中論 觀苦品第十二
受苦時，心裡總冒出這一句。答案不外四個：自己招的、別人給的、兩邊都有份、根本沒道理可講。品初那位問者，正是這樣排出來的：
「自作及他作，共作無因作， 如是說諸苦，於果則不然。」
四個一起掃。掃掉的是答案，不是苦。青目說得明白：「眾生以眾緣致苦，厭苦欲求滅。」苦是有的，有來路的，也是可以求滅的；錯只錯在「不知苦惱實因緣」——不知道苦依因緣而有，才會在因緣之外去找一個作苦的人。
自與他
自作若成立，苦憑自己的體性就生得出自己，用不著緣。青目點破：「自名從自性生。」可是「因前五陰有後五陰生」——今日之身依著昔日之身；既要待緣，那個『自』字就落空了。
問方於是改口：此陰作彼陰，那不就是他作？
要說他作，先得證明此陰與彼陰互不相干。青目舉織布為喻：「如縷與布異者，應離縷有布。」布與線確實不一樣，可是抽掉線，布就散了。這種抽不掉的異，撐不起一個站在外面的作者。
離苦何有人
問方再退到人上：是人自作苦、自受苦。頌只回一問：「若人自作苦，離苦何有人？」青目追到底：「應說是人，而不可說」。
改說別人作了苦交給我，兩頭同樣落空：受的一頭，「離五陰無有此人受」；給的一頭，「若有者，應說其相」。
何況此與彼只是兩個位子。青目說：「此彼相待故。」站到那一邊看，彼作苦正是他自作苦；自作先已破，他作也跟著倒。怪自己與怪別人，看似相反，底下扛的是同一個假設。
刀不自割
「如刀不能自割」——能割與所割不能是同一件，法也不能拿自己作出自己來。他作那邊則是「離苦無彼自性」；硬立一個彼，「彼亦即是苦」，繞回原處。
共作要先各有一件才合得起來，兩邊都無，合出來還是無；無因則「多過」，而且把止息也一併取消了。
末後推開去：不只是苦，「外萬物地水山木等一切法皆亦不成」。
帶走
『誰作的』這一問，在一切法上都問不出結果。問得出結果的是另一句：依什麼緣而有。緣散則不生——下手處在緣，不在那個找不到的作苦者。
When suffering comes, this question always rises in the mind. There are only four answers: I brought it on myself, someone else gave it to me, both sides had a hand in it, or there is simply no reason. The questioner at the chapter’s opening arranges precisely these four:
“Self-made and made by another, jointly made and made without a cause— when suffering is explained in these ways, none applies to the fruit.”
All four are swept away together. What is swept away is the answer, not suffering. Qingmu says plainly: “Beings incur suffering through many conditions; weary of suffering, they wish to seek its cessation.” Suffering exists, has a way it comes about, and can be brought to cessation. The error lies only in “not knowing that suffering actually exists through causes and conditions”—not knowing that suffering depends on conditions, one searches outside those conditions for someone who made it.
Self and Other
If self-making were established, suffering could generate itself through its own substance and would have no need for conditions. Qingmu exposes the point: “Self means arising from intrinsic nature.” Yet “the later five aggregates arise through the preceding five aggregates”—the present body depends on the past body. Since conditions are required, the word “self” falls away.
The questioner changes his claim: if these aggregates make those aggregates, is that not making by another?
To speak of another as maker, one must first prove that these aggregates and those have nothing to do with one another. Qingmu uses weaving as an analogy: “If thread and cloth were different, cloth should exist apart from thread.” Cloth and thread indeed are not identical, but remove the thread and the cloth comes apart. A difference that cannot be separated cannot support a maker standing outside.
Apart from Suffering, Where Is the Person?
The questioner retreats again to the person: the person makes and experiences his own suffering. The verse answers only with a question: “If a person makes suffering himself, apart from suffering, where is the person?” Qingmu presses to the end: “One should state who this person is, but he cannot be stated.”
Change the claim and say another made the suffering and gave it to me, and both ends vanish alike. At the receiving end, “apart from the five aggregates there is no such person to receive”; at the giving end, “if such a person exists, one should state his mark.”
Besides, “this” and “that” are only two positions. Qingmu says: “This and that exist in mutual dependence.” Viewed from that side, that person’s making suffering is precisely his making his own suffering. Self-making has already been refuted, so other-making falls with it. Blaming oneself and blaming someone else seem opposed, but underneath they carry the same assumption.
A Knife Does Not Cut Itself
“Just as a knife cannot cut itself”—cutter and cut cannot be one thing, and a dharma cannot use itself to produce itself. On the other side, making by another fails because “apart from suffering, that has no intrinsic nature.” Force “that” into existence, and “that itself is suffering”; the circle returns to its starting point.
Joint making first requires one thing on each side before they can be combined. With neither side present, the combination remains absent. Making without a cause has “many faults” and would cancel cessation as well.
The final verse extends the analysis: not only suffering, but “all external dharmas such as earth, water, mountains, and trees are likewise not established.”
Carry This Away
Applied to any dharma, the question “Who made it?” yields no answer. Another question does yield an answer: through what conditions does it exist? When the conditions disperse, it does not arise. The place to begin is with conditions, not with the unfindable maker of suffering.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷二〈觀苦品第十二〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0016b21〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0016b21〕有人說曰：
「自作及他作，共作無因作，
如是說諸苦，於果則不然。」
有人言：苦惱自作；或言他作；或言亦自作亦他作；或言無因作，於果皆不然。於果皆不然者，眾生以眾緣致苦，厭苦欲求滅。不知苦惱實因緣有四種謬，是故說於果皆不然。何以故？
「苦若自作者，則不從緣生，
因有此陰故，而有彼陰生。」
若苦自作，則不從眾緣生，自名從自性生。是事不然。何以故？因前五陰有後五陰生，是故苦不得自作。
問曰：若言此五陰作彼五陰者，則是他作。
答曰：是事不然。何以故？
「若謂此五陰，異彼五陰者，
如是則應言，從他而作苦。」
若此五陰與彼五陰異，彼五陰與此五陰異者應從他作。如縷與布異者，應離縷有布。若離縷無布者，則布不異縷。如是彼五陰異此五陰者，則應離此五陰有彼五陰。若離此五陰無彼五陰者，則此五陰不異彼五陰，是故不應言苦從他作。
問曰：自作者，是人人自作苦、自受苦。
答曰：
「若人自作苦，離苦何有人？
而謂於彼人，而能自作苦。」
若謂人自作苦者，離五陰苦，何處別有人而能自作苦？應說是人，而不可說，是故苦非人自作。若謂人不自作苦，他人作苦與此人者，是亦不然。何以故？
「若苦他人作，而與此人者；
若當離於苦，何有此人受？」
若他人作苦與此人者，離五陰無有此人受。復次：
「苦若彼人作，持與此人者；
離苦何有人，而能授於此？」
若謂彼人作苦授與此人者，離五陰苦，何有彼人作苦持與此人？若有者，應說其相。復次：
〔T30 0017a02〕「自作若不成，云何彼作苦？
若彼人作苦，即亦名自作。」
種種因緣彼自作苦不成，而言他作苦。是亦不然。何以故？此彼相待故。若彼作苦，於彼亦名自作苦。自作苦先已破，汝受自作苦不成故，他作亦不成。復次：
「苦不名自作，法不自作法，
彼無有自體，何有彼作苦？」
自作苦不然。何以故？如刀不能自割。如是法不能自作法，是故不能自作。他作亦不然。何以故？離苦無彼自性。若離苦有彼自性者，應言彼作苦，彼亦即是苦，云何苦自作苦？
問曰：若自作、他作不然，應有共作。
答曰：
「若此彼苦成，應有共作苦；
此彼尚無作，何況無因作！」
自作、他作猶尚有過，何況無因作。無因多過，如〈破作作者品〉中說。復次：
「非但說於苦，四種義不成；
一切外萬物，四義亦不成。」
佛法中雖說五受陰為苦，有外道人謂苦受為苦，是故說不但說於苦四種義不成，外萬物地水山木等一切法皆亦不成。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷二〈觀苦品第十二〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、有人提出四種說法
〔T30 0016b21〕有人這樣說：
苦是自己作的，是他者作的，是自他共同作的，是沒有原因而作的——像這樣來說種種苦，用在苦這個果上，都不對。
青目解釋說：有人講苦惱是自己作的；有人講是他者作的；有人講是既自己作、也他者作的；有人講是沒有原因而作的——用在果上，都不對。所謂用在果上都不對，是說：眾生本是憑著眾多因緣才招來苦的，也正因為厭患苦，才想求苦的息滅。就因為不知道苦惱實在是依因緣而有，才分出這四種謬誤，所以說用在果上都不對。這是什麼緣故呢？
二、苦若是自己作的，就不從緣生
苦如果是自己作出來的，那就不是從緣而生的了；然而，正因為有這一組五陰的緣故，才有那一組五陰生起。
青目解釋說：如果苦是自己作的，就不從眾緣而生——所謂自，意思就是從自性而生。這件事不對。什麼緣故？因為有前五陰，才有後五陰生起，所以苦不能說是自作。
三、問：此五陰作彼五陰，豈不就是他作
問的一方說：如果講這一組五陰作那一組五陰，那就是他作了。
答的一方說：這件事不對。什麼緣故？
如果說這一組五陰與那一組五陰是相異的，這樣才應該講：苦是從他者而作的。
青目解釋說：如果此五陰與彼五陰相異，彼五陰與此五陰相異，才應該說苦從他作。就像縷與布如果相異，那麼離開縷也應當另有布；如果離開縷並沒有布，那麼布就不異於縷。同樣的道理，彼五陰若異於此五陰，就應當離開此五陰而另有彼五陰；如果離開此五陰並沒有彼五陰，那麼此五陰就不異於彼五陰。所以不應當說苦是從他作的。
四、問：是人自己作苦、自己受苦
問的一方說：所謂自作，是說人人自己作苦、自己受苦。
答的一方於是回答如下。
如果人自己作苦，那麼離開苦，哪裡還有那個人？卻說在那個人身上，他能夠自己作出苦來。
青目解釋說：如果講人自己作苦，那麼離開五陰之苦，何處另有一個人能夠自己作苦？應當把這個人指說出來，然而指說不出來，所以苦不是人自己作的。如果改說人不自作苦，而是別人作了苦交給這個人，這也不對。什麼緣故？
五、他人作苦交給此人，此人在哪裡受
如果苦是他人作的，而交給了這個人；那麼一旦離開了苦，哪裡有這個人來領受？
青目解釋說：如果他人作苦交給這個人，離開五陰就沒有這個人可以領受。再者：
