中論 觀因緣品第一
《中論》開卷是一句頂禮：
「不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷， 不一亦不異，不來亦不出。 能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論， 我稽首禮佛，諸說中第一。」
青目下了一句斷語：「以此二偈讚佛，則已略說第一義。」論還沒開始，第一義已經說完；後面二十七品，只是讓人自己走到這裡。
兩種病，同一個動作
一邊是外道八家：從大自在天生、從時生、從微塵生……都在萬物背後安一個源頭。一邊是像法之人，「人根轉鈍、深著諸法」，只「但著文字」；聽見畢竟空，反而「取是空相而起貪著」。
抓法，與抓空——伸手的動作是同一個。八不所對治的，就是這隻手。
穀與芽之間，什麼也找不到
八不聽來玄，青目卻只用一物說盡，而且每次都說「世間現見故」。
「離劫初穀，今穀不可得」故不生；「若滅，今不應有穀」故不滅；「如穀芽時種則變壞」故不常；「如從穀有芽」故不斷；「如穀不作芽、芽不作穀」故不一；「何故分別穀芽、穀莖、穀葉」故不異；「如穀子中芽無所從來」故不來；沒有誰見過芽「如蛇從穴出」，故不出。
不是推論出來的，是本來就找不到。
生只有四條路
「諸法不自生，亦不從他生， 不共不無因，是故知無生。」
自生則「一法有二體」，且「生更有生，生則無窮」；他生不成，因為「有自故有他」，自既無，他無所立；共生兼有二過；無因則「布施持戒等應墮地獄」。根在一句：「諸法自性不在眾緣中，但眾緣和合故得名字。」
果還沒生，憑什麼叫它緣
阿毘曇立四緣，這是本品最周密的一個立：
「因緣次第緣，緣緣增上緣， 四緣生諸法，更無第五緣。」
答方只問一句：「若是果未生，何不名非緣？」青目點破：「緣成由於果，以果後、緣先故。」——你叫它緣，是因為先看見了果。
四緣逐破，各有一處要害。次第緣要前念的滅去給後念作緣，可是「果若未生時，則不應有滅」，未來未生，那個滅無所交付——「滅法何能緣？故無次第緣。」緣緣要有一個所緣之法，而諸法相入法性，「一切皆空無相無緣」，所以「於此無緣法，云何有緣緣？」增上緣依「是事有故是事有」而立，然而「諸法無自性，故無有有相」；有相先就沒有，那句「是事有」便沒有著落。
四緣既盡，末後收成一頌：
「果不從緣生，不從非緣生， 以果無有故，緣非緣亦無。」
不是緣生不出果，是果既不可得，緣這個名字便沒有掛處。
而破緣不是破因果——青目說得明白，真正壞因果的是無因之說。
The Treatise on the Middle opens with an act of homage:
“Neither arising nor ceasing; neither permanence nor annihilation; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going forth. Able to teach these causes and conditions, he skillfully ends all conceptual proliferation. I bow my head to the Buddha, foremost among all who teach.”
Qingmu gives one judgment: “By praising the Buddha with these two verses, the ultimate meaning has already been stated in brief.” Before the treatise begins, the ultimate meaning has been said in full. The twenty-seven chapters that follow merely let the reader reach it for themselves.
Two Illnesses, One Movement
On one side stand eight non-Buddhist schools: things arise from Maheśvara, from time, from atoms. Each places a source behind the myriad things. On the other stand people of the Semblance Dharma, whose “faculties have become dull” and who “cling deeply to dharmas” and “only to words.” Hearing of ultimate emptiness, they instead “grasp the mark of emptiness and become attached.”
Grasping dharmas and grasping emptiness—the hand makes the same movement. The eight negations treat that hand.
Between Grain and Sprout, Nothing Can Be Found
The eight negations sound abstruse, yet Qingmu exhausts them with one object, saying each time, “Because it is visibly evident in the world.”
“Apart from the grain at the beginning of the eon, present grain cannot be found,” so there is no arising. “If it ceased, grain should not exist now,” so there is no ceasing. “When a grain sprouts, the seed changes and breaks down,” so it is not permanent. “A sprout comes from the grain,” so it is not annihilated. “A grain does not make the sprout, nor does the sprout make the grain,” so they are not identical. “Why distinguish grain sprout, grain stalk, and grain leaf?” so they are not different. “The sprout in a grain has nowhere from which it comes,” so there is no coming. No one sees a sprout emerge “like a snake from its hole,” so there is no going forth.
This is not inferred. It is what cannot be found in the first place.
Arising Has Only Four Routes
“Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor from another; neither from both nor without a cause—thus one knows non-arising.”
Self-arising gives “one dharma two bodies” and makes “arising have further arising, without end.” Arising from another fails because “an other exists because of a self”; with no self, other has nowhere to stand. Arising from both inherits the faults of both. Arising without a cause would make “giving and keeping precepts lead to hell.” The root lies in one sentence: “The intrinsic nature of dharmas is not present among the many conditions; a name is obtained only because the conditions come together.”
Before the Effect Arises, What Makes It a Condition?
Abhidharma establishes four conditions, the most exacting position in the chapter:
“The causal condition, immediately preceding condition, object condition, and dominant condition: these four conditions produce dharmas; there is no fifth condition.”
The respondent asks only this: “Before the effect has arisen, why is it not called a non-condition?” Qingmu exposes the point: “A condition is established through the effect, because the effect is later and the condition earlier.” You call it a condition because you have first seen the effect.
Each of the four conditions has one vulnerable point. The immediately preceding condition requires the ceasing of an earlier moment to condition a later one, yet “before the effect has arisen, there should be no ceasing.” The future has not arisen, so that ceasing has nowhere to be delivered: “How can a ceased dharma condition anything? Thus there is no immediately preceding condition.” The object condition requires an apprehended dharma, but when the marks of dharmas enter dharma-nature, “all are empty, signless, and objectless.” Thus, “How could there be an object condition regarding dharmas that have no object?” The dominant condition rests on “because this exists, that exists,” yet “dharmas have no intrinsic nature, and therefore no mark of existence.” If no mark of existence is present, the words “this exists” have nowhere to land.
Once the four conditions have been exhausted, the final verse gathers them:
“An effect arises neither from conditions nor from non-conditions; because no effect exists, neither conditions nor non-conditions exist.”
It is not that conditions fail to produce an effect. Once the effect cannot be found, the name “condition” has nowhere to hang.
And refuting conditions is not refuting cause and effect. Qingmu is explicit: what truly destroys cause and effect is the assertion of no cause.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷一〈觀因緣品第一〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0001b14〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0001b14〕不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷，
不一亦不異，不來亦不出。
能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論，
我稽首禮佛，諸說中第一。
問曰：何故造此論？
答曰：有人言萬物從大自在天生、有言從韋紐天生、有言從和合生、有言從時生、有言從世性生、有言從變生、有言從自然生、有言從微塵生。有如是等謬故，墮於無因、邪因、斷常等邪見，種種說我我所，不知正法。佛欲斷如是等諸邪見令知佛法故，先於聲聞法中說十二因緣，又為已習行有大心堪受深法者以大乘法說因緣相，所謂一切法不生不滅、不一不異等，畢竟空、無所有。如《般若波羅蜜》中說：佛告須菩提：「菩薩坐道場時，觀十二因緣，如虛空不可盡。」佛滅度後，後五百歲像法中，人根轉鈍、深著諸法，求十二因緣、五陰、十二入、十八界等決定相，不知佛意，但著文字，聞大乘法中說畢竟空，不知何因緣故空，即生疑見：若都畢竟空，云何分別有罪福報應等？如是則無世諦、第一義諦。取是空相而起貪著，於畢竟空中生種種過。龍樹菩薩為是等故，造此中論。
「不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷，
不一亦不異，不來亦不出。
能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論，
我稽首禮佛，諸說中第一。」
以此二偈讚佛，則已略說第一義。
問曰：諸法無量，何故但以此八事破？
答曰：法雖無量，略說八事則為總破一切法。不生者，諸論師種種說生相，或謂因果一、或謂因果異、或謂因中先有果、或謂因中先無果、或謂自體生、或謂從他生、或謂共生、或謂有生、或謂無生。如是等說生相皆不然，此事後當廣說。生相決定不可得，故不生。不滅者，若無生何得有滅？以無生、無滅故，餘六事亦無。
問曰：不生、不滅已總破一切法。何故復說六事？
答曰：為成不生不滅義故。有人不受不生不滅，而信不常不斷。若深求不常不斷，即是不生不滅。何以故？法若實有則不應無，先有今無是即為斷，若先有性是則為常，是故說不常不斷，即入不生不滅義。有人雖聞四種破諸法，猶以四門成諸法。是亦不然。若一則無緣，若異則無相續，後當種種破，是故復說不一不異。有人雖聞六種破諸法，猶以來出成諸法。來者言諸法從自在天、世性、微塵等來，出者還去至本處。復次萬物無生。何以故？世間現見故。世間眼見劫初穀不生。何以故？離劫初穀，今穀不可得。若離劫初穀有今穀者則應有生；而實不爾，是故不生。
〔T30 0002a11〕問曰：若不生則應滅。
答曰：不滅。何以故？世間現見故。世間眼見劫初穀不滅。若滅，今不應有穀；而實有穀，是故不滅。
問曰：若不滅則應常。
答曰：不常。何以故？世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不常，如穀芽時種則變壞，是故不常。
問曰：若不常則應斷。
答曰：不斷。何以故？世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不斷，如從穀有芽，是故不斷；若斷，不應相續。
問曰：若爾者，萬物是一。
答曰：不一。何以故？世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不一，如穀不作芽、芽不作穀。若穀作芽、芽作穀者應是一；而實不爾，是故不一。
問曰：若不一則應異。
答曰：不異。何以故？世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不異。若異者，何故分別穀芽、穀莖、穀葉？不說樹芽、樹莖、樹葉，是故不異。
問曰：若不異，應有來。
答曰：無來。何以故？世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不來，如穀子中芽無所從來。若來者，芽應從餘處來，如鳥來栖樹；而實不爾，是故不來。
問曰：若不來，應有出。
答曰：不出。何以故？世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不出。若有出，應見芽從穀出，如蛇從穴出；而實不爾，是故不出。
問曰：汝雖釋不生不滅義，我欲聞造論者所說。
答曰：
「諸法不自生，亦不從他生，
不共不無因，是故知無生。」
不自生者，萬物無有從自體生，必待眾因。復次若從自體生，則一法有二體：一謂生、二謂生者。若離餘因從自體生者，則無因無緣。又生更有生，生則無窮。自無故，他亦無。何以故？有自故有他。若不從自生，亦不從他生，共生則有二過：自生、他生故。若無因而有萬物者，是則為常。是事不然。無因則無果，若無因有果者，布施持戒等應墮地獄、十惡五逆應當生天，以無因故。復次：
「如諸法自性，不在於緣中，
以無自性故，他性亦復無。」
諸法自性不在眾緣中，但眾緣和合故得名字。自性即是自體，眾緣中無自性。自性無故不自生，自性無故他性亦無。何以故？因自性有他性，他性於他亦是自性。若破自性即破他性，是故不應從他性生。若破自性、他性，即破共義。無因則有大過，有因尚可破，何況無因！於四句中生不可得，是故不生。
問曰：阿毘曇人言「諸法從四緣生」，云何言不生？何謂四緣？
「因緣次第緣，緣緣增上緣，
四緣生諸法，更無第五緣。」
一切所有緣，皆攝在四緣，以是四緣萬物得生。因緣名一切有為法；次第緣除過去現在阿羅漢最後心心數法，餘過去現在心心數法；緣緣、增上緣一切法。
答曰：
「果為從緣生，為從非緣生？
是緣為有果，是緣為無果？」
若謂有果，是果為從緣生、為從非緣生？若謂有緣，是緣為有果、為無果？二俱不然。何以故？
「因是法生果，是法名為緣；
若是果未生，何不名非緣？」
諸緣無決定。何以故？若果未生，是時不名為緣；但眼見從緣生果，故名之為緣。緣成由於果，以果後、緣先故。若未有果，何得名為緣？如瓶以水土和合故有瓶生，見瓶故知水土等是瓶緣。若瓶未生時，何以不名水土等為非緣？是故果不從緣生。緣尚不生，何況非緣。復次：
「果先於緣中，有無俱不可。
先無為誰緣，先有何用緣。」
緣中先非有果、非無果。若先有果，不名為緣，果先有故。若先無果，亦不名為緣，不生餘物故。
問曰：已總破一切因緣，今欲聞一一破諸緣。
〔T30 0003a01〕答曰：
「若果非有生，亦復非無生，
亦非有無生，何得言有緣？」
若緣能生果，應有三種：若有、若無、若有無。如先偈中說，緣中若先有果，不應言生，以先有故。若先無果，不應言生，以先無故，亦應與非緣同故。有無亦不生者，有無名為半有半無，二俱有過。又有與無相違，無與有相違，何得一法有二相？如是三種求果生相不可得故，云何言有因緣？次第緣者：
「果若未生時，則不應有滅，
滅法何能緣？故無次第緣。」
諸心心數法於三世中次第生。現在心心數法滅，與未來心作次第緣。未來法未生，與誰作次第緣？若未來法已有，即是生，何用次第緣？現在心心數法無有住時，若不住，何能為次第緣，若有住，則非有為法。何以故，一切有為法常有滅相故。若滅已，則不能與作次第緣。若言滅法猶有則是常，若常則無罪福等。若謂滅時能與作次第緣，滅時半滅半未滅，更無第三法名為滅時。又佛說：一切有為法念念滅，無一念時住。云何言現在法有欲滅未欲滅？汝謂一念中無是欲滅未欲滅，則破自法。汝阿毘曇說：有滅法、有不滅法；有欲滅法、有不欲滅法。欲滅法者，現在法將欲滅。未欲滅法者，除現在將欲滅法，餘現在法及過去未來無為法，是名不欲滅法。是故無次第緣。緣緣者：
「如諸佛所說，真實微妙法，
於此無緣法，云何有緣緣？」
佛說大乘諸法，若有色無色、有形無形、有漏無漏、有為無為等諸法相入於法性，一切皆空無相無緣。譬如眾流入海同為一味。實法可信，隨宜所說不可為實，是故無緣緣。增上緣者：
「諸法無自性，故無有有相；
說有是事故，是事有不然。」
經說十二因緣，是事有故是事有。此則不然。何以故？諸法從眾緣生故自無定性，自無定性故無有有相。有相無故，何得言是事有故是事有？是故無增上緣，佛隨凡夫分別有無故說。復次：
「略廣因緣中，求果不可得；
因緣中若無，云何從緣出？」
略者，於和合因緣中無果。廣者，於一一緣中亦無果。若略廣因緣中無果，云何言果從因緣出？復次：
「若謂緣無果，而從緣中出；
是果何不從，非緣中而出？」
若因緣中求果不可得，何故不從非緣出？如泥中無瓶，何故不從乳中出？復次：
「若果從緣生，是緣無自性，
從無自性生，何得從緣生？
果不從緣生，不從非緣生，
以果無有故，緣非緣亦無。」
果從眾緣生，是緣無自性。若無自性則無法，無法何能生？是故果不從緣生。不從非緣生者，破緣故說非緣。實無非緣法，是故不從非緣生。若不從二生，是則無果。無果故，緣非緣亦無。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷一〈觀因緣品第一〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、歸敬頌
〔T30 0001b14〕不生，也不滅；不常，也不斷；不一，也不異；不來，也不出。
能夠這樣宣說因緣之理，善巧地息滅一切戲論——我頭面頂禮於佛，在一切言說之中，佛所說的是第一。
二、問：為什麼要造這一部論
問的一方說：為什麼造這部論？
答的一方說：有人主張萬物是從大自在天生出來的，有人說是從韋紐天生出來的，有人說是從和合生出來的，有人說是從時生出來的，有人說是從世性生出來的，有人說是從變生出來的，有人說是從自然生出來的，有人說是從微塵生出來的。因為有這樣種種的謬說，所以墮入無因、邪因、斷、常這一類邪見，種種地宣說我與我所，不知道什麼是正法。
佛想要斷除這樣一類邪見、使人得知佛法，所以先在聲聞法裡宣說十二因緣；又為那些已經久修久習、有大心、堪能承受深法的人，用大乘法宣說因緣之相，也就是：一切法不生不滅、不一不異等等，畢竟空、無所有。就像《般若波羅蜜》中所說的，佛告訴須菩提：菩薩坐在道場的時候，觀十二因緣，猶如虛空一樣不可窮盡。
佛滅度以後，在後五百歲的像法之中，人的根機轉為遲鈍，深深地執著諸法，在十二因緣、五陰、十二入、十八界等等上面尋求一個決定不變之相，不能了知佛的本意，只是執著文字。這樣的人聽見大乘法中宣說畢竟空，卻不知道是憑什麼因緣說空，於是就生起懷疑之見：若是一切都畢竟空了，怎麼還能分別有罪、有福、有報應等等？照這樣說，那就沒有世諦，也沒有第一義諦了。他們取著這個空相而生起貪著，在畢竟空之中反倒生出種種過失。龍樹菩薩為了這一類人的緣故，造了這部《中論》。
三、以此二偈讚佛，已略說第一義
不生，也不滅；不常，也不斷；不一，也不異；不來，也不出。
能夠這樣宣說因緣之理，善巧地息滅一切戲論——我頭面頂禮於佛，在一切言說之中，佛所說的是第一。
用這兩首偈讚佛，也就已經簡要地把第一義說出來了。
四、問：為什麼只用這八事來破
問的一方說：諸法無量無邊，為什麼只用這八件事來破？
答的一方說：法雖然無量，簡要地說這八件事，就足以總破一切法。
先說不生。諸位論師種種地宣說生之相：有的說因與果是一，有的說因與果是異，有的說因中先已有果，有的說因中先沒有果，有的說是自體生，有的說是從他生，有的說是共生，有的說是有生，有的說是無生。像這樣種種關於生相的說法，都不能成立——這件事在後面還要廣說。生之相決定不可得，所以說不生。
再說不滅。若是連生都沒有，哪裡還會有滅？因為沒有生、沒有滅的緣故，其餘六件事也就都沒有了。
五、問：既已總破，為什麼還要說那六事
問的一方說：不生、不滅這兩件，已經總破了一切法，為什麼還要再說那六件事？
答的一方說：是為了成立不生不滅之義。
有人不接受不生不滅，卻相信不常不斷。若是深深地推求那個不常不斷，其實就是不生不滅。為什麼呢？法若是實有的，就不應當變成沒有；先前有而如今沒有，這就是斷；若是先前就有一個性在那裡，這就是常。所以宣說不常不斷，也就進入了不生不滅之義。
有人雖然聽了這四種破法，仍舊用四門來成立諸法，這也是不對的。若說是一，那就沒有能作之緣；若說是異，那就沒有前後相續——後面還要種種地破，所以再說不一不異。
有人雖然聽了這六種破法，仍舊用來、出兩門來成立諸法。所謂來，是說諸法從自在天、世性、微塵等等而來；所謂出，是說回頭去到本來的處所。
六、以世間現見說八事
再者，萬物無生。為什麼呢？因為世間現前可見的緣故。世間肉眼可見：劫初之穀不生。為什麼呢？離開劫初之穀，如今的穀就不可得。若是離開劫初之穀另有如今的穀，那才應當有生；而事實上並不是這樣，所以說不生。
〔T30 0002a11〕問的一方說：若說不生，那就應當有滅。
答的一方說：不滅。為什麼呢？因為世間現前可見的緣故。世間肉眼可見：劫初之穀不滅。若是滅了，如今就不應當還有穀；而事實上確實有穀，所以說不滅。
問的一方說：若說不滅，那就應當是常。
答的一方說：不常。為什麼呢？因為世間現前可見的緣故。世間肉眼可見萬物不常，譬如穀生芽的時候，種子隨即變壞，所以說不常。
問的一方說：若說不常，那就應當是斷。
答的一方說：不斷。為什麼呢？因為世間現前可見的緣故。世間肉眼可見萬物不斷，譬如從穀而有芽，所以說不斷；若是斷了，就不應當有相續。
問的一方說：若是這樣，那萬物就是一。
答的一方說：不一。為什麼呢？因為世間現前可見的緣故。世間肉眼可見萬物不一，譬如穀不作芽、芽不作穀。若是穀作芽、芽作穀，那才應當是一；而事實上並不是這樣，所以說不一。
問的一方說：若說不一，那就應當是異。
答的一方說：不異。為什麼呢？因為世間現前可見的緣故。世間肉眼可見萬物不異。若是異，為什麼還分別說穀芽、穀莖、穀葉，而不說成樹芽、樹莖、樹葉？所以說不異。
問的一方說：若說不異，那就應當有來。
答的一方說：無來。為什麼呢？因為世間現前可見的緣故。世間肉眼可見萬物不來，譬如穀子裡的芽，並沒有一個所從而來的地方。若是有來，芽就應當從別處來，好比鳥飛來棲在樹上；而事實上並不是這樣，所以說不來。
問的一方說：若說不來，那就應當有出。
答的一方說：不出。為什麼呢？因為世間現前可見的緣故。世間肉眼可見萬物不出。若是有出，就應當看見芽從穀中出來，好比蛇從穴中出來；而事實上並不是這樣，所以說不出。
