中論 觀六情品第三
問方引經立宗：「眼耳及鼻舌、身意等六情，此眼等六情，行色等六塵。」眼在內，色在外，「眼能見色」，直推到意知法。答方只說：「無也。何以故？」
尺子是燈
頌先問眼能不能見自己：「是眼則不能，自見其己體」。青目取燈為量——「如燈能自照亦能照他」，光一亮，自他俱在光中。眼若真是見的相，也該如此，「而實不爾」。
看得見別的，看不見自己，這件事本身就露了底。
換一個譬喻，換不掉三時
問方改舉火：「如火能燒他，不能自燒。」答方不與他爭火，只說「汝雖作火喻，不能成眼見法」，並指回前品：「去未去去時，已總答是事。」
青目把尺子搬過來：「如已燒、未燒、燒時俱無有燒，如是已見、未見、見時俱無見相。」火喻要立，先得有一個站得住的燒；燒在三時裡就取不到。
見是對上了才得的名字
「眼未對色則不能見，爾時不名為見，因對色名為見。」閉眼時那雙眼還在，見這個名卻安不上去。所以「未見時無見」——並沒有一個現成的見，等在那裡預備出去見。
見者的位子，兩條路都到不了
「見不能有見，非見亦不見」：見這一邊已看過，非見那一邊「無見相故」。於是連帶——「若已破於見，則為破見者。」
青目補兩重：「若離見有見者，無眼者亦應以餘情見」；改說以見來見，則相落在見中，「見者無見相」。靠不住，或靠了也不歸自己。
位子一空，另一頭同空：「以無見者故，何有見可見？」
第一節鬆了，整條鏈都鬆
「見、可見法無故，識、觸、受、愛四法皆無。」再往下，「以無愛等故，四取等十二因緣分亦無」。
所遮的是那個「決定」，不是眼前這一次看見。
末頌類推餘五：「當知如是義，皆同於上說。」青目給的理由是「屬眾緣故無決定」，末了說「義同故不別說」——把尺子交回讀者手裡。
The questioner establishes the position by citing scripture: “The eye and ear, together with nose, tongue, body, and mind, are the six faculties; these six operate in relation to the six objects, beginning with form.” Eye is inside, form outside, and “the eye sees form,” all the way through mind knowing dharmas. The respondent says only: “No. Why?”
The Measure Is a Lamp
The verse first asks whether the eye can see itself: “This eye cannot see its own body.” Qingmu measures it by a lamp—“A lamp illuminates both itself and other things.” When light shines, self and other stand together within it. If the eye truly bore the mark of seeing, it should do the same, “yet that is not so.”
Seeing other things but not itself gives the game away.
Changing the Analogy Cannot Change the Three Times
The questioner substitutes fire: “Fire burns other things but cannot burn itself.” The respondent does not debate fire. He says only, “Although you offer the analogy of fire, it cannot establish a dharma of seeing in the eye,” then points back to the preceding chapter: “What has gone, not gone, and the time of going have already answered this matter.”
Qingmu carries the measure across: “Just as no burning exists in what has burned, what has not yet burned, or the time of burning, no mark of seeing exists in what has been seen, what has not yet been seen, or the time of seeing.” For the fire analogy to stand, a burning capable of standing must first be found. It cannot be obtained in the three times.
Seeing Is a Name Obtained Only in the Encounter
“Before the eye faces form, it cannot see and is not called seeing. It is called seeing because it faces form.” The eyes remain when closed, but the name seeing cannot be placed upon them. Thus, “before seeing, there is no seeing”—no ready-made seeing waits there, prepared to go out and see.
The Position of Seer Cannot Be Reached by Either Route
“Seeing cannot possess seeing, nor does non-seeing see.” The side of seeing has already been examined; non-seeing fails “because it lacks the mark of seeing.” The consequence follows: “Once seeing is refuted, the seer is refuted with it.”
Qingmu adds two levels: “If a seer existed apart from seeing, a person without eyes should see through another faculty.” If instead seeing is used to see, the mark resides in seeing, while “the seer lacks the mark of seeing.” Either there is no support, or what supports it does not belong to the seer.
Once that position is empty, the other end is empty with it: “Since there is no seer, where can seeing and the visible exist?”
Release the First Link and the Whole Chain Releases
“Because seeing and the visible are absent, consciousness, contact, feeling, and craving are all absent.” Further: “Because craving and the rest are absent, the four kinds of clinging and the other links of dependent origination are absent.”
What is barred is the “fixed,” not the seeing occurring before your eyes.
The final verse extends the measure to the other five faculties: “Know that their meaning is wholly the same as explained above.” Qingmu’s reason is that they “belong to many conditions and therefore are not fixed.” He closes with, “Because the meaning is the same, they are not explained separately”—returning the measure to the reader’s hand.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷一〈觀六情品第三〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0005c16〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0005c16〕問曰：經中說有六情，所謂：
〔T30 0006a01〕「眼耳及鼻舌、身意等六情，
此眼等六情，行色等六塵。」
此中眼為內情、色為外塵，眼能見色，乃至意為內情、法為外塵，意能知法。
答曰：無也。何以故？
「是眼則不能，自見其己體；
若不能自見，云何見餘物？」
是眼不能見自體。何以故？如燈能自照亦能照他。眼若是見相，亦應自見亦應見他。而實不爾，是故偈中說「若眼不自見，何能見餘物？」
問曰：眼雖不能自見，而能見他。如火能燒他，不能自燒。
答曰：
「火喻則不能，成於眼見法；
去未去去時，已總答是事。」
汝雖作火喻，不能成眼見法。是事〈去來品〉中已答，如已去中無去、未去中無去、去時中無去；如已燒、未燒、燒時俱無有燒，如是已見、未見、見時俱無見相。復次：
「見若未見時，則不名為見；
而言見能見，是事則不然。」
眼未對色則不能見，爾時不名為見，因對色名為見。是故偈中說「未見時無見」，云何以見能見？復次二處俱無見法。何以故？
「見不能有見，非見亦不見；
若已破於見，則為破見者。」
見不能見，先已說過故。非見亦不見，無見相故。若無見相，云何能見？見法無故，見者亦無。何以故？若離見有見者，無眼者亦應以餘情見。若以見見，則見中有見相。見者無見相，是故偈中說「若已破於見，則為破見者。」復次：
「離見不離見，見者不可得；
以無見者故，何有見可見？」
若有見，見者則不成；若無見，見者亦不成。見者無故，云何有見可見？若無見者，誰能用見法分別外色？是故偈中說「以無見者故，何有見可見？」復次：
「見可見無故，識等四法無；
四取等諸緣，云何當得有？」
見、可見法無故，識、觸、受、愛四法皆無。以無愛等故，四取等十二因緣分亦無。復次：
「耳鼻舌身意，聲及聞者等，
當知如是義，皆同於上說。」
如見、可見法空，屬眾緣故無決定。餘耳等五情聲等五塵，當知亦同見可見法，義同故不別說。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷一〈觀六情品第三〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、問：經中明明說有六情
〔T30 0005c16〕問的一方說：經裡說有六情，就是下面所說的——
眼、耳，以及鼻、舌、身、意這六情；這眼等六情，行於色等六塵。
這裡面，眼是在內的情，色是在外的塵，眼能見色；這樣一路類推，直到意是在內的情，法是在外的塵，意能知法。
二、答：沒有。眼不能見自己
答的一方說：沒有。為什麼？
這眼並不能夠自己見到它自己的本體；若是連自己都不能見，又怎麼談得上見其餘的東西？
這眼不能見自己的本體。為什麼？譬如燈，既能照自己，也能照別的東西。眼若真的就是見的相，那麼也應當能自己見自己，也應當能見別的東西。可是事實並不是這樣。所以偈中說：『眼若不能自見，怎麼能見其餘的東西？』
三、問：火能燒他而不自燒，眼也一樣
問的一方說：眼雖然不能見自己，卻能見別的東西。就像火能燒別的東西，卻不能燒自己。
四、答：火喻不成，三時之中都沒有
答的一方說：
火的譬喻並不能夠成立眼有見法這件事；已去、未去、去時三者，在前面已經總括地答過這件事了。
你雖然作了火的譬喻，卻不能成立眼有見法。這件事在〈去來品〉裡已經答過了：譬如已去之中沒有去，未去之中沒有去，正在去的時候也沒有去；同樣的，已燒、未燒、正燒的時候，也一概沒有燒可得。像這樣，已見、未見、正見的時候，也一概沒有見的相可得。
其次：
見在還沒有見的時候，就不能叫作見；而說這個見能見，這件事就說不通。
眼還沒有對著色的時候，就不能見，那個時候不叫作見；因為對著色，才叫作見。所以偈中說『沒有見的時候並沒有見』，那麼又怎麼能拿見去見呢？
其次，見與非見這兩處，都沒有見法可得。為什麼？
