中論 觀成壞品第二十一

The questioner points to what lies before the eyes: “All worldly things presently display the mark of ruin; therefore, destruction exists.” The treatise does not dispute what is seen. It asks only: on what does the destruction you speak of stand?

With All Four Gates Traversed, Formation and Destruction Do Not Stand by Themselves

“Apart from formation or together with formation, no destruction exists there; apart from destruction or together with destruction, no formation exists there.”

Apart from formation there is no destruction, because “formation means the conjunction of many conditions; destruction means their dispersal.” What has never conjoined has nothing to disperse: “Without a jar, one cannot say that a jar is destroyed.” Together with formation there is likewise no destruction, because conjunction requires things first separately established; erase their difference and destruction loses its cause. Apart from destruction there is no formation, because “if formation existed apart from destruction, formation would be permanent.” Together with destruction there is no formation, because “a person cannot have hair and have no hair at the same time.”

Exhaustion and nonexhaustion fare the same. What is exhausted does not remain, like flowing water, and is “like a mirage with no determinate nature obtainable”; no moment of formation can be cut from it. If nonexhaustion is fixed as permanent continuity, one likewise asks: “How can one discriminate and say, ‘Now is the time of formation’?”

Dharmas and formation-destruction still less can be separated from one another. Apart from formation and destruction, a dharma can only “be absent or permanent”; apart from a dharma, “if separated from the dharma, who forms and who is destroyed?” If intrinsic nature is empty, there is no one to form or be destroyed; if “nonempty means determinately existent,” there is likewise no formation or destruction. To say they are one fails; to say they are different fails as well.

As for taking “seen with the eye” as evidence, Qingmu does not deny what is seen. He points out where the seeing comes from: “Ordinary people obtained these eyes through inverted causes and conditions in prior lives; through the causes and conditions of recollection, conception, and discrimination in this life, they say that the eye sees arising and ceasing.”

Arising Cannot Make the Connection Either

“From a dharma no dharma arises, nor does a nondharma arise; from a nondharma neither a dharma nor a nondharma arises.”

What has nothing whatsoever cannot produce another nothing whatsoever, “as a hare’s horn does not produce a turtle’s hair.” The three kinds—arising from self, other, or both—likewise do not arise. Before arising there is no self; without self, there is no other.

Continuity Cannot Rescue the Extremes of Annihilation and Permanence

The questioner builds a bridge with “because cause and fruit are continuous, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.” The reply says: “Because what ceases does not arise again, the cause is annihilated.” If every joint is broken, adding more joints does not make an unbroken line.

The graver consequence comes next. If the continuity of the three modes of existence is taken as real, “nirvāṇa, by extinguishing continuity, falls into annihilation.” If the first existence ceases, later existence is causeless; if it does not cease, there are “two existences at the same time.” At the time of ceasing and at the time of arising, there are still two existences. If both truly occur at the same time, “one dies in these very aggregates and is born in these very aggregates.”

Sought carefully through the three times, it cannot be obtained anywhere: “One should know that the continuity of existence exists through ignorance and inversion; in reality, it is absent.”

Where It Lands

The treatise does not say that flowers do not fade or people do not die; Qingmu himself says, “Yet remaining does in fact occur.” What is removed is only formation and destruction treated as capable of standing by themselves. Views of the extremes of existence and nonexistence all grow from this point: determine that it forms, and one falls into permanence; determine that it is utterly destroyed, and one falls into annihilation. Once the root is gone, neither extreme has a place to arise.

When the jar exists, no mark of destruction is present; when the jar is absent, no mark of destruction is present either.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle three, “Examination of Formation and Dissolution, Chapter Twenty-One,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.

1. Question: Ruin Plainly Present before the Eyes

〔T30 0027c12〕The questioner says: All things in the world presently display the mark of ruin. Therefore, destruction exists.

The respondent answers as follows.

2. Verse: No Destruction Apart from or Together with Formation; No Formation Apart from or Together with Destruction

Apart from formation or together with formation, no destruction exists there; apart from destruction or together with destruction, no formation exists there.

Qingmu explains: whether formation exists or is absent, destruction is absent in both cases; whether destruction exists or is absent, formation is absent in both cases. Why?

3. Verse: Examining the Four Gates One by One

If separated from formation, how could destruction exist? As death apart from birth—this cannot be so.

If formation and destruction exist together, how could formation and destruction exist? Like birth and death in the world, they cannot both occur at one time.

If separated from destruction, how could formation exist? Impermanence has never, even for an instant, been absent from dharmas.

