中論 觀染染者品第六

The questioner arrives with a sentence from the sūtra: the three poisons are the root of the world, and craving has an especially large number of names. With the terms distinguished so finely, he installs two positions—“Resting upon sentient beings, the being is called the defiled, and craving is called the defiling dharma.”

The response is short: “Although the sūtra teaches the names of the three poisons, their reality cannot be found.” The names are accepted; the reality must still be sought.

Sequence: One Side Need Not Be Defiled Again; on the Other, No One Can Be Defiled

“If, apart from the defiling dharma, a defiled person already existed, because this person was already in desire, defilement would have to arise again.”

Qingmu says: “If it is already determined that a defiled person exists, no further defilement is needed, because that person has already been defiled.” What is defilement to do to someone already defiled?

Reverse it and the same applies: “If there were no defiled person, how could there be defilement?” With no one to receive it, upon whom could defilement fall? The defiling dharma undergoes the same test—of defilement existing prior to and apart from a person, Qingmu says it is “like fire without fuel.”

Simultaneity: Neither Owes the Other Priority, So Neither Exists through the Other

Then let them arise at the same time. Yet “the defiled and the defiling dharma together have no dependence upon each other.” Established without a cause, they become permanent. Qingmu states the cost of permanence directly: “If permanent, many faults follow; there is no dharma of liberation.”

Identity and Difference: If One, It Cannot Conjoin with Itself; If Different, It Need Not Conjoin

“How could one dharma conjoin with itself? A fingertip cannot touch itself.” A fingertip cannot touch itself; one end cannot produce a conjunction.

What about difference? “If each is already fully established, no further conjunction is needed; even if they conjoin, they remain different.” Two things already complete in themselves remain two even when placed together. Qingmu adds: if person and dharma were one, “there would be utter confusion”; if different things can conjoin by virtue of difference, “even the most distant should conjoin.”

The Two Sides Rescue Each Other

When difference does not work, conjunction is brought in; when conjunction incurs faults, difference is brought back. Qingmu catches the movement in a sentence: “You yourself believe the matter settled, but what you say is unsettled.”

Since the mark of difference is unestablished, “within which mark of difference do you intend to assert a mark of conjunction?”

The Final Sentence Must Be Read as a Whole

“Thus, defilement and the defiled are established through neither conjunction nor nonconjunction,” and from defilement the examination extends to anger, delusion, every affliction, and every dharma.

Yet Qingmu closes with: “Neither before nor after, neither conjoined nor dispersed—they are established through causes and conditions.” The four negations dismantle fixed arrangements; the final words say that things still exist—in the mode of being established through causes and conditions.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll One, “Examination of Defilement and the Defiled, Chapter Six,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Since the Three Poisons Are the Root of the World, Must Defilement and the Defiled Not Exist?

〔T30 0008a15〕The questioner says: The sūtra teaches that craving, anger, and delusion are the root of the world. Craving has many names: first it is called love, next attachment, next defilement, next sexual desire, and next covetous desire—there are many such names. This is a binding affliction. When it rests upon a sentient being, that being is called the defiled, while craving is called the defiling dharma. Because there are a defiling dharma and a defiled person, craving exists. The other two, anger and delusion, are the same: where anger exists there is an angry person, and where delusion exists there is a deluded person. The three poisons condition the arising of three kinds of action; those three kinds of action condition the arising of the three realms. Thus, all dharmas exist.

II. Answer: Although the Sūtra Teaches the Names of the Three Poisons, Their Reality Cannot Be Found

The respondent says: Although the sūtra teaches the names of the three poisons, their reality cannot be found. Why?

III. Verse: One Already Defiled Need Not Be Defiled Again; without a Defiled Person, No One Receives Defilement

If, apart from the defiling dharma, a defiled person already existed independently, then because this person was already in desire, defilement would have to arise again;

if there were no defiled person, how could there be defilement?

Whether defilement is said to exist or not exist, examination of the defiled proceeds in the same way.

IV. Explanation: Neither Prior Existence nor Prior Nonexistence of Defilement and the Defiled Can Stand

If it is already determined that a defiled person exists, no further defilement is needed, because that person has already been defiled. If it is already determined that there is no defiled person, defilement likewise should not arise: there must first be a person who can be defiled before defilement can arise. If there is initially no defiled person, there is no one to receive defilement.