七、四門求生不可得
問的一方說：你雖然解釋了不生不滅之義，我想聽的是造論者本人所說。
答的一方於是舉頌：諸法不從自己生，也不從他者生，不從自他共生，也不是無因而生；因為這樣，所以知道無生。
所謂不自生，是說萬物沒有一個能從自體生出來的，必定要待眾多的因。再者，若是從自體生，那麼一個法上就有了兩個體：一個叫作生，一個叫作生者。若是離開其餘的因而從自體生，那就成了無因無緣。又，能生者自己還要有生，如此生了又生，就沒有窮盡。
自既然沒有，他也就沒有。為什麼呢？因為有自才有他。若是既不從自生，也不從他生，那麼共生就有兩重過失——因為共生就是自生加他生的緣故。
若說沒有因而有萬物，那就成了常，這件事不能成立。沒有因就沒有果；若是無因而有果，那麼布施、持戒等等應當墮地獄，十惡、五逆應當生天——因為根本無因的緣故。
再者，舉頌說：諸法的自性不在眾緣之中；因為沒有自性的緣故，他性也同樣沒有。
諸法的自性不在眾緣之中，只是眾緣和合的緣故才得到一個名字。自性就是自體，而眾緣之中沒有自性。自性沒有，所以不自生；自性沒有，所以他性也沒有。為什麼呢？因為要有自性才有他性，而他性對於他自己來說也就是自性。若是破了自性，也就破了他性，所以不應當說從他性生。若是自性、他性都破了，也就破了共生之義。無因則有極大的過失——有因尚且可以破，何況無因！在這四句之中，生不可得，所以說不生。
八、立四緣
問的一方說：阿毘曇的人說，諸法從四緣生，怎麼能說不生？哪四種緣呢？
於是舉出頌來：因緣、次第緣、緣緣、增上緣——這四緣生出諸法，再沒有第五種緣。
一切所有的緣，都收攝在這四緣之中；憑這四緣，萬物才得以生。所謂因緣，指的是一切有為法。所謂次第緣，是除去過去、現在阿羅漢的最後心與心數法之外，其餘過去、現在的心與心數法。至於緣緣與增上緣，指的是一切法。
九、總破四緣
答的一方舉頌說：果究竟是從緣生的，還是從非緣生的？這緣究竟是有果的，還是無果的？
若說有果，那麼這個果是從緣生的、還是從非緣生的？若說有緣，那麼這個緣是有果的、還是無果的？兩頭都不能成立。為什麼呢？
頌說：因為這個法能生果，這個法才叫作緣；若是這個果還沒有生，為什麼不叫它作非緣？
諸緣並沒有一個決定不變的份位。為什麼呢？若是果還沒有生，這時候就不能叫作緣；只因為肉眼看見從它生出了果，才給它一個緣的名字。緣之所以成為緣，是由於果；因為果在後、緣在先的緣故。若是還沒有果，怎麼能得到緣這個名字？譬如瓶，是憑水與土和合的緣故而有瓶生；看見了瓶，才知道水土等等是瓶的緣。若在瓶還沒有生的時候，為什麼不把水土等等叫作非緣？所以果不從緣生。緣尚且不能生果，何況非緣。
再者，頌說：果先前在緣之中，說它有、說它無，兩樣都不可以。先前若是沒有，它是給誰作緣？先前若是已經有了，又何必用緣？
緣中先前既不是有果，也不是無果。若是先前有果，就不叫作緣，因為果先前已經在了。若是先前沒有果，也不叫作緣，因為它並不生出別的東西來。
十、逐一破四緣
問的一方說：你已經總破了一切因緣，如今我想聽你一一破那四種緣。
〔T30 0003a01〕答的一方說：
頌說：果若不是以有而生，也不是以無而生，也不是以亦有亦無而生，怎麼能說有因緣？
若說緣能生果，應當有三種情形：或有、或無、或亦有亦無。如同前面偈中所說：緣中若是先前有果，就不應當說生，因為先前已經有了；若是先前沒有果，也不應當說生，因為先前根本沒有，而且這樣一來，緣就與非緣沒有分別了。至於說亦有亦無而生也不成立，是因為亦有亦無就叫作半有半無，兩頭都有過失；而且有與無互相違背，無與有互相違背，怎麼能在一個法上有兩個相？像這樣用三種情形尋求果之生相都不可得，那麼怎麼能說有因緣？
其次說次第緣。頌說：果若還沒有生的時候，就不應當有滅；已滅之法怎麼能作緣？所以沒有次第緣。
諸心與心數法在三世之中依次第而生。現在的心與心數法滅去，給未來的心作次第緣。可是未來之法還沒有生，它給誰作次第緣？未來之法若是已經有了，那就是已生，又何必用次第緣？現在的心與心數法沒有停住的時候；若是不住，怎麼能作次第緣？若是有住，那就不是有為法了。為什麼呢？因為一切有為法常有滅相的緣故。若是已經滅了，就不能給誰作次第緣。若說已滅之法仍舊還在，那就是常；若是常，就沒有罪福等等可說了。若說正在滅的時候能作次第緣——正滅的時候是半滅半未滅，此外再沒有第三個法可以叫作滅時。
又，佛說：一切有為法念念滅，沒有一念停住的時候。那怎麼能說現在之法有將要滅的、有還不將要滅的？你若說一念之中並沒有這種將滅未將滅的分別，那就破了你自己的法。你們阿毘曇說：有滅法、有不滅法，有欲滅法、有不欲滅法。所謂欲滅法，是現在之法將要滅的；所謂未欲滅法，是除去現在將要滅的法之外，其餘的現在法以及過去、未來、無為法——這叫作不欲滅法。所以沒有次第緣。
其次說緣緣。頌說：如諸佛所說的真實微妙之法，在這樣的無緣之法上，怎麼會有緣緣？
佛說大乘諸法：若有色、若無色，若有形、若無形，若有漏、若無漏，若有為、若無為等等，種種法相入於法性之時，一切都是空、無相、無緣。譬如眾多的河流入海，同成一味。真實之法可信，隨順機宜所說的則不可執為真實，所以沒有緣緣。
其次說增上緣。頌說：諸法沒有自性，所以沒有一個有相可得；那麼說因為這件事有、所以那件事有——這樣說是不能成立的。
經中說十二因緣，是這件事有、所以那件事有。這一說法在此不能成立。為什麼呢？因為諸法從眾緣而生，所以自身沒有決定之性；自身沒有決定之性，所以沒有一個有相可得。有相既然沒有，怎麼能說因為這件事有、所以那件事有？所以沒有增上緣——佛是隨順凡夫分別有無而這樣說的。
十一、結破：果無有故，緣非緣亦無
再者，頌說：無論從略處、從廣處，在因緣之中尋求果都不可得；因緣之中若是沒有果，怎麼說果從緣中出來？
所謂略，是說在和合的因緣之中沒有果；所謂廣，是說在一一的緣之中也沒有果。若是略處、廣處的因緣中都沒有果，怎麼能說果是從因緣中出來的？
再者，頌說：若說緣中沒有果，而果卻能從緣中出來，那麼這個果為什麼不從非緣之中出來？
若是在因緣中尋求果不可得，那為什麼不從非緣中出來？譬如泥中沒有瓶，那為什麼不從乳中出來？
再者，頌說：果若是從緣而生，這緣本身沒有自性；從沒有自性的東西而生，怎麼能說是從緣生？果不從緣生，也不從非緣生；因為果本來沒有的緣故，緣與非緣也就都沒有。
果既然從眾緣而生，這緣就沒有自性。若是沒有自性，就沒有一個法在那裡；沒有法在那裡，又怎麼能生？所以果不從緣生。所謂不從非緣生，是因為破了緣才說到非緣；實際上並沒有一個叫作非緣的法，所以也不從非緣生。若是這兩頭都不生，那就沒有果。果既然沒有，緣與非緣也就都沒有。
Composed by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, commented upon by the brahmin Qingmu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin: Treatise on the Middle, scroll one, “Examination of Conditions,” Taishō canon T30n1564. Markers at the beginnings of passages, 〔T30 …〕, give Taishō page, column, and line anchors.
I. Verse of Homage
〔T30 0001b14〕Neither arising nor ceasing; neither permanence nor annihilation; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going forth.
To the Buddha, who can teach dependent origination in this way and skillfully bring all conceptual proliferation to rest, I bow with my head at his feet. Among all teachings expressed in words, what the Buddha teaches is foremost.
II. Question: Why Was This Treatise Composed?
The questioner asks: Why was this treatise composed?
The respondent says: Some maintain that all things are produced by Maheśvara; some say they are produced by Viṣṇu; some say by conjunction; some by time; some by primordial nature; some by transformation; some by spontaneity; and some by atoms. Because of such varied and erroneous claims, people fall into wrong views of no cause, a wrong cause, annihilation, or permanence. They expound self and what belongs to self in many ways and do not know what the true Dharma is.
Wishing to end such wrong views and enable people to know the Buddha’s teaching, the Buddha first taught the twelve links of dependent origination within the śrāvaka teaching. For those who had practiced and cultivated for a long time, possessed the great resolve, and were capable of receiving the profound Dharma, he also taught through the Mahāyāna the mark of causes and conditions: all dharmas neither arise nor cease, are neither identical nor different, and so forth; they are ultimately empty and have no possession of their own. As stated in the Prajñā-pāramitā, the Buddha told Subhūti that when a bodhisattva sits at the place of awakening and contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination, they are inexhaustible like space.
After the Buddha’s passing, during the Semblance Dharma in the latter five-hundred-year period, people’s faculties became dull. They clung deeply to dharmas, seeking a fixed and unchanging mark in the twelve links of dependent origination, the five aggregates, the twelve sense fields, the eighteen elements, and so forth. Unable to understand the Buddha’s intent, they clung only to words. When such people heard the Mahāyāna teaching that all is ultimately empty, they did not understand the causes and conditions on account of which emptiness was taught. They therefore formed a view of doubt: If everything is ultimately empty, how can demerit, merit, karmic results, and the like still be distinguished? On that account, there would be neither conventional truth nor ultimate truth. Grasping the mark of emptiness, they grew attached to it and instead produced many faults within ultimate emptiness. The bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed the Treatise on the Middle for people such as these.
III. In Praising the Buddha with These Two Verses, the Ultimate Meaning Has Already Been Stated in Brief
Neither arising nor ceasing; neither permanence nor annihilation; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going forth.
To the Buddha, who can teach dependent origination in this way and skillfully bring all conceptual proliferation to rest, I bow with my head at his feet. Among all teachings expressed in words, what the Buddha teaches is foremost.
These two verses praise the Buddha and at the same time state the ultimate meaning in brief.
IV. Question: Why Use Only These Eight Matters to Refute?
The questioner asks: Dharmas are limitless and boundless. Why use only these eight matters to refute them?
The respondent says: Although dharmas are limitless, stating these eight matters in brief is sufficient to refute all dharmas comprehensively.
First comes non-arising. The masters of various treatises describe the mark of arising in many ways. Some say cause and effect are identical; some say cause and effect are different; some say the effect already exists in the cause; some say it does not yet exist in the cause; some say a thing arises from itself; some that it arises from another; some that it arises from both; some that there is arising; and some that there is no arising. All such claims about the mark of arising fail to stand, as will be explained at length below. Because no fixed mark of arising can be found, the text says “non-arising.”
Next comes non-ceasing. If there is not even arising, where could ceasing occur? Because there is neither arising nor ceasing, the other six matters are likewise absent.
V. Question: If the Comprehensive Refutation Is Complete, Why State the Other Six Matters?
The questioner asks: Non-arising and non-ceasing already refute all dharmas comprehensively. Why state the other six matters as well?
The respondent says: They establish the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing.
Some people reject non-arising and non-ceasing but accept neither permanence nor annihilation. If one investigates neither permanence nor annihilation deeply, however, it is precisely non-arising and non-ceasing. Why? If a dharma truly existed, it should not turn into nonexistence. To have existed before and not exist now is annihilation. If a nature was already there before, that is permanence. Thus, teaching neither permanence nor annihilation leads into the meaning of neither arising nor ceasing.
Some, although they have heard these four modes of refutation, still use four gateways to establish dharmas. This too is incorrect. If things are identical, there is no condition capable of acting. If they are different, there is no continuity between earlier and later. These claims will be refuted in many ways below, so neither identity nor difference is stated next.
Some, although they have heard these six modes of refutation, still use the two gateways of coming and going forth to establish dharmas. “Coming” means that dharmas come from Maheśvara, primordial nature, atoms, and so forth. “Going forth” means that they return to their original place.
VI. Explaining the Eight Matters through What Is Visibly Evident in the World
Moreover, all things are unarisen. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that the grain from the beginning of the eon does not arise. Why? Apart from the grain at the beginning of the eon, the grain of the present could not be found. Only if there were present grain separate from the grain at the beginning of the eon would arising be possible. But that is not so; therefore the text says “non-arising.”
〔T30 0002a11〕The questioner says: If there is no arising, there should be ceasing.
The respondent says: There is no ceasing. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that the grain from the beginning of the eon does not cease. If it had ceased, grain should not still exist now. Yet grain certainly does exist; therefore the text says “non-ceasing.”
The questioner says: If there is no ceasing, things should be permanent.
The respondent says: They are not permanent. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things are impermanent. For example, when a grain produces a sprout, the seed changes and breaks down at once. Therefore the text says “not permanent.”
The questioner says: If things are not permanent, they should be annihilated.
The respondent says: They are not annihilated. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things are not cut off. For example, a sprout comes from a grain. Therefore the text says “not annihilated”; if continuity were cut off, there should be no succession.
The questioner says: If that is so, all things are identical.
The respondent says: They are not identical. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things are not identical. A grain, for example, does not make the sprout, nor does the sprout make the grain. Only if the grain made the sprout and the sprout made the grain should they be identical. But that is not so; therefore the text says “not identical.”
The questioner says: If things are not identical, they should be different.
The respondent says: They are not different. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things are not different. If they were different, why would we distinguish a grain sprout, a grain stalk, and a grain leaf, rather than calling them a tree sprout, a tree stalk, and a tree leaf? Therefore the text says “not different.”
The questioner says: If things are not different, there should be coming.
The respondent says: There is no coming. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things do not come. The sprout in a grain, for example, has no place from which it comes. If there were coming, the sprout should arrive from elsewhere, like a bird flying in to perch on a tree. But that is not so; therefore the text says “no coming.”
The questioner says: If there is no coming, there should be going forth.