六、彼人作苦持來授與，彼人又在哪裡
苦如果是那個人作的，拿來交給這個人；那麼離開苦，哪裡有那個人，能夠把苦授與這一位？
青目解釋說：如果講那個人作苦授與這個人，離開五陰之苦，哪裡有那個人作了苦拿來交給這個人？如果說有，就應當把他的相說出來。再者：
七、自作既已不成，他作只是換一個位子
〔T30 0017a02〕自作如果不成立，怎麼還說是那個人作苦？如果那個人作苦，在他那一邊也一樣叫作自作。
青目解釋說：已經用種種因緣說明了那個人自己作苦不能成立，卻改口說是他作苦，這也不對。什麼緣故？因為此與彼是相待而有的。如果那個人作苦，在那個人那一邊也就叫作自作苦。自作苦先前已經破了，你所主張的自作苦既然不成立，所以他作也不成立。再者：
八、法不自作法，彼無自體
苦不能叫作自作，法不會自己作自己這個法；那個彼既然沒有自體，哪裡有那個彼來作苦？
青目解釋說：自作苦不對。什麼緣故？就像刀不能自己割自己。同樣的，法不能自己作自己這個法，所以不能自作。他作也不對。什麼緣故？離開苦就沒有那個彼的自性。如果離開苦而另有那個彼的自性，才可以說是彼作苦——可是那個彼也就是苦了，苦又怎麼能自己作苦呢？
九、問：那應該有共作
問的一方說：如果自作、他作都不對，那應該有共作。
答的一方於是回答如下。
如果此所作的苦與彼所作的苦都能成立，才應當有共作的苦；此與彼尚且無所作，何況是無因而作！
青目解釋說：自作、他作尚且有過失，何況無因作。無因的過失很多，如〈破作作者品〉中所說。再者：
十、不只是苦，外在萬物也一樣
不只是說到苦的時候，這四種義理不能成立；一切外在的萬物，這四義也同樣不能成立。
青目解釋說：佛法之中雖然說五受陰是苦，卻有外道之人認為苦受才是苦，所以說：不只是說苦的時候四種義理不成立，外在萬物——地、水、山、木等一切法——也都同樣不能成立。
Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle two, “Examination of Suffering, Chapter Twelve,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.
1. Someone Proposes Four Explanations
〔T30 0016b21〕Someone says the following:
Suffering is self-made, made by another, jointly made by self and other, or made without a cause. Applied to suffering as a fruit, all these ways of explaining the varieties of suffering are wrong.
Qingmu explains: Some say that suffering is self-made; some say it is made by another; some say it is both self-made and made by another; some say it is made without a cause. Applied to the fruit, none is correct. “Applied to the fruit, none is correct” means this: beings incur suffering through many causes and conditions, and precisely because they are weary of suffering, they wish to seek its cessation. Not knowing that suffering actually exists through causes and conditions, they divide into these four errors. Therefore, the verse says that applied to the fruit, none is correct. Why?
2. If Suffering Were Self-Made, It Would Not Arise from Conditions
If suffering were self-made, it would not arise from conditions; yet this set of five aggregates is present as a condition through which that set of five aggregates arises.
Qingmu explains: If suffering were self-made, it would not arise through many conditions. “Self” means arising from intrinsic nature. This is wrong. Why? Because the later five aggregates arise through the preceding five aggregates. Therefore, suffering cannot be said to be self-made.
3. Question: If These Five Aggregates Make Those Five Aggregates, Is That Not Making by Another?
The questioner says: If one says that this set of five aggregates makes that set of five aggregates, then it is made by another.
The respondent says: This is not so. Why?
Only if one said that this set of five aggregates was different from that set could one then say that suffering was made by another.
Qingmu explains: Only if these five aggregates were different from those five aggregates, and those aggregates different from these, should one say that suffering is made by another. If thread and cloth were different, for example, cloth should exist separately apart from thread. If no cloth exists apart from thread, cloth is not different from thread. By the same principle, if those five aggregates were different from these, those five aggregates should exist separately apart from these five. If no such five aggregates exist apart from these, then these five aggregates are not different from those. Therefore, one should not say that suffering is made by another.
4. Question: The Person Makes and Experiences His Own Suffering
The questioner says: Self-made means that each person makes and experiences his own suffering.
The respondent then answers as follows.
If a person makes suffering himself, where is that person apart from suffering, of whom one could say that he is able to make suffering himself?
Qingmu explains: If one says that a person makes suffering himself, where is there a separate person apart from the suffering of the five aggregates who could make suffering himself? One should be able to point out this person, yet he cannot be pointed out. Therefore, suffering is not made by a person himself. If the claim is changed to say that a person does not make his own suffering, but another person makes suffering and gives it to him, this too is wrong. Why?
5. If Another Person Makes Suffering and Gives It to This Person, Where Is This Person to Receive It?
If suffering is made by another person and given to this person, then apart from suffering, where is this person to receive it?
Qingmu explains: If another person makes suffering and gives it to this person, apart from the five aggregates there is no such person to receive it. Further:
6. If That Person Makes Suffering and Brings It to Give, Where Is That Person?
If suffering is made by that person and brought to be given to this person, then apart from suffering, where is that person who could give suffering to this one?
Qingmu explains: If one says that person makes suffering and gives it to this person, apart from the suffering of the five aggregates, where is that person who makes suffering, brings it, and gives it to this person? If such a person exists, one should state his mark. Further:
7. Once Self-Making Fails, Making by Another Merely Changes Positions
〔T30 0017a02〕If self-making is not established, how can one still say that person makes suffering? If that person makes suffering, from that person’s side it is likewise called self-making.
Qingmu explains: It has already been shown through various causes and conditions that a person’s making his own suffering cannot be established; to change the claim and say that another makes suffering is likewise wrong. Why? Because “this” and “that” exist in mutual dependence. If that person makes suffering, on that person’s side it is also called making one’s own suffering. Self-made suffering has already been refuted. Since the self-made suffering you accept is not established, making by another is likewise not established. Further:
8. A Dharma Does Not Make Itself; “That” Has No Substance of Its Own
Suffering cannot be called self-made; a dharma does not make that very dharma itself. Since “that” has no substance of its own, where is that which could make suffering?
Qingmu explains: Self-made suffering is wrong. Why? Just as a knife cannot cut itself, a dharma cannot make that very dharma itself; therefore, it cannot be self-made. Making by another is also wrong. Why? Apart from suffering, “that” has no intrinsic nature. Only if “that” had an intrinsic nature separately apart from suffering could one say that “that” makes suffering. Yet “that” is itself suffering, so how could suffering make suffering itself?
9. Question: Then There Should Be Joint Making
The questioner says: If self-making and making by another are both wrong, there should be joint making.
The respondent then answers as follows.
