中論 觀六種品第五
問方立得很平常:「六種各有定相,有定相故則有六種。」答方不從地水火風接,先動虛空。
兩頭不能同時先在
「空相未有時,則無虛空法; 若先有虛空,即為是無相。」
相在先,法還沒有;法在先,那一段它無相可指。
而相這一頭自己也有所待——「無色處名虛空相」,要對著色才說得出來。
相沒有落腳處
「有相無相中,相則無所住; 離有相無相,餘處亦不住。」
無相之法沒有對象給它相:「若無牛,是諸相無所住。」已有相的法容不下另一相:「如水相中火相不住,先有自相故」。第三處也沒有。
於是「因相有可相,因可相有相,共相因待故」。而且角色能對調:「如火以烟為相,烟亦復以火為相。」
破有,不必去要一個無
「凡物若自壞、若為他壞,名為無。」所以「無不自有,從有而有」。有既不立,無亦無所依;知有無者也一同破。
收成一頌,順帶把其餘五種一併帶走:
「是故知虛空,非有亦非無, 非相非可相,餘五同虛空。」
種種求相不可得,「餘五種亦如是」——地水火風識不必逐一再走一遍。
何以先動這個?青目自問自答:地水火風眾緣和合故易破,識以苦樂因故知無常變異故易破,虛空沒有這樣的相,「但凡夫悕望為有」;何況「虛空能持四大,四大因緣有識,是故先破根本,餘者自破」。
錯在取相那一下
「淺智見諸法,若有若無相,是則不能見,滅見安隱法。」
錯處不在見,在「取相言有」「取相言無」。智者用的還是同一個生滅:「智者見諸法生即滅無見,見諸法滅即滅有見」。
青目把這個道理推到自己身上:「乃至無漏道見尚滅,何況餘見。」用來破見的那個見,也不留作最後的所得。
安隱不在有無之外另擺一物,是有見無見都止息的那個地方。
The questioner’s thesis sounds perfectly ordinary: “The six elements each have a fixed mark; because they have fixed marks, the six elements exist.” The respondent does not begin with earth, water, fire, or wind. He begins with space.
Both Ends Cannot Be There First
“Before the mark of space exists, no dharma of space exists; if space already existed beforehand, it would be without a mark.”
If the mark comes first, the dharma does not yet exist; if the dharma comes first, there is an interval in which no mark points to it.
And the mark itself depends on something—“A place without form is called the mark of space.” It can be spoken of only in relation to form.
A Mark Has Nowhere to Land
“Within the marked and unmarked, a mark has nowhere to abide; apart from the marked and unmarked, it likewise abides nowhere else.”
A markless dharma provides no object for a mark: “If there is no ox, these marks have nowhere to abide.” A dharma already bearing a mark has no room for another: “The mark of fire does not abide within the mark of water, because water already has its own mark.” There is no third place.
Thus, “The marked exists because of a mark, and a mark exists because of the marked; the two depend upon one another.” The roles can also reverse: “Fire has smoke as its mark, while smoke in turn has fire as its mark.”
Refuting Existence Does Not Require Positing a Nonexistence
“When a thing destroys itself or is destroyed by another, it is called nonexistent.” Thus, “Nonexistence does not exist on its own but comes from existence.” Since existence does not stand, nonexistence has nothing on which to depend; the knower of existence and nonexistence is refuted along with them.
The conclusion gathers this into a single verse and carries away the remaining five elements with it:
“Thus know that space is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither marking mark nor marked; the other five are like space.”
However its mark is sought, it cannot be found; “the other five elements are likewise.” Earth, water, fire, wind, and consciousness need not each traverse the path again.
Why begin with this one? Qingmu asks and answers: earth, water, fire, and wind are easy to refute because they conjoin through many conditions; consciousness is easy to refute because suffering and pleasure as its causes reveal it as impermanent and changing. Space has no such mark, and “ordinary people merely hope that it exists.” Moreover, “space can support the four great elements, and consciousness exists through the four elements as causes and conditions; therefore, refute the root first, and the others are refuted of themselves.”
The Error Lies in the Instant of Grasping the Mark
“Those of shallow wisdom see dharmas as marked by existence or nonexistence; they cannot see the secure dharma in which views are brought to an end.”
The error is not in seeing but in “grasping the mark and asserting existence” or “grasping the mark and asserting nonexistence.” The wise use the very same arising and ceasing: “Seeing dharmas arise, the wise at once end the view of nonexistence; seeing dharmas cease, they at once end the view of existence.”
Qingmu turns the principle upon itself: “Even the view of the uncontaminated path is to be ended, how much more other views.” Even the view used to refute views is not retained as a final attainment.
Security is not another object placed beyond existence and nonexistence. It is where both the view of existence and the view of nonexistence have ceased.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷一〈觀六種品第五〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0007b06〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0007b06〕問曰:六種各有定相,有定相故則有六種。
答曰:
「空相未有時,則無虛空法;
若先有虛空,即為是無相。」
若未有虛空相先有虛空法者,虛空則無相。何以故?無色處名虛空相。色是作法無常,若色未生,未生則無滅,爾時無虛空相。因色故有無色處,無色處名虛空相。
問曰:若無相有虛空,有何咎?
答曰:
「是無相之法,一切處無有;
於無相法中,相則無所相。」
若於常無常法中,求無相法不可得。如論者言,是有是無,云何知各有相?故生住滅是有為相,無生住滅是無為相。虛空若無相,則無虛空。若謂先無相、後相來相者,是亦不然。若先無相,則無法可相。何以故?
「有相無相中,相則無所住;
離有相無相,餘處亦不住。」
如有峯有角、尾端有毛、頸下垂𩑶,是名牛相。若離是相則無牛。若無牛,是諸相無所住。是故說於無相法中相則無所相。有相中相亦不住,先有相故。如水相中火相不住,先有自相故。復次若無相中相住者,則為無因,無因名為無法而有相。相、可相、常相,因待故。離有相無相法,更無第三處可相。是故偈中說「離有相無相,餘處亦不住。」復次:
「相法無有故,可相法亦無;
可相法無故,相法亦復無。」
相無所住故,則無可相法;可相法無故,相法亦無。何以故?因相有可相,因可相有相,共相因待故。
「是故今無相,亦無有可相;
離相可相已,更亦無有物。」
於因緣中本末推求,相、可相決定不可得。是二不可得故,一切法皆無。一切法皆攝在相、可相二法中,或相為可相、或可相為相。如火以烟為相,烟亦復以火為相。
問曰:若無有有,應當有無。
答曰:
「若使無有有,云何當有無?
有無既已無,知有無者誰?」
凡物若自壞、若為他壞,名為無。無不自有,從有而有。是故言「若使無有有,云何當有無?」眼見耳聞尚不可得,何況無物。
問曰:以無有有故無亦無,應當有知有無者。
答曰:若有知者,應在有中、應在無中?有無既破,知者亦同破。
「是故知虛空,非有亦非無,
非相非可相,餘五同虛空。」
如虛空種種求相不可得,餘五種亦如是。
問曰
虛空不在初、不在後。何以先破?
答曰:地、水、火、風眾緣和合,故易破。識以苦樂因故知無常變異,故易破。虛空無如是相,但凡夫悕望為有,是故先破。復次虛空能持四大,四大因緣有識,是故先破根本,餘者自破。
〔T30 0008a03〕問曰:世間人盡見諸法是有是無,汝何以獨與世間相違,言無所見?
答曰:
「淺智見諸法,若有若無相,
是則不能見,滅見安隱法。」
若人未得道,不見諸法實相,愛見因緣故種種戲論。見法生時謂之為有,取相言有;見法滅時謂之為斷,取相言無。智者見諸法生即滅無見,見諸法滅即滅有見,是故於一切法雖有所見,皆如幻如夢,乃至無漏道見尚滅,何況餘見。是故若不見滅、見安隱法者,則見有見無。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷一〈觀六種品第五〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、問:六種各有它決定的相
〔T30 0007b06〕問的一方說:地、水、火、風、虛空、識這六種,各有它們決定的相;因為有決定的相的緣故,所以就有這六種。
答的一方於是回答如下。
二、頌:空的相還沒有的時候,虛空之法也還沒有
在空的相還沒有的時候,就沒有虛空這樣一個法; 如果虛空先就已經在那裡了,那它便成了一個沒有相的東西。
三、釋:沒有色的所在,才叫作虛空相
假使虛空的相還沒有,而先有一個虛空之法,那麼這虛空就是沒有相的。為什麼呢?沒有色的所在,才叫作虛空相。色是造作而成的法,是無常的;假使色還沒有生起,既然還沒有生起,也就談不上壞滅,那個時候並沒有虛空相。要因為有色的緣故,才有沒有色的所在;沒有色的所在,就叫作虛空相。
四、問:讓它沒有相而仍舊是有,又有什麼過失
問的一方說:如果就讓虛空沒有相而仍舊是有,這有什麼過失呢?
五、頌:沒有相的法,一切處所都沒有
答的一方說:
這個沒有相的法,在一切處所之中都是沒有的; 在沒有相的法裡面,相也就沒有可以去標誌的對象。
六、釋:常法與無常法之中,求不到一個無相之法
在常法與無常法之中去尋求一個沒有相的法,是求不到的。就像論者所說的,說這是有、這是無,若不憑相,怎麼知道它們各自有相呢?所以生、住、滅是有為法的相,沒有生、住、滅是無為法的相。虛空如果沒有相,那就沒有虛空。若說它先是沒有相,後來才有相過來標誌它,這也是不對的。因為先既沒有相,就沒有一個法可以被標誌。這是為什麼呢?