五、見與非見兩處都無見，見者也不能成立
那個見並不能夠有見，那個非見也一樣不見；若是已經破除了見，那也就等於破除了見者。
見不能見，因為前面已經說過它的過失了。非見也不見，因為它沒有見的相。既然沒有見的相，怎麼能見？見法既然沒有，見者也就沒有。為什麼？
若是離開見另有一個見者，那麼沒有眼睛的人，也應當能用其餘的情去見。若是說拿見來見，那麼見的相就落在見裡面了；而見者自身並沒有見的相。所以偈中說：『若是已經破除了見，那也就等於破除了見者。』
其次：
不論是離開見，還是不離開見，見者都是求不到的；因為沒有見者的緣故，哪裡還有見與可見？
若是有見，見者便不能成立；若是沒有見，見者也一樣不能成立。見者既然沒有，怎麼會有見與可見？若是沒有見者，那麼是誰在使用見法去分別外面的色？所以偈中說：『因為沒有見者的緣故，哪裡還有見與可見？』
六、識、觸、受、愛四法無，四取等諸緣也無
其次：
因為見與可見都沒有的緣故，識等四法也就沒有；那麼四取等種種緣，又怎麼能夠有呢？
見與可見這兩個法既然沒有，識、觸、受、愛這四個法也就全都沒有。因為沒有愛等的緣故，四取等十二因緣的支分也就沒有。
七、其餘五情，義理相同
其次：
耳、鼻、舌、身、意，以及聲與聞者等等；應當知道這樣的義理，全都同於上面所說的。
就像見與可見這兩個法是空的，因為屬於眾緣的緣故，所以沒有決定性。其餘的耳等五情、聲等五塵，應當知道也同於見與可見這兩個法；因為義理相同的緣故，就不另外分開來說了。
Composed by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, commented upon by the brahmin Qingmu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin: Treatise on the Middle, scroll one, “Examination of the Six Faculties,” Taishō canon T30n1564. Markers at the beginnings of passages, 〔T30 …〕, give Taishō page, column, and line anchors.
I. Question: The Sūtra Plainly Says That Six Faculties Exist
〔T30 0005c16〕The questioner says: The sūtra teaches that there are six faculties, as stated below:
The eye and ear, together with nose, tongue, body, and mind, are the six faculties. These six, beginning with the eye, operate in relation to the six objects, beginning with form.
Here the eye is the internal faculty, form the external object, and the eye sees form. The same applies in sequence until mind is the internal faculty, dharmas are the external object, and mind knows dharmas.
II. Answer: No. The Eye Cannot See Itself
The respondent says: No. Why?
This eye cannot see its own body. If it cannot even see itself, how could it be said to see other things?
The eye cannot see its own body. Why? A lamp, for example, illuminates both itself and other things. If the eye truly bore the mark of seeing, it too should see itself and other things. Yet that is not so. The verse therefore says: “If the eye cannot see itself, how can it see other things?”
III. Question: Fire Burns Other Things but Not Itself; the Eye Is the Same
The questioner says: Although the eye cannot see itself, it can see other things, just as fire can burn other things but cannot burn itself.
IV. Answer: The Fire Analogy Fails; Nothing Exists in Any of the Three Times
The respondent says:
The analogy of fire cannot establish that the eye possesses a dharma of seeing. What has gone, what has not gone, and the time of going have already answered this matter comprehensively.
Although you offer the analogy of fire, it cannot establish a dharma of seeing in the eye. “Examination of Going and Coming” already answered this: there is no going in what has already gone, in what has not yet gone, or at the time presently going. Likewise, no burning can be found in what has burned, what has not yet burned, or what is presently burning. In the same way, no mark of seeing can be found in what has been seen, what has not yet been seen, or what is presently being seen.
Next:
Before seeing has seen, it cannot be called seeing. The claim that this seeing can see therefore makes no sense.
Before the eye faces form, it cannot see and is not then called seeing. It is called seeing because it faces form. Thus the verse says, “Before seeing, there is no seeing.” How, then, can seeing be used to see?
Next, no dharma of seeing can be found either in seeing or in what is not seeing. Why?
V. Seeing Exists in Neither Seeing nor Non-seeing, So a Seer Cannot Be Established
Seeing cannot possess seeing, nor does what is not seeing see. Once seeing has been refuted, the seer is refuted with it.
Seeing cannot see because its faults have already been explained. What is not seeing does not see because it lacks the mark of seeing. Without the mark of seeing, how could it see? Since there is no dharma of seeing, there is no seer. Why?
If a seer existed apart from seeing, a person without eyes should be able to see through another faculty. If one says that seeing is used to see, the mark of seeing would reside in seeing, while the seer itself would lack that mark. Thus the verse says: “Once seeing has been refuted, the seer is refuted with it.”
Next:
Whether apart from seeing or not apart from seeing, the seer cannot be found. Since there is no seer, where could seeing and the visible exist?
If seeing exists, the seer cannot be established; if seeing does not exist, the seer likewise cannot be established. Since there is no seer, how can there be seeing and the visible? With no seer, who could use the dharma of seeing to distinguish external forms? Thus the verse says: “Since there is no seer, where could seeing and the visible exist?”
VI. Without Consciousness, Contact, Feeling, and Craving, the Four Kinds of Clinging and Other Conditions Are Also Absent
Next:
Because seeing and the visible do not exist, the four dharmas beginning with consciousness do not exist. How, then, could the four kinds of clinging and the other conditions exist?
Since neither seeing nor the visible exists, consciousness, contact, feeling, and craving are all absent. Because craving and the rest are absent, the four kinds of clinging and the other links of dependent origination are also absent.
VII. The Same Meaning Applies to the Other Five Faculties
Next:
The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, together with sound, the hearer, and so forth—know that their meaning is entirely the same as explained above.
Seeing and the visible are empty because they belong to many conditions and therefore have no fixed nature. Know that the other five faculties beginning with the ear, and the other five objects beginning with sound, are the same as seeing and the visible. Because the meaning is the same, they are not explained separately.