The defiling dharma is the same. If a defiling dharma determinately existed before and apart from a person, it would be without a cause—how could it arise? It would be like fire without fuel. If it is already determined that there is no defiling dharma, there is no defiled person. Thus the verse says: “Whether defilement exists or does not exist, the defiled is the same.”

V. Question: Then Say That the Defiling Dharma and the Defiled Arise Simultaneously

The questioner says: If it cannot be found that the defiling dharma and the defiled arise in sequence and dependence, what fault would there be in saying that they arise simultaneously?

The respondent answers as follows.

VI. Verse: If Both Are Established Simultaneously, No Dependence Can Be Spoken Of

That the defiled person and the defiling dharma are established together cannot stand;

if the defiled and defilement exist simultaneously, neither side depends on the other.

VII. Explanation: without Dependence They Become Permanent Dharmas Existing without Causes

If the defiling dharma and the defiled were established simultaneously, they would not depend upon each other: the defiling dharma would not exist because of the defiled, nor the defiled because of the defiling dharma. They would then have to be permanent, because each was already established without a cause. If they were permanent, many faults would follow—there would be no dharma of liberation.

Next, defilement and the defiled should be refuted through the two gates of identity and difference. Why?

VIII. Verse: Identity Cannot Conjoin, and Difference Cannot Conjoin Either

If the defiled person and the defiling dharma were one, how could one dharma conjoin with itself?

If the defiled person and the defiling dharma were different, how could different dharmas conjoin?

IX. Explanation: If One, There Is No Conjunction; If Different, No Further Conjunction Is Needed

The defiling dharma and the defiled are said to conjoin either as one dharma or as different dharmas. If they are one, there is no conjunction. Why? How could one dharma conjoin with itself? A fingertip cannot touch itself. If different dharmas are said to conjoin, that also cannot stand. Why? Because each is already established as different. Since each has already been fully established, no further conjunction is needed; even if they are said to conjoin, they remain different.

Next, neither the gate of identity nor the gate of difference can stand. Why?

X. Verse: Conjunction Should Exist Even Apart from a Companion

If what is one can still conjoin, then conjunction should exist apart from a companion;

if what is different can still conjoin, it likewise should conjoin apart from a companion.

XI. Explanation: Identity Throws Person and Dharma into Confusion; Difference Would Let Even the Most Distant Things Conjoin

If defilement and the defiled are one but are forcibly called conjoined, then defilement and the defiled should exist apart from all other causes and conditions. Moreover, if they are one, there should not be two names, defilement and the defiled—defilement is a dharma, while the defiled is a person. If person and dharma were one, there would be utter confusion.

If defilement and the defiled are each different yet said to conjoin, then they should conjoin without any other causes and conditions. If what is different can conjoin, even things separated by a vast distance should conjoin.

XII. Question: The Eye Sees Different Dharmas Conjoin

The questioner says: It may be granted that one thing cannot conjoin, but the eye sees different dharmas conjoining.

The respondent answers as follows.

XIII. Verse: If They Are First Called Different and Then Conjoined, What Does Conjunction Do for Them?

If what is different can conjoin, what does conjunction do for defilement and the defiled?

The marks of these two are already different, and only afterward is a mark of conjunction asserted.

XIV. Explanation: Once They Are Already Different, the Later Conjunction Is Forcibly Added

If defilement and the defiled first possess fixed marks of difference and conjoin only afterward, this does not constitute conjunction. Why? The marks of these two were already different, yet afterward conjunction is forcibly asserted.

Next:

XV. Verse: Once Each Has Established a Different Mark, How Can Conjunction Still Be Asserted?

If defilement and the defiled have each already established a different mark,

once their different marks have been established, how can they be said to conjoin?

XVI. Explanation: Once Each Has Its Separate Mark, Why Forcibly Assert a Mark of Conjunction?

If defilement and the defiled have each already established a separate mark, why do you now forcibly assert a mark of conjunction?

Next:

XVII. Verse: When Difference Fails, Conjunction Is Brought In; When Conjunction Fails, Difference Is Brought Back

Because the mark of difference has not been established, you wish to speak of conjunction;

when the mark of conjunction is ultimately not established, you turn back and speak of the mark of difference.

XVIII. Explanation: You Believe You Have Settled It, Yet What You Say Is Unsettled

Because the different marks of defilement and the defiled are not established, you change to asserting a mark of conjunction. But the mark of conjunction contains faults, so defilement and the defiled remain unestablished. In order to establish the mark of conjunction, you then turn back and assert a mark of difference. You yourself believe the matter settled, but what you say is unsettled. Why?