4. Commentary: Qingmu Explains Each Gate

Apart from formation, destruction cannot be found. Why? If destruction existed apart from formation, it would not exist because of formation and would be causeless; moreover, no formed dharma would exist to be destroyed. Formation means the conjunction of many conditions; destruction means the dispersal of many conditions. If destruction existed apart from formation, then without formation what would be destroyed? Without a jar, one cannot say that a jar is destroyed. Therefore, apart from formation there is no destruction.

If one says that destruction exists together with formation, this too cannot be established. Why? Dharmas are first separately established and afterward conjoin; a conjoined dharma is not apart from difference. If destruction is apart from difference, destruction is causeless. Therefore, together with formation there is likewise no destruction.

If both apart from destruction and together with destruction there is no formation—first consider separation from destruction. If formation existed apart from destruction, formation would be permanent, and permanence is precisely the mark of indestructibility. Yet in fact no dharma is seen that permanently bears the mark of indestructibility. Therefore, apart from destruction there is no formation.

If formation existed together with destruction, this too cannot be established. Formation and destruction contradict one another; how could both exist at the same time? A person, for example, cannot have hair and have no hair at the same time. Formation and destruction are likewise so. Therefore, formation together with destruction cannot be established. Why? Suppose one who discriminates dharmas says that destruction is constantly present within formation. This too cannot be established. Why? If destruction were constantly present within formation, there should be no mark of remaining; yet remaining does in fact occur. Therefore, whether apart from destruction or together with destruction, formation should not exist.

Further:

5. Verse and Commentary: Neither Together nor Apart Is Possible

〔T30 0028a11〕Together with destruction there is no formation; apart from destruction there is likewise no formation. Since both are impossible, how could formation exist?

Qingmu explains: together with destruction there is no formation, and apart from destruction there is no formation. If together, the two dharmas contradict one another; how could they occur at one time? If apart, formation is causeless. Neither gate is established, so how could formation exist? If one asserts formation, one should explain the reason.

6. Exhaustion and Nonexhaustion

The questioner says: Dharmas displaying the mark of exhaustion and extinction are presently found. Such a dharma may be called exhausted or not exhausted. Therefore, formation and destruction should exist.

The respondent says in verse: if exhausted, there is no formation; if not exhausted, there is likewise no formation. If exhausted, there is no destruction; if not exhausted, there is likewise no destruction.

Qingmu explains: dharmas constantly cease and are exhausted thought by thought, day and night; what is past does not remain, like flowing water. This is called exhaustion. It cannot be appropriated or spoken, like a mirage with no determinate intrinsic nature obtainable. Since no determinate intrinsic nature can be found in exhaustion, how can one discriminate and say that formation exists? Therefore, exhaustion does not establish formation. Since formation is absent, destruction likewise should not exist; therefore, it is said that within exhaustion there is no destruction.

Further, because arising and ceasing continue thought by thought without interruption, this is called nonexhaustion. If such a dharma is determined to be permanently abiding and unbroken, how can one discriminate and say, “Now is the time of formation”? Therefore, within nonexhaustion there is no formation. Since formation is absent, destruction is absent; therefore, within nonexhaustion there is likewise no destruction. When sought in this way, a real thing cannot be found. Thus, there is no formation and no destruction.

7. Can a Dharma and Formation-Destruction Be Separated from One Another?

The questioner says: Set the matter of formation and destruction aside. What fault is there if only the existence of a dharma is established?

The respondent says in verse: apart from formation and destruction, no dharma exists either; apart from a dharma, formation and destruction likewise do not exist.

Qingmu explains the statement that no dharma exists apart from formation and destruction. If a dharma has neither formation nor destruction, that dharma should either be absent or permanent. Yet no permanent dharma exists in the world. Your claim that a dharma exists apart from formation and destruction cannot be established.

The questioner says: What fault is there if one separates from the dharma and retains only formation and destruction?

The respondent says: To have formation and destruction apart from a dharma likewise cannot be established. Why? Apart from the dharma, who forms and who is destroyed? Therefore, formation and destruction apart from a dharma cannot be established.

Further:

8. Empty and Nonempty

If the intrinsic nature of dharmas is empty, who could have formation and destruction? If intrinsic nature is not empty, formation and destruction likewise do not exist.

Qingmu explains: if the intrinsic nature of dharmas is empty, where within emptiness could formation and destruction exist? If the intrinsic nature of dharmas is not empty, nonempty means determinately existent; formation and destruction likewise should not exist.

