中論 觀顛倒品第二十三
問方引經：貪恚癡從憶想分別生，「淨不淨顛倒，皆從眾緣生」——既然說得出它怎麼生，就該是有的。
答方承認那個次第，只往下多走一步：「三毒即無性，故煩惱無實。」從緣而生的，就不是自己在那裡。
掛在誰身上
「誰有此煩惱，是即為不成」。青目解「煩惱名為能惱他」，可是被惱的眾生「於一切處推求不可得」；退說屬心，也「是事亦不然」。煩惱於垢心中五求不得，垢心於煩惱中五求亦不得——兩面都找不到。
顛倒自己呢？青目下定義：「顛倒名虛妄」。虛妄即無性；一個無自性的因，生不出真實的果。
境如炎如夢
問方改從境立，說六入是三毒根本。答頌：「皆空如炎夢，如乾闥婆城」、「猶如幻化人，亦如鏡中像」——看得見，取不著。而淨與不淨要在境上取，且互相靠著才有名字，於是「無淨不淨故，則不生貪恚」。
破常，不留無常
「於無常著常，是則名顛倒」，然而「空中無有常，何處有常倒？」更要緊的是下一頌：「空中無無常，何有非顛倒？」破常不是為了住到無常上去。連不生也不許立成實相——「乃至無漏法尚不名為不生相」。
三時推求之後，末句不是結論，是叮嚀：「汝今除憍慢心，善自觀察，誰為顛倒者？」
第一環不接
「如是顛倒滅，無明則亦滅」。顛倒既然求之不生，無明便無所依，「無明滅故三種行業乃至老死等皆滅」。
至於斷：實有斷不得，虛妄也斷不得，末後仍是一問——「誰能斷無性法？」
滅不是動手去除，是不生。
The questioner cites a sūtra: greed, anger, and delusion arise from recollection, conception, and discrimination, while “the inversions of pure and impure all arise from many conditions.” Since their mode of arising can be explained, they must exist.
The respondent accepts the sequence and takes it only one step farther: “The three poisons have no intrinsic nature; therefore, the afflictions are unreal.” What arises through conditions is not there by itself.
Upon Whom Are They Hung?
“Who possesses these afflictions cannot be established.” Qingmu explains that “affliction means that which afflicts another,” yet the being afflicted “cannot be found when sought anywhere.” Retreat and say they belong to mind, and “this too is wrong.” Afflictions cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind, nor a defiled mind within afflictions—neither side can be found.
What of inversion itself? Qingmu defines it: “Inversion means false and delusive.” The false has no intrinsic nature; a cause without intrinsic nature cannot produce a real fruit.
The Object Is Like a Mirage and a Dream
The questioner changes ground and says the six entrances are the root of the three poisons. The answer in verse: “All are empty, like a mirage, a dream, or a city of gandharvas,” “like an illusory person and an image in a mirror”—seen yet impossible to seize. Pure and impure are appropriated upon objects and receive their names only by leaning on each other; thus, “because neither pure nor impure exists, neither greed nor anger arises.”
Refuting Permanence Does Not Leave Impermanence
“To cling to permanence in what is impermanent is called inversion,” yet “within emptiness there is no permanence; where is there an inversion of permanence?” More important is the next verse: “Within emptiness there is no impermanence; where is there one who is not inverted?” Refuting permanence is not a move into impermanence as a refuge. Even nonarising is not allowed to become an established true character—“Even uncontaminated dharmas cannot be named a mark of nonarising.”
After the search through the three times, the final sentence is not a conclusion but an admonition: “Now remove the mind of arrogance, observe well for yourself: who is the inverted one?”
The First Link Does Not Connect
“When inversion ceases in this way, ignorance likewise ceases.” Since inversion, sought, does not arise, ignorance has nothing on which to depend; “because ignorance ceases, the three kinds of karmic formation through aging-and-death all cease.”
As for severing: what truly exists cannot be severed, and what is false cannot be severed either. The final line remains a question: “Who can sever a dharma without intrinsic nature?”
Cessation is not removing something by hand; it is nonarising.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷四〈觀顛倒品第二十三〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0031a12〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0031a12〕問曰：
「從憶想分別，生於貪恚癡，
淨不淨顛倒，皆從眾緣生。」
經說因淨不淨顛倒，憶想分別生貪恚癡。是故當知有貪恚癡。
答曰：
「若因淨不淨，顛倒生三毒，
三毒即無性，故煩惱無實。」
若諸煩惱因淨不淨顛倒憶想分別生，即無自性，是故諸煩惱無實。復次：
「我法有以無，是事終不成；
無我諸煩惱，有無亦不成。」
我無有因緣若有若無而可成，今無我諸煩惱云何以有無而可成？何以故？
「誰有此煩惱，是即為不成；
若離是而有，煩惱則無屬。」
煩惱名為能惱他，惱他者應是眾生，是眾生於一切處推求不可得。若謂離眾生但有煩惱，是煩惱則無所屬。若謂雖無我而煩惱屬心，是事亦不然。何以故？
「如身見五種，求之不可得，
煩惱於垢心，五求亦不得。」
如身見，五陰中五種求不可得；諸煩惱亦於垢心中，五種求亦不可得。又垢心於煩惱中，五種求亦不可得。復次：
「淨不淨顛倒，是則無自性；
云何因此二，而生諸煩惱？」
淨不淨顛倒者，顛倒名虛妄。若虛妄即無性，無性則無顛倒。若無顛倒，云何因顛倒起諸煩惱？
問曰：
「色聲香味觸，及法為六種，
如是之六種，是三毒根本。」
是六入，三毒根本，因此六入生淨不淨顛倒，因淨不淨顛倒生貪恚癡。
答曰：
「色聲香味觸，及法體六種，
皆空如炎夢，如乾闥婆城。
如是六種中，何有淨不淨？
猶如幻化人，亦如鏡中像。」
色聲香味觸法自體，未與心和合時空無所有，如炎如夢，如化如鏡中像，但誑惑於心，無有定相。如是六入中，何有淨不淨？復次：
「不因於淨相，則無有不淨；
因淨有不淨，是故無不淨。」
若不因於淨，先無有不淨，因何而說不淨？是故無不淨。復次：
「不因於不淨，則亦無有淨；
因不淨有淨，是故無有淨。」
若不因不淨，先無有淨，因何而說淨？是故無有淨。復次：
「若無有淨者，何由而有貪？
若無有不淨，何由而有恚？」
無淨不淨故，則不生貪恚。
問曰：經說常等四顛倒。若無常中見常，是名顛倒；若無常中見無常，此非顛倒。餘三顛倒亦如是。有顛倒故，顛倒者亦應有，何故言都無？
答曰：
「於無常著常，是則名顛倒；
空中無有常，何處有常倒？」
若於無常中著常，名為顛倒。諸法性空中無有常，是中何處有常顛倒？餘三亦如是。復次：
「若於無常中，著無常非倒；
空中無無常，何有非顛倒？」
若著無常言是無常，不名為顛倒者，諸法性空中無無常，無常無故，誰為非顛倒？餘三亦如是。復次：
「可著著者著，及所用著法，
是皆寂滅相，云何而有著？」
可著名物，著者名作者，著名業，所用法名所用事，是皆性空寂滅相。如〈如來品〉中所說，是故無有著。復次：
「若無有著法，言邪是顛倒，
言正不顛倒，誰有如是事？」
著名憶想分別此彼有無等。若無此著者，誰為邪顛倒？誰為正不顛倒？復次：
「有倒不生倒，無倒不生倒，
〔T30 0032a01〕倒者不生倒，不倒亦不生。
若於顛倒時，亦不生顛倒，
汝可自觀察，誰生於顛倒？」
已顛倒者，則更不生顛倒，已顛倒故。不顛倒者亦不顛倒，無有顛倒故。顛倒時亦不顛倒，有二過故。汝今除憍慢心，善自觀察，誰為顛倒者？復次：
「諸顛倒不生，云何有此義？
無有顛倒故，何有顛倒者？」
顛倒種種因緣破故，墮在不生。彼貪著不生，謂不生是顛倒實相。是故偈說，云何名不生為顛倒？乃至無漏法尚不名為不生相，何況顛倒是不生相。顛倒無故，何有顛倒者？因顛倒有顛倒者。復次：
「若常我樂淨，而是實有者，
是常我樂淨，則非是顛倒。」
若常我樂淨是四實有性者，是常我樂淨則非顛倒。何以故？定有實事故。云何言顛倒？若謂常我樂淨倒是四無者，無常苦無我不淨是四應實有，不名顛倒。顛倒相違故名不顛倒。是事不然。何以故？
「若常我樂淨，而實無有者；
無常苦不淨，是則亦應無。」
若常我樂淨是四實無，無故無常等四事亦不應有。何以故？無相因待故。復次：
「如是顛倒滅，無明則亦滅，
以無明滅故，諸行等亦滅。」
如是者，如其義。滅諸顛倒故，十二因緣根本無明亦滅，無明滅故三種行業乃至老死等皆滅。復次：
「若煩惱性實，而有所屬者，
云何當可斷？誰能斷其性？」
若諸煩惱即是顛倒而實有性者，云何可斷？誰能斷其性？若謂諸煩惱皆虛妄無性而可斷者，是亦不然。何以故？
「若煩惱虛妄，無性無屬者，
云何當可斷？誰能斷無性？」
若諸煩惱虛妄無性，則無所屬，云何可斷？誰能斷無性法？
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷四〈觀顛倒品第二十三〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、問：三毒從顛倒而生，所以應當實有
〔T30 0031a12〕問的一方說：
從憶想分別，生起貪、恚、癡；淨與不淨的顛倒，都是從眾多因緣而生的。
經裡說：因為有淨與不淨的顛倒，憶想分別便生起貪、恚、癡。因此應當知道：貪、恚、癡是有的。
二、答：既是從顛倒生的，就沒有自性
答的一方回答如下。
如果是因為淨與不淨，由顛倒生起三毒，那麼三毒就沒有自性；所以煩惱並不真實。
如果諸煩惱是因淨不淨的顛倒與憶想分別而生的，那就沒有自性；因此諸煩惱並不真實。再說：
自性的我，無論說它有、說它無，這件事終究不能成立；既然沒有我，諸煩惱說有說無，也一樣不能成立。
我，沒有任何因緣可以說它有、或說它無而得以成立；如今既然沒有我，諸煩惱又怎能以有、以無而得以成立呢？為什麼這樣說？
三、是誰擁有這煩惱
是誰擁有這煩惱？這一點就不能成立；如果離開這個擁有者而另有煩惱，煩惱便無所歸屬。
煩惱，意思是能夠惱亂他人。能惱亂他人的，應當是眾生；可是這眾生在一切處推求都不可得。如果說離開眾生而只有煩惱，那煩惱就沒有歸屬之處。如果說雖然沒有我，煩惱卻歸屬於心，這也不對。為什麼？
如同身見，用五種方式推求都不可得；煩惱在垢心之中，用五種方式推求也同樣不可得。
如同身見，在五陰之中用五種方式推求不可得；諸煩惱也一樣，在垢心之中用五種方式推求也不可得。反過來，垢心在諸煩惱之中，用五種方式推求也不可得。再說：
淨與不淨的顛倒，本身就沒有自性；既然如此，怎能因為這兩者而生起諸煩惱？
所謂淨不淨的顛倒——顛倒的意思就是虛妄。若是虛妄，就沒有自性；沒有自性，就沒有顛倒。既然沒有顛倒，怎能因顛倒而生起諸煩惱？
四、問：六境是三毒的根本
問的一方說：
色、聲、香、味、觸，加上法，共為六種；這樣的六種，就是三毒的根本。
這六入是三毒的根本：因這六入生起淨不淨的顛倒，因淨不淨的顛倒生起貪、恚、癡。
五、答：六境皆空，如炎如夢
答的一方回答如下。
色、聲、香、味、觸，加上法，體有六種；它們都是空的，像陽炎、像夢，像乾闥婆城。這樣的六種之中，哪裡有淨與不淨？就像幻化出來的人，也像鏡子裡的影像。
色、聲、香、味、觸、法的自體，在還沒有與心和合的時候，空而無所有：像陽炎、像夢，像幻化、像鏡中的影像，只是誑惑人心，並沒有決定不變之相。這樣的六入之中，哪裡有淨與不淨？再說：
不憑著淨的相，就沒有不淨；既然是因淨才有不淨，所以並沒有不淨。
若不憑著淨，先前就沒有不淨，那要憑什麼說不淨？所以並沒有不淨。再說：
不憑著不淨，也就沒有淨；既然是因不淨才有淨，所以並沒有淨。
若不憑著不淨，先前就沒有淨，那要憑什麼說淨？所以並沒有淨。再說：
如果沒有淨，憑什麼會有貪？如果沒有不淨，憑什麼會有恚？
因為沒有淨與不淨的緣故，就不生起貪與恚。
六、問：經說常等四顛倒
問的一方說：經裡說常等四種顛倒。若在無常之中見為常，這叫作顛倒；若在無常之中見為無常，這就不是顛倒。其餘三種顛倒也是這樣。既然有顛倒，顛倒的人也應當有；為什麼說全都沒有？
七、答：性空之中，常尚且沒有
答的一方回答如下。
在無常上執著為常，這才叫作顛倒；可是空中並沒有常，哪裡還有一個常的顛倒？
若在無常之中執著為常，名為顛倒。諸法性空之中並沒有常，這裡頭哪裡有常顛倒？其餘三種也是這樣。再說：
若在無常之中，執著它是無常而說這不算顛倒；可是空中連無常也沒有，哪裡有一個不顛倒的？
若執著無常、說它是無常，因而不名為顛倒——可是諸法性空之中並沒有無常；無常既然沒有，誰又是那個不顛倒的？其餘三種也是這樣。再說：
所執著的境、能執著的人、執著這件事，以及執著時所用的法，這些全都是寂滅之相；既然如此，哪裡還有執著？
所執著的，是指物；能執著的，是指作者；執著，是指業；所用的法，是指所用之事——這些全都是性空寂滅之相，如〈如來品〉中所說。所以並沒有執著。再說：
若沒有執著這回事，那麼說邪是顛倒、說正是不顛倒，這樣的事，又有誰擁有？
執著，是指憶想分別此、彼、有、無等等。若沒有這個執著的人，誰是邪顛倒？誰是正不顛倒？再說：
已經有顛倒的，不生顛倒；沒有顛倒的，也不生顛倒；〔T30 0032a01〕顛倒的人不生顛倒，不顛倒的人也不生。若在顛倒的時候，也不生顛倒——你不妨自己觀察：究竟是誰生起了顛倒？
已經顛倒了的人，就不再生起顛倒，因為已經顛倒了。不顛倒的人也不顛倒，因為並沒有顛倒。顛倒的時候也不顛倒，因為有兩重過失。你如今除去憍慢心，好好自己觀察：誰是那個顛倒的人？再說：
諸顛倒既然不生，怎麼會有顛倒這一義？既然沒有顛倒，哪裡還有顛倒的人？
顛倒被種種因緣所破，於是落在不生。那人卻又貪著這個不生，說不生就是顛倒的實相。所以偈中說：怎能把不生叫作顛倒？乃至無漏法尚且不能名為不生之相，何況顛倒是不生之相？顛倒既然沒有，哪裡有顛倒的人？因為有顛倒才有顛倒的人。再說：
八、常我樂淨與無常苦不淨
若常、我、樂、淨是真實有的，那麼這常、我、樂、淨就不是顛倒。
若常、我、樂、淨這四者有真實的自性，那麼這常、我、樂、淨就不是顛倒。為什麼？因為決定有真實的事。既然如此，怎能說它是顛倒？若說常、我、樂、淨這四種顛倒是沒有的，那麼無常、苦、無我、不淨這四種就應當真實有，不名為顛倒——因為與顛倒相違，所以名為不顛倒。這也不對。為什麼？