人一睜眼，世界就在那裡。這件事太順了，順到沒有人會停下來問一句：那個能看的，自己在哪裡？
這一品就是從這裡下手的。它問的不是你看見了什麼，而是那個『看』本身，站不站得住。
品首來問的一方，手裡拿的是經。他說「經中說有六情」，隨即把經說的那一頌背出來：
「眼耳及鼻舌、身意等六情， 此眼等六情，行色等六塵。」
然後他把這一頌的意思展開：眼在裡面，色在外面，「眼能見色」；一直推到意在裡面，法在外面，意能知法。六樣感官，各對著六樣境界，一一相應。
這一問問得規矩，也問得有力。它不是自己編出來的道理，是經裡本有的話。
答的一方只回了兩個字。
「無也。何以故？」
燈能照自己，眼不能
要看清楚論主為什麼敢這樣答，得先看他手上那個尺子。
頌說：
「是眼則不能，自見其己體； 若不能自見，云何見餘物？」
青目把這一頌接成一個譬喻。他說「如燈能自照亦能照他」——燈這樣東西，光一亮，自己也在光裡，別的東西也在光裡。照的作用不必分內外，它一發便是通的。
於是青目下了一句對照：「眼若是見相，亦應自見亦應見他。」你若說眼睛本身就是「見」這件事的相，那它應當像燈一樣，自己也照得到，別的也照得到。
「而實不爾」。
事實不是這樣。一雙眼睛可以看見山、看見人、看見遠處的一點火光，卻永遠看不見自己。鏡子裡看見的是鏡中之影，不是那個正在看的東西。
這裡要留意論主的手法。他並不是說『眼睛沒有用』——這一品從頭到尾沒有這樣說。他是拿「見」這個名目所應有的樣子，回頭去量那個被說成自帶見性的眼睛：燈的照是通的，眼的見卻是偏的。既然偏，那麼「見」就不是眼自己身上帶著的一件現成本事。
能看見別的、卻看不見自己，這件事本身就在說：看，不是一樣東西，是一件待緣才成的事。
火能燒他而不自燒——這個救法，救不動
問的一方立刻補了一個譬喻，而且補得很機敏。
他說：「眼雖不能自見，而能見他。如火能燒他，不能自燒。」
這句話的分量在哪裡？他等於承認了燈喻不成立，然後另找一個現成的例子來頂替：世上本來就有這樣的東西啊——火燒得了柴，燒不了自己；那麼眼看得見色，看不見自己，也就沒什麼奇怪。
答方沒有跟他爭火會不會自燒。他說的是：「汝雖作火喻，不能成眼見法。」你這個譬喻換得再巧，也還沒有替眼睛立起一個見來。
頌接著點出這一問早已答過：
「火喻則不能，成於眼見法； 去未去去時，已總答是事。」
「已總答」三個字，指的是前面的〈去來品〉。那一品在三個時段裡找那個「去」：已經去過的路段裡，去已經完了，找不到正在去；還沒去的路段裡，去還沒開始，也找不到；那麼正在去的當下呢——把當下再攤開，仍舊只是已去與未去兩截。三處都摸不到一個獨立的「去」。
青目把這把尺子直接搬到燒與見上：「如已燒、未燒、燒時俱無有燒，如是已見、未見、見時俱無見相。」
換一個譬喻不能解決問題，因為問題不在譬喻，在時間。火喻要成立，先得有一個真站得住的「燒」；可是燒本身在三時裡都拿不出來。用一件同樣拿不出來的事，去證另一件拿不出來的事，兩頭都懸著。
見，是對著色才有的名字
論主接著把話收得更近，說到我們最日常的那一段經驗。
頌說：
「見若未見時，則不名為見； 而言見能見，是事則不然。」
青目的釋文極平實：「眼未對色則不能見，爾時不名為見，因對色名為見。」
閉著眼的時候，那雙眼睛在不在？在。可是那個時候，你不會說它正在見。它要對上一個色，見這個名字才安得上去。
於是問題就來了。人心裡常有一個想法：先有一個現成的「見」，然後這個見去見東西。可是青目說「未見時無見」——在還沒有見的那一段，見這個名目根本立不起來。既然立不起來，就沒有一個先在的見等在那裡，準備出去見。
它不是先有然後去用的一件工具，是對上了才得名的一件事。
這一步很要緊。前面兩節破的是眼自帶見性，這一節破的是把「見」從那一次相對之中抽出來，當成獨立的一項。
見與非見，兩處都安不下一個見
話說到這裡，論主用了一副夾子把路封死。
頌說：
「見不能有見，非見亦不見； 若已破於見，則為破見者。」
天下的東西，要嘛是見，要嘛不是見，沒有第三類。兩邊逐一看。
先看見這一邊。青目說「見不能見，先已說過故」——它已經被前面幾節看過了：它不自見，它不能離開對色而先立。既然如此，再說它裡面另有一個見在起作用，是把同一件事重說一遍，並沒有多出什麼。
再看非見這一邊。青目說「非見亦不見，無見相故」——一個本來就不是見的東西，身上沒有見的相；沒有見的相，見這件事無從發生。
兩邊都安不下，於是頌下了一句連帶的話：「若已破於見，則為破見者。」
見這一頭既然求不到，靠見得名的那一位——見者——也就跟著求不到。青目替這一句補了兩重理由。
第一重：「若離見有見者，無眼者亦應以餘情見。」你若說見者是離開見而另有的一位，那麼一個沒有眼睛的人，他身上那位見者還在，他就該能用耳朵或鼻子去見色。事實並非如此。
第二重：「若以見見，則見中有見相。」你若改口說，見者是靠著見才能見的，那麼見的相就落在見這一邊了；而「見者無見相」——見者自己身上並沒有帶著那個相。
一邊靠不住，一邊靠了也不歸自己。見者這個位子，兩條路都走不到。
沒有一位在看的人，也就沒有一組被看的東西
頌把這件事推到底：
「離見不離見，見者不可得； 以無見者故，何有見可見？」
青目解得極簡：「若有見，見者則不成；若無見，見者亦不成。」
有見的時候，見這件事已經在那裡了，不必再另立一位來作它的主人；沒有見的時候，更說不上有誰在見。兩邊都不成，見者便沒有一個站的地方。
接著青目問了一句非常貼身的話：「若無見者，誰能用見法分別外色？」
這一問看似是反過來質疑論主的，其實是把讀者心裡最後那個影子指出來。人總覺得：就算見是待緣的，總還有『我』在用它吧？青目正是要說——那個『用』的位子，一併求不到。
而位子一空，另一頭也跟著空。頌問「何有見可見」，可見就是被看見的那一邊。看的人不能單立，被看的東西也就不能單立；不是先有兩個現成的東西再湊在一起，是這一對名目只在相對之中才說得出來。
一鬆，就鬆到底
到這裡，論主忽然把話拉遠：
「見可見無故，識等四法無； 四取等諸緣，云何當得有？」
青目點名：「見、可見法無故，識、觸、受、愛四法皆無。」
順著十二因緣看就清楚了。眼對色，才有眼識；根、境、識三者湊齊，才有觸；有觸才有受；有受才有愛。這是一條接一條往下長的。如今第一節就沒有一個自己站得住的見與可見，後面那幾節自然也沒有一個自己站得住的識、觸、受、愛。
青目再往下推一步：「以無愛等故，四取等十二因緣分亦無。」愛既然沒有自性，由愛而起的四取——以及取之後的有、生、老死——也就沒有自性。
要留意這裡說的是「無」什麼。論主並沒有說世上不曾發生眼看見色、不曾生起愛、不曾有人執取。他所遮的，是那個「決定」。這一節的位置也值得看：它讓這一品從一個看起來很細的認識問題，一直通到生死流轉的整條鏈上——鬆的不是一個環，是這條鏈自始就沒有一個環是硬的。
其餘五情，不必再說一遍
末頌收尾：
「耳鼻舌身意，聲及聞者等， 當知如是義，皆同於上說。」
青目給了理由：「如見、可見法空，屬眾緣故無決定。」耳與聲、鼻與香、舌與味、身與觸、意與法，每一組都可以照樣走一遍：耳不自聞、聞在未聞時無名、離聞無聞者、聞與所聞不能相離而立。
所以他說「義同故不別說」。
這句話讀起來像是省筆，其實是一種信任。論主把方法交給了讀者：這一品給的不是七個結論，是一把可以自己再用的尺。
讀這一品的人可以帶走什麼
一是留意那個『看不見自己』的地方。「如燈能自照亦能照他」——燈是通的，眼不是。凡是覺得自己身上有一樣本事是現成的、不待別的，不妨問一句：它照得到自己嗎？
二是不要替一件事先立一個主人。「若無見者，誰能用見法分別外色？」——這一問底下的那個『誰』，正是最容易被漏過去的一環。看的時候只是看，未必要在看的背後再安一位。
三是記住一鬆就鬆到底。「以無愛等故，四取等十二因緣分亦無。」眼前這一次看見，並不是與生死無關的小事；它正是那條鏈的第一節。看清了這一節是待緣的，後面的也就不必當作鐵板。
承衍：吉藏之鏡
以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論，只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。
吉藏《中觀論疏》先替經說與論說解結。他說佛所以說六情，本意在令人明白六是空；外人聽了卻執定實有六情，是不識佛意。又說佛說六情屬世諦，如來說世諦正是要人由此悟入第一義；小乘人卻當作實有六，於第一義未曾入。所以他判：論主今言無六，用意乃是申明佛說六的本意，不是毀破經教。
他又替本品立了科判。答方七偈分為兩段：前六偈正破眼情，後一偈類觀其餘五情。六偈再依次標為六節——正破、指前破、重破、法無故人無、人無故法無、因無故果無。他還把這六偈束成兩層：前五偈破見因之義，末一偈破見所生之果；五偈之中又分破眼見、破色見、破人見三類。至於末段識等四法，他讀作因無故果無：眼與色和合而生眼識乃至四取，眼色是因、識等是果；前面既求三種見而不可得，因已不立，於是次明果亦不生。
這面鏡替本品安了科名與層次，又把經論之間的張力接進三論一系判釋世諦與第一義的架構；科判與判釋是吉藏所增，不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判，各還其位。
The instant the eyes open, the world is there. It happens so seamlessly that no one stops to ask: where is the one who sees?
