed by this person, and responsibility remains. At the ultimate level, no ready-made agent apart from conditions can be found, nor any ready-made action apart from the agent. The two levels do not interfere. Precisely because there is no intrinsic nature, conditions can move; if a truly unchanging agent existed, that agent could not perform anything new.

This Measure Does Not Apply Only to the Agent

The final verse extends the examination:

“As action and agent are refuted, experience and experiencer are the same; all dharmas whatsoever should likewise be refuted in this way.”

Qingmu first restates the reasoning: “Because they cannot be separated, they are not fixed; because unfixed, they lack intrinsic nature.” Since they cannot be separated, neither is independently determinate; since they are not determinate, they lack intrinsic nature.

He then tests another pair of person and dharma: “Experience means the body of the five aggregates; experiencer means the person.” Experience is this body and mind of five aggregates; experiencer is the person who undergoes it. The result is the same: “Apart from the person there are no five aggregates; apart from the five aggregates there is no person.”

This step reaches far. The preceding discussion concerned “I act”; here it concerns “I experience.” Someone may understand that agent is a provisional name and still tightly guard an experiencer—pain is experienced by me, pleasure by me; surely this “me” is real? The final verse says the same measure reaches this pair. The one who experiences and the body-mind experienced are likewise an inseparable and unfixed pair.

“All other dharmas should likewise be refuted in this way.” Wherever one can ask, “Which of these two ends was established first?” the same examination can be made.

What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?

First, the more real a matter is made, the less secure it becomes. “If the agent determinately exists and the action also determinately exists” concludes by “falling into causelessness.” To seek an absolutely reliable owner for action leaves conditions nowhere to operate.

Second, the identity agent is not received first and then enacted. “Because of action there is an agent; because of the agent there is action.” A person becomes that agent at the very time of acting. This can be applied directly to oneself: there is no need to decide first what kind of person one is and then behave according to the identity.

Third, refuting a determinate agent does not remove demerit, merit, cause, and fruit. What truly makes demerit, merit, and karmic fruition collapse is the path of causelessness. What is preserved here is “provisionally said to exist, without fixed determination”—the name can be spoken without making the body real.

Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror

The preceding is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows lets the Sui–Tang Three Treatises tradition illuminate it from the side. The mirror is not the treatise; it offers another way to read the same verses.

Jizang’s Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle places this chapter and those following it within the gate of nonaction, after emptiness and the signless, as one stage in the sequence of the three gates of liberation. He also exhaustively tests acting through five combinations of person and dharma: person and dharma both existent; both nonexistent; half existent and half nonexistent; one existent and one nonexistent; and one person with three dharmas or three persons with one dharma. Each arrangement changes the fault but leaves no fifth road. He further classifies the chapter: the first eleven verses refute action and agent, meaning person and dharma within the cause; the final verse refutes experience and experiencer, meaning person and dharma within the fruit. Once person and dharma are absent in both cause and fruit, all is empty.

This interpretation—the chapter’s position among the three gates of liberation, the fivefold table of tests, and the division between person and dharma within cause and fruit—is Jizang’s addition, not the original wording of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s long commentary. The reader layer still follows Kumārajīva’s verse groups and sequence of questions and answers. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.