若常、我、樂、淨實在是沒有的，那麼無常、苦、不淨，也應當同樣沒有。
若常、我、樂、淨這四者實在沒有，因為沒有的緣故，無常等四事也不應當有。為什麼？因為沒有可以相因相待的了。再說：
九、顛倒滅則無明滅
這樣顛倒滅了，無明也就滅了；因為無明滅的緣故，諸行等也滅。
所謂這樣，是說如它的義理。因為滅了諸顛倒的緣故，十二因緣根本的無明也滅；無明滅的緣故，三種行業乃至老死等等全都滅。再說：
十、煩惱可斷嗎
若煩惱的體性真實，而且有所歸屬，那麼怎能夠斷它？誰能斷掉它的自性？
若諸煩惱就是顛倒而有真實自性，怎能斷？誰能斷掉它的自性？若說諸煩惱都是虛妄無性而可以斷，這也不對。為什麼？
若煩惱是虛妄的，沒有自性也沒有歸屬，那麼怎能夠斷它？誰能去斷一個沒有自性的？
若諸煩惱虛妄無性，就沒有歸屬之處；怎能斷？誰能斷一個沒有自性的法？
Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle four, “Examination of Inversion, Chapter Twenty-Three,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.
1. Question: Since the Three Poisons Arise from Inversion, They Must Truly Exist
〔T30 0031a12〕The questioner says:
From recollection, conception, and discrimination arise greed, anger, and delusion. The inversions of pure and impure all arise from many conditions.
The sūtra says that through inversions of pure and impure, recollection, conception, and discrimination give rise to greed, anger, and delusion. Therefore, one should know that greed, anger, and delusion exist.
2. Answer: Since They Arise from Inversion, They Have No Intrinsic Nature
The respondent answers as follows.
If the three poisons arise through inversions regarding pure and impure, then the three poisons have no intrinsic nature. Therefore, the afflictions are not real.
If the afflictions arise through inversions regarding pure and impure and through recollection, conception, and discrimination, they have no intrinsic nature. Therefore, the afflictions are not real. Further:
Whether the intrinsically existent self is said to exist or not exist, it can never be established. Since there is no self, neither the existence nor the nonexistence of the afflictions can be established.
There are no causes and conditions through which a self can be established as existent or nonexistent. Since there is now no self, how could the afflictions be established through either existence or nonexistence? Why is this said?
3. Who Possesses These Afflictions?
Who possesses these afflictions cannot be established. If afflictions existed apart from this possessor, they would belong to no one.
Affliction means that which afflicts another. The one afflicted should be a being, yet this being cannot be found when sought anywhere. If afflictions alone existed apart from a being, they would have nowhere to belong. If one says that though there is no self, afflictions belong to the mind, this too is wrong. Why?
Just as the view of a body cannot be found through the fivefold search, afflictions likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind.
Just as the view of a body cannot be found through the fivefold search within the five aggregates, the afflictions likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind. Conversely, a defiled mind likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within the afflictions. Further:
The inversions of pure and impure themselves have no intrinsic nature. How, then, could afflictions arise through these two?
Inversions of pure and impure—the word “inversion” means false and delusive. What is false and delusive has no intrinsic nature; without intrinsic nature, there is no inversion. Since there is no inversion, how could afflictions arise through inversion?
4. Question: The Six Objects Are the Root of the Three Poisons
The questioner says:
Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, together with dharmas, make six. These six are the root of the three poisons.
These six entrances are the root of the three poisons: through the six entrances arise inversions of pure and impure, and through those inversions arise greed, anger, and delusion.
5. Answer: The Six Objects Are All Empty, Like Mirage and Dream
The respondent answers as follows.
Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas are six in kind. They are all empty, like a mirage, a dream, or a city of gandharvas. Within these six, where are pure and impure? They are like an illusory person and like an image in a mirror.
Before the substances of form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas combine with mind, they are empty and possess nothing: like a mirage, a dream, an illusion, or an image in a mirror. They merely deceive the mind and have no determinate, unchanging mark. Within these six entrances, where are pure and impure? Further:
Without depending on the mark of pure, impure does not exist. Since impure exists only through pure, there is no impure.
If no impure first existed without depending on pure, on what basis could it be called impure? Therefore, there is no impure. Further:
Without depending on impure, there likewise is no pure. Since pure exists only through impure, there is no pure.
If no pure first existed without depending on impure, on what basis could it be called pure? Therefore, there is no pure. Further:
Without pure, through what could greed exist? Without impure, through what could anger exist?
Because neither pure nor impure exists, neither greed nor anger arises.
6. Question: The Sūtra Speaks of Four Inversions Beginning with Permanence
The questioner says: The sūtra speaks of four inversions beginning with permanence. To see permanence within what is impermanent is called inversion; to see impermanence within what is impermanent is not inversion. The remaining three inversions are likewise so. Since inversion exists, one who is inverted should likewise exist. Why say that all are absent?
7. Answer: Within Emptiness of Nature, Even Permanence Does Not Exist
The respondent answers as follows.
To cling to permanence in what is impermanent is called inversion. Yet within emptiness, there is no permanence. Where could there be an inversion of permanence?
Clinging to permanence within impermanence is called inversion. Within the emptiness of nature of dharmas, there is no permanence. Where within it could there be an inversion of permanence? The remaining three are likewise so. Further:
If one clings to impermanence within impermanence and says that this is not inversion, yet within emptiness there is not even impermanence, where could there be one who is not inverted?
If one clings to impermanence and says “this is impermanent,” and therefore does not call it inversion—within the emptiness of nature of dharmas, there is no impermanence. Since impermanence does not exist, who is the one not inverted? The remaining three are likewise so. Further:
The object of clinging, the one who clings, the act of clinging, and the dharma used in clinging all bear the mark of quiescence. How, then, could there be clinging?
The object of clinging means the thing; the one who clings means the agent; clinging means the act; and the dharma used means the matter employed. All bear the mark of emptiness of nature and quiescence, as explained in the “Examination of the Tathāgata.” Therefore, there is no clinging. Further:
If no dharma of clinging exists, who possesses the distinction that wrong is inversion and right is noninversion?
Clinging means recollection, conception, and discrimination regarding this and that, existence and nonexistence, and so forth. Without this one who clings, who is wrongly inverted? Who is rightly noninverted? Further:
One already inverted does not generate inversion; one without inversion does not generate inversion;〔T30 0032a01〕an inverted person does not generate inversion, nor does a noninverted one. Even at the time of inversion, inversion does not arise. Observe well for yourself: who, in the end, generates inversion?