This chapter begins there. It does not ask what you have seen. It asks whether “seeing” itself can stand.
The questioner at the beginning of the chapter comes holding a sūtra. He says, “The sūtra teaches that six faculties exist,” then recites its verse:
“The eye and ear, together with nose, tongue, body, and mind, are the six faculties; these six, beginning with the eye, operate in relation to the six objects, beginning with form.”
He then unfolds its meaning. The eye is inside, form outside, and “the eye sees form.” The sequence continues until mind is inside, dharmas outside, and mind knows dharmas. Six faculties each face one of six fields, corresponding one by one.
The question is disciplined and forceful. It is not a theory of the questioner’s invention; the words are already present in the sūtra.
The respondent gives only two words.
“No. Why?”
A Lamp Illuminates Itself; the Eye Does Not
To see why the treatise author dares answer this way, first look at the measure he holds.
The verse says:
“This eye cannot see its own body; if it cannot see itself, how can it see other things?”
Qingmu turns the verse into an analogy. He says, “A lamp illuminates both itself and other things.” When a lamp shines, it stands in the light together with everything else. Illumination need not be divided into an inside and an outside; as soon as it operates, it reaches both.
Qingmu then draws the comparison: “If the eye bore the mark of seeing, it should see itself and other things.” If the eye itself were the mark of seeing, it should be like a lamp: it should illuminate itself as well as everything else.
“Yet that is not so.”
It is not. A pair of eyes sees mountains, people, and a point of fire in the distance, but never itself. What appears in a mirror is a reflected image, not the thing presently seeing.
Notice the treatise author’s method. He does not say “eyes are useless”—the chapter never says this. He takes what the name “seeing” would have to mean and uses it to measure an eye said to possess vision in itself. A lamp’s illumination is pervasive; the eye’s vision is partial. Since it is partial, seeing is not a ready-made capacity carried inside the eye.
Being able to see other things but not itself already tells us that seeing is not a thing. It is an event established through conditions.
Fire Burns Other Things but Not Itself—This Rescue Cannot Rescue the Claim
The questioner immediately supplies another analogy, and does so cleverly.
He says: “Although the eye cannot see itself, it can see other things, just as fire burns other things but cannot burn itself.”
What weight does this carry? He effectively concedes that the lamp analogy fails, then substitutes another ready example: things like this already exist in the world. Fire burns wood but not itself; therefore nothing is strange about the eye seeing form but not itself.
The respondent does not debate whether fire can burn itself. He says: “Although you offer the analogy of fire, it cannot establish a dharma of seeing in the eye.” However cleverly the analogy is exchanged, it still does not establish a seeing that belongs to the eye.
The verse then points out that this question has already been answered:
“The analogy of fire cannot establish a dharma of seeing in the eye; what has gone, not gone, and the time of going have already answered this matter.”
The words “already answered” point back to “Examination of Going and Coming.” That chapter seeks “going” in three periods. In the stretch already walked, going is over, so present going cannot be found. In the stretch not yet walked, going has not begun. What about the present moment of going? Spread the moment open and it is still only two sections, already gone and not yet gone. No independent going can be touched in any of the three.
Qingmu brings that measure directly to burning and seeing: “Just as no burning exists in what has burned, what has not yet burned, or the time of burning, no mark of seeing exists in what has been seen, what has not yet been seen, or the time of seeing.”
Changing the analogy does not solve the problem, because the problem is not the analogy but time. For the analogy to work, a real burning must first stand. Yet burning cannot be produced in any of the three times. One unfindable event cannot prove another; both ends remain suspended.
Seeing Is a Name Obtained Only When the Eye Faces Form
The treatise author now brings the words closer, to the most everyday part of experience.
The verse says:
“Before seeing has seen, it is not called seeing; the claim that seeing can see is therefore not so.”
Qingmu’s explanation is plain: “Before the eye faces form, it cannot see and is not called seeing. It is called seeing because it faces form.”
When your eyes are closed, are they still there? Yes. But you do not say that they are seeing. Only when the eye faces a form can the name seeing be placed upon the event.
The difficulty now appears. The mind habitually imagines that a ready-made seeing exists first and then goes out to see things. Qingmu says, however, “Before seeing, there is no seeing.” Before an act of seeing, the name seeing cannot be established at all. If it cannot be established, no preexisting seeing waits there, prepared to go out and see.
It is not a tool that exists first and is then used. It is an event that receives its name only when the encounter occurs.
This step matters. The preceding sections refuted a seeing-nature inherent in the eye. This section refutes extracting “seeing” from a particular relation and making it an independent item.
Neither Seeing nor Non-seeing Can House Another Seeing
At this point the treatise author closes the path with a pair of tongs.
The verse says:
“Seeing cannot possess seeing, nor does non-seeing see; once seeing is refuted, the seer is refuted with it.”
Anything in the world is either seeing or not seeing; there is no third kind. Examine both sides in turn.
First, seeing. Qingmu says, “Seeing cannot see, because this was explained before.” The preceding sections have already examined it: seeing does not see itself, and cannot be established before it faces form. To say that another seeing operates inside it merely repeats the same event without adding anything.
Next, non-seeing. Qingmu says, “Non-seeing does not see because it lacks the mark of seeing.” Something that is not seeing bears no mark of seeing. Without that mark, no seeing can occur.
Neither side has room for it, so the verse gives a linked conclusion: “Once seeing is refuted, the seer is refuted with it.”
Once seeing cannot be found, the one named through seeing—the seer—cannot be found either. Qingmu supplies two levels of reason.
First: “If a seer existed apart from seeing, a person without eyes should see through another faculty.” If the seer were someone existing separately from seeing, the seer would remain present in a blind person, who should then be able to see form with the ear or nose. This is not so.
Second: “If seeing is used to see, the mark of seeing resides in seeing.” If one instead says that the seer can see only by relying on seeing, the mark resides on the side of seeing, while “the seer lacks the mark of seeing.” The seer carries no such mark in itself.
One route has no support; on the other, what supports it does not belong to the seer. The position of seer cannot be reached by either path.
With No One Who Sees, There Is No Set of Things Seen
The verse drives the matter to its end:
“Whether apart from seeing or not apart from seeing, the seer cannot be found; since there is no seer, where can seeing and the visible exist?”
Qingmu explains it simply: “If seeing exists, the seer cannot be established; if seeing does not exist, the seer likewise cannot be established.”
When seeing exists, the event is already there and no separate owner need be established. When seeing does not exist, still less can anyone be said to see. Neither side succeeds; the seer has nowhere to stand.
Qingmu then asks a question close to the bone: “If there is no seer, who can use the dharma of seeing to distinguish external forms?”
This sounds like a challenge to the treatise author, but it actually points to the last shadow in the reader’s mind. Even if seeing depends on conditions, we feel, surely “I” still use it. Qingmu is saying that this position of “using” cannot be found either.