Further:

9. One and Different

If formation and destruction are one, this cannot be established; if formation and destruction are different, this likewise cannot be established.

Qingmu explains: when formation and destruction are sought as one, they cannot be found. Why? Because their marks differ and because they receive many discriminations. When formation and destruction are sought as different, they likewise cannot be found. Why? Because they have no separate bodies and because there is no cause.

Further:

10. Seeing Arising and Ceasing with the Eye

If one says that because arising and ceasing are seen with the eye, arising and ceasing truly exist, then one sees arising and ceasing through delusion.

Qingmu explains: if one says that arising and ceasing are seen with the eye, how can they be refuted through speech? This cannot be established. Why? Arising and ceasing seen with the eye occur through ignorance and inversion. One should see that the intrinsic nature of dharmas is empty, unfixed, like an illusion and a dream. Ordinary people obtained these eyes through inverted causes and conditions in prior lives; through the causes and conditions of recollection, conception, and discrimination in this life, they say that the eye sees arising and ceasing. Within the ultimate meaning, arising and ceasing in truth do not exist. This has already been explained at length in “Examination of the Marks.”

Further:

11. Dharma and Nondharma Do Not Produce One Another

From a dharma no dharma arises, nor does a nondharma arise; from a nondharma neither a dharma nor a nondharma arises.

Qingmu explains “from a dharma no dharma arises”: whether it is said to lose or to arrive, neither account can be established. If a dharma arises from a dharma, whether through arriving or losing, it becomes causeless; causelessness falls into annihilation and permanence. If what has already arrived arises as a dharma from a dharma, then although this dharma has arrived it is called arising: it becomes permanent; it also arises once more after having arisen; and it likewise arises causelessly. This cannot be established. If what has already been lost arises as a dharma from a dharma, then the cause has been lost and the producer is causeless; therefore, a dharma likewise does not arise through loss.

“From a dharma no nondharma arises”: nondharma means having nothing whatsoever, while dharma means existence. How could a mark of nonexistence arise from a mark of existence? Therefore, from a dharma no nondharma arises.

“From a nondharma no dharma arises”: nondharma means absence. How can absence produce existence? If existence arose from absence, it would be causeless, and causelessness has great faults. Therefore, a dharma does not arise from a nondharma.

“From a nondharma no nondharma arises”: nondharma means having nothing whatsoever. How could having nothing whatsoever produce having nothing whatsoever? A hare’s horn, for example, does not produce a turtle’s hair. Therefore, a nondharma does not arise from a nondharma.

12. Arising from Self, Other, or Both

The questioner says: Although dharma and nondharma do not arise under the many preceding discriminations, at least a dharma should be able to produce a dharma.

The respondent says in verse: a dharma does not arise from itself, another, or self and other together. How, then, could arising exist?

Qingmu explains: before a dharma arises, it has nothing whatsoever; since it cannot produce itself, a dharma does not arise from self. If a dharma has not arisen, another is likewise absent; because another is absent, it cannot be said to arise from another. Further, before arising there is no self; without self there is likewise no other, so both together cannot produce either. If none of these three produces, how could a dharma arise from a dharma?

Further:

13. Appropriated Dharmas and the Two Extremes of Annihilation and Permanence

If there is an appropriated dharma, one falls into annihilation or permanence. One should know that the appropriated dharma is either permanent or impermanent.

Qingmu explains: appropriating a dharma means discriminating, “This is wholesome, this is unwholesome; this is permanent, this is impermanent,” and so forth. Such a person necessarily falls into either the view of permanence or the view of annihilation. Why? The appropriated dharma can only be one of two kinds: permanent or impermanent. Neither can be established. Why? If permanent, one falls into the extreme of permanence; if impermanent, one falls into the extreme of annihilation.

14. Can Continuity of Cause and Fruit Avoid Annihilation and Permanence?

The questioner says: One who appropriates dharmas does not fall into annihilation or permanence; because cause and fruit are continuous, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.

〔T30 0029a01〕Qingmu says: Someone may trust, appropriate, discriminate, and explain dharmas without falling into annihilation and permanence. A sūtra, for example, says that the five aggregates are impermanent, suffering, empty, and not-self, yet they are not annihilated; it also says that demerit and merit are not lost through immeasurable kalpas, yet they are not permanent. Why? Because the causes and fruits of these dharmas constantly arise and cease in continuity, coming and going without interruption. Because they arise and cease, they are not permanent; because they are continuous, they are not annihilated.

The respondent says in verse: if cause and fruit arise and cease, continuous and unbroken—because what ceases does not arise again, the cause is annihilated.