One already inverted does not generate inversion again, because he is already inverted. One not inverted likewise does not become inverted, because there is no inversion. At the time of inversion, inversion likewise does not arise, because two faults follow. Now remove the mind of arrogance, observe well for yourself, and ask: who is the inverted one? Further:
Since the inversions do not arise, how could there be the meaning of inversion? Since there is no inversion, where is there one who is inverted?
Inversion is refuted through various causes and conditions and thus falls into nonarising. Yet someone then craves and clings to nonarising, saying nonarising is the true character of inversion. Therefore, the verse asks: how can nonarising be called inversion? Even uncontaminated dharmas cannot be named a mark of nonarising, how much less can inversion be such a mark? Since inversion does not exist, where is one who is inverted? One who is inverted exists only through inversion. Further:
8. Permanent, Self, Pleasant, and Pure; Impermanent, Suffering, and Impure
If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure truly existed, then permanent, self, pleasant, and pure would not be inversions.
If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure possessed real intrinsic nature, they would not be inversions. Why? Because determinate real things would exist. How could they be called inversions? If one says that the four inversions—permanent, self, pleasant, and pure—are nonexistent, then impermanent, suffering, selfless, and impure should truly exist and should not be called inversions; because they oppose inversion, they would be named noninversion. This too is wrong. Why?
If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure were truly nonexistent, then impermanent, suffering, and impure should likewise be nonexistent.
If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure were truly absent, because they are absent, the four things beginning with impermanence likewise should not exist. Why? Because nothing remains to serve as their mutually dependent cause. Further:
9. When Inversion Ceases, Ignorance Ceases
When inversion ceases in this way, ignorance likewise ceases. Because ignorance ceases, formations and the rest likewise cease.
“In this way” means in accordance with its meaning. Because all inversions cease, ignorance, the root of the twelve links of dependent arising, likewise ceases. Because ignorance ceases, the three kinds of karmic formation through aging-and-death all cease. Further:
10. Can the Afflictions Be Severed?
If the nature of the afflictions were real and belonged to someone, how could they be severed? Who could sever their intrinsic nature?
If the afflictions were precisely inversion and possessed real intrinsic nature, how could they be severed? Who could sever their intrinsic nature? If one says that the afflictions are all false, without nature, and therefore can be severed, this too is wrong. Why?
If the afflictions are false and delusive, without intrinsic nature and without belonging, how could they be severed? Who could sever what has no intrinsic nature?
If the afflictions are false and without intrinsic nature, they belong nowhere. How could they be severed? Who could sever a dharma without intrinsic nature?
人對自己的煩惱，多半有一種奇怪的信任。氣起來的時候，我們不會懷疑那個氣是不是真的；貪起來的時候，也不會懷疑那個貪是不是真的。它來得那麼有力，怎麼可能是假的？
這一品要問的，正是這件事。而它問的方式很特別：不從煩惱本身下手，從煩惱的來歷下手。
問方的一步推理
問方一開口不是自造一個主張，是引一段經。頌說：
「從憶想分別，生於貪恚癡， 淨不淨顛倒，皆從眾緣生。」
青目替他把用意點明：「經說因淨不淨顛倒，憶想分別生貪恚癡。是故當知有貪恚癡。」
推理的關竅在最後一句。前面兩句說的是生起的次第：顛倒與憶想分別在前，貪、恚、癡在後。問方由這個次第推出一個結論——既然說得出它怎麼生，就表示它確實有。
這是人最容易走的一步。凡能指出來歷的東西，我們就當它是真的。
答方只把同一句話往下多走一步
「若因淨不淨，顛倒生三毒， 三毒即無性，故煩惱無實。」
答方沒有否認問方所引的經，也沒有換掉那個次第。他承認了它，然後指出：正是這個次第，說明的是相反的事。青目講得更平白：「若諸煩惱因淨不淨顛倒憶想分別生，即無自性，是故諸煩惱無實。」
從緣而生，就不是自己在那裡；不是自己在那裡，就沒有可以叫作它自己的體性。問方拿來證明有的那條理由，答方拿來說明無自性。同一句經文，兩邊都用；差別只在肯不肯往下多走一步。
煩惱掛在誰身上
答方接著換一個角度。既然說煩惱是有的，總該有一個擁有它的人。
「我法有以無，是事終不成； 無我諸煩惱，有無亦不成。」
「誰有此煩惱，是即為不成； 若離是而有，煩惱則無屬。」
青目先解「煩惱」二字：「煩惱名為能惱他」。能惱他，就得有一個被惱的，那應當是眾生；可是「是眾生於一切處推求不可得」。
於是有人退一步：就算沒有我，煩惱總歸是屬於心的吧。青目連這條路也擋住：「若謂雖無我而煩惱屬心，是事亦不然。」
五求：兩面都找不到
「如身見五種，求之不可得， 煩惱於垢心，五求亦不得。」
身見在五陰之中以五種方式推求不可得，這是前面諸品已經用熟的作法。此處把同一把尺移到煩惱與垢心之間，而且量了兩回：煩惱在垢心中求不得；青目再補一筆——「又垢心於煩惱中，五種求亦不可得。」
兩面都找不到。並不是煩惱藏得深，是煩惱與心之間，本來就沒有一個可以指認的容器關係。
虛妄的東西，生不出真實的東西
「淨不淨顛倒，是則無自性； 云何因此二，而生諸煩惱？」
青目在這裡下了本品最短的一個定義：「顛倒名虛妄」；接著推：「若虛妄即無性，無性則無顛倒。」
問方要用顛倒作為能生的因，可是因本身是虛妄；虛妄無自性，無自性便談不上是一個能生之因。立足點就這樣被抽走了。
六境：如炎、如夢、如乾闥婆城
問方於是換一個更硬的落點。他不再說顛倒，改說境：
「色聲香味觸，及法為六種， 如是之六種，是三毒根本。」
青目替他說明：「是六入，三毒根本」——境在前，顛倒在後，三毒最後。
答方的頌回得極美：
「色聲香味觸，及法體六種， 皆空如炎夢，如乾闥婆城。」
「如是六種中，何有淨不淨？ 猶如幻化人，亦如鏡中像。」
青目補上一個時間點：六境的自體，「未與心和合時空無所有」，並下斷語：「但誑惑於心，無有定相。」
這一串譬喻值得逐個看。炎是遠望所見的水氣，走近了沒有水；夢裡的事，醒來就不在；乾闥婆城遠看有城，近看無城；幻化出來的人有形而不是人；鏡中的像看得見卻取不出。五個譬喻只說同一件事——看得見，取不著。
而淨與不淨，是要在境上取的。境本身取不著，淨不淨便無處安放。
淨與不淨，是互相靠著才有的名字
「不因於淨相，則無有不淨； 因淨有不淨，是故無不淨。」
反過來也一樣：不因不淨，就沒有淨可說。兩個名字互相靠著才立得起來，沒有哪一個先自己成立。
既然如此：
「若無有淨者，何由而有貪？ 若無有不淨，何由而有恚？」
青目一句收住：「無淨不淨故，則不生貪恚。」
四顛倒：破了常，也不留無常
問方這時搬出經裡的常等四顛倒：在無常之中見為常是顛倒，在無常之中見為無常就不是顛倒；既有顛倒，就該有顛倒的人。
答方先答前一半：
「於無常著常，是則名顛倒； 空中無有常，何處有常倒？」
青目說其餘我、樂、淨三倒同此，「餘三亦如是。」
然後是本品最容易被讀漏的一轉：
「若於無常中，著無常非倒； 空中無無常，何有非顛倒？」
前一頌破計常，人多半肯接受；這一頌連計無常也不放過。理由是同一條：性空之中常固然沒有，無常也沒有；你所執的那個無常，同樣不是一個實有之物可執。破常倒，不是為了立一個無常來安身，是要人連那把用來破的尺也放下。
連「著」本身也是寂滅相
「可著著者著，及所用著法， 是皆寂滅相，云何而有著？」
青目分四項對釋：「可著名物，著者名作者，著名業，所用法名所用事」，並指回舊處：「如〈如來品〉中所說」。
接著他給「著」下定義：「著名憶想分別此彼有無等。」——這四個字正是品首問方所引的那一句。一品走了一圈，回到起點：所謂執著，就是在此、彼、有、無之間分別計較。
三時推求：誰生於顛倒
頌把顛倒放到三時裡推：「有倒不生倒，無倒不生倒，」下接「倒者不生倒，不倒亦不生。」
「若於顛倒時，亦不生顛倒， 汝可自觀察，誰生於顛倒？」
青目逐項說明：已顛倒的，因為已經顛倒了，不再生顛倒；不顛倒的，因為沒有顛倒，也不生；顛倒的時候也不顛倒，有兩重過失。
末後不是一句結論，是一句叮嚀：「汝今除憍慢心，善自觀察，誰為顛倒者？」這一問不是要一個答案，是要人自己回去看。
連「不生」也不許立成實相
推到這裡，容易生出一個新的執：既然顛倒不生，那「不生」就是顛倒的實相了吧？
青目把這個念頭原樣揭出來：「彼貪著不生，謂不生是顛倒實相。」然後擋住：「乃至無漏法尚不名為不生相，何況顛倒是不生相。」
連無漏法都不許被定名為不生之相。破到最後，破的工具本身也不留下。
一邊沒有，另一邊也站不住
「若常我樂淨，而是實有者， 是常我樂淨，則非是顛倒。」
若這四者真有實性，如實見它們反而不能叫顛倒了。反過來，若把這四者定作實無，而讓無常、苦、不淨那一邊實有——
「若常我樂淨，而實無有者； 無常苦不淨，是則亦應無。」
青目給的理由只有四個字：「無相因待故。」一邊倒下，另一邊也失去了可以相對的東西。淨與不淨如此，常與無常也如此。
顛倒滅，無明滅，十二支隨滅
「如是顛倒滅，無明則亦滅， 以無明滅故，諸行等亦滅。」
青目把這一句接進十二因緣：「滅諸顛倒故，十二因緣根本無明亦滅，無明滅故三種行業乃至老死等皆滅。」
這是整品所指向的實益。十二支的第一環是無明，而無明之所以立得住，靠的正是顛倒。顛倒既然求之不生，無明便無所依；第一環不接，後面整條鏈隨之而滅。
一路推求顛倒不可得，看似只是拆一個名相；拆到底，拆掉的是生死的第一環。
那麼煩惱究竟可不可斷
品末兩頌把「斷」字也放到同一把尺下量。
「若煩惱性實，而有所屬者， 云何當可斷？誰能斷其性？」
「若煩惱虛妄，無性無屬者， 云何當可斷？誰能斷無性？」
實有也斷不得——自性若真是自性，就不會因誰而失。虛妄也斷不得——無性之法不是一件物事，拿不起也放不下。青目最後一句仍是問句：「誰能斷無性法？」
一品結在一個沒有作答的問上。這不是懸而未決。要說「斷」，先得有一個實物、一個所屬之處、一個能斷的人；三者推求都不可得，斷便不是拿掉什麼，而是不再有可拿之物。這與上一段的顛倒滅、無明滅正是同一件事：滅不是動手去除，是不生。
讀這一品的人可以帶走什麼
一是說得出來歷，不等於它是真的。問方的那一步錯得極自然，我們每天都在走。
二是破了一邊，不要急著站到另一邊去。破常不是為了住在無常上，破淨不是為了住在不淨上；「空中無無常」一句已經把退路封了。
三是煩惱起時，先問它掛在誰身上。頌與釋一路推求：能惱的人推求不可得，屬心也不然，垢心與煩惱兩面五求皆不得。這一問問下去，用力處就變了——不是與煩惱角力，是看它本來無所屬。
承衍：吉藏之鏡
以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論，只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。
吉藏《中觀論疏》釋本品品目，說內外大小諸家都承認有顛倒，卻不知顛倒本性空寂；今推求顛倒不可得，即是實相，所以名為破顛倒。他又說諸家都以為顛倒先有生、後修道令滅，若如此則顛倒不滅；今明顛倒本自不生、今亦不滅，顛倒方才真滅。他更就倒與不倒二相說：若計倒與不倒為二，則兩者皆成顛倒；了知本無二相，則兩者皆名不倒。全品他判為二章，前章破顛倒煩惱生，後章破滅顛倒煩惱。品末他下一結語：能依本品作此正觀，煩惱顛倒畢竟永滅；異此而觀便是邪觀，舊惑不除而新倒更起。
這面鏡把本品接進了三論一系破邪顯正的判釋架構；其分章與判語是吉藏所增，不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判，各還其位。
People tend to place a strange trust in their afflictions. When anger rises, we do not doubt whether it is real. When greed rises, we do not doubt whether greed is real. It comes with such force—how could it be false?