The respondent says: There is no going forth. Why? Because this is visibly evident in the world. The worldly eye can see that all things do not go forth. If there were going forth, one should see a sprout emerge from the grain as a snake emerges from its hole. But that is not so; therefore the text says “no going forth.”
VII. Arising Cannot Be Found through Any of the Four Gateways
The questioner says: Although you have explained the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing, I want to hear what the treatise author himself has said.
The respondent therefore cites the verse: Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from another; they do not arise from both self and other, nor do they arise without a cause. Thus we know that there is no arising.
“Not arising from itself” means that no thing can arise from its own body; it must depend upon a multiplicity of causes. Moreover, if a dharma arose from itself, one dharma would contain two bodies: one called arising and one called that which arises. If it arose from itself apart from all other causes, it would arise without causes or conditions. Furthermore, that which produces would itself have to be produced; arising would then produce further arising without end.
Since there is no self, there is also no other. Why? Because an other exists only in relation to a self. If arising is neither from self nor from other, arising from both contains both faults, because arising from both is simply self-arising plus arising from another.
If all things existed without a cause, they would be permanent, which cannot stand. Without a cause there is no effect. If effects existed without causes, giving, keeping precepts, and the like should lead to hell, while the ten evil acts and the five heinous offenses should lead to birth in heaven, since there would be no cause at all.
The respondent further cites a verse: The intrinsic nature of dharmas is not present in the many conditions. Because there is no intrinsic nature, there is likewise no other-nature.
The intrinsic nature of dharmas is not present in the many conditions; a name is obtained only because the many conditions come together. Intrinsic nature means a thing’s own body, yet the many conditions contain no intrinsic nature. Because intrinsic nature is absent, there is no self-arising. Because intrinsic nature is absent, there is also no other-nature. Why? Other-nature exists only in relation to intrinsic nature, while the nature of an other, relative to itself, is itself intrinsic nature. Refuting intrinsic nature therefore also refutes other-nature, so one should not say that things arise from other-nature. Once intrinsic nature and other-nature have both been refuted, the meaning of arising from both is also refuted. Arising without a cause entails an enormous fault: if arising with a cause can be refuted, how much more arising without one! Arising cannot be found within any of the four alternatives; therefore the text says “non-arising.”
VIII. Establishing the Four Conditions
The questioner says: Abhidharma proponents say that dharmas arise from four conditions. How can you say there is no arising? What are the four conditions?
The verse is then cited: The causal condition, the immediately preceding condition, the object condition, and the dominant condition—these four conditions produce all dharmas; there is no fifth condition.
Every condition there is falls within these four, and through these four conditions all things are able to arise. “Causal condition” refers to all conditioned dharmas. “Immediately preceding condition” refers to all past and present mental events and mental factors except the final mental event and mental factors of an arhat in the past or present. “Object condition” and “dominant condition” refer to all dharmas.
IX. Comprehensive Refutation of the Four Conditions
The respondent cites a verse: Does the effect ultimately arise from conditions or from what are not conditions? Do these conditions possess an effect, or do they lack one?
If an effect exists, does it arise from conditions or from what are not conditions? If conditions exist, do they possess an effect or lack one? Neither side can stand. Why?
The verse says: Only because this dharma can produce an effect is it called a condition. Before the effect has arisen, why is it not called a non-condition?
Conditions have no fixed and unchanging position. Why? Before an effect has arisen, something cannot at that time be called a condition. It is only because the physical eye sees an effect arise from it that it is given the name “condition.” A condition is a condition because of the effect, for the effect comes afterward and the condition comes first. Without an effect, how can the name “condition” be obtained? A jar, for example, arises because water and clay come together. Only on seeing the jar does one know that water, clay, and so forth are its conditions. Before the jar arises, why not call the water, clay, and so forth non-conditions? Therefore the effect does not arise from conditions. If even conditions cannot produce an effect, how much less can non-conditions do so.
The respondent further cites a verse: Whether the effect already exists or does not exist in the conditions, neither assertion is possible. If it did not previously exist, for whom would they serve as conditions? If it already existed, what need would there be for conditions?
The effect neither already exists nor does not exist in the conditions. If the effect already existed, they would not be called conditions, because the effect would already be present. If the effect did not already exist, they likewise would not be called conditions, because they would not produce some other thing.
X. Refuting the Four Conditions One by One
The questioner says: You have comprehensively refuted all causes and conditions. Now I wish to hear you refute each of the four conditions one by one.
〔T30 0003a01〕The respondent says:
The verse says: If an effect is produced neither as existent, nor as nonexistent, nor as both existent and nonexistent, how can there be a causal condition?
If conditions can produce an effect, there should be three possibilities: it is existent, nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent. As the preceding verse said, if the effect already exists in the conditions, one should not speak of its production, because it already exists. If the effect does not exist in the conditions, one should likewise not speak of its production, because it is entirely absent beforehand; moreover, conditions would then be no different from non-conditions. Production as both existent and nonexistent also fails, because “both existent and nonexistent” means half existent and half nonexistent, entailing the faults of both sides. Furthermore, existence and nonexistence contradict one another, just as nonexistence and existence do. How could a single dharma possess both marks? Since the mark of an effect’s production cannot be found through any of these three possibilities, how can there be a causal condition?
Next comes the immediately preceding condition. The verse says: Before an effect has arisen, there should be no ceasing. How could a dharma that has already ceased serve as a condition? Therefore there is no immediately preceding condition.
Mental events and mental factors arise sequentially throughout the three times. The present mental event and mental factors cease and serve as the immediately preceding condition for a future mental event. Yet the future dharma has not arisen: for what can it serve as an immediately preceding condition? If the future dharma already exists, it has already arisen; what need would it have for an immediately preceding condition? The present mental event and mental factors have no moment in which they abide. If they do not abide, how can they serve as an immediately preceding condition? If they did abide, they would not be conditioned dharmas. Why? Because every conditioned dharma always bears the mark of ceasing. Once they have ceased, they cannot serve as the immediately preceding condition for anything. If one says that a dharma that has ceased still exists, it would be permanent; if it were permanent, demerit, merit, and the like could not be spoken of. If one says that it can serve as the immediately preceding condition while it is ceasing, then at the time of ceasing it is half ceased and half not yet ceased, and there is no third dharma apart from these that could be called the time of ceasing.
Moreover, the Buddha taught that all conditioned dharmas cease from moment to moment, with no moment in which they abide. How, then, can one say that among present dharmas some are about to cease and others are not yet about to cease? If one says that within a single moment there is no distinction between being about to cease and not yet being about to cease, one refutes one’s own doctrine. Your Abhidharma teaches that there are dharmas that cease and dharmas that do not cease, dharmas intending to cease and dharmas not intending to cease. A “dharma intending to cease” is a present dharma that is about to cease. A “dharma not yet intending to cease” comprises all other present dharmas apart from present dharmas about to cease, together with past, future, and unconditioned dharmas. These are called dharmas not intending to cease. Therefore there is no immediately preceding condition.
Next comes the object condition. The verse says: In the true and subtle Dharma taught by the buddhas, how could there be an object condition with regard to dharmas that have no object?
The Buddha teaches all Mahāyāna dharmas: whether material or immaterial, formed or formless, contaminated or uncontaminated, conditioned or unconditioned, and so forth, when their varied marks enter dharma-nature, all are empty, signless, and objectless. It is like the many rivers entering the sea and becoming a single flavor. The true Dharma is worthy of trust, whereas teachings adapted to people’s capacities must not be grasped as ultimately true. Therefore there is no object condition.
Next comes the dominant condition. The verse says: Dharmas have no intrinsic nature, and so no mark of existence can be found. The claim that because this exists, that exists therefore cannot stand.
The sūtra speaks of the twelve links of dependent origination as “because this exists, that exists.” That statement cannot stand here. Why? Because dharmas arise from many conditions, they have no fixed nature of their own. Because they have no fixed nature of their own, no mark of existence can be found. Since there is no mark of existence, how can one say that because this exists, that exists? Therefore there is no dominant condition—the Buddha spoke in this way in accommodation to ordinary people’s distinctions between existence and nonexistence.
XI. Concluding Refutation: Because No Effect Exists, Neither Conditions nor Non-conditions Exist
The respondent further cites a verse: Whether sought in the conditions collectively or separately, an effect cannot be found. If no effect exists within causes and conditions, how can one say that an effect emerges from conditions?
“Collectively” means that no effect is present within causes and conditions in combination. “Separately” means that no effect is present within any individual condition. If no effect exists in causes and conditions either collectively or separately, how can one say that an effect emerges from causes and conditions?
The respondent further cites a verse: If an effect absent from conditions could nevertheless emerge from conditions, why would that effect not emerge from non-conditions?
If an effect cannot be found when sought within causes and conditions, why does it not emerge from non-conditions? A jar, for example, is not present in clay; why, then, does it not emerge from milk?
The respondent further cites a verse: If an effect arises from conditions, those conditions themselves lack intrinsic nature. How can something produced from what lacks intrinsic nature be said to arise from conditions? An effect arises neither from conditions nor from non-conditions. Because there is no effect in the first place, neither conditions nor non-conditions exist.
Since an effect arises from many conditions, those conditions lack intrinsic nature. If they lack intrinsic nature, no dharma is present there. If no dharma is present there, how could it produce anything? Therefore an effect does not arise from conditions. As for not arising from non-conditions, “non-condition” is spoken of only after “condition” has been refuted; in reality there is no dharma called a non-condition, so the effect does not arise from non-conditions either. If it arises from neither side, there is no effect. Since there is no effect, neither conditions nor non-conditions exist.
翻開《中論》，第一眼看見的不是命題，是一個人在拜佛。
「不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷， 不一亦不異，不來亦不出。 能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論， 我稽首禮佛，諸說中第一。」
八個「不」字排在最前面，後面兩句才說出禮拜的理由：佛能這樣說因緣，故能善滅諸戲論；能善滅諸戲論，故於一切言說之中為第一。青目對這二偈只下一句斷語：「以此二偈讚佛，則已略說第一義。」
二十七品的論還沒開始，第一義就已經說完了；後面所有的破，都只是把這二偈重說一遍。《中論》不是層層推進到結論，是先把結論交出來，再一門一門地讓人自己走到那裡。
這部論是為什麼人造的
要懂八不，先要知道這部論寫給誰。品首第一問是：「何故造此論？」青目的答語分遠近兩截。
遠因是外道的種種生說。青目一口氣列了八家：「有人言萬物從大自在天生、有言從韋紐天生、有言從和合生、有言從時生、有言從世性生、有言從變生、有言從自然生、有言從微塵生。」八家各異，病卻同一——都在萬物背後安一個能生的源頭。安了源頭，就免不了「墮於無因、邪因、斷常等邪見，種種說我我所」。
佛怎麼對治？青目說了兩步：「先於聲聞法中說十二因緣」，然後「為已習行有大心堪受深法者以大乘法說因緣相」，那個相就是「一切法不生不滅、不一不異等，畢竟空、無所有」。青目引經為據，說「如《般若波羅蜜》中說」，佛告須菩提：「菩薩坐道場時，觀十二因緣，如虛空不可盡。」（《小品般若波羅蜜經》相應處作「菩薩坐道場時，如是觀十二因緣，離於二邊，是為菩薩不共之法。」）——十二因緣不是被空取消的，是要如虛空那樣去觀的。
近因才是這部論真正的對象。青目說：佛滅度後五百歲的像法之中，「人根轉鈍、深著諸法」，尋求決定之相，「不知佛意，但著文字」。這種人聽見畢竟空，不知佛憑什麼因緣說空，於是起疑：若一切畢竟空，罪福報應怎麼分別？
然後青目寫下全段最要緊的一句：「取是空相而起貪著，於畢竟空中生種種過。」
病不在空，在把空也抓成一個東西。八家在萬物背後安源頭，這一批人在諸法之外安一個叫作「空」的實物，然後抱著它。兩種病看似相反，做的是同一件事：伸手去抓。龍樹造論，正是「為是等故」。八個「不」字的分量到此才落得下來：它們不是八條命題，是八次鬆手。
八事為什麼夠：不生不滅是根，其餘六事是為了成立它
有人立刻要問：「諸法無量，何故但以此八事破？」青目答得乾脆：「法雖無量，略說八事則為總破一切法。」
他先立不生。諸論師說生相，說法極多——「或謂因果一、或謂因果異、或謂因中先有果、或謂因中先無果、或謂自體生、或謂從他生、或謂共生、或謂有生、或謂無生」——青目一句總判：「如是等說生相皆不然」。結論是：「生相決定不可得，故不生。」
不生既立，不滅隨之：「若無生何得有滅？」青目再推一步：「以無生、無滅故，餘六事亦無。」
又來一問：既然不生不滅已總破一切法，何必再說那六事？
青目答：「為成不生不滅義故。」——後六事不是另外六條破，是把不生不滅這一件事替不同的人再說一遍。
有人不接受不生不滅，卻信不常不斷。青目說：「若深求不常不斷，即是不生不滅。」理由在「法若實有則不應無」——先有今無便是斷，先有其性便是常；既說不常不斷，就已經進了不生不滅之門。
有人聽了四種破，還要用四門成立諸法。青目說：「若一則無緣，若異則無相續」——說一就沒有能生所生可言，說異則前後接不上。
有人聽了六種破，還要用來、出成立諸法：來是「言諸法從自在天、世性、微塵等來」，出是「還去至本處」。這正接回品首那八家——來與出，就是給萬物找一個老家。
八不不是八把刀，是同一把刀對著八種握法。人手鬆不開的姿勢有八樣，所以說了八次。
世間眼見：一顆穀子，說盡八事
接下來青目忽然不談理，改談眼睛看見的事。他反覆用同一個理由：「世間現見故。」所舉之物從頭到尾只有一樣——穀。
不生：「離劫初穀，今穀不可得」——今天這顆穀不是憑空新起的一件事。不滅：「若滅，今不應有穀」——若真滅盡，如今手上這顆從哪裡來？
不常：「如穀芽時種則變壞」——發芽時種子就壞了，哪裡常？不斷：「如從穀有芽」，並補一句「若斷，不應相續」。
不一：「如穀不作芽、芽不作穀」——不是同一個東西改了名字。不異：「若異者，何故分別穀芽、穀莖、穀葉？不說樹芽、樹莖、樹葉」——若真不相干，為什麼偏偏叫它穀芽？
不來：「如穀子中芽無所從來」；若有來，「芽應從餘處來，如鳥來栖樹」——芽不像鳥，牠不是從別處飛進穀裡的。不出：若有出，「應見芽從穀出，如蛇從穴出」——誰見過芽像蛇出洞那樣鑽出來？
八不聽起來玄，青目卻把它放在一顆穀子上，而且每一次都說「世間現見故」。八不不是推論出來的結論，是本來就這樣、人人看得見的那件事。穀與芽之間找不到生滅常斷一異來出——找不到，不是因為推理精密，是因為那裡本來沒有。八個「不」所否定的，都是人加上去的說法，不是穀子上本有的東西。
造論者親自出手：生從四門求，都求不到
問方聽了半天，說了一句很誠實的話：「汝雖釋不生不滅義，我欲聞造論者所說。」於是頌出：
「諸法不自生，亦不從他生， 不共不無因，是故知無生。」
自、他、共、無因——生只有這四種來路，四門都走不通，生便不可得。青目逐門說：
自生不成。「萬物無有從自體生，必待眾因」；若真從自體生，「則一法有二體：一謂生、二謂生者」。而能生者自己也是被生的，於是「又生更有生，生則無窮」。
他生不成，理由極輕巧：「自無故，他亦無。何以故？有自故有他。」——自既站不住，他也沒有立足處。共生不成：既是自加他，兩邊的過失一併都在，所以「共生則有二過」。
無因不成。青目說「若無因而有萬物者，是則為常」，並舉後果：「無因則無果，若無因有果者，布施持戒等應墮地獄、十惡五逆應當生天」——若果真不待因，善惡與苦樂便可隨意錯配。這正是回答品首那批人的疑：破生不等於破因果；真正破因果的，是無因之說。
頌再進一步，把根挖出來：
「如諸法自性，不在於緣中， 以無自性故，他性亦復無。」
青目的釋只有兩層。一：「諸法自性不在眾緣中，但眾緣和合故得名字。」——眾緣裡翻不出自性；緣湊齊了，得到的只是一個名字。二：「因自性有他性，他性於他亦是自性。」——他性在他自己那一邊也還是自性，所以「若破自性即破他性」。
自性一破，四門全倒。青目末後說：「無因則有大過，有因尚可破，何況無因！於四句中生不可得，是故不生。」
到這裡，歸敬偈第一個「不」字才算交代完。不生不是說什麼都沒發生，是說：那件發生的事，找不到一個能發動它的自己。
阿毘曇立四緣：這是全品最強的一個立
破到這裡，來了一個真正的對手。阿毘曇人說「諸法從四緣生」——外道立自在天、立微塵，拿的是實體；阿毘曇拿的卻是佛法自己的名相：萬物是從眾緣生的。這幾乎就是龍樹自己要說的話。
四緣頌：
「因緣次第緣，緣緣增上緣， 四緣生諸法，更無第五緣。」
而且立得極周密：「一切所有緣，皆攝在四緣」，一一有定義——因緣「名一切有為法」；次第緣是「除過去現在阿羅漢最後心心數法，餘過去現在心心數法」；緣緣、增上緣則通「一切法」。連阿羅漢最後心不作次第緣這種細處都算進去了。
這是本品最值得敬重的一個立，破它才是本品的重頭。底下所破的不是諸法從眾緣而生這件事，是那個生字裡藏著的實有。
總破：緣這個名字，是果給的
答方先不逐條拆，先問一個總的：
「果為從緣生，為從非緣生？ 是緣為有果，是緣為無果？」
青目說「二俱不然」，然後給出理由，那是全品最鋒利的一句：
「因是法生果，是法名為緣； 若是果未生，何不名非緣？」
青目展開：「諸緣無決定。」「若果未生，是時不名為緣；但眼見從緣生果，故名之為緣。」緊接著一句斷語：「緣成由於果，以果後、緣先故。」
人以為緣在前、果在後，是緣造出了果；青目說：緣這個名字，是果回過頭來給的。他舉瓶為例：水土和合而有瓶生，「見瓶故知水土等是瓶緣」；那麼「若瓶未生時，何以不名水土等為非緣？」於是結論：「是故果不從緣生。緣尚不生，何況非緣。」
再補一頌堵住剩下的路：
「果先於緣中，有無俱不可。 先無為誰緣，先有何用緣。」
緣中若先有果，它就不叫緣了——「果先有故」，東西已經在了，緣做了什麼？緣中若先無果，也不叫緣——「不生餘物故」。青目總說一句：「緣中先非有果、非無果。」
緣是關係中的一個名字，不是一件自己站得住的東西。看清這一點，四緣一一破只是把它落實。
一一破四緣
問方不服：「已總破一切因緣，今欲聞一一破諸緣。」
因緣。
「若果非有生，亦復非無生， 亦非有無生，何得言有緣？」
生只能是三種：果先有、果先無、果亦有亦無。先有的不必說生，「以先有故」；先無的也不能說生，「以先無故」，且那樣一來「亦應與非緣同故」。至於亦有亦無，青目說「有無名為半有半無，二俱有過」，並且「有與無相違，無與有相違，何得一法有二相？」三路都不通，所以說「云何言有因緣」。