Qingmu explains: you say that the causes and fruits of dharmas are continuous, and therefore neither annihilated nor permanent. Yet if a dharma that has ceased is gone and does not arise again, the cause has been cut off. If the cause is cut off, how can continuity exist? What has ceased does not arise.

Further:

15. Abiding in Intrinsic Nature, and Nirvāṇa Falling into Annihilation

If a dharma abides in its intrinsic nature, it should not possess both existence and nonexistence; if nirvāṇa extinguishes continuity, it falls into annihilation.

Qingmu explains: if a dharma is determinately within the mark of existence, at that time it has no mark of nonexistence. If a jar, for example, is determinately within the mark of jar, at that time it has no mark of loss or destruction. When the jar exists, there is no mark of loss or destruction; when the jar is absent, there is likewise no mark of loss or destruction. Why? If there is no jar, there is nothing to destroy. For this reason, ceasing cannot be found. Apart from ceasing, arising is likewise absent. Why? Because arising and ceasing exist through mutual dependence. Further, because the faults of permanence and the rest follow, one dharma should not possess both existence and nonexistence.

Further, you previously said that because cause and fruit arise and cease in continuity, one can appropriate dharmas without falling into annihilation or permanence. This cannot be established. Why? You say that because cause and fruit are continuous, there is continuity of the three modes of existence, and that extinguishing this continuity is called nirvāṇa. If so, at the time of nirvāṇa one should fall into annihilation, because the continuity of the three modes of existence has been extinguished.

Further:

16. First Existence and Later Existence

If the first existence ceases, there is no later existence; if the first existence does not cease, there is likewise no later existence.

Qingmu explains: first existence means existence in this life, and later existence means existence in the next. If the first existence ceases and later existence follows, the later existence is causeless. This cannot be established, so one cannot say that later existence occurs after the first existence ceases. If the first existence does not cease, later existence likewise should not exist. Why? If later existence occurs before the first existence has ceased, there are two existences at one time. This cannot be established, so if the first existence does not cease, there is no later existence.

The questioner says: later existence does not arise after the first existence has ceased or while it has not ceased; it arises precisely at the time of ceasing.

The respondent says in verse: if later existence arises at the time when the first existence ceases, the time of ceasing is one existence and the time of arising is one existence.

Qingmu explains: if later existence arises at the time when the first existence ceases, two existences coexist at the same time: one existence belongs to the time of ceasing and one to the time of arising.

The questioner says: it is not so that two existences coexist at the times of ceasing and arising. Yet one presently sees later existence arise when the first existence ceases.

The respondent says in verse: if arising and ceasing are said to occur at the same time, one should die within these very five aggregates and be born within these very five aggregates.

Qingmu explains: if the times of arising and ceasing are one time without two existences, yet one says that later existence arises as first existence ceases, then one should be born in the very same aggregates in which one dies, not in another set of aggregates. Why? The one who dies is precisely the one who is born. Such contradictory dharmas as death and birth should not occur at the same time and place. Therefore, your earlier statement—that the times of ceasing and arising are one time without two existences, and that one presently sees later existence arise when first existence ceases—cannot be established.

Further:

17. Seeking Continuity through the Three Times

Seeking existence through the three times, continuity cannot be found; if it is absent within the three times, where could continuity of existence exist?

Qingmu explains: the three modes of existence are existence in the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm. Because true wisdom has not been obtained throughout beginningless saṃsāra, continuity of the three modes of existence constantly occurs. Yet now, when carefully sought through the three times, it cannot be found. If existence is absent within the three times, where could continuity of existence exist? One should know that the so-called continuity of existence exists through ignorance and inversion; in reality, it is absent.

Everything is being destroyed. This is perhaps what people are least willing to doubt. Flowers fade, vessels break, bodies age, houses collapse. No treatise need be read; the eyes have already furnished all the proof.

The questioner in this chapter therefore opens with exactly that confidence: “All worldly things presently display the mark of ruin; therefore, destruction exists.” He is not speculating; he points to what lies before him.

What Nāgārjuna asks next is not whether flowers really fade. He asks something else: on what, exactly, does the “destruction” you speak of stand?

Formation and Destruction: Neither Can Stand Alone

The respondent’s first verse opens the pattern of the whole chapter in one sentence:

“Apart from formation or together with formation, no destruction exists there; apart from destruction or together with destruction, no formation exists there.”