Only if the suffering made by this and the suffering made by that were each established should there be jointly made suffering. Neither this nor that makes anything—how much less could there be making without a cause!
Qingmu explains: Self-making and making by another already incur faults; how much more so making without a cause. Causelessness incurs many faults, as explained in the chapter that refutes act and agent. Further:
10. Not Only Suffering: External Things Are Likewise So
It is not only when speaking of suffering that these four theses cannot be established; for all external things, the four theses likewise cannot be established.
Qingmu explains: Although the Buddhadharma says that the five aggregates subject to appropriation are suffering, some non-Buddhists take only painful experience as suffering. Therefore it is said that the four theses are not established only for suffering; for all external things—all dharmas such as earth, water, mountains, and trees—they are likewise not established.
人受苦的時候，心裡總會冒出一句話：這是誰弄的？
答案不外那幾種。或者說是自己招的——都怪我自己；或者說是別人給的——若不是他，我何至於此；或者說兩邊都有份——他先起頭，我也有錯；再不然就說根本沒有道理可講，就是碰上了，運氣而已。
本品一開頭，來問的那一位，就把這四種說法整整齊齊排了出來：
「自作及他作，共作無因作， 如是說諸苦，於果則不然。」
四種說法，一句「於果則不然」全掃了。
要先看清楚：掃掉的是什麼。
掃掉四個答案，不是掃掉苦
青目解釋這句時，補了一段極要緊的話：「眾生以眾緣致苦，厭苦欲求滅。不知苦惱實因緣有四種謬」。
這段話有三層意思，一層也不可略。第一，苦是有的——眾生確實在受苦。第二，苦是有來路的——「以眾緣致苦」，是眾多因緣招來的。第三，苦是可以求滅的——「厭苦欲求滅」，厭患它，想要它止息，這件事本身沒有錯。
那麼錯在哪裡？錯在「不知苦惱實因緣」。不知道苦其實是依因緣而有，才會在因緣之外去找一個作苦的人；找不著，就在自作、他作、共作、無因作這四處輪流猜。四種答案，是同一種不知道分出來的四支。
所以本品接下來一路的破，破的從來不是『苦有原因』，也不是『苦可以止息』。破的是那個被安在因緣背後的作苦者。
自作：若真是自己生自己，緣就派不上用場了
第一個答案先受檢驗。頌說：
「苦若自作者，則不從緣生， 因有此陰故，而有彼陰生。」
這一頌的力氣，全在『則不從緣生』五個字。
青目把『自』字的分量點破了：「自名從自性生。」自作的意思不是『我這一趟受苦跟我先前的行為有關』，而是苦憑自己的體性生出自己來——既然憑自己就夠了，那就用不著任何別的條件。
可是事實不是這樣。青目接著說：「因前五陰有後五陰生」。這一期的身心，是依著前一期的身心才有的。既然要待前陰，就不是憑自己；既然不是憑自己，『自作』二字就落空了。
留意這裡並沒有否定前後之間有承接。恰恰相反，正因為承接是實的，『自生』才不成立。破的不是因果，破的是不待因果的那個『自』。
他作：離開縷，還有布嗎
問的一方立刻抓住這個承接反問：既然是「若言此五陰作彼五陰者，則是他作」，那不就是他作嗎？
答方的回應是條件式的：
「若謂此五陰，異彼五陰者， 如是則應言，從他而作苦。」
要說苦從他作，先得證明此陰與彼陰真是兩個互不相干的東西。
於是青目舉了一個織布的譬喻——「如縷與布異者，應離縷有布。若離縷無布者，則布不異縷。」
這個譬喻要慢慢看。縷是線，布是織成的匹。布跟線當然不一樣：線是一條一條的，布是一整幅的，摸起來、用起來都不同。可是你能不能把線拿走，還剩下一幅布？拿不走。線一抽，布就散了。
所以布與線的關係，既不是同一個東西，也不是兩個各自站得住的東西。它們的異，是不能離開的異。
前後五陰正是這樣。今日之身與昔日之身，樣貌、境遇、心行都變了，說它們『異』不算錯；但你若把前陰整個抽掉，後陰也就沒有著落。這種抽不掉的異，撐不起他作——他作要的是一個站在外面、與我全無干係的作者，而這裡根本找不出這樣一個外面。
那麼是人自己作苦、自己受苦嗎
問的一方換了個層面：不談五陰法，談人。「是人人自作苦、自受苦。」
這一問其實最貼近我們平常的心情。頌的回應是一個問句：
「若人自作苦，離苦何有人？」
離開苦，那個人在哪裡？
青目把話說得更死：「離五陰苦，何處別有人而能自作苦？應說是人，而不可說」——你要說是人自己作苦，就請把這個人指出來；而指不出來。
指不出來的緣故在於：離開五陰，人就沒有可指之處。所謂『我』，正是在這五陰上安立的；若先有一個在五陰之外、在苦之外現成的我，然後這個我動手製造苦給自己，那麼在他還沒造苦之前，那個我又是靠什麼成立的？
給的人與受的人，兩頭都落空
問方再退一步：不是自己作，是別人作了給我。
答方順著這句話，把它拆成兩頭問。
先問受的一頭：
「若苦他人作，而與此人者； 若當離於苦，何有此人受？」
青目直說：「離五陰無有此人受。」苦要交給誰？交給那個離開五陰還在的人。可是離開五陰，那個接手的人不見了。
再問給的一頭：
「苦若彼人作，持與此人者； 離苦何有人，而能授於此？」
青目一樣追到底：「若有者，應說其相。」——你若說真有這麼一位造苦、拿來、交付的彼人，請說出他的樣子。
一個交，一個接，兩頭都須先有一個離苦而立的人。兩頭都指不出來，這樁交付也就無從發生。
換一個代詞，錯還是同一個錯
到這裡，頌把自作與他作連了起來：
「自作若不成，云何彼作苦？ 若彼人作苦，即亦名自作。」
青目點出關竅：「此彼相待故。」
此與彼不是兩種東西，是兩個位子。誰站在說話的這一邊就叫此，站在那一邊就叫彼；換一個立足處，此彼就對調了。所以你說是彼人作苦，站到彼那一邊去看，那正是他自己作苦——「於彼亦名自作苦」。
而自作苦這條路，先前已經走不通了。青目於是收：「自作苦先已破，汝受自作苦不成故，他作亦不成。」
同一個困難，換一個代詞並不會消失。這一句值得記著：怪自己與怪別人，看似兩條相反的路，底下扛的是同一個假設——有一個現成的作苦者。假設倒了，兩條路一起倒。
刀不能自己割自己
最後一頌從人門收回法門：
「苦不名自作，法不自作法， 彼無有自體，何有彼作苦？」
青目給了本品最好記的一個譬喻：「如刀不能自割。」
刀能割東西，這是刀的本事。可是刀再利，割不了自己。要割，得有能割與所割兩頭；一件東西同時充當這兩頭，這件事本身就立不起來。法也一樣——法不能拿自己當材料，作出自己這個法來。
至於他作那一邊，青目的理由是：「離苦無彼自性。」離開苦，那個彼沒有自己的體。若硬說離苦另有彼的自性——那就再問一句：「彼亦即是苦，云何苦自作苦？」你安立的那個彼，說到底還是苦；於是繞回原處，仍舊是苦在作苦。
共作與無因，一併收了
問方還有最後兩著：既然自作、他作都不行，那總該是共作吧？
頌答得乾脆：
「若此彼苦成，應有共作苦； 此彼尚無作，何況無因作！」
共作是把兩件事合起來。可是要合，得先各有一件。此作既不成，彼作也不成，兩邊都沒有東西可合，合出來的自然也是沒有。
至於無因，青目說：「自作、他作猶尚有過，何況無因作。無因多過，如〈破作作者品〉中說。」自他還講得出一套道理尚且不成，撤掉一切因待、說苦就是憑空冒出來的，過失只會更多。而且——把苦說成無因，等於同時取消了苦的止息：無因而生的東西，也無由使它不生。這與品初「厭苦欲求滅」那句話，正相衝突。
不只是苦
末頌把這一把尺推出去：
「非但說於苦，四種義不成； 一切外萬物，四義亦不成。」
青目在這裡先辨了一件事：「佛法中雖說五受陰為苦，有外道人謂苦受為苦」。佛法所說的苦，是這整個五受陰；外道所指的，只是苦的那一種感受。無論你所指的苦是寬是窄，四種作法都立不住。
然後他把範圍推到底：「外萬物地水山木等一切法皆亦不成。」大地、水、山、樹木——凡是可以問『這是怎麼來的』的東西，同樣不能說是自己作的、他者作的、共同作的，或無因而作的。
本品因此不只是一場關於苦的辯論。『誰作的』這個問法本身，在一切法上都問不出結果來；能問出結果的，只有『依什麼緣而有』。
讀這一品的人可以帶走什麼
一是，苦來的時候，可以少問一句『這是誰弄的』。四個答案已經一一試過了，沒有一個站得住；追下去只是換代詞。
二是，怪自己與怪別人，並不是兩種相反的心。『此彼相待』——它們共用同一個假設。放掉那個假設，兩頭一起鬆。
三是，破了四作，並沒有把苦說成無所謂、也沒有把止息說成不可能。品初那句「眾生以眾緣致苦，厭苦欲求滅」始終站在那裡：苦依眾緣而有；正因為依緣，緣散它便不生。要下手的地方在緣，不在那個找不到的作苦者。
承衍：吉藏之鏡
以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論，只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。
吉藏《中觀論疏》解本品品目時說：世間之患沒有比苦更大的，各家都急著求離，卻因為不通達苦的因，而生出四種謬解；封執苦有定性，苦果便不得息，反而更造苦因。所以觀苦，正是要顯示因緣之苦沒有定性，令苦果得息、不再起苦因。
他又替全品立了科判：破的八偈分作兩截，前七偈釋不自不他，末一偈釋不共不無因；前七偈再分三層，先兩偈就法說不自他，次三偈就人說不自他，最後兩偈人法合結。這一科判，正對應本品從五陰法門轉入人門、再合收的次第。
至於結破的兩偈，吉藏分出相待與相即兩門：相待門說待自才有他，自既不成，他也不成；相即門說他在他自身那一邊即是自。他也用刀不自割與眼不自見兩個例子解法不自作，用彼無自體解他不能作苦。
刀喻是青目本有的，眼不自見一喻則是吉藏所增；科判分層與定性、止息的判釋架構，也是三論一系的讀法，不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判，各還其位。
When people suffer, a sentence always rises in the mind: Who did this?