次第緣。
「果若未生時，則不應有滅， 滅法何能緣？故無次第緣。」
次第緣說的是前念心滅、給後念心讓位。青目的問極簡單：「未來法未生，與誰作次第緣？」——你要給的那一位還沒來。反過來，「若未來法已有，即是生，何用次第緣？」現在這一頭也不放過：現在心心數法「無有住時」，不住便作不了緣，有住又不是有為法。至於「若言滅法猶有則是常，若常則無罪福等」。退一步說滅時能作緣也不成：「滅時半滅半未滅，更無第三法名為滅時」。這一破是就他自家的教理說的。
青目末後搬出佛語作證：「一切有為法念念滅，無一念時住。」念念滅無一念住，阿毘曇自分的欲滅法、未欲滅法便沒有地方安放——「汝謂一念中無是欲滅未欲滅，則破自法」。
緣緣。
「如諸佛所說，真實微妙法， 於此無緣法，云何有緣緣？」
青目說：佛說大乘諸法，有色無色、有形無形、有漏無漏、有為無為，「等諸法相入於法性，一切皆空無相無緣」。隨即設喻：「譬如眾流入海同為一味。」——各條河入了海，就不再各是各的水。
然後他加了一句判準：「實法可信，隨宜所說不可為實」。這一句是讀一切佛法名相的鑰匙：同一位佛所說的話，有些就究竟說，有些就那個人當時聽得進的份上說；把後者當成前者，就成了執。
增上緣。
「諸法無自性，故無有有相； 說有是事故，是事有不然。」
增上緣所依的是那句人人熟悉的話：「是事有故是事有。」青目答：「此則不然。」理由是「諸法從眾緣生故自無定性，自無定性故無有有相」——連一個站得住的「有」都指不出來，那句話裡的兩個「有」字各指什麼？
他末後補上最要緊的一筆：「佛隨凡夫分別有無故說。」——那樣說是隨順凡夫慣於分有分無的心；那句話的份位是接引，不是究竟。
收結：果既無有，緣與非緣一齊落地
四緣破完，還有兩重掃尾。一是略廣：
「略廣因緣中，求果不可得； 因緣中若無，云何從緣出？」
青目分得清楚：「略者，於和合因緣中無果。廣者，於一一緣中亦無果。」——人常以為東西合起來會多出點什麼；這裡說：合處與分處都沒有。
一是非緣：
「若謂緣無果，而從緣中出； 是果何不從，非緣中而出？」
青目一問到底：「如泥中無瓶，何故不從乳中出？」——泥裡既然沒有瓶，乳裡也一樣沒有瓶，憑什麼瓶偏要從泥裡出？說果從緣出，靠的是經驗上的慣見，不是緣中真有一個果等著出來。
於是末頌收全品：
「若果從緣生，是緣無自性， 從無自性生，何得從緣生？ 果不從緣生，不從非緣生， 以果無有故，緣非緣亦無。」
青目的釋乾淨利落。先說緣：「果從眾緣生，是緣無自性。若無自性則無法，無法何能生？」再說非緣：「破緣故說非緣。實無非緣法」——非緣之名是為破緣才立的，它自己並不是一件東西。最後合起來：「若不從二生，是則無果。無果故，緣非緣亦無。」
這一收是全品的落錘：不是先有緣、後來發現它生不出果，是果既不可得，緣這個名字就沒有掛處。緣與非緣是一對互相支撐的名字；抽掉果，兩個一齊落地。
回頭再看第一句頂禮就明白了。「能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論」——所讚的不是佛講了一套關於因緣的道理，是佛說因緣的方式本身就止息了戲論。所以「我稽首禮佛，諸說中第一」，第一之處正在此。
讀這一品的人可以帶走什麼
一是記住這部論是為兩種人造的：一種「但著文字」，一種「取是空相而起貪著」。八不對治的是同一個動作。
二是把「緣成由於果」放在心上。名字給得再熟，也不表示那裡有一個能生的東西。
三是知道破緣不是破因果。真正毀壞因果的是無因之說；本品所破的，只是緣上那一點自性。
承衍：吉藏之鏡
以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論，只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。
吉藏《中觀論疏》先把品題與論名連在一起讀：所觀的正因緣本來不生不滅、乃至不來不去，因緣即顯中道；觀是辨於心，論是宣於口。他又說本品的「因緣」可作三層讀：一指所破的四緣，一總指生死涅槃、凡聖解惑皆依相待假名而立，一指十二因緣；三讀並存，他並不要人擇一。
對本品的文脈，吉藏判為三段：先以兩偈從四門明無生，次由外人立四緣以證有生，後從「果為從緣生」以下破四緣而顯無生。他對從緣無生的鏡語最直截：既是假緣，即是無性；無性所以無生。又以水中之月為喻，月與水俱在而月無定生。到末偈，疏再說緣由果而有故緣無自性，果由緣而有故果亦無自性。
緣緣一門吉藏著墨最多。他以攀緣為病之本，說求能緣、所緣皆不可得，即以無所得斷此病；又保存五種解法：心境合稱、能緣之心復緣於境、境生心緣、萬法為心緣作緣、通別兩緣合稱。他明說緣緣即是無緣緣，而不是連緣緣之義也一併掃去；又釋無相為無所緣、無緣為無能緣。
這面鏡把本品接進了三論一系破邪顯正的判釋架構；其判釋是吉藏所增，不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判，各還其位。
Open the Treatise on the Middle. The first thing you see is not a proposition, but a person bowing to the Buddha.
“Neither arising nor ceasing; neither permanence nor annihilation; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going forth. Able to teach these causes and conditions, he skillfully ends all conceptual proliferation. I bow my head to the Buddha, foremost among all who teach.”
Eight negations come first. Only the final two lines give the reason for the bow: because the Buddha can teach causes and conditions in this way, he can skillfully end all conceptual proliferation; because he can end all proliferation, what he teaches is foremost among everything expressed in words. Qingmu gives only one judgment on these two verses: “By praising the Buddha with these two verses, the ultimate meaning has already been stated in brief.”
Before the twenty-seven chapters have begun, the ultimate meaning has already been said in full. Every refutation that follows only says these two verses again. The Treatise on the Middle does not advance layer by layer toward its conclusion. It gives you the conclusion first, then lets you walk through one gate after another until you arrive there yourself.
For Whom Was This Treatise Composed?
To understand the eight negations, first ask whom this treatise addresses. The chapter begins with the question, “Why was this treatise composed?” Qingmu’s answer has a distant and an immediate part.
The distant occasion is the many non-Buddhist accounts of production. Qingmu lists eight in a single breath: “Some say all things are produced by Maheśvara; some by Viṣṇu; some by conjunction; some by time; some by primordial nature; some by transformation; some by spontaneity; and some by atoms.” The eight schools differ, but their illness is one: each places a source capable of producing behind the myriad things. Once such a source is posited, one cannot avoid “falling into wrong views of no cause, wrong cause, annihilation, and permanence, while speaking in many ways of self and what belongs to self.”
How did the Buddha treat this? Qingmu describes two steps. He “first taught the twelve links of dependent origination in the śrāvaka teaching,” then “for those already practiced, possessed of the great resolve, and capable of receiving the profound Dharma, taught through the Mahāyāna the mark of causes and conditions.” That mark is that “all dharmas neither arise nor cease, are neither identical nor different, and so forth; they are ultimately empty and have no possession of their own.” Qingmu grounds this in scripture, saying that “as stated in the Prajñā-pāramitā,” the Buddha told Subhūti: “When a bodhisattva sits at the place of awakening, he contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination as inexhaustible like space.” (The corresponding passage in the Smaller Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra reads: “When a bodhisattva sits at the place of awakening and contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination in this way, he is free from the two extremes. This is a dharma unique to a bodhisattva.”) The twelve links are not canceled by emptiness. They are to be contemplated like space.
The immediate occasion identifies the treatise’s true audience. Qingmu says that during the Semblance Dharma five hundred years after the Buddha’s passing, “people’s faculties became dull and they clung deeply to dharmas.” They sought fixed marks, “did not know the Buddha’s intent, and clung only to words.” Such people heard of ultimate emptiness but did not understand the causes and conditions on account of which the Buddha taught emptiness. They wondered: If everything is ultimately empty, how can the karmic results of demerit and merit be distinguished?
Qingmu then writes the pivotal sentence of the entire passage: “Grasping this mark of emptiness, they become attached and produce many faults within ultimate emptiness.”
The illness is not emptiness. It is turning emptiness into something else to clutch. The eight schools place a source behind the myriad things. These people place outside dharmas a real object called “emptiness” and embrace it. The two illnesses appear opposed, but perform the same action: the hand reaches out to grasp. Nāgārjuna composed the treatise precisely “for such people.” Only here does the weight of the eight negations settle into place. They are not eight propositions. They are eight releases of the hand.
Why Are Eight Matters Enough? Non-arising and Non-ceasing Are the Root; the Other Six Establish Them
Someone immediately asks, “Dharmas are limitless; why refute them through only these eight matters?” Qingmu answers without hesitation: “Although dharmas are limitless, stating these eight matters in brief comprehensively refutes all dharmas.”
He begins with non-arising. The masters of various treatises describe the mark of arising in many ways: “cause and effect are identical; cause and effect are different; the effect already exists in the cause; the effect does not yet exist in the cause; a thing arises from itself; it arises from another; it arises from both; there is arising; or there is no arising.” Qingmu judges them all in a single sentence: “All such descriptions of arising are incorrect.” His conclusion is: “No fixed mark of arising can be found; therefore there is non-arising.”
Once non-arising is established, non-ceasing follows: “If there is no arising, how could there be ceasing?” Qingmu takes another step: “Because there is neither arising nor ceasing, the other six matters are likewise absent.”
Another question follows. If non-arising and non-ceasing already refute all dharmas comprehensively, why mention the other six?
Qingmu answers: “To establish the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing.” The latter six are not six additional refutations. They say the same thing—non-arising and non-ceasing—again for people standing in different places.
Some reject non-arising and non-ceasing but accept neither permanence nor annihilation. Qingmu says: “If one investigates non-permanence and non-annihilation deeply, it is precisely non-arising and non-ceasing.” The reason lies in the statement that “if a dharma truly existed, it should not become nonexistent.” To have existed before and not exist now is annihilation; to have possessed a nature beforehand is permanence. To say neither permanence nor annihilation is therefore already to have entered the gate of neither arising nor ceasing.
Some hear four refutations but still try to establish dharmas through four gateways. Qingmu says, “If identical, there is no condition; if different, there is no continuity.” Identity leaves no producer and produced; difference leaves earlier and later unable to connect.
Some hear six refutations but still establish dharmas through coming and going forth. Coming means that “dharmas come from Maheśvara, primordial nature, atoms, and so forth”; going forth means “returning to their original place.” This returns directly to the eight accounts at the beginning of the chapter. Coming and going forth give the myriad things a home to come from and return to.
The eight negations are not eight knives. They are one knife turned toward eight ways of gripping. The hand refuses to open in eight different postures, and so the teaching is spoken eight times.
What the Worldly Eye Sees: One Grain Exhausts the Eight Matters
Qingmu suddenly leaves abstract reasoning and turns to what the eye can see. He repeats the same reason each time: “Because it is visibly evident in the world.” Throughout, he uses only one object—a grain.
Non-arising: “Apart from the grain at the beginning of the eon, present grain cannot be found.” This grain today did not originate from nowhere as an entirely new event. Non-ceasing: “If it had ceased, grain should not exist now.” If it had truly vanished without remainder, where did the grain in your hand come from?
Not permanent: “When a grain sprouts, the seed changes and breaks down.” How could it be permanent? Not annihilated: “A sprout comes from the grain,” followed by, “If it were annihilated, there should be no continuity.”
Not identical: “A grain does not make the sprout, nor does the sprout make the grain.” It is not one thing merely changing its name. Not different: “If they were different, why distinguish grain sprout, grain stalk, and grain leaf, rather than tree sprout, tree stalk, and tree leaf?” If wholly unrelated, why call this particular thing a grain sprout?
No coming: “The sprout within a grain has nowhere from which it comes.” If it came, “the sprout should arrive from elsewhere like a bird flying in to perch on a tree.” A sprout is not a bird; it does not fly into the grain from somewhere else. No going forth: if it went forth, “one should see the sprout emerge from the grain like a snake emerging from its hole.” Who has ever seen a sprout tunnel out like a snake leaving a cave?
The eight negations sound abstruse, yet Qingmu places them upon a single grain and repeats each time, “Because it is visibly evident in the world.” The eight negations are not conclusions produced by inference. They name what has always been so and what anyone can see. Between grain and sprout, no arising or ceasing, permanence or annihilation, identity or difference, coming or going forth can be found. It is not absent because the reasoning is unusually subtle. It was never there. Each negation denies a claim imposed by us, not something inherent in the grain.
The Treatise Author Takes Up the Question Himself: Arising Is Sought through Four Gateways and Found in None
After listening for some time, the questioner says something entirely honest: “Although you have explained the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing, I want to hear what the treatise author himself has said.” The verse appears:
“Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor from another; neither from both nor without a cause—thus one knows non-arising.”
Self, other, both, and no cause: these are the only four routes from which arising could come. When all four gateways are impassable, arising cannot be found. Qingmu explains each one.
Self-arising fails. “No thing arises from its own body; it must depend on many causes.” If it truly arose from itself, “one dharma would have two bodies: one called arising, the other that which arises.” The producer itself would also need to be produced, and thus “arising would have further arising, without end.”
Arising from another fails for a very light-footed reason: “Because there is no self, there is no other. Why? An other exists because of a self.” If self cannot stand, other has no ground on which to stand. Arising from both fails because it combines self and other and inherits the faults on both sides: “Arising from both has two faults.”
Arising without a cause fails. Qingmu says, “If all things existed without a cause, they would be permanent,” and gives the consequence: “Without a cause there is no effect. If an effect existed without a cause, giving and keeping precepts should lead to hell, while the ten evil acts and five heinous offenses should lead to heaven.” If effects truly required no causes, good and evil, suffering and happiness, could be mismatched at will. This directly answers the doubters at the opening of the chapter: refuting arising does not refute cause and effect; the assertion that truly destroys cause and effect is arising without a cause.
The verse digs further and exposes the root:
“The intrinsic nature of dharmas is not present in conditions; because intrinsic nature is absent, other-nature is likewise absent.”
Qingmu’s explanation has only two levels. First: “The intrinsic nature of dharmas is not present among the many conditions; a name is obtained only because the conditions come together.” Search through the conditions and no intrinsic nature can be found; when they assemble, what is obtained is only a name. Second: “Other-nature exists because of intrinsic nature; relative to the other, other-nature is itself intrinsic nature.” On its own side, what is called other-nature is still intrinsic nature. Thus, “refuting intrinsic nature refutes other-nature.”
Once intrinsic nature falls, all four gateways fall with it. Qingmu concludes: “Arising without a cause entails a great fault. If arising with a cause can be refuted, how much more arising without one! Arising cannot be found within the four alternatives; therefore there is non-arising.”
Only here has the first “not” in the homage been fully accounted for. Non-arising does not say that nothing happens. It says that in the event that happens, no self exists that can set it in motion.
Abhidharma Establishes Four Conditions: The Strongest Position in the Chapter
At this point a genuine opponent arrives. Abhidharma proponents say that “dharmas arise from four conditions.” Non-Buddhists establish Maheśvara or atoms, taking a substance as their ground. Abhidharma instead takes the Buddha’s own terminology: the myriad things arise through many conditions. This is almost exactly what Nāgārjuna himself wishes to say.
The verse on the four conditions reads:
“The causal condition, immediately preceding condition, object condition, and dominant condition: these four conditions produce dharmas; there is no fifth condition.”
The position is exacting: “Every condition is included within the four,” and each receives a definition. Causal condition “names all conditioned dharmas.” Immediately preceding condition comprises “all past and present mental events and mental factors apart from the final mental event and factors of an arhat in the past or present.” Object and dominant conditions include “all dharmas.” Even the fine point that an arhat’s final mind does not serve as an immediately preceding condition has been accounted for.
This is the position most worthy of respect in the chapter, and its refutation is the chapter’s central work. What is refuted below is not the fact that dharmas arise through many conditions. It is the concealed reality smuggled into the word “arise.”
Comprehensive Refutation: The Effect Gives “Condition” Its Name
The respondent does not yet dismantle the four one by one. He first asks a comprehensive question:
“Does the effect arise from conditions or from non-conditions? Do these conditions possess an effect, or do they lack one?”