Four positions: apart from formation, together with formation, apart from destruction, together with destruction. Destruction has only two possible ways to be established—either apart from formation or simultaneously with it. The same applies to formation. The four gates exhaust the field; there is no fifth. Qingmu restates it more simply: “Whether formation exists or is absent, destruction is absent in both cases. Whether destruction exists or is absent, formation is absent in both cases.”

First consider separation from formation. The verse says: “If separated from formation, how could destruction exist?” It follows with an analogy: “As death apart from birth—this cannot be so.”

The analogy should be read slowly. People in the world speak of birth and death as two events, one earlier and one later. But if they were truly two independent events, one should be able to have only the latter—death without birth. Can anyone die without ever having been born? No. Death is not an event that comes by itself; it is spoken in relation to birth. Remove birth, and the word death no longer has anything to indicate.

The same holds for destruction. Qingmu sets out the definitions of formation and destruction: “Formation means the conjunction of many conditions; destruction means the dispersal of many conditions.” Once formation is removed, what is dispersing? His analogy is utterly plain: “Without a jar, one cannot say that a jar is destroyed.”

Without a jar, you cannot break a jar. The fragments on the ground are called “fragments of a jar” only because there was a jar before. Destruction has never been an independent fact; it is the reverse face of a fact.

Together Does Not Work Either: Having Hair and Having No Hair

Try another formulation, then: can formation and destruction coexist simultaneously?

The verse says: “If formation and destruction exist together, how could formation and destruction exist?” The analogy remains birth and death: “Like birth and death in the world, they cannot both occur at one time.”

Qingmu presses more finely here. If destruction and formation are together, then before being together each must first be something in its own right: “Dharmas are first separately established and afterward conjoin; a conjoined dharma is not apart from difference.” For conjunction, there must first be two things that can conjoin. After they conjoin, their difference has not vanished. But if destruction truly occurs simultaneously and in the same body as formation, the difference disappears; once the difference disappears, destruction loses the cause on which it depends.

Conversely, can formation exist apart from destruction? Qingmu says: “If formation existed apart from destruction, formation would be permanent; permanence is the mark of indestructibility.” Does such a thing exist in the world? No. Thus, apart from destruction there is no formation.

Can formation exist together with destruction? Qingmu changes the analogy: “A person cannot have hair and have no hair at the same time.” Formation and destruction contradict one another. Two contradictory marks cannot occupy the same position simultaneously.

Someone devises a retreat: then say that formation constantly contains destruction. Would that not make them simultaneous? Qingmu’s answer is crisp: “If destruction were constantly present within formation, no dharma of remaining should exist; yet remaining does in fact occur.” If formation were being destroyed every moment, no interval could be called “remaining.” Yet remaining can be spoken, and we really do say that a thing “is there.” This route therefore fails as well.

After traversing the four gates, Nāgārjuna gathers the point: “Together with destruction there is no formation, and apart from it there is no formation,” then asks: “Since both are impossible, how could formation exist?” Qingmu adds a final sentence: “If it exists, explain it.” If you still assert the claim, please give the reason.

At this point the treatise observes every courtesy: it does not forbid you to speak; it asks you to speak.

Exhaustion and Nonexhaustion: Both Doors Close Together

The questioner changes direction. He says: “Dharmas displaying the mark of exhaustion and extinction are presently found.” Such dharmas can be spoken of as exhausted or not exhausted. Since both exhaustion and nonexhaustion can be spoken, formation and destruction should likewise be speakable.

This is an intelligent move. He no longer directly asserts that destruction truly exists, but begins from the fact that we undeniably use these expressions.

The respondent’s verse closes both doors at once:

“If exhausted, there is no formation; if not exhausted, there is likewise no formation. If exhausted, there is no destruction; if not exhausted, there is likewise no destruction.”

First, exhaustion. Qingmu describes it beautifully: “Dharmas constantly cease and are exhausted thought by thought, day and night; what is past does not remain, like flowing water. This is called exhaustion.” Moment after moment ceases throughout day and night, and what has passed refuses to stop even for an instant, like flowing water. Reach for such a thing, and it cannot be grasped; try to speak of it, and speech cannot catch it—“like a mirage, with no determinate nature obtainable.” It is like shimmering heat over a wilderness; approach it and there is nothing there. Since no determinate intrinsic nature can be obtained, from what moment could one cut and say, “This is the time of formation”? If formation cannot be indicated, destruction has nowhere to be placed.

Next, nonexhaustion. “Further, because arising and ceasing continue thought by thought without interruption, it is called nonexhaustion.” Arising and ceasing continue without interruption, and this is called nonexhaustion. But if the continuity is determined to be permanently abiding and unbroken, the difficulty deepens. Along a line that never breaks, “how can one discriminate and say, ‘Now is the time of formation’?” Where does it begin? Without a beginning, there is no formation; without formation, there is no destruction.