There are only a few possible answers. Perhaps I brought it on myself—it is all my fault. Perhaps another gave it to me—if not for that person, how could I have come to this? Perhaps both sides had a hand in it—the other began it, but I too was wrong. Or perhaps there is simply no reason: it happened; it was only bad luck.
At the very opening of the chapter, the questioner arranges these four explanations in a neat row:
“Self-made and made by another, jointly made and made without a cause— when suffering is explained in these ways, none applies to the fruit.”
Four explanations are swept away by the single phrase “none applies to the fruit.”
First see clearly what is being swept away.
Four Answers Are Swept Away, Not Suffering
When explaining this sentence, Qingmu adds a crucial passage: “Beings incur suffering through many conditions; weary of suffering, they wish to seek its cessation. Not knowing that suffering actually exists through causes and conditions, they form four errors.”
This passage has three layers, and none can be omitted. First, suffering exists—beings truly suffer. Second, suffering has a way it comes about: it is “incurred through many conditions.” Third, suffering can be brought to cessation: being weary of it and wishing it to cease is not itself wrong.
Where, then, is the error? In “not knowing that suffering actually exists through causes and conditions.” Not knowing that suffering depends on causes and conditions, one searches outside them for someone who made it. Failing to find such a one, the mind guesses in turn at self-making, making by another, joint making, and causeless making. The four answers are four branches of the same ignorance.
Thus all the refutations that follow never refute the claim that suffering has causes, nor the claim that suffering can cease. What they refute is the maker of suffering installed behind causes and conditions.
Self-Making: If It Truly Produced Itself, Conditions Would Have No Work to Do
The first answer undergoes examination. The verse says:
“If suffering were self-made, it would not arise from conditions; because these aggregates exist, those aggregates arise.”
The force of the verse lies entirely in the five words “it would not arise from conditions.”
Qingmu exposes the weight of “self”: “Self means arising from intrinsic nature.” Self-making does not mean that my present suffering is related to my earlier conduct. It means that suffering produces itself through its own substance. If itself is enough, then no other condition is needed.
But that is not what happens. Qingmu continues: “The later five aggregates arise through the preceding five aggregates.” The body and mind of this life depend upon the body and mind of the preceding life. Since preceding aggregates must be awaited, the later ones do not arise through themselves. Since they do not arise through themselves, the words “self-made” fall away.
Notice that nothing here denies continuity between before and after. Precisely because the continuity is real, “self-arising” is unestablished. What is refuted is not cause and fruit, but the “self” that does not wait for cause and fruit.
Making by Another: Apart from Thread, Is There Still Cloth?
The questioner immediately seizes on this continuity and objects: since “these five aggregates make those five aggregates, it is made by another,” is this not precisely making by another?
The respondent’s answer is conditional:
“If one says that these five aggregates are different from those five aggregates, only then should one say that suffering is made by another.”
Before saying that suffering is made by another, one must prove that these aggregates and those are truly two things wholly unrelated to one another.
So Qingmu offers an analogy from weaving: “If thread and cloth were different, cloth should exist apart from thread. If cloth does not exist apart from thread, then cloth is not different from thread.”
This analogy must be viewed slowly. Thread is yarn; cloth is a woven bolt. Cloth is of course not the same as thread: threads are individual strands, cloth is a whole expanse, and they differ to touch and in use. But can all the thread be removed while a bolt of cloth remains? No. Pull out the thread and the cloth comes apart.
Thus cloth and thread are neither one thing nor two things each able to stand by itself. Their difference is a difference that cannot be separated.
The preceding and later five aggregates are just so. Today’s body differs in appearance, circumstances, and mental activity from the body of the past; it is not wrong to call them “different.” Yet if the preceding aggregates are entirely removed, the later ones have nowhere to land. A difference that cannot be removed cannot support making by another. Other-making requires a maker standing outside, wholly unrelated to me; no such outside can be found here.
Then Does a Person Make and Experience His Own Suffering?
The questioner changes levels. Instead of discussing the dharma of the aggregates, he discusses a person: “Each person makes and experiences his own suffering.”
This question lies closest to our ordinary feeling. The verse responds with a question:
“If a person makes suffering himself, apart from suffering, where is the person?”
Apart from suffering, where is that person?
Qingmu makes the line still tighter: “Apart from the suffering of the five aggregates, where is there a separate person who could make suffering himself? One should state who this person is, but he cannot be stated.” If you say a person makes suffering himself, point the person out. Yet the person cannot be pointed out.
He cannot be pointed out because apart from the five aggregates, there is nowhere to point to a person. What is called “I” is posited precisely upon these five aggregates. If a ready-made “I” first existed outside the aggregates and outside suffering, and then this “I” set to work making suffering for itself, on what was that “I” established before it made suffering?
Giver and Receiver: Both Ends Vanish
The questioner retreats one more step: I did not make it; someone else made it and gave it to me.
The respondent follows the sentence and divides it into two ends.
First ask about the receiver:
“If suffering is made by another and given to this person, apart from suffering, where is this person to receive it?”
Qingmu says directly: “Apart from the five aggregates there is no such person to receive it.” To whom is suffering to be handed? To the person who remains apart from the five aggregates. But apart from the five aggregates, the person who would take it disappears.
Then ask about the giver:
“If suffering is made by that person and brought to be given to this one, apart from suffering, where is the person who could give it to this one?”
Qingmu again presses to the end: “If such a person exists, one should state his mark.” If you say there truly is such a “that person” who makes suffering, carries it over, and hands it across, describe his mark.
One hands it over and another receives it; each end first requires a person standing apart from suffering. Neither can be pointed out, so the transfer has no way to occur.
Change the Pronoun, and the Error Remains the Same
At this point, the verse connects self-making and making by another:
“If self-making is not established, how can that person make suffering? If that person makes suffering, it is likewise called self-making.”
Qingmu identifies the hinge: “This and that exist in mutual dependence.”
This and that are not two kinds of thing, but two positions. Whoever stands on the speaking side is “this”; the one on the other side is “that.” Change where you stand, and this and that exchange places. So when you say that person makes suffering, viewed from that person’s side it is precisely his making his own suffering—“for that person it is likewise called self-made suffering.”
But the route of self-made suffering has already failed. Qingmu therefore concludes: “Self-made suffering has already been refuted. Since the self-made suffering you accept is not established, making by another is likewise not established.”
The same difficulty does not vanish when the pronoun changes. This sentence is worth remembering: blaming oneself and blaming another look like opposed paths, but beneath them lies the same assumption—a ready-made maker of suffering. When the assumption falls, both paths fall together.
A Knife Cannot Cut Itself
The final verse returns from the approach of the person to the approach of dharmas:
“Suffering is not called self-made; a dharma does not make itself. Since that has no substance of its own, where is that which makes suffering?”
Qingmu offers the chapter’s most memorable analogy: “Just as a knife cannot cut itself.”