七、頌:相在有相與無相之中都住不住
在有相的法與沒有相的法之中,相都沒有可以安住的地方; 離開了有相與無相,其餘的地方也一樣住不住。
八、釋:牛相之喻、水火之喻,以及無因之過
像是有肉峯、有角,尾巴末端有毛,頸子底下垂著垂胡,這就叫作牛的相。假使離開了這些相,就沒有牛。既然沒有牛,這些相也就沒有可以安住的地方。所以說:在沒有相的法裡面,相沒有可以去標誌的對象。在已經有相的法裡面,相也一樣住不住,因為它先已經有了相。就像在水的相裡面,火的相住不進去,因為水先已有它自己的相。再者,如果相能夠住在沒有相的法裡面,那就成了沒有原因;沒有原因,意思就是本無其法而竟然有相。相、可相以及恆常之相,都是因待而立的。離開有相與無相這兩類法,再沒有第三個地方可以被標誌。所以偈中說:離開有相與無相,其餘的地方也一樣住不住。再者:
九、頌:相與可相,一邊不立,另一邊也不立
因為能標誌之法沒有的緣故,被標誌之法也就沒有; 因為被標誌之法沒有的緣故,能標誌之法同樣也沒有。
十、釋:兩者共相因待
相既然沒有可以安住的地方,就沒有可相之法;可相之法沒有的緣故,相也就沒有。這是為什麼呢?因為有相才有可相,因為有可相才有相,兩者是共相因待的。
十一、頌:離開相與可相,也再沒有一個物
所以如今沒有能標誌的相,也沒有被標誌的可相; 離開了相與可相之後,更沒有別的一個物。
十二、釋:一切法都收在相與可相這兩法之中
在因緣之中從本到末推求,相與可相決定是不可得的。這兩者既然不可得,一切法也就都沒有。一切法都收攝在相與可相這兩法之中:有時這一個作相、那一個作可相,有時反過來,那一個作相、這一個作可相。就像火以煙為相,煙也反過來以火為相。
十三、問:既然沒有有,就應當有無
問的一方說:如果沒有有,那就應當有無。
十四、頌:連有都沒有,哪裡會有無
假使連有都沒有了,怎麼會有無呢? 有與無既然都已經沒有,那麼知道有與無的那一位又是誰?
十五、釋:無不是自己就有的,是從有而來的
凡是一樣東西,或是自己壞了,或是被別的東西壞了,才叫作無。無不是自己就有的,是從有而來的。所以說:假使連有都沒有了,怎麼會有無呢?眼睛看得見、耳朵聽得到的東西尚且不可得,何況是無物。
十六、問:那就應當有一位知道有與無的人
問的一方說:既然因為沒有有的緣故,無也沒有了,那就應當有一位知道有與無的人。
答的一方說:如果有這樣一位知者,他應該是在有之中呢,還是在無之中呢?有與無既然已經破了,知者也就跟著一同破了。
十七、頌:虛空非有非無,其餘五種同於虛空
所以應當知道:虛空不是有,也不是無, 不是能標誌的相,也不是被標誌的可相;其餘的五種,同於虛空。
十八、釋:種種去求它的相,都求不到
就像虛空這樣種種去求它的相而求不到,其餘的五種也是如此。
十九、問:虛空既不在最先也不在最後,為什麼先破它
問的一方說:虛空不在六種的最前面,也不在最後面,為什麼先破它呢?
答的一方說:地、水、火、風是眾緣和合而成的,所以容易破。識因為有苦、樂為因的緣故,可以看出它是無常變異的,所以也容易破。虛空沒有這樣的相,只是凡夫希望它是有,所以先破它。再者,虛空被說成能夠任持四大,四大為因緣又有識;所以先破那個根本,其餘的自然就破了。
二十、問:世間人都見有見無,你為什麼獨獨與世間相違
〔T30 0008a03〕問的一方說:世間的人全都見到諸法是有、是無,你為什麼獨獨與世間相違,說沒有所見呢?
二十一、頌:淺智之人見有見無,便見不到那安隱之法
答的一方說:
智慧淺薄的人見到諸法時,只見到若有若無的相; 這樣的人就見不到那滅除諸見的安隱之法。
二十二、釋:智者見生時即滅去無見,見滅時即滅去有見
如果一個人還沒有得道,見不到諸法的實相,因為愛與見的因緣而生起種種戲論。他見到法生起的時候,就說它是有,取著這個相而說有;見到法壞滅的時候,就說它是斷了,取著這個相而說無。有智慧的人見到諸法生起,當下就滅去了無的見;見到諸法壞滅,當下就滅去了有的見。所以對於一切法雖然有所見,都像幻、像夢一樣;乃至無漏道的見尚且要滅,何況其餘的見。因此,如果不見那滅除諸見的安隱之法,就會落在見有、見無這兩邊。
Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll One, “Examination of the Six Elements, Chapter Five,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.
I. Question: Each of the Six Elements Has Its Fixed Mark
〔T30 0007b06〕The questioner says: Earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness each have their own fixed marks; because there are fixed marks, the six elements exist.
The respondent answers as follows.
II. Verse: Before the Mark of Space Exists, the Dharma of Space Does Not Exist
Before the mark of space exists, no dharma called space exists; if space already existed beforehand, it would be something without a mark.
III. Explanation: A Place without Form Is Called the Mark of Space
Suppose the mark of space did not yet exist but a dharma of space existed first. Space would then be without a mark. Why? A place without form is called the mark of space. Form is a fabricated and impermanent dharma. If form has not yet arisen, then, because it has not arisen, its destruction cannot be spoken of either; at that time there is no mark of space. Only because form exists can there be a place without form; a place without form is called the mark of space.
IV. Question: What Fault Is There If Space Exists without a Mark?
The questioner says: What fault would there be in simply allowing space to exist without a mark?
V. Verse: A Markless Dharma Exists Nowhere
The respondent says:
This markless dharma exists nowhere at all; within a markless dharma, a mark has nothing that it can mark.
VI. Explanation: No Markless Dharma Can Be Found among Permanent or Impermanent Dharmas
Search among permanent and impermanent dharmas for a dharma without a mark, and none can be found. As the debater says, this exists and that does not; without relying on marks, how could one know that each has its own mark? Thus, arising, abiding, and ceasing are the marks of conditioned dharmas, while the absence of arising, abiding, and ceasing is the mark of unconditioned dharmas. If space had no mark, there would be no space. If one says that it first lacked a mark and was only later marked by a mark that arrived, that also is incorrect. Since it initially had no mark, there was no dharma that could be marked. Why is this?
VII. Verse: A Mark Abides in Neither the Marked nor the Unmarked
Within a dharma that has a mark or one that has no mark, a mark has nowhere to abide; apart from the marked and unmarked, it likewise abides nowhere else.
VIII. Explanation: The Mark of an Ox, Water and Fire, and the Fault of Being Uncaused
A fleshy hump, horns, hair at the end of the tail, and a dewlap hanging beneath the neck are called the marks of an ox. Apart from these marks, there is no ox. Since there is no ox, these marks have nowhere to abide. Thus it is said: within a markless dharma, a mark has nothing it can mark. A mark likewise cannot abide within a dharma that already has a mark, because the dharma already possesses its own mark. The mark of fire cannot abide within the mark of water, for water already possesses its own mark. Moreover, if a mark could abide within a markless dharma, it would be uncaused. “Uncaused” means that a mark exists although no such dharma originally existed. Mark, marked, and permanent mark are all established through dependence. Apart from the two classes, dharmas with a mark and dharmas without a mark, there is no third place that could be marked. Thus the verse says: apart from the marked and unmarked, it likewise abides nowhere else. Again:
IX. Verse: If Either Mark or Marked Fails, the Other Fails as Well
Because there is no dharma of marking, there is no dharma that is marked; because there is no dharma that is marked, there is likewise no dharma of marking.
X. Explanation: The Two Depend upon Each Other
Since a mark has nowhere to abide, there is no dharma that is marked; because there is no dharma that is marked, there is no mark either. Why? The marked exists because of a mark, and a mark exists because of the marked. The two depend upon one another.
XI. Verse: Apart from Mark and Marked, There Is No Further Thing
Thus, there is now no marking mark, nor anything that is marked; apart from mark and marked, there is no further thing.
XII. Explanation: All Dharmas Are Included within Mark and Marked
When causes and conditions are examined from beginning to end, mark and marked are definitively unfindable. Since these two cannot be found, all dharmas are absent as well. All dharmas are included within these two, mark and marked: sometimes this one functions as the mark and that one as the marked; at other times the roles reverse, and that one functions as the mark and this one as the marked. Fire, for example, has smoke as its mark, while smoke in turn has fire as its mark.
XIII. Question: Since Existence Is Absent, Nonexistence Should Exist
The questioner says: If there is no existence, then nonexistence should exist.
XIV. Verse: If Even Existence Is Absent, Where Could Nonexistence Be?
If existence itself does not exist, how could nonexistence exist? Since both existence and nonexistence are absent, who is it that knows existence and nonexistence?
XV. Explanation: Nonexistence Does Not Exist on Its Own but Comes from Existence
When a thing either destroys itself or is destroyed by another thing, it is called nonexistent. Nonexistence does not exist on its own but comes from existence. Thus it is said: if existence itself does not exist, how could nonexistence exist? Even what the eye sees and the ear hears cannot be found—how much less a nonexistent thing.
XVI. Question: Then There Should Be Someone Who Knows Existence and Nonexistence
The questioner says: Since nonexistence is also absent because existence is absent, there should then be someone who knows existence and nonexistence.
The respondent says: If such a knower existed, would this person be within existence or within nonexistence? Since existence and nonexistence have been refuted, the knower is refuted together with them.
XVII. Verse: Space Is Neither Existent nor Nonexistent; the Other Five Are Like Space
Thus one should know: space is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither marking mark nor marked; the other five elements are like space.