One is too fluid to indicate; the other too continuous to divide. Qingmu gathers them: “When sought in this way, a real thing cannot be found; therefore, there is no formation and no destruction.”

Trying to Keep the Dharma and Let Formation and Destruction Go

The questioner retreats a step—the same step we ourselves would likely take: “Set formation and destruction aside. What fault is there if only a dharma exists?” Let the dispute over formation and destruction rest; surely we can still say that “the thing exists.”

The verse blocks both directions:

“Apart from formation and destruction, no dharma exists either; apart from a dharma, formation and destruction likewise do not exist.”

What follows if a dharma exists apart from formation and destruction? Qingmu says: “That dharma should either be absent or permanent.” A thing that neither forms nor is destroyed must either not exist at all or permanently abide without change. No such permanent dharma exists in the world.

Conversely, what if the dharma is set aside and only the two marks formation and destruction are retained? Qingmu ends it with one question: “Apart from the dharma, who forms and who is destroyed?”

The question deserves a long pause. In daily speech, we call “change” something palpably real. Yet change must be the change of something. Remove that something, and “change” leaves only a word. A dharma is not separate from formation and destruction, and formation and destruction are not separate from a dharma. They are two ways of speaking of the same event, and neither can be extracted to stand as master.

The verse next asks again from the side of intrinsic nature: “If a dharma’s intrinsic nature is empty, who could have formation and destruction?” It also asks: “If intrinsic nature is not empty, formation and destruction likewise do not exist.” If dharmas fundamentally have no body of their own, on whom do formation and destruction fall? If dharmas have a determinate body—Qingmu specifies that “nonempty means determinately existent”—how could a determinately existent thing contain formation and destruction?

It asks again from the side of one and different: “If formation and destruction are one, this cannot be so; if formation and destruction are different, this likewise cannot be so.” To say they are one fails, because “their marks differ and they receive many discriminations.” The appearances of formation and destruction can plainly be distinguished. To say they are different also fails, because “there is no separate thing, and there is likewise no cause.” Apart from formation, no self-standing destruction can be indicated.

Can “Seen with the Eye” Serve as Proof?

After this circuit, the questioner’s original confidence is finally met directly. The verse says:

“If one says that because arising and ceasing are seen with the eye, then arising and ceasing exist, one sees arising and ceasing through delusion.”

Qingmu first restates the other’s claim: the eye plainly sees it, so how can you refute it with words?

He does not then deny “seeing.” He explains how this “seeing” arose: “Ordinary people obtained these eyes through inverted causes and conditions in prior lives; through the causes and conditions of recollection, conception, and discrimination in this life, they say that the eye sees arising and ceasing.” These eyes were obtained through inverted causes and conditions in prior lives, and what is called “seeing arising and ceasing” includes another operation of recollection, conception, and discrimination in this life.

In other words, visual seeing has never been pure reception. What a person sees is a result formed from the eye together with habitual discrimination. To use that result to prove arising and ceasing with intrinsic nature is to use the verdict as proof that the verdict is correct. Qingmu therefore says directly: “Within the ultimate meaning, arising and ceasing in truth do not exist.” This does not mean nothing happens before the eyes. It means that among everything that happens, not one event is arising or ceasing with intrinsic nature.

Neither from a Dharma nor from a Nondharma Can Anything Arise

If the questioner still wishes to rescue the thesis, only one path remains: arising. At least the later thing arises from the earlier thing, does it not?

The verse exhausts the sources of arising:

“From a dharma no dharma arises, nor does a nondharma arise; from a nondharma neither a dharma nor a nondharma arises.”

Dharma means existence; nondharma means having nothing whatsoever. Four combinations follow: existence producing existence, existence producing nonexistence, nonexistence producing existence, and nonexistence producing nonexistence.

Existence producing existence—does the causal dharma preserve its original form or lose it? If it preserves its form yet is still called production, it is permanent and what has already arisen must arise again. If it loses its form, the producer is gone and the fruit becomes causeless. Qingmu is clear: causelessness “falls into annihilation and permanence.”

Existence producing nonexistence and nonexistence producing existence both leap from one thing to its contrary, with no bridge between them. For nonexistence producing nonexistence, Qingmu uses the chapter’s lightest analogy: “As a hare’s horn does not produce a turtle’s hair.” Of two things that do not exist, the former cannot produce the latter.