A knife can cut things; that is what a knife does. But however sharp it is, it cannot cut itself. Cutting requires two ends, cutter and cut; one thing serving as both at once cannot be established. A dharma is likewise so: it cannot use itself as material and make that very dharma itself.
As for making by another, Qingmu’s reason is: “Apart from suffering, that has no intrinsic nature.” Apart from suffering, “that” has no substance of its own. If one forcibly establishes an intrinsic nature of that apart from suffering, another question follows: “That itself is suffering; how could suffering make suffering itself?” The “that” you establish is ultimately suffering. The circle returns to the start: suffering is still making suffering.
Joint Making and Causeless Making Gathered Together
The questioner has two final moves. If neither self-making nor making by another works, surely it is jointly made.
The verse answers cleanly:
“If suffering made by this and that were established, jointly made suffering should exist; neither this nor that makes anything—how much less could there be making without a cause!”
Joint making combines two things. But to combine them, each must first exist. Making by this is unestablished and making by that is also unestablished; with nothing on either side to combine, the combination is likewise absent.
As for causeless making, Qingmu says: “Self-making and making by another already incur faults; how much more so making without a cause. Causelessness incurs many faults, as explained in the chapter that refutes act and agent.” Self and other can at least present a line of reasoning, yet still fail. Removing all dependence on causes and saying that suffering simply appears from nowhere only multiplies the faults. Moreover, to call suffering causeless simultaneously cancels its cessation: what arises without a cause has no basis on which it can be made not to arise. This directly conflicts with the opening statement that beings, “weary of suffering, wish to seek its cessation.”
Not Only Suffering
The final verse extends this measuring line outward:
“It is not only in speaking of suffering that the four theses are unestablished; for all external things, the four theses likewise are unestablished.”
Qingmu first distinguishes one matter: “Although the Buddhadharma says that the five aggregates subject to appropriation are suffering, some non-Buddhists take painful experience as suffering.” The suffering spoken of in the Buddhadharma is the whole of the five aggregates subject to appropriation; non-Buddhists refer only to the painful kind of experience. Whether suffering is taken broadly or narrowly, none of the four modes of making can stand.
Then he extends the scope to the end: “For all external things—all dharmas such as earth, water, mountains, and trees—they are likewise unestablished.” Earth, water, mountains, trees—whatever one can ask “How did this come about?” of likewise cannot be said to make itself, be made by another, be jointly made, or be made without a cause.
This chapter is therefore more than a debate about suffering. Applied to any dharma, the question “Who made it?” yields no answer. Only the question “Through what conditions does it exist?” yields an answer.
What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?
First, when suffering comes, one can ask “Who did this?” one time less. The four answers have been tried one by one, and none can stand. To keep pursuing them merely changes pronouns.
Second, blaming oneself and blaming another are not two opposed states of mind. “This and that exist in mutual dependence”—they share the same assumption. Release the assumption and both ends loosen together.
Third, refuting the four modes of making does not declare suffering irrelevant or cessation impossible. The opening sentence remains standing throughout: “Beings incur suffering through many conditions; weary of suffering, they wish to seek its cessation.” Suffering exists through many conditions; precisely because it depends on conditions, when the conditions disperse it does not arise. The place to begin is with conditions, not with the unfindable maker of suffering.
Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror
The foregoing is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows uses the eye of the Sui-Tang Three Treatise lineage as a sidewise illumination—a mirror is not the treatise, but another way of reading the same verses.
When explaining the chapter title in his Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, Jizang says that no affliction of the world exceeds suffering. Every teaching urgently seeks release, yet failure to understand suffering’s cause gives rise to four erroneous interpretations. Clinging to suffering as having determinate nature prevents the fruit of suffering from ceasing and instead produces more causes of suffering. The examination of suffering therefore shows that conditioned suffering has no determinate nature, enabling its fruit to cease and its causes to arise no more.
He also constructs a doctrinal outline for the whole chapter. The eight verses of refutation divide into two: the first seven explain neither self-making nor making by another; the last explains neither joint nor causeless making. The first seven divide into three layers: two verses first treat neither self nor other at the level of dharmas; the next three treat neither self nor other at the level of persons; the final two conclude person and dharma together. This outline precisely follows the chapter’s movement from the five aggregates as dharmas to the person and then to their joint conclusion.
For the two concluding verses, Jizang distinguishes the approaches of mutual dependence and reciprocal identity. Mutual dependence says that other exists by depending on self; since self is unestablished, other is also unestablished. Reciprocal identity says that what is other for another is precisely self. He also uses the two examples of a knife that does not cut itself and an eye that does not see itself to explain that a dharma does not make itself, and uses the lack of substance in “that” to explain why another cannot make suffering.
The knife analogy is already present in Qingmu, while the eye not seeing itself is added by Jizang. The layered doctrinal outline and the interpretive structure of determinate nature and cessation likewise belong to the Three Treatise lineage’s reading, not to the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verses and Qingmu’s prose commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
本品底本為《大正新脩大藏經》T30n1564〔0016b21–0017a24〕；正文按所傳次第保存問者、龍樹頌與青目釋。
二、異釋對勘
品初以「有人說曰」標出問方立說，後接的總頌仍屬同一問難次第。 T30n1564青目釋〔0016b21〕：「有人說曰：」
偈的上半列自作、他作、共作、無因作四說，下半說四說用於苦果皆不成立。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0016b22–0016b23〕：「自作及他作，共作無因作，如是說諸苦，於果則不然。」