XVIII. Explanation: However Its Mark Is Sought, It Cannot Be Found
Just as the mark of space cannot be found however it is sought, so too with the other five elements.
XIX. Question: Space Is Neither First nor Last—Why Refute It First?
The questioner says: Space is neither first nor last among the six elements. Why is it refuted first?
The respondent says: Earth, water, fire, and wind are formed through the conjunction of many conditions and are therefore easy to refute. Because consciousness takes suffering and pleasure as causes, it can be seen to be impermanent and changing and is likewise easy to refute. Space has no such mark; ordinary people merely hope that it exists, and so it is refuted first. Moreover, space is said to support the four great elements, while consciousness exists through the four elements as causes and conditions. Thus, refute the root first, and the others are refuted of themselves.
XX. Question: Everyone in the World Sees Existence and Nonexistence—Why Do You Alone Oppose the World?
〔T30 0008a03〕The questioner says: Everyone in the world sees dharmas as existent or nonexistent. Why do you alone oppose the world and say that nothing is seen?
XXI. Verse: Those of Shallow Wisdom See Existence and Nonexistence and Cannot See the Secure Dharma That Ends Views
The respondent says:
When those of shallow wisdom see dharmas, they see only the marks of existence or nonexistence; such people cannot see the secure dharma in which views are brought to an end.
XXII. Explanation: Seeing Arising, the Wise End the View of Nonexistence; Seeing Cessation, They End the View of Existence
If a person has not yet attained the path and does not see the true mark of dharmas, craving and views condition the arising of all kinds of proliferation. Seeing a dharma arise, such a person calls it existent, grasps that mark, and asserts existence; seeing a dharma cease, such a person calls it annihilated, grasps that mark, and asserts nonexistence. Seeing dharmas arise, a wise person at once ends the view of nonexistence; seeing dharmas cease, a wise person at once ends the view of existence. Thus, although all dharmas are seen, they are like illusions and dreams. Even the view of the uncontaminated path is to be ended, how much more other views. Therefore, one who does not see the secure dharma in which views are brought to an end falls into the two extremes of seeing existence and seeing nonexistence.
人認東西,靠的是樣子。硬的是地,濕的是水,暖的是火,動的是風。認久了,心裡自然生出一句道理:既然各有各的樣子,那就各有各的東西。
本品開頭來問的一方,說的正是這句話:
「六種各有定相,有定相故則有六種。」
地、水、火、風、虛空、識這六樣,各有它決定的相;相既然是決定的,六樣自然也就是實有的。這一問不從經教來,從日常來。它的力氣也正在於此——太順了,順到人不覺得它是一個主張。
答的一方沒有從地水火風接起,先動虛空。而且第一句不問虛空有沒有,問的是:它的相,是什麼時候有的。
相與法,哪一個先在
頌說:
「空相未有時,則無虛空法; 若先有虛空,即為是無相。」
兩句是一副夾子。
先看上一句。你要用相來證明虛空是有,那麼在空的相還沒有的時候,虛空這個法就還說不上。
再看下一句。可是你又說虛空是先在的——它得先在那裡,相才有東西可附。那好,在相還沒來的那一段,它就是一個沒有相的東西。
用來作證的那樣東西,回過頭來把被證的那樣東西架空了。相若在先,法還沒有;法若在先,那一段時間它無相可指。問方原想讓相與法各自站穩再彼此扶持,這一頌指出:兩頭不能同時先在。
虛空相是怎麼來的:它自己也有所待
青目接著把「相」這一頭也交代清楚。虛空相是什麼?「無色處名虛空相。」
這一句看似只是下定義,其實是把問方的地基掀開了。青目說:「色是作法無常,若色未生,未生則無滅,爾時無虛空相。」色是造作出來的、是無常的;色若還沒生起,也就談不上滅去,那個時候並沒有虛空相可說。要「因色故有無色處」,才有一個沒有色的所在可指,這個所在才叫作虛空相。
虛空相不是離色而自己就在的一個標誌,它要對著色才說得出來。
這一步很關鍵。問方本是拿相當作最硬的憑據——相是決定的,所以法是決定的。如今這個相自己就有所待:待色而後可說。拿一個待他而立的東西,去證一個不待他而立的東西,路是不通的。
那就承認它沒有相吧——這條路也走不遠
問方於是退一步:「若無相有虛空,有何咎?」就讓虛空沒有相而仍舊是有,這有什麼不好?
答方的回應不是說『沒有相的東西一定不存在』,而是把話題交回給認識:你要怎麼指出它?
頌說:
「是無相之法,一切處無有; 於無相法中,相則無所相。」
青目補得很實在:「若於常無常法中,求無相法不可得。」人所談論的法不外常與無常兩類,而這兩類各有其相——「生住滅是有為相,無生住滅是無為相」。有為的以生、住、滅為相,無為的以沒有生、住、滅為相。人是憑相認得法的。既然如此,一個全然無相的法,就沒有一條路可以到達它;「虛空若無相,則無虛空」。
還有一條救法:先無相,後來相才過來標誌它。青目也堵住了:「若先無相,則無法可相。」相要來,總得有東西給它相;先既無相可辨,那裡並沒有一個現成的對象在等著。
名字可以先立,被指認的東西不能空著。
相能住在哪裡:三處都推不下去
到這裡,答方換了一種下手處。不問法了,問相本身:這個相,安住在什麼地方?
「有相無相中,相則無所住; 離有相無相,餘處亦不住。」
一個法要嘛已經有相,要嘛沒有相,除此之外沒有第三類。三處逐一推。
第一,無相的法。青目舉牛為例:「如有峯有角、尾端有毛、頸下垂𩑶,是名牛相。」有肉峯、有角、尾端有毛、頸下垂著垂胡,這些合起來叫作牛的相。然後兩句對推:「若離是相則無牛。」「若無牛,是諸相無所住。」離了這些相,指不出牛;而沒有牛,這些相也沒有可安住之處。牛與牛相不是先各自成了,再彼此認領。
第二,已有相的法。「有相中相亦不住,先有相故。」它既然已經有了相,另一個相入不進來。青目用水火作喻:「如水相中火相不住,先有自相故。」水已有水的相,火的相安不進去。
第三,若說相能住進無相之法。青目說這便「則為無因,無因名為無法而有相」——沒有原因地,本無其法而竟然有相。然後下了一句要緊的話:「相、可相、常相,因待故。」相也好、可相也好、被說成恆常的相也好,都是因待而立的。
三處推完,青目收束:「離有相無相法,更無第三處可相。」
這一節不是同一句話說三遍。它封的是三條不同的救路:對象缺席、位置已滿、無因而得。三條都封上,『相能自己帶著標誌作用、再附到某個先成之法上』這個想法就沒有落腳處了。
相與可相:兩頭一起立,也一起不立
於是頌把話說到底:
「相法無有故,可相法亦無; 可相法無故,相法亦復無。」
青目解得極簡:「因相有可相,因可相有相,共相因待故。」
要看清這裡的「共相因待」四個字。它不是說有兩個現成的東西互相幫忙站著——那樣的話,兩個都還是自體,只是彼此靠著。它說的是:這一對名目,只在對望之中才說得出來。能標誌的所以叫能標誌,是因為有被標誌的;被標誌的所以叫被標誌,是因為有能標誌的。抽掉一頭,另一頭連名字都不成立。
末頌把六種之所以被推出來的整個機關收攏:
「是故今無相,亦無有可相; 離相可相已,更亦無有物。」
青目說:「於因緣中本末推求,相、可相決定不可得。」而人所談的一切法,「皆攝在相、可相二法中」。他又補了一句最鬆動的話:「或相為可相、或可相為相。如火以烟為相,烟亦復以火為相。」
火與煙,誰是相、誰是可相?看你從哪一頭看。遠遠見煙,煙是火之相;近前見火,火也可以是煙之相。同一對東西,角色可以對調。能對調,正說明這兩個身分不是各自帶在身上的自性,是在關係裡分派的。
破了有,不必接著去要一個無
問方這時走了一條許多人都會走的路:「若無有有,應當有無。」既然有立不住,那總該有一個「無」吧。
頌答:
「若使無有有,云何當有無? 有無既已無,知有無者誰?」
青目講得很具體:「凡物若自壞、若為他壞,名為無。」一樣東西自己壞了,或被別的壞了,人才說它無。所以——「無不自有,從有而有。」無這個說法,是從有那裡借來的;有既然沒有立住,靠它得名的無也就無所依傍。他又補一句反詰:「眼見耳聞尚不可得,何況無物。」眼見耳聞的東西尚且推求不得,何況一個本來就沒有的東西。
問方最後一著,是想在有無之外保住一位『知道有無的人』。答方的回應乾脆:「若有知者,應在有中、應在無中?有無既破,知者亦同破。」你所立的這位知者,總得落在有這一邊或無那一邊;兩邊都已推求不得,他也沒有一個可站的地方。
於是總頌:
「是故知虛空,非有亦非無, 非相非可相,餘五同虛空。」
青目一句帶過其餘:「如虛空種種求相不可得,餘五種亦如是。」
為什麼偏偏從虛空下手
有人問得好:「虛空不在初、不在後。何以先破?」虛空在六種的名單裡既不排頭也不排尾,為什麼先動它?