The verse therefore also blocks arising from self, other, or both: “A dharma does not arise from itself, nor does it arise from another”; “it does not arise from self and other; how could arising exist?” Before a dharma arises, there is nothing. Since there is no “self” that could produce itself, there is no “other” to depend upon either—without self, where could other come from?

Continuity: Walking a Tightrope between Annihilation and Permanence

The most important passage lies in the latter half. A verse first gives a general judgment: “If one appropriates a dharma, one falls into annihilation or permanence.” Anyone who appropriates some dharma as determinately existent cannot escape the two extremes. The reason is almost cold in its simplicity: the appropriated dharma can only be permanent or impermanent. “If permanent, one falls into the extreme of permanence; if impermanent, one falls into the extreme of annihilation.”

The questioner now proposes an exceptionally elegant solution:

“One who appropriates dharmas does not fall into annihilation or permanence; because cause and fruit are continuous, there is neither annihilation nor permanence.”

Qingmu states the proposal in its strongest form—notice that this passage renders the opposing position as well as possible: “As a sūtra says, the five aggregates are impermanent, suffering, empty, and not-self, yet they are not annihilated; although demerit and merit are said not to be lost through immeasurable kalpas, they are not permanent.” The five aggregates are impermanent, so they are not permanent; demerit and merit are not lost through immeasurable kalpas, so they are not annihilated. Because of arising and ceasing, there is no permanence; because of continuity, there is no annihilation. Both extremes are avoided.

This is precisely where many people’s minds find rest: things are not eternal, yet death is not simply the end of everything. An unseen line joins what comes before to what comes after.

The respondent’s question cuts exactly at that line:

“If cause and fruit arise and cease, continuous and unbroken, because what ceases does not arise again, the cause is annihilated.”

You say continuity. Yet continuity is strung from causes that cease one by one. Once a particular cause has ceased, does it arise again? If it does not, it has been cut off. Something broken at every joint does not become unbroken merely because there are many joints. Qingmu follows with the question: “If the cause is cut off, how can continuity exist?”

The force of the blow lies here: the questioner’s proposal is not wrong in attitude, but in treating “continuity” as a real thing capable of sustaining itself. It tries to save both extremes with a real continuity, yet continuity itself still has to fall under either annihilation or nonannihilation.

Would Nirvāṇa Then Be Annihilation?

Following that line, the verse presses out a more serious consequence:

“A dharma abiding in its intrinsic nature should have neither existence nor nonexistence; if nirvāṇa extinguishes continuity, it falls into annihilation.”

The first half gives the principle. Qingmu again uses the jar: “If a jar is determinately fixed in the mark of jar, at that time it has no mark of loss or destruction.” If the jar is determinately jar, no mark of destruction can then be spoken. When the jar is absent, “if there is no jar, there is nothing to destroy”—even the object that could be destroyed is gone. Thus, when the jar exists there is no destruction; when it is absent there is no destruction. Extinction cannot be placed at either end. Once extinction cannot be placed, arising cannot be placed either, because “arising and ceasing depend upon one another.” Arising and ceasing are a pair that exist only through one another, not two self-standing things.

Only then does the latter half disclose the heavy consequence. If the three modes of existence are established through continuity and extinguishing that continuity is called nirvāṇa, does nirvāṇa not become cutting off something truly existent? Qingmu makes it explicit: if so, “at the time of nirvāṇa one should fall into annihilation.”

Every practitioner should attend to this step. If saṃsāra is regarded as a truly existent line, nirvāṇa can only be the act of cutting it; cutting off a truly existent thing is annihilation. Clinging to a real continuity does not rescue one from eternalism; it first destroys nirvāṇa.

The Segment That Cannot Be Joined

The treatise therefore pursues the matter one level further, to the most concrete point: how exactly does existence in this life join existence in the next?

“If the first existence ceases, there is no later existence; if the first existence does not cease, there is likewise no later existence.”

The first existence is existence in this life; later existence is existence in the next. If the first has ceased, from where does the later come? It is causeless. If the first has not yet ceased, later existence already exists—“then there are two existences at one time.” Two existences stand side by side simultaneously.

The questioner finds an exceptionally clever position: not after cessation and not before cessation, but arising at the very instant of cessation.

The verse answers: “At the time of ceasing there is one existence, and at the time of arising there is one existence.” The supposed single instant still contains two existences: one ceasing and one arising.

The questioner retreats again: no, there are not two existences. It is just as presently seen: the former ceases and the latter arises.