Qingmu says, “Neither is so,” then gives the sharpest reason in the chapter:
“Because this dharma produces an effect, it is called a condition; before the effect has arisen, why is it not called a non-condition?”
Qingmu unfolds this: “Conditions have no fixed status.” “Before the effect has arisen, something is not called a condition; it is only because the eye sees an effect arise from it that it is called a condition.” Then comes the judgment: “A condition is established through the effect, because the effect is later and the condition earlier.”
We imagine that condition stands first and effect comes later, so the condition must have made the effect. Qingmu says that the effect turns back and gives the condition its name. His example is a jar. Water and clay come together and a jar arises; “seeing the jar, one knows that water, clay, and so forth are the jar’s conditions.” But “before the jar arises, why not call the water, clay, and so forth non-conditions?” Hence the conclusion: “Therefore the effect does not arise from conditions. If conditions do not produce it, how much less non-conditions.”
Another verse closes the remaining route:
“Whether the effect already exists or does not exist in the conditions, neither is possible. If it was absent before, for whom are they conditions? If present before, what use are conditions?”
If the effect already exists in the conditions, they are not called conditions—“because the effect already exists.” The thing is already there; what did the conditions do? If the effect did not exist in them, they likewise are not called conditions—“because they do not produce some other thing.” Qingmu concludes in one sentence: “The effect neither exists nor does not exist beforehand in conditions.”
A condition is a name within a relationship, not a thing that stands by itself. Once this is seen, refuting the four conditions one by one simply puts it into practice.
Refuting the Four Conditions One by One
The questioner is unsatisfied: “You have comprehensively refuted all causes and conditions. Now I wish to hear each of the four conditions refuted in turn.”
Causal condition.
“If an effect is produced neither as existent, nor as nonexistent, nor as both existent and nonexistent, how can there be a causal condition?”
There are only three possibilities for production: the effect exists beforehand, does not exist beforehand, or both exists and does not exist. What already exists need not be called produced, “because it already exists.” What is absent cannot be called produced either, “because it was absent beforehand”; moreover, this “would make conditions the same as non-conditions.” As for both existence and nonexistence, Qingmu says, “Both existent and nonexistent means half existent and half nonexistent, entailing the faults of both,” and adds, “Existence and nonexistence contradict one another, and nonexistence contradicts existence. How can one dharma have two marks?” None of the three routes works, so “how can there be a causal condition?”
Immediately preceding condition.
“Before an effect has arisen, there should be no ceasing. How can a ceased dharma condition anything? Thus there is no immediately preceding condition.”
An immediately preceding condition means that the prior mental moment ceases and yields to the next. Qingmu asks simply, “The future dharma has not arisen; for whom does it serve as an immediately preceding condition?” The one to receive it has not arrived. Conversely, “If the future dharma already exists, it has arisen; what need has it of an immediately preceding condition?” He does not spare the present side either. Present mental events and mental factors “have no time in which they abide.” If they do not abide, they cannot serve as conditions; if they do abide, they are not conditioned dharmas. As for the claim that “a ceased dharma still exists,” it would be permanent, and “if permanent there would be no demerit or merit.” Retreating to the claim that it conditions at the time of ceasing also fails: “At the time of ceasing it is half ceased and half not yet ceased; there is no third dharma called the time of ceasing.” This refutation proceeds from the opponent’s own doctrine.
Qingmu finally invokes the Buddha’s words as evidence: “All conditioned dharmas cease moment by moment, with no moment in which they abide.” If there is moment-by-moment ceasing and not one moment of abiding, the Abhidharma distinction between dharmas intending and not intending to cease has nowhere to be placed: “If you say this distinction does not exist within a single moment, you refute your own doctrine.”
Object condition.
“In the true and subtle Dharma taught by the buddhas, how could there be an object condition regarding dharmas that have no object?”
Qingmu says that the Mahāyāna dharmas taught by the Buddha—material and immaterial, formed and formless, contaminated and uncontaminated, conditioned and unconditioned—“when their marks enter dharma-nature, are all empty, signless, and objectless.” He immediately gives an image: “Like the many rivers entering the sea and becoming one flavor.” Once each river enters the sea, its water is no longer separately its own.
He then adds a criterion: “The true Dharma is worthy of trust; teachings adapted to capacities cannot be taken as ultimately true.” This sentence is a key to reading every category in the Buddha’s teaching. The same Buddha speaks some words ultimately and others according to what a person can receive at that time. To take the latter as the former is to cling.
Dominant condition.
“Dharmas have no intrinsic nature, and therefore no mark of existence; the claim that because this exists, that exists does not stand.”
The dominant condition rests on the familiar statement “because this exists, that exists.” Qingmu answers: “This does not stand here.” Why? “Because dharmas arise from many conditions, they have no fixed nature of their own; because they have no fixed nature, no mark of existence is present.” If no freestanding “exists” can be pointed to, what do the two occurrences of “exists” in that statement each denote?
He adds the most important final stroke: “The Buddha spoke in accommodation to ordinary people’s distinctions between existence and nonexistence.” The statement meets ordinary minds where they habitually divide what exists from what does not. Its level is guidance, not ultimacy.
Conclusion: With No Effect, Conditions and Non-conditions Fall Together
Once the four conditions have been refuted, two final sweeps remain. The first concerns collective and separate search:
“Sought among causes and conditions collectively or separately, an effect cannot be found; if none is present in causes and conditions, how can it emerge from conditions?”
Qingmu distinguishes them clearly: “‘Collectively’ means no effect in the conjunction of causes and conditions. ‘Separately’ means no effect in any individual condition.” We often suppose that combining things adds something extra. Here, nothing is present either in combination or in separation.
The second sweep concerns non-conditions:
“If an effect absent from conditions could emerge from conditions, why would that effect not emerge from non-conditions?”
Qingmu presses the question to its end: “If there is no jar in clay, why does it not emerge from milk?” There is no jar in clay, and equally no jar in milk. Why should a jar emerge from clay in particular? To say an effect emerges from conditions rests on habitual experience, not on an effect actually waiting inside the conditions to come out.
The final verse then gathers the entire chapter:
“If an effect arises from conditions, those conditions lack intrinsic nature. How can what arises from the natureless be said to arise from conditions? An effect arises neither from conditions nor from non-conditions; because no effect exists, neither conditions nor non-conditions exist.”
Qingmu’s explanation is clean. First the condition: “An effect arises from many conditions, so those conditions lack intrinsic nature. If they lack intrinsic nature, there is no dharma; how can no dharma produce?” Then the non-condition: “‘Non-condition’ is spoken of because condition is refuted. In reality there is no dharma called a non-condition.” The name non-condition is posited only in order to refute condition; it is not itself a thing. Finally, both are brought together: “If the effect arises from neither, there is no effect. Because there is no effect, neither conditions nor non-conditions exist.”
This is the chapter’s final hammer stroke: it is not that conditions exist first and are later discovered to be unable to produce an effect. Once the effect cannot be found, the name “condition” has nowhere to hang. Condition and non-condition are mutually supporting names. Remove the effect and both fall at once.
Return now to the first act of homage. Its meaning becomes clear: “Able to teach these causes and conditions, he skillfully ends all conceptual proliferation.” The praise is not that the Buddha gives a doctrine about causes and conditions. The very way he teaches them brings proliferation to rest. That is why the verse continues, “I bow my head to the Buddha, foremost among all who teach.” His primacy lies precisely here.
What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?
First, remember the two kinds of person for whom the treatise was composed: one “clings only to words,” the other “grasps the mark of emptiness and becomes attached.” The eight negations treat the same action in both.
Second, keep “a condition is established through the effect” close to heart. Familiarity with a name does not mean that something capable of producing stands there.
Third, know that refuting conditions is not refuting cause and effect. What truly destroys cause and effect is the assertion of no cause. This chapter refutes only the speck of intrinsic nature placed upon conditions.
Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror
The preceding is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows lets the Sui–Tang Three Treatises tradition illuminate it from the side. The mirror is not the treatise; it offers another way to read the same verses.
Jizang’s Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle first reads the chapter title together with the title of the treatise. The true causes and conditions contemplated here are originally neither arising nor ceasing, through neither coming nor going, and so causes and conditions reveal the Middle Way. Contemplation discerns in the mind; treatise declares through the mouth. He also gives “causes and conditions” three levels: the four conditions refuted here; the general fact that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, ordinary and noble, understanding and delusion, all stand through relative provisional designation; and the twelve links of dependent origination. All three readings coexist. He does not ask the reader to choose only one.
Jizang divides the chapter’s movement into three parts: first, two verses clarify non-arising through the four gateways; next, an outsider establishes the four conditions to prove arising; finally, from “Does the effect arise from conditions?” onward, the four conditions are refuted to reveal non-arising. His mirror language for non-arising through conditions is direct: precisely because something provisionally depends on conditions, it has no intrinsic nature; because it has none, it does not arise. He uses the moon in water: moon and water are both present, yet the reflected moon has no fixed arising. At the final verse, the commentary says again that conditions exist through the effect and therefore lack intrinsic nature, while the effect exists through conditions and therefore lacks intrinsic nature.
Jizang gives the most attention to the object condition. He treats cognitive engagement as the root of illness and says that seeking apprehender and apprehended and finding neither ends that illness through non-attainment. He also preserves five explanations: mind and object named together; the apprehending mind again apprehending the object; the object producing the apprehending mind; the myriad dharmas serving as conditions for the mind that apprehends them; and the general and specific senses of condition named together. He explicitly says that the object condition is precisely the absence of a fixed object condition, not that its meaning is swept away as well; he explains “signless” as no apprehended object and “objectless” as no apprehending mind.
This mirror connects the chapter to the Three Treatises tradition’s interpretive structure of refuting the false and revealing the correct. Its judgments are Jizang’s additions, not the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s long commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
本品底本為《大正新脩大藏經》T30n1564〈觀因緣品第一〉〔T30 0001b10–0003c04〕；讀者面正文從歸敬頌〔0001b14〕起。下表只錄本品原校所見異讀，正文一律守大正底本，不以異讀逕改。
| 位置 | 大正底本 | 原校異讀 |
|---|---|---|
| 0001b10 | 中論觀因緣品 | 中論卷【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0001b10 | 十六偈 | 無【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0001b12 | 梵志青目釋 | 無【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0001b13 | 三藏 | 三藏法師【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0001b21 | 變 | 變化【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0001b22 | 等謬故墮 | 謬墮【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0001c04 | 疑見 | 見疑【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0001c12 | 佛 | 佛已【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0001c15 | 諸 | 謂【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0001c17 | 從他生 | 他生【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0002a02 | 則 | 即【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0002b09 | 眾因 | 眾因緣【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0002b14 | 是則為 | 則為是【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0002b19 | 他性 | 他生【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0002b20 | 諸法自性 | 諸法性【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0002b26 | 四句 | 四緣【元】【明】 |
| 0003a07 | 應與非緣同故 | 緣與無緣同故【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0003a14 | 現在心心數法 | 現在心數法【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0003a27 | 未欲滅法者 | 未欲滅者【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0003b15 | 分別有無故說 | 分別有無故說緣【宋】【元】【明】【三】 |
| 0003b24 | 泥中無瓶 | 埿中無瓶【宋】【元】 |
其中「他性／他生」〔0002b19〕與「四句／四緣」〔0002b26〕會直接影響讀法，故特別保留異讀；然而下文緊接「因自性有他性」「於四句中生不可得」，大正本的上下文自成一讀。此處只陳列，不代作取捨。
本品引《般若波羅蜜》為「菩薩坐道場時，觀十二因緣，如虛空不可盡」〔T30 0001b28–0001b29〕。現存《小品般若波羅蜜經》相應段先說「虛空無盡故，般若波羅蜜無盡」，繼而作「菩薩坐道場時，如是觀十二因緣，離於二邊」〔T08 0578c19–0578c26〕，後又說以無盡法觀十二因緣〔0578c27–0579a07〕。兩者語序與逐字不盡同，宜視為本論所存的約引，不把現存經文倒改入本論。
二、異釋對勘