青目給了兩個理由。
一是難易。「地、水、火、風眾緣和合,故易破。」四大是眾緣湊起來的,這件事人容易看見。「識以苦樂因故知無常變異,故易破。」識隨著苦樂而變,這件事人也容易感覺到。可是虛空不然——「虛空無如是相,但凡夫悕望為有,是故先破。」它既沒有可指的和合之相,也不隨苦樂變異;它是憑著人心裡一份指望被說成有的。最難看出破綻的那一個,正是最該先看的那一個。
二是次第。「復次虛空能持四大,四大因緣有識,是故先破根本,餘者自破。」有一種說法把虛空當作四大的所依,四大又為識之緣;那麼順著這條路,先看那個被當作根本的,其餘的自然跟著鬆動。
這兩個理由合起來,說明先破虛空是就論證的方便而言,不是說六種裡有哪一種格外重要或格外不重要。
最後一問:你這樣說,豈不是與世人為難
品末的一問語氣最重:「世間人盡見諸法是有是無,汝何以獨與世間相違,言無所見?」世上的人明明都見到諸法是有是無,你為什麼獨獨與世間相違,說沒有所見?
答頌只有一句話,卻是全品的落處:
「淺智見諸法,若有若無相, 是則不能見,滅見安隱法。」
要留意頌並沒有說『世人所見的都是假的』。它說的是:智慧淺的人見到諸法時,只見到若有若無這兩個相;停在這兩個相上,就見不到那個滅除諸見的安隱之法。
青目把這件事說得很體貼:「若人未得道,不見諸法實相,愛見因緣故種種戲論。」問題的根不在見,在愛見——見了就要抓。所以「見法生時謂之為有,取相言有;見法滅時謂之為斷,取相言無」。生滅本是眼前的事,錯處在「取相」那一下。看見了東西出現,順手就把它按成有;看見了東西消失,順手就把它按成斷滅。
智者不然。青目說:「智者見諸法生即滅無見,見諸法滅即滅有見」。注意這兩句的巧妙:智者所用的,恰恰還是同樣那個生滅。他見到法生起,當下就知道不能說一切定然是無;他見到法壞滅,當下就知道不能說一切定然是實有。同一件事,在淺智那裡供養了兩個見,在智者那裡消掉了兩個見。
所以答的一方並沒有與世間爭一個『見不見』。所見不必取消,取相那一下可以放下。
青目末後把這個道理推到自己身上:「是故於一切法雖有所見,皆如幻如夢,乃至無漏道見尚滅,何況餘見。」連無漏道之見尚且要滅,何況其餘。這一句是本品最柔軟也最徹底的地方——用來破見的那個見,也不留作最後的所得。
結語一句:「是故若不見滅、見安隱法者,則見有見無。」安隱不是有無之外另擺一件東西,是有見無見都止息了的那個地方。
讀這一品的人可以帶走什麼
一是留意「相」這個字底下的所待。「無色處名虛空相」——連虛空的相都要對著色才說得出來。日常裡凡是覺得某樣東西『本來就是這樣』的時候,不妨問一句:這個樣子,是對著什麼說的?
二是破了一邊不必補另一邊。「無不自有,從有而有」。放下了有,不必轉身去要一個無來安心;那個無仍是從有那裡借來的。
三是用生滅,而不取生滅。「智者見諸法生即滅無見,見諸法滅即滅有見」——眼前的生滅照樣看,只是不在那一下把它按成有、按成斷。
承衍:吉藏之鏡
以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論,只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。
吉藏《中觀論疏》說佛隨虛妄眾生種種異說,或立五陰之名、或標六種之稱,而意在破我;滯教之人不領無我而但取著於法,上品已破其迷於五陰,本品再除其惑於六種。他又把品序讀成門的轉換:上來所明是空門,此處次說無相門;若因空門悟入便不須無相,只為有人取著空相反成非門,所以次破空相,令人從無相門悟入。
他並把答中八偈判為兩段:前七偈破相以明無相門,末一偈作呵責門破。前七之中,前六偈破虛空、次一偈類推其餘五種;破虛空又分五偈半破虛空之法、半偈破知空之人;破有的五偈再分四節——初一偈半舉能相破所相,次一偈半舉所相破能相,第三一偈就相與可相相待而破,第四一偈結束。至於智者見生滅一段,他以因緣生與緣離滅相配:既見諸法從因緣生,何得斷無;既見緣離故滅,豈得定有。
這面鏡替本品立了科判、給諸門安了名目,又把品序接進三論一系由空門轉無相門的判釋架構;科判與門名是吉藏所增,不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判,各還其位。
We recognize things by their marks. What is hard is earth, what is wet water, what is warm fire, and what moves wind. After recognizing them this way for long enough, a principle naturally forms in the mind: since each has its own mark, each must be its own thing.
The questioner at the opening of this chapter says precisely this:
“The six elements each have a fixed mark; because they have fixed marks, the six elements exist.”
Earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness each possess a determinate mark; since the marks are determinate, the six things must naturally be truly existent. This question does not come from scripture but from daily life. Its force lies exactly there—it flows so smoothly that we do not notice it is a thesis.
The respondent does not begin with earth, water, fire, or wind. He begins with space. And his first sentence does not ask whether space exists; it asks: When did its mark begin to exist?
Which Exists First, the Mark or the Dharma?
The verse says:
“Before the mark of space exists, no dharma of space exists; if space already existed beforehand, it would be without a mark.”
The two lines form a pair of tongs.
First consider the opening line. If you wish to use its mark to prove that space exists, then before the mark of space exists, the dharma called space cannot yet be spoken of.
Now consider the second. Yet you also say that space was there first—it must be there before the mark has something to which it can attach. Very well: during the interval before the mark arrives, space is a thing without a mark.
What was brought in as proof turns back and leaves what it was meant to prove suspended. If the mark comes first, the dharma does not yet exist; if the dharma comes first, there is an interval in which no mark points to it. The questioner wanted mark and dharma each to stand securely and then support one another. The verse shows that both ends cannot be there first.
How the Mark of Space Arises: It Too Depends on Something
Qingmu next explains the side of the “mark.” What is the mark of space? “A place without form is called the mark of space.”
This may look like a mere definition, but it pulls up the questioner’s foundation. Qingmu says: “Form is a fabricated and impermanent dharma. If form has not yet arisen, then, because it has not arisen, it has not ceased; at that time there is no mark of space.” Form is fabricated and impermanent. If form has not arisen, its passing away cannot yet be spoken of, and at that time there is no mark of space. Only “because form exists can there be a place without form”; only then is there a place devoid of form to which one can point, and this place is called the mark of space.
The mark of space is not an indicator that exists by itself apart from form. It can be spoken of only in relation to form.
This step is crucial. The questioner originally treated the mark as the firmest evidence—the mark is fixed, therefore the dharma is fixed. Now the mark itself depends on something else: it can be spoken of only in dependence upon form. A thing that stands only by depending on another cannot prove a thing that stands without depending on another.
Then Grant That It Has No Mark—This Path Does Not Go Far Either
The questioner retreats a step: “What fault is there if space exists without a mark?” Why not simply allow space to remain existent without a mark?
The respondent does not say, “Anything without a mark must not exist.” Instead, he returns the matter to recognition: how will you point it out?
The verse says:
“This markless dharma exists nowhere at all; within a markless dharma, a mark has nothing that it can mark.”
Qingmu fills this out concretely: “If one searches among permanent and impermanent dharmas for a markless dharma, it cannot be found.” The dharmas people discuss fall into the permanent and impermanent, and both have their marks—“arising, abiding, and ceasing are the marks of the conditioned; the absence of arising, abiding, and ceasing is the mark of the unconditioned.” The conditioned is marked by arising, abiding, and ceasing; the unconditioned by their absence. People recognize dharmas by their marks. Consequently, there is no route to a dharma wholly without a mark: “If space had no mark, there would be no space.”
Another rescue remains: perhaps it first lacks a mark and later a mark comes to indicate it. Qingmu closes this as well: “If it initially has no mark, there is no dharma that can be marked.” If a mark is to arrive, something must be there for it to mark; if no mark can initially distinguish anything, there is no ready-made object waiting there.
A name may be posited first; the thing supposedly identified cannot remain empty.
Where Can a Mark Abide? None of Three Places Works
At this point the respondent changes the point of entry. Instead of asking about the dharma, he asks about the mark itself: where does this mark abide?
“Within the marked and unmarked, a mark has nowhere to abide; apart from the marked and unmarked, it likewise abides nowhere else.”
A dharma either already has a mark or lacks one; there is no third class. Each place is examined in turn.
First, a markless dharma. Qingmu uses an ox as an example: “A fleshy hump, horns, hair at the end of the tail, and a dewlap hanging beneath the neck are called the marks of an ox.” These together are called the marks of an ox. Then he presses in both directions: “Apart from these marks, there is no ox.” “If there is no ox, these marks have nowhere to abide.” Apart from the marks, no ox can be indicated; without an ox, the marks have nowhere to abide. Ox and ox-marks do not first exist separately and then claim one another.
Second, a dharma that already has a mark. “Within the marked, a mark likewise does not abide, because a mark is already present.” Since it already has its mark, another cannot enter. Qingmu uses water and fire as an analogy: “The mark of fire does not abide within the mark of water, because water already has its own mark.” Water already bears the mark of water; the mark of fire cannot enter it.
Third, suppose a mark could enter a markless dharma. Qingmu says it would then “be uncaused; uncaused means that a mark exists although no dharma exists.” Without a cause, a mark appears although the dharma was originally absent. Then he speaks an important sentence: “Mark, marked, and permanent mark are established through dependence.” Mark, marked, and even what is called a permanent mark all stand through dependence.
Once the three places have been examined, Qingmu concludes: “Apart from dharmas with a mark and dharmas without a mark, there is no third place that can be marked.”
This section is not the same sentence repeated three times. It seals three different escape routes: the object is absent, the position is occupied, and the mark appears without a cause. Once all three are closed, the thought that “a mark carries its own power of indication and later attaches to some already established dharma” has nowhere to land.
Mark and Marked: They Stand Together and Fail Together
The verse then carries the point through:
“Because there is no dharma of marking, there is no dharma that is marked; because there is no dharma that is marked, there is likewise no dharma of marking.”