XIX. Verse: If the Mark of Difference Is Unestablished, Conjunction Has Nothing on Which to Depend

Because the mark of difference has not been established, the mark of conjunction cannot be established;

within which mark of difference do you intend to assert a mark of conjunction?

XX. Explanation: without a Mark of Difference to Depend upon, Conjunction Cannot Be Spoken Of

Because the different marks of defilement and the defiled are not established here, the mark of conjunction is likewise unestablished. Within which mark of difference do you intend to assert a mark of conjunction?

Next:

XXI. Verse: Neither Conjunction nor Nonconjunction Can Stand; All Dharmas Are the Same

Thus, defilement and the defiled are established through neither conjunction nor nonconjunction;

all other dharmas are the same, established through neither conjunction nor nonconjunction.

XXII. Explanation: From Craving and Defilement the Examination Extends to All Dharmas, Which Remain Conditioned Arisings

As with defilement, so too with anger and delusion. As with the three poisons, so too with all afflictions and all dharmas. Neither before nor after, neither conjoined nor dispersed—such things are all established through causes and conditions.

By the time one reaches this chapter of the Treatise on the Middle, the questioner comes holding a sentence from the sūtra.

He speaks with confidence: the sūtra teaches that craving, anger, and delusion are the root of the world. Moreover, craving has more than one name—“first it is called love, next attachment, next defilement, next sexual desire, and next covetous desire.” As the names unfold one after another, the terminology is complete and its levels distinct. When the names are this numerous and precise, could what they indicate really be empty? He therefore installs two positions in passing: “Resting upon sentient beings, the being is called the defiled, and craving is called the defiling dharma.” A person stands there to be defiled, and a dharma stands there to defile. Once both ends are established, craving naturally exists. The inference then continues: the three poisons produce three kinds of action; those actions produce the three realms; “therefore, all dharmas exist.”

One sūtra sentence and a few inferential steps, and the entire world has been erected.

The respondent gives only one sentence, but it is the gate of the entire chapter:

“Although the sūtra teaches the names of the three poisons, their reality cannot be found.”

See clearly the distinction this sentence makes. He does not say the sūtra is wrong, nor that there is no such thing as craving. He first accepts the names—“although the sūtra teaches the names of the three poisons”—and only then asks: if we follow these names to seek the real thing, can it be found?

A name’s presence does not mean that something standing by itself exists beneath it. The ten verses that follow all do the same thing: taking the two names defiling dharma and defiled person, they pass through one gate after another seeking the reality those names indicate.

The Gate of Sequence: Who Is There First?

The first verse begins with before and after:

“If, apart from the defiling dharma, a defiled person already existed, because this person was already in desire, defilement would have to arise again.”

Suppose a defiled person stands there first and the defiling dharma arrives afterward. Qingmu topples the supposition in one sentence: “If it is already determined that a defiled person exists, no further defilement is needed, because that person has already been defiled.”

The step is utterly plain. Calling someone “the defiled” means the person is already defiled; what is left for a defiling dharma to do upon arrival? What can it add? If the person still lacks a measure of defilement before qualifying as defiled, then the earlier name “the defiled” cannot be attached.

What if the order is reversed? The verse continues: “If there were no defiled person, how could there be defilement?” Qingmu says: “If it is already determined that there is no defiled person, defilement likewise should not arise. A defiled person must first exist, and only then can defilement arise. If there is initially no defiled person, there is no one to receive defilement.”

Prior absence of the defiled does not work either—upon whom could defilement operate? With no one to receive it, defilement has nowhere to land.

At one end, a person already defiled has no need to be defiled again; at the other, no person exists to be defiled. Neither end of this path goes through.

The verse then turns the same measure upon the other side: “Whether defilement exists or does not exist, the defiled is the same.” Qingmu’s analogy is vivid: “If a defiling dharma determinately existed before and apart from a person, it would be without a cause. How could it arise? It would be like fire without fuel.”

A defiling dharma existing prior to and apart from a person is like a fire without fuel. What would the fire burn? Upon what would craving crave?

Then Say They Are Simultaneous—But Simultaneity Removes Dependence

The questioner changes his footing: since sequence fails, let defiling dharma and defiled person arise at the same time. He asks directly: “What fault is there if they arise simultaneously?”

The move looks clever. Arising together, neither owes the other priority.

But the verse points out what has been lost:

“That the defiled person and the defiling dharma are established together cannot stand; if the defiled and the defiling dharma exist together, there is no dependence.”