This chapter asks precisely that question. Its method is unusual: rather than begin with the affliction itself, it begins with where the affliction came from.
The Questioner’s Single Step of Inference
The questioner does not open by inventing a thesis, but by citing a sūtra. The verse says:
“From recollection, conception, and discrimination arise greed, anger, and delusion; the inversions of pure and impure all arise from many conditions.”
Qingmu makes the questioner’s intent explicit: “The sūtra says that through inversions of pure and impure, recollection, conception, and discrimination produce greed, anger, and delusion. Therefore, one should know that greed, anger, and delusion exist.”
The hinge of the inference lies in its final sentence. The first two lines describe a sequence of arising: inversion and recollection, conception, and discrimination come first; greed, anger, and delusion follow. From this sequence, the questioner draws a conclusion—if we can explain how something arises, it must truly exist.
This is the step people take most easily. Whatever has an identifiable origin, we treat as real.
The Respondent Takes the Same Sentence Only One Step Farther
“If the three poisons arise through inversions of pure and impure, the three poisons have no intrinsic nature; therefore, the afflictions are unreal.”
The respondent does not deny the sūtra cited by the questioner, nor change its sequence. He accepts it, then points out that this very sequence explains the opposite. Qingmu states it more plainly: “If the afflictions arise through inversions of pure and impure and through recollection, conception, and discrimination, they have no intrinsic nature. Therefore, the afflictions are unreal.”
What arises through conditions is not there by itself. What is not there by itself has no nature that can be called its own. The reason the questioner uses to prove existence, the respondent uses to explain absence of intrinsic nature. Both use the same sūtra passage; they differ only in whether they are willing to take it one step farther.
Upon Whom Are the Afflictions Hung?
The respondent next changes angle. If afflictions exist, someone must possess them.
“Whether the dharma of a self exists or does not exist, it can never be established; without a self, the existence or nonexistence of the afflictions likewise is unestablished.”
“Who possesses these afflictions cannot be established; if they exist apart from that, the afflictions belong to no one.”
Qingmu first explains the term “affliction”: “Affliction means that which afflicts another.” If it afflicts another, someone must be afflicted, namely a being. Yet “this being cannot be found when sought anywhere.”
Someone then retreats: even if there is no self, afflictions surely belong to mind. Qingmu blocks this route too: “If one says that though there is no self, afflictions belong to mind, this too is not so.”
The Fivefold Search: Neither Side Can Be Found
“Just as the view of a body cannot be found through the fivefold search, afflictions likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind.”
The view of a body cannot be found through the fivefold search within the five aggregates; the preceding chapters have made this method familiar. Here the same measure is moved between affliction and defiled mind and applied twice: affliction cannot be found within a defiled mind; Qingmu adds the reverse—“A defiled mind likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within the afflictions.”
Neither side can be found. The affliction is not deeply hidden; between affliction and mind there was never a container relation that could be pointed out.
What Is False Cannot Produce What Is Real
“The inversions of pure and impure have no intrinsic nature; how could afflictions arise through these two?”
Qingmu gives the chapter’s briefest definition: “Inversion means false and delusive.” Then he infers: “What is false has no intrinsic nature; without intrinsic nature, there is no inversion.”
The questioner wishes to use inversion as a producing cause, but the cause itself is false. What is false has no intrinsic nature; without intrinsic nature, it cannot serve as an intrinsically existent producing cause. The point of support is removed.
The Six Objects: Like Mirage, Dream, and a City of Gandharvas
The questioner therefore changes to a harder place to stand. He no longer speaks of inversion, but of objects:
“Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas make six; these six are the root of the three poisons.”
Qingmu explains his point: “These six entrances are the root of the three poisons.” Objects come first, inversion follows, and the three poisons come last.
The respondent’s verse is beautiful:
“Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas are six in kind; all are empty, like a mirage, a dream, or a city of gandharvas.”
“Within these six, where are pure and impure? They are like an illusory person and an image in a mirror.”
Qingmu supplies a moment in time: before the substances of the six objects “combine with mind, they are empty and possess nothing,” then gives a verdict: “They merely deceive the mind and have no determinate mark.”
Each analogy deserves individual attention. A mirage is water seen from afar, but no water remains on approach. Dream events disappear on waking. A city of gandharvas looks like a city from afar and vanishes up close. An illusory person has form but is not a person. A mirror image can be seen but not extracted. All five say one thing: visible, yet impossible to seize.
Pure and impure are appropriated upon objects. When the object itself cannot be seized, pure and impure have nowhere to be placed.
Pure and Impure Are Names That Stand Only by Leaning on Each Other
“Without depending on the mark of pure, there is no impure; because impure exists through pure, there is no impure.”
The reverse is the same: without depending on impure, no pure can be spoken. The two names stand only by leaning on one another; neither is first established on its own.
If so:
“Without pure, through what could greed exist? without impure, through what could anger exist?”
Qingmu concludes in one sentence: “Because neither pure nor impure exists, neither greed nor anger arises.”
The Four Inversions: Refuting Permanence Does Not Leave Impermanence
The questioner now brings forward the four inversions beginning with permanence from the sūtra: seeing permanence within impermanence is inversion, while seeing impermanence within impermanence is not. Since inversion exists, one who is inverted must exist.
The respondent first answers the former half:
“Clinging to permanence in what is impermanent is called inversion; within emptiness there is no permanence—where is there an inversion of permanence?”
Qingmu says the other three inversions of self, pleasant, and pure are the same: “The remaining three are likewise so.”
Then comes the turn in this chapter that is easiest to overlook:
“If within impermanence one clings to impermanence and calls it noninversion, within emptiness there is no impermanence—where is there one not inverted?”
Most will accept the first verse’s refutation of permanence; this one refuses even the clinging to impermanence. The reason is the same: permanence is absent within emptiness of nature, but so is impermanence. The impermanence grasped is likewise not an existing thing available for grasping. Refuting the inversion of permanence is not establishing impermanence as a place to settle. It asks one to release even the measure used in refutation.
Even “Clinging” Itself Bears the Mark of Quiescence
“The object of clinging, the one who clings, the act of clinging, and the dharma used in clinging all bear the mark of quiescence. How could clinging exist?”
Qingmu explains the four separately: “The object of clinging means the thing; the one who clings means the agent; clinging means the act; and the dharma used means the matter employed.” He points back to a familiar place: “As explained in the ‘Examination of the Tathāgata.’”
He next defines clinging: “Clinging means recollection, conception, and discrimination regarding this and that, existence and nonexistence.” These are precisely the words cited by the questioner at the chapter’s opening. The chapter has gone full circle and returned to its beginning: clinging is discrimination and calculation among this, that, existence, and nonexistence.
Search through the Three Times: Who Generates Inversion?
The verse searches inversion through the three times: “One with inversion does not generate inversion; one without inversion does not generate inversion,” followed by “one inverted does not generate inversion, nor does one not inverted.”
“At the time of inversion, inversion likewise does not arise. Observe well for yourself: who generates inversion?”
Qingmu explains each: one already inverted does not generate inversion because he is already inverted; one not inverted does not generate it because there is no inversion; at the time of inversion, inversion likewise does not arise because two faults follow.
The final line is not a conclusion, but an admonition: “Now remove the mind of arrogance, observe well for yourself: who is the inverted one?” The question does not seek an answer; it asks the reader to return and look.
Even “Nonarising” Cannot Be Established as True Character
At this point, a new attachment easily arises: if inversion does not arise, then “nonarising” must be inversion’s true character.
Qingmu reveals the thought exactly as it is: “That person craves and clings to nonarising, saying nonarising is the true character of inversion.” Then he blocks it: “Even uncontaminated dharmas cannot be named the mark of nonarising, how much less can inversion be such a mark?”
Even uncontaminated dharmas cannot be fixed under the name “mark of nonarising.” When refutation reaches its end, the instrument of refutation is not left behind.
When One Side Is Absent, the Other Cannot Stand
“If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure truly existed, then permanent, self, pleasant, and pure would not be inversions.”
If the four truly possessed real nature, seeing them as they are could not be called inversion. Conversely, if one determines these four as truly nonexistent and allows impermanent, suffering, and impure on the other side to be real—
“If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure were truly nonexistent, then impermanent, suffering, and impure should likewise be nonexistent.”
Qingmu’s reason has only four Chinese characters: “There is no mutual causation or dependence.” When one side falls, the other loses what it stood against. Pure and impure are so; permanent and impermanent are likewise so.
Inversion Ceases, Ignorance Ceases, and the Twelve Links Cease in Sequence
“When inversion ceases in this way, ignorance likewise ceases; because ignorance ceases, formations and the rest likewise cease.”
Qingmu connects this sentence to the twelve links: “Because all inversions cease, ignorance, the root of the twelve links, likewise ceases; because ignorance ceases, the three kinds of karmic formation through aging-and-death all cease.”
This is the practical consequence toward which the whole chapter points. The first link of the twelve is ignorance, and what allows ignorance to stand is precisely inversion. When inversion, sought, does not arise, ignorance has nothing on which to depend. The first link does not connect, and the entire chain behind it ceases.
The long inquiry into the unfindability of inversion may appear merely to dismantle a term; followed to the end, it dismantles the first link of saṃsāra.
Then Can the Afflictions Ultimately Be Severed or Not?
The final two verses place even the word “sever” under the same measure.
“If the nature of the afflictions were real and belonged to someone, how could they be severed? Who could sever their intrinsic nature?”
“If the afflictions are false, without intrinsic nature and belonging, how could they be severed? Who could sever what has no intrinsic nature?”
What truly exists cannot be severed—if intrinsic nature were truly intrinsic nature, it would not disappear through anyone. What is false likewise cannot be severed—a dharma without nature is not a thing that can be lifted or put down. Qingmu’s final sentence remains a question: “Who could sever a dharma without intrinsic nature?”
The chapter ends on an unanswered question. This is not an unresolved matter. To speak of severing first requires a real thing, somewhere it belongs, and someone who severs; none of the three can be found. Severing is therefore not removing something, but the absence of anything that can be taken. This is the same matter as the preceding cessation of inversion and ignorance: cessation is not removing something by hand; it is nonarising.