When that position is empty, the other end empties with it. The verse asks, “Where can seeing and the visible exist?” “The visible” is what stands on the seen side. If the person who sees cannot stand alone, the thing seen cannot stand alone either. Two ready-made things do not first exist and then meet; the paired names can be spoken only within their relation.
Release One Link and the Whole Chain Releases
The treatise author suddenly widens the view:
“Because seeing and the visible are absent, consciousness and the other three dharmas are absent; how, then, can the four kinds of clinging and the other conditions exist?”
Qingmu names them: “Because seeing and the visible are absent, consciousness, contact, feeling, and craving are all absent.”
The point becomes clear along the twelve links of dependent origination. Only when eye faces form is there eye consciousness. Only when faculty, object, and consciousness gather is there contact; only with contact is there feeling; only with feeling, craving. The links grow one after another. If the first section contains no seeing or visible that stands by itself, the later sections likewise contain no consciousness, contact, feeling, or craving that stands by itself.
Qingmu takes one more step: “Because craving and the rest are absent, the four kinds of clinging and the other links of dependent origination are absent.” Since craving has no intrinsic nature, the four kinds of clinging that arise through it—and existence, birth, and aging-and-death after clinging—have none either.
Notice what is said to be “absent.” The treatise author does not say that eyes never see form, that craving never arises, or that no one ever clings. What he bars is the “fixed.” The placement of this section also matters. It takes the chapter from what looks like a fine-grained problem of cognition all the way through the chain of saṃsāric continuation. What releases is not one link; from the beginning, no link in the chain was iron.
The Other Five Faculties Need Not Be Explained Again
The final verse closes:
“The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, together with sound, the hearer, and the rest— know that their meaning is wholly the same as explained above.”
Qingmu gives the reason: “Seeing and the visible are empty because they belong to many conditions and therefore are not fixed.” Each pair—ear and sound, nose and scent, tongue and flavor, body and touch, mind and dharmas—can be examined in the same way: the ear does not hear itself; hearing has no name before hearing; apart from hearing there is no hearer; hearing and the heard cannot be established separately.
Thus he says, “Because the meaning is the same, they are not explained separately.”
The sentence sounds like an economy of ink, but it is really an act of trust. The treatise author returns the method to the reader: this chapter does not give seven conclusions. It gives you a measure you can use again.
What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?
First, notice the place that “cannot see itself.” “A lamp illuminates itself and other things”: a lamp reaches both; the eye does not. Whenever some capacity seems ready-made within you and independent of anything else, ask: can it illuminate itself?
Second, do not establish an owner before an event. “If there is no seer, who can use the dharma of seeing to distinguish external forms?” The “who” beneath that question is the link most easily overlooked. When seeing occurs, there is simply seeing; no additional person need be installed behind it.
Third, remember that release of one link releases the whole chain. “Because craving and the rest are absent, the four kinds of clinging and the other links of dependent origination are absent.” This present act of seeing is not a small event unrelated to birth and death; it is the first section of the chain. See that this section depends on conditions, and the rest need no longer be treated as iron.
Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror
The preceding is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows lets the Sui–Tang Three Treatises tradition illuminate it from the side. The mirror is not the treatise; it offers another way to read the same verses.
Jizang’s Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle first resolves the apparent conflict between sūtra and treatise. The Buddha spoke of six faculties so that people might understand the six as empty; the outsider hears this and clings to six fixed and real faculties, failing to recognize the Buddha’s intent. Jizang also says that the Buddha’s teaching of six faculties belongs to conventional truth, and that the Tathāgata teaches conventional truth precisely to lead people through it into the ultimate meaning. Lesser Vehicle practitioners instead take the six as real and have not entered the ultimate meaning. Thus, when the treatise author now says there are no six, his intent is to clarify the Buddha’s original purpose in teaching six, not to destroy the sūtra teaching.
Jizang also classifies the chapter. The respondent’s seven verses divide into two sections: the first six directly refute the eye faculty; the final verse contemplates the other five by analogy. The six verses are further marked in sequence as direct refutation, referral to the preceding refutation, renewed refutation, no person because no dharma, no dharma because no person, and no effect because no cause. He also gathers them into two levels: the first five refute seeing as cause and the last refutes its produced effect. Within the five, he distinguishes refuting the eye’s seeing, form’s seeing, and a person’s seeing. He reads the final consciousness and other three dharmas as no effect because no cause: eye and form conjoin to produce eye consciousness and then the four kinds of clinging; eye and form are causes, consciousness and the rest effects. Since the preceding search for three kinds of seeing found none, the causes are unestablished, and the effects are then shown not to arise.
This mirror supplies names and levels for the chapter’s divisions and connects the tension between sūtra and treatise to the Three Treatises tradition’s interpretation of conventional and ultimate truth. The classification and judgment are Jizang’s additions, not the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s long commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
本品底本為《大正新脩大藏經》T30n1564〈觀六情品第三〉〔T30 0005c16–0006b17〕；〔0006b18〕已入下一品題。本文依大正底本，不以異讀逕改正文。本次逐義鎖證未發現足以改動讀者面 L1 的原校異讀。
二、異釋對勘
問者先以經說六情、六塵及根取境立有。T30n1564青目釋〔0005c16〕：「問曰：經中說有六情」 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0006a01–0006a02〕：「眼耳及鼻舌、身意等六情，此眼等六情，行色等六塵。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0006a03–0006a04〕：「此中眼為內情、色為外塵，眼能見色，乃至意為內情、法為外塵，意能知法。」
青目先以「無也」總標否定，隨即問何以故，後文再逐門成立。T30n1564青目釋〔0006a04–0006a05〕：「答曰：無也。何以故？」