Qingmu explains with utmost brevity: “The marked exists because of a mark, and a mark exists because of the marked; the two depend upon one another.”
We need to see clearly what “depend upon one another” means here. It does not mean that two ready-made things help each other stand—in that case each would still have its own body and merely lean on the other. It says: this pair of terms can be spoken only as they face one another. What marks is called a mark because there is something marked; what is marked is so called because there is a mark. Remove one end, and even the other’s name cannot be established.
The final verse gathers the entire mechanism through which the six elements were inferred:
“Thus, there is now no mark, nor anything that is marked; apart from mark and marked, there is no further thing.”
Qingmu says: “When causes and conditions are examined from beginning to end, mark and marked are definitively unfindable.” Yet all dharmas discussed by people “are included within the two dharmas, mark and marked.” He adds the most loosening sentence: “Sometimes the mark functions as the marked, and sometimes the marked as the mark. Fire has smoke as its mark, while smoke in turn has fire as its mark.”
Between fire and smoke, which is the mark and which the marked? It depends on which direction you look. See smoke from afar, and smoke is the mark of fire; see fire close at hand, and fire can also be the mark of smoke. The roles within the same pair can reverse. Their reversibility shows precisely that the two identities are not intrinsic natures carried separately within each thing but roles assigned within a relation.
Refuting Existence Does Not Require Positing a Nonexistence
The questioner now takes a road many people would take: “If there is no existence, there should be nonexistence.” If existence cannot stand, surely there must at least be a “nonexistence.”
The verse answers:
“If existence itself does not exist, how could nonexistence exist? since existence and nonexistence are both absent, who knows existence and nonexistence?”
Qingmu is concrete: “When a thing destroys itself or is destroyed by another, it is called nonexistent.” When something breaks down of itself or is destroyed by another, people call it absent. Thus, “Nonexistence does not exist on its own but comes from existence.” The word nonexistence is borrowed from existence; once existence itself has not been established, the nonexistence named through it has nothing on which to depend. He adds a counterquestion: “Even what the eye sees and the ear hears cannot be found, how much less a nonexistent thing.” Even visibly seen and audibly heard things are unfindable under examination, much less a thing that is absent from the outset.
The questioner’s final move is to preserve beyond existence and nonexistence someone who “knows existence and nonexistence.” The respondent is direct: “If there were a knower, would the knower be within existence or within nonexistence? Since existence and nonexistence have been refuted, the knower is refuted together with them.” The knower you establish must fall on the existent side or the nonexistent side; since neither can be found, the knower too has nowhere to stand.
Thus, the summarizing verse:
“Therefore, know that space is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither marking mark nor marked; the other five are like space.”
Qingmu passes over the rest in one sentence: “Just as the mark of space cannot be found however it is sought, so too with the other five elements.”
Why Begin Precisely with Space?
Someone asks well: “Space is neither first nor last. Why refute it first?” Space comes neither first nor last in the list of six elements, so why begin there?
Qingmu gives two reasons.
The first concerns difficulty. “Earth, water, fire, and wind conjoin through many conditions and are therefore easy to refute.” That the four great elements are brought together through many conditions is easy to see. “Because consciousness takes suffering and pleasure as causes, it can be known to be impermanent and changing and is therefore easy to refute.” It is likewise easy to feel consciousness changing with suffering and pleasure. Space is different: “Space has no such mark; ordinary people merely hope that it exists, and so it is refuted first.” It shows neither an obvious mark of conjunction nor change with suffering and pleasure; it is said to exist through a hope in the ordinary mind. The one whose flaw is hardest to see is exactly the one to examine first.
The second concerns sequence. “Moreover, space can support the four great elements, and consciousness exists through the four elements as causes and conditions; therefore, refute the root first, and the others are refuted of themselves.” One account makes space the support of the four great elements and makes those four conditions for consciousness. Following that path, examine first what is taken as the root, and the rest naturally loosen with it.
Together, these reasons show that space is refuted first for argumentative convenience, not because any one of the six elements is exceptionally important or unimportant.
The Final Question: Does This Not Put You at Odds with the World?
The final question carries the greatest force: “Everyone in the world sees dharmas as existent or nonexistent. Why do you alone oppose the world and say that nothing is seen?” Everyone plainly sees dharmas as existent or nonexistent. Why do you alone contradict the world and claim that nothing is seen?
The answering verse says only one thing, but it is where the chapter comes to rest:
“Those of shallow wisdom see dharmas as marked by existence or nonexistence; they cannot see the secure dharma in which views are brought to an end.”
Notice that the verse does not say “everything worldly people see is false.” It says that those of shallow wisdom, on seeing dharmas, see only the two marks of existence or nonexistence; stopping upon these two marks, they cannot see the secure dharma in which all views are ended.
Qingmu speaks with care: “If a person has not attained the path and does not see the true mark of dharmas, craving and views condition all kinds of proliferation.” The root of the difficulty is not seeing but craving and views—what is seen must be grasped. Thus, “Seeing a dharma arise, one calls it existent, grasps the mark, and asserts existence; seeing a dharma cease, one calls it annihilated, grasps the mark, and asserts nonexistence.” Arising and ceasing are things before one’s eyes; the error lies in the instant of “grasping the mark.” See a thing appear and at once press it into existence; see it disappear and at once press it into annihilation.
The wise are different. Qingmu says: “Seeing dharmas arise, the wise at once end the view of nonexistence; seeing dharmas cease, they at once end the view of existence.” Notice the ingenuity of the two sentences: the wise use the very same arising and ceasing. On seeing a dharma arise, they immediately know that all cannot be said to be determinately nonexistent; on seeing it cease, they immediately know that all cannot be said to be truly existent. The very same event nourishes two views in shallow wisdom and dissolves two views in wisdom.
Thus, the respondent is not disputing with the world over whether anything is “seen.” What is seen need not be cancelled; the grasping of its mark can be released.
At the close, Qingmu turns the principle upon itself: “Thus, although all dharmas are seen, they are like illusions and dreams. Even the view of the uncontaminated path is to be ended, how much more other views.” Even the view of the uncontaminated path is to be ended, much more the rest. This is the chapter’s softest and most thorough point—the view used to refute views is not retained as a final attainment.
The concluding sentence says: “Thus, one who does not see the secure dharma in which views are ended sees existence and sees nonexistence.” Security is not another thing placed outside existence and nonexistence; it is where the views of existence and nonexistence have both ceased.
What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?
First, notice what the word “mark” depends upon. “A place without form is called the mark of space.” Even space’s mark can be spoken only in relation to form. Whenever something in daily life seems “just naturally this way,” ask: in relation to what is this mark being spoken?
Second, refuting one side does not require filling the gap with the other. “Nonexistence does not exist on its own but comes from existence.” After releasing existence, one need not turn around and seek reassurance in a nonexistence; that nonexistence still borrows its name from existence.
Third, use arising and ceasing without grasping either. “Seeing dharmas arise, the wise at once end the view of nonexistence; seeing dharmas cease, they at once end the view of existence.” Arising and ceasing before one’s eyes are seen exactly as before; one simply does not press them, at that instant, into existence or annihilation.
Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror
The preceding is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows lets the Sui–Tang Three Treatises tradition illuminate it from the side. The mirror is not the treatise; it offers another way to read the same verses.
Jizang’s Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle says that the Buddha, adapting to deluded beings, gives various teachings, sometimes naming the five aggregates and sometimes the six elements, while intending to refute the self. People stuck to the teaching do not understand no-self and instead cling only to dharmas; the preceding chapter refuted their confusion over the five aggregates, and this chapter removes their delusion over the six elements. He also reads the chapter sequence as a transition of gates: the preceding chapter clarified the gate of emptiness, and this one next teaches the gate of the signless. If one awakens through the gate of emptiness, there is no need for the signless; but because someone may grasp the mark of emptiness and thereby turn it into no gate at all, this chapter next refutes the mark of emptiness and lets one enter through the gate of the signless.
He also divides the eight answering verses into two sections: the first seven refute marks and clarify the gate of the signless; the final verse is a gate of admonition and refutation. Among the first seven, the first six refute space and the next extends the examination to the other five elements. The refutation of space further divides into five and a half verses refuting the dharma of space and half a verse refuting the person who knows space. The five verses refuting existence divide into four: the first verse and a half use what marks to refute what is marked; the next verse and a half use what is marked to refute what marks; the third verse refutes through the interdependence of mark and marked; and the fourth concludes. For the passage on the wise seeing arising and ceasing, he pairs arising through causes and conditions with ceasing when conditions disperse: since dharmas are seen to arise through causes and conditions, how could they be annihilated nonexistence; since they cease when conditions part, how could they be determinately existent?