What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?
First, being able to trace an origin does not make something real. The questioner’s step is utterly natural; we take it every day.
Second, after refuting one side, do not rush to stand on the other. Refuting permanence is not dwelling in impermanence, and refuting pure is not dwelling in impure. “Within emptiness there is no impermanence” closes the route of retreat.
Third, when affliction arises, first ask upon whom it is hung. The verse and commentary search all the way: the one afflicted cannot be found, belonging to mind likewise fails, and neither affliction within defiled mind nor defiled mind within affliction is found by the fivefold search. Following this question changes where effort is applied—not wrestling with affliction, but seeing that it originally belongs nowhere.
Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror
The foregoing is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows uses the eye of the Sui-Tang Three Treatise lineage as a sidewise illumination—a mirror is not the treatise, but another way of reading the same verses.
When explaining the chapter title in his Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, Jizang says that Buddhist and non-Buddhist, Great and Lesser Vehicle, all acknowledge inversion but do not know that its original nature is empty and quiescent. To seek inversion and find it unobtainable is precisely true character; therefore, the chapter is called the refutation of inversion. He further says that all suppose inversion arises first and is later extinguished through cultivation; if so, inversion cannot cease. When inversion is understood as originally unborn and presently unceasing, it truly ceases. He also treats the two marks of inverted and noninverted: conceiving them as two makes both inversion; understanding that they originally lack two marks names both noninverted. He divides the chapter into two sections: the first refutes the arising of inversion and affliction, and the second refutes the cessation of inversion and affliction. At the chapter’s end, he concludes that one who performs the chapter’s correct contemplation allows affliction and inversion to cease ultimately and forever, while contrary contemplation is wrong contemplation, leaving old delusions and generating new inversions.
This mirror connects the chapter to the Three Treatise lineage’s interpretive structure of refuting error and disclosing correctness. Its sectional division and judgments are Jizang’s additions, not the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s extended commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
本品底本為《大正新脩大藏經》T30n1564〔0031a12–0032b10〕；原典依底本聲部保存問方、龍樹頌與青目釋。清辨系 T30n1566 有同品異釋；安慧系現存漢譯止於第十三品，本品據實標闕。
二、異釋對勘
安慧 T1567 本品闕傳。清辨系 T30n1566 保存顛倒無自性、十二支還滅與幻女譬的同品異釋；只作分區見證。
問頌分說：貪、恚、癡從憶想分別生，淨不淨顛倒皆從眾緣生 T30n1564龍樹頌（問方立說）〔0031a13–0031a14〕：「從憶想分別，生於貪恚癡，淨不淨顛倒，皆從眾緣生。」本品題署 T30n1564中論品題〔0031a11〕：「觀顛倒品第二十三」
問方由經說淨不淨顛倒及憶想分別生三毒，推論貪恚癡實有 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0031a15–0031a16〕：「經說因淨不淨顛倒，憶想分別生貪恚癡。是故當知有貪恚癡。」
三毒既因淨不淨顛倒而生，便沒有自性，所以煩惱無實 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031a17–0031a18〕：「若因淨不淨，顛倒生三毒，三毒即無性，故煩惱無實。」
青目重申煩惱由淨不淨顛倒、憶想分別生，故無自性而無實 T30n1564青目釋〔0031a19–0031a20〕：「若諸煩惱因淨不淨顛倒憶想分別生，即無自性，是故諸煩惱無實。復次：」
自性我無論說有或無都不成立，無我時煩惱的有無也不能自成 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031a21–0031a22〕：「我法有以無，是事終不成；無我諸煩惱，有無亦不成。」
青目說我沒有可由因緣成立的有無，自性我不成時煩惱也不能以有無成立 T30n1564青目釋〔0031a23–0031a24〕：「我無有因緣若有若無而可成，今無我諸煩惱云何以有無而可成？何以故？」
煩惱若有所屬，須先有一個擁有煩惱者；若離此人另有煩惱，煩惱便無所屬 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031a25–0031a26〕：「誰有此煩惱，是即為不成；若離是而有，煩惱則無屬。」
青目說所惱眾生遍求不得、離眾生的煩惱無所屬，並明斥改說煩惱屬心「是事亦不然」 T30n1564青目釋〔0031a27–0031b01〕：「煩惱名為能惱他，惱他者應是眾生，是眾生於一切處推求不可得。若謂離眾生但有煩惱，是煩惱則無所屬。若謂雖無我而煩惱屬心，是事亦不然。何以故？」
如身見以五種方式推求不可得，煩惱在垢心中五求也不可得 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031b02–0031b03〕：「如身見五種，求之不可得，煩惱於垢心，五求亦不得。」
青目明說煩惱在垢心中、垢心在煩惱中，兩面五求都不可得 T30n1564青目釋〔0031b04–0031b06〕：「如身見，五陰中五種求不可得；諸煩惱亦於垢心中，五種求亦不可得。又垢心於煩惱中，五種求亦不可得。復次：」
淨不淨顛倒本無自性，不能由這兩個無性因生出自性煩惱 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031b07–0031b08〕：「淨不淨顛倒，是則無自性；云何因此二，而生諸煩惱？」
青目以顛倒就是虛妄、虛妄即無性，追問無自性顛倒如何生起煩惱 T30n1564青目釋〔0031b09–0031b11〕：「淨不淨顛倒者，顛倒名虛妄。若虛妄即無性，無性則無顛倒。若無顛倒，云何因顛倒起諸煩惱？」
問頌列色、聲、香、味、觸、法六境，主張它們是三毒根本 T30n1564龍樹頌（問方立說）〔0031b12–0031b13〕：「色聲香味觸，及法為六種，如是之六種，是三毒根本。」
問方說六境生淨不淨顛倒，淨不淨顛倒再生貪恚癡 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0031b14–0031b15〕：「是六入，三毒根本，因此六入生淨不淨顛倒，因淨不淨顛倒生貪恚癡。」
色聲香味觸法六境皆空，如炎、夢、乾闥婆城、幻人與鏡像，其中無自性淨不淨 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031b16–0031b19〕：「色聲香味觸，及法體六種，皆空如炎夢，如乾闥婆城。如是六種中，何有淨不淨？猶如幻化人，亦如鏡中像。」
青目說六境未與心和合時空無所有，如炎、夢、化、鏡中像四喻顯其誑心而無定相，故其中沒有淨不淨 T30n1564青目釋〔0031b20–0031b23〕：「色聲香味觸法自體，未與心和合時空無所有，如炎如夢，如化如鏡中像，但誑惑於心，無有定相。如是六入中，何有淨不淨？復次：」
不淨須因淨才得名，不離淨自有；既因淨而立，所以沒有自性不淨 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031b24–0031b25〕：「不因於淨相，則無有不淨；因淨有不淨，是故無不淨。」
青目追問若不因淨，先前何來不淨可說，故不淨不能自立 T30n1564青目釋〔0031b26–0031b27〕：「若不因於淨，先無有不淨，因何而說不淨？是故無不淨。復次：」
淨也須因不淨才得名，不離不淨自有；既因不淨而立，所以沒有自性淨 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031b28–0031b29〕：「不因於不淨，則亦無有淨；因不淨有淨，是故無有淨。」
青目追問若不因不淨，先前何來淨可說，故淨不能自立 T30n1564青目釋〔0031c01–0031c02〕：「若不因不淨，先無有淨，因何而說淨？是故無有淨。復次：」
沒有自性淨，便無從生貪；沒有自性不淨，也無從生恚 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031c03–0031c04〕：「若無有淨者，何由而有貪？若無有不淨，何由而有恚？」
青目總結淨不淨不成，所以貪與恚也不由自性境相而生 T30n1564青目釋〔0031c05〕：「無淨不淨故，則不生貪恚。」
問方引經列常、我、樂、淨四倒及其相反正觀，並由顛倒推論顛倒者應有 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0031c05–0031c08〕：「問曰：經說常等四顛倒。若無常中見常，是名顛倒；若無常中見無常，此非顛倒。餘三顛倒亦如是。有顛倒故，顛倒者亦應有，何故言都無？」
於無常法著常才名常倒，但諸法性空中沒有自性常，便無一個常倒可得 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031c10–0031c11〕：「於無常著常，是則名顛倒；空中無有常，何處有常倒？」
青目以諸法性空中無有常自體，類推其餘我、樂、淨三倒也如此 T30n1564青目釋〔0031c12–0031c14〕：「若於無常中著常，名為顛倒。諸法性空中無有常，是中何處有常顛倒？餘三亦如是。復次：」
若執無常就是非顛倒，性空中也沒有自性無常可得，非顛倒便不能自立 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031c15–0031c16〕：「若於無常中，著無常非倒；空中無無常，何有非顛倒？」
青目追問性空中無常不成時，誰可被固定稱為非顛倒，餘三亦然 T30n1564青目釋〔0031c17–0031c19〕：「若著無常言是無常，不名為顛倒者，諸法性空中無無常，無常無故，誰為非顛倒？餘三亦如是。復次：」
可著物、著者、著業與所用著法四項皆是寂滅相，故無自性著 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031c20–0031c21〕：「可著著者著，及所用著法，是皆寂滅相，云何而有著？」
青目分別以物、作者、業、所用事解釋四項，並說它們皆是性空寂滅相 T30n1564青目釋〔0031c22–0031c24〕：「可著名物，著者名作者，著名業，所用法名所用事，是皆性空寂滅相。如〈如來品〉中所說，是故無有著。復次：」
若沒有自性著法，便無固定的邪顛倒與正不顛倒，也無人可持有這兩種自性 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031c25–0031c26〕：「若無有著法，言邪是顛倒，言正不顛倒，誰有如是事？」
青目把著解作分別此彼有無，並追問此著不成時誰是邪倒、誰是正不倒 T30n1564青目釋〔0031c27–0031c28〕：「著名憶想分別此彼有無等。若無此著者，誰為邪顛倒？誰為正不顛倒？復次：」
已倒、未倒、倒者、不倒者與倒時都不能再生一個自性顛倒 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031c29–0032a03〕：「有倒不生倒，無倒不生倒，倒者不生倒，不倒亦不生。若於顛倒時，亦不生顛倒，汝可自觀察，誰生於顛倒？」
青目說已顛倒者不再生倒，不顛倒者無倒可生，倒時又有兩過，並勸除憍慢心、善自觀察誰是顛倒者 T30n1564青目釋〔0032a04–0032a07〕：「已顛倒者，則更不生顛倒，已顛倒故。不顛倒者亦不顛倒，無有顛倒故。顛倒時亦不顛倒，有二過故。汝今除憍慢心，善自觀察，誰為顛倒者？復次：」
顛倒既不自性生，便無自性顛倒，也無依顛倒成立的顛倒者 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0032a08–0032a09〕：「諸顛倒不生，云何有此義？無有顛倒故，何有顛倒者？」
青目破除把不生當作顛倒實相的取著，並說連無漏法尚不可定名不生相 T30n1564青目釋〔0032a10–0032a14〕：「顛倒種種因緣破故，墮在不生。彼貪著不生，謂不生是顛倒實相。是故偈說，云何名不生為顛倒？乃至無漏法尚不名為不生相，何況顛倒是不生相。顛倒無故，何有顛倒者？因顛倒有顛倒者。復次：」
常、我、樂、淨若真有固定實性，如實見它們便不應名顛倒 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0032a15–0032a16〕：「若常我樂淨，而是實有者，是常我樂淨，則非是顛倒。」
青目說四相若定實便非顛倒；若改說四相全無而令其反面實有，也仍不成立 T30n1564青目釋〔0032a17–0032a21〕：「若常我樂淨是四實有性者，是常我樂淨則非顛倒。何以故？定有實事故。云何言顛倒？若謂常我樂淨倒是四無者，無常苦無我不淨是四應實有，不名顛倒。顛倒相違故名不顛倒。是事不然。何以故？」
常、我、樂、淨若被定作實無，無常、苦、不淨也應當無 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0032a22–0032a23〕：「若常我樂淨，而實無有者；無常苦不淨，是則亦應無。」
青目說前四若實無，後四也因沒有相因相待而不能自性成立 T30n1564青目釋〔0032a24–0032a25〕：「若常我樂淨是四實無，無故無常等四事亦不應有。何以故？無相因待故。復次：」