眼若以見為定相，應能自見；不自見便不能憑定相成立見他。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0006a06–0006a07〕：「是眼則不能，自見其己體；若不能自見，云何見餘物？」 T30n1564青目釋〔0006a08–0006a10〕：「如燈能自照亦能照他。眼若是見相，亦應自見亦應見他。而實不爾」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0066a09–0066a10〕：「如是彼眼根，不能見自體，自體既不見，云何得見他？」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0142c09〕：「是眼即不能，自見於己體。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0142c14〕：「若不能自見，云何能見他？」
問者以火能燒他而不能自燒，欲救眼能見他而不自見。T30n1564青目釋〔0006a11–0006a12〕：「問曰：眼雖不能自見，而能見他。如火能燒他，不能自燒。」
答方拒絕火喻，並把〈去來品〉的三時檢驗依次移到燒與見。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0006a13–0006a14〕：「火喻則不能，成於眼見法；去未去去時，已總答是事。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0006a16–0006a18〕：「如已去中無去、未去中無去、去時中無去；如已燒、未燒、燒時俱無有燒，如是已見、未見、見時俱無見相。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0067b04〕：「如是第一義中，已燒、未燒、燒時無燒。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0067b07–0067b08〕：「如是已見、未見、見時不見。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0142c25–0142c26〕：「今此亦然，已燒未燒燒時無燒，已見未見見時無見。」
眼未對色時尚不名為見，故不能先立一個見，再說此見能見。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0006a19–0006a20〕：「見若未見時，則不名為見；而言見能見，是事則不然。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0006a21–0006a22〕：「眼未對色則不能見，爾時不名為見，因對色名為見。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0067b14–0067b15〕：「眼若未見時，不得說為見；而言眼能見，是義則不然。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0142c29〕：「見若未見時，即不名為見。」
已名為見者不能再以另一見去見，非見也沒有見相；兩處皆不能安立見法。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0006a24–0006a25〕：「見不能有見，非見亦不見；若已破於見，則為破見者。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0006a26–0006a27〕：「見不能見，先已說過故。非見亦不見，無見相故。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0067b17〕：「見則無彼見，非見亦無見。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0143a10〕：「能見亦不見，見法無性故。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0143a13〕：「所見亦不見，見法離性故。」
見法既無，見者也不能離見先成；否則無眼者也應能借餘情而見。若改說以見來見，見相便落在見中，見者自身仍無見相。T30n1564青目釋〔0006a27–0006b01〕：「見法無故，見者亦無。何以故？若離見有見者，無眼者亦應以餘情見。若以見見，則見中有見相。見者無見相」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0067b28〕：「若已遮於見，應知遮見者。」
離見與不離見兩門都求不到見者；見者不立，見與可見也無由自立。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0006b03–0006b04〕：「離見不離見，見者不可得；以無見者故，何有見可見？」 T30n1564青目釋〔0006b05–0006b07〕：「若有見，見者則不成；若無見，見者亦不成。見者無故，云何有見可見？若無見者，誰能用見法分別外色？」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0067c22〕：「離眼不離眼，見者不可得。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0143a21〕：「離見不離見，見者不可得。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0143a26〕：「以無見者故，云何有所見？」
見與可見不立，識、觸、受、愛四法也不能由此成立。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0006b09〕：「見可見無故，識等四法無；」 T30n1564青目釋〔0006b11〕：「見、可見法無故，識、觸、受、愛四法皆無。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0068b05〕：「見所見無故，識等四種無。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0143b05〕：「見可見無故，識等四法無。」
四法不立，四取以及十二因緣支的後續果也無從建立。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0006b10〕：「四取等諸緣，云何當得有？」 T30n1564青目釋〔0006b11–0006b12〕：「以無愛等故，四取等十二因緣分亦無。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0068b10〕：「彼取緣等果，何處當可得？」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0143b11–0143b12〕：「謂以識等及取緣有生緣老死，此等諸法無所成故，無所有故。」
眼與色的檢驗，類推到耳、鼻、舌、身、意及其五境。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0006b13–0006b14〕：「耳鼻舌身意，聲及聞者等，當知如是義，皆同於上說。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0006b15–0006b17〕：「如見、可見法空，屬眾緣故無決定。餘耳等五情聲等五塵，當知亦同見可見法，義同故不別說。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0068b16–0068b17〕：「耳鼻舌身意，聞者所聞等，應知如是義，皆同眼見遮。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0143b17–0143b18〕：「此中應知，如眼見說能聞所聞等，譬如能見所有聞等，如應廣說此中且止」
《大乘中觀釋論》明分世俗與勝義：世俗可說六根取境，勝義中能取、所取的定性不可得。T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0142c04–0142c07〕：「此論所說如是見等六根行諸境界，謂眼見色乃至意知法。此有所說，當知皆是世俗道理，增上所作此無相違。若於勝義諦中，色等眼等所取能取性不可得。」
《般若燈論釋》在世諦層列眼、色、空、明、作意等緣聚集，並說依此施設見者之名，不另立外道所計的丈夫。T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0067c29–0068a03〕：「彼色可得者，謂眼、色、空、明及以作意，此等有故有色可得。又此等諸緣具足聚集，說彼調達名為見者，無如僧佉所計丈夫名為見者。」
《般若燈論釋》把「四取」逐名列為欲取、戒取、我語取、見取，並把後續指向有、生、老死。T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0068b11–0068b13〕：「攝受是取義，彼有幾種？謂欲取、戒取、我語取、見取。彼取緣有及生老死，如是過失常隨逐汝。」
三、諸家異釋（吉藏專疏）
吉藏把經說六情判為世諦教說，其用意在令眾生由此悟入第一義；論主說無六，是申明而非毀破經意。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0063b20–0063b24〕：「又佛說六情是妄者，意欲明六是空；而外人謂有妄，故亦不識佛意。又佛意說六是世諦，尋如來意，欲令悟第一義故說世諦；而小乘人謂實有六，不知第一義。今言無六意，乃申佛說六意也。」
吉藏把七首破頌分為六首正破眼情與一首類觀餘五；六首又依次標出正破、指前破、重破、法無故人無、人無故法無、因無故果無。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0063c11–0063c20〕：「第二七偈破，為二：初有六偈正破眼情、次有一偈類觀餘五。六偈即分為六：第一偈正破、第二指前破、第三重破、第四法無故人無、第五人無故法無、第六偈因無故果無。今束此六偈為二：初之五偈正破見因義、第二一偈破見所生果。就五偈中復為三類：初三偈破眼見、第二半偈破色見、第三一行半破人見。三偈即三：初一偈舉不自見況破見他、第二偈三時門破見他、第三偈就對色義破見他。」
吉藏以「因無故果無」讀末段：先由見與可見不可得明因不立，再說識等四法之果不生。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0065b02–0065b07〕：「所言因者，眼色和合生於眼識乃至四取，故眼色為因、識等為果。若望品意，從品初都是破見因竟，謂求三種見不得即明無因，是故今第二次明無果。見可見無故，近牒第五偈下半，遠牒一品破也。」
四、名相
本品以「六情」稱眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意，以「六塵」稱色、聲等六境；異釋亦見「六根」「六入」之名。T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0065c18–0065c19〕：「為遮起故，令人識知內六入等無自性義，故說此品。」根本文脈所破是能見、所見、見者的決定自性，不把詞名自身當作另一實體。
五、科判
根本文從一首立頌起問，隨後以七首頌破；吉藏再把七破頌分為六首正破眼情、一首類觀餘五。此處只誌錄科分，不以疏家科判倒改根本文序。
六、關中舊學·譯史
本品署龍樹造、青目釋、鳩摩羅什譯；本單元未另見足以增補譯場年月的品內材料，譯史仍依卷首序記總錄。
七、唯識軸互讀（空有）
本品沒有可供本單元逐義鎖證的唯識系直接對文，據實標闕；不以後代宗派判詞補入。
八、系內餘論互讀
根本文自指前一〈觀去來品〉，把已去、未去、去時的檢驗移到已燒、未燒、燒時與已見、未見、見時；除此之外，本次不另引系內餘論作孤立旁證。
九、校本定位
| 用途 | 書證與範圍 |
|---|---|
| 根本論頌與青目釋 | T30n1564〔0005c16–0006b17〕 |
| 清辨系異釋 | T30n1566〔0065c18–0068c11〕 |
| 安慧系部分傳本異釋 | T30n1567〔0142b29–0143b21〕 |
| 吉藏逐文疏 | T42n1824〔0061c23–0065c07〕 |
Textual Collation
The base text is “Examination of the Six Faculties, Chapter Three” in the Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka, T30n1564〔T30 0005c16–0006b17〕;〔0006b18〕already belongs to the title of the next chapter. The present text follows the Taishō base and is not directly emended from variants. The point-by-point evidence lock found no original collation variant sufficient to alter the reader-facing L1.
Comparative Readings
The questioner first establishes existence by citing the sūtra’s six faculties and six objects and the faculties’ apprehension of their objects. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0005c16〕 reads: 「問曰：經中說有六情」 tr. “Question: The sūtra teaches that six faculties exist.” Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0006a01–0006a02〕 reads: 「眼耳及鼻舌、身意等六情，此眼等六情，行色等六塵。」 tr. “The eye and ear, together with nose, tongue, body, and mind, are the six faculties; these six, beginning with the eye, operate in relation to the six objects, beginning with form.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006a03–0006a04〕 reads: 「此中眼為內情、色為外塵，眼能見色，乃至意為內情、法為外塵，意能知法。」 tr. “Here the eye is the internal faculty, form the external object, and the eye sees form; through mind as the internal faculty and dharmas as the external object, mind knows dharmas.”
Qingmu first marks the comprehensive negation with 「無也」 tr. “No,” immediately asks why, and then establishes the answer through successive gateways. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006a04–0006a05〕 reads: 「答曰：無也。何以故？」 tr. “Answer: No. Why?”