The verse unfolds the consequence of that statement:

“If one says that arising and ceasing occur at one time, then one dies in these very aggregates and is born in these very aggregates.”

If ceasing and arising truly occur at the same time and belong to the same existence, a person should be reborn within the very same five aggregates in which death occurs, not in another set of aggregates. For Qingmu says: “The one who dies is precisely the one who is born.”

The sentence sounds like a tongue twister, yet its edge is keen. Death and birth are contradictory events; contradictory events cannot occupy the same time and place. To join death and birth through “the same instant” requires the dead person to be the person born on the spot.

Seeking Existence through the Three Times

The final verse gathers the chapter:

“Seeking existence through the three times, continuity cannot be found; if it is absent within the three times, how could continuity of existence exist?”

The three modes of existence are existence in the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm. Qingmu says that because true wisdom has not been obtained throughout beginningless saṃsāra, continuity of the three modes of existence constantly occurs. Yet when it is carefully examined within past, present, and future, it cannot be obtained anywhere. If existence is absent throughout the three times, where could the continuity of existence be placed?

His final sentence is where the chapter lands: “One should know that the continuity of existence exists through ignorance and inversion; in reality, it is absent.”

We must read its measure precisely. It does not say “there is no saṃsāra.” It says that the continuity of saṃsāra appears through ignorance and inversion; in reality, no continuity with intrinsic nature revolves there.

What This Chapter Removes

After reading the chapter, one may easily misunderstand: is Nāgārjuna saying that flowers do not really fade and people do not really die?

No. From beginning to end, the treatise does not quarrel with what is before the eyes. Qingmu himself says “yet remaining does in fact occur,” and likewise says that “dharmas constantly cease and are exhausted thought by thought, day and night.” He does not deny worldly speech.

What the treatise removes is formation and destruction treated as able to stand by themselves. We fear destruction because we take it as a real event; we grasp formation because we take it as a real event. Yet through the four gates, formation exists in dependence upon destruction, destruction in dependence upon formation, dharmas in dependence upon formation and destruction, and formation and destruction in dependence upon dharmas. Exhaustion cannot indicate formation, and nonexhaustion cannot indicate formation. One is not established, and different is likewise not established. Arising from self, other, or both all fail to arise. Pursued to the end, nothing can be found that stands there by itself without depending upon another.

This is why the chapter closes by turning to annihilation and permanence. Views of existence and nonexistence do not arise without a root; they grow from the claim that “a truly existent thing is forming and being destroyed.” Determine that it has formed, and one falls into permanence; determine that it is utterly destroyed, and one falls into annihilation. Remove the root and neither extreme has a place to arise.

The plain jar remains throughout the chapter. When the jar exists, there is no mark of destruction; when the jar is absent, there is likewise no mark of destruction. Much of the destruction feared in a human life is the same: while it is feared, the event has not occurred; when it truly arrives, the one capable of fearing is no longer there.

Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror

The preceding is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows uses the Sui–Tang Three Treatises tradition as a mirror held alongside it—a mirror is not the treatise, but another way to see the same verses.

In explaining the chapter title in his Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, Jizang likewise takes the conjunction of many conditions as formation and their dispersal as destruction, and gives four levels of meaning: the conjunction and dispersal of things presently seen; the marks of arising and remaining as formation and the marks of change and ceasing as destruction; kalpas of formation and destruction in the vessel-world and sentient world; and even formation and destruction in the rise and decline of doctrinal meanings. He divides the whole chapter into eight gates—together and apart, exhausted and unexhausted, body and mark, empty and nonempty, one and different, arising and ceasing, annihilation and permanence, and the three times. To seek formation and destruction in all these ways and find them unobtainable shows that all dharmas were never formed from the beginning and are not now destroyed; this is the Middle Way.

Concerning the passage on visibly seeing arising and ceasing, Jizang says that this question runs through all sūtras and treatises and reveals both the fault in ordinary perception and the sages’ intention in breaking delusion. In principle there is no arising or ceasing; determinate arising and ceasing come from deluded feeling. As for the chapter’s final refutation of the continuity of the three modes of existence, his judgment is that practitioners of Greater and Lesser Vehicles see the arising of the three existences and seek to extinguish them. Yet if the arising and ceasing of the three existences are taken as real, the three existences cannot be extinguished. Only by awakening that the three existences were never born from the beginning and are not now extinguished can one leave them. The intention in refuting worldly dharmas is precisely to let sentient beings know that the world is ultimately empty.

This sequence of analytic gates and the designation “Middle Way” are Jizang’s additions, not the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s extended commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.