This mirror supplies a classification for the chapter, names its gates, and joins its sequence to the Three Treatises tradition’s interpretive transition from the gate of emptiness to the gate of the signless. The classification and names of gates are Jizang’s additions, not the words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s long commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
本品底本為《大正新脩大藏經》T30n1564〈觀六種品第五〉〔T30 0007b06–0008a13〕;〔0008a14〕已入下一品題。本文依大正底本,不以異讀逕改正文。本次逐義鎖證未發現足以改動讀者面 L1 的原校異讀。
二、異釋對勘
問者以六種各有定相而立六種為有。T30n1564青目釋〔0007b06〕:「問曰:六種各有定相,有定相故則有六種。」
論主先檢驗空與空相的先後:空相未有便無虛空,虛空若先有反成無相。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0007b08–0007b09〕:「空相未有時,則無虛空法;若先有虛空,即為是無相。」
青目以無色處名虛空相,說明此相因色而立。T30n1564青目釋〔0007b11–0007b13〕:「無色處名虛空相。色是作法無常,若色未生,未生則無滅,爾時無虛空相。因色故有無色處,無色處名虛空相。」
問者轉而容許無相有虛空;答方指出一切處無無相法,先無相便沒有後相所相之法。T30n1564青目釋〔0007b13–0007b14〕:「問曰:若無相有虛空,有何咎?」 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0007b15–0007b16〕:「是無相之法,一切處無有;於無相法中,相則無所相。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0007b17–0007b21〕:「若於常無常法中,求無相法不可得。如論者言,是有是無,云何知各有相?故生住滅是有為相,無生住滅是無為相。虛空若無相,則無虛空。若謂先無相、後相來相者,是亦不然。若先無相,則無法可相。何以故?」
相不能住在有相或無相之法中,離此二者也沒有第三處。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0007b22–0007b23〕:「有相無相中,相則無所住;離有相無相,餘處亦不住。」
牛相之例顯示離相無牛、無牛則相無所住,相與可相不能各自先立。T30n1564青目釋〔0007b24–0007b26〕:「如有峯有角、尾端有毛、頸下垂𩑶,是名牛相。若離是相則無牛。若無牛,是諸相無所住。」
有相法已有自相,無相法若忽得相便成無因;有相、無相之外又無第三所依。T30n1564青目釋〔0007b26–0007b29〕:「有相中相亦不住,先有相故。如水相中火相不住,先有自相故。復次若無相中相住者,則為無因,無因名為無法而有相。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0007c01–0007c02〕:「離有相無相法,更無第三處可相。」
相與可相彼此因待:任一不立,另一也不立。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0007c04–0007c05〕:「相法無有故,可相法亦無;可相法無故,相法亦復無。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0007c06–0007c08〕:「相無所住故,則無可相法;可相法無故,相法亦無。何以故?因相有可相,因可相有相,共相因待故。」
從因緣本末推求,相與可相決定不可得,故一切法也不能成立;離二更無第三物,兩者角色又可互換,如火煙互相為相。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0007c09–0007c10〕:「是故今無相,亦無有可相;離相可相已,更亦無有物。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0007c11–0007c14〕:「於因緣中本末推求,相、可相決定不可得。是二不可得故,一切法皆無。一切法皆攝在相、可相二法中,或相為可相、或可相為相。如火以烟為相,烟亦復以火為相。」
問者由有不成立轉執無;答方說無依物之自壞或他壞而得名,不能離有自立,並以眼見耳聞尚不可得反問何況無物。T30n1564青目釋〔0007c14–0007c15〕:「問曰:若無有有,應當有無。」 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0007c16–0007c17〕:「若使無有有,云何當有無?有無既已無,知有無者誰?」 T30n1564青目釋〔0007c18–0007c20〕:「凡物若自壞、若為他壞,名為無。無不自有,從有而有。是故言「若使無有有,云何當有無?」眼見耳聞尚不可得,何況無物。」
問者再立知有無者;答方說知者若在有或無中,便隨已破的有無同破。T30n1564青目釋〔0007c20–0007c22〕:「問曰:以無有有故無亦無,應當有知有無者。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0007c22–0007c23〕:「答曰:若有知者,應在有中、應在無中?有無既破,知者亦同破。」
虛空非有非無、非相非可相,其餘五種也接受同一檢驗。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0007c24–0007c25〕:「是故知虛空,非有亦非無,非相非可相,餘五同虛空。」 T30n1564青目釋〔0007c26〕:「如虛空種種求相不可得,餘五種亦如是。」
問者先問虛空既不在六種初後,何以先破。T30n1564青目釋〔0007c27〕:「虛空不在初、不在後。何以先破?」 答方說四大由眾緣和合而易破,識由苦樂因顯無常變異也易破;虛空少此顯相而為凡夫悕望。T30n1564青目釋〔0007c28–0008a01〕:「地、水、火、風眾緣和合,故易破。識以苦樂因故知無常變異,故易破。虛空無如是相,但凡夫悕望為有,是故先破。」
另一先破理由,是虛空被說成能持四大,四大因緣又有識;先破根本,餘者隨破。T30n1564青目釋〔0008a01–0008a03〕:「復次虛空能持四大,四大因緣有識,是故先破根本,餘者自破。」
問者以世人皆見有無責論者違世間;答頌反責淺智不能見滅見之安隱法。T30n1564青目釋〔0008a03–0008a04〕:「問曰:世間人盡見諸法是有是無,汝何以獨與世間相違,言無所見?」 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0008a05–0008a06〕:「淺智見諸法,若有若無相,是則不能見,滅見安隱法。」
未得道者因愛見起戲論,見生取有、見滅取斷無。T30n1564青目釋〔0008a07–0008a09〕:「若人未得道,不見諸法實相,愛見因緣故種種戲論。見法生時謂之為有,取相言有;見法滅時謂之為斷,取相言無。」
智者見生即滅無見,見滅即滅有見,不以生滅固定有無兩邊。T30n1564青目釋〔0008a09–0008a10〕:「智者見諸法生即滅無見,見諸法滅即滅有見」
一切所見皆如幻如夢,乃至無漏道見尚滅。T30n1564青目釋〔0008a11–0008a12〕:「是故於一切法雖有所見,皆如幻如夢,乃至無漏道見尚滅,何況餘見。」
本品以是否見到滅見安隱法判別有無二見,而不另立一個可取的無。T30n1564青目釋〔0008a12–0008a13〕:「是故若不見滅、見安隱法者,則見有見無。」
《大乘中觀釋論》把六界及其相安在世俗諦,不以所說之相推出勝義自性。T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0144c17–0144c18〕:「此說無相,謂世俗諦。如是諸相有所說者,非勝義諦。」
《般若燈論釋》以遮有不等於另取非有為界,譬如說青非青並非要成立白。T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0072c03–0072c04〕:「遮有言非有,不取非有故;如遮青非青,不欲說為白。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0072c05–0072c06〕:「此二種見名為不善。是故有智慧者,欲息戲論得無餘樂者,應須遮此二種惡見。」
《大乘中觀釋論》以寂止諸見、遠離一切見明勝義,並以止息諸見說一切法寂靜。T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0145c23–0145c26〕:「見有性無性,彼即少智慧;無真實微妙,聖慧眼開生。雖觀於諸性,當寂止諸見;此即勝義諦,遠離一切見。」 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0145c27–0145c28〕:「若於諸見能止息者,即當遠離諸嬈惱性,於一切法而得寂靜。」
三、諸家異釋(吉藏專疏)
吉藏說五陰與六種之名都為破我;若只取著法,便須由五陰之破續到六種。他又把本品置於由空門轉入無相門的次第。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0069c06–0069c10〕:「佛隨虛妄眾生種種異說,或作五陰之名、或標六種之稱,而意在破我,令我見息,法亦不留。滯教之人不領無我,但取著於法,上已破其迷五,今復除其惑六,故說此品。」 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0069c18–0069c20〕:「上以明空門,今次說無相門。若因空門悟入,不須無相,但為取空相即便非門,今次破空相,令從無相門悟入」
吉藏把八偈分成前七破相、末一呵責;前六破虛空,第七類餘五,並細分能相、所相、相待與結攝。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0070c03–0070c11〕:「答中八偈為二:初七偈破相明無相門、第二一偈呵責門破,就理實明無,即呵其無而謂有。初又二:前六偈破虛空、次一偈類餘五種。破虛空為二:初五偈半破虛空之法、次半偈破知空之人。初有二:第一五偈破虛空是有、次半偈破虛空是無。破有中有五偈為四:初一偈半舉能相破所相、次一偈半舉所相破能相、第三一偈相可相相待破、第四一偈結束破。」
吉藏以因緣生與緣離滅解「見生滅無見、見滅滅有見」:有生故非定無,有滅故非實有。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0073a13–0073a15〕:「智者既見諸法從因緣生,何得斷無?豈得有生?是故見生即滅無見。緣離故滅,豈定有耶?」 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0073a18–0073a19〕:「以有生故知非定無、以有滅故知非實有」
四、名相
- 六種:本品所列地、水、火、風、虛空、識;根本文先詳破虛空,再令餘五同觀。
- 虛空相:青目釋為無色處;所破是把相待之相固定成先在自相。
- 相/可相:能作標誌者與被標誌者;本品以互待、互換與無第三物檢驗二者。
- 滅見安隱法:止息取有、取無的見,不是閉絕世俗所見,也不是另取一個無。
五、科判
根本文八偈:前七偈從空相、相與可相、有無、知者推至餘五同空;末偈以滅見安隱法呵有無二取。本文重建依逐頌、逐釋與問答轉折立十九項 root,不以疏家科判倒改根本文序。
六、關中舊學·譯史
本品署龍樹造、青目釋、鳩摩羅什譯。羅什本題「六種」,後譯對文有「六界」;讀者面守本題,異名只在考據層誌錄。
七、唯識軸互讀(空有)
本品只把識列為六種之一,並以苦樂因顯其無常變異;沒有可供本單元逐義鎖證的後世識體分類,據實標闕。
八、系內餘論互讀
本品承〈觀五陰品〉末段「依空問答」而再破可取的空相;下一品轉觀染法與染者。此處只記本論明示的相鄰次第,不以後品反寫本品 root。
九、校本定位
| 用途 | 書證與範圍 |
|---|---|
| 根本論頌與青目釋 | T30n1564〔0007b06–0008a13〕 |
| 清辨系異釋 | T30n1566〔0070c27–0072c29〕 |
| 安慧系部分傳本異釋 | T30n1567〔0144c13–0145c28〕 |
| 吉藏逐文疏 | T42n1824〔0069c06–0073a29〕 |
Textual Collation
The base text is “Examination of the Six Elements, Chapter Five” in the Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka, T30n1564〔T30 0007b06–0008a13〕;〔0008a14〕already belongs to the title of the next chapter. The present text follows the Taishō base and is not directly emended from variants. The point-by-point evidence lock found no original collation variant sufficient to alter the reader-facing L1.
