中論 觀業品第十七

〔T30 0021b21〕
心要Essence

問方不是來拆台的,是來護因果的:「業決定有,能令一切眾生受果報。」他先舉的還是善——「人能降伏心,利益於眾生」,先自滅惡,才談得上利他;再立業體,「佛所說思者,所謂意業是」,而「思為所作本」;再分七法,「作時名作業,作已常隨逐生,名無作業」,並以施而受用得二福、「一者從射生;二者從殺生」證業有重量。

答方只下一個兩難:「業住至受報,是業即為常;  若滅即無業,云何生果報?」住則常,滅則無。

問方兩救。一是穀種:「如芽等相續,皆從種子生」,「先業後有果,不斷亦不常」。破它的不是別的,正是同一副骨架——「為滅已相續?為不滅相續?」滅已則無因,不滅則「一穀子則生一切世間穀」;何況穀種可見,「況心及業,無觸無形不可見」。二是「不失法如券,業如負財物」:業花掉了,券還在。可是券若「以不念念滅故」而住到給果,常只是換了個名字寄放,所以「是義俱不離斷常過」。

問方被逼出真話:「若爾者,則無業果報。」

正義在此:「雖空亦不斷,雖有亦不常,  業果報不失,是名佛所說。」何以不斷——「業畢竟空、寂滅相、自性離,有何法可斷、何法可失?」斷是斷一個有,本來不曾立那個有。何以不常——生死往來從顛倒起,「無實故非常」。

再說到底:「諸業本不生,以無定性故」,而不滅的理由是「以不生因緣故則不滅,非以常故不滅」。反過來看,業若有性便成常而不可作,於是「則他人作罪此人受報」,梵行無據,「冬不應思為春事」,「作罪及作福,亦無有差別」,「受於果報已,而應更復受」。追到根上——「是煩惱非實,業當何有實?」

所破的從來不是業,是業的自性。身也一樣:「煩惱諸業空,何況於諸身。」作者也一樣:業無自性生,「是故則無有,能起於業者」;世俗一面則保住「五陰中假名人是作者」。

最後問方說:「今現見眾生作業受果報。」答以化人更作化人——「如初變化人,是名為作者,  變化人所作,是則名為業。」化人「無有實事但可眼見」,且「是業雖無實而可眼見」。看得見不等於有自性;無自性也不妨礙看得見。連作者都是變出來的。

「皆如幻與夢,如炎亦如嚮。」回聲確實響了,山裡並沒有一個聲音的自體。

The questioner has not come to sabotage the argument but to protect cause and fruit: “Karma determinately exists and can make every sentient being undergo its fruition.” He begins with goodness: “A person can subdue the mind and benefit sentient beings”—first extinguish one’s own evil, then speak of benefiting others. He next establishes karma’s substance: “The volition spoken of by the Buddha is precisely mental karma,” while “volition is the basis of what is done.” Then he divides it into seven dharmas: “What is done while acting is called performed karma; what constantly follows and arises after the act is called nonperformed karma.” Through the donor’s two merits when a gift is used, and the two wrongs—“one arising from shooting, the second from killing”—he proves that karma carries weight.

The respondent poses only a dilemma: “If karma remains until fruition is undergone, this karma becomes permanent; if it ceases, there is no karma—how could it produce fruition?” If it remains, it is permanent; if it ceases, it is absent.

The questioner offers two rescues. First, the grain seed: “A continuum such as sprout and the rest all arises from a seed”; “karma comes first and fruit afterward, neither annihilated nor permanent.” It is refuted by the same skeleton: “Does the continuum occur after cessation, or without cessation?” If after cessation, it is causeless; if without cessation, “one grain seed would produce every grain in the world.” Moreover, a grain seed can be seen, “how much less mind and karma, intangible, formless, and invisible.” Second, “the dharma of nonloss is like a bond, and karma like property taken on debt”: the karma is spent, but the bond remains. Yet if the bond remains until it yields fruit “because it does not cease thought by thought,” permanence has merely been stored under another name; thus “this doctrine does not escape the faults of annihilation and permanence on either side.”

The questioner is forced to say what he truly fears: “If so, then there is no karma and no fruition.”

Here is the right meaning: “Though empty, it is not annihilated; though existent, it is not permanent; karma and fruition are not lost—this is what the Buddha taught.” Why is it not annihilated? “Karma is ultimately empty, bears the character of quiescent extinction, and is separate from intrinsic nature. What dharma is there to annihilate, what dharma to lose?” Annihilation means annihilating something existent; that existence was never established. Why is it not permanent? Coming and going in saṃsāra arises from inversion and, “because unreal, is not permanent.”

Pressing to the end: “Karmas originally do not arise because they have no determinate intrinsic nature.” The reason they do not cease is that “because they do not arise, they do not cease—not because they are permanent.” Conversely, if karma had intrinsic nature, it would be permanent and could not be performed. Then “another person commits the wrong and this person undergoes its fruition”; pure conduct loses its basis; “in winter one should not plan for spring”; “committing wrong and cultivating merit would have no difference”; and “after undergoing fruition, one should undergo it once more.” Trace it to the root: “These afflictions are unreal—how could karma be real?”

What is refuted has never been karma but karma’s intrinsic nature. The same holds for the body: “Afflictions and karmas are empty—how much more the bodies?” The same holds for the agent: karma does not arise with intrinsic nature, “therefore there is no one who can originate karma,” while conventionally “the person provisionally named among the five aggregates is the agent.”

At last the questioner says: “We now plainly see sentient beings perform karma and undergo fruition.” The answer is a conjured person who conjures another: “The first conjured person is called the agent; what the conjured person does is called karma.” The conjured person “has no real affair and can merely be seen,” and “although this karma is unreal, it can be seen.” Visibility does not equal intrinsic nature; lacking intrinsic nature does not prevent visibility. Even the agent is conjured.

“All are like illusion and dream, like a mirage and also an echo.” The echo truly sounds, but no intrinsic body of sound resides in the mountain.

原典Canonical · verbatim

龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷三〈觀業品第十七〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0021b21〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。

〔T30 0021b21〕問曰:汝雖種種破諸法,而業決定有,能令一切眾生受果報。如經說,一切眾生皆隨業而生,惡者入地獄、修福者生天、行道者得涅槃,是故一切法不應空。所謂業者:   「人能降伏心,利益於眾生,
  是名為慈善,二世果報種。」
人有三毒,為惱他故生行。善者先自滅惡,是故說降伏其心利益他人。利益他者,行布施、持戒、忍辱等,不惱眾生,是名利益他,亦名慈善福德,亦名今世後世樂果種子。復次:   「大聖說二業,思與從思生,
  是業別相中,種種分別說。」
大聖略說業有二種:一者思、二者從思生,是二業如阿毘曇中廣說。   「佛所說思者,所謂意業是;
  所從思生者,即是身口業。」
思是心數法,諸心數法中能發起、有所作,故名業。因是思故起外身口業。雖因餘心心數法有所作,但思為所作本,故說思為業。是業今當說相。   「身業及口業,作與無作業,
  如是四事中,亦善亦不善。
  從用生福德,罪生亦如是,
  及思為七法,能了諸業相。」
口業者,四種口業。身業者,三種身業。是七種業有二種差別,有作、有無作。作時名作業,作已常隨逐生,名無作業。是二種有善、不善。不善名不止惡,善名止惡。復有從用生福德,如施主施受者,若受者受用,施主得二種福:一從施生;二從用生。如人以箭射人,若箭殺人,有二種罪:一者從射生;二者從殺生。若射不殺,射者但得射罪,無殺罪。是故偈中說罪福從用生,如是名為六種業。第七名思,是七種即是分別業相。是業有今世、後世果報,是故決定有業、有果報故,諸法不應空。 〔T30 0022a05〕答曰:   「業住至受報,是業即為常;
  若滅即無業,云何生果報?」
業若住至受果報,即為是常。是事不然。何以故?業是生滅相,一念尚不住,何況至果報!若謂業滅,滅則無,云何能生果報? 問曰:   「如芽等相續,皆從種子生,
  從是而生果,離種無相續。
  從種有相續,從相續有果,
  先種後有果,不斷亦不常。
  如是從初心,心法相續生,
  從是而有果,離心無相續。
  從心有相續,從相續有果,
  先業後有果,不斷亦不常。」
如從穀有芽,從芽有莖葉等相續,從是相續而有果生。離種無相續生,是故從穀子有相續,從相續有果。先種後有果,故不斷亦不常。如穀種喻,業果亦如是。初心起罪福,猶如穀種。因是心,餘心心數法相續生,乃至果報。先業後果故,不斷亦不常。若離業有果報,則有斷常。是善業因緣果報者,所謂:   「能成福德者,是十白業道,
  二世五欲樂,即是白業報。」
白名善淨。成福德因緣者,從是十白業道生,不殺、不盜、不邪婬、不妄語、不兩舌、不惡口、不無益語、不嫉、不恚、不邪見,是名為善。從身口意生是果報者,得今世名利,後世天人中貴處生。布施恭敬等雖有種種福德,略說則攝在十善道中。 答曰:   「若如汝分別,其過則甚多,
  是故汝所說,於義則不然。」
若以業果報相續故,以穀子為喻者,其過甚多,但此中不廣說。汝說穀子喻者,是喻不然。何以故?穀子有觸有形,可見有相續。我思惟是事,尚未受此言,況心及業,無觸無形不可見。生滅不住欲以相續,是事不然。復次從穀子有芽等相續者,為滅已相續?為不滅相續?若穀子滅已相續者,則為無因。若穀子不滅而相續者,從是穀子常生諸穀。若如是者,一穀子則生一切世間穀。是事不然,是故業果報相續則不然。 問曰:   「今當復更說,順業果報義,
  諸佛辟支佛,賢聖所稱歎。」
所謂:   「不失法如券,業如負財物,
  此性則無記,分別有四種。
  見諦所不斷,但思惟所斷,
  以是不失法,諸業有果報。
  若見諦所斷,而業至相似,
  則得破業等,如是之過咎。
  一切諸行業,相似不相似,
  一界初受身,爾時報獨生。
  如是二種業,現世受果報,
  或言受報已,而業猶故在。
  若度果已滅,若死已而滅,
  於是中分別,有漏及無漏。」
不失法者當知如券,業者如取物。是不失法,欲界繫、色界繫、無色界繫亦不繫。若分別善、不善、無記中,但是無記。是無記義,阿毘曇中廣說。見諦所不斷,從一果至一果,於中思惟所斷。是以諸業,以不失法故果生。若見諦所斷而業至相似,則得破業過。是事阿毘曇中廣說。復次不失法者,於一界諸業相似不相似,初受身時果報獨生,於現在身從業更生業。是業有二種,隨重而受報。或有言,是業受報已業猶在,以不念念滅故。若度果已滅、若死已而滅者,須陀洹等度果已而滅,諸凡夫及阿羅漢死已而滅。於此中分別有漏及無漏者,從須陀洹等諸賢聖,有漏、無漏等應分別。 答曰:是義俱不離斷常過,是故亦不應受。 問曰:若爾者,則無業果報。 答曰:   「雖空亦不斷,雖有亦不常,
  業果報不失,是名佛所說。」
此論所說義離於斷常。何以故?業畢竟空、寂滅相、自性離,有何法可斷、何法可失?顛倒因緣故,往來生死亦不常。何以故?若法從顛倒起則是虛妄無實,無實故非常。復次貪著顛倒不知實相故,言業不失。此是佛所說。復次:   「諸業本不生,以無定性故;
  〔T30 0023a01〕諸業亦不滅,以其不生故。
  若業有性者,是則名為常,
  不作亦名業,常則不可作。
  若有不作業,不作而有罪,
  不斷於梵行,而有不淨過。
  是則破一切,世間語言法,
  作罪及作福,亦無有差別。
  若言業決定,而自有性者,
  受於果報已,而應更復受。
  若諸世間業,從於煩惱生,
  是煩惱非實,業當何有實?」
第一義中諸業不生。何以故?無性故。以不生因緣故則不滅,非以常故不滅。若不爾者,業性應決定有。若業決定有性則為是常,若常則是不作業。何以故?常法不可作故。復次若有不作業者,則他人作罪此人受報,又他人斷梵行而此人有罪,則破世俗法。若先有者,冬不應思為春事,春不應思為夏事。有如是等過。復次作福及作罪者則無有別異,起布施持戒等業名為作福,起殺盜等業名為作罪。若不作而有業,則無有分別。復次是業若決定有性,則一時受果報已復應更受。是故汝說以不失法故有業報,則有如是等過。復次若業從煩惱起,是煩惱無有決定,但從憶想分別有。若諸煩惱無實,業云何有實?何以故?因無性故業亦無性。 問曰:若諸煩惱及業無性不實,今果報身現有,應是實。 答曰:   「諸煩惱及業,是說身因緣;
  煩惱諸業空,何況於諸身。」
諸賢聖說煩惱及業是身因緣,是中愛能潤生,業能生上中下好醜貴賤等果報。今諸煩惱及業,種種推求無有決定,何況諸身有決定果?隨因緣故。 問曰:汝雖種種因緣破業及果報,而經說,有起業者。起業者有故,有業有果報。如說:   「無明之所蔽,愛結之所縛,
  而於本作者,不即亦不異。」
《無始經》中說,眾生為無明所覆、愛結所縛,於無始生死中往來,受種種苦樂。今受者於先作者,不即是、亦不異。若即是,人作罪受牛形,則人不作牛、牛不作人。若異則失業果報,墮於無因,無因則斷滅。是故今受者於先作者,不即是、亦不異。 答曰:   「業不從緣生,不從非緣生,
  是故則無有,能起於業者。
  無業無作者,何有業生果?
  若其無有果,何有受果者?」
若無業、無作業者,何有從業生果報?若無果報,云何有受果報者?業有三種:五陰中假名人是作者,是業於善惡處生,名為果報。若起業者尚無,何況有業、有果報及受果報者? 問曰:汝雖種種破業、果報及起業者,而今現見眾生作業受果報。是事云何? 答曰:   「如世尊神通,所作變化人,
  如是變化人,復變作化人。
  如初變化人,是名為作者,
  變化人所作,是則名為業。
  諸煩惱及業,作者及果報,
  皆如幻與夢,如炎亦如嚮。」
如佛神通力所作化人,是化人復化作化人。如化人,無有實事但可眼見,又化人口業說法、身業布施等,是業雖無實而可眼見。如是生死身作者及業,亦應如是知。諸煩惱者,名為三毒,分別有九十八使、九結、十纏、六垢等無量諸煩惱。業名為身、口、意業。今世、後世分別有善、不善、無記,苦報、樂報、不苦不樂報,現報業、生報業、後報業,如是等無量。作者名為能起諸煩惱業、能受果報者。果報名從善惡業生無記五陰,如是等諸業皆空無性,如幻如夢、如炎如嚮。

The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.

白話Plain reading

龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷三〈觀業品第十七〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。

一、問:業是決定實有的,所以諸法不應是空

〔T30 0021b21〕問的一方說:你雖然用種種方式破斥了諸法,可是業卻是決定實有的,它能夠使一切眾生承受果報。正如經裡所說,一切眾生都是隨著自己所造的業而受生的:造惡的人墮入地獄,修福的人生到天上,行道的人證得涅槃。因此一切法不應當是空。

所謂業,就是下面所要說的這些。

二、頌:慈善是兩世果報的種子

人若能降伏自己的心,並且利益眾生,這就叫作慈善,也就是今世與後世這兩世果報的種子。

三、釋:先自滅惡,然後利益他人

人有貪、瞋、癡三毒,為了惱害他人的緣故,而生起種種行。修善的人,先自己滅除自己的惡,所以說要降伏他的心、利益別人。

所謂利益他人,就是奉行布施、持戒、忍辱等等,不惱害眾生:這就叫作利益他人,也叫作慈善福德,也叫作今世與後世樂果的種子。

其次還要再說。

四、頌:大聖所說的兩種業

大聖說業有兩種,一是思,一是從思而生的;這業在種種別相之中,還可以作各式各樣的分別解說。

五、釋:兩種業出於阿毘曇

大聖簡略地說,業有兩種:第一種是思,第二種是從思而生的。這兩種業,如同《阿毘曇》裡所廣說的那樣。

六、頌:思就是意業,從思生的就是身口業

佛所說的思,指的就是意業;那從思而生起的,就是身業與口業。

七、釋:思何以稱為業

思是心數法。在諸多心數法之中,它能夠發起、能夠有所造作,所以叫作業。因為有這個思的緣故,才會生起外在的身業與口業。

雖然依靠其餘的心法、心數法也能有所造作,但思才是一切所造作的根本,所以單說思是業。

這業,現在應當來說它的相。

八、頌:七法能夠了知一切業相

身業與口業,各有作業與無作業;在這樣的四件事之中,也有善的,也有不善的。

又有從受用而生起的福德,罪從受用而生起也是同樣的道理;再加上思,合為七法——這七法就能夠了知一切業的相。

九、釋:四種口業、三種身業,以及作與無作

所謂口業,是四種口業。所謂身業,是三種身業。

這七種業有兩種差別:有作業、有無作業。正在造作的時候,叫作作業;造作完了以後還常常隨逐著而生起的,叫作無作業。這兩種各有善、有不善。不善,是指不止息惡;善,是指止息惡。

另外還有從受用而生起的福德。譬如施主布施給受施的人,若受施的人受用了這布施,施主便得到兩種福:一種是從布施本身而生的,一種是從對方的受用而生的。

又譬如有人用箭射人:如果這一箭把人射死了,就有兩種罪,一種是從發射而生的,一種是從殺死而生的;如果只射中而沒有射死,射的人就只得到射的罪,沒有殺的罪。

所以偈裡說罪與福是從受用而生的。像這樣,合起來就叫作六種業。第七種名為思。這七種,就是分別業相的內容。

這業有今世的果報,也有後世的果報。因此,既然決定有業、有果報,那麼諸法就不應當是空。

十、答:住到受報就成常,滅了就沒有業

〔T30 0022a05〕答的一方說:

業若停住直到承受果報,那麼這業就成了常;若是業已經滅了,滅了就沒有業,又怎麼能生出果報來?