（一）歸敬頌的譯語
羅什本作：「不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷，不一亦不異，不來亦不出。」〔T30 0001b14–0001b15〕《般若燈論釋》作：「不滅亦不起，不斷亦不常，非一非種種，不來亦不去。」〔T30 0051c15–0051c16〕《大乘中觀釋論》現存開頭作：「不滅亦不生，不斷亦不常等。」〔T30 0136a18〕三本在「生／起」「異／種種」「出／去」上各守譯語；本檔並列，不以一譯校正另一譯。
《般若燈論釋》把「緣起」解作「種種因緣和合得起」，又以「語自性執，永不行故」釋戲論息〔T30 0051c26–0051c28〕；《大乘中觀釋論》則說，若取著言詮而執有性，戲論由此止息，分別自性空才名寂靜〔T30 0136a26–0136b01〕。兩釋都把八不連到緣起與自性執，開合與措辭不同。
（二）四門不生
羅什本把四門合成一頌：「諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共不無因，是故知無生。」〔T30 0002b06–0002b07〕《般若燈論釋》譯為：「無時亦無處，隨有一物體，從自他及共，無因而起者。」〔T30 0052b16–0052b17〕《大乘中觀釋論》則把四門分開標舉：「諸法不自生」〔T30 0136c09〕、「亦不從他生」〔0136c29〕、「共生亦無性」〔0137a18〕、「亦不無因生」〔0137a22〕。科分一合一開，但都逐一觸及自、他、共、無因四門。
（三）四緣與二諦語境
羅什本列「因緣、次第緣、緣緣、增上緣」而後逐一檢驗〔T30 0002b27–0003b15〕。《般若燈論釋》同列四緣，並說佛為攝受無因、惡因諸諍論者，於世諦中說四緣〔T30 0054c21–0055a03、0055a25–0055a28〕。《大乘中觀釋論》亦列四緣，說為攝化無因、惡因諍論者而於世俗諦開示，非勝義諦中定實之生〔T30 0137a28–0137b21〕。這是兩部異釋在同一論域中的明文定位；本檔不進一步判哪一種表述為勝。
三、諸家異釋（吉藏專疏）
吉藏先把本品與論名連在一起：觀正因緣「不生不滅乃至不來不去」，因此因緣即顯中道；觀察辨於心，論說宣於口〔T42 0005c01–0005c19〕。又說本品之「因緣」有通別三層：可指所破四緣，可總指一切生死涅槃、凡聖解惑皆依相待假名，也可指十二因緣〔T42 0005c23–0006a18〕。這三讀並存於疏中，不必互相排除。
對本文次第，吉藏判作三段：先以兩偈從四門明無生；次由外人立四緣證有生；後從「果為從緣生」以下破四緣而顯無生〔T42 0040c22–0040c29〕。到破四緣處又分：先破四緣能生果，再明非緣不能生果，最後雙結果不從緣、非緣生；其內又有總破、別破、結破〔T42 0046b01–0046b10〕。本試作的六段只把這一骨架細化成可讀篇幅。
吉藏對「從緣」與「無生」的鏡語最為直接：「既其假緣即無性，無性故無生。」又以水中月說，雖從月與水而現，實無定生〔T42 0046a23–0046b01〕。到末偈，疏再說緣由果有，所以緣無自性；果由緣有，所以果無自性〔T42 0052c03–0052c12〕。此處是吉藏的判釋，本檔誌錄為主鏡，不把它下灌成底本文字。
吉藏並明〈十二門論·觀因緣門〉、〈觀有果無果門〉、〈觀緣門〉三門，分別攝入本品「自性不在於緣中」、別破四緣之初與結破四緣之末〔T42 0007b18–0007b25〕；這提供兩論互讀的傳統科判依據。
緣緣一門不可只以「空、無相、無緣」一句帶過。吉藏先以攀緣為病本，說求能緣、所緣不可得即以無所得斷病；又保存五種緣緣解：心境合稱、能緣心復緣境、境生心緣、萬法為心緣作緣、通別兩緣合稱〔T42 0050b05–0050b21〕。這五解是疏中所錄義門，不能倒稱青目原定義，也不能因譯疏篇幅而省略。
疏又把前三緣相接：破因緣故境無定性，破次第緣故心無定性，心境既無自性，緣緣便不能另立；反過來，前念後念若不可定立，能緣心也不能自性緣境〔T42 0050c03–0050c10〕。因此四緣逐破不是四份互不相干的材料，而是能生、所生、能緣、所緣前後互照。
吉藏明說「緣緣即是無緣緣」而「不無緣緣義」〔T42 0051a13–0051a14〕；若把色獨置世諦、空獨置第一義，便把空與不空割成斷常二見，故只破偏執定有定無〔0051a16–0051a20〕。又釋「無相」為無所緣、「無緣」為無能緣，並以有緣緣為隨宜說、無緣緣為真實說〔0051b10–0051b20〕。這一鏡既不壞依緣所說的心境作用，也不留下能所自性。
四、名相
| 名相 | 本品與古德所定義界 |
|---|---|
| 八不 | 不生、不滅、不常、不斷、不一、不異、不來、不出。青目說八事總破一切法，而後六事為成立不生不滅之義〔T30 0001c13–0002a10〕。 |
| 因緣（通義） | 本品一面指十二因緣，一面進入四緣論域；吉藏又以空、假、中三義釋因緣，說因緣所生無自性，故不得定言有，空亦不可執作定空〔T42 0007a01–0007a08〕。 |
| 戲論 | 本品先列無因、邪因、斷常及我我所等見〔T30 0001b18–0001b23〕。《順中論》明言戲論是「取著有得有物」及不實取相〔T30 0041a01–0041a02〕。 |
| 自性 | 青目直釋「自性即是自體」；眾緣中無自性，只因和合而得名字〔T30 0002b20–0002b22〕。 |
| 他性 | 本品說因自性而立他性；對他而言，他性又成其自性，故破自性即連帶破他性〔T30 0002b22–0002b25〕。 |
| 因緣（四緣之一） | 本品釋為一切有為法〔T30 0002c02–0002c03〕；《大智度論》別列相應、共生、自種、遍、報五因〔T25 0296b14–0296b15〕。 |
| 次第緣 | 除阿羅漢末後心心數法外，其餘過去、現在心心數法能與次第〔T30 0002c02–0002c04〕。本品隨即檢驗已滅法如何能緣未來法。 |
| 緣緣 | 本品以一切法為緣緣所攝〔T30 0002c04〕，再以真實法無相、無緣檢驗定實所緣〔T30 0003b02–0003b08〕。 |
| 增上緣 | 本品亦以一切法為其範圍〔T30 0002c04〕，再從「是事有故是事有」檢驗是否可成立有定性的「有相」〔T30 0003b09–0003b15〕。 |
本品大正原校附有梵語對讀，但不屬漢傳古德音，本檔依規從闕，不以現代梵本補入。
五、科判
原典實測為四十個長行區塊、十五個頌組、三十六頌行；頌組與頌行都不是「頌數」。讀者單元仍為一品，內部依自然轉折分六段：
- 八不與造論因緣〔T30 0001b14–0001c21〕；
- 八不總攝及穀芽問答〔0001c21–0002b04〕；
- 四門不生與無自性〔0002b04–0002b27〕；
- 四緣立說與總破〔0002b27–0002c24〕；
- 四緣逐一檢驗〔0002c24–0003b16〕；
- 果、緣、非緣俱遣〔0003b16–0003c04〕。
前三段把歸敬頌所標的「不生」展成八不與四門；後三段讓「四緣生諸法」的立說經過總檢、逐檢與結破。這一細分與吉藏「四門明無生→外立四緣→破四緣顯無生」的三大段相應，而沒有把疏的科判改寫成論文本身。
六、關中舊學·譯史
卷首僧叡序明記：「今所出者，是天竺梵志名賓伽羅、秦言青目之所釋也。」又說青目釋中有乖闕煩重之處，「法師皆裁而裨之」〔T30 0001a24–0001b01〕。因此，今本所傳不只包含龍樹頌，也包含青目釋與羅什譯場的裁補；把頌與釋同留在原典層，正合序記所見的傳本身分。
僧叡又把四論並舉：「《百論》治外以閑邪，斯文袪內以流滯，《大智釋論》之淵博，《十二門觀》之精詣」〔T30 0001b01–0001b04〕。這不是後設拼成的書單，而是本論卷首序已保存的關中讀法：中、百、大智、十二門彼此照見，而各有用力所在。
品首署「龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋、姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯」〔T30 0001b12–0001b13〕。本次未從未核經錄推補譯年；譯時、譯場若要再細定，須另以經錄逐條立證。
七、唯識軸互讀（空有）
《順中論義入大般若波羅蜜經初品法門》署「龍勝菩薩造、無着菩薩釋」〔T30 0039c22–0039c23〕，所引歸敬頌作「不滅亦不生……佛已說因緣，斷諸戲論法」〔0039c24–0039c28〕。它又引般若語，說一切法自體性空，故無少法可取可捨、可生可滅、可斷可常、可一可異、可來可去〔0040a18–0040a28〕。
本處只確認一件硬連結：漢傳所署無着之釋，直接以龍勝歸敬頌進入般若讀法。至於後世空有二軸如何判攝，本品沒有給出裁決；本次也沒有為湊目而牽入《掌珍論》或《成唯識論》的非同位段落。
八、系內餘論互讀
（一）《十二門論》
〈觀因緣門〉從「眾緣所生法，是即無自性；若無自性者，云何有是法」起〔T30 0159c26–0159c27〕，繼以瓶、疊、舍、酥、芽及十二因緣分說內外眾緣〔0159c28–0160a09〕。其結論是緣空故從緣生法亦空〔0160b01–0160b03〕。這正把《中論》本品「眾緣中無自性」的短論證展成一門。
（二）《大智度論》
〈四緣義〉先照錄四緣與各自定義〔T25 0296b11–0296b19〕，再逐項提出與本品相近的追問：因中先有果或先無果皆不成；已滅心如何作次第緣；一切法無相、無緣時如何定立緣緣與增上緣〔0296b20–0296c05〕。其後說般若「無所捨、無所破」，所破是對四緣的著〔0296c05–0296c10〕；又說：「菩薩觀知諸法從四緣生，而不取四緣中定相。」並以水中月說四緣和合而無定實〔0297a23–0297b04〕。這使「破四緣」不宜讀成取消世俗因緣作用。
（三）《迴諍論》
《迴諍論》以芽為例：芽不在種子、地、水、火、風、虛空等一一緣中，也不在諸緣和合中，更不離因緣另有，所以說芽無自體〔T32 0015b03–0015b10〕；其本頌又說：「若彼有自體，不須因緣生，若須因緣者，如是得言空。」〔T32 0015a16–0015a17〕這一互讀把本品「緣中無果」推入空語自身能否成立的辯難，掛鏈而不重錄全論。
九、校本定位
| 類別 | 本次所據 |
|---|---|
| 底本真相源 | T30n1564〔0001b10–0003c04〕 |
| 卷首序記 | T30n1564〔0001a24–0001b06〕 |
| 般若經證 | T08n0227〔0578c19–0579a07〕 |
| 同頌異釋一 | T30n1566〔0051c15–0052b17、0054c21–0055b13〕 |
| 同頌異釋二 | T30n1567〔0136a11–0137b24〕 |
| 吉藏逐文疏 | T42n1824〔0005c01–0007b25、0040c22–0042a20、0045b09–0047b05、0052a12–0052c19〕 |
| 唯識軸掛接 | T30n1565〔0039c22–0040b17〕 |
| 三論系內互讀 | T30n1568〔0159c22–0160b15〕 |
| 龍樹系內互讀 | T25n1509〔0296b11–0297b20〕；T32n1631〔0015a15–0015b13〕 |
逐義原證
以下逐義原證只負責把本品所傳每一義理鎖回原始漢譯經論疏。龍樹頌、青目釋、異釋與吉藏疏各依其本來身分標示；引文與行錨均由原始經藏標記檔逐條核對，不以摘要代替原證。
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0001b14–0001b17〕：「不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷，不一亦不異，不來亦不出。能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論，我稽首禮佛，諸說中第一。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001b18–0001b23〕：「有人言萬物從大自在天生、有言從韋紐天生、有言從和合生、有言從時生、有言從世性生、有言從變生、有言從自然生、有言從微塵生。有如是等謬故，墮於無因、邪因、斷常等邪見，種種說我我所，不知正法。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001b23–0001b27〕：「佛欲斷如是等諸邪見令知佛法故，先於聲聞法中說十二因緣，又為已習行有大心堪受深法者以大乘法說因緣相，所謂一切法不生不滅、不一不異等，畢竟空、無所有。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001b28–0001b29〕：「佛告須菩提：「菩薩坐道場時，觀十二因緣，如虛空不可盡。」」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001c01–0001c03〕：「像法中，人根轉鈍、深著諸法，求十二因緣、五陰、十二入、十八界等決定相，不知佛意，但著文字」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001c03–0001c07〕：「聞大乘法中說畢竟空，不知何因緣故空，即生疑見：若都畢竟空，云何分別有罪福報應等？如是則無世諦、第一義諦。取是空相而起貪著，於畢竟空中生種種過。龍樹菩薩為是等故，造此中論。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001c12〕：「以此二偈讚佛，則已略說第一義。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001c13–0001c14〕：「法雖無量，略說八事則為總破一切法。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001c14–0001c19〕：「不生者，諸論師種種說生相，或謂因果一、或謂因果異、或謂因中先有果、或謂因中先無果、或謂自體生、或謂從他生、或謂共生、或謂有生、或謂無生。如是等說生相皆不然，此事後當廣說。生相決定不可得，故不生。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001c19–0001c21〕：「不滅者，若無生何得有滅？以無生、無滅故，餘六事亦無。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001c21–0001c22〕：「問曰：不生、不滅已總破一切法。何故復說六事？」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001c22–0001c23〕：「答曰：為成不生不滅義故。有人不受不生不滅，而信不常不斷。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0001c23–0002a03〕：「若深求不常不斷，即是不生不滅。何以故？法若實有則不應無，先有今無是即為斷，若先有性是則為常，是故說不常不斷，即入不生不滅義。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002a04–0002a05〕：「若一則無緣，若異則無相續，後當種種破，是故復說不一不異。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002a06–0002a08〕：「來者言諸法從自在天、世性、微塵等來，出者還去至本處。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002a09–0002a11〕：「世間眼見劫初穀不生。何以故？離劫初穀，今穀不可得。若離劫初穀有今穀者則應有生；而實不爾，是故不生。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002a13–0002a14〕：「世間眼見劫初穀不滅。若滅，今不應有穀；而實有穀，是故不滅。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002a15–0002a17〕：「世間眼見萬物不常，如穀芽時種則變壞，是故不常。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002a18–0002a19〕：「世間眼見萬物不斷，如從穀有芽，是故不斷；若斷，不應相續。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002a21–0002a23〕：「世間眼見萬物不一，如穀不作芽、芽不作穀。若穀作芽、芽作穀者應是一；而實不爾，是故不一。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002a24–0002a26〕：「世間眼見萬物不異。若異者，何故分別穀芽、穀莖、穀葉？不說樹芽、樹莖、樹葉，是故不異。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002a28–0002b01〕：「世間眼見萬物不來，如穀子中芽無所從來。若來者，芽應從餘處來，如鳥來栖樹；而實不爾，是故不來。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002b02–0002b04〕：「世間眼見萬物不出。若有出，應見芽從穀出，如蛇從穴出；而實不爾，是故不出。」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0002b06–0002b07〕：「諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共不無因，是故知無生。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002b08–0002b11〕：「不自生者，萬物無有從自體生，必待眾因。復次若從自體生，則一法有二體：一謂生、二謂生者。若離餘因從自體生者，則無因無緣。又生更有生，生則無窮。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002b11–0002b13〕：「自無故，他亦無。何以故？有自故有他。若不從自生，亦不從他生，共生則有二過：自生、他生故。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002b13–0002b17〕：「若無因而有萬物者，是則為常。是事不然。無因則無果，若無因有果者，布施持戒等應墮地獄、十惡五逆應當生天，以無因故。」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0002b18–0002b19〕：「如諸法自性，不在於緣中，以無自性故，他性亦復無。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002b20–0002b27〕：「諸法自性不在眾緣中，但眾緣和合故得名字。自性即是自體，眾緣中無自性。自性無故不自生，自性無故他性亦無。何以故？因自性有他性，他性於他亦是自性。若破自性即破他性，是故不應從他性生。若破自性、他性，即破共義。無因則有大過，有因尚可破，何況無因！於四句中生不可得，是故不生。」
- T30n1564龍樹頌（阿毘曇人四緣立說）〔0002b29–0002c01〕：「因緣次第緣，緣緣增上緣，四緣生諸法，更無第五緣。」
- T30n1564青目釋（阿毘曇人四緣立說）〔0002c02–0002c05〕：「一切所有緣，皆攝在四緣，以是四緣萬物得生。因緣名一切有為法；次第緣除過去現在阿羅漢最後心心數法，餘過去現在心心數法；緣緣、增上緣一切法。」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0002c06–0002c07〕：「果為從緣生，為從非緣生？是緣為有果，是緣為無果？」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002c08–0002c10〕：「若謂有果，是果為從緣生、為從非緣生？若謂有緣，是緣為有果、為無果？二俱不然。何以故？」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0002c11–0002c12〕：「因是法生果，是法名為緣；若是果未生，何不名非緣？」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002c13–0002c16〕：「諸緣無決定。何以故？若果未生，是時不名為緣；但眼見從緣生果，故名之為緣。緣成由於果，以果後、緣先故。若未有果，何得名為緣？」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002c16–0002c18〕：「為緣？如瓶以水土和合故有瓶生，見瓶故知水土等是瓶緣。若瓶未生時，何以不名水土等為非緣？是故果不從緣生。」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0002c20–0002c21〕：「果先於緣中，有無俱不可。先無為誰緣，先有何用緣。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0002c22–0002c24〕：「緣中先非有果、非無果。若先有果，不名為緣，果先有故。若先無果，亦不名為緣，不生餘物故。」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0003a02–0003a03〕：「若果非有生，亦復非無生，亦非有無生，何得言有緣？」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0003a04–0003a09〕：「若緣能生果，應有三種：若有、若無、若有無。如先偈中說，緣中若先有果，不應言生，以先有故。若先無果，不應言生，以先無故，亦應與非緣同故。有無亦不生者，有無名為半有半無，二俱有過。又有與無相違，無與有相違，何得一法有二相？」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0003a12–0003a13〕：「果若未生時，則不應有滅，滅法何能緣？故無次第緣。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0003a14–0003a18〕：「諸心心數法於三世中次第生。現在心心數法滅，與未來心作次第緣。未來法未生，與誰作次第緣？若未來法已有，即是生，何用次第緣？現在心心數法無有住時，若不住，何能為次第緣，若有住，則非有為法。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0003a20–0003a24〕：「若言滅法猶有則是常，若常則無罪福等。若謂滅時能與作次第緣，滅時半滅半未滅，更無第三法名為滅時。又佛說：一切有為法念念滅，無一念時住。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0003a24–0003a29〕：「云何言現在法有欲滅未欲滅？汝謂一念中無是欲滅未欲滅，則破自法。汝阿毘曇說：有滅法、有不滅法；有欲滅法、有不欲滅法。欲滅法者，現在法將欲滅。未欲滅法者，除現在將欲滅法，餘現在法及過去未來無為法，是名不欲滅法。是故無次第緣。」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0003b02–0003b03〕：「如諸佛所說，真實微妙法，於此無緣法，云何有緣緣？」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0003b04–0003b08〕：「佛說大乘諸法，若有色無色、有形無形、有漏無漏、有為無為等諸法相入於法性，一切皆空無相無緣。譬如眾流入海同為一味。實法可信，隨宜所說不可為實，是故無緣緣。」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0003b09–0003b10〕：「諸法無自性，故無有有相；說有是事故，是事有不然。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0003b11–0003b15〕：「經說十二因緣，是事有故是事有。此則不然。何以故？諸法從眾緣生故自無定性，自無定性故無有有相。有相無故，何得言是事有故是事有？是故無增上緣，佛隨凡夫分別有無故說。」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0003b16–0003b17〕：「略廣因緣中，求果不可得；因緣中若無，云何從緣出？」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0003b18–0003b20〕：「略者，於和合因緣中無果。廣者，於一一緣中亦無果。若略廣因緣中無果，云何言果從因緣出？」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0003b21–0003b22〕：「若謂緣無果，而從緣中出；是果何不從，非緣中而出？」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0003b23–0003b24〕：「若因緣中求果不可得，何故不從非緣出？如泥中無瓶，何故不從乳中出？」
- T30n1564龍樹頌〔0003b25–0003b28〕：「若果從緣生，是緣無自性，從無自性生，何得從緣生？果不從緣生，不從非緣生，以果無有故，緣非緣亦無。」
- T30n1564青目釋〔0003b29–0003c04〕：「果從眾緣生，是緣無自性。若無自性則無法，無法何能生？是故果不從緣生。不從非緣生者，破緣故說非緣。實無非緣法，是故不從非緣生。若不從二生，是則無果。無果故，緣非緣亦無。」
- T08n0227《小品般若波羅蜜經》〔0578c24–0578c25〕：「菩薩坐道場時，如是觀十二因緣，離於二邊，是為菩薩不共之法。」
- T30n1565《順中論》〔0040a24–0040a28〕：「一切法自體性空。若其彼法自體空者，彼法無體；若無體者，是名般若波羅蜜；若是般若波羅蜜者，彼無少法可取可捨、若生若滅、若斷若常、若一義若異義、若來若去。此是真實般若波羅蜜。」
- T30n1565《順中論》〔0041a01–0041a04〕：「言戲論者，所謂取著有得有物二，及不實取諸相等，是戲弄法，故名戲論。彼今略說。所謂取體、若取非體、取體非體、或取非體非非體等，此偈於彼一切皆斷。」
- T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0051c26–0051c28〕：「緣起者，種種因緣和合得起，故名緣起。語自性執，永不行故，名戲論息。一切災障無故，或時自性空，故名善滅。」
- T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0055a25–0055a28〕：「是故佛說，第一義中，因及眾緣不能生眼。如是應知，佛為憐愍世間住於亂慧無因惡因諸諍論者，於世諦中，說有因緣、次第緣、緣緣、增上緣。」
- T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0136a27–0136b01〕：「若取著言詮，即為戲論。如其言詮，於如是性執有性者，彼皆息滅，此即名為滅諸戲論、離諸嬈惱性。分別自性空已乃名寂靜。」
- T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0137b18–0137b21〕：「若如是見，此非道理，彼遍計性故。是故前說無第五緣，亦非斷滅。世間所有諸執無因惡因諍論亂意之者，為攝化彼故，如其分位於世俗諦開示宣說諸因緣等，此即非勝義諦。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0005c01–0005c03〕：「觀此正因緣不生不滅乃至不來不去，故此因緣即是中道。因於中道發生正觀，觀辨於心論宣於口，故知觀於因緣釋中觀論。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0005c06–0005c09〕：「觀正因緣既不生不滅，即破邪因緣是斷常生滅。是故偈云「能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論。」能說是因緣，謂顯正也；善滅諸戲論，謂破邪也。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0005c24–0005c25〕：「因緣有三：一從下破四緣受名，以四緣攝生義盡」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0005c28–0005c29〕：「以生死涅槃、凡聖解惑皆是假名相待，無有自性，稱為因緣義」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0006a03–0006a04〕：「以萬法皆是因緣、無有自性，以無自性是故不生」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0006a06〕：「三者此品觀十二因緣，故云觀因緣品。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0007a03–0007a08〕：「因緣凡有三義：一者因緣是空義。以因緣所生法即是寂滅性，故知因緣即是空義。二者因緣是假義。既無自性故不得言有，空亦復空故不得言空，為化眾生故以假名說，故因緣是假義。三者因緣是中道義。即此因緣離於二邊，故名為中道。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0046a23–0046b01〕：「今申假名四緣生義，良由諸法從四緣生，故是無生法。若定實即不假緣，既其假緣即無性，無性故無生。又他若聞四緣即言有生、若聞無生即無四緣，今須反之，若聞四緣即知無生，亦聞真諦即須知有生。問：諸法既空，云何諸法從四緣生？答：如水中月雖空，要從月從水生。雖從此二生，而實無生。一切法亦爾也。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0052c08–0052c10〕：「緣由果有，緣無自性；果由緣有，果無自性。又緣復賴緣，緣無性也。又果生緣壞，緣則改變，故無性也。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0052c11–0052c12〕：「乃明都無能生所生性，云何乃於無生法中計有生」
- T30n1568龍樹論〔0159c28–0159c29〕：「眾緣所生法有二種：一者內，二者外。眾緣亦有二種：一者內，二者外。」
- T30n1568龍樹論〔0160a08–0160a09〕：「如是內外諸法皆從眾緣生，從眾緣生故，即非是無性耶！」
- T30n1568龍樹論〔0160b02–0160b03〕：「故眾緣皆空。緣空故，從緣生法亦空，是故當知一切有為法皆空。」
- T25n1509《大智度論》〔0296b14–0296b15〕：「「因緣」者，相應因、共生因、自種因、遍因、報因——是五因名為因緣。復次，一切有為法，亦名因緣。」
- T25n1509《大智度論》〔0296c07–0296c10〕：「般若波羅蜜於一切法無所捨、無所破，畢竟清淨，無諸戲論。如佛說有四緣，但以少智之人著於四緣而生邪論；為破著故，說言諸法實空，無所破。」
- T25n1509《大智度論》〔0297a28–0297b02〕：「菩薩觀知諸法從四緣生，而不取四緣中定相。四緣和合生，如水中月，雖為虛誑無所有，要從水月因緣生，不從餘緣有；諸法亦如是，各自從因緣生，亦無定實。」
- T32n1631《迴諍論》〔0015b03–0015b09〕：「若一切法皆是因緣，則是因緣、因緣和合，離諸因緣是則更無一切自體，如是一切諸法皆空。如芽非是種子中有，非地、非水、非火、非風、非虛空等因緣中有，非是一一因緣中有，非諸因緣和合中有，非離因緣、因緣和合餘處別有。若此等中一切皆無，如是得言芽無自體。」
- T32n1631《迴諍論》〔0015a16–0015a17〕：「若彼有自體，不須因緣生，若須因緣者，如是得言空。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0050b05–0050b08〕：「無始來常有此心，即有能緣、所緣。《淨名經》云「心有攀緣，即是病本。」何所攀緣？謂之三界。云何斷攀緣？謂無所得。今求緣緣不可得，即是斷眾生病本，令得解脫也。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0050b08–0050b21〕：「解緣緣有五。一云：心是能緣、境是所緣，心境合說故名緣緣。二解云：心是能緣，復緣前境，故心名緣緣。第三解云：前境是緣、能生心緣，緣能生緣，故名緣緣，從境受名。四解云：緣緣者，是心緣之緣，即是果也；萬法為心緣作緣，從果受名，故云緣緣。根本集阿毘曇師作此釋。何以知然？《大品》云「因、次第、緣、增上」，而次第及增上既是果，則知緣緣亦是果，故從果受名。即此論云「無相無緣」。無緣是無能緣，無相明無所緣，故知以心為能緣，萬法為能緣之心作緣，故云緣緣。五解云：通別兩舉。所言緣者，是生心之緣，謂別緣也。此緣復是四緣中之一緣，是通緣也。故通別兩舉，名為緣緣也。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0050c03–0050c10〕：「又破因緣故無境、破次第緣是破心，既無心境，云何有緣緣？今縱妄情言有，故破之易折也。又前後二門相成。上明既不得前滅後生，云何得緣境耶？即以前門成後；今明既不得緣境，云何得生滅耶？即以後門成前。又各逐義便，彼既立心前滅後生，宜一一就三世中責之；今立能緣所緣，故引實相畢竟空蕩之。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0051a13–0051a14〕：「求此色不可得，故無緣緣，而不無緣緣義，今只明緣緣即是無緣緣。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0051a16–0051a20〕：「若聞色自安置世諦、聞空置第一義，此是空者自空、不空者自不空耳，則是斷常二見。今只是有者不有，豈得無有？只明空者不空，豈得無空？故知空有不二，但破偏執定有定無，故言非有非無耳。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0051b10–0051b11〕：「無相無所緣，無緣無能緣也。」