Comparative Readings
The questioner establishes the six elements as existent because each has a fixed mark. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007b06〕 reads: 「問曰:六種各有定相,有定相故則有六種。」 tr. “Question: The six elements each have a fixed mark; because they have fixed marks, the six elements exist.”
The treatise author first examines the temporal order of space and its mark: before the mark exists there is no space, while space existing first would instead be markless. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0007b08–0007b09〕 reads: 「空相未有時,則無虛空法;若先有虛空,即為是無相。」 tr. “Before the mark of space exists, no dharma of space exists; if space already existed beforehand, it would be without a mark.”
Qingmu calls a place without form the mark of space, showing that this mark is established in dependence upon form. His commentary in T30n1564〔0007b11–0007b13〕 reads: 「無色處名虛空相。色是作法無常,若色未生,未生則無滅,爾時無虛空相。因色故有無色處,無色處名虛空相。」 tr. “A place without form is called the mark of space. Form is a fabricated and impermanent dharma. If form has not yet arisen, then, because it has not arisen, it has not ceased; at that time there is no mark of space. Because form exists, there is a place without form; a place without form is called the mark of space.”
The questioner then allows space to exist without a mark; the respondent points out that a markless dharma exists nowhere and, if initially markless, leaves no dharma for a later mark to mark. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007b13–0007b14〕 reads: 「問曰:若無相有虛空,有何咎?」 tr. “Question: What fault is there if space exists without a mark?” Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0007b15–0007b16〕 reads: 「是無相之法,一切處無有;於無相法中,相則無所相。」 tr. “This markless dharma exists nowhere at all; within a markless dharma, a mark has nothing that it can mark.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007b17–0007b21〕 reads: 「若於常無常法中,求無相法不可得。如論者言,是有是無,云何知各有相?故生住滅是有為相,無生住滅是無為相。虛空若無相,則無虛空。若謂先無相、後相來相者,是亦不然。若先無相,則無法可相。何以故?」 tr. “If one searches among permanent and impermanent dharmas for a markless dharma, it cannot be found. As the debater says, this exists and that does not; how could one know each except by its mark? Thus, arising, abiding, and ceasing are the marks of conditioned dharmas, while the absence of arising, abiding, and ceasing is the mark of unconditioned dharmas. If space had no mark, there would be no space. If one says that it first lacked a mark and a mark later came to mark it, that also cannot stand. If it initially had no mark, there was no dharma that could be marked. Why?”
A mark cannot abide within either a dharma with a mark or a dharma without one, and apart from those two there is no third place. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0007b22–0007b23〕 reads: 「有相無相中,相則無所住;離有相無相,餘處亦不住。」 tr. “Within the marked and unmarked, a mark has nowhere to abide; apart from the marked and unmarked, it likewise abides nowhere else.”
The example of an ox shows that apart from its marks there is no ox, while without an ox the marks have nowhere to abide; mark and marked cannot each be established first. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007b24–0007b26〕 reads: 「如有峯有角、尾端有毛、頸下垂𩑶,是名牛相。若離是相則無牛。若無牛,是諸相無所住。」 tr. “A fleshy hump, horns, hair at the end of the tail, and a dewlap hanging beneath the neck are called the marks of an ox. Apart from these marks, there is no ox. If there is no ox, these marks have nowhere to abide.”
A dharma with a mark already has its own mark; if a mark suddenly entered a markless dharma, it would be uncaused. Beyond the marked and unmarked there is no third support. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007b26–0007b29〕 reads: 「有相中相亦不住,先有相故。如水相中火相不住,先有自相故。復次若無相中相住者,則為無因,無因名為無法而有相。」 tr. “Within a dharma with a mark, a mark likewise does not abide, because the dharma already has a mark. The mark of fire does not abide within the mark of water, for water already possesses its own mark. Moreover, if a mark abided within a markless dharma, it would be uncaused; ‘uncaused’ means that a mark exists though no dharma exists.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c01–0007c02〕 reads: 「離有相無相法,更無第三處可相。」 tr. “Apart from dharmas with a mark and dharmas without a mark, there is no third place that can be marked.”
Mark and marked depend upon one another: if either fails, the other fails with it. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0007c04–0007c05〕 reads: 「相法無有故,可相法亦無;可相法無故,相法亦復無。」 tr. “Because there is no dharma of marking, there is no dharma that is marked; because there is no dharma that is marked, there is likewise no dharma of marking.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c06–0007c08〕 reads: 「相無所住故,則無可相法;可相法無故,相法亦無。何以故?因相有可相,因可相有相,共相因待故。」 tr. “Since a mark has nowhere to abide, there is no dharma that is marked; because there is no dharma that is marked, there is no dharma of marking either. Why? The marked exists because of a mark, and a mark exists because of the marked. The two depend upon one another.”
When causes and conditions are examined from beginning to end, mark and marked are definitively unfindable, so all dharmas likewise cannot be established. Apart from them there is no third thing, while their roles can reverse, as fire and smoke mark one another. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0007c09–0007c10〕 reads: 「是故今無相,亦無有可相;離相可相已,更亦無有物。」 tr. “Thus, there is now no mark, nor anything that is marked; apart from mark and marked, there is no further thing.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c11–0007c14〕 reads: 「於因緣中本末推求,相、可相決定不可得。是二不可得故,一切法皆無。一切法皆攝在相、可相二法中,或相為可相、或可相為相。如火以烟為相,烟亦復以火為相。」 tr. “When causes and conditions are examined from beginning to end, mark and marked are definitively unfindable. Since these two cannot be found, all dharmas are absent. All dharmas are included within the two dharmas, mark and marked: sometimes the mark functions as the marked, and sometimes the marked as the mark. Fire has smoke as its mark, while smoke in turn has fire as its mark.”
When the questioner turns from failure to establish existence toward grasping nonexistence, the respondent says that nonexistence receives its name when a thing destroys itself or is destroyed by another, cannot stand apart from existence, and asks how an absent thing could be found when even the visibly seen and audibly heard are unfindable. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c14–0007c15〕 reads: 「問曰:若無有有,應當有無。」 tr. “Question: If there is no existence, there should be nonexistence.” Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0007c16–0007c17〕 reads: 「若使無有有,云何當有無?有無既已無,知有無者誰?」 tr. “If existence itself does not exist, how could nonexistence exist? Since existence and nonexistence are both absent, who knows existence and nonexistence?” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c18–0007c20〕 reads: 「凡物若自壞、若為他壞,名為無。無不自有,從有而有。是故言「若使無有有,云何當有無?」眼見耳聞尚不可得,何況無物。」 tr. “When a thing destroys itself or is destroyed by another, it is called nonexistent. Nonexistence does not exist on its own but comes from existence. Thus it is said, ‘If existence itself does not exist, how could nonexistence exist?’ Even what the eye sees and the ear hears cannot be found, how much less a nonexistent thing.”
The questioner next establishes a knower of existence and nonexistence; the respondent says that if this knower lies within existence or nonexistence, it is refuted together with the already refuted pair. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c20–0007c22〕 reads: 「問曰:以無有有故無亦無,應當有知有無者。」 tr. “Question: Since nonexistence is also absent because existence is absent, there should be someone who knows existence and nonexistence.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c22–0007c23〕 reads: 「答曰:若有知者,應在有中、應在無中?有無既破,知者亦同破。」 tr. “Answer: If a knower existed, would the knower be within existence or within nonexistence? Since existence and nonexistence have been refuted, the knower is refuted together with them.”
Space is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither mark nor marked; the remaining five elements receive the same examination. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0007c24–0007c25〕 reads: 「是故知虛空,非有亦非無,非相非可相,餘五同虛空。」 tr. “Thus, know that space is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither marking mark nor marked; the other five are like space.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c26〕 reads: 「如虛空種種求相不可得,餘五種亦如是。」 tr. “Just as the mark of space cannot be found however it is sought, so too with the other five elements.”
The questioner asks why space is refuted first when it is neither first nor last among the six elements. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c27〕 reads: 「虛空不在初、不在後。何以先破?」 tr. “Space is neither first nor last. Why refute it first?” The respondent says that the four great elements are easily refuted because they conjoin through many conditions, and consciousness because suffering and pleasure disclose its impermanence and change; space lacks such obvious marks and is hoped to exist by ordinary people. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0007c28–0008a01〕 reads: 「地、水、火、風眾緣和合,故易破。識以苦樂因故知無常變異,故易破。虛空無如是相,但凡夫悕望為有,是故先破。」 tr. “Earth, water, fire, and wind conjoin through many conditions and are therefore easy to refute. Because consciousness takes suffering and pleasure as causes, it is known to be impermanent and changing and is therefore easy to refute. Space has no such mark; ordinary people merely hope that it exists, and so it is refuted first.”
Another reason for refuting space first is that it is said to support the four great elements while consciousness arises with those four as causes and conditions; refuting the root brings the others down with it. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0008a01–0008a03〕 reads: 「復次虛空能持四大,四大因緣有識,是故先破根本,餘者自破。」 tr. “Moreover, space can support the four great elements, and consciousness exists through the four elements as causes and conditions; therefore, refute the root first, and the others are refuted of themselves.”
The questioner charges the treatise author with opposing the world, since everyone sees existence and nonexistence; the answering verse replies that shallow wisdom cannot see the secure dharma that ends views. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0008a03–0008a04〕 reads: 「問曰:世間人盡見諸法是有是無,汝何以獨與世間相違,言無所見?」 tr. “Question: Everyone in the world sees dharmas as existent or nonexistent. Why do you alone oppose the world and say that nothing is seen?” Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0008a05–0008a06〕 reads: 「淺智見諸法,若有若無相,是則不能見,滅見安隱法。」 tr. “Those of shallow wisdom see dharmas as marked by existence or nonexistence; they cannot see the secure dharma in which views are brought to an end.”