業若能停住直到承受果報,就成了常住之法——這件事並不成立。為什麼呢?因為業是生滅之相,連一念的時間都停不住,何況要停到果報現前!

若說業已經滅了,滅了就是沒有,那又怎麼能生出果報來?

十一、問:如芽等相續(穀種之喻)

問的一方說:

就像芽等等一路相續,都是從種子而生的;從這相續而生出果實來,離開種子便沒有相續。

從種子而有相續,從相續而有果實;先有種子,然後才有果實——所以既不是斷,也不是常。

同樣地,從最初的那一念心,種種心法相續而生;從這相續而有果報,離開了心便沒有相續。

從心而有相續,從相續而有果報;先有業,然後才有果報——所以既不是斷,也不是常。

十二、釋:穀種與初心

就像從穀子生出芽來,從芽生出莖、葉等等一路相續,從這一串相續而有果實生出。離開種子就沒有相續生起,所以說從穀子而有相續,從相續而有果實。先有種子,然後才有果實,所以既不是斷,也不是常。

像穀種這個譬喻一樣,業與果也是如此。最初一念心生起罪或福,就好比穀種一樣。因為這一念心,其餘的心法、心數法相續而生,一直到果報現前。因為先有業、然後有果的緣故,所以既不是斷,也不是常。

如果離開業而另有果報,那就落入斷與常了。

至於善業所引的因緣果報,就是下面所說的。

十三、頌:十白業道與白業報

能夠成就福德的,是這十種白業道;今世與後世的五欲之樂,就是白業的果報。

十四、釋:十白業道之列與其果

白,是善淨的意思。成就福德的因緣,是從這十種白業道而生的:不殺生、不偷盜、不邪婬、不妄語、不兩舌、不惡口、不說無益的話、不嫉妒、不瞋恚、不邪見——這些叫作善。

從身、口、意所生的果報,是得到今世的名聲利養,後世則生在天上與人間的尊貴之處。

布施、恭敬等等雖然還有種種福德,簡略地說,都收攝在十善道之中。

十五、答:你這樣分別,過失就非常多

答的一方說:

若照你這樣分別下去,過失就非常多;所以你所說的,在道理上並不成立。

如果因為業與果報相續的緣故,就拿穀子來作譬喻,那過失非常多,只是這裡不詳細說。

你所說的穀子之喻,這譬喻並不成立。為什麼呢?穀子是可以觸到、有形狀的,它的相續是看得見的;我思量這件事,尚且還沒有接受這種說法,何況是心與業——它們無可觸、無形狀、不可看見,又是生滅不住的,卻要拿相續來說明,這是不成立的。

其次,說從穀子而有芽等相續,那麼是滅了以後才相續呢?還是不滅而相續呢?

如果穀子滅了以後才相續,那就成了沒有因。如果穀子不滅而相續,那麼從這一顆穀子就會常常生出種種穀子來;若是這樣,一顆穀子就能生出全世間的穀子了。這是不成立的。

所以說,業與果報用相續來成立,並不成立。

十六、問:另說一種順於業果報的道理

問的一方說:

現在應當再說一種順於業與果報的道理,這是諸佛、辟支佛與賢聖們所稱歎的。

就是下面所說的。

十七、頌:不失法如券,業如負財物

不失法就像一張借據,業就像所欠的財物;這不失法的體性是無記的,分別起來有四種。

它不是見諦所斷的,只是思惟所斷的;因為有這不失法,所以諸業才會有果報。

如果它是見諦所斷的,而業卻延續到了相似的位次,那就會得到破壞業等等這樣的過失。

一切諸行之業,有相似的、有不相似的;在同一界中最初受身的時候,那時候果報單獨生起。

像這樣的兩種業,在現世承受果報;也有人說,果報承受完了以後,業還照舊存在。

或者是超越了果位以後才滅,或者是死了以後才滅;在這裡面,還要分別出有漏與無漏。

十八、釋:券與負物,以及四種、二斷、二滅

所謂不失法,應當知道它就像一張借據;所謂業,就像取走了財物。

這不失法,繫屬欲界、繫屬色界、繫屬無色界,也有不繫屬三界的。若在善、不善、無記之中分別,它只是無記。這無記的道理,《阿毘曇》裡有廣說。

它不是見諦所斷的;從這一個果位到那一個果位,在這中間,它是思惟所斷的。因此諸業就靠這不失法而使果報生起。

如果它是見諦所斷的,而業卻延續到了相似的位次,那就會得到破壞業的過失。這件事,《阿毘曇》裡有廣說。

其次,所謂不失法:在同一界中,諸業有相似的、有不相似的,最初受身的時候果報單獨生起,而在現在的身上,又從業更生出業來。

這業有兩種,隨著輕重來承受果報。也有人說,這業承受完果報以後,業還存在,因為它不是念念生滅的。

所謂超越果位以後才滅、死了以後才滅:須陀洹等等是超越果位以後才滅,凡夫與阿羅漢是死了以後才滅。

所謂在這裡面分別有漏與無漏:從須陀洹等等諸位賢聖起,有漏、無漏等等應當加以分別。

十九、答:這道理仍舊不離斷常之過

答的一方說:這個道理,兩頭都不離斷與常的過失,所以也不應當接受。

二十、問:那樣就沒有業與果報了

問的一方說:若是這樣,那就沒有業與果報了。

二十一、頌:雖空亦不斷,雖有亦不常

答的一方說:

雖然是空,卻也不是斷;雖然是有,卻也不是常;業與果報並不失壞——這才是佛所說的。

二十二、釋:畢竟空故無可斷失,從顛倒起故不是常

這部論所說的道理,是離於斷與常的。為什麼呢?

業是畢竟空的、是寂滅之相、是自性遠離的,那還有什麼法可以斷、有什麼法可以失壞?

由於顛倒的因緣,才在生死之中往來,這也不是常。為什麼呢?如果一個法是從顛倒而生起的,那它就是虛妄不實的;不實,所以不是常。

其次,因為貪著顛倒、不知道實相的緣故,所以說業不失壞。這是佛所說的。

其次還要再說。

二十三、頌:諸業本不生,因為沒有決定的自性

〔T30 0023a01〕諸業本來就不生,因為沒有決定的自性;諸業也不滅,因為它本來不生。

如果業有自性,那它就叫作常;不造作也算是業,而常法是不可造作的。

如果有不造作而成的業,那就會有並未造作卻擔上罪的事;並沒有斷絕梵行,卻要擔上不淨的過失。

這樣一來,就破壞了一切世間的語言之法;造罪與造福,也就沒有差別了。

如果說業是決定的、自己有自性的,那麼承受過果報以後,還應當再受一次。

如果一切世間的業,是從煩惱而生的,而這煩惱並不真實,那業又哪裡會有真實可言?

二十四、釋:定性之業所帶出的種種過失

第一義之中,諸業不生。為什麼呢?因為沒有自性。因為不生的緣故,所以也不滅——並不是因為它是常,所以才不滅。

若不是這樣,業的體性就應當是決定實有的。業若決定有自性,那它就是常;若是常,那就是不造作的業。為什麼呢?因為常法是不能造作的。

其次,如果有不造作而成的業,那麼別人造罪,這個人卻要受報;又是別人斷絕梵行,這個人卻擔上罪過——這就破壞了世俗之法。

如果一切先已存在,那麼冬天就不必去籌畫春天的事,春天也不必去籌畫夏天的事。有這樣種種的過失。

其次,造福的與造罪的也就沒有差異了:生起布施、持戒等等的業,叫作造福;生起殺生、偷盜等等的業,叫作造罪。若是不造作而業已經有了,那就沒有分別可言。

其次,這業如果決定有自性,那麼一次承受果報以後,還應當再承受一次。

所以你說因為有不失法的緣故,所以有業報——那就有像這樣種種的過失。

其次,業如果是從煩惱生起的,而這煩惱並沒有決定的自性,只是從憶想分別而有。如果諸煩惱不真實,業又怎麼會真實?為什麼呢?因為因沒有自性,所以業也沒有自性。

二十五、問:果報之身現在明明是有的

問的一方說:如果諸煩惱與業都無自性、不真實,可是果報之身現在明明是有的,那它應該是真實的。

二十六、頌:煩惱與業尚且是空,何況諸身

答的一方說:

諸煩惱與諸業,被說是身的因緣;煩惱與諸業尚且是空,何況由它們所成的諸身?

二十七、釋:愛能潤生,業生上中下之報

諸位賢聖說煩惱與業是身的因緣。在這裡面,愛能夠滋潤而使受生,業能夠生出上、中、下與好、醜、貴、賤等等的果報。

如今諸煩惱與業,種種推求下來都沒有決定的自性,何況諸身能有決定的果?因為它們都是隨著因緣而有的。

二十八、問:經裡說有起業的人

問的一方說:你雖然用種種因緣破斥了業與果報,可是經裡說,是有起業的人的。既然有起業的人,就有業、有果報。就像所說的:

被無明所遮蔽,被愛結所繫縛,而對於本來的造作者,既不就是他,也不異於他。

《無始經》裡說,眾生被無明所覆蓋、被愛結所繫縛,在無始的生死之中往來,承受種種苦樂。

如今承受果報的這一位,對於先前造作的那一位,既不就是他,也不異於他。

如果就是他,那麼人造了罪而受牛的形體,就成了人不作牛、牛不作人。如果是異於他,那就失壞了業與果報,落入沒有因;沒有因,就是斷滅。

所以說,如今承受果報的這一位,對於先前造作的那一位,既不就是他,也不異於他。

二十九、頌:沒有業也沒有作者,哪裡會有受果的人

答的一方說:

業不從緣而生,也不從非緣而生,所以並沒有能夠起業的人。

既沒有業、也沒有作者,哪裡會有從業而生的果?如果連果都沒有,哪裡會有承受果的人?

三十、釋:五陰之中的假名人

如果沒有業、沒有造業的人,哪裡會有從業而生的果報?如果沒有果報,又怎麼會有承受果報的人?

業有三種。五陰之中的假名人是作者;這業在善處或惡處生起果,就叫作果報。

如果連起業的人尚且沒有,何況是業、是果報、以及承受果報的人?

三十一、問:現在明明看見眾生造業受報

問的一方說:你雖然用種種方式破斥了業、果報以及起業的人,可是現在明明看見眾生在造業、在承受果報。這件事又該怎麼說?

三十二、頌:如變化人更變作化人

答的一方說:

就像世尊以神通所變化出來的人,這樣的一個變化人,又再變作出一個化人。

最初的那個變化人,就叫作作者;變化人所造作的,就叫作業。

諸煩惱與諸業、作者與果報,全都如同幻術與夢境,如同陽焰,也如同回聲。

三十三、釋:化人說法、化人布施

就像佛以神通力所變化出來的化人,這化人又變化出化人來。就像化人一樣,並沒有實在的事,只是眼睛可以看見;而且化人也用口業說法、用身業布施等等——這些業雖然沒有真實,卻是眼睛看得見的。

像這樣,生死之身、作者與業,也應當這樣去了知。

所謂諸煩惱,就是三毒;分別起來有九十八使、九結、十纏、六垢等等無量的煩惱。

所謂業,就是身業、口業、意業;就今世、後世分別,有善、不善、無記,有苦報、樂報、不苦不樂報,有現報業、生報業、後報業,像這樣等等無量。

所謂作者,就是能夠生起諸煩惱與業、能夠承受果報的那一位。

所謂果報,就是從善業惡業所生的無記五陰。

像這樣種種業,都是空的、沒有自性的,如同幻術、如同夢境、如同陽焰、如同回聲。

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Three, “Examination of Karma, Chapter Seventeen,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Karma Determinately Exists, So Dharmas Should Not Be Empty

〔T30 0021b21〕The questioner says: Although you have refuted dharmas in many ways, karma determinately exists and can make every sentient being undergo its fruition. As the sūtra says, all sentient beings are born according to the karma they themselves have performed: those who commit evil fall into the hells, those who cultivate merit are born in the heavens, and those who practice the path realize nirvāṇa. Therefore, all dharmas should not be empty.

What is called karma is what follows.

II. Verse: Loving Goodness Is the Seed of Fruition in Two Lives

If people can subdue their own minds and benefit sentient beings, this is called loving goodness; it is the seed of fruition in this and later lives.

III. Commentary: First Extinguish One’s Own Evil, Then Benefit Others

People possess the three poisons of greed, anger, and delusion and, because they wish to trouble others, give rise to various activities. Those who cultivate goodness first extinguish their own evil; therefore it is said that they subdue their minds and benefit others.

Benefiting others means practicing generosity, keeping precepts, patience, and the rest without troubling sentient beings. This is called benefiting others; it is also called the merit of loving goodness and the seed of pleasant fruition in this and later lives.

Next, there is more to say.

IV. Verse: The Two Kinds of Karma Taught by the Great Sage

The Great Sage taught two kinds of karma: volition and what arises from volition. Within karma’s various particular characters, many kinds of analysis can be given.

V. Commentary: The Two Kinds of Karma Come from the Abhidharma

The Great Sage briefly taught two kinds of karma. The first is volition; the second is what arises from volition. These two kinds of karma are extensively explained in the Abhidharma.

VI. Verse: Volition Is Mental Karma; What Arises from Volition Is Bodily and Verbal Karma

The volition spoken of by the Buddha is mental karma. What arises from volition is bodily and verbal karma.

VII. Commentary: Why Volition Is Called Karma

Volition is an associated mental dharma. Among associated mental dharmas, it can initiate and produce action, and therefore it is called karma. Because of this volition, outward bodily and verbal karma arises.

Although other mind-dharmas and associated mental dharmas can also produce action, volition is the basis of everything done; therefore volition alone is called karma.

The character of this karma should now be explained.

VIII. Verse: Seven Dharmas Disclose the Character of All Karma

Bodily karma and verbal karma each have performed and nonperformed karma. Among these four things, some are wholesome and some unwholesome.

There is also merit arising from use, and demerit arises from use in the same way. Together with volition, these make seven dharmas. These seven disclose the character of all karma.

IX. Commentary: Four Kinds of Verbal Karma, Three of Bodily Karma, and Performance and Nonperformance

Verbal karma means the four kinds of verbal karma. Bodily karma means the three kinds of bodily karma.

These seven karmas have two distinctions: performed karma and nonperformed karma. What is done while acting is called performed karma; what constantly follows and arises after the act is called nonperformed karma. Each of these may be wholesome or unwholesome. Unwholesome means not stopping evil; wholesome means stopping evil.

There is also merit arising from use. Suppose a donor gives something to a recipient. If the recipient uses the gift, the donor obtains two kinds of merit: one arises from the giving itself, and the other from the recipient’s use.

Again, suppose someone shoots another person with an arrow. If the arrow kills that person, there are two kinds of demerit: one arises from shooting and the other from killing. If the arrow only strikes but does not kill, the archer incurs only the demerit of shooting and not the demerit of killing.

Therefore the verse says that demerit and merit arise from use. Together these are called six kinds of karma. The seventh is called volition. These seven constitute the analysis of karma’s character.

This karma has fruition in the present life and fruition in later lives. Since karma and fruition determinately exist, dharmas therefore should not be empty.

X. Answer: If It Remains Until Fruition, It Is Permanent; If It Ceases, No Karma Remains

〔T30 0022a05〕The respondent says:

If karma remains until fruition is undergone, this karma becomes permanent. If karma has ceased, cessation leaves no karma—how could it produce fruition?

If karma could remain until fruition is undergone, it would be a permanently abiding dharma. This cannot be established. Why? Karma bears the marks of arising and ceasing and cannot remain for even a single thought, much less until fruition becomes present.

If one says karma has ceased, cessation means absence. How, then, could it produce fruition?

XI. Question: A Continuum Such as Sprout and the Rest (The Grain-Seed Analogy)

The questioner says:

Just as the continuum of sprout and the rest all arises from a seed, from this continuum fruit is produced. Apart from the seed, there is no continuum.

From the seed there is a continuum, and from the continuum there is fruit. The seed comes first and fruit afterward; therefore, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

In the same way, various mind-dharmas arise in continuity from the initial thought. From this continuum there is fruition; apart from mind, there is no continuum.

From mind there is a continuum, and from the continuum there is fruition. Karma comes first and fruition afterward; therefore, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

XII. Commentary: The Grain Seed and the Initial Thought

Just as a sprout grows from a grain, then stalk, leaves, and the rest arise in continuity from the sprout, and fruit grows from this succession: apart from the seed, no continuum arises. Therefore it is said that from the grain there is a continuum and from the continuum there is fruit. Since the seed comes first and fruit afterward, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

As in the grain-seed analogy, so too with karma and fruit. The initial thought that gives rise to demerit or merit is like a grain seed. Because of this thought, other mind-dharmas and associated mental dharmas arise in continuity until fruition becomes present. Because karma comes first and fruit afterward, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

If fruition existed separately from karma, one would fall into annihilation and permanence.