Two things established simultaneously no longer depend upon one another. Qingmu makes this explicit: “The defiling dharma does not exist because of the defiled. The defiled does not exist because of the defiling dharma. These two should be permanent, because each has been established without a cause.”

The questioner originally wanted the fact of craving’s existence; if he truly secures simultaneous establishment, what he secures instead are two things that exist without causes. What exists without a cause is permanent. Qingmu states the cost of permanence directly: “If permanent, many faults follow; there is no dharma of liberation.”

This sentence should be remembered. Examining the fixed reality of defilement and the defiled is not an effort to win an argument; it preserves the possibility of liberation. If defilement truly were a permanent thing, it could never be washed away.

Identity and Difference: How Can One Dharma Conjoin with Itself?

Having questioned sequence and simultaneity, the respondent establishes another gate: “Next, defilement and the defiled should be refuted through identity and difference.”

“If the defiled and the defiling dharma are one, how could one dharma conjoin? if the defiled and the defiling dharma are different, how could different dharmas conjoin?”

First consider identity. Qingmu gives an example in only a few words, yet anyone understands it: “How could one dharma conjoin with itself? A fingertip cannot touch itself.”

A fingertip cannot touch itself. Conjunction needs at least two ends; with only one end, conjunction cannot be spoken of. Since craving is said to occur when defiled person and defiling dharma conjoin, they cannot at the same time be said to be one.

Next consider difference. Difference fails too, not because the two cannot touch, but because no touch is needed: “Because they are established as different. If each is already fully established, no further conjunction is needed; even if conjoined, they remain different.”

Two things already fully established in themselves gain nothing by conjoining or not conjoining. Even placed together, they remain two.

The respondent presses a level further:

“If what is one can conjoin, conjunction should exist apart from a companion; if what is different can conjoin, conjunction should likewise exist apart from a companion.”

If one can still be called conjoined, it should conjoin apart from a companion—one end is enough, so why wait for another? If different things can conjoin, they should likewise conjoin apart from a companion—each is independently established and originally does not await the other.

On the side of identity, Qingmu adds a more immediate point: “Moreover, if they are one, there should not be the two names defilement and the defiled. Defilement is a dharma, while the defiled is a person. If person and dharma are one, there is utter confusion.”

Defilement is a dharma; the defiled is a person. If person and dharma were one, utter confusion would follow—when craving ceased, the person would cease with it; as long as the person remained, craving could never be removed. Everyday speech distinguishes the matter clearly: this person has craving. Making the distinction already concedes that the two are not one.

On the side of difference, Qingmu’s inference is equally uncompromising: “If what is different can conjoin, even the most distant should conjoin.” If two things truly stand independently yet can conjoin, distance cannot be a reason against it; even the most distant should conjoin.

The Eye Sees Different Dharmas Conjoin—That Conjunction Was Added Later

The questioner appeals to experience: “It may be granted that one thing does not conjoin, but the eye sees different dharmas conjoining.” I concede that one cannot conjoin, but the eye sees different things come together every day.

The respondent does not deny what the eye sees. He asks what the word “different” had already been made to mean:

“If what is different can conjoin, what does conjunction do for defilement and the defiled? the marks of these two are already different, and only afterward is a mark of conjunction asserted.”

You first call the two things independently possessed of fixed, different marks, then say that they conjoin. What has conjunction done for them? Qingmu says: “The marks of these two were already different, and only afterward is conjunction forcibly asserted.” The word “forcibly” strikes the crux—conjunction is added later, but the addition does not alter the independently established identities assigned to them beforehand.

The verse asks once again:

“If defilement and the defiled have each already established a different mark, once the different marks have been established, how can they be said to conjoin?”

Qingmu makes the words still plainer for the reader: “If defilement and the defiled have each already established a separate mark, why do you now forcibly assert a mark of conjunction?”

Two Unestablished Accounts Hold Each Other Up

Here the chapter’s most interesting move appears. The respondent stops refuting one claim at a time and instead diagrams the opponent’s changing footing:

“Because the mark of difference has not been established, you wish to speak of conjunction; when the mark of conjunction is ultimately unestablished, you turn back and speak of the mark of difference.”

Qingmu is more explicit: “Because the different marks of defilement and the defiled are unestablished, you next assert a mark of conjunction. But the mark of conjunction contains faults, and defilement and the defiled are not established. In order to establish the mark of conjunction, you then assert a mark of difference again.”