顛倒止息，無明也止息；無明滅故諸行等亦滅 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0032a26–0032a27〕：「如是顛倒滅，無明則亦滅，以無明滅故，諸行等亦滅。」
青目說滅諸顛倒故無明滅，無明滅故三種行業乃至老死皆滅 T30n1564青目釋〔0032a28–0032b01〕：「如是者，如其義。滅諸顛倒故，十二因緣根本無明亦滅，無明滅故三種行業乃至老死等皆滅。復次：」
煩惱若有實性且有所屬，自性便不可斷，也找不到能斷其性的主體 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0032b02–0032b03〕：「若煩惱性實，而有所屬者，云何當可斷？誰能斷其性？」
青目重問實有煩惱如何可斷，並明斥虛妄無性而可斷之說「是亦不然」 T30n1564青目釋〔0032b04–0032b06〕：「若諸煩惱即是顛倒而實有性者，云何可斷？誰能斷其性？若謂諸煩惱皆虛妄無性而可斷者，是亦不然。何以故？」
煩惱若虛妄無性又無所屬，也不能把無性法當成實物來斷，亦無固定能斷者 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0032b07–0032b08〕：「若煩惱虛妄，無性無屬者，云何當可斷？誰能斷無性？」
青目總結虛妄無性煩惱無所屬，故不能把無性法作為自性所斷 T30n1564青目釋〔0032b09–0032b10〕：「若諸煩惱虛妄無性，則無所屬，云何可斷？誰能斷無性法？」
《般若燈論釋》明本品亦為遮空所對治、令解顛倒無自性而說。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0121b24–0121b25〕：「釋曰：今此品者，亦為遮空所對治，令解顛倒無自性故說。」
《般若燈論釋》說無顛倒因故十二支證得無自體，煩惱因而止息。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0123c27–0123c29〕：「此謂無明、行、識、名色、六入、觸、受、愛、取、有、生及老死等，由無顛倒因故，證得無自體，息諸煩惱，其義得成。」
《般若燈論釋》以幻女譬說煩惱無實而可離，並收束外人所成立驗有過、我自成立驗無過，令解顛倒無自體為本品義意。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0124a12–0124a16〕：「第一義中煩惱無自體，是斷故，譬如幻作女人，雖是幻化而諸凡夫起染欲心，後知非實染心自捨。煩惱無實亦復如是。此中已說外人所成立驗有過，顯我自成立驗無過，令解顛倒無自體故，是品義意。」
三、諸家異釋（吉藏專疏）
吉藏以顛倒本性空寂、不生不滅說顛倒可滅，並遣倒與不倒二相。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0145b16–0145b24〕：「問：云何破顛倒耶？答：內外大小皆言有是顛倒，不知顛倒本性空寂；今求其顛倒不可得，即是實相，故云破顛倒品。又內外大小皆言有顛倒生，而欲滅之，則顛倒不滅；今求顛倒本自不生、今亦不滅，故顛倒便滅，故名破顛倒。又外人見顛倒不顛倒二相，則是明與無明愚者謂二。若計倒不倒二，則倒與不倒皆成顛倒；今了倒不倒本無二相，則倒與不倒皆名不倒，故破顛倒。」
吉藏把全品分為破顛倒煩惱生與破滅顛倒煩惱兩章。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0145b26–0145b29〕：「所以開此二者，大小內外皆言：前有顛倒煩惱生，後修治道斷之令滅。是故今明煩惱本自不生、今亦不滅。」
吉藏說依本品正觀則顛倒畢竟永滅，異此觀則舊惑未除又起新倒。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0145c11–0145c13〕：「結破意者，能如此品正觀，則煩惱顛倒畢竟永滅；異斯觀者則是邪觀，非但故惑不除，新倒更起。」
四、名相
三毒是貪、恚、癡；淨不淨顛倒皆從眾緣生，憶想分別生貪恚癡；四顛倒是常、我、樂、淨四執；五求在本品雙向檢驗煩惱與垢心；著的四項為可著、著者、著業與所用著法。
五、科判
根本文剔除五個純問答標記後，依四十五個有實質內容的聲部立四十五項根本義：品初因果與無性十二項、六境淨不淨十項、四倒與邪正九項、三時不生四項、四相相待與還滅六項、可斷性四項。
六、關中舊學·譯史
本品署龍樹造、青目釋、鳩摩羅什譯；清辨系有同品異釋，安慧系現存漢譯止於第十三品，本品據實標闕。
七、唯識軸互讀（空有）
境、心、分別與煩惱只依本品五求和緣起次第互讀，不以後世心識模型回寫根本文；安慧系本品無傳。
八、系內餘論互讀
本品以身見五求檢驗煩惱與垢心；以可著、著者、著與所用著法檢驗執取；以顛倒滅、無明滅、諸行等滅收束還滅次第。
九、校本定位
| 用途 | 書證與範圍 |
|---|---|
| 根本論頌與青目釋 | T30n1564〔0031a12–0032b10〕 |
| 清辨系異釋 | T30n1566〔0121b23–0124a29〕 |
| 安慧系異釋 | T30n1567 漢譯止於第十三品，本品無傳 |
| 吉藏逐文疏 | T42 0145b16–0145c13 |
Textual Collation
The base text for this chapter is the Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka, T30n1564〔0031a12–0032b10〕. Following the base text’s voices, the source preserves the questioner, Nāgārjuna’s verses, and Qingmu’s commentary. The Bhāviveka-line T30n1566 has a coordinate alternative interpretation of the same chapter. The extant Chinese translation of the Sthiramati line ends with Chapter Thirteen; the corresponding chapter is reported as absent.
Comparative Readings
The corresponding chapter is absent from the transmitted Sthiramati text. The Bhāviveka-line T30n1566 preserves coordinate alternative interpretations of inversion’s lack of intrinsic nature, the cessation sequence of the twelve links, and the analogy of an illusory woman; it serves only as evidence within its own section.
The questioner’s verse states that greed, anger, and delusion arise from recollection, conception, and discrimination, while inversions of pure and impure arise from many conditions. Nāgārjuna’s verse spoken as the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0031a13–0031a14〕 reads: 「從憶想分別，生於貪恚癡，淨不淨顛倒，皆從眾緣生。」 tr. “From recollection, conception, and discrimination arise greed, anger, and delusion. The inversions of pure and impure all arise from many conditions.” The chapter title in T30n1564〔0031a11〕 reads: 「觀顛倒品第二十三」 tr. “Examination of Inversion, Chapter Twenty-Three.”
From the sūtra’s statement that inversions of pure and impure and recollection, conception, and discrimination produce the three poisons, the questioner infers that greed, anger, and delusion truly exist. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0031a15–0031a16〕 reads: 「經說因淨不淨顛倒，憶想分別生貪恚癡。是故當知有貪恚癡。」 tr. “The sūtra says that through inversions of pure and impure, recollection, conception, and discrimination produce greed, anger, and delusion. Therefore, one should know that greed, anger, and delusion exist.”
Since the three poisons arise through inversions of pure and impure, they have no intrinsic nature; therefore, the afflictions are unreal. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031a17–0031a18〕 reads: 「若因淨不淨，顛倒生三毒，三毒即無性，故煩惱無實。」 tr. “If the three poisons arise through inversions of pure and impure, the three poisons have no intrinsic nature. Therefore, the afflictions are unreal.”
Qingmu reiterates that because the afflictions arise through inversions of pure and impure and through recollection, conception, and discrimination, they lack intrinsic nature and are unreal. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031a19–0031a20〕 reads: 「若諸煩惱因淨不淨顛倒憶想分別生，即無自性，是故諸煩惱無實。復次：」 tr. “If the afflictions arise through inversions of pure and impure and through recollection, conception, and discrimination, they have no intrinsic nature. Therefore, the afflictions are unreal. Further:”
Whether the intrinsically existent self is said to exist or not exist, it is unestablished; without a self, neither the existence nor nonexistence of the afflictions can be established on its own. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031a21–0031a22〕 reads: 「我法有以無，是事終不成；無我諸煩惱，有無亦不成。」 tr. “Whether the dharma of a self exists or does not exist, this can never be established. Without a self, the existence or nonexistence of the afflictions likewise is unestablished.”
Qingmu says that no existence or nonexistence of a self can be established through causes and conditions; when an intrinsically existent self is unestablished, neither can afflictions be established through existence or nonexistence. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031a23–0031a24〕 reads: 「我無有因緣若有若無而可成，今無我諸煩惱云何以有無而可成？何以故？」 tr. “There are no causes and conditions through which a self can be established as existent or nonexistent. Since there is now no self, how could the afflictions be established through existence or nonexistence? Why?”
If afflictions belong to someone, a possessor must first exist; if afflictions exist apart from that person, they belong to no one. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031a25–0031a26〕 reads: 「誰有此煩惱，是即為不成；若離是而有，煩惱則無屬。」 tr. “Who possesses these afflictions cannot be established. If they exist apart from that, the afflictions belong to no one.”
Qingmu says the afflicted being cannot be found anywhere, afflictions apart from a being belong nowhere, and the rescue claim that they belong to the mind is 「是事亦不然」 tr. “likewise not so.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031a27–0031b01〕 reads: 「煩惱名為能惱他，惱他者應是眾生，是眾生於一切處推求不可得。若謂離眾生但有煩惱，是煩惱則無所屬。若謂雖無我而煩惱屬心，是事亦不然。何以故？」 tr. “Affliction means that which afflicts another. The one afflicted should be a being, yet this being cannot be found when sought anywhere. If one says that afflictions alone exist apart from a being, the afflictions belong to no one. If one says that though there is no self, afflictions belong to mind, this too is not so. Why?”
Just as the view of a body cannot be found through the fivefold search, afflictions likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031b02–0031b03〕 reads: 「如身見五種，求之不可得，煩惱於垢心，五求亦不得。」 tr. “Just as the view of a body cannot be found through the fivefold search, afflictions likewise cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind.”