The causal fruition brought about by wholesome karma is as follows.

XIII. Verse: The Ten White Paths of Karma and White Karmic Fruition

What accomplishes merit is these ten white paths of karma. The pleasures of the five desires in this and later lives are the fruition of white karma.

XIV. Commentary: The List of Ten White Paths of Karma and Their Fruit

White means wholesome and pure. The conditions that accomplish merit arise from these ten white paths of karma: not killing, not stealing, no sexual misconduct, no false speech, no divisive speech, no harsh speech, no useless speech, no jealousy, no anger, and no wrong view. These are called wholesome.

The fruition arising from body, speech, and mind is reputation and material benefit in this life and birth in honored stations among humans and devas in later lives.

Although generosity, respect, and the rest include many forms of merit, briefly stated they are all contained within the ten wholesome paths.

XV. Answer: Your Analysis Entails a Great Many Faults

The respondent says:

If one analyzes as you do, the faults are extremely numerous. Therefore, what you say cannot be established in principle.

If you use a grain as analogy because karma and fruition occur in continuity, the faults are extremely numerous and are not explained here in detail.

Your grain analogy cannot be established. Why? A grain can be touched, has form, and its continuum can be seen. Even after considering this, I still do not accept the account—how much less mind and karma, which are intangible, formless, invisible, and arise and cease without remaining. To explain them through continuity cannot be established.

Further, if the continuum of sprout and the rest proceeds from a grain, does it continue after the grain has ceased, or does it continue without the grain ceasing?

If it continues after the grain has ceased, it becomes causeless. If it continues without the grain ceasing, this single grain would constantly produce many grains. If so, one grain seed would produce every grain in the world. This cannot be established.

Therefore, karma and fruition cannot be established through continuity.

XVI. Question: Another Doctrine Congruent with Karma and Fruition

The questioner says:

Another doctrine congruent with karma and fruition should now be explained, one praised by the Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas, and worthy sages.

It is as follows.

XVII. Verse: The Dharma of Nonloss Is Like a Bond; Karma Is Like Property Owed

The dharma of nonloss is like a bond, and karma like property taken on debt. The nature of this dharma of nonloss is indeterminate, and analysis distinguishes four kinds.

It is not severed by seeing the truths but only by cultivation. Because this dharma of nonloss exists, all karmas have fruition.

If it were severed by seeing the truths while karma extended to a similar stage, faults such as the destruction of karma would follow.

Among all karmas of conditioned activities, some are similar and some dissimilar. When one first receives a body in a given realm, fruition arises independently at that time.

These two kinds of karma undergo fruition in the present life. Some also say that after fruition has been undergone, the karma remains as before.

It ceases either after passing beyond a fruit-stage or after death. Within this, outflowing and nonoutflowing are further distinguished.

XVIII. Commentary: The Bond and Property Owed, and the Four Kinds, Two Severances, and Two Cessations

What is called the dharma of nonloss should be understood as like a bond. What is called karma is like taking property.

This dharma of nonloss may be bound to the desire realm, the form realm, or the formless realm, or it may be unbound to the three realms. When distinguished among wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate, it is only indeterminate. The Abhidharma explains this indeterminate character extensively.

It is not severed by seeing the truths. In passing from one fruit-stage to another, it is severed through cultivation. Thus it is by relying on the dharma of nonloss that all karmas produce fruition.

If it were severed by seeing the truths while karma extended to a similar stage, the fault of destroying karma would follow. This is extensively explained in the Abhidharma.

Further, regarding the dharma of nonloss: within one realm, karmas are similar or dissimilar. When one first receives a body, fruition arises independently; and in the present body, karma further gives rise to karma.

This karma is of two kinds and undergoes fruition according to its weight. Some also say that after this karma has undergone fruition it still exists, because it does not arise and cease thought by thought.

As for ceasing after passing beyond a fruit-stage or ceasing after death: stream-enterers and the rest cease it after passing beyond a fruit-stage, while ordinary persons and arhats cease it after death.

As for distinguishing outflowing and nonoutflowing within this: beginning with stream-enterers and the other worthy sages, outflowing, nonoutflowing, and the rest should be distinguished.

XIX. Answer: This Doctrine Still Does Not Escape the Faults of Annihilation and Permanence

The respondent says: On both sides, this doctrine does not escape the faults of annihilation and permanence; therefore it too should not be accepted.

XX. Question: Then There Would Be No Karma and Fruition

The questioner says: If so, then there would be no karma and no fruition.

XXI. Verse: Though Empty, Not Annihilated; Though Existent, Not Permanent

The respondent says:

Though empty, it is not annihilated; though existent, it is not permanent. Karma and fruition are not lost—this is what the Buddha taught.

XXII. Commentary: Ultimately Empty, There Is Nothing to Annihilate or Lose; Arising from Inversion, It Is Not Permanent

The meaning taught in this treatise is free from annihilation and permanence. Why?

Karma is ultimately empty, bears the character of quiescent extinction, and is separate from intrinsic nature. What dharma is there to annihilate? What dharma is there to lose?

Because of inverted causes and conditions, there is coming and going in saṃsāra; this too is not permanent. Why? If a dharma arises from inversion, it is false and unreal. Because unreal, it is not permanent.

Further, because one greedily clings to inversion and does not know true character, it is said that karma is not lost. This is what the Buddha taught.

Next, there is more to say.

XXIII. Verse: Karmas Originally Do Not Arise Because They Have No Determinate Intrinsic Nature

〔T30 0023a01〕Karmas originally do not arise because they have no determinate intrinsic nature. Nor do karmas cease, because they do not originally arise.

If karma had intrinsic nature, it would be called permanent. What is not performed would still be called karma, while a permanent dharma cannot be performed.

If karma could exist without being performed, there would be demerit without commission; pure conduct would not have been broken, yet the fault of impurity would still be incurred.

This would destroy every convention of worldly language; committing wrong and cultivating merit would have no difference.

If karma were determinate and possessed intrinsic nature in itself, after one had undergone its fruition, one should undergo it once again.

If all worldly karma arises from afflictions and these afflictions are unreal, where could reality be found in karma?

XXIV. Commentary: The Many Faults Entailed by Karma with Determinate Intrinsic Nature

In the ultimate meaning, karmas do not arise. Why? Because they have no intrinsic nature. Because they do not arise, they also do not cease—not because they are permanent and therefore do not cease.

Otherwise, karma’s substance would have to be determinately existent. If karma determinately possessed intrinsic nature, it would be permanent. If permanent, it would be karma not performed. Why? Because a permanent dharma cannot be performed.

Further, if karma could exist without being performed, another person could commit a wrong and this person undergo its fruition. Again, another person could break pure conduct and this person incur the offense. This would destroy worldly convention.

If everything existed beforehand, then in winter one should not plan for spring, nor in spring should one plan for summer. Many such faults follow.

Further, there would be no difference between cultivating merit and committing wrong. Giving rise to such karmas as generosity and keeping precepts is called cultivating merit; giving rise to such karmas as killing and stealing is called committing wrong. If karma exists without being performed, no distinction remains.

Further, if this karma determinately possessed intrinsic nature, after undergoing fruition once, one should undergo it again.

Therefore, your claim that karmic fruition exists because of the dharma of nonloss entails these many faults.

Further, if karma arises from afflictions, these afflictions have no determinate intrinsic nature and exist only through conceptual recollection and discrimination. If afflictions are unreal, how could karma be real? Why? Because the cause has no intrinsic nature, karma too has no intrinsic nature.

XXV. Question: The Body of Fruition Plainly Exists Now

The questioner says: If afflictions and karma lack intrinsic nature and are unreal, still the body of fruition plainly exists now. It therefore should be real.

XXVI. Verse: Afflictions and Karmas Are Empty—How Much More the Bodies?

The respondent says:

Afflictions and karmas are said to be the causes and conditions of the body. Afflictions and karmas themselves are empty—how much more the bodies formed from them?

XXVII. Commentary: Craving Moistens Birth; Karma Produces Higher, Middle, and Lower Fruitions

The worthy sages say that afflictions and karma are the causes and conditions of the body. Within these, craving moistens and enables birth, while karma produces higher, middle, and lower, attractive and ugly, noble and base, and other such fruitions.

Now afflictions and karma, when sought in many ways, have no determinate intrinsic nature. How much less could bodies have determinate fruit? They exist according to causes and conditions.

XXVIII. Question: The Sūtras Speak of One Who Originates Karma

The questioner says: Although you have refuted karma and fruition through various causes and conditions, the sūtras say that one who originates karma exists. Because one who originates karma exists, karma and fruition exist. As it is said:

Obscured by ignorance and bound by the fetter of craving, the present undergoer is neither identical with nor different from the original agent.

The Beginningless Sūtra says that sentient beings, covered by ignorance and bound by the fetter of craving, come and go through beginningless saṃsāra and undergo various sufferings and pleasures.

The one who now undergoes fruition is neither identical with nor different from the one who acted before.

If identical, a person who committed wrong and received the form of a cow would entail that the person did not become the cow and the cow did not become the person. If different, karma and fruition would be lost and fall into causelessness; causelessness is annihilation.

Therefore, the one who now undergoes fruition is neither identical with nor different from the one who acted before.

XXIX. Verse: With Neither Karma nor Agent, Where Could There Be One Who Undergoes the Fruit?

The respondent says:

Karma does not arise from conditions, nor does it arise from nonconditions. Therefore, no one exists who can originate karma.

With neither karma nor agent, how could there be fruit arising from karma? If there is no fruit, how could there be one who undergoes the fruit?

XXX. Commentary: The Person Provisionally Named among the Five Aggregates

If neither karma nor the one who performs karma exists, how could fruition arise from karma? If fruition does not exist, how could there be one who undergoes fruition?

Karma is of three kinds. The person provisionally named among the five aggregates is the agent. When this karma produces a fruit in a good or bad destination, it is called fruition.

If even the one who originates karma does not exist, how much less karma, fruition, and one who undergoes fruition?

XXXI. Question: We Plainly See Sentient Beings Perform Karma and Undergo Fruition

The questioner says: Although you have refuted karma, fruition, and one who originates karma in many ways, we now plainly see sentient beings perform karma and undergo fruition. How is this to be explained?

XXXII. Verse: Like a Conjured Person Who Conjures Another Person

The respondent says:

It is like a person whom the World-Honored One conjures through supernormal power: this conjured person in turn conjures another person.

The first conjured person is called the agent. What the conjured person does is called karma.

Afflictions and karmas, agent and fruition, are all like illusion and dream, like a mirage and an echo.

XXXIII. Commentary: A Conjured Person Teaches Dharma and Gives Alms

It is like the conjured person produced by the Buddha’s supernormal power; this conjured person in turn conjures another person. Like a conjured person, it has no real affair and can merely be seen. Moreover, the conjured person uses verbal karma to teach the Dharma and bodily karma to give alms and so forth. Although these karmas are unreal, they can be seen.

In this way, the body in saṃsāra, the agent, and karma should also be understood.

What are called afflictions are the three poisons; distinguished further, there are ninety-eight tendencies, nine fetters, ten enwrapments, six stains, and immeasurable other afflictions.

What is called karma is bodily, verbal, and mental karma. Distinguished according to this and later lives, there are wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; painful fruition, pleasant fruition, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant fruition; karma with fruition in the present life, karma with fruition in the next life, and karma with fruition in a later life—immeasurable kinds such as these.

What is called the agent is the one who can give rise to afflictions and karmas and can undergo fruition.

What is called fruition is the indeterminate five aggregates produced from wholesome and unwholesome karma.

All these various karmas are empty and without intrinsic nature, like illusion, dream, mirage, and echo.

義疏Exposition

前面一路破下來,破去、破來、破生、破滅、破作者。讀到這裡,總有一個人要站出來說話——而且他要說的,是全論最難擋的一句。

他說:別的都可以商量,業不行。 「業決定有,能令一切眾生受果報。」他的理由不是玄理,是經:「一切眾生皆隨業而生」——作惡的墮地獄,修福的生天,行道的得涅槃。這三件事若不成立,佛法整條路就塌了。所以他下結論:「是故一切法不應空。」

要看清這一問的分量:他不是在維護一個抽象的實有,他是在維護因果。若空義的代價是罪福無別,那麼這個空義不要也罷。本品之所以一再立、一再破,正因為答的一方也認這件事重。

他先把善說在前頭

問方開口舉的例,不是惡業,是善業。

「人能降伏心,利益於眾生,是名為慈善,二世果報種。」

青目把這一頌解得很實在:人有三毒,因為要惱害別人才生起種種行;修善的人「先自滅惡」,所以說降伏其心、利益他人。而利益他人的內容,也不是空話——「行布施、持戒、忍辱等,不惱眾生」。

留意這裡的次第:先降伏自己的心,才談得上利益別人。惱他之行根在三毒,三毒不先滅,所謂利他多半只是另一種惱他。這一句安在最前面,等於替全品定了一個底:以下無論怎麼破,這一件事不動。

業是什麼:思,與從思生的

問方接著要立業的體,分兩層。第一層是總說:「大聖說二業,思與從思生」。第二層落實:「佛所說思者,所謂意業是」,「所從思生者,即是身口業」。

為什麼是思?青目答得極準:思是心數法,在諸心數法中「能發起、有所作,故名業」。造作要有一個發動處,那就是思。他又補一句要緊的:其餘心心數法也能有所作,但「思為所作本」——所以單挑思出來叫業。

業的根不在手,也不在口,在那個一動的念。

七法:造作的那一刻,與造作以後

問方再把業相分成七件:「身業及口業,作與無作業,如是四事中,亦善亦不善」,加上「從用生福德,罪生亦如是」的兩件,「及思為七法,能了諸業相」。

最值得停的是作與無作。青目的定義是:「作時名作業,作已常隨逐生,名無作業。」

正在做時是作業;做完了,那件事並沒有隨手散掉,它還「常隨逐」著。這是問方立論的骨——只有隨逐,才接得到後世的果。善與不善的分判,青目說得也乾淨:「不善名不止惡,善名止惡。」

再看從用而生的兩件。施主布施,若受者受用了,得二福:「一從施生;二從用生。」反過來,人以箭射人而箭殺了人,就有二罪:「一者從射生;二者從殺生。」而「若射不殺,射者但得射罪,無殺罪」。

這一對譬喻是問方最有力的一著:一件業的重量,不只在造作的當下,也在它落到別人身上所起的作用。所以他說:業有今世、後世果報,決定有業、有果報,「諸法不應空」。

兩難:住到受報是常,滅了又生不出果

〔T30 0022a05〕答的一方沒有繞路,直接下一個兩難:

「業住至受報,是業即為常;  若滅即無業,云何生果報?」

你要業能受報,業就得在那裡等到果報現前;等得住,它就是常。可是青目說:「業是生滅相,一念尚不住,何況至果報!」

那走另一頭:業滅了。滅了就是沒有,沒有的東西,「云何能生果報」?

業要接得上果,就得住;一住就成常。業不常,就得滅;一滅就接不上果。兩頭都堵死了。這一問不是文字遊戲——它問的是:你所立的那個「業」,究竟是個什麼東西,能既生滅又能跨時?