If seeing were the eye’s fixed mark, the eye should see itself; failure to see itself prevents its vision of other things from being established through a fixed mark. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0006a06–0006a07〕 reads: 「是眼則不能，自見其己體；若不能自見，云何見餘物？」 tr. “This eye cannot see its own body; if it cannot see itself, how can it see other things?” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006a08–0006a10〕 reads: 「如燈能自照亦能照他。眼若是見相，亦應自見亦應見他。而實不爾」 tr. “A lamp illuminates itself and other things. If the eye bore the mark of seeing, it should see itself and other things. Yet that is not so.” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0066a09–0066a10〕, reads: 「如是彼眼根，不能見自體，自體既不見，云何得見他？」 tr. “Thus the eye faculty cannot see its own body. Since it does not see itself, how could it see another?” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0142c09〕, reads: 「是眼即不能，自見於己體。」 tr. “This eye cannot see its own body.” The same text, T30n1567〔0142c14〕, reads: 「若不能自見，云何能見他？」 tr. “If it cannot see itself, how can it see another?”
The questioner uses fire, which burns other things but not itself, to rescue the claim that the eye sees others without seeing itself. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006a11–0006a12〕 reads: 「問曰：眼雖不能自見，而能見他。如火能燒他，不能自燒。」 tr. “Question: Although the eye cannot see itself, it can see another, just as fire burns another but cannot burn itself.”
The respondent rejects the fire analogy and transfers the three-time examination of “Examination of Going and Coming” first to burning and then to seeing. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0006a13–0006a14〕 reads: 「火喻則不能，成於眼見法；去未去去時，已總答是事。」 tr. “The analogy of fire cannot establish a dharma of seeing in the eye; what has gone, not gone, and the time of going have already answered this matter.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006a16–0006a18〕 reads: 「如已去中無去、未去中無去、去時中無去；如已燒、未燒、燒時俱無有燒，如是已見、未見、見時俱無見相。」 tr. “As there is no going in what has gone, what has not gone, or the time of going, so there is no burning in what has burned, what has not burned, or the time of burning; likewise no mark of seeing exists in what has been seen, what has not been seen, or the time of seeing.” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0067b04〕, reads: 「如是第一義中，已燒、未燒、燒時無燒。」 tr. “Thus, within the ultimate meaning, there is no burning in what has burned, what has not burned, or the time of burning.” The same text, T30n1566〔0067b07–0067b08〕, reads: 「如是已見、未見、見時不見。」 tr. “Likewise there is no seeing in what has been seen, what has not been seen, or the time of seeing.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0142c25–0142c26〕, reads: 「今此亦然，已燒未燒燒時無燒，已見未見見時無見。」 tr. “Here too it is so: there is no burning in what has burned, not burned, or the time of burning, and no seeing in what has been seen, not seen, or the time of seeing.”
Before the eye faces form it is not yet called seeing, so one cannot establish a seeing first and then say that this seeing sees. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0006a19–0006a20〕 reads: 「見若未見時，則不名為見；而言見能見，是事則不然。」 tr. “Before seeing has seen, it is not called seeing; the claim that seeing can see is therefore not so.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006a21–0006a22〕 reads: 「眼未對色則不能見，爾時不名為見，因對色名為見。」 tr. “Before the eye faces form, it cannot see and is not called seeing; it is called seeing because it faces form.” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0067b14–0067b15〕, reads: 「眼若未見時，不得說為見；而言眼能見，是義則不然。」 tr. “Before the eye sees, it cannot be spoken of as seeing; the claim that the eye can see is not so.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0142c29〕, reads: 「見若未見時，即不名為見。」 tr. “Before seeing has seen, it is not called seeing.”
What is already named seeing cannot see through another seeing, while non-seeing lacks the mark of seeing. Neither can establish a dharma of seeing. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0006a24–0006a25〕 reads: 「見不能有見，非見亦不見；若已破於見，則為破見者。」 tr. “Seeing cannot possess seeing, nor does non-seeing see; once seeing is refuted, the seer is refuted with it.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006a26–0006a27〕 reads: 「見不能見，先已說過故。非見亦不見，無見相故。」 tr. “Seeing cannot see because this was explained before; non-seeing does not see because it lacks the mark of seeing.” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0067b17〕, reads: 「見則無彼見，非見亦無見。」 tr. “Seeing does not possess that seeing; non-seeing likewise has no seeing.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0143a10〕, reads: 「能見亦不見，見法無性故。」 tr. “That which can see likewise does not see, because the dharma of seeing has no nature.” The same text, T30n1567〔0143a13〕, reads: 「所見亦不見，見法離性故。」 tr. “What is seen likewise does not see, because the dharma of seeing is free of nature.”
Since there is no dharma of seeing, a seer cannot be established before and apart from seeing; otherwise a blind person should be able to see through another faculty. If instead seeing is used to see, the mark of seeing resides within seeing and the seer itself still lacks that mark. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006a27–0006b01〕 reads: 「見法無故，見者亦無。何以故？若離見有見者，無眼者亦應以餘情見。若以見見，則見中有見相。見者無見相」 tr. “Because there is no dharma of seeing, there is no seer. Why? If a seer existed apart from seeing, a person without eyes should see through another faculty. If seeing sees, the mark of seeing resides in seeing, while the seer lacks the mark of seeing.” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0067b28〕, reads: 「若已遮於見，應知遮見者。」 tr. “If seeing has been denied, know that the seer is denied.”
Neither apart from seeing nor not apart from seeing can a seer be found; when no seer stands, seeing and the visible cannot stand by themselves. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0006b03–0006b04〕 reads: 「離見不離見，見者不可得；以無見者故，何有見可見？」 tr. “Whether apart from seeing or not apart from seeing, the seer cannot be found; since there is no seer, where can seeing and the visible exist?” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006b05–0006b07〕 reads: 「若有見，見者則不成；若無見，見者亦不成。見者無故，云何有見可見？若無見者，誰能用見法分別外色？」 tr. “If seeing exists, the seer cannot be established; if seeing is absent, the seer likewise cannot be established. Since there is no seer, how can there be seeing and the visible? With no seer, who can use the dharma of seeing to distinguish external forms?” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0067c22〕, reads: 「離眼不離眼，見者不可得。」 tr. “Whether apart from the eye or not apart from the eye, the seer cannot be found.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0143a21〕, reads: 「離見不離見，見者不可得。」 tr. “Whether apart from seeing or not apart from seeing, the seer cannot be found.” The same text, T30n1567〔0143a26〕, reads: 「以無見者故，云何有所見？」 tr. “Since there is no seer, how could anything be seen?”
When seeing and the visible cannot be established, consciousness, contact, feeling, and craving cannot be established from them. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0006b09〕 reads: 「見可見無故，識等四法無；」 tr. “Because seeing and the visible are absent, consciousness and the other three dharmas are absent.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006b11〕 reads: 「見、可見法無故，識、觸、受、愛四法皆無。」 tr. “Because seeing and the visible are absent, consciousness, contact, feeling, and craving are all absent.” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0068b05〕, reads: 「見所見無故，識等四種無。」 tr. “Because seeing and what is seen are absent, the four beginning with consciousness are absent.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0143b05〕, reads: 「見可見無故，識等四法無。」 tr. “Because seeing and the visible are absent, consciousness and the other three dharmas are absent.”
When these four do not stand, the four kinds of clinging and the subsequent effects among the links of dependent origination cannot be established. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0006b10〕 reads: 「四取等諸緣，云何當得有？」 tr. “How could the four kinds of clinging and the other conditions exist?” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006b11–0006b12〕 reads: 「以無愛等故，四取等十二因緣分亦無。」 tr. “Because craving and the rest are absent, the four kinds of clinging and the other links of dependent origination are absent.” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0068b10〕, reads: 「彼取緣等果，何處當可得？」 tr. “Where could the effects of clinging and its conditions be found?” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0143b11–0143b12〕, reads: 「謂以識等及取緣有生緣老死，此等諸法無所成故，無所有故。」 tr. “Consciousness and the rest, together with clinging conditioning existence, birth conditioning aging-and-death—these dharmas are unestablished and have no possession of their own.”