青目把四說定為不知苦從眾緣而有的四種謬，並以眾生厭苦求滅確立本品不否定苦因與苦滅。 T30n1564青目釋〔0016b24–0016b28〕：「有人言：苦惱自作；或言他作；或言亦自作亦他作；或言無因作，於果皆不然。於果皆不然者，眾生以眾緣致苦，厭苦欲求滅。不知苦惱實因緣有四種謬，是故說於果皆不然。何以故？」
苦若自作便不從緣生；然而後五陰依前五陰而起，故苦不能說成自作。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0016b29–0016c01〕：「苦若自作者，則不從緣生，因有此陰故，而有彼陰生。」
青目明定自作為從自性生，並以此前五陰為因、彼後五陰生，判苦不得自作。 T30n1564青目釋〔0016c02–0016c04〕：「若苦自作，則不從眾緣生，自名從自性生。是事不然。何以故？因前五陰有後五陰生，是故苦不得自作。」
問者把此前五陰作彼後五陰直接解作他作。 T30n1564青目釋〔0016c04–0016c05〕：「問曰：若言此五陰作彼五陰者，則是他作。」
答方先判此說不成立並追問理由，原文作 T30n1564青目釋〔0016c05–0016c06〕：「答曰：是事不然。何以故？」；若此前五陰與彼後五陰彼此相異，才可說從他作苦。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0016c07–0016c08〕：「若謂此五陰，異彼五陰者，如是則應言，從他而作苦。」
青目以離縷無布、離此前陰無彼後陰，破前後五陰自性互異，故苦不從全然他者作。 T30n1564青目釋〔0016c09–0016c14〕：「若此五陰與彼五陰異，彼五陰與此五陰異者應從他作。如縷與布異者，應離縷有布。若離縷無布者，則布不異縷。如是彼五陰異此五陰者，則應離此五陰有彼五陰。若離此五陰無彼五陰者，則此五陰不異彼五陰，是故不應言苦從他作。」
問者把自作改解為人人自己作苦、自己受苦，將論證從法門轉到人門。 T30n1564青目釋〔0016c14–0016c15〕：「問曰：自作者，是人人自作苦、自受苦。」
答方隨即轉入頌答，原文只標 T30n1564青目釋〔0016c15〕：「答曰：」；若說人自作苦，便須在苦外另有一人；離苦無人可得，故不能立苦外作者。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0016c16–0016c17〕：「若人自作苦，離苦何有人？而謂於彼人，而能自作苦。」
青目以離五陰苦無別人破人自作，並接續標出他人作苦給此人的救義同樣須受檢驗。 T30n1564青目釋〔0016c18–0016c21〕：「若謂人自作苦者，離五陰苦，何處別有人而能自作苦？應說是人，而不可說，是故苦非人自作。若謂人不自作苦，他人作苦與此人者，是亦不然。何以故？」
若苦由他人造成再給此人，離五陰苦便沒有一個自性此人可作受者。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0016c22–0016c23〕：「若苦他人作，而與此人者；若當離於苦，何有此人受？」
青目明說，離五陰便沒有此人可受他人所作之苦。 T30n1564青目釋〔0016c24–0016c25〕：「若他人作苦與此人者，離五陰無有此人受。復次：」
若彼人造苦持來授與此人，離五陰苦也沒有一個自性彼人能造作與交付。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0016c26–0016c27〕：「苦若彼人作，持與此人者；離苦何有人，而能授於此？」
青目從授者端重申，離五陰苦不能另立彼人造苦持來；若說有，便應指出其相。 T30n1564青目釋〔0016c28–0017a01〕：「若謂彼人作苦授與此人者，離五陰苦，何有彼人作苦持與此人？若有者，應說其相。復次：」
他作不能在自作破後獨立成立，因彼人若作苦，從彼人的立場又名自作；此彼只相待得名。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0017a02–0017a03〕：「自作若不成，云何彼作苦？若彼人作苦，即亦名自作。」
青目以此彼相待及彼作於彼仍名自作，說明自作既破，他作也不能換位保存。 T30n1564青目釋〔0017a04–0017a07〕：「種種因緣彼自作苦不成，而言他作苦。是亦不然。何以故？此彼相待故。若彼作苦，於彼亦名自作苦。自作苦先已破，汝受自作苦不成故，他作亦不成。復次：」
頌說苦法不自作法，所謂彼若離苦沒有自體，也不能成為他者而作苦。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0017a08–0017a09〕：「苦不名自作，法不自作法，彼無有自體，何有彼作苦？」
青目以刀不能自割解法不自作法，再以離苦無彼自性解他作也不成立。 T30n1564青目釋〔0017a10–0017a14〕：「自作苦不然。何以故？如刀不能自割。如是法不能自作法，是故不能自作。他作亦不然。何以故？離苦無彼自性。若離苦有彼自性者，應言彼作苦，彼亦即是苦，云何苦自作苦？」
問者見自作、他作不然，轉救共作。 T30n1564青目釋〔0017a14〕：「問曰：若自作、他作不然，應有共作。」
答方隨即轉入頌答，原文只標 T30n1564青目釋〔0017a14–0017a15〕：「答曰：」；只有此作與彼作各自成立才可說共作；自他尚且不成，共作無基，無因作更不能成立。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0017a16–0017a17〕：「若此彼苦成，應有共作苦；此彼尚無作，何況無因作！」
青目說自作、他作尚且有過，無因更多，並回指〈破作作者品〉所說諸過。 T30n1564青目釋〔0017a18–0017a19〕：「自作、他作猶尚有過，何況無因作。無因多過，如〈破作作者品〉中說。復次：」
自作、他作、共作、無因作四義不只於苦不成，外在一切萬物也同樣不能由四義成立。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0017a20–0017a21〕：「非但說於苦，四種義不成；一切外萬物，四義亦不成。」
青目辨佛法所說五受陰苦與外道人所稱苦受，再列地水山木等一切法同樣不由四義成立。 T30n1564青目釋〔0017a22–0017a24〕：「佛法中雖說五受陰為苦，有外道人謂苦受為苦，是故說不但說於苦四種義不成，外萬物地水山木等一切法皆亦不成。」
《般若燈論釋》先舉「彼處燈來」與「此菴羅樹是我所種」兩種世間說法，再以燈焰前後相續說業果非不作而得、亦非作已失滅，保存不常不斷的責任相續。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0088c29–0089a07〕：「世諦中相似相續因果不別，世間咸見作如是說。如言彼處燈來、此菴羅樹是我所種，此亦如是，後時有相與彼前思相續，因果不別。前有相思，此剎那作名為自作，由前剎那思所積集善不善業，彼業滅時與後為因。如彼燈焰前為後因，如是展轉相續乃至得果，故非不作而得，亦非作已失滅。」
《大乘中觀釋論》以諸法緣所成，故既無自作，也無他作的道理。 T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0157b18–0157b19〕：「釋曰：緣所成故。此中若法緣所成性，即無自作，此遣法自相。又復亦非他作道理。」
《般若燈論釋》明離五陰無別人，只在五陰施設人名，故第一義中無獨立作苦者。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0089b07–0089b12〕：「釋曰：何等是苦？謂五陰相。離彼苦陰無別有人，云何而言人作於苦？復次若汝執言人與五陰不一不異者，是義不然。何以故？但於五陰施調達名，無人可得，以緣起故，譬如瓶等。如是第一義中彼人不成，人既不成，無作苦者。」
三、諸家異釋（吉藏專疏）
吉藏以不達苦因而生四謬、執苦定性反覆造因，說觀苦正為顯因緣苦無定性而息果止因。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0103b10–0103b14〕：「今言破者，物之大患莫過於苦，九十六術皆競求離，不達其因生四種謬。五百異部雖識苦因、未窮其本，封執定性，則苦果不息，更造苦因。今欲示其因緣之苦無有定性，令苦果得息、不起苦因，故云觀苦品。」
吉藏將次八偈分作初七偈釋不自不他、次一偈釋不共不無因；前七偈又分初兩偈明法、次三偈明人、第三兩偈結人法。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0103c07–0103c10〕：「次八偈釋破為二：初七偈釋不自不他、次一偈釋不共不無因。七偈為三：初兩偈明法不自他、次三偈明人不自他、第三兩偈結人法不自他。」
吉藏以待自故有他、自不成故他不成，又以他於他即自解人門結破。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0103c29–0104a03〕：「偈結破自他，初偈結人不自他、次偈結法不自他。初偈上半就相待門、下半就相即門。相待門者，待自故有他，自既不成，他亦不成也。相即者，他於他即是自。」
吉藏以刀不自割、眼不自見解法不自作。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0104a05–0104a06〕：「舉例如刀不自割、眼不自見，苦豈自作耶？」
吉藏又以彼於彼即自、彼無自體，解他不能作苦。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0104a06–0104a07〕：「彼於彼即是自，若有彼之自體可言彼，既無彼自體豈有彼作耶？」
四、名相
苦在青目釋中以五受陰苦為主；自作是從自性生，他作要求此彼自性互異，共作須自他兩支先成，無因作則撤去一切因待。
五、科判
本品由四作總標入法上自他、人上自他，再結破共作與無因，末後推及一切外物；問、答、頌與長行依其原次展開。
六、關中舊學·譯史
本品署龍樹造、青目釋、鳩摩羅什譯；清辨系與安慧系只作同位異釋見證，不混合聲部，也不以後譯改羅什本文。
七、唯識軸互讀（空有）
本品不以後世宗派分類裁判其義；《大乘中觀釋論》以「緣所成故」說明：諸法既無自作，也非他作。
八、系內餘論互讀
本品無因段明文回指〈觀作作者品〉，末頌再把四門推及外在萬物。
九、校本定位
| 用途 | 書證與範圍 |
|---|---|
| 根本論頌與青目釋 | T30n1564〔0016b21–0017a24〕 |
| 清辨系異釋 | T30n1566 同品 |
| 安慧系異釋 | T30n1567 同品 |
| 吉藏逐文疏 | T42n1824 同品 |
Textual Collation
The base text for this chapter is the Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka, T30n1564〔0016b21–0017a24〕. The body preserves the transmitted sequence of the questioner, Nāgārjuna’s verses, and Qingmu’s commentary.
Comparative Readings
At the chapter’s opening, 「有人說曰」 tr. “someone says” marks the questioner’s thesis; the general verse that follows belongs to the same sequence of challenge. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016b21〕 reads: 「有人說曰：」 tr. “Someone says:”
The verse’s first half lists four theories—self-made, made by another, jointly made, and made without a cause—while the second says that none can be established when applied to suffering as fruit. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0016b22–0016b23〕 reads: 「自作及他作，共作無因作，如是說諸苦，於果則不然。」 tr. “Self-made and made by another, jointly made and made without a cause—when suffering is explained in these ways, none applies to the fruit.”
Qingmu identifies the four claims as four errors arising from ignorance that suffering exists through many conditions, and affirms through beings’ weariness with suffering and search for cessation that the chapter does not deny the causes of suffering or its cessation. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016b24–0016b28〕 reads: 「有人言：苦惱自作；或言他作；或言亦自作亦他作；或言無因作，於果皆不然。於果皆不然者，眾生以眾緣致苦，厭苦欲求滅。不知苦惱實因緣有四種謬，是故說於果皆不然。何以故？」 tr. “Some say that suffering is self-made; some say it is made by another; some say it is both self-made and made by another; some say it is made without a cause. Applied to the fruit, none is correct. ‘Applied to the fruit, none is correct’ means that beings incur suffering through many conditions and, weary of suffering, wish to seek its cessation. Not knowing that suffering actually exists through causes and conditions, they form four errors. Therefore, it is said that applied to the fruit, none is correct. Why?”
If suffering were self-made, it would not arise from conditions; yet the later five aggregates arise in dependence on the preceding five aggregates, so suffering cannot be said to make itself. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0016b29–0016c01〕 reads: 「苦若自作者，則不從緣生，因有此陰故，而有彼陰生。」 tr. “If suffering were self-made, it would not arise from conditions. Because these aggregates exist, those aggregates arise.”