第一救:如芽相續

問方的第一救,是拿種子出來:

「如芽等相續,皆從種子生,  從是而生果,離種無相續。」

青目說得很順:從穀有芽,從芽有莖葉,一路相續,末後結果;離種無此一串,所以「先種後有果,不斷亦不常」。搬到心上:初心起罪福猶如穀種,因這一念心,其餘心心數法相續而生,直到果報——「先業後有果,不斷亦不常」。

這一救很漂亮:它不要業自己住到受報,它讓業交棒。前一環滅了,後一環已接上,所以不斷;沒有哪一環常住,所以不常。

問方順勢把善業的果也列出:「能成福德者,是十白業道」——不殺、不盜、不邪婬、不妄語、不兩舌、不惡口、不無益語、不嫉、不恚、不邪見;果是今世名利、後世天人貴處。他還說布施恭敬種種福德,略說都攝在十善道中。

破芽喻:譬喻不是證明

答方只回一頌:「若如汝分別,其過則甚多,是故汝所說,於義則不然。」

青目替他分兩路說。

第一路是譬喻本身不對等。「穀子有觸有形,可見有相續」——穀種摸得著、看得見,它的相續是眼前可驗的事。可是青目說,就算是這樣看得見的穀種,「我思惟是事,尚未受此言」,何況心與業,「無觸無形不可見」,又生滅不住,卻要拿相續來說明。

一個看得見的相續,尚且不足以證明有一個貫串其中的東西,何況拿它去比看不見的。譬喻只能助解,不能代替成立。

第二路是就穀種本身逼問:「為滅已相續?為不滅相續?」

若「穀子滅已相續者,則為無因」——前一環既然滅盡,後一環從哪裡出來?若不滅而相續,那這顆穀子就永遠在那裡生,「一穀子則生一切世間穀」。

這一逼問跟前面那個兩難是同一副骨架:滅了就無因,不滅就成常——把業換成種子,兩難照樣長在裡面。

第二救:不失法如券

問方再來,說法更精細,而且先掛上保證:「今當復更說,順業果報義,諸佛辟支佛,賢聖所稱歎。」

其說是:「不失法如券,業如負財物」。

這是極巧的設計:業造完就滅,這一點他讓步;可是造業的同時另生一個東西,叫不失法。青目解得明白:「不失法者當知如券,業者如取物。」——物早已花掉,券還在,債就還在。所以「以是不失法,諸業有果報」。

他把這張券的規格也交代得很細:「此性則無記,分別有四種」——通欲界繫、色界繫、無色界繫與不繫;在善、不善、無記中,它只是無記。又說「見諦所不斷,但思惟所斷」;若說它是見諦所斷的,而業卻延到相似位次,「則得破業等,如是之過咎」。再說「一界初受身,爾時報獨生」,二種業現世受報,「或言受報已,而業猶故在」,理由是「以不念念滅故」。至於它幾時滅——「若度果已滅,若死已而滅」,須陀洹等度果已滅,凡夫與阿羅漢死已而滅;其中還要分別有漏無漏。

這一套已經很像一部完整的機制。但答方只回一句:

「是義俱不離斷常過,是故亦不應受。」

因為券本身也逃不掉那個兩難:它若「不念念滅」而住到給果,它就是常;它若也念念滅,那與業同病,一樣接不上。問方把常挪到券上,常沒有被破,只是換了個名字寄放。救義若只是把難處搬家,難處就還在。

問方到這裡被逼出了真話:「若爾者,則無業果報。」

正義:雖空亦不斷,雖有亦不常

全品的樞紐,就在這一頌:

「雖空亦不斷,雖有亦不常,  業果報不失,是名佛所說。」

答方的路不是在斷與常之間找折衷,而是不從那裡入手。青目的解釋要一句一句讀。

先說何以不斷:「業畢竟空、寂滅相、自性離,有何法可斷、何法可失?」

斷是斷一個有;失是失一個有。業若本來就沒有一個自性可得,就沒有一個東西擺在那裡等著被斷、被失。斷見之所以成立,是先默認了有。空義釜底抽薪處在此——不是說『有過而現在斷了』,是說從來不曾立過那個自性有。

再說何以不常:「顛倒因緣故,往來生死亦不常。」為什麼?「若法從顛倒起則是虛妄無實,無實故非常。」

生死往來不是沒有,是有;但它是從顛倒因緣起的。凡從顛倒起的,就是虛妄無實;無實,自然談不上常。不常的理由不是『它會壞』,是『它本來就不實』。

那麼「業果報不失」是在什麼位置上說的?青目答:「貪著顛倒不知實相故,言業不失。」——不失之說,是就未見實相的眾生分上如實而說,不是另立一個不壞的業體。而說這話的人是佛:「此是佛所說。」

諸業本不生:定性業會鬧出哪些怪事

答方把話說到底:

「諸業本不生,以無定性故;  〔T30 0023a01〕諸業亦不滅,以其不生故。」

青目點出這是就哪一層說:「第一義中諸業不生。」為什麼不生?無性故。而不滅的理由要看仔細——「以不生因緣故則不滅,非以常故不滅」。不滅不是因為它常住,是因為它根本沒有生過。沒有生過的東西,談不上滅;這與問方那個『住而不滅』是完全兩件事。

然後是反面:業若真有自性,會怎麼樣?答方列了五件怪事。

一是常而不可作:「若業有性者,是則名為常,不作亦名業,常則不可作。」青目補:「常法不可作故。」自性有的東西不待造作而已然,那修行造作就成了多餘。

二是他作我受:「若有不作業,不作而有罪」——青目說得直白,「則他人作罪此人受報」。

三是梵行無據:「不斷於梵行,而有不淨過」——「又他人斷梵行而此人有罪,則破世俗法」。

四是世間語言全亂:「是則破一切,世間語言法」。青目舉例:若一切先已存在,那麼「冬不應思為春事,春不應思為夏事」。人為來日打算,正因為事還沒有;若事已先在,籌畫就無從說起。自性有一旦成立,時間就死了。

五是罪福無別:「作罪及作福,亦無有差別」——布施持戒名為作福,殺盜名為作罪;若不作而業已有,這分別就沒有了。

再加一件:「若言業決定,而自有性者,受於果報已,而應更復受。」受過了還得再受,永無了時。青目回頭把賬算到問方頭上:「是故汝說以不失法故有業報,則有如是等過。」

最後一著往上一層追:「若諸世間業,從於煩惱生,是煩惱非實,業當何有實?」青目說煩惱「無有決定,但從憶想分別有」,於是斷語:「因無性故業亦無性。」

那麼現在這個身呢?

問方換一個角度:煩惱與業就算不實,果報之身現在明明擺在這裡。答方只把因果的次序提出來:「諸煩惱及業,是說身因緣;煩惱諸業空,何況於諸身。」

青目把這個因說得很具體:諸賢聖說煩惱與業是身的因緣,其中「愛能潤生」,業則生上中下、好醜貴賤等果報。既然這兩個因種種推求都「無有決定」,那麼由它們所成的身,哪裡會有決定的果?——「隨因緣故」。

能生的既無自性,所生的更無自性。摸得到一個身,並不證明有一個自性的身,只證明因緣還在。

那作者呢?

問方最後的據點是人,他引經:「無明之所蔽,愛結之所縛,而於本作者,不即亦不異。」青目說這是《無始經》所說:眾生為無明所覆、愛結所縛,於無始生死中往來受苦樂。

而『不即不異』四字,是問方自己已經想過的兩難:「若即是,人作罪受牛形,則人不作牛、牛不作人」——若今受者就是先作者,那人受了牛身,人與牛混成一個。「若異則失業果報,墮於無因,無因則斷滅」——若全然是兩個,業果就斷線了。所以他取中間:不即也不異。

答方沒有在『即與異』上與他糾纏,而是把地基抽掉:

「業不從緣生,不從非緣生,  是故則無有,能起於業者。  無業無作者,何有業生果?  若其無有果,何有受果者?」

一串連鎖:業無自性生,故無自性的起業者;無業無作者,即無自性的果;無果,即無自性的受果者。青目同時保住世俗一面:「五陰中假名人是作者」——作者是假名安立的,業於善惡處生名為果報。既然起業者尚不可得,「何況有業、有果報及受果報者」。

『不即不異』之所以成立,正因為兩邊都不是自性的東西。問方以為要先有一個實在的作者才談得上不即不異;答方指出:那個作者一實在,不即不異反而立不住。

化人更作化人

問方退到最後一步,也是最誠實的一步——「今現見眾生作業受果報。是事云何?」

答方以全品的收束回他:

「如世尊神通,所作變化人,  如是變化人,復變作化人。  如初變化人,是名為作者,  變化人所作,是則名為業。」

佛以神通變出一個化人,這化人又變出一個化人:前者是作者,後者所作就是業。

青目把關節說得很清楚:化人「無有實事但可眼見」;而且化人還會用口業說法、用身業布施——「是業雖無實而可眼見」。

這正是回答「現見」的地方。看得見,並不等於有自性;沒有自性,也不妨礙看得見。問方把「現見」當成實有的證據,這譬喻把兩者分開了:眼前的造作與受報一件也不必否認,只是底下並沒有一個不動的東西撐著。

而「復變作化人」這一層尤其要緊——作者本身也是被變出來的。業無自性,作者也無自性;不是空的業掛在實的人身上。所以青目說:「如是生死身作者及業,亦應如是知。」

末後青目把四樣一一開列:煩惱是三毒,分別有九十八使、九結、十纏、六垢等無量;業是身口意業,分今世後世、善不善無記、苦樂不苦不樂報、現報生報後報等無量;作者是能起煩惱業、能受果報者;果報是從善惡業所生的無記五陰。開得這樣細,然後一句收盡——「皆空無性」。

而頌給的四個譬喻是:「皆如幻與夢,如炎亦如嚮。」四樣有一個共同處:都真的現前,都真的沒有一個自體。回聲確實響了,山裡並沒有一個聲音的本體;業確實造了,相續裡也沒有一個業的自體。

讀這一品的人可以帶走什麼

一是破與存要並著讀。答方確有破斥的一路,話說得很盡:「無業無作者,何有業生果?」「若起業者尚無,何況有業、有果報及受果報者?」自性的業、自性的作者、自性的果報,逐項推去不留。而本品同時不失另一路:「業果報不失,是名佛所說」,「是業雖無實而可眼見」。所撤的是加在業上的決定自性,所存的是不失法與世諦所說的因果——兩路缺一,讀法都會偏。

二是看住那個一動的念。「思為所作本」。手與口的業,是那一念已經動過之後的事。

三是不必替因果找一個保管人。券也好,相續也好,都是要找個東西替自己保管所造的業。「業畢竟空、寂滅相、自性離,有何法可斷、何法可失?」——本來不曾有可失之物,也就不必立一個保管的。

四是現見不是實有的證據。「是業雖無實而可眼見」——看得見的事,照樣可以是無自性的。

承衍:吉藏之鏡

以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論,只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。

吉藏《中觀論疏》判本品為七章,說各章中皆有前立、次破,合為七立七破,末章則破現所見之事。他又說本品所對治者有二:一是邪見外道如六師等言無黑業、無黑業報,白業亦然;二是方廣一流言一切皆空、無有罪福。所以他標本品之宗為:雖畢竟空,而善惡之業宛然不失。至於末後化人之喻,他以真俗二諦分判——幻化人非真人,是就真諦說;又非無幻化人,顯非無之義,非真人顯非有之義:合起來是明俗諦六道宛然而常四絕,四絕宛然而六道不失。

這面鏡把本品接進了三論一系破邪顯正與二諦判釋的架構;其判釋是吉藏所增,不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判,各還其位。

The preceding chapters have refuted going, coming, arising, ceasing, and the agent. By this point someone is bound to stand up and speak—and what he says is the hardest sentence in the entire treatise to withstand.

He says: everything else can be discussed, but not karma. “Karma determinately exists and can make every sentient being undergo its fruition.” His reason is not metaphysical theory but scripture: “All sentient beings are born according to karma”—those who commit evil fall into the hells, those who cultivate merit are born in the heavens, and those who practice the path attain nirvāṇa. If these three fail, the entire Buddhist path collapses. He therefore concludes: “All dharmas should not be empty.”

We must see the weight of this question. He is not defending an abstract real existence; he is defending cause and fruit. If the price of emptiness is that demerit and merit become indistinguishable, then emptiness is not worth having. This chapter establishes and refutes again and again precisely because the respondent too recognizes what is at stake.

He Begins by Speaking of Goodness

The questioner’s first example is not evil karma but wholesome karma.

“A person can subdue the mind and benefit sentient beings; this is called loving goodness, the seed of fruition in two lives.”

Qingmu explains this verse very concretely. People have the three poisons and give rise to various activities because they wish to trouble others. One who cultivates goodness “first extinguishes one’s own evil,” and therefore subdues the mind and benefits others. Benefiting others is not empty rhetoric either: “practicing generosity, keeping precepts, patience, and the rest without troubling sentient beings.”

Notice the order here: only after subduing one’s own mind can one speak of benefiting others. Activities that trouble others are rooted in the three poisons. Unless those poisons are first extinguished, what is called benefiting others is most often merely another way of troubling them. Placed at the very beginning, this line establishes the chapter’s ground: no matter what is refuted below, this does not move.

What Is Karma? Volition and What Arises from Volition

The questioner next establishes karma’s substance in two levels. First the general statement: “The Great Sage taught two karmas: volition and what arises from volition.” Then the concrete statement: “The volition spoken of by the Buddha is mental karma,” and “what arises from volition is bodily and verbal karma.”

Why volition? Qingmu answers with precision: volition is an associated mental dharma and among such dharmas “can initiate and produce action, and therefore is called karma.” Action needs a point of initiation; that is volition. He adds an important sentence: other mind-dharmas and associated mental dharmas can also act, but “volition is the basis of what is done.” Volition alone is therefore singled out and called karma.

Karma’s root lies neither in the hand nor the mouth, but in the thought at the instant it moves.

Seven Dharmas: The Moment of Acting and What Follows the Act

The questioner further divides karma’s character into seven items: “Bodily karma and verbal karma, performed and nonperformed karma—among these four things some are wholesome and some unwholesome.” Add the two items “merit arising from use; demerit arising likewise,” and “together with volition these are seven dharmas that disclose the character of all karma.”

What most deserves a pause is performed and nonperformed karma. Qingmu defines them: “What is done while acting is called performed karma; what constantly follows and arises after the act is called nonperformed karma.”

While the deed is being done, it is performed karma. Once done, the event does not simply scatter; it “constantly follows.” This is the skeleton of the questioner’s thesis: only by following can it connect with fruition in a later life. Qingmu also draws the wholesome-unwholesome line cleanly: “Unwholesome means not stopping evil; wholesome means stopping evil.”

Now consider the two that arise from use. A donor gives; if the recipient uses the gift, the donor obtains two merits: “one arising from giving, the second arising from use.” Conversely, if someone shoots another with an arrow and the arrow kills, there are two demerits: “one arising from shooting, the second arising from killing.” Yet “if it strikes but does not kill, the archer obtains only the demerit of shooting and not the demerit of killing.”

This pair of analogies is the questioner’s most forceful move: a karma’s weight lies not only in the moment it is performed but also in the effect it has upon another. Therefore he says that karma has fruition in this and later lives; karma and fruition determinately exist, so “dharmas should not be empty.”

The Dilemma: If It Remains until Fruition, It Is Permanent; If It Ceases, It Cannot Produce Fruit

〔T30 0022a05〕The respondent takes no detour and directly poses a dilemma:

“If karma remains until fruition is undergone, this karma becomes permanent; if it ceases, there is no karma—how could it produce fruition?”

For karma to yield fruition, it must wait there until fruition becomes present. If it can wait, it is permanent. But Qingmu says: “Karma bears the marks of arising and ceasing and cannot remain for even a single thought, much less until fruition!”

Take the other path: karma ceases. Cessation is absence. How could what is absent “produce fruition”?

For karma to connect with fruit, it must remain; once it remains, it becomes permanent. If karma is not permanent, it must cease; once it ceases, it cannot connect with fruit. Both paths are blocked. This is no word game. It asks: just what sort of thing is the “karma” you establish, that it can both arise and cease and yet cross time?

First Rescue: Continuity Like a Sprout

The questioner’s first rescue brings out the seed:

“A continuum such as sprout and the rest all arises from a seed; from this continuum fruit is produced, and apart from the seed there is no continuum.”

Qingmu explains smoothly: from grain comes sprout, from sprout stalk and leaves, and through this continuum fruit finally appears. Apart from the seed there is no such succession; thus “the seed comes first and fruit afterward, neither annihilated nor permanent.” Move this to mind: the initial thought gives rise to demerit or merit like a grain seed; because of this thought, the remaining mind-dharmas and associated mental dharmas arise in continuity until fruition—“karma comes first and fruit afterward, neither annihilated nor permanent.”

It is an elegant rescue. Karma itself need not remain until fruition; it hands on the baton. Each former link ceases after the later has connected, so there is no annihilation; no link permanently abides, so there is no permanence.

The questioner then lists the fruit of wholesome karma: “What accomplishes merit is the ten white paths of karma”—not killing, not stealing, no sexual misconduct, no false speech, no divisive speech, no harsh speech, no useless speech, no jealousy, no anger, and no wrong view. Their fruit is reputation and benefit in this life and honored stations among humans and devas in later lives. He says that the many merits of generosity and respect are, in brief, all contained within the ten wholesome paths.

Refuting the Sprout Analogy: An Analogy Is Not Proof

The respondent gives only one verse: “If one analyzes as you do, the faults are extremely numerous. Therefore, what you say cannot be established in principle.”

Qingmu explains it through two paths.

The first is that the terms of the analogy are unequal. “A grain can be touched, has form, and its continuum can be seen.” Grain can be touched and seen; its continuum can be tested before one’s eyes. Yet Qingmu says that even with visible grain, “after considering this, I still do not accept the account.” How much less mind and karma, “intangible, formless, and invisible,” which arise and cease without remaining, when continuity is used to explain them.

Even a visible continuum is insufficient to prove that one thing runs through it; how much less when it is used to analogize what cannot be seen. An analogy can aid understanding but cannot substitute for establishment.

The second path presses the grain itself: “Does the continuum occur after cessation, or without cessation?”

If “the continuum occurs after the grain has ceased, it becomes causeless”—once the former link has wholly ceased, where does the later arise? If it continues without cessation, this grain remains there producing forever, so “one grain seed would produce every grain in the world.”

This pressure has the same skeleton as the earlier dilemma: after cessation it is causeless; without cessation it becomes permanent. Replace karma with a seed, and the dilemma remains inside it.

Second Rescue: The Dharma of Nonloss Is Like a Bond

The questioner tries again with a more refined doctrine, first hanging up a warrant: “Another doctrine congruent with karma and fruition should now be explained, one praised by the Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas, and worthy sages.”

The doctrine is: “The dharma of nonloss is like a bond, and karma like property taken on debt.”

This is an ingenious design. He concedes that karma ceases once performed. Yet as the karma is performed, it gives rise to another thing called the dharma of nonloss. Qingmu explains it clearly: “The dharma of nonloss should be understood as like a bond, and karma like taking property.” The property has long been spent, but the bond remains, and therefore the debt remains. Thus “because this dharma of nonloss exists, all karmas have fruition.”

He gives this bond a detailed specification. “Its nature is indeterminate, and analysis distinguishes four kinds”: bound to the desire realm, form realm, or formless realm, and unbound. Among wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate, it is only indeterminate. It is “not severed by seeing the truths but only by cultivation.” If it were severed by seeing the truths while karma extended to a similar stage, “faults such as the destruction of karma would follow.” Further, “when one first receives a body in a realm, fruition independently arises then”; two kinds of karma undergo fruition in the present life, and “some say that after fruition has been undergone, karma remains as before,” because “it does not cease thought by thought.” When does it cease? “Either after passing beyond a fruit-stage or after death”: stream-enterers and the rest after passing beyond a fruit-stage, ordinary persons and arhats after death. Outflowing and nonoutflowing must also be distinguished within it.