Those who have not attained the path produce proliferation through craving and views, grasping existence upon seeing arising and annihilating nonexistence upon seeing cessation. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0008a07–0008a09〕 reads: 「若人未得道,不見諸法實相,愛見因緣故種種戲論。見法生時謂之為有,取相言有;見法滅時謂之為斷,取相言無。」 tr. “If a person has not attained the path and does not see the true mark of dharmas, craving and views condition all kinds of proliferation. Seeing a dharma arise, such a person calls it existent, grasps the mark, and asserts existence; seeing a dharma cease, such a person calls it annihilated, grasps the mark, and asserts nonexistence.”
Seeing arising, the wise at once end the view of nonexistence; seeing cessation, they end the view of existence, without fixing arising and ceasing as the two extremes. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0008a09–0008a10〕 reads: 「智者見諸法生即滅無見,見諸法滅即滅有見」 tr. “Seeing dharmas arise, the wise at once end the view of nonexistence; seeing dharmas cease, they at once end the view of existence.”
Everything seen is like illusion and dream; even the view of the uncontaminated path is to be ended. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0008a11–0008a12〕 reads: 「是故於一切法雖有所見,皆如幻如夢,乃至無漏道見尚滅,何況餘見。」 tr. “Thus, although all dharmas are seen, they are like illusions and dreams. Even the view of the uncontaminated path is to be ended, how much more other views.”
The chapter distinguishes the two views of existence and nonexistence by whether one sees the secure dharma that ends views; it does not posit another graspable nonexistence. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0008a12–0008a13〕 reads: 「是故若不見滅、見安隱法者,則見有見無。」 tr. “Thus, one who does not see the secure dharma in which views are ended sees existence and sees nonexistence.”
The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation places the six elements and their marks within conventional truth and does not infer ultimate intrinsic nature from the marks spoken of. T30n1567〔0144c17–0144c18〕 reads: 「此說無相,謂世俗諦。如是諸相有所說者,非勝義諦。」 tr. “This teaching of the signless refers to conventional truth. Whatever is said of such marks does not belong to ultimate truth.”
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary draws the boundary that denying existence does not mean grasping another nonexistence: saying blue is not blue, for example, is not meant to establish white. T30n1566〔0072c03–0072c04〕 reads: 「遮有言非有,不取非有故;如遮青非青,不欲說為白。」 tr. “In denying existence one says ‘not existent’ without grasping nonexistence, just as denying that blue is blue is not meant to call it white.” The same text, T30n1566〔0072c05–0072c06〕, reads: 「此二種見名為不善。是故有智慧者,欲息戲論得無餘樂者,應須遮此二種惡見。」 tr. “These two kinds of view are called unwholesome. Therefore, a wise person who wishes to quell proliferation and attain unexcelled joy should deny both evil views.”
The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation explains the ultimate as calming and leaving all views, and describes all dharmas as quiescent when views cease. T30n1567〔0145c23–0145c26〕 reads: 「見有性無性,彼即少智慧;無真實微妙,聖慧眼開生。雖觀於諸性,當寂止諸見;此即勝義諦,遠離一切見。」 tr. “Those who see existent nature or nonexistent nature have little wisdom; there is no true subtlety until the eye of noble wisdom opens. Although one examines every nature, all views should be calmed and stopped; this is ultimate truth, far removed from every view.” The same text, T30n1567〔0145c27–0145c28〕, reads: 「若於諸見能止息者,即當遠離諸嬈惱性,於一切法而得寂靜。」 tr. “One who can bring views to rest leaves every nature of disturbance far behind and realizes quiescence in all dharmas.”
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang says that the names of both the five aggregates and the six elements are given to refute the self; if one clings only to dharmas, the refutation of the five aggregates must be followed by that of the six elements. He also places this chapter in a sequence moving from the gate of emptiness to the gate of the signless. His Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, T42n1824〔0069c06–0069c10〕, reads: 「佛隨虛妄眾生種種異說,或作五陰之名、或標六種之稱,而意在破我,令我見息,法亦不留。滯教之人不領無我,但取著於法,上已破其迷五,今復除其惑六,故說此品。」 tr. “The Buddha adapts to deluded beings with various teachings, sometimes naming the five aggregates and sometimes designating the six elements, while intending to refute the self so that the view of self ceases and dharmas too are not retained. Those stuck to the teaching do not understand no-self and cling only to dharmas. The preceding chapter refuted their confusion over the five; this one removes their delusion over the six, and therefore this chapter is taught.” The same text, T42n1824〔0069c18–0069c20〕, reads: 「上以明空門,今次說無相門。若因空門悟入,不須無相,但為取空相即便非門,今次破空相,令從無相門悟入」 tr. “The preceding chapter clarified the gate of emptiness; this one next teaches the gate of the signless. If one awakens through the gate of emptiness, the signless is unnecessary. But because grasping the mark of emptiness makes it no gate at all, this chapter next refutes the mark of emptiness and enables entry through the gate of the signless.”
Jizang divides the eight verses into seven that refute marks and one final admonition. The first six refute space, the seventh extends the examination to the other five, and the sections further divide into what marks, what is marked, their dependence, and the conclusion. His commentary, T42n1824〔0070c03–0070c11〕, reads: 「答中八偈為二:初七偈破相明無相門、第二一偈呵責門破,就理實明無,即呵其無而謂有。初又二:前六偈破虛空、次一偈類餘五種。破虛空為二:初五偈半破虛空之法、次半偈破知空之人。初有二:第一五偈破虛空是有、次半偈破虛空是無。破有中有五偈為四:初一偈半舉能相破所相、次一偈半舉所相破能相、第三一偈相可相相待破、第四一偈結束破。」 tr. “The eight answering verses divide in two: the first seven refute marks and clarify the gate of the signless; the second, a single verse, refutes through the gate of admonition. To clarify nonexistence in accord with principle is to admonish those who call that nonexistence existent. The first section again has two parts: the first six verses refute space, and the next extends the examination to the other five elements. The refutation of space has two parts: the first five and a half verses refute the dharma of space, and the next half verse refutes the person who knows space. The first has two parts: five verses refute space as existent, and the next half verse refutes space as nonexistent. The five verses refuting existence have four parts: the first verse and a half use what marks to refute what is marked; the next verse and a half use what is marked to refute what marks; the third verse refutes through the interdependence of mark and marked; and the fourth concludes the refutation.”
Jizang explains 「見生滅無見、見滅滅有見」 tr. “seeing arising ends the view of nonexistence; seeing cessation ends the view of existence” through arising from causes and conditions and ceasing when conditions part: because there is arising, dharmas are not determinately nonexistent; because there is cessation, they are not truly existent. His commentary, T42n1824〔0073a13–0073a15〕, reads: 「智者既見諸法從因緣生,何得斷無?豈得有生?是故見生即滅無見。緣離故滅,豈定有耶?」 tr. “Since the wise see dharmas arise through causes and conditions, how could they be annihilated nonexistence? How could there be arising? Thus, seeing arising at once ends the view of nonexistence. Since dharmas cease when conditions part, how could they be determinately existent?” The same text, T42n1824〔0073a18–0073a19〕, reads: 「以有生故知非定無、以有滅故知非實有」 tr. “Because there is arising, know they are not determinately nonexistent; because there is cessation, know they are not truly existent.”
Terminology
- Six elements: earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness as listed in this chapter. The root text first refutes space in detail and then directs that the other five be examined in the same way.
- Mark of space: explained by Qingmu as a place without form. What is refuted is fixing a relational mark as an independently prior intrinsic mark.
- Mark / marked: that which indicates and that which is indicated. The chapter tests them through mutual dependence, reversible roles, and the absence of any third thing.
- Secure dharma in which views are ended: the cessation of views that grasp existence or nonexistence. It neither shuts out what is conventionally seen nor grasps another nonexistence.
Doctrinal Outline
The root text has eight verses: the first seven proceed from the mark of space through mark and marked, existence and nonexistence, and the knower, and then extend the examination to the other five elements. The final verse admonishes both forms of grasping through the secure dharma that ends views. The present reconstruction establishes nineteen root items through the sequence of verses, commentary, and turns of question and answer; it does not retroject a commentator’s classification into the root text’s order.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
The chapter is attributed to Nāgārjuna as author, Qingmu as commentator, and Kumārajīva as translator. Kumārajīva’s version titles it 「六種」 tr. “six elements,” while later translated parallels use 「六界」 tr. “six realms.” The reader layer preserves the root title; the alternative name is recorded only in the apparatus.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
This chapter only lists consciousness as one of the six elements and discloses its impermanence and change through suffering and pleasure as causes. It contains no later classification of the substance of consciousness suitable for point-by-point evidence locking in this unit, and the absence is recorded honestly.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
This chapter follows the 「依空問答」 tr. “questions and answers relying on emptiness” at the end of “Examination of the Five Aggregates” by refuting a graspable mark of emptiness; the next chapter turns to defilement and the defiled. Only the treatise’s explicit adjacent sequence is recorded here; a later chapter is not used to rewrite this chapter’s root.
Position of the Editions
| Use | Textual witness and range |
|---|---|
| Root verses and Qingmu’s commentary | T30n1564〔0007b06–0008a13〕 |
| Bhāviveka-line alternative commentary | T30n1566〔0070c27–0072c29〕 |
| Partially transmitted Sthiramati-line alternative commentary | T30n1567〔0144c13–0145c28〕 |
| Jizang’s line-by-line commentary | T42n1824〔0069c06–0073a29〕 |