Qingmu defines self-making as arising from intrinsic nature and judges that suffering cannot be self-made because the preceding five aggregates serve as a cause for the arising of the later five. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016c02–0016c04〕 reads: 「若苦自作，則不從眾緣生，自名從自性生。是事不然。何以故？因前五陰有後五陰生，是故苦不得自作。」 tr. “If suffering were self-made, it would not arise through many conditions. Self means arising from intrinsic nature. This is not so. Why? Because the later five aggregates arise through the preceding five aggregates. Therefore, suffering cannot be self-made.”
The questioner directly interprets the preceding five aggregates making the later five as making by another. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016c04–0016c05〕 reads: 「問曰：若言此五陰作彼五陰者，則是他作。」 tr. “Question: If one says that these five aggregates make those five aggregates, then it is made by another.”
The respondent first judges the claim unestablished and asks why. The source in Qingmu’s commentary, T30n1564〔0016c05–0016c06〕, reads: 「答曰：是事不然。何以故？」 tr. “Answer: This is not so. Why?” Only if these preceding aggregates and those later aggregates were mutually different could suffering be said to be made by another. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0016c07–0016c08〕 reads: 「若謂此五陰，異彼五陰者，如是則應言，從他而作苦。」 tr. “If one says that these five aggregates are different from those five aggregates, only then should one say that suffering is made by another.”
Qingmu uses the absence of cloth apart from thread and of later aggregates apart from preceding aggregates to refute intrinsic difference between the preceding and later aggregates; suffering is therefore not made by something wholly other. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016c09–0016c14〕 reads: 「若此五陰與彼五陰異，彼五陰與此五陰異者應從他作。如縷與布異者，應離縷有布。若離縷無布者，則布不異縷。如是彼五陰異此五陰者，則應離此五陰有彼五陰。若離此五陰無彼五陰者，則此五陰不異彼五陰，是故不應言苦從他作。」 tr. “If these five aggregates were different from those, and those different from these, suffering should be made by another. If thread and cloth were different, cloth should exist apart from thread. If no cloth exists apart from thread, cloth is not different from thread. Likewise, if those five aggregates were different from these, those aggregates should exist apart from these. If no such five aggregates exist apart from these, then these five aggregates are not different from those. Therefore, one should not say that suffering is made by another.”
The questioner reinterprets self-making as each person making and experiencing his own suffering, moving the argument from the dharma approach to the person approach. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016c14–0016c15〕 reads: 「問曰：自作者，是人人自作苦、自受苦。」 tr. “Question: Self-made means that each person makes and experiences his own suffering.”
The respondent immediately turns to answer in verse. The source marks only Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016c15〕: 「答曰：」 tr. “Answer:” If a person makes suffering himself, a person separate from suffering must exist; since no person can be found apart from suffering, a maker outside suffering cannot be established. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0016c16–0016c17〕 reads: 「若人自作苦，離苦何有人？而謂於彼人，而能自作苦。」 tr. “If a person makes suffering himself, apart from suffering where is the person of whom one could say that he is able to make suffering himself?”
Qingmu refutes a person’s self-making because no separate person exists apart from the suffering of the five aggregates, then marks the rescue claim that another person makes suffering and gives it to this person as likewise requiring examination. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016c18–0016c21〕 reads: 「若謂人自作苦者，離五陰苦，何處別有人而能自作苦？應說是人，而不可說，是故苦非人自作。若謂人不自作苦，他人作苦與此人者，是亦不然。何以故？」 tr. “If one says that a person makes suffering himself, where is there a separate person apart from the suffering of the five aggregates who could make suffering himself? One should state who this person is, but he cannot be stated. Therefore, suffering is not made by a person himself. If one says that a person does not make suffering himself, but another makes suffering and gives it to him, this too is not so. Why?”
If suffering were made by another person and then given to this person, there would be no intrinsically existent “this person” apart from the suffering of the five aggregates to serve as recipient. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0016c22–0016c23〕 reads: 「若苦他人作，而與此人者；若當離於苦，何有此人受？」 tr. “If suffering is made by another and given to this person, apart from suffering, where is this person to receive it?”
Qingmu states explicitly that apart from the five aggregates there is no such person to receive suffering made by another. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016c24–0016c25〕 reads: 「若他人作苦與此人者，離五陰無有此人受。復次：」 tr. “If another person makes suffering and gives it to this person, apart from the five aggregates there is no such person to receive it. Further:”
If that person makes suffering and brings it to give to this person, neither is there an intrinsically existent “that person” apart from the suffering of the five aggregates who could make and deliver it. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0016c26–0016c27〕 reads: 「苦若彼人作，持與此人者；離苦何有人，而能授於此？」 tr. “If suffering is made by that person and brought to be given to this person, apart from suffering, where is the person who could give it to this one?”
From the giver’s end, Qingmu reiterates that no separate “that person” can be established apart from the suffering of the five aggregates as one who makes, brings, and gives suffering; if such a person exists, his mark should be stated. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0016c28–0017a01〕 reads: 「若謂彼人作苦授與此人者，離五陰苦，何有彼人作苦持與此人？若有者，應說其相。復次：」 tr. “If one says that person makes suffering and gives it to this person, apart from the suffering of the five aggregates where is that person who makes suffering, brings it, and gives it to this person? If such a person exists, one should state his mark. Further:”
Making by another cannot remain independently established once self-making has been refuted, because if that person makes suffering, from that person’s perspective it is again called self-making; “this” and “that” receive their names only in mutual dependence. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0017a02–0017a03〕 reads: 「自作若不成，云何彼作苦？若彼人作苦，即亦名自作。」 tr. “If self-making is not established, how can that person make suffering? If that person makes suffering, it is likewise called self-making.”
Qingmu uses the mutual dependence of this and that and the fact that what is made by that remains self-made for that person to show that once self-making is refuted, making by another cannot be preserved merely by changing positions. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0017a04–0017a07〕 reads: 「種種因緣彼自作苦不成，而言他作苦。是亦不然。何以故？此彼相待故。若彼作苦，於彼亦名自作苦。自作苦先已破，汝受自作苦不成故，他作亦不成。復次：」 tr. “Through various causes and conditions, that person’s making his own suffering has been shown unestablished; to say another makes suffering is likewise not so. Why? Because this and that exist in mutual dependence. If that person makes suffering, from that person’s side it is likewise called making his own suffering. Self-made suffering has already been refuted. Since the self-made suffering you accept is not established, making by another is likewise not established. Further:”
The verse says that suffering as a dharma does not make a dharma itself; since “that” has no substance of its own apart from suffering, it cannot become another that makes suffering. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0017a08–0017a09〕 reads: 「苦不名自作，法不自作法，彼無有自體，何有彼作苦？」 tr. “Suffering is not called self-made; a dharma does not make itself. Since that has no substance of its own, where is that which makes suffering?”
Qingmu explains a dharma not making itself through the analogy of a knife that cannot cut itself, then explains that making by another is likewise not established because “that” has no intrinsic nature apart from suffering. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0017a10–0017a14〕 reads: 「自作苦不然。何以故？如刀不能自割。如是法不能自作法，是故不能自作。他作亦不然。何以故？離苦無彼自性。若離苦有彼自性者，應言彼作苦，彼亦即是苦，云何苦自作苦？」 tr. “Self-made suffering is not so. Why? Just as a knife cannot cut itself, a dharma cannot make that very dharma itself; therefore, it cannot be self-made. Making by another is likewise not so. Why? Apart from suffering, that has no intrinsic nature. If that had intrinsic nature apart from suffering, one should say that it makes suffering. Yet that itself is suffering; how could suffering make suffering itself?”
Seeing that neither self-making nor making by another succeeds, the questioner turns to rescue the thesis through joint making. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0017a14〕 reads: 「問曰：若自作、他作不然，應有共作。」 tr. “Question: If self-making and making by another are not so, there should be joint making.”
The respondent immediately turns to answer in verse. The source marks only Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0017a14–0017a15〕: 「答曰：」 tr. “Answer:” Joint making could be spoken of only if making by this and by that were each established. Since neither self nor other makes anything, joint making lacks a foundation, and making without a cause is still less possible. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0017a16–0017a17〕 reads: 「若此彼苦成，應有共作苦；此彼尚無作，何況無因作！」 tr. “If the suffering made by this and that were established, there should be jointly made suffering. Neither this nor that makes anything—how much less could there be making without a cause!”