- T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0051b16–0051b20〕：「無緣緣是真實說，有緣緣是隨宜說，所以用無以破有。問：何故就此偈明權實耶？答：此偈有二意，一者引正破邪、二者舉實顯權。偈既云真實微妙法，則知有方便隨宜法也。」
本品共錄二十一條大正原校異讀；實引九部漢譯經論疏（含底本），所有引點均由本次原始經藏標記檔重取。無現代學者、無現代梵本、無異釋勝負裁決。
Textual Collation
The base text for this chapter is “Examination of Conditions, Chapter One” in the Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka, T30n1564〔T30 0001b10–0003c04〕. The reader text begins with the verse of homage〔0001b14〕. The table below records only variant readings found in the original collation notes for this chapter. The main text follows the Taishō base throughout and is never emended directly from a variant.
| Location | Taishō base text | Variant in the original collation |
|---|---|---|
| 0001b10 | 中論觀因緣品 · “Treatise on the Middle, Examination of Conditions” | 中論卷 · “Scroll of the Treatise on the Middle”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0001b10 | 十六偈 · “sixteen verses” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0001b12 | 梵志青目釋 · “commented upon by the brahmin Qingmu” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0001b13 | 三藏 · “Tripiṭaka Master” | 三藏法師 · “Tripiṭaka Dharma Master”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0001b21 | 變 · “transformation” | 變化 · “transformation and change”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0001b22 | 等謬故墮 · “because of such errors, they fall” | 謬墮 · “erroneously fall”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0001c04 | 疑見 · “view of doubt” | 見疑 · “view and doubt”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0001c12 | 佛 · “Buddha” | 佛已 · “the Buddha has”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0001c15 | 諸 · “various” | 謂 · “say”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0001c17 | 從他生 · “arise from another” | 他生 · “arising from another”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0002a02 | 則 · “then” | 即 · “is precisely”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0002b09 | 眾因 · “many causes” | 眾因緣 · “many causes and conditions”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0002b14 | 是則為 · “this would be” | 則為是 · “would then be this”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0002b19 | 他性 · “other-nature” | 他生 · “arising from another”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0002b20 | 諸法自性 · “the intrinsic nature of dharmas” | 諸法性 · “the nature of dharmas”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0002b26 | 四句 · “four alternatives” | 四緣 · “four conditions”【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0003a07 | 應與非緣同故 · “because they should be the same as non-conditions” | 緣與無緣同故 · “because conditions and what lacks conditions are the same”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0003a14 | 現在心心數法 · “present mental events and mental factors” | 現在心數法 · “present mental factors”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0003a27 | 未欲滅法者 · “as for dharmas not yet intending to cease” | 未欲滅者 · “as for those not yet intending to cease”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0003b15 | 分別有無故說 · “spoken because of distinctions between existence and nonexistence” | 分別有無故說緣 · “conditions are spoken because of distinctions between existence and nonexistence”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】【Third】 |
| 0003b24 | 泥中無瓶 · “there is no jar in clay” | 埿中無瓶 · same reading with a variant graph for “clay”【Song】【Yuan】 |
The readings 「他性／他生」 tr. “other-nature / arising from another”〔0002b19〕 and 「四句／四緣」 tr. “four alternatives / four conditions”〔0002b26〕 directly affect interpretation and are therefore retained in particular. The following prose, however, immediately says 「因自性有他性」 tr. “other-nature exists because of intrinsic nature” and 「於四句中生不可得」 tr. “arising cannot be found within the four alternatives”; the context of the Taishō text thus forms a coherent reading of its own. The variants are listed without deciding between them.
This chapter cites the Prajñā-pāramitā as 「菩薩坐道場時，觀十二因緣，如虛空不可盡」 tr. “When a bodhisattva sits at the place of awakening, he contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination as inexhaustible like space”〔T30 0001b28–0001b29〕. The corresponding passage in the extant Smaller Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra first says 「虛空無盡故，般若波羅蜜無盡」 tr. “Because space is inexhaustible, the perfection of wisdom is inexhaustible,” and then states 「菩薩坐道場時，如是觀十二因緣，離於二邊」 tr. “When a bodhisattva sits at the place of awakening and contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination in this way, he is free from the two extremes”〔T08 0578c19–0578c26〕. It later speaks again of contemplating the twelve links through an inexhaustible dharma〔0578c27–0579a07〕. The order and exact wording are not identical; the treatise’s wording should be understood as an approximate citation preserved in the treatise, not corrected retroactively from the extant sūtra.
Comparative Readings
A. Vocabulary in the Verse of Homage
Kumārajīva’s version reads: 「不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷，不一亦不異，不來亦不出。」 tr. “Neither arising nor ceasing; neither permanence nor annihilation; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going forth”〔T30 0001b14–0001b15〕. The Prajñā Lamp Commentary reads: 「不滅亦不起，不斷亦不常，非一非種種，不來亦不去。」 tr. “Neither ceasing nor originating; neither annihilation nor permanence; neither one nor manifold; neither coming nor going”〔T30 0051c15–0051c16〕. The extant opening of the Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation reads: 「不滅亦不生，不斷亦不常等。」 tr. “Neither ceasing nor arising; neither annihilation nor permanence, and so forth”〔T30 0136a18〕. The three versions preserve distinct vocabulary for 「生／起」 tr. “arising / originating,” 「異／種種」 tr. “difference / manifoldness,” and 「出／去」 tr. “going forth / going.” They are placed side by side here without using one translation to correct another.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary explains 「緣起」 tr. “dependent origination” as 「種種因緣和合得起」 tr. “originating through the conjunction of many causes and conditions,” and explains the cessation of conceptual proliferation with 「語自性執，永不行故」 tr. “because discursive clinging to intrinsic nature no longer operates”〔T30 0051c26–0051c28〕. The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation says that when one grasps verbal formulations and clings to the existence of a nature, conceptual proliferation is brought to rest; only after intrinsic nature has been discerned as empty is there tranquility〔T30 0136a26–0136b01〕. Both commentaries connect the eight negations with dependent origination and clinging to intrinsic nature, although their divisions and formulations differ.
B. Non-arising through the Four Gateways
Kumārajīva’s version combines the four gateways in one verse: 「諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共不無因，是故知無生。」 tr. “Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor from another; neither from both nor without a cause—thus one knows non-arising”〔T30 0002b06–0002b07〕. The Prajñā Lamp Commentary translates it as: 「無時亦無處，隨有一物體，從自他及共，無因而起者。」 tr. “At no time and in no place does any single entity originate from itself, from another, from both, or without a cause”〔T30 0052b16–0052b17〕. The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation marks the four gateways separately: 「諸法不自生」 tr. “Dharmas do not arise from themselves”〔T30 0136c09〕, 「亦不從他生」 tr. “nor do they arise from another”〔0136c29〕, 「共生亦無性」 tr. “arising from both likewise has no nature”〔0137a18〕, and 「亦不無因生」 tr. “nor do they arise without a cause”〔0137a22〕. One division combines and the other unfolds, but both address the four gateways of self, other, both, and no cause one by one.
C. The Four Conditions in the Context of the Two Truths
Kumārajīva’s version lists 「因緣、次第緣、緣緣、增上緣」 tr. “the causal condition, the immediately preceding condition, the object condition, and the dominant condition,” then examines each in turn〔T30 0002b27–0003b15〕. The Prajñā Lamp Commentary gives the same four conditions and says that, in order to embrace disputants who assert no cause or an evil cause, the Buddha taught the four conditions within conventional truth〔T30 0054c21–0055a03、0055a25–0055a28〕. The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation also lists the four conditions, explaining that they were revealed within conventional truth in order to guide disputants who assert no cause or an evil cause, not as fixed and real arising within ultimate truth〔T30 0137a28–0137b21〕. These are explicit placements made by the two alternative commentaries in the same field of discourse; this apparatus does not further decide which formulation is superior.
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang first connects the chapter to the title of the treatise: contemplating true causes and conditions as 「不生不滅乃至不來不去」 tr. “neither arising nor ceasing, through neither coming nor going” reveals the Middle Way precisely through causes and conditions; contemplation discerns it in the mind, while treatise discourse declares it through speech〔T42 0005c01–0005c19〕. He also says that this chapter’s 「因緣」 tr. “causes and conditions” has three levels, both general and specific: it can refer to the four conditions being refuted; it can refer generally to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, ordinary and noble, delusion and understanding, all of which depend on relative provisional designation; and it can refer to the twelve links of dependent origination〔T42 0005c23–0006a18〕. These three readings coexist in the commentary and need not exclude one another.
Jizang divides the sequence of the text into three parts: first, two verses clarify non-arising through the four gateways; next, an outsider establishes four conditions to prove arising; and finally, beginning with 「果為從緣生」 tr. “Does the effect arise from conditions?”, the four conditions are refuted to reveal non-arising〔T42 0040c22–0040c29〕. At the refutation of the four conditions, he further distinguishes the initial refutation of the four conditions’ capacity to produce an effect, the subsequent explanation that non-conditions cannot produce an effect, and the final double conclusion that an effect arises from neither conditions nor non-conditions. Within this are comprehensive refutation, individual refutation, and concluding refutation〔T42 0046b01–0046b10〕. The six-part division in this edition only unfolds that skeleton into readable spans.
Jizang’s most direct mirror language concerning 「從緣」 tr. “from conditions” and 「無生」 tr. “non-arising” is: 「既其假緣即無性，無性故無生。」 tr. “Precisely because it depends provisionally on conditions, it has no intrinsic nature; because it has no intrinsic nature, it does not arise.” He also uses the moon in water: although it appears through the moon and water, it has no fixed arising in reality〔T42 0046a23–0046b01〕. At the final verse, the commentary again says that conditions exist because of the effect and therefore lack intrinsic nature, while the effect exists because of conditions and therefore lacks intrinsic nature〔T42 0052c03–0052c12〕. This is Jizang’s interpretive judgment. It is recorded as the principal mirror, not poured downward into the words of the base text.
Jizang also expressly states that three gates in the Twelve Gate Treatise—“Examination of Causes and Conditions,” “Examination of an Existing or Nonexisting Effect,” and “Examination of Conditions”—are respectively contained in this chapter’s 「自性不在於緣中」 tr. “intrinsic nature is not present in conditions,” the opening of its individual refutation of the four conditions, and the conclusion of its refutation of the four conditions〔T42 0007b18–0007b25〕. This supplies a traditional classificatory basis for reading the two treatises together.
The object condition cannot be exhausted by the single phrase 「空、無相、無緣」 tr. “empty, signless, and objectless.” Jizang first treats cognitive engagement as the root of illness: seeking the apprehending mind and apprehended object and finding neither ends the illness through non-attainment. He then preserves five explanations of the object condition: mind and object named together; the apprehending mind again taking the object; the object producing the apprehending mind; all dharmas serving as conditions for the mind that apprehends them; and the combined naming of condition in its general and specific senses〔T42 0050b05–0050b21〕. These five explanations are doctrinal gateways recorded in the commentary. They cannot be retroactively called Qingmu’s original definition, nor omitted merely to shorten the translated exposition.
The commentary further connects the first three conditions: refuting the causal condition leaves the object without fixed nature; refuting the immediately preceding condition leaves the mind without fixed nature; when mind and object lack intrinsic nature, an object condition cannot be independently established. Conversely, if earlier and later moments cannot be definitively established, the apprehending mind cannot intrinsically apprehend an object either〔T42 0050c03–0050c10〕. The sequential refutation of the four conditions is therefore not four unrelated bundles of material; producer and produced, apprehender and apprehended, illuminate one another across the sequence.
Jizang explicitly says 「緣緣即是無緣緣」 tr. “the object condition is precisely the absence of a fixed object condition,” while also saying 「不無緣緣義」 tr. “the meaning of the object condition is not absent”〔T42 0051a13–0051a14〕. To place material form solely in conventional truth and emptiness solely in ultimate truth would split emptiness and nonemptiness into the two views of annihilation and permanence; what is refuted is only partial clinging to fixed existence or fixed nonexistence〔0051a16–0051a20〕. He further explains 「無相」 tr. “signless” as the absence of an apprehended object and 「無緣」 tr. “objectless” as the absence of an apprehending mind, and treats the existence of an object condition as an adaptive teaching while the absence of a fixed object condition is the true teaching〔0051b10–0051b20〕. This mirror neither destroys the dependently stated functioning of mind and object nor leaves intrinsic nature in either pole.