This now resembles a complete mechanism. But the respondent gives one sentence:

“On both sides, this doctrine does not escape the faults of annihilation and permanence; therefore it too should not be accepted.”

The bond itself cannot escape the same dilemma. If it “does not cease thought by thought” and remains until it yields fruit, it is permanent. If it too ceases thought by thought, it shares karma’s illness and likewise cannot connect. The questioner has moved permanence onto the bond; permanence has not been refuted, only deposited under another name. If a rescue merely relocates the difficulty, the difficulty remains.

Here the questioner is forced to say what he really means: “If so, then there is no karma and no fruition.”

Right Meaning: Though Empty, Not Annihilated; Though Existent, Not Permanent

The pivot of the entire chapter is this verse:

“Though empty, it is not annihilated; though existent, it is not permanent; karma and fruition are not lost—this is what the Buddha taught.”

The respondent does not seek a compromise between annihilation and permanence; he does not enter from there. Qingmu’s explanation must be read sentence by sentence.

First, why not annihilated? “Karma is ultimately empty, bears the character of quiescent extinction, and is separate from intrinsic nature. What dharma is there to annihilate? What dharma is there to lose?”

Annihilation means annihilating something existent; loss means losing something existent. If karma has no intrinsic nature obtainable from the beginning, there is no thing placed there waiting to be annihilated or lost. Annihilationist view is established only by first tacitly admitting existence. Here emptiness cuts at the root. It does not say, “It existed and has now been annihilated”; it says that this existence by intrinsic nature was never established.

Next, why not permanent? “Because of inverted causes and conditions, there is coming and going in saṃsāra; this too is not permanent.” Why? “If a dharma arises from inversion, it is false and unreal. Because unreal, it is not permanent.”

Coming and going in saṃsāra is not nonexistent; it exists. But it arises from inverted causes and conditions. Whatever arises from inversion is false and unreal; being unreal, it cannot be permanent. The reason it is not permanent is not that it will break, but that it was never real.

At what level, then, is it said that “karma and fruition are not lost”? Qingmu answers: “Because one greedily clings to inversion and does not know true character, it is said that karma is not lost.” Nonloss is spoken truthfully with reference to sentient beings who have not seen true character; it does not establish another imperishable karmic substance. The one who says this is the Buddha: “This is what the Buddha taught.”

Karmas Originally Do Not Arise: What Strange Consequences Follow from Determinate Karma?

The respondent presses the point to its end:

“Karmas originally do not arise because they have no determinate intrinsic nature; 〔T30 0023a01〕nor do karmas cease, because they do not arise.”

Qingmu identifies the level: “In the ultimate meaning, karmas do not arise.” Why do they not arise? Because they have no intrinsic nature. The reason for noncessation must be seen carefully: “Because they do not arise, they do not cease—not because they are permanent and therefore do not cease.” They are not unceasing because they permanently abide, but because they never arose. What never arose cannot be said to cease. This is wholly different from the questioner’s “remaining and not ceasing.”

Now the reverse: what happens if karma truly has intrinsic nature? The respondent lists five strange consequences.

First, it is permanent and cannot be performed: “If karma had intrinsic nature, it would be called permanent. What is not performed would still be called karma, while the permanent cannot be performed.” Qingmu adds: “because a permanent dharma cannot be performed.” What intrinsically exists is already so without awaiting performance, and cultivation becomes superfluous.

Second, another acts and I undergo: “If karma could exist without being performed, there would be demerit without commission.” Qingmu states it directly: “another person commits the wrong and this person undergoes its fruition.”

Third, pure conduct loses its basis: “Pure conduct would not have been broken, yet the fault of impurity would still be incurred”—“another person breaks pure conduct and this person incurs the offense, destroying worldly convention.”

Fourth, all worldly language is thrown into disorder: “This would destroy every convention of worldly language.” Qingmu gives an example. If everything already existed beforehand, “in winter one should not plan for spring, nor in spring plan for summer.” People plan for what is to come precisely because it does not yet exist. If it existed beforehand, planning could not be spoken of. Once intrinsic existence is established, time dies.

Fifth, demerit and merit become indistinguishable: “Committing wrong and cultivating merit would have no difference.” Generosity and keeping precepts are called cultivating merit; killing and stealing are called committing wrong. If karma exists without being performed, no distinction remains.

Add one more: “If karma were determinate and possessed intrinsic nature, after undergoing fruition one should undergo it once again.” After it has been undergone, it must be undergone forever. Qingmu charges the account back to the questioner: “Therefore, your claim that karmic fruition exists because of the dharma of nonloss entails these many faults.”

The final move traces one level higher: “If worldly karma arises from afflictions and these afflictions are unreal, how could karma be real?” Qingmu says afflictions “have no determinate existence and exist only through conceptual recollection and discrimination,” and concludes: “Because the cause has no intrinsic nature, karma too has no intrinsic nature.”

What about This Present Body?

The questioner changes angles. Even if afflictions and karma are unreal, the body of fruition plainly stands here. The respondent merely brings out the causal order: “Afflictions and karmas are said to be the causes and conditions of the body. Afflictions and karmas are empty—how much more the bodies?”

Qingmu makes the causes concrete. Worthy sages say afflictions and karma are causes and conditions for the body: “craving moistens birth,” while karma produces higher, middle, and lower, attractive and ugly, noble and base fruitions. Since these two causes, when sought in many ways, “have no determinate existence,” how could the body formed from them have determinate fruit? It exists “according to causes and conditions.”

Since what produces has no intrinsic nature, what is produced has still less intrinsic nature. Touching a body does not prove a body with intrinsic nature; it proves only that causes and conditions remain.

What about the Agent?

The questioner’s final ground is the person. He cites scripture: “Obscured by ignorance and bound by the fetter of craving, the present undergoer is neither identical with nor different from the original agent.” Qingmu says this is taught in the Beginningless Sūtra: sentient beings covered by ignorance and bound by craving’s fetter come and go through beginningless saṃsāra and undergo suffering and pleasure.

The four words “neither identical nor different” show that the questioner has already considered the dilemma. “If identical, a person who commits wrong and receives the form of a cow would mean that the person did not become the cow and the cow did not become the person.” If the present undergoer simply is the prior agent, then when a human receives a cow’s body, human and cow collapse into one. “If different, karma and fruition are lost and fall into causelessness; causelessness is annihilation.” If entirely two, the line of karma and fruit is broken. He therefore takes the middle: neither identical nor different.

The respondent does not entangle himself in identity and difference but removes their ground:

“Karma does not arise from conditions, nor from nonconditions; therefore there is no one who can originate karma. With neither karma nor agent, how could there be fruit arising from karma? If there is no fruit, how could there be one who undergoes fruit?”

A chain follows: karma does not arise with intrinsic nature, therefore there is no intrinsically existent originator of karma; without karma or agent, there is no intrinsically existent fruit; without fruit, there is no intrinsically existent undergoer. Qingmu simultaneously preserves the conventional side: “The person provisionally named among the five aggregates is the agent.” The agent is provisionally established, while karma producing fruit in good or bad destinations is called fruition. Since even an originator of karma cannot be obtained, “how much less karma, fruition, and one who undergoes fruition?”

“Neither identical nor different” is established precisely because neither side is a thing with intrinsic nature. The questioner assumes that an actual agent must first exist before one can speak of neither identity nor difference. The respondent shows that once the agent is made real, neither identity nor difference can stand.

A Conjured Person Conjures Another Person

The questioner retreats to the final and most honest step: “We now plainly see sentient beings perform karma and undergo fruition. How is this to be explained?”

The respondent answers with the chapter’s conclusion:

“It is like a person whom the World-Honored One conjures through supernormal power; this conjured person in turn conjures another person. The first conjured person is called the agent; what the conjured person does is called karma.”

Through supernormal power, the Buddha conjures a person who then conjures another person. The former is the agent; what the latter does is karma.

Qingmu makes the pivot very clear. A conjured person “has no real affair and can merely be seen.” Yet the conjured person also uses verbal karma to teach Dharma and bodily karma to give alms: “Although this karma is unreal, it can be seen.”

This directly answers “plainly see.” Visibility does not equal intrinsic nature; lacking intrinsic nature does not prevent visibility. The questioner takes “plainly seen” as evidence of real existence. The analogy separates them. Not one act or fruition before the eyes must be denied; beneath it, however, no unmoving thing provides support.

The layer in which the conjured person “in turn conjures another” is especially important. The agent itself is also conjured. Karma has no intrinsic nature, and the agent has no intrinsic nature; empty karma does not hang upon a real person. Thus Qingmu says: “In this way, the body in saṃsāra, the agent, and karma should also be understood.”

At the end Qingmu lists four things one by one. Afflictions are the three poisons, further divided into ninety-eight tendencies, nine fetters, ten enwrapments, six stains, and immeasurably many more. Karma is bodily, verbal, and mental karma, divided into this and later lives; wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; painful, pleasant, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant fruition; present-life, next-life, and later-life fruition, and immeasurably more. Agent means one who can give rise to afflictions and karma and undergo fruition. Fruition means the indeterminate five aggregates born from wholesome and unwholesome karma. After opening them out so finely, one sentence gathers all: “all are empty and without intrinsic nature.”

The verse gives four analogies: “All are like illusion and dream, like a mirage and an echo.” They share one point: each truly appears, and each truly lacks an intrinsic body. The echo truly sounds, but no body of sound resides in the mountain. Karma is truly performed, but no intrinsic body of karma resides in the continuum.

What a Reader Can Carry Away from This Chapter

First, refutation and preservation must be read together. The respondent undeniably has a line of refutation and speaks without reserve: “With neither karma nor agent, how could there be fruit arising from karma?” “If even the one who originates karma does not exist, how much less karma, fruition, and one who undergoes fruition?” Karma, agent, and fruition with intrinsic nature are each examined away without remainder. Yet the chapter also preserves another line: “Karma and fruition are not lost—this is what the Buddha taught,” and “Although this karma is unreal, it can be seen.” What is removed is the determinate intrinsic nature added to karma; what is preserved is the causality spoken at the level of conventional truth. Omit either line and the reading tilts.

Second, watch the thought at the instant it moves. “Volition is the basis of what is done.” The karma of hand and mouth comes after that thought has already moved.

Third, there is no need to find a custodian for cause and fruit. Bond or continuum, each seeks something to keep custody of the karma one has performed. “Karma is ultimately empty, bears the character of quiescent extinction, and is separate from intrinsic nature. What dharma is there to annihilate, what dharma to lose?” Since there was never a thing that could be lost, no custodian need be established.

Fourth, what is plainly seen is not evidence of real existence. “Although this karma is unreal, it can be seen.” What can be seen may still lack intrinsic nature.

Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror

What precedes is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows is illuminated from the perspective of the Sui-Tang Three Treatise lineage—a mirror is not the treatise, but another way of reading the same group of verses.

Jizang’s Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle divides this chapter into seven sections, saying that each first establishes and then refutes, for seven establishments and seven refutations; the final section refutes what is plainly seen. He further says the chapter addresses two targets. First are wrong-view non-Buddhists such as the six teachers, who say there is no black karma and no black karmic fruition, and likewise no white karma. Second are proponents of a “vast emptiness” who say everything is empty and there is neither demerit nor merit. He therefore states the chapter’s thesis: though ultimately empty, wholesome and unwholesome karma plainly are not lost. As for the concluding analogy of the conjured person, he distinguishes the two truths. That the illusory person is not a real person is spoken from ultimate truth. Yet there is not no illusory person, revealing the meaning of not nonexistent; not being a real person reveals the meaning of not existent. Together, this clarifies that conventionally the six destinies are plain while the four alternatives are always cut off, and while the four alternatives are cut off, the six destinies plainly are not lost.

This mirror connects the chapter to the Three Treatise framework of refuting error, revealing rightness, and distinguishing the two truths. Its articulation is Jizang’s addition, not the words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s extended commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.

考據Apparatus

一、校勘

本品以《大正新脩大藏經》T30n1564〔0021b21–0023c14〕為底本;正文依底本分立問方、龍樹頌與青目釋。思與從思生、七業、相續、不失法及幻化喻均守各自聲部。 本品二十則異讀如下;原典層仍取【大】底本,異讀只並錄:〔0021b27〕【大】「為」/【宋】【元】【明】無字;〔0021c18〕【大】「無」/【宋】【元】【明】「不」;〔0021c23〕【大】「殺」/【宋】【元】【明】「殺一」;〔0022a07〕【大】「業」/【宋】【元】【明】「常」;〔0022a27〕【大】「德」/【宋】【元】【明】「業」;〔0022c07〕【大】「記」/【宋】【元】【明】「記無記」;〔0022c10〕【大】「而」/【宋】【元】【明】「者」;〔0022c21〕【大】「亦」/【宋】【元】【明】「而」;〔0023a02〕【大】「則」/【宋】【元】【明】「即」;〔0023a10〕【大】「生」/【宋】【元】【明】「出」;〔0023a22〕【大】「有」/【宋】【元】【明】無字;〔0023b02–0023b03〕【大】「潤生」/【宋】【元】【明】「生著」;〔0023b03〕【大】「生」/【宋】【元】【明】「作」;〔0023b09〕第一則【大】「即」/【宋】【元】【明】「異」;〔0023b09〕第二則【大】「異」/【宋】【元】【明】「一」;〔0023b14〕【大】「無因,無因則」/【宋】【元】【明】無字;〔0023b15〕【大】「今」/【宋】【元】【明】無字;〔0023c03〕【大】「嚮」/【宋】【元】【明】「響」;〔0023c07〕【大】「諸」/【宋】【元】【明】無字;〔0023c14〕【大】「炎如嚮」/【宋】【元】【明】「響如焰」。

二、異釋對勘

清辨系 T30n1566 有同品可作不失法、無生與幻化異釋見證;安慧系 T30n1567 漢譯止於第十三品,本品標闕,不作推補。

問方以眾生隨業受地獄、天與涅槃等報,主張業決定有並反對一切法空。 T30n1564青目釋〔0021b21–0021b24〕:「問曰:汝雖種種破諸法,而業決定有,能令一切眾生受果報。如經說,一切眾生皆隨業而生,惡者入地獄、修福者生天、行道者得涅槃,是故一切法不應空。所謂業者:」

問頌以降伏自心、利益眾生為慈善,並說它是今後二世樂果的種子。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0021b25–0021b26〕:「人能降伏心,利益於眾生,是名為慈善,二世果報種。」

青目以自滅三毒惡及布施、持戒、忍辱等不惱眾生,解釋慈善與二世樂果種。 T30n1564青目釋〔0021b27–0021c02〕:「人有三毒,為惱他故生行。善者先自滅惡,是故說降伏其心利益他人。利益他者,行布施、持戒、忍辱等,不惱眾生,是名利益他,亦名慈善福德,亦名今世後世樂果種子。復次:」

問頌引大聖略說思與從思生二業,並說業的別相可作多種分別。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0021c03–0021c04〕:「大聖說二業,思與從思生,是業別相中,種種分別說。」

青目說思與從思生是大聖略說的二業,詳細分類見阿毘曇。 T30n1564青目釋〔0021c05–0021c06〕:「大聖略說業有二種:一者思、二者從思生,是二業如阿毘曇中廣說。」

問頌以思為意業,以從思生為身業與口業。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0021c07–0021c08〕:「佛所說思者,所謂意業是;所從思生者,即是身口業。」

青目以思在心數中能發起造作、又是外身口業之本,解釋思何以名業。 T30n1564青目釋〔0021c09–0021c12〕:「思是心數法,諸心數法中能發起、有所作,故名業。因是思故起外身口業。雖因餘心心數法有所作,但思為所作本,故說思為業。是業今當說相。」

問頌以身作、身無作、口作、口無作為內四,從用所生二業為外二,連同思為第七,說此七法能了諸業相。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0021c13–0021c16〕:「身業及口業,作與無作業,如是四事中,亦善亦不善。從用生福德,罪生亦如是,及思為七法,能了諸業相。」

青目依偈次第解釋身口內四、從用外二及思第七:作時名作、作已隨逐名無作,並以施用與箭殺說明從用所生的外二業。 T30n1564青目釋〔0021c17–0022a05〕:「口業者,四種口業。身業者,三種身業。是七種業有二種差別,有作、有無作。作時名作業,作已常隨逐生,名無作業。是二種有善、不善。不善名不止惡,善名止惡。復有從用生福德,如施主施受者,若受者受用,施主得二種福:一從施生;二從用生。如人以箭射人,若箭殺人,有二種罪:一者從射生;二者從殺生。若射不殺,射者但得射罪,無殺罪。是故偈中說罪福從用生,如是名為六種業。第七名思,是七種即是分別業相。是業有今世、後世果報,是故決定有業、有果報故,諸法不應空。」

龍樹說業若住至受報便成常,若滅則已無業,不能再生果報。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0022a06–0022a07〕:「業住至受報,是業即為常;若滅即無業,云何生果報?」

青目說業有生滅相而一念不住,不能常住至受報;若滅則無,也不能由已滅業生果。 T30n1564青目釋〔0022a08–0022a10〕:「業若住至受果報,即為是常。是事不然。何以故?業是生滅相,一念尚不住,何況至果報!若謂業滅,滅則無,云何能生果報?」