Qingmu states explicitly that afflictions cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind, nor a defiled mind through the fivefold search within afflictions. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031b04–0031b06〕 reads: 「如身見，五陰中五種求不可得；諸煩惱亦於垢心中，五種求亦不可得。又垢心於煩惱中，五種求亦不可得。復次：」 tr. “Just as the view of a body cannot be found through the fivefold search within the five aggregates, so the afflictions cannot be found through the fivefold search within a defiled mind. Further, a defiled mind cannot be found through the fivefold search within the afflictions. Further:”
Inversions of pure and impure originally lack intrinsic nature, so these two causes without intrinsic nature cannot produce intrinsically existent afflictions. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031b07–0031b08〕 reads: 「淨不淨顛倒，是則無自性；云何因此二，而生諸煩惱？」 tr. “The inversions of pure and impure have no intrinsic nature. How could afflictions arise through these two?”
Qingmu says that inversion means false and delusive, and what is false has no intrinsic nature; he asks how an inversion without intrinsic nature can produce afflictions. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031b09–0031b11〕 reads: 「淨不淨顛倒者，顛倒名虛妄。若虛妄即無性，無性則無顛倒。若無顛倒，云何因顛倒起諸煩惱？」 tr. “As for inversions of pure and impure, inversion means false and delusive. What is false has no intrinsic nature; without intrinsic nature, there is no inversion. If there is no inversion, how could afflictions arise through inversion?”
The questioner’s verse lists the six objects—form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas—and asserts that they are the root of the three poisons. Nāgārjuna’s verse spoken as the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0031b12–0031b13〕 reads: 「色聲香味觸，及法為六種，如是之六種，是三毒根本。」 tr. “Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas are six in kind. These six are the root of the three poisons.”
The questioner says that the six objects produce inversions of pure and impure, which in turn produce greed, anger, and delusion. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0031b14–0031b15〕 reads: 「是六入，三毒根本，因此六入生淨不淨顛倒，因淨不淨顛倒生貪恚癡。」 tr. “These six entrances are the root of the three poisons. Through these six entrances arise inversions of pure and impure; through those inversions arise greed, anger, and delusion.”
The six objects of form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas are all empty, like mirage, dream, city of gandharvas, illusory person, and mirror image; no intrinsically existent pure or impure exists within them. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031b16–0031b19〕 reads: 「色聲香味觸，及法體六種，皆空如炎夢，如乾闥婆城。如是六種中，何有淨不淨？猶如幻化人，亦如鏡中像。」 tr. “Form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas are six in kind. All are empty, like a mirage, a dream, or a city of gandharvas. Within these six, where are pure and impure? They are like an illusory person and an image in a mirror.”
Qingmu says that before combining with mind the six objects are empty and possess nothing. Four analogies—mirage, dream, illusion, and mirror image—show that they deceive mind and have no determinate mark; therefore, pure and impure do not exist within them. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031b20–0031b23〕 reads: 「色聲香味觸法自體，未與心和合時空無所有，如炎如夢，如化如鏡中像，但誑惑於心，無有定相。如是六入中，何有淨不淨？復次：」 tr. “Before the substances of form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas combine with mind, they are empty and possess nothing, like a mirage, a dream, an illusion, or an image in a mirror. They merely deceive the mind and have no determinate mark. Within these six entrances, where are pure and impure? Further:”
Impure receives its name only through pure and does not exist by itself apart from pure. Because it is established through pure, there is no intrinsically existent impure. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031b24–0031b25〕 reads: 「不因於淨相，則無有不淨；因淨有不淨，是故無不淨。」 tr. “Without depending on the mark of pure, there is no impure. Because impure exists through pure, there is no impure.”
Qingmu asks from what impure could be spoken if it did not first exist apart from pure; therefore, impure cannot stand by itself. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031b26–0031b27〕 reads: 「若不因於淨，先無有不淨，因何而說不淨？是故無不淨。復次：」 tr. “If impure did not depend on pure, no impure existed before. Through what could it be called impure? Therefore, there is no impure. Further:”
Pure likewise receives its name only through impure and does not exist by itself apart from impure. Because it is established through impure, there is no intrinsically existent pure. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031b28–0031b29〕 reads: 「不因於不淨，則亦無有淨；因不淨有淨，是故無有淨。」 tr. “Without depending on impure, there likewise is no pure. Because pure exists through impure, there is no pure.”
Qingmu asks from what pure could be spoken if it did not first exist apart from impure; therefore, pure cannot stand by itself. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031c01–0031c02〕 reads: 「若不因不淨，先無有淨，因何而說淨？是故無有淨。復次：」 tr. “If pure did not depend on impure, no pure existed before. Through what could it be called pure? Therefore, there is no pure. Further:”
Without intrinsically existent pure, greed cannot arise; without intrinsically existent impure, anger cannot arise. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031c03–0031c04〕 reads: 「若無有淨者，何由而有貪？若無有不淨，何由而有恚？」 tr. “Without pure, through what could greed exist? Without impure, through what could anger exist?”
Qingmu concludes that because neither pure nor impure is established, greed and anger do not arise through intrinsically existent marks of objects. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031c05〕 reads: 「無淨不淨故，則不生貪恚。」 tr. “Because neither pure nor impure exists, neither greed nor anger arises.”
The questioner cites the sūtra’s four inversions—permanent, self, pleasant, and pure—and their contrary correct contemplations, then infers from the existence of inversion that one who is inverted should exist. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0031c05–0031c08〕 reads: 「問曰：經說常等四顛倒。若無常中見常，是名顛倒；若無常中見無常，此非顛倒。餘三顛倒亦如是。有顛倒故，顛倒者亦應有，何故言都無？」 tr. “Question: The sūtra speaks of four inversions beginning with permanence. To see permanence within what is impermanent is called inversion; to see impermanence within what is impermanent is not inversion. The remaining three inversions are likewise so. Since inversion exists, one who is inverted should likewise exist. Why say that all are absent?”
Only clinging to permanence in an impermanent dharma is called inversion, but within the emptiness of nature of dharmas there is no intrinsically existent permanence, so no inversion of permanence can be found. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031c10–0031c11〕 reads: 「於無常著常，是則名顛倒；空中無有常，何處有常倒？」 tr. “Clinging to permanence in what is impermanent is called inversion. Within emptiness there is no permanence; where is there an inversion of permanence?”
Qingmu says that within the emptiness of nature of dharmas there is no substance of permanence; he applies the same analysis to inversions of self, pleasant, and pure. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031c12–0031c14〕 reads: 「若於無常中著常，名為顛倒。諸法性空中無有常，是中何處有常顛倒？餘三亦如是。復次：」 tr. “Clinging to permanence within impermanence is called inversion. Within the emptiness of nature of dharmas, there is no permanence. Where within it could there be an inversion of permanence? The remaining three are likewise so. Further:”
If clinging to impermanence is said to be noninversion, no intrinsically existent impermanence can be found within emptiness of nature either, so noninversion cannot stand by itself. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031c15–0031c16〕 reads: 「若於無常中，著無常非倒；空中無無常，何有非顛倒？」 tr. “If within impermanence one clings to impermanence and calls it noninversion, within emptiness there is no impermanence. Where is there one who is not inverted?”
Qingmu asks who can be fixed as noninverted when impermanence is unestablished within emptiness of nature; the other three are likewise so. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031c17–0031c19〕 reads: 「若著無常言是無常，不名為顛倒者，諸法性空中無無常，無常無故，誰為非顛倒？餘三亦如是。復次：」 tr. “If one clings to impermanence, says it is impermanent, and therefore does not call it inversion—within the emptiness of nature of dharmas there is no impermanence. Since impermanence is absent, who is noninverted? The remaining three are likewise so. Further:”
Object of clinging, one who clings, act of clinging, and dharma employed in clinging all bear the mark of quiescence; therefore, no intrinsically existent clinging exists. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031c20–0031c21〕 reads: 「可著著者著，及所用著法，是皆寂滅相，云何而有著？」 tr. “The object of clinging, the one who clings, the act of clinging, and the dharma used in clinging all bear the mark of quiescence. How could clinging exist?”
Qingmu explains the four as thing, agent, act, and matter employed, and says that all bear the mark of emptiness of nature and quiescence. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031c22–0031c24〕 reads: 「可著名物，著者名作者，著名業，所用法名所用事，是皆性空寂滅相。如〈如來品〉中所說，是故無有著。復次：」 tr. “The object of clinging means the thing; the one who clings means the agent; clinging means the act; and the dharma used means the matter employed. All bear the mark of emptiness of nature and quiescence, as explained in the ‘Examination of the Tathāgata.’ Therefore, there is no clinging. Further:”
Without an intrinsically existent dharma of clinging, there is neither a fixed wrong inversion nor a correct noninversion, nor a person who possesses either intrinsic nature. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031c25–0031c26〕 reads: 「若無有著法，言邪是顛倒，言正不顛倒，誰有如是事？」 tr. “If no dharma of clinging exists, who possesses the distinction that wrong is inversion and right is noninversion?”
Qingmu defines clinging as discrimination regarding this and that, existence and nonexistence, and asks, when such clinging is unestablished, who is wrongly inverted and who correctly noninverted. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031c27–0031c28〕 reads: 「著名憶想分別此彼有無等。若無此著者，誰為邪顛倒？誰為正不顛倒？復次：」 tr. “Clinging means recollection, conception, and discrimination regarding this and that, existence and nonexistence, and the rest. Without this clinging, who is wrongly inverted? Who is correctly noninverted? Further:”
Already inverted, not yet inverted, inverted person, noninverted person, and time of inversion cannot generate another intrinsically existent inversion. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031c29–0032a03〕 reads: 「有倒不生倒，無倒不生倒，倒者不生倒，不倒亦不生。若於顛倒時，亦不生顛倒，汝可自觀察，誰生於顛倒？」 tr. “One with inversion does not generate inversion; one without inversion does not generate inversion. One inverted does not generate inversion, nor does one not inverted. At the time of inversion, inversion likewise does not arise. Observe well for yourself: who generates inversion?”
Qingmu says one already inverted does not generate inversion again, one not inverted has no inversion to generate, and inversion at the time of inversion incurs two faults; he urges the reader to remove arrogance and observe well who is inverted. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0032a04–0032a07〕 reads: 「已顛倒者，則更不生顛倒，已顛倒故。不顛倒者亦不顛倒，無有顛倒故。顛倒時亦不顛倒，有二過故。汝今除憍慢心，善自觀察，誰為顛倒者？復次：」 tr. “One already inverted does not generate inversion again, because he is already inverted. One not inverted likewise does not become inverted, because there is no inversion. At the time of inversion, inversion likewise does not arise, because two faults follow. Now remove the mind of arrogance and observe well for yourself: who is the inverted one? Further:”
Because inversion does not arise through intrinsic nature, there is no intrinsically existent inversion and no inverted person established through it. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0032a08–0032a09〕 reads: 「諸顛倒不生，云何有此義？無有顛倒故，何有顛倒者？」 tr. “Since the inversions do not arise, how could this meaning exist? Since there is no inversion, where is there one who is inverted?”