Qingmu says that self-making and making by another already incur faults, that causeless making incurs still more, and refers back to the faults explained in the chapter on act and agent. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0017a18–0017a19〕 reads: 「自作、他作猶尚有過，何況無因作。無因多過，如〈破作作者品〉中說。復次：」 tr. “Self-making and making by another already incur faults; how much more so making without a cause. Causelessness incurs many faults, as explained in the chapter that refutes act and agent. Further:”
The four theses of self-making, making by another, joint making, and making without a cause are not only unestablished for suffering; all external things likewise cannot be established through these four theses. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0017a20–0017a21〕 reads: 「非但說於苦，四種義不成；一切外萬物，四義亦不成。」 tr. “It is not only in speaking of suffering that the four theses are unestablished; for all external things, the four theses likewise are unestablished.”
Qingmu distinguishes the Buddhist statement that the five aggregates subject to appropriation are suffering from the non-Buddhist restriction of suffering to painful experience, then lists all dharmas such as earth, water, mountains, and trees as likewise unestablished through the four theses. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0017a22–0017a24〕 reads: 「佛法中雖說五受陰為苦，有外道人謂苦受為苦，是故說不但說於苦四種義不成，外萬物地水山木等一切法皆亦不成。」 tr. “Although the Buddhadharma says that the five aggregates subject to appropriation are suffering, some non-Buddhists take painful experience as suffering. Therefore it is said not only that the four theses are unestablished for suffering; for all external things—all dharmas such as earth, water, mountains, and trees—they are likewise unestablished.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary first cites the two conventional statements 「彼處燈來」 tr. “the lamp came from that place” and 「此菴羅樹是我所種」 tr. “I planted this mango tree,” then uses the succession of lamp flames to explain that karmic fruit is neither obtained without action nor lost after action, preserving responsibility in a continuity that is neither permanent nor annihilated. T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0088c29–0089a07〕 reads: 「世諦中相似相續因果不別，世間咸見作如是說。如言彼處燈來、此菴羅樹是我所種，此亦如是，後時有相與彼前思相續，因果不別。前有相思，此剎那作名為自作，由前剎那思所積集善不善業，彼業滅時與後為因。如彼燈焰前為後因，如是展轉相續乃至得果，故非不作而得，亦非作已失滅。」 tr. “Within conventional truth, a similar continuity makes cause and fruit nondifferent, and everyone in the world is seen to speak this way. They say, ‘The lamp came from that place,’ or ‘I planted this mango tree.’ This case is likewise so: a later marked state continues the prior volition, and cause and fruit are nondifferent. A prior marked volition acts in this moment and is called self-made. Through wholesome and unwholesome karma accumulated by the prior moment of volition, when that karma ceases it serves as a cause for what follows. Just as one lamp flame causes the next, so it continues successively until the fruit is obtained. Therefore, the fruit is not obtained without action, nor is it lost once the action has been performed.”
The Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Commentary states that because dharmas are made through conditions, there is neither self-making nor any principle of making by another. T30n1567 Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Commentary〔0157b18–0157b19〕 reads: 「釋曰：緣所成故。此中若法緣所成性，即無自作，此遣法自相。又復亦非他作道理。」 tr. “The commentary says: because it is made through conditions. If a dharma here has the nature of being made through conditions, there is no self-making; this dispels the dharma’s own mark. Nor is there any principle of making by another.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary explains that there is no separate person apart from the five aggregates and that a person’s name is posited only upon them; therefore, no independent maker of suffering exists in ultimate truth. T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0089b07–0089b12〕 reads: 「釋曰：何等是苦？謂五陰相。離彼苦陰無別有人，云何而言人作於苦？復次若汝執言人與五陰不一不異者，是義不然。何以故？但於五陰施調達名，無人可得，以緣起故，譬如瓶等。如是第一義中彼人不成，人既不成，無作苦者。」 tr. “The commentary says: What is suffering? It is the mark of the five aggregates. Apart from those suffering aggregates, there is no separate person; how could one say that a person makes suffering? Further, if you cling to the claim that person and five aggregates are neither identical nor different, this is not so. Why? The name Devadatta is merely posited upon the five aggregates. No person can be found, because of dependent arising, just as with a jar and the like. Thus in ultimate truth that person is not established. Since a person is not established, there is no maker of suffering.”
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang says that the four errors arise from failing to understand the cause of suffering and that repeated production of causes follows from clinging to suffering as possessing determinate nature. The examination of suffering therefore discloses that conditioned suffering has no determinate nature so that the fruit of suffering may cease and the causes of suffering no longer arise. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0103b10–0103b14〕 reads: 「今言破者，物之大患莫過於苦，九十六術皆競求離，不達其因生四種謬。五百異部雖識苦因、未窮其本，封執定性，則苦果不息，更造苦因。今欲示其因緣之苦無有定性，令苦果得息、不起苦因，故云觀苦品。」 tr. “In speaking of refutation here, no great affliction of beings surpasses suffering. The ninety-six teachings all contend in seeking release from it, yet because they do not understand its cause, four errors arise. Although the five hundred divergent schools know the cause of suffering, they do not penetrate its root. Clinging to determinate nature, the fruit of suffering does not cease, and they produce further causes of suffering. The present chapter wishes to show that suffering through causes and conditions has no determinate nature, enabling the fruit of suffering to cease and preventing causes of suffering from arising. It is therefore called the chapter examining suffering.”
Jizang divides the next eight verses into the first seven explaining neither self-making nor making by another and the next one explaining neither joint nor causeless making. The first seven are further divided into the first two on dharmas, the next three on persons, and the final two jointly concluding person and dharma. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0103c07–0103c10〕 reads: 「次八偈釋破為二：初七偈釋不自不他、次一偈釋不共不無因。七偈為三：初兩偈明法不自他、次三偈明人不自他、第三兩偈結人法不自他。」 tr. “The next eight verses explain the refutation in two parts: the first seven explain neither self-making nor making by another, and the next verse explains neither joint making nor making without a cause. The seven verses have three parts: the first two clarify that dharmas are neither self-made nor made by another; the next three clarify that persons are neither self-made nor made by another; and the third pair concludes that neither persons nor dharmas are self-made or made by another.”
Jizang explains that “other” exists by depending on “self,” so because self is unestablished, other is unestablished; he further concludes the person approach by explaining that what is other for another is precisely self. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0103c29–0104a03〕 reads: 「偈結破自他，初偈結人不自他、次偈結法不自他。初偈上半就相待門、下半就相即門。相待門者，待自故有他，自既不成，他亦不成也。相即者，他於他即是自。」 tr. “The verses conclude the refutation of self and other. The first concludes that the person is neither self-made nor made by another; the next concludes that the dharma is neither self-made nor made by another. The first verse’s first half uses the approach of mutual dependence, and its second half the approach of reciprocal identity. The mutual-dependence approach says that other exists by depending on self; since self is unestablished, other is likewise unestablished. Reciprocal identity means that what is other for another is precisely self.”
Jizang explains a dharma’s not making itself through a knife that does not cut itself and an eye that does not see itself. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0104a05–0104a06〕 reads: 「舉例如刀不自割、眼不自見，苦豈自作耶？」 tr. “Examples are raised: a knife does not cut itself, and an eye does not see itself. How could suffering make itself?”
Jizang further explains that because what is other for another is self and “that” has no substance of its own, another cannot make suffering. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0104a06–0104a07〕 reads: 「彼於彼即是自，若有彼之自體可言彼，既無彼自體豈有彼作耶？」 tr. “What is other for another is precisely self. Only if that possessed its own substance could it be called that; since that has no substance of its own, how could that make anything?”
Terminology
In Qingmu’s commentary, suffering primarily means the suffering of the five aggregates subject to appropriation. Self-making means arising from intrinsic nature; making by another requires this and that to be intrinsically different; joint making requires the self and other branches to be established first; making without a cause removes every dependence on causes.
Doctrinal Outline
The chapter moves from a general statement of four modes of making into self and other at the level of dharmas, self and other at the level of persons, then concludes the refutations of joint and causeless making and finally extends the analysis to all external things. Question, answer, verse, and prose unfold in their original sequence.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
This chapter is attributed to Nāgārjuna as author, Qingmu as commentator, and Kumārajīva as translator. The Bhāviveka and Sthiramati lines serve only as coordinate witnesses to alternative interpretations; their voices are not combined, nor are later translations used to revise Kumārajīva’s text.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
The chapter is not adjudicated through later sectarian classifications. The Mahāyāna Madhyamaka Commentary uses 「緣所成故」 tr. “because they are made through conditions” to explain that dharmas are neither self-made nor made by another.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
The causeless section of this chapter explicitly refers back to the chapter on act and agent, while the final verse extends the four routes to external things.
Position of the Editions
| Use | Textual witness and range |
|---|---|
| Root verses and Qingmu commentary | T30n1564〔0016b21–0017a24〕 |
| Bhāviveka-line alternative interpretation | T30n1566, corresponding chapter |
| Sthiramati-line alternative interpretation | T30n1567, corresponding chapter |
| Jizang’s running commentary | T42n1824, corresponding chapter |