問頌以種芽果與初心後心兩重相續說先因後果,主張業果不斷亦不常。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0022a11–0022a18〕:「如芽等相續,皆從種子生,從是而生果,離種無相續。從種有相續,從相續有果,先種後有果,不斷亦不常。如是從初心,心法相續生,從是而有果,離心無相續。從心有相續,從相續有果,先業後有果,不斷亦不常。」

青目以穀種、芽莖葉、果與初心後續心法解釋業果相續,並說離業有果即墮斷常。 T30n1564青目釋〔0022a19–0022a26〕:「如從穀有芽,從芽有莖葉等相續,從是相續而有果生。離種無相續生,是故從穀子有相續,從相續有果。先種後有果,故不斷亦不常。如穀種喻,業果亦如是。初心起罪福,猶如穀種。因是心,餘心心數法相續生,乃至果報。先業後果故,不斷亦不常。若離業有果報,則有斷常。是善業因緣果報者,所謂:」

問頌以十白業道為福德因,說它能招今後二世五欲樂報。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0022a27–0022a28〕:「能成福德者,是十白業道,二世五欲樂,即是白業報。」

青目列不殺等十白業道,並說其今世名利、後世天人貴處等報,布施恭敬亦略攝其中。 T30n1564青目釋〔0022a29–0022b05〕:「白名善淨。成福德因緣者,從是十白業道生,不殺、不盜、不邪婬、不妄語、不兩舌、不惡口、不無益語、不嫉、不恚、不邪見,是名為善。從身口意生是果報者,得今世名利,後世天人中貴處生。布施恭敬等雖有種種福德,略說則攝在十善道中。」

龍樹總斥問方的種子相續分別過失甚多,於義不然。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0022b06–0022b07〕:「若如汝分別,其過則甚多,是故汝所說,於義則不然。」

青目說種子有形可見尚未足證相續,心業無形且生滅不住更不能;種滅後相續墮無因,不滅則一種常生一切穀。 T30n1564青目釋〔0022b08–0022b18〕:「若以業果報相續故,以穀子為喻者,其過甚多,但此中不廣說。汝說穀子喻者,是喻不然。何以故?穀子有觸有形,可見有相續。我思惟是事,尚未受此言,況心及業,無觸無形不可見。生滅不住欲以相續,是事不然。復次從穀子有芽等相續者,為滅已相續?為不滅相續?若穀子滅已相續者,則為無因。若穀子不滅而相續者,從是穀子常生諸穀。若如是者,一穀子則生一切世間穀。是事不然,是故業果報相續則不然。」

問頌宣稱將另說順業果報、為諸佛辟支佛與賢聖所稱歎的不失法義。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0022b19–0022b20〕:「今當復更說,順業果報義,諸佛辟支佛,賢聖所稱歎。」

問頌以不失法如券、業如負財物領起,說其性無記、分為四種、見諦所不斷而但思惟所斷,並列受報與滅失諸門。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0022b22–0022c04〕:「不失法如券,業如負財物,此性則無記,分別有四種。見諦所不斷,但思惟所斷,以是不失法,諸業有果報。若見諦所斷,而業至相似,則得破業等,如是之過咎。一切諸行業,相似不相似,一界初受身,爾時報獨生。如是二種業,現世受果報,或言受報已,而業猶故在。若度果已滅,若死已而滅,於是中分別,有漏及無漏。」

青目解釋不失法如券,通三界與不繫而自性無記,見諦不斷、思惟所斷,並依界、重業、度果或命終分配果報與滅位。 T30n1564青目釋〔0022c05–0022c18〕:「不失法者當知如券,業者如取物。是不失法,欲界繫、色界繫、無色界繫亦不繫。若分別善、不善、無記中,但是無記。是無記義,阿毘曇中廣說。見諦所不斷,從一果至一果,於中思惟所斷。是以諸業,以不失法故果生。若見諦所斷而業至相似,則得破業過。是事阿毘曇中廣說。復次不失法者,於一界諸業相似不相似,初受身時果報獨生,於現在身從業更生業。是業有二種,隨重而受報。或有言,是業受報已業猶在,以不念念滅故。若度果已滅、若死已而滅者,須陀洹等度果已而滅,諸凡夫及阿羅漢死已而滅。於此中分別有漏及無漏者,從須陀洹等諸賢聖,有漏、無漏等應分別。」

青目代答方總結不失法義仍俱不離斷常過,所以不應接受。 T30n1564青目釋〔0022c18–0022c19〕:「答曰:是義俱不離斷常過,是故亦不應受。」

問方以不失法既破便應無業果報,提出斷滅反難。 T30n1564青目釋〔0022c19–0022c20〕:「問曰:若爾者,則無業果報。」

龍樹說業雖空而不斷、雖有而不常,業果報不失才是佛所說。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0022c21–0022c22〕:「雖空亦不斷,雖有亦不常,業果報不失,是名佛所說。」

青目以業畢竟空、自性離故無可斷失,又以業從顛倒因緣起而虛妄非常,解釋佛說業不失。 T30n1564青目釋〔0022c23–0022c28〕:「此論所說義離於斷常。何以故?業畢竟空、寂滅相、自性離,有何法可斷、何法可失?顛倒因緣故,往來生死亦不常。何以故?若法從顛倒起則是虛妄無實,無實故非常。復次貪著顛倒不知實相故,言業不失。此是佛所說。復次:」

龍樹說業因無定性而本不生、因不生而不滅;若業有性便常而不可作,遂有未作得罪、梵行污染、罪福無別、重複受報及煩惱不實而業無實等過。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0022c29–0023a11〕:「諸業本不生,以無定性故;諸業亦不滅,以其不生故。若業有性者,是則名為常,不作亦名業,常則不可作。若有不作業,不作而有罪,不斷於梵行,而有不淨過。是則破一切,世間語言法,作罪及作福,亦無有差別。若言業決定,而自有性者,受於果報已,而應更復受。若諸世間業,從於煩惱生,是煩惱非實,業當何有實?」

青目解釋業無性故不生、不生故不滅而非以常不滅;定性業會造成他作我受、梵行染污、冬春造作失序、罪福無別與反覆受報。 T30n1564青目釋〔0023a12–0023a27〕:「第一義中諸業不生。何以故?無性故。以不生因緣故則不滅,非以常故不滅。若不爾者,業性應決定有。若業決定有性則為是常,若常則是不作業。何以故?常法不可作故。復次若有不作業者,則他人作罪此人受報,又他人斷梵行而此人有罪,則破世俗法。若先有者,冬不應思為春事,春不應思為夏事。有如是等過。復次作福及作罪者則無有別異,起布施持戒等業名為作福,起殺盜等業名為作罪。若不作而有業,則無有分別。復次是業若決定有性,則一時受果報已復應更受。是故汝說以不失法故有業報,則有如是等過。復次若業從煩惱起,是煩惱無有決定,但從憶想分別有。若諸煩惱無實,業云何有實?何以故?因無性故業亦無性。」

問方以煩惱與業若不實而現有果報身,主張果身應是真實。 T30n1564青目釋〔0023a27–0023a28〕:「問曰:若諸煩惱及業無性不實,今果報身現有,應是實。」

龍樹說煩惱與業被說為身因緣,二因尚空,果報諸身更無自性可得。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0023a29–0023b01〕:「諸煩惱及業,是說身因緣;煩惱諸業空,何況於諸身。」

青目說愛能潤生、業生上中下與好醜貴賤等報;煩惱業推求無決定,諸身更只隨因緣而無定果。 T30n1564青目釋〔0023b02–0023b05〕:「諸賢聖說煩惱及業是身因緣,是中愛能潤生,業能生上中下好醜貴賤等果報。今諸煩惱及業,種種推求無有決定,何況諸身有決定果?隨因緣故。」

問方以經說有起業者,主張作者既有便有業與果報。 T30n1564青目釋〔0023b05–0023b07〕:「問曰:汝雖種種因緣破業及果報,而經說,有起業者。起業者有故,有業有果報。如說:」

問頌說眾生被無明覆、愛結縛,今受者與本作者不即亦不異。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0023b08–0023b09〕:「無明之所蔽,愛結之所縛,而於本作者,不即亦不異。」

青目以人作罪受牛形說先作者與今受者若即則人牛混同,若異則失業果而墮無因斷滅。 T30n1564青目釋〔0023b10–0023b15〕:「《無始經》中說,眾生為無明所覆、愛結所縛,於無始生死中往來,受種種苦樂。今受者於先作者,不即是、亦不異。若即是,人作罪受牛形,則人不作牛、牛不作人。若異則失業果報,墮於無因,無因則斷滅。是故今受者於先作者,不即是、亦不異。」

龍樹說業不從緣或非緣自性生,故無自性能起業者;無業無作者,果與受果者也不能自性成立。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0023b16–0023b19〕:「業不從緣生,不從非緣生,是故則無有,能起於業者。無業無作者,何有業生果?若其無有果,何有受果者?」

青目說五陰中假名人是作者,業於善惡處生而名果報;起業者尚無自性,業果與受者更無自性。 T30n1564青目釋〔0023b20–0023b24〕:「若無業、無作業者,何有從業生果報?若無果報,云何有受果報者?業有三種:五陰中假名人是作者,是業於善惡處生,名為果報。若起業者尚無,何況有業、有果報及受果報者?」

問方以現見眾生作業受報,追問人法皆空如何與眼前造作受報相容。 T30n1564青目釋〔0023b24–0023b26〕:「問曰:汝雖種種破業、果報及起業者,而今現見眾生作業受果報。是事云何?」

龍樹以佛化人復作化人說作者與業,並說煩惱、業、作者、果報皆如幻夢、陽焰與回響。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0023b27–0023c03〕:「如世尊神通,所作變化人,如是變化人,復變作化人。如初變化人,是名為作者,變化人所作,是則名為業。諸煩惱及業,作者及果報,皆如幻與夢,如炎亦如嚮。」

青目說化人雖無實而可見其說法布施,生死身、煩惱、三業、作者與諸類果報也皆空無性而如幻夢炎響。 T30n1564青目釋〔0023c04–0023c14〕:「如佛神通力所作化人,是化人復化作化人。如化人,無有實事但可眼見,又化人口業說法、身業布施等,是業雖無實而可眼見。如是生死身作者及業,亦應如是知。諸煩惱者,名為三毒,分別有九十八使、九結、十纏、六垢等無量諸煩惱。業名為身、口、意業。今世、後世分別有善、不善、無記,苦報、樂報、不苦不樂報,現報業、生報業、後報業,如是等無量。作者名為能起諸煩惱業、能受果報者。果報名從善惡業生無記五陰,如是等諸業皆空無性,如幻如夢、如炎如嚮。」

《般若燈論釋》以券喻不失法保存已壞業至給果後自壞,見證對方保存機制仍須受住滅檢驗。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0100c26–0101a02〕:「釋曰:此謂不失法在,如債主有券主,雖與財而不散失,至於後時子本俱得。業亦如是,能得後果,業雖已壞,由有不失法在,能令行人得勝果報。亦如債主既得財已,於負債人前毀其本券。如是如是,不失法能與造業者果已,其體亦壞。」

《般若燈論釋》說其宗中業無生,種子相續在第一義亦無生,故所立譬喻無體。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0101c07–0101c08〕:「釋曰:我宗中業無有生。如是種子相續者,第一義中亦無有生。是故汝所立譬喻無體」

《般若燈論釋》說業等從因緣和合生、如幻無實而可見,故世諦中有而非第一義。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0103a22–0103a23〕:「釋曰:此謂業等從因緣和合生,如幻化無實但可眼見,是世諦中有,非第一義。」

三、諸家異釋(吉藏專疏)

吉藏說本品各章皆有先立後破,合為七立七破,末章破現所見事。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0117a11–0117a12〕:「第七破現所見事。一一章中皆有前立、次破,故有七立七破。」

吉藏說雖畢竟空而善惡業宛然不失,遮止一切皆空便無罪福的讀法。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0116c01–0116c04〕:「品者,為邪見外道如六師等言:無有黑業、無黑業報,白業亦爾。次方廣之流亦言:一切皆空,無有罪福。是故今明雖畢竟空,而善惡之業宛然不失。」

吉藏以幻化人非無而非真人分真俗,說六道宛然而四句常絕。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0123a23–0123a25〕:「幻化人非真人,謂真諦也。又非無幻化人顯非無義,非真人顯非有義,都是明俗諦幻六道宛然而常四絕,四絕宛然而六道不失也。」

四、名相

思是造作心數,從思生指由思發起的身口業;作與無作、從用生罪福是問方業相分類;不失法是如券保存業果的救義;不斷不常不另立第三體;如幻保存可見作用而遮自性。

五、科判

依現行原典聲部立三十七項 root:慈善與七業九項、業住滅及種子相續八項、不失法五項、無性業與果身七項、作者受者五項、幻化收束三項。

六、關中舊學·譯史

本品署龍樹造、青目釋、鳩摩羅什譯;清辨系有同品可作 witness。安慧系現存漢譯止於第十三品,本品據實標闕,不以他品補位。

七、唯識軸互讀(空有)

業分類、不失法與作者果報不以後代唯識或有部體系回寫;清辨系與吉藏只在異釋、承衍層照明,不改羅什本聲部。

八、系內餘論互讀

本品由業體、相續與不失法的救義,推至作者、受者及現見業果,再以如幻收束;本目不另借下一品義理回寫本品。

九、校本定位

用途書證與範圍
根本論頌與青目釋T30n1564〔0021b21–0023c14〕
清辨系異釋T30n1566〔0099a06–0104a15〕
安慧系異釋T30n1567 漢譯止於第十三品,本品無傳
吉藏逐文疏T42n1824 同品

Textual Collation

The base text is T30n1564〔0021b21–0023c14〕in the Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka. Following the base text, this edition distinguishes the questioner, Nāgārjuna’s verses, and Qingmu’s commentary. Volition and what arises from volition, the seven karmas, continuity, the dharma of nonloss, and the analogy of conjuration are each kept within their own voices. The chapter has the following twenty variant readings; the source layer retains the Taishō base, while variants are recorded alongside it only: at〔0021b27〕Taishō reads 「為」 tr. “for,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions omit it; at〔0021c18〕Taishō reads 「無」 tr. “non-,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「不」 tr. “not”; at〔0021c23〕Taishō reads 「殺」 tr. “killing,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「殺一」 tr. “killing, one”; at〔0022a07〕Taishō reads 「業」 tr. “karma,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「常」 tr. “permanent”; at〔0022a27〕Taishō reads 「德」 tr. “merit,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「業」 tr. “karma”; at〔0022c07〕Taishō reads 「記」 tr. “determinate,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「記無記」 tr. “determinate and indeterminate”; at〔0022c10〕Taishō reads 「而」 tr. “while,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「者」 tr. “that which”; at〔0022c21〕Taishō reads 「亦」 tr. “also,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「而」 tr. “yet”; at〔0023a02〕Taishō reads 「則」 tr. “then,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「即」 tr. “precisely”; at〔0023a10〕Taishō reads 「生」 tr. “arise,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「出」 tr. “issue”; at〔0023a22〕Taishō reads 「有」 tr. “exist,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions omit it; at〔0023b02–0023b03〕Taishō reads 「潤生」 tr. “moistens birth,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「生著」 tr. “produces attachment”; at〔0023b03〕Taishō reads 「生」 tr. “produce,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「作」 tr. “make”; at the first occurrence in〔0023b09〕Taishō reads 「即」 tr. “identical,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「異」 tr. “different”; at the second occurrence in〔0023b09〕Taishō reads 「異」 tr. “different,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「一」 tr. “one”; at〔0023b14〕Taishō reads 「無因,無因則」 tr. “causeless; causelessness then,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions omit it; at〔0023b15〕Taishō reads 「今」 tr. “now,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions omit it; at〔0023c03〕Taishō reads 「嚮」 tr. “echo,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「響」 tr. “resonance”; at〔0023c07〕Taishō reads 「諸」 tr. “the various,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions omit it; at〔0023c14〕Taishō reads 「炎如嚮」 tr. “mirage and echo,” while the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions read 「響如焰」 tr. “resonance and flame.”

Comparative Readings

The Bhāviveka-line T30n1566 preserves the corresponding chapter as witness for variant interpretations of the dharma of nonloss, nonarising, and conjuration. The extant Chinese translation of the Sthiramati-line T30n1567 ends with Chapter Thirteen; this chapter is marked absent and is not speculatively supplied.

Because sentient beings undergo such fruitions as hell, heaven, and nirvāṇa according to karma, the questioner maintains that karma determinately exists and rejects the emptiness of all dharmas. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0021b21–0021b24〕reads: 「問曰:汝雖種種破諸法,而業決定有,能令一切眾生受果報。如經說,一切眾生皆隨業而生,惡者入地獄、修福者生天、行道者得涅槃,是故一切法不應空。所謂業者:」 tr. “Question: Although you have refuted dharmas in many ways, karma determinately exists and can make every sentient being undergo its fruition. As the sūtra says, all sentient beings are born according to karma: those who commit evil enter the hells, those who cultivate merit are born in the heavens, and those who practice the path attain nirvāṇa. Therefore all dharmas should not be empty. What is called karma is as follows.”

The questioner’s verse takes subduing one’s own mind and benefiting sentient beings as loving goodness and calls this the seed of pleasant fruition in this and later lives. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0021b25–0021b26〕reads: 「人能降伏心,利益於眾生,是名為慈善,二世果報種。」 tr. “A person can subdue the mind and benefit sentient beings; this is called loving goodness, the seed of fruition in two lives.”