Qingmu refutes clinging to nonarising as inversion’s true character and says that even uncontaminated dharmas cannot be determinately named the mark of nonarising. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0032a10–0032a14〕 reads: 「顛倒種種因緣破故，墮在不生。彼貪著不生，謂不生是顛倒實相。是故偈說，云何名不生為顛倒？乃至無漏法尚不名為不生相，何況顛倒是不生相。顛倒無故，何有顛倒者？因顛倒有顛倒者。復次：」 tr. “Inversion is refuted through various causes and conditions and thus falls into nonarising. That person craves and clings to nonarising, saying nonarising is the true character of inversion. Therefore, the verse asks: how can nonarising be called inversion? Even uncontaminated dharmas cannot be named the mark of nonarising, how much less can inversion be such a mark? Since inversion does not exist, where is one who is inverted? One who is inverted exists through inversion. Further:”
If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure truly possessed fixed reality, seeing them as they are could not be called inversion. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0032a15–0032a16〕 reads: 「若常我樂淨，而是實有者，是常我樂淨，則非是顛倒。」 tr. “If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure truly existed, then permanent, self, pleasant, and pure would not be inversions.”
Qingmu says that if the four marks were determinately real, they would not be inversions; changing the claim to make all four nonexistent while establishing their opposites as real likewise fails. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0032a17–0032a21〕 reads: 「若常我樂淨是四實有性者，是常我樂淨則非顛倒。何以故？定有實事故。云何言顛倒？若謂常我樂淨倒是四無者，無常苦無我不淨是四應實有，不名顛倒。顛倒相違故名不顛倒。是事不然。何以故？」 tr. “If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure possessed real nature, they would not be inversions. Why? Because determinate real things would exist. How could they be called inversion? If one says that the four inversions—permanent, self, pleasant, and pure—are nonexistent, then impermanent, suffering, selfless, and impure should truly exist and should not be called inversions. Because they oppose inversion, they would be named noninversion. This is not so. Why?”
If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure were determined as truly nonexistent, impermanent, suffering, and impure should likewise be nonexistent. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0032a22–0032a23〕 reads: 「若常我樂淨，而實無有者；無常苦不淨，是則亦應無。」 tr. “If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure were truly nonexistent, then impermanent, suffering, and impure should likewise be nonexistent.”
Qingmu says that if the first four are truly absent, the latter four cannot be established through intrinsic nature because nothing remains to serve as their mutually dependent cause. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0032a24–0032a25〕 reads: 「若常我樂淨是四實無，無故無常等四事亦不應有。何以故？無相因待故。復次：」 tr. “If permanent, self, pleasant, and pure were truly absent, because they are absent, the four things beginning with impermanence likewise should not exist. Why? Because there is no mutual causation or dependence. Further:”
When inversion ceases, ignorance ceases; because ignorance ceases, formations and the remaining links likewise cease. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0032a26–0032a27〕 reads: 「如是顛倒滅，無明則亦滅，以無明滅故，諸行等亦滅。」 tr. “When inversion ceases in this way, ignorance likewise ceases. Because ignorance ceases, formations and the rest likewise cease.”
Qingmu says that because all inversions cease, ignorance ceases; because ignorance ceases, the three kinds of karmic formation through aging-and-death all cease. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0032a28–0032b01〕 reads: 「如是者，如其義。滅諸顛倒故，十二因緣根本無明亦滅，無明滅故三種行業乃至老死等皆滅。復次：」 tr. “‘In this way’ means in accordance with its meaning. Because all inversions cease, ignorance, the root of the twelve links of dependent arising, likewise ceases. Because ignorance ceases, the three kinds of karmic formation through aging-and-death all cease. Further:”
If afflictions possessed real nature and belonged to someone, intrinsic nature could not be severed, nor could a subject who severs it be found. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0032b02–0032b03〕 reads: 「若煩惱性實，而有所屬者，云何當可斷？誰能斷其性？」 tr. “If the nature of the afflictions were real and belonged to someone, how could they be severed? Who could sever their intrinsic nature?”
Qingmu again asks how real afflictions could be severed and explicitly rejects as 「是亦不然」 tr. “likewise not so” the claim that false afflictions without nature can therefore be severed. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0032b04–0032b06〕 reads: 「若諸煩惱即是顛倒而實有性者，云何可斷？誰能斷其性？若謂諸煩惱皆虛妄無性而可斷者，是亦不然。何以故？」 tr. “If the afflictions are precisely inversion and possess real intrinsic nature, how could they be severed? Who could sever their intrinsic nature? If one says that the afflictions are all false, without nature, and therefore can be severed, this too is not so. Why?”
If afflictions are false, without intrinsic nature and belonging, a dharma without nature cannot be treated as a real object to be severed; nor is there a fixed severer. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0032b07–0032b08〕 reads: 「若煩惱虛妄，無性無屬者，云何當可斷？誰能斷無性？」 tr. “If the afflictions are false, without intrinsic nature and belonging, how could they be severed? Who could sever what has no intrinsic nature?”
Qingmu concludes that false afflictions without intrinsic nature belong nowhere and therefore cannot be treated as intrinsically existent objects of severance. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0032b09–0032b10〕 reads: 「若諸煩惱虛妄無性，則無所屬，云何可斷？誰能斷無性法？」 tr. “If the afflictions are false and without intrinsic nature, they belong nowhere. How could they be severed? Who could sever a dharma without intrinsic nature?”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary says that the chapter is also taught to block what emptiness counteracts and enable understanding that inversion has no intrinsic nature. T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0121b24–0121b25〕 reads: 「釋曰：今此品者，亦為遮空所對治，令解顛倒無自性故說。」 tr. “The commentary says: this chapter is likewise taught to block what emptiness counteracts and enable understanding that inversion has no intrinsic nature.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary says that because the cause of inversion is absent, the twelve links are realized to lack substance of their own and the afflictions cease. T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0123c27–0123c29〕 reads: 「此謂無明、行、識、名色、六入、觸、受、愛、取、有、生及老死等，由無顛倒因故，證得無自體，息諸煩惱，其義得成。」 tr. “This means that ignorance, formations, consciousness, name-and-form, six entrances, contact, experience, craving, appropriation, existence, birth, aging-and-death, and the rest are realized to lack substance of their own because the cause of inversion is absent. The afflictions cease, and the meaning is thereby established.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary uses an illusory woman to explain that unreal afflictions may be relinquished. It concludes that the opponent’s proof incurs faults while its own does not, and that enabling understanding of inversion’s lack of substance is the chapter’s intent. T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0124a12–0124a16〕 reads: 「第一義中煩惱無自體，是斷故，譬如幻作女人，雖是幻化而諸凡夫起染欲心，後知非實染心自捨。煩惱無實亦復如是。此中已說外人所成立驗有過，顯我自成立驗無過，令解顛倒無自體故，是品義意。」 tr. “In ultimate truth, afflictions lack substance of their own and are therefore severed, like a woman produced by illusion. Although she is illusory, ordinary people generate a defiled mind of desire; after knowing she is unreal, the defiled mind relinquishes itself. Unreal afflictions are likewise so. Here it has been explained that the opponent’s established proof incurs faults, while our own proof is shown faultless. Enabling understanding that inversion lacks substance of its own is the chapter’s doctrinal intent.”
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang says that inversion can cease because its original nature is empty and quiescent, neither arising nor ceasing; he also dispels the two marks of inverted and noninverted. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0145b16–0145b24〕 reads: 「問：云何破顛倒耶？答：內外大小皆言有是顛倒，不知顛倒本性空寂；今求其顛倒不可得，即是實相，故云破顛倒品。又內外大小皆言有顛倒生，而欲滅之，則顛倒不滅；今求顛倒本自不生、今亦不滅，故顛倒便滅，故名破顛倒。又外人見顛倒不顛倒二相，則是明與無明愚者謂二。若計倒不倒二，則倒與不倒皆成顛倒；今了倒不倒本無二相，則倒與不倒皆名不倒，故破顛倒。」 tr. “Question: How is inversion refuted? Answer: Buddhist and non-Buddhist, Great and Lesser Vehicle, all say that inversion exists but do not know that inversion’s original nature is empty and quiescent. To seek inversion now and find it unobtainable is precisely true character; therefore, the chapter is called the refutation of inversion. Further, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, Great and Lesser Vehicle, all say that inversion arises first and wish later to extinguish it; then inversion would not cease. Now inversion is sought and found originally unborn and presently unceasing; only then does inversion cease. Therefore, it is called the refutation of inversion. Further, the opponent sees the two marks of inverted and noninverted, taking wisdom and ignorance as two. If inverted and noninverted are conceived as two, then both become inversion. When one understands that inverted and noninverted originally lack two marks, both are named noninverted. Therefore, inversion is refuted.”
Jizang divides the chapter into two sections: refuting the arising of inversion and affliction, and refuting the cessation of inversion and affliction. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0145b26–0145b29〕 reads: 「所以開此二者，大小內外皆言：前有顛倒煩惱生，後修治道斷之令滅。是故今明煩惱本自不生、今亦不滅。」 tr. “The reason these two sections are opened is that Great and Lesser Vehicle, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, all say inversion and affliction arise first and are then severed and extinguished by cultivating the path of remedy. Therefore, the present text explains that the afflictions are originally unborn and presently unceasing.”
Jizang says that correct contemplation according to this chapter allows inversion and affliction to cease ultimately and forever; contemplation differing from it leaves old delusions in place and generates new inversions. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0145c11–0145c13〕 reads: 「結破意者，能如此品正觀，則煩惱顛倒畢竟永滅；異斯觀者則是邪觀，非但故惑不除，新倒更起。」 tr. “To conclude the intent of the refutation: one who performs correct contemplation according to this chapter allows affliction and inversion to cease ultimately and forever. Contemplation differing from this is wrong contemplation: not only are old delusions not removed, but new inversions arise again.”
Terminology
The three poisons are greed, anger, and delusion. Inversions of pure and impure arise through many conditions, while recollection, conception, and discrimination produce greed, anger, and delusion. The four inversions are the attachments to permanent, self, pleasant, and pure. In this chapter the fivefold search tests afflictions and defiled mind in both directions. The four elements of clinging are object of clinging, one who clings, act of clinging, and dharma employed in clinging.
Doctrinal Outline
After excluding five pure dialogue markers, the root text presents forty-five fundamental meanings according to forty-five voiced passages with substantive content: twelve on cause, fruit, and absence of intrinsic nature at the chapter opening; ten on the six objects, pure, and impure; nine on the four inversions and wrong and correct; four on nonarising through the three times; six on the mutual dependence and cessation sequence of the four marks; and four on severability.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
This chapter is attributed to Nāgārjuna as author, Qingmu as commentator, and Kumārajīva as translator. The Bhāviveka line preserves a coordinate alternative interpretation. The extant Chinese translation of the Sthiramati line ends with Chapter Thirteen; its absence here is reported as such.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
Object, mind, discrimination, and affliction are read together only according to the chapter’s fivefold search and sequence of dependent arising. Later models of consciousness are not written back into the root text. The corresponding Sthiramati-line chapter is not transmitted.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
The chapter uses the fivefold search of the view of a body to examine afflictions and defiled mind; object of clinging, one who clings, act of clinging, and dharma employed to examine appropriation; and the cessation of inversion, ignorance, and formations and the rest to conclude the cessation sequence.
Position of the Editions
| Use | Textual witness and range |
|---|---|
| Root verses and Qingmu commentary | T30n1564〔0031a12–0032b10〕 |
| Bhāviveka-line alternative interpretation | T30n1566〔0121b23–0124a29〕 |
| Sthiramati-line alternative interpretation | T30n1567 Chinese translation ends with Chapter Thirteen; this chapter is not transmitted |
| Jizang’s running commentary | T42 0145b16–0145c13 |