When difference does not work, conjunction is moved in to rescue it; when conjunction causes trouble, difference is moved back. Neither side yet stands, but they lean upon each other for support.

Qingmu then delivers the chapter’s sharpest sentence:

“You yourself believe the matter settled, but what you say is unsettled.”

You believe you have settled it, yet the words you speak never settle. This sentence is not addressed only to the ancient questioner. When the same matter is given one account from one angle, another after the angle shifts, and then the first again—the mind beneath them that imagines it has grasped something has never come to rest.

The final gate closes in one verse:

“Because the mark of difference is unestablished, the mark of conjunction cannot be established; within which mark of difference do you intend to assert a mark of conjunction?”

Once the mark of difference fails, conjunction has nothing on which to depend. Qingmu hands the words back unchanged: “Within which mark of difference do you intend to assert a mark of conjunction?”

Conclusion: Neither Conjunction nor Nonconjunction; All Dharmas Are the Same

“Thus, defilement and the defiled are established through neither conjunction nor nonconjunction; all dharmas are the same, established through neither conjunction nor nonconjunction.”

The second half of the verse carries the chapter outward from the single matter of craving. Qingmu follows it: “As with defilement, so too with anger and delusion. As with the three poisons, so too with all afflictions and all dharmas.”

Examine anger and delusion as defilement was examined; examine all afflictions and all dharmas as the three poisons were examined. What this chapter really tests is not merely craving but the thought that “an agent and an acted-upon thing each first stand on their own, then come together.”

The crucial point is the final sentence. Do not read the preceding ten verses as saying that nothing exists:

“Neither before nor after, neither conjoined nor dispersed—they are established through causes and conditions.”

Not before, not after, not conjoined, not dispersed—and then the words “established through causes and conditions.” The four negations dismantle fixed arrangements of sequence, conjunction, and dispersion; the final words say that these things still exist, only in the mode of existing through causes and conditions.

Craving does arise. It still burns people and still must be counteracted. What is denied here is only that, behind the arising of craving, a ready-made defiled person and a ready-made defiling dharma already wait to be brought together.

What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?

First, a complete set of names does not make a ready-made entity. “Although the sūtra teaches the names of the three poisons, their reality cannot be found.” The more finely love, attachment, defilement, sexual desire, and covetous desire are distinguished, the easier it is to imagine that a corresponding object must be sitting beneath them.

Second, a person already defiled does not need to be defiled again. This is a useful measure: whenever an identity is installed first and an event is then sought to accomplish that identity, the same fault appears.

Third, examining fixed reality preserves liberation. “If permanent, many faults follow; there is no dharma of liberation.” If defilement were a permanent thing, practice would have no point at which to begin.

Fourth, notice whether you are making two sides rescue one another. “You yourself believe the matter settled, but what you say is unsettled.” This sentence is best used as a mirror for oneself, not a weapon against someone else.

Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror

The preceding is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows lets the Sui–Tang Three Treatises tradition illuminate it from the side. The mirror is not the treatise; it offers another way to read the same verses.

Jizang’s Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle reads the five names love, attachment, defilement, sexual desire, and covetous desire as a sequence from shallow to deep: the initial arising of thought is called love; the mind’s continuing fixation, attachment; deep and persistent entanglement, defilement; the stirring of a frantic mind, sexual desire; and the expedient effort to take something as one’s own, covetous desire. He says the first three are still light and extend through the three kinds of existence, while the latter two are heavy and belong only to the desire realm. He also divides the chapter’s ten verses into six sections: refutation through before and after; refutation through simultaneity; refutation through identity and difference; focused refutation through difference; admonition; and analogical refutation of other dharmas. He judges these six gates to be a contemplation that cuts off afflictions: seeking affliction through six gates and finding none is right contemplation, called the uninterrupted path; the contemplation arising in the next moment is called the path of liberation. For the final verse, he says the first half recapitulates the preceding vertical refutation of five claims, while the second extends the analogy horizontally to all dharmas. He especially warns that, once conjunction has been refuted, someone might inversely grasp nonconjunction as establishing person and dharma; therefore nonconjunction too is refuted. The first two verses concern person and dharma before and after and so belong to the gate of nonconjunction; from simultaneity through the chapter’s end, the gate of conjunction is refuted.

This mirror joins the chapter to the Three Treatises tradition’s interpretive framework of refuting the deviant and disclosing the right. The sequence assigned to the names and the sixfold classification are Jizang’s additions, not the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s long commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.