Qingmu explains loving goodness and the seed of pleasant fruition in two lives through extinguishing the evil of the three poisons in oneself and then practicing generosity, keeping precepts, patience, and the rest without troubling sentient beings. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0021b27–0021c02〕reads: 「人有三毒,為惱他故生行。善者先自滅惡,是故說降伏其心利益他人。利益他者,行布施、持戒、忍辱等,不惱眾生,是名利益他,亦名慈善福德,亦名今世後世樂果種子。復次:」 tr. “People possess the three poisons and give rise to activities in order to trouble others. Those who cultivate goodness first extinguish their own evil; therefore it is said that they subdue their minds and benefit others. Benefiting others means practicing generosity, keeping precepts, patience, and the rest without troubling sentient beings. This is called benefiting others; it is also called the merit of loving goodness and the seed of pleasant fruition in this and later lives. Further:”

The questioner’s verse cites the Great Sage’s brief teaching of the two karmas—volition and what arises from volition—and says karma’s particular characters admit many distinctions. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0021c03–0021c04〕reads: 「大聖說二業,思與從思生,是業別相中,種種分別說。」 tr. “The Great Sage taught two karmas: volition and what arises from volition. Within the particular characters of this karma, many kinds of analysis are taught.”

Qingmu says volition and what arises from volition are the two karmas briefly taught by the Great Sage; their detailed classification appears in the Abhidharma. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0021c05–0021c06〕reads: 「大聖略說業有二種:一者思、二者從思生,是二業如阿毘曇中廣說。」 tr. “The Great Sage briefly taught two kinds of karma: first volition, and second what arises from volition. These two karmas are extensively explained in the Abhidharma.”

The questioner’s verse identifies volition as mental karma and what arises from volition as bodily and verbal karma. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0021c07–0021c08〕reads: 「佛所說思者,所謂意業是;所從思生者,即是身口業。」 tr. “The volition spoken of by the Buddha is mental karma; what arises from volition is bodily and verbal karma.”

Qingmu explains why volition is called karma: among associated mental dharmas it can initiate action, and it is the basis of outward bodily and verbal karma. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0021c09–0021c12〕reads: 「思是心數法,諸心數法中能發起、有所作,故名業。因是思故起外身口業。雖因餘心心數法有所作,但思為所作本,故說思為業。是業今當說相。」 tr. “Volition is an associated mental dharma. Among associated mental dharmas, it can initiate and produce action, and therefore is called karma. Because of this volition, outward bodily and verbal karma arises. Although other mind-dharmas and associated mental dharmas can also produce action, volition is the basis of what is done; therefore volition is called karma. The character of this karma should now be explained.”

The questioner’s verse makes bodily performance, bodily nonperformance, verbal performance, and verbal nonperformance the inner four; demerit and merit arising from use the outer two; and volition the seventh, saying these seven disclose the character of all karma. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0021c13–0021c16〕reads: 「身業及口業,作與無作業,如是四事中,亦善亦不善。從用生福德,罪生亦如是,及思為七法,能了諸業相。」 tr. “Bodily karma and verbal karma, performed and nonperformed karma—among these four things some are wholesome and some unwholesome. Merit arises from use, and demerit likewise arises; together with volition these are seven dharmas that disclose the character of all karma.”

Following the verse’s sequence, Qingmu explains the inner four of body and speech, the outer two arising from use, and volition as the seventh. What is done during acting is called performed; what follows after acting is nonperformed. The two external karmas arising from use are illustrated by use of a gift and death by an arrow. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0021c17–0022a05〕reads: 「口業者,四種口業。身業者,三種身業。是七種業有二種差別,有作、有無作。作時名作業,作已常隨逐生,名無作業。是二種有善、不善。不善名不止惡,善名止惡。復有從用生福德,如施主施受者,若受者受用,施主得二種福:一從施生;二從用生。如人以箭射人,若箭殺人,有二種罪:一者從射生;二者從殺生。若射不殺,射者但得射罪,無殺罪。是故偈中說罪福從用生,如是名為六種業。第七名思,是七種即是分別業相。是業有今世、後世果報,是故決定有業、有果報故,諸法不應空。」 tr. “Verbal karma means the four kinds of verbal karma; bodily karma means the three kinds of bodily karma. These seven karmas have two distinctions: performed and nonperformed. What is done while acting is called performed karma; what constantly follows and arises after the act is called nonperformed karma. These two may be wholesome or unwholesome. Unwholesome means not stopping evil; wholesome means stopping evil. There is also merit arising from use. If a donor gives to a recipient and the recipient uses the gift, the donor gains two kinds of merit: one arising from giving, the second from use. If someone shoots another with an arrow and the arrow kills, there are two kinds of demerit: one arising from shooting, the second from killing. If the arrow strikes but does not kill, the archer obtains only the demerit of shooting and not the demerit of killing. Therefore the verse says demerit and merit arise from use. These together are called six kinds of karma. The seventh is volition. These seven constitute the analysis of karma’s character. This karma has fruition in this and later lives. Because karma and fruition determinately exist, dharmas therefore should not be empty.”

Nāgārjuna says karma becomes permanent if it remains until fruition is undergone; if it ceases, no karma remains that could produce fruition. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0022a06–0022a07〕reads: 「業住至受報,是業即為常;若滅即無業,云何生果報?」 tr. “If karma remains until fruition is undergone, this karma becomes permanent. If it ceases, there is no karma—how could it produce fruition?”

Qingmu says karma bears the marks of arising and ceasing and cannot remain for one thought, so cannot permanently abide until fruition; if it ceases, it is absent and an extinguished karma cannot produce fruit. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0022a08–0022a10〕reads: 「業若住至受果報,即為是常。是事不然。何以故?業是生滅相,一念尚不住,何況至果報!若謂業滅,滅則無,云何能生果報?」 tr. “If karma remains until fruition is undergone, it is permanent. This is not so. Why? Karma bears the marks of arising and ceasing and cannot remain for even one thought, much less until fruition. If one claims that karma ceases, cessation is absence; how could it produce fruition?”

Through two continuities—seed, sprout, and fruit, and initial thought followed by later thoughts—the questioner’s verse maintains that cause precedes fruit and that karma and fruit are neither annihilated nor permanent. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0022a11–0022a18〕reads: 「如芽等相續,皆從種子生,從是而生果,離種無相續。從種有相續,從相續有果,先種後有果,不斷亦不常。如是從初心,心法相續生,從是而有果,離心無相續。從心有相續,從相續有果,先業後有果,不斷亦不常。」 tr. “A continuum such as sprout and the rest all arises from a seed; from this fruit is produced, and apart from the seed there is no continuum. From the seed there is a continuum, and from the continuum there is fruit. Seed comes first and fruit afterward, neither annihilated nor permanent. In this way, mind-dharmas arise in continuity from the initial thought; from this there is fruit, and apart from mind there is no continuum. From mind there is a continuum, and from the continuum there is fruit. Karma comes first and fruit afterward, neither annihilated nor permanent.”

Qingmu uses grain seed, sprout, stalk, leaves, and fruit together with the initial thought and subsequent mind-dharmas to explain the continuity of karma and fruit, saying that fruit apart from karma would fall into annihilation and permanence. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0022a19–0022a26〕reads: 「如從穀有芽,從芽有莖葉等相續,從是相續而有果生。離種無相續生,是故從穀子有相續,從相續有果。先種後有果,故不斷亦不常。如穀種喻,業果亦如是。初心起罪福,猶如穀種。因是心,餘心心數法相續生,乃至果報。先業後果故,不斷亦不常。若離業有果報,則有斷常。是善業因緣果報者,所謂:」 tr. “As a sprout grows from grain, stalk, leaves, and the rest arise in continuity from the sprout, and fruit is produced from this continuum. Apart from the seed no continuum arises; therefore from the grain there is a continuum and from the continuum there is fruit. Because the seed comes first and fruit afterward, there is neither annihilation nor permanence. As in the grain-seed analogy, so too with karma and fruit. The initial thought giving rise to demerit or merit is like a grain seed. Because of this thought, the remaining mind-dharmas and associated mental dharmas arise in continuity up to fruition. Because karma comes first and fruit afterward, there is neither annihilation nor permanence. If fruition existed apart from karma, there would be annihilation and permanence. The causal fruition of wholesome karma is as follows.”

The questioner’s verse calls the ten white paths of karma the causes of merit and says they bring pleasant fruition through the five desires in this and later lives. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0022a27–0022a28〕reads: 「能成福德者,是十白業道,二世五欲樂,即是白業報。」 tr. “What accomplishes merit is the ten white paths of karma; the pleasures of the five desires in two lives are the fruition of white karma.”

Qingmu lists the ten white paths beginning with not killing and describes their fruition as reputation and benefit in this life and honored stations among humans and devas later; generosity and respect are briefly included within them. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0022a29–0022b05〕reads: 「白名善淨。成福德因緣者,從是十白業道生,不殺、不盜、不邪婬、不妄語、不兩舌、不惡口、不無益語、不嫉、不恚、不邪見,是名為善。從身口意生是果報者,得今世名利,後世天人中貴處生。布施恭敬等雖有種種福德,略說則攝在十善道中。」 tr. “White means wholesome and pure. The conditions accomplishing merit arise from these ten white paths of karma: not killing, not stealing, no sexual misconduct, no false speech, no divisive speech, no harsh speech, no useless speech, no jealousy, no anger, and no wrong view. These are called wholesome. The fruition arising from body, speech, and mind is reputation and benefit in this life and birth in honored stations among humans and devas in later lives. Although generosity, respect, and the rest include many merits, briefly stated they are contained within the ten wholesome paths.”

Nāgārjuna generally rejects the questioner’s analysis through seed continuity as carrying many faults and being untenable in meaning. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0022b06–0022b07〕reads: 「若如汝分別,其過則甚多,是故汝所說,於義則不然。」 tr. “If one analyzes as you do, the faults are extremely numerous. Therefore, what you say cannot be established in principle.”

Qingmu says that a visible, formed seed is still insufficient to prove continuity, so formless mind and karma, which arise and cease without remaining, can still less be so established. Continuity after the seed’s cessation is causeless; continuity without its cessation means one seed constantly produces every grain. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0022b08–0022b18〕reads: 「若以業果報相續故,以穀子為喻者,其過甚多,但此中不廣說。汝說穀子喻者,是喻不然。何以故?穀子有觸有形,可見有相續。我思惟是事,尚未受此言,況心及業,無觸無形不可見。生滅不住欲以相續,是事不然。復次從穀子有芽等相續者,為滅已相續?為不滅相續?若穀子滅已相續者,則為無因。若穀子不滅而相續者,從是穀子常生諸穀。若如是者,一穀子則生一切世間穀。是事不然,是故業果報相續則不然。」 tr. “If a grain is used as analogy because karma and fruition occur in continuity, the faults are extremely numerous and are not explained here in detail. Your grain analogy is not so. Why? A grain can be touched, has form, and its continuum can be seen. Even after considering this, I still do not accept the account—how much less mind and karma, intangible, formless, and invisible. To use continuity for what arises and ceases without remaining is not so. Further, does the continuum of sprout and the rest from a grain occur after cessation, or without cessation? If it occurs after the grain has ceased, it is causeless. If the grain continues without ceasing, this grain would constantly produce many grains. If so, one grain seed would produce every grain in the world. This is not so. Therefore, the continuity of karma and fruition is not so.”

The questioner’s verse announces another doctrine congruent with karma and fruition, the dharma of nonloss praised by Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas, and worthy sages. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0022b19–0022b20〕reads: 「今當復更說,順業果報義,諸佛辟支佛,賢聖所稱歎。」 tr. “Another doctrine congruent with karma and fruition should now be explained, one praised by the Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas, and worthy sages.”

The questioner’s verse introduces the dharma of nonloss as like a bond and karma as like property taken on debt. It says the former is indeterminate, distinguishes four kinds, identifies it as severed not by seeing the truths but only by cultivation, and lists the gates of fruition and cessation. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0022b22–0022c04〕reads: 「不失法如券,業如負財物,此性則無記,分別有四種。見諦所不斷,但思惟所斷,以是不失法,諸業有果報。若見諦所斷,而業至相似,則得破業等,如是之過咎。一切諸行業,相似不相似,一界初受身,爾時報獨生。如是二種業,現世受果報,或言受報已,而業猶故在。若度果已滅,若死已而滅,於是中分別,有漏及無漏。」 tr. “The dharma of nonloss is like a bond, and karma like property taken on debt. Its nature is indeterminate, and analysis distinguishes four kinds. It is not severed by seeing the truths but only by cultivation. Because of this dharma of nonloss, all karmas have fruition. If it were severed by seeing the truths while karma extended to a similar stage, faults such as the destruction of karma would follow. Among all karmas of conditioned activities, some are similar and some dissimilar. When one first receives a body in a realm, fruition arises independently at that time. These two kinds of karma undergo fruition in the present life. Some say that after fruition has been undergone, karma remains as before. It ceases either after passing beyond a fruit-stage or after death. Within this, outflowing and nonoutflowing are distinguished.”

Qingmu explains the dharma of nonloss as like a bond, extending through the three realms and the unbound while itself indeterminate. It is severed not by seeing the truths but by cultivation, and fruition and cessation are allocated by realm, weight of karma, passage beyond a fruit-stage, or death. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0022c05–0022c18〕reads: 「不失法者當知如券,業者如取物。是不失法,欲界繫、色界繫、無色界繫亦不繫。若分別善、不善、無記中,但是無記。是無記義,阿毘曇中廣說。見諦所不斷,從一果至一果,於中思惟所斷。是以諸業,以不失法故果生。若見諦所斷而業至相似,則得破業過。是事阿毘曇中廣說。復次不失法者,於一界諸業相似不相似,初受身時果報獨生,於現在身從業更生業。是業有二種,隨重而受報。或有言,是業受報已業猶在,以不念念滅故。若度果已滅、若死已而滅者,須陀洹等度果已而滅,諸凡夫及阿羅漢死已而滅。於此中分別有漏及無漏者,從須陀洹等諸賢聖,有漏、無漏等應分別。」 tr. “The dharma of nonloss should be understood as like a bond, while karma is like taking property. This dharma of nonloss may be bound to the desire realm, form realm, or formless realm, or it may be unbound. When distinguished among wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate, it is only indeterminate. This indeterminate meaning is extensively explained in the Abhidharma. It is not severed by seeing the truths. In passing from one fruit-stage to another, it is severed through cultivation. Thus, because of the dharma of nonloss, all karmas produce fruit. If it were severed by seeing the truths while karma extended to a similar stage, the fault of destroying karma would follow. This is extensively explained in the Abhidharma. Further, regarding the dharma of nonloss: within one realm, karmas are similar or dissimilar. When one first receives a body, fruition arises independently, and in the present body karma further produces karma. This karma is of two kinds and undergoes fruition according to its weight. Some say that after this karma undergoes fruition, it remains, because it does not cease thought by thought. As for ceasing after passing beyond a fruit-stage or after death: stream-enterers and the rest cease it after passing beyond a fruit-stage, while ordinary persons and arhats cease it after death. As for distinguishing outflowing and nonoutflowing within this: beginning with stream-enterers and the other worthy sages, outflowing, nonoutflowing, and the rest should be distinguished.”

Speaking for the respondent, Qingmu concludes that the doctrine of nonloss still does not escape the faults of annihilation and permanence and therefore should not be accepted. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0022c18–0022c19〕reads: 「答曰:是義俱不離斷常過,是故亦不應受。」 tr. “Answer: On both sides, this doctrine does not escape the faults of annihilation and permanence; therefore it too should not be accepted.”

Because the dharma of nonloss has been refuted, the questioner raises an annihilationist challenge: there should then be no karma or fruition. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0022c19–0022c20〕reads: 「問曰:若爾者,則無業果報。」 tr. “Question: If so, then there would be no karma and no fruition.”

Nāgārjuna says karma is not annihilated though empty and not permanent though existent; karma and fruition are not lost, and this is what the Buddha taught. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0022c21–0022c22〕reads: 「雖空亦不斷,雖有亦不常,業果報不失,是名佛所說。」 tr. “Though empty, it is not annihilated; though existent, it is not permanent. Karma and fruition are not lost—this is what the Buddha taught.”