The examination of eye and form extends by analogy to ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind and their five corresponding objects. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0006b13–0006b14〕 reads: 「耳鼻舌身意，聲及聞者等，當知如是義，皆同於上說。」 tr. “The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, together with sound, the hearer, and the rest—know that their meaning is wholly the same as explained above.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0006b15–0006b17〕 reads: 「如見、可見法空，屬眾緣故無決定。餘耳等五情聲等五塵，當知亦同見可見法，義同故不別說。」 tr. “Seeing and the visible are empty because they belong to many conditions and are therefore not fixed. Know that the other five faculties beginning with the ear and the other five objects beginning with sound are the same as seeing and the visible. Because the meaning is the same, they are not explained separately.” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0068b16–0068b17〕, reads: 「耳鼻舌身意，聞者所聞等，應知如是義，皆同眼見遮。」 tr. “The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, the hearer and heard, and the rest—know that their meaning is the same as the denial of the eye’s seeing.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0143b17–0143b18〕, reads: 「此中應知，如眼見說能聞所聞等，譬如能見所有聞等，如應廣說此中且止」 tr. “Know here that hearer and heard are explained as eye and seeing are; all hearing is analogous to seeing. It should be explained at length, but stops here.”
The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation explicitly distinguishes conventional and ultimate: conventionally one may speak of the six faculties apprehending objects, but in ultimate truth fixed natures of apprehender and apprehended cannot be found. T30n1567〔0142c04–0142c07〕 reads: 「此論所說如是見等六根行諸境界，謂眼見色乃至意知法。此有所說，當知皆是世俗道理，增上所作此無相違。若於勝義諦中，色等眼等所取能取性不可得。」 tr. “This treatise speaks of the six faculties, seeing and the rest, operating in their objects: the eye sees form through mind knowing dharmas. Know that all this is conventional reasoning and dominant activity, without contradiction. Within ultimate truth, however, the natures of apprehended form and the like and apprehending eye and the like cannot be found.”
At the conventional level, the Prajñā Lamp Commentary lists the gathering of eye, form, space, light, attention, and other conditions, and says that the name seer is established through them, without positing the person imagined by non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya. T30n1566〔0067c29–0068a03〕 reads: 「彼色可得者，謂眼、色、空、明及以作意，此等有故有色可得。又此等諸緣具足聚集，說彼調達名為見者，無如僧佉所計丈夫名為見者。」 tr. “That form is obtainable means that eye, form, space, light, and attention are present, and therefore form can be obtained. When these conditions gather in full, Devadatta is called a seer; no person such as Sāṃkhya imagines is called the seer.”
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary names the 「四取」 tr. “four kinds of clinging” as clinging to sensuality, clinging to precepts, clinging to a doctrine of self, and clinging to views, then points onward to existence, birth, and aging-and-death. T30n1566〔0068b11–0068b13〕 reads: 「攝受是取義，彼有幾種？謂欲取、戒取、我語取、見取。彼取緣有及生老死，如是過失常隨逐汝。」 tr. “‘Clinging’ means appropriating. How many kinds are there? Clinging to sensuality, precepts, a doctrine of self, and views. Clinging conditions existence and birth and aging-and-death; such faults constantly follow you.”
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang judges the sūtra’s teaching of six faculties to be a teaching within conventional truth whose purpose is to let beings enter ultimate meaning. When the treatise author says that no six exist, he clarifies rather than destroys the sūtra’s intent. His Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, T42n1824〔0063b20–0063b24〕, reads: 「又佛說六情是妄者，意欲明六是空；而外人謂有妄，故亦不識佛意。又佛意說六是世諦，尋如來意，欲令悟第一義故說世諦；而小乘人謂實有六，不知第一義。今言無六意，乃申佛說六意也。」 tr. “The Buddha teaches the six faculties as false in order to clarify that the six are empty; the outsider regards the false as existent and so fails to know the Buddha’s intent. The Buddha teaches the six within conventional truth in order to awaken people through it to the ultimate meaning, but Lesser Vehicle practitioners deem six truly existent and do not know the ultimate. Saying now that there are no six clarifies the Buddha’s intent in teaching six.”
Jizang divides the seven refuting verses into six that directly refute the eye faculty and one that contemplates the other five by analogy. The six are then named direct refutation, referral to the prior refutation, renewed refutation, no person because no dharma, no dharma because no person, and no effect because no cause. His commentary, T42n1824〔0063c11–0063c20〕, reads: 「第二七偈破，為二：初有六偈正破眼情、次有一偈類觀餘五。六偈即分為六：第一偈正破、第二指前破、第三重破、第四法無故人無、第五人無故法無、第六偈因無故果無。今束此六偈為二：初之五偈正破見因義、第二一偈破見所生果。就五偈中復為三類：初三偈破眼見、第二半偈破色見、第三一行半破人見。三偈即三：初一偈舉不自見況破見他、第二偈三時門破見他、第三偈就對色義破見他。」 tr. “The second section, seven refuting verses, divides in two: six directly refute the eye faculty, and one contemplates the other five by analogy. The six divide into six: direct refutation; referral to the previous refutation; renewed refutation; no person because no dharma; no dharma because no person; and no effect because no cause. Gathered in two, the first five refute seeing as cause and the last the effect produced by seeing. The five further have three kinds: the first three refute the eye’s seeing, half a verse refutes form’s seeing, and a verse and a half refute a person’s seeing. The first three are: using failure to see itself to refute seeing another; refuting seeing another through the three times; and refuting it through facing form.”
Jizang reads the final passage through 「因無故果無」 tr. “no effect because no cause”: the inability to find seeing and the visible first shows the causes unestablished, after which consciousness and the other three effects do not arise. His commentary, T42n1824〔0065b02–0065b07〕, reads: 「所言因者，眼色和合生於眼識乃至四取，故眼色為因、識等為果。若望品意，從品初都是破見因竟，謂求三種見不得即明無因，是故今第二次明無果。見可見無故，近牒第五偈下半，遠牒一品破也。」 tr. “Cause means that the conjunction of eye and form produces eye consciousness through the four kinds of clinging; eye and form are causes, consciousness and the rest effects. In the chapter’s intent, everything from its beginning refutes seeing as cause. Seeking three kinds of seeing and finding none shows no cause; therefore the second part shows no effect. ‘Because seeing and the visible are absent’ directly recapitulates the latter half of the fifth verse and remotely recapitulates the chapter’s entire refutation.”
Terminology
This chapter calls eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind 「六情」 tr. “six faculties,” and form, sound, and the other objects 「六塵」 tr. “six objects”; the alternative commentaries also use 「六根」 tr. “six faculties” and 「六入」 tr. “six sense bases.” The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0065c18–0065c19〕, reads: 「為遮起故，令人識知內六入等無自性義，故說此品。」 tr. “This chapter is taught to bar arising and enable people to know that the six internal sense bases and the rest lack intrinsic nature.” The root context refutes fixed intrinsic nature in seer, seen, and seeing; it does not treat the terms themselves as other substances.
Doctrinal Outline
The root text begins its question with one establishing verse and then refutes it through seven verses. Jizang further divides the seven into six directly refuting the eye faculty and one contemplating the other five by analogy. This section records the classification without retrojecting a commentator’s divisions into the order of the root text.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
The chapter is attributed to Nāgārjuna as author, Qingmu as commentator, and Kumārajīva as translator. No chapter-internal evidence sufficient to add translation-workshop dates was found; transmission history remains recorded under the preface to the scroll.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
No direct Yogācāra parallel suitable for point-by-point evidence locking in this unit was found, and the absence is recorded honestly. Later sectarian classifications are not supplied in its place.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
The root text itself refers back to “Examination of Going and Coming,” transferring the examination of already gone, not yet gone, and the time of going to what has burned, not burned, and the time of burning, and then to what has been seen, not seen, and the time of seeing. Beyond this, no isolated passage from another treatise is added as collateral evidence.
Position of the Editions
| Use | Textual witness and range |
|---|---|
| Root verses and Qingmu’s commentary | T30n1564〔0005c16–0006b17〕 |
| Bhāviveka-line alternative commentary | T30n1566〔0065c18–0068c11〕 |
| Partially transmitted Sthiramati-line alternative commentary | T30n1567〔0142b29–0143b21〕 |
| Jizang’s line-by-line commentary | T42n1824〔0061c23–0065c07〕 |