Qingmu explains the Buddha’s teaching that karma is not lost by saying that karma is ultimately empty and separate from intrinsic nature, so there is nothing to annihilate or lose, while because karma arises from inverted causes and conditions it is false and not permanent. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0022c23–0022c28〕reads: 「此論所說義離於斷常。何以故?業畢竟空、寂滅相、自性離,有何法可斷、何法可失?顛倒因緣故,往來生死亦不常。何以故?若法從顛倒起則是虛妄無實,無實故非常。復次貪著顛倒不知實相故,言業不失。此是佛所說。復次:」 tr. “The meaning taught in this treatise is free from annihilation and permanence. Why? Karma is ultimately empty, bears the character of quiescent extinction, and is separate from intrinsic nature. What dharma is there to annihilate, what dharma to lose? Because of inverted causes and conditions, there is coming and going in saṃsāra; this too is not permanent. Why? If a dharma arises from inversion, it is false and unreal. Because unreal, it is not permanent. Further, because one greedily clings to inversion and does not know true character, it is said that karma is not lost. This is what the Buddha taught. Further:”

Nāgārjuna says karma originally does not arise because it lacks determinate intrinsic nature and does not cease because it does not arise. If it had intrinsic nature, it would be permanent and unperformed, entailing faults of demerit without commission, polluted pure conduct, no distinction between demerit and merit, repeated fruition, and unreal afflictions somehow producing real karma. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0022c29–0023a11〕reads: 「諸業本不生,以無定性故;諸業亦不滅,以其不生故。若業有性者,是則名為常,不作亦名業,常則不可作。若有不作業,不作而有罪,不斷於梵行,而有不淨過。是則破一切,世間語言法,作罪及作福,亦無有差別。若言業決定,而自有性者,受於果報已,而應更復受。若諸世間業,從於煩惱生,是煩惱非實,業當何有實?」 tr. “Karmas originally do not arise because they have no determinate intrinsic nature. Nor do karmas cease, because they do not arise. If karma had intrinsic nature, it would be called permanent. What is not performed would still be called karma, while the permanent cannot be performed. If karma could exist without being performed, there would be demerit without commission; pure conduct would not have been broken, yet the fault of impurity would still be incurred. This would destroy every convention of worldly language; committing wrong and cultivating merit would have no difference. If karma were determinate and possessed intrinsic nature in itself, after undergoing fruition one should undergo it once again. If worldly karma arises from afflictions and these afflictions are unreal, how could karma be real?”

Qingmu explains that because karma has no intrinsic nature it does not arise, and because it does not arise it does not cease—not because it is permanent. Karma with determinate nature would entail that another acts while I undergo, pure conduct is defiled, planning from winter to spring is disordered, demerit and merit do not differ, and fruition repeats. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0023a12–0023a27〕reads: 「第一義中諸業不生。何以故?無性故。以不生因緣故則不滅,非以常故不滅。若不爾者,業性應決定有。若業決定有性則為是常,若常則是不作業。何以故?常法不可作故。復次若有不作業者,則他人作罪此人受報,又他人斷梵行而此人有罪,則破世俗法。若先有者,冬不應思為春事,春不應思為夏事。有如是等過。復次作福及作罪者則無有別異,起布施持戒等業名為作福,起殺盜等業名為作罪。若不作而有業,則無有分別。復次是業若決定有性,則一時受果報已復應更受。是故汝說以不失法故有業報,則有如是等過。復次若業從煩惱起,是煩惱無有決定,但從憶想分別有。若諸煩惱無實,業云何有實?何以故?因無性故業亦無性。」 tr. “In the ultimate meaning, karmas do not arise. Why? Because they have no intrinsic nature. Because they do not arise, they do not cease—not because they are permanent and therefore do not cease. Otherwise, karma’s nature would have to be determinately existent. If karma determinately had intrinsic nature, it would be permanent. If permanent, it would be karma not performed. Why? Because a permanent dharma cannot be performed. Further, if karma could exist without being performed, another person would commit a wrong and this person undergo its fruition; another person would break pure conduct and this person incur the offense. This would destroy worldly convention. If everything existed beforehand, in winter one should not plan for spring, nor in spring plan for summer. Such faults follow. Further, there would be no difference between cultivating merit and committing wrong. Giving rise to karmas such as generosity and keeping precepts is called cultivating merit; giving rise to karmas such as killing and stealing is called committing wrong. If karma exists without being performed, no distinction remains. Further, if this karma determinately had intrinsic nature, after undergoing fruition once one should undergo it again. Therefore, your claim that karmic fruition exists because of the dharma of nonloss entails these many faults. Further, if karma arises from afflictions, these afflictions have no determinate existence and exist only through conceptual recollection and discrimination. If the afflictions are unreal, how could karma be real? Why? Because the cause has no intrinsic nature, karma too has no intrinsic nature.”

If afflictions and karma are unreal while a body of fruition is presently manifest, the questioner argues that this body should be real. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0023a27–0023a28〕reads: 「問曰:若諸煩惱及業無性不實,今果報身現有,應是實。」 tr. “Question: If afflictions and karma lack intrinsic nature and are unreal, still the body of fruition is presently manifest and should be real.”

Nāgārjuna says afflictions and karma are spoken of as causes and conditions for the body; if these two causes are empty, bodies of fruition still less possess intrinsic nature. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0023a29–0023b01〕reads: 「諸煩惱及業,是說身因緣;煩惱諸業空,何況於諸身。」 tr. “Afflictions and karmas are said to be the causes and conditions of the body. Afflictions and karmas are empty—how much more the bodies?”

Qingmu says craving moistens birth, while karma produces higher, middle, and lower, attractive and ugly, noble and base fruitions. Since afflictions and karma have no determinate intrinsic nature when sought, bodies still more merely follow causes and conditions without determinate fruit. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0023b02–0023b05〕reads: 「諸賢聖說煩惱及業是身因緣,是中愛能潤生,業能生上中下好醜貴賤等果報。今諸煩惱及業,種種推求無有決定,何況諸身有決定果?隨因緣故。」 tr. “The worthy sages say that afflictions and karma are the causes and conditions of the body. Within these, craving moistens birth, while karma produces higher, middle, and lower, attractive and ugly, noble and base fruitions. Now afflictions and karma, when sought in many ways, have no determinate existence. How much less could bodies have determinate fruit? They follow causes and conditions.”

Because the sūtras speak of one who originates karma, the questioner argues that the agent, karma, and fruition exist. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0023b05–0023b07〕reads: 「問曰:汝雖種種因緣破業及果報,而經說,有起業者。起業者有故,有業有果報。如說:」 tr. “Question: Although you have refuted karma and fruition through various causes and conditions, the sūtras say that one who originates karma exists. Because one who originates karma exists, karma and fruition exist. As it is said:”

The questioner’s verse says sentient beings are obscured by ignorance and bound by craving’s fetter, while the present undergoer is neither identical with nor different from the original agent. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0023b08–0023b09〕reads: 「無明之所蔽,愛結之所縛,而於本作者,不即亦不異。」 tr. “Obscured by ignorance and bound by the fetter of craving, the present undergoer is neither identical with nor different from the original agent.”

Using a human who commits wrong and receives the form of a cow, Qingmu says that if prior agent and present undergoer are identical, human and cow collapse together; if different, karma and fruition are lost and fall into causeless annihilation. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0023b10–0023b15〕reads: 「《無始經》中說,眾生為無明所覆、愛結所縛,於無始生死中往來,受種種苦樂。今受者於先作者,不即是、亦不異。若即是,人作罪受牛形,則人不作牛、牛不作人。若異則失業果報,墮於無因,無因則斷滅。是故今受者於先作者,不即是、亦不異。」 tr. “The Beginningless Sūtra says that sentient beings, covered by ignorance and bound by craving’s fetter, come and go through beginningless saṃsāra and undergo various sufferings and pleasures. The one who now undergoes fruition is neither identical with nor different from the one who acted before. If identical, a person who committed wrong and received a cow’s form would mean that the person did not become the cow and the cow did not become the person. If different, karma and fruition would be lost and fall into causelessness; causelessness is annihilation. Therefore, the one who now undergoes fruition is neither identical with nor different from the one who acted before.”

Nāgārjuna says karma does not arise with intrinsic nature from conditions or nonconditions, and hence no intrinsic originator of karma exists. Without karma or agent, fruit and one who undergoes fruit likewise cannot be intrinsically established. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0023b16–0023b19〕reads: 「業不從緣生,不從非緣生,是故則無有,能起於業者。無業無作者,何有業生果?若其無有果,何有受果者?」 tr. “Karma does not arise from conditions, nor from nonconditions. Therefore, no one exists who can originate karma. With neither karma nor agent, how could there be fruit arising from karma? If there is no fruit, how could there be one who undergoes the fruit?”

Qingmu says the person provisionally named among the five aggregates is the agent, while karma produces fruit in good and bad destinations and is called fruition. Since the originator of karma lacks intrinsic nature, karma, fruit, and undergoer still more lack intrinsic nature. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0023b20–0023b24〕reads: 「若無業、無作業者,何有從業生果報?若無果報,云何有受果報者?業有三種:五陰中假名人是作者,是業於善惡處生,名為果報。若起業者尚無,何況有業、有果報及受果報者?」 tr. “If there is neither karma nor one who performs karma, how could fruition arise from karma? If fruition does not exist, how could there be one who undergoes fruition? Karma is of three kinds. The person provisionally named among the five aggregates is the agent. When this karma produces a fruit in a good or bad destination, it is called fruition. If even the one who originates karma does not exist, how much less karma, fruition, and one who undergoes fruition?”

The questioner points to presently seeing sentient beings perform karma and undergo fruition, asking how the emptiness of person and dharmas accords with visible action and fruition. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0023b24–0023b26〕reads: 「問曰:汝雖種種破業、果報及起業者,而今現見眾生作業受果報。是事云何?」 tr. “Question: Although you have refuted karma, fruition, and one who originates karma in many ways, we now plainly see sentient beings perform karma and undergo fruition. How is this to be explained?”

Nāgārjuna explains agent and karma through a person conjured by the Buddha who then conjures another person, and says afflictions, karma, agent, and fruition are like illusion, dream, mirage, and echo. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0023b27–0023c03〕reads: 「如世尊神通,所作變化人,如是變化人,復變作化人。如初變化人,是名為作者,變化人所作,是則名為業。諸煩惱及業,作者及果報,皆如幻與夢,如炎亦如嚮。」 tr. “It is like a person whom the World-Honored One conjures through supernormal power; this conjured person in turn conjures another person. The first conjured person is called the agent; what the conjured person does is called karma. Afflictions and karmas, agent and fruition, are all like illusion and dream, like a mirage and an echo.”

Qingmu says that although a conjured person is unreal, one can see it teach Dharma and give alms. The body in saṃsāra, afflictions, the three karmas, agent, and all classes of fruition are likewise empty of intrinsic nature, like illusion, dream, mirage, and echo. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0023c04–0023c14〕reads: 「如佛神通力所作化人,是化人復化作化人。如化人,無有實事但可眼見,又化人口業說法、身業布施等,是業雖無實而可眼見。如是生死身作者及業,亦應如是知。諸煩惱者,名為三毒,分別有九十八使、九結、十纏、六垢等無量諸煩惱。業名為身、口、意業。今世、後世分別有善、不善、無記,苦報、樂報、不苦不樂報,現報業、生報業、後報業,如是等無量。作者名為能起諸煩惱業、能受果報者。果報名從善惡業生無記五陰,如是等諸業皆空無性,如幻如夢、如炎如嚮。」 tr. “It is like a conjured person produced by the Buddha’s supernormal power; this conjured person in turn conjures another person. Like a conjured person, it has no real affair and can merely be seen. Moreover, the conjured person uses verbal karma to teach Dharma and bodily karma to give alms and so forth. Although this karma is unreal, it can be seen. In this way, the body in saṃsāra, the agent, and karma should also be understood. What are called afflictions are the three poisons, further distinguished into ninety-eight tendencies, nine fetters, ten enwrapments, six stains, and immeasurable afflictions. Karma means bodily, verbal, and mental karma. Distinguished according to this and later lives, there are wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; painful, pleasant, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant fruition; present-life, next-life, and later-life fruition—immeasurable kinds such as these. The agent means one who can give rise to afflictions and karma and undergo fruition. Fruition means the indeterminate five aggregates produced from wholesome and unwholesome karma. All these karmas are empty and without intrinsic nature, like illusion, dream, mirage, and echo.”

The Prajñā Lamp Treatise Commentary uses the bond analogy: the dharma of nonloss preserves karma already destroyed until it yields fruit and then itself is destroyed. This witnesses that the opponent’s mechanism of preservation still must undergo examination through remaining and ceasing. T30n1566 Prajñā Lamp Treatise Commentary〔0100c26–0101a02〕reads: 「釋曰:此謂不失法在,如債主有券主,雖與財而不散失,至於後時子本俱得。業亦如是,能得後果,業雖已壞,由有不失法在,能令行人得勝果報。亦如債主既得財已,於負債人前毀其本券。如是如是,不失法能與造業者果已,其體亦壞。」 tr. “Commentary: This means that the dharma of nonloss remains, as a creditor holds a bond. Although wealth has been given, it is not dispersed or lost; later, principal and interest are both obtained. Karma is likewise capable of obtaining later fruit. Although karma has already been destroyed, because the dharma of nonloss remains, it can make the practitioner obtain superior fruition. It is also like a creditor who, once he has received the wealth, destroys the original bond before the debtor. In just this way, once the dharma of nonloss has given fruit to the performer of karma, its own substance is destroyed.”

The Prajñā Lamp Treatise Commentary says that in its school karma has no arising and that the seed continuum likewise has no arising in the ultimate meaning; therefore, the proposed analogy has no substance. T30n1566 Prajñā Lamp Treatise Commentary〔0101c07–0101c08〕reads: 「釋曰:我宗中業無有生。如是種子相續者,第一義中亦無有生。是故汝所立譬喻無體」 tr. “Commentary: In our school, karma has no arising. Likewise, a continuum of seeds also has no arising in the ultimate meaning. Therefore, the analogy you establish has no substance.”

The Prajñā Lamp Treatise Commentary says karma and the rest arise from the conjunction of causes and conditions and are visible though illusory and unreal; therefore, they exist in conventional truth but not in the ultimate meaning. T30n1566 Prajñā Lamp Treatise Commentary〔0103a22–0103a23〕reads: 「釋曰:此謂業等從因緣和合生,如幻化無實但可眼見,是世諦中有,非第一義。」 tr. “Commentary: This means karma and the rest arise from the conjunction of causes and conditions. Like illusion and conjuration, they are unreal but can be seen. They exist within conventional truth, not in the ultimate meaning.”

Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)

Jizang says each section of this chapter first establishes and then refutes, for a total of seven establishments and seven refutations; the last section refutes what is presently seen. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0117a11–0117a12〕reads: 「第七破現所見事。一一章中皆有前立、次破,故有七立七破。」 tr. “The seventh refutes the presently seen affair. Within each section there is first an establishment and then a refutation; therefore there are seven establishments and seven refutations.”

Jizang says that although ultimately empty, wholesome and unwholesome karma plainly are not lost, thereby blocking the reading that because everything is empty there is neither demerit nor merit. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0116c01–0116c04〕reads: 「品者,為邪見外道如六師等言:無有黑業、無黑業報,白業亦爾。次方廣之流亦言:一切皆空,無有罪福。是故今明雖畢竟空,而善惡之業宛然不失。」 tr. “This chapter addresses wrong-view non-Buddhists such as the six teachers, who say there is no black karma and no black karmic fruition, and likewise no white karma. Next, proponents of a ‘vast emptiness’ also say that everything is empty and there is neither demerit nor merit. Therefore, the present chapter clarifies that although ultimately empty, wholesome and unwholesome karma plainly are not lost.”

Jizang distinguishes the two truths through the illusory person, who is not nonexistent yet is not a real person. He says the six destinies plainly remain while the four alternatives are always cut off. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0123a23–0123a25〕reads: 「幻化人非真人,謂真諦也。又非無幻化人顯非無義,非真人顯非有義,都是明俗諦幻六道宛然而常四絕,四絕宛然而六道不失也。」 tr. “That the illusory person is not a real person refers to ultimate truth. Yet there is not no illusory person, revealing the meaning of not nonexistent; not being a real person reveals the meaning of not existent. Together, this clarifies that in conventional truth the illusory six destinies plainly remain while the four alternatives are always cut off; while the four alternatives are cut off, the six destinies plainly are not lost.”

Terminology

Volition is the associated mental factor that performs; what arises from volition means bodily and verbal karma initiated by volition. Performance and nonperformance, together with demerit and merit arising from use, belong to the questioner’s classification of karma’s character. The dharma of nonloss is a rescue doctrine that preserves karmic fruition like a bond. Neither annihilated nor permanent does not establish a third substance. “Like illusion” preserves visible function while blocking intrinsic nature.

Doctrinal Outline

Following the voices in the current base text, thirty-seven root items are distinguished: nine on loving goodness and the seven karmas; eight on karma’s remaining and ceasing and seed-continuity; five on the dharma of nonloss; seven on karma without intrinsic nature and the body of fruition; five on agent and undergoer; and three concluding through conjuration.

Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History

This chapter is attributed to Nāgārjuna as author, Qingmu as commentator, and Kumārajīva as translator. The Bhāviveka line preserves the corresponding chapter as a comparative witness. The extant Chinese Sthiramati line ends with Chapter Thirteen; this chapter is truthfully marked absent and is not supplied from another chapter.

Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)

The classifications of karma, the dharma of nonloss, agent, and fruition are not retrospectively rewritten through later Yogācāra or Sarvāstivāda systems. The Bhāviveka line and Jizang illuminate only at the levels of comparative reading and carried-forward exposition; they do not alter the voices of Kumārajīva’s base text.

Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage

From karma’s substance, continuity, and the rescue doctrine of nonloss, this chapter proceeds to agent, undergoer, and presently seen karmic fruit, then concludes through the analogy of illusion. This section does not use the doctrine of the next chapter to rewrite the present one.

Position of the Editions

UseWitness and Range
Root verses and Qingmu’s commentaryT30n1564〔0021b21–0023c14〕
Bhāviveka-line comparative interpretationT30n1566〔0099a06–0104a15〕
Sthiramati-line comparative interpretationThe extant Chinese T30n1567 ends with Chapter Thirteen; this chapter is not transmitted
Jizang’s phrase-by-phrase commentaryCorresponding chapter in T42n1824

Translator · 釋慧鏡 Shi Huijing — with AI-assisted consistency checking

License · CC BY-NC-SA 4.0