Terminology
| Term | Scope established by this chapter and the ancient masters |
|---|---|
| Eight negations | Neither arising nor ceasing, permanence nor annihilation, identity nor difference, coming nor going forth. Qingmu says that the eight matters comprehensively refute all dharmas, while the latter six establish the meaning of neither arising nor ceasing〔T30 0001c13–0002a10〕. |
| Causes and conditions (general sense) | The chapter refers both to the twelve links of dependent origination and to the field of the four conditions. Jizang further explains causes and conditions through emptiness, provisional designation, and the Middle: what arises through causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature and therefore cannot be determinately called existent, while emptiness too cannot be grasped as fixed emptiness〔T42 0007a01–0007a08〕. |
| Conceptual proliferation | The chapter first lists views of no cause, a wrong cause, annihilation, permanence, self, and what belongs to self〔T30 0001b18–0001b23〕. The Treatise Conforming to the Middle expressly defines conceptual proliferation as 「取著有得有物」 tr. “grasping at attainment and at an existent object,” together with the unreal apprehension of marks〔T30 0041a01–0041a02〕. |
| Intrinsic nature | Qingmu directly explains 「自性即是自體」 tr. “intrinsic nature is a thing’s own body.” The many conditions contain no intrinsic nature; a name is obtained only through their conjunction〔T30 0002b20–0002b22〕. |
| Other-nature | The chapter says that other-nature is established because of intrinsic nature; relative to the other itself, other-nature is again its intrinsic nature. Refuting intrinsic nature therefore refutes other-nature along with it〔T30 0002b22–0002b25〕. |
| Causal condition (one of the four) | The chapter defines this as all conditioned dharmas〔T30 0002c02–0002c03〕. The Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom separately lists five causes: associated cause, co-arisen cause, same-kind cause, pervasive cause, and retributive cause〔T25 0296b14–0296b15〕. |
| Immediately preceding condition | All past and present mental events and mental factors apart from an arhat’s final mental event and mental factors can provide succession〔T30 0002c02–0002c04〕. The chapter immediately examines how a dharma that has ceased could condition a future dharma. |
| Object condition | The chapter includes all dharmas within the object condition〔T30 0002c04〕, then uses the true Dharma’s signlessness and objectlessness to examine an apprehended object taken as fixed and real〔T30 0003b02–0003b08〕. |
| Dominant condition | The chapter likewise makes all dharmas its range〔T30 0002c04〕, then uses 「是事有故是事有」 tr. “because this exists, that exists” to examine whether a fixed 「有相」 tr. “mark of existence” can be established〔T30 0003b09–0003b15〕. |
The original Taishō collation for this chapter supplies Sanskrit comparisons, but these are not ancient Chinese transmissions of Sanskrit sounds. Under the governing rule they are omitted here and no modern Sanskrit edition is used to fill the gap.
Doctrinal Outline
Direct measurement of the source gives forty long-prose blocks, fifteen verse groups, and thirty-six verse lines; neither verse groups nor verse lines are the same thing as the traditional 「頌數」 tr. “number of verses.” The reader unit remains one chapter, internally divided at natural turns into six parts:
- The eight negations and the occasion for composing the treatise〔T30 0001b14–0001c21〕;
- The eight negations as a comprehensive frame and the grain-and-sprout dialogue〔0001c21–0002b04〕;
- Non-arising through the four gateways and the absence of intrinsic nature〔0002b04–0002b27〕;
- Establishing and comprehensively refuting the four conditions〔0002b27–0002c24〕;
- Examining the four conditions one by one〔0002c24–0003b16〕;
- Relinquishing effect, condition, and non-condition together〔0003b16–0003c04〕.
The first three parts unfold the 「不生」 tr. “non-arising” marked in the verse of homage into the eight negations and the four gateways. The latter three put the claim 「四緣生諸法」 tr. “the four conditions produce dharmas” through comprehensive examination, individual examination, and concluding refutation. This finer division corresponds to Jizang’s three large parts—「四門明無生→外立四緣→破四緣顯無生」 tr. “the four gateways clarify non-arising → an outsider establishes the four conditions → the four conditions are refuted to reveal non-arising”—without rewriting the commentary’s classification as though it were the treatise’s own structure.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
Seng Rui’s preface to the scroll expressly records: 「今所出者，是天竺梵志名賓伽羅、秦言青目之所釋也。」 tr. “The work now translated is the commentary written by the Indian brahmin named Piṅgala, called Qingmu in the language of Qin.” It further says that wherever Qingmu’s commentary was defective or cumbersome, 「法師皆裁而裨之」 tr. “the Master edited and supplemented it throughout”〔T30 0001a24–0001b01〕. The received text therefore contains not only Nāgārjuna’s verses, but Qingmu’s commentary and editorial supplementation from Kumārajīva’s translation workshop. Retaining verse and commentary together in the source layer accords precisely with the transmitted identity recorded in the preface.
Seng Rui also names the four treatises together: 「《百論》治外以閑邪，斯文袪內以流滯，《大智釋論》之淵博，《十二門觀》之精詣」 tr. “The Hundred Treatise treats the external in order to bar error; this work clears the internal so that what was obstructed may flow; the Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom is vast in learning; and the contemplations of the Twelve Gates are profound and exact”〔T30 0001b01–0001b04〕. This is not a retrospectively assembled reading list but a Guanzhong path of reading preserved in the treatise’s own preface: the Treatise on the Middle, the Hundred Treatise, the Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom, and the Twelve Gate Treatise illuminate one another while applying their force in distinct places.
The chapter heading reads 「龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋、姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯」 tr. “composed by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, commented upon by the brahmin Qingmu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin”〔T30 0001b12–0001b13〕. No translation date has been supplied from an unverified catalog. A more precise determination of date or workshop would require item-by-item evidence from the catalogs.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
The Treatise Conforming to the Meaning of the Middle and Entering the Dharma Gate of the First Chapter of the Great Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra is attributed to 「龍勝菩薩造、無着菩薩釋」 tr. “composed by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna and commented upon by the bodhisattva Asaṅga”〔T30 0039c22–0039c23〕. Its verse of homage reads 「不滅亦不生……佛已說因緣，斷諸戲論法」 tr. “Neither ceasing nor arising … the Buddha has taught causes and conditions, cutting off all dharmas of conceptual proliferation”〔0039c24–0039c28〕. It further cites the prajñā teaching that the intrinsic body and nature of all dharmas are empty, so no slightest dharma can be grasped or relinquished, produced or ceased, annihilated or made permanent, identical or different, coming or going〔0040a18–0040a28〕.
Only one firm connection is established here: the commentary attributed in Chinese transmission to Asaṅga enters a prajñā reading directly through Nāgārjuna’s verse of homage. This chapter does not decide how later axes of emptiness and existence should classify one another, and this apparatus does not drag in non-parallel passages from the Jewel in the Hand Treatise or the Cheng Weishi Lun merely to fill a heading.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
A. Twelve Gate Treatise
“Examination of Causes and Conditions” begins from 「眾緣所生法，是即無自性；若無自性者，云何有是法」 tr. “A dharma produced by many conditions is thereby without intrinsic nature; if it has no intrinsic nature, how could this dharma exist?”〔T30 0159c26–0159c27〕. It then uses the jar, cloth, house, butter, sprout, and the twelve links of dependent origination to explain internal and external conditions separately〔0159c28–0160a09〕. It concludes that because conditions are empty, dharmas produced from conditions are also empty〔0160b01–0160b03〕. This unfolds the brief argument in this chapter of the Treatise on the Middle—「眾緣中無自性」 tr. “there is no intrinsic nature among the many conditions”—into an entire gate.
B. Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom
Its “Meaning of the Four Conditions” first records the four conditions and their respective definitions〔T25 0296b11–0296b19〕, then raises questions similar to those in this chapter one by one: neither an effect already present in its cause nor an effect absent from its cause can be established; how can a mental event that has ceased serve as an immediately preceding condition; and how can an object condition or dominant condition be determinately established when all dharmas are signless and objectless〔0296b20–0296c05〕? It then says that prajñā has 「無所捨、無所破」 tr. “nothing to relinquish and nothing to refute”; what is refuted is attachment to the four conditions〔0296c05–0296c10〕. It also states, 「菩薩觀知諸法從四緣生，而不取四緣中定相。」 tr. “The bodhisattva contemplates and knows that dharmas arise from the four conditions, yet does not grasp a fixed mark within the four conditions,” and uses the moon in water to describe the conjunction of four conditions without fixed reality〔0297a23–0297b04〕. This prevents 「破四緣」 tr. “refuting the four conditions” from being read as canceling the conventional functioning of causes and conditions.
C. Vigrahavyāvartanī
The Vigrahavyāvartanī uses a sprout as its example: the sprout is not present individually in seed, earth, water, fire, wind, space, or any other condition; nor is it present in the conjunction of conditions; nor does it exist elsewhere apart from causes and conditions. Therefore the sprout has no body of its own〔T32 0015b03–0015b10〕. Its root verse also says: 「若彼有自體，不須因緣生，若須因緣者，如是得言空。」 tr. “If it possessed a body of its own, it would not need to arise from causes and conditions; if it requires causes and conditions, it may in this way be called empty”〔T32 0015a16–0015a17〕. This cross-reading carries the chapter’s claim 「緣中無果」 tr. “there is no effect in the conditions” into the challenge of whether the discourse of emptiness can itself stand, linking the works without reproducing the entire treatise.
Position of the Editions
| Category | Sources used here |
|---|---|
| Base-text ground truth | T30n1564〔0001b10–0003c04〕 |
| Preface record | T30n1564〔0001a24–0001b06〕 |
| Prajñā sūtra witness | T08n0227〔0578c19–0579a07〕 |
| Alternative commentary on the same verses, one | T30n1566〔0051c15–0052b17、0054c21–0055b13〕 |
| Alternative commentary on the same verses, two | T30n1567〔0136a11–0137b24〕 |
| Jizang’s line-by-line commentary | T42n1824〔0005c01–0007b25、0040c22–0042a20、0045b09–0047b05、0052a12–0052c19〕 |
| Yogācāra-axis connection | T30n1565〔0039c22–0040b17〕 |
| Cross-reading within the Three Treatises | T30n1568〔0159c22–0160b15〕 |
| Cross-reading within Nāgārjuna’s lineage | T25n1509〔0296b11–0297b20〕; T32n1631〔0015a15–0015b13〕 |
Primary Evidence for Each Doctrinal Point
The primary evidence below serves only to lock every doctrine transmitted in this chapter back to the original Chinese translations of sūtra, treatise, or commentary. Nāgārjuna’s verses, Qingmu’s commentary, alternative commentaries, and Jizang’s subcommentary are each identified according to their original status. Every quotation and line anchor has been checked item by item against the original marked canon file; no summary substitutes for primary evidence.
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0001b14–0001b17〕: 「不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷，不一亦不異，不來亦不出。能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論，我稽首禮佛，諸說中第一。」 tr. “Neither arising nor ceasing; neither permanence nor annihilation; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going forth. To the Buddha, who teaches these causes and conditions and skillfully brings all conceptual proliferation to rest, I bow my head. Among all spoken teachings, his is foremost.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001b18–0001b23〕: 「有人言萬物從大自在天生、有言從韋紐天生、有言從和合生、有言從時生、有言從世性生、有言從變生、有言從自然生、有言從微塵生。有如是等謬故，墮於無因、邪因、斷常等邪見，種種說我我所，不知正法。」 tr. “Some say all things are produced by Maheśvara, some by Viṣṇu, some by conjunction, some by time, some by primordial nature, some by transformation, some by spontaneity, and some by atoms. Because of such errors, they fall into wrong views of no cause, wrong cause, annihilation, and permanence; they speak in many ways of self and what belongs to self, and do not know the true Dharma.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001b23–0001b27〕: 「佛欲斷如是等諸邪見令知佛法故，先於聲聞法中說十二因緣，又為已習行有大心堪受深法者以大乘法說因緣相，所謂一切法不生不滅、不一不異等，畢竟空、無所有。」 tr. “Wishing to end such wrong views and enable people to know the Buddha’s teaching, the Buddha first taught the twelve links of dependent origination in the śrāvaka teaching. For those already practiced, possessed of the great resolve, and capable of receiving profound Dharma, he taught through the Mahāyāna the mark of causes and conditions: all dharmas neither arise nor cease, are neither identical nor different, and so forth; they are ultimately empty and have no possession of their own.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001b28–0001b29〕: 「佛告須菩提：「菩薩坐道場時，觀十二因緣，如虛空不可盡。」」 tr. “The Buddha told Subhūti: ‘When a bodhisattva sits at the place of awakening, he contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination as inexhaustible like space.’”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001c01–0001c03〕: 「像法中，人根轉鈍、深著諸法，求十二因緣、五陰、十二入、十八界等決定相，不知佛意，但著文字」 tr. “During the Semblance Dharma, people’s faculties become dull. They cling deeply to dharmas and seek fixed marks in the twelve links of dependent origination, the five aggregates, the twelve sense fields, the eighteen elements, and so forth. They do not know the Buddha’s intent, but cling only to words.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001c03–0001c07〕: 「聞大乘法中說畢竟空，不知何因緣故空，即生疑見：若都畢竟空，云何分別有罪福報應等？如是則無世諦、第一義諦。取是空相而起貪著，於畢竟空中生種種過。龍樹菩薩為是等故，造此中論。」 tr. “Hearing the Mahāyāna teaching of ultimate emptiness, they do not know on account of what causes and conditions emptiness is taught and form a view of doubt: If all is ultimately empty, how can demerit, merit, karmic results, and the like be distinguished? Then there would be neither conventional nor ultimate truth. Grasping this mark of emptiness, they become attached and produce many faults within ultimate emptiness. The bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed this Treatise on the Middle for such people.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001c12〕: 「以此二偈讚佛，則已略說第一義。」 tr. “By praising the Buddha with these two verses, the ultimate meaning has already been stated in brief.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001c13–0001c14〕: 「法雖無量，略說八事則為總破一切法。」 tr. “Although dharmas are limitless, stating the eight matters in brief comprehensively refutes all dharmas.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001c14–0001c19〕: 「不生者，諸論師種種說生相，或謂因果一、或謂因果異、或謂因中先有果、或謂因中先無果、或謂自體生、或謂從他生、或謂共生、或謂有生、或謂無生。如是等說生相皆不然，此事後當廣說。生相決定不可得，故不生。」 tr. “‘Non-arising’ means that the masters of various treatises describe the mark of arising in many ways: cause and effect are identical; cause and effect are different; the effect already exists in the cause; the effect does not yet exist in the cause; a thing arises from itself, from another, or from both; there is arising; or there is no arising. All such accounts of arising are incorrect, as will be explained at length below. No fixed mark of arising can be found; therefore there is non-arising.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001c19–0001c21〕: 「不滅者，若無生何得有滅？以無生、無滅故，餘六事亦無。」 tr. “‘Non-ceasing’ means: if there is no arising, how could there be ceasing? Because there is neither arising nor ceasing, the other six matters are likewise absent.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001c21–0001c22〕: 「問曰：不生、不滅已總破一切法。何故復說六事？」 tr. “Question: Non-arising and non-ceasing already refute all dharmas comprehensively. Why state the other six matters?”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001c22–0001c23〕: 「答曰：為成不生不滅義故。有人不受不生不滅，而信不常不斷。」 tr. “Answer: To establish the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing. Some people reject non-arising and non-ceasing, but accept neither permanence nor annihilation.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0001c23–0002a03〕: 「若深求不常不斷，即是不生不滅。何以故？法若實有則不應無，先有今無是即為斷，若先有性是則為常，是故說不常不斷，即入不生不滅義。」 tr. “If neither permanence nor annihilation is investigated deeply, it is precisely neither arising nor ceasing. Why? If a dharma truly existed, it should not become nonexistent. To have existed before and not exist now is annihilation; if a nature existed beforehand, that is permanence. Thus, teaching neither permanence nor annihilation enters the meaning of neither arising nor ceasing.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002a04–0002a05〕: 「若一則無緣，若異則無相續，後當種種破，是故復說不一不異。」 tr. “If they are identical there is no condition; if different there is no continuity. These will be refuted in many ways below, so neither identity nor difference is stated next.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002a06–0002a08〕: 「來者言諸法從自在天、世性、微塵等來，出者還去至本處。」 tr. “‘Coming’ means that dharmas come from Maheśvara, primordial nature, atoms, and so forth; ‘going forth’ means returning to their original place.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002a09–0002a11〕: 「世間眼見劫初穀不生。何以故？離劫初穀，今穀不可得。若離劫初穀有今穀者則應有生；而實不爾，是故不生。」 tr. “The worldly eye sees that the grain at the beginning of the eon does not arise. Why? Apart from that grain, present grain cannot be found. If present grain existed apart from it, arising should occur; but this is not so, and therefore there is non-arising.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002a13–0002a14〕: 「世間眼見劫初穀不滅。若滅，今不應有穀；而實有穀，是故不滅。」 tr. “The worldly eye sees that the grain at the beginning of the eon does not cease. If it ceased, there should be no grain now; yet grain does exist, and therefore there is non-ceasing.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002a15–0002a17〕: 「世間眼見萬物不常，如穀芽時種則變壞，是故不常。」 tr. “The worldly eye sees that all things are impermanent. When a grain sprouts, for example, the seed changes and breaks down; therefore things are not permanent.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002a18–0002a19〕: 「世間眼見萬物不斷，如從穀有芽，是故不斷；若斷，不應相續。」 tr. “The worldly eye sees that all things are not annihilated. A sprout comes from a grain; therefore there is no annihilation. If there were, no continuity should occur.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002a21–0002a23〕: 「世間眼見萬物不一，如穀不作芽、芽不作穀。若穀作芽、芽作穀者應是一；而實不爾，是故不一。」 tr. “The worldly eye sees that all things are not identical. A grain does not make the sprout, nor does the sprout make the grain. If each made the other they should be identical, but this is not so; therefore they are not identical.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002a24–0002a26〕: 「世間眼見萬物不異。若異者，何故分別穀芽、穀莖、穀葉？不說樹芽、樹莖、樹葉，是故不異。」 tr. “The worldly eye sees that all things are not different. If they were different, why distinguish grain sprout, grain stalk, and grain leaf rather than tree sprout, tree stalk, and tree leaf? Therefore they are not different.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002a28–0002b01〕: 「世間眼見萬物不來，如穀子中芽無所從來。若來者，芽應從餘處來，如鳥來栖樹；而實不爾，是故不來。」 tr. “The worldly eye sees that all things do not come. The sprout in a grain has nowhere from which it comes. If it came, it should arrive from elsewhere like a bird perching in a tree; but this is not so, and therefore there is no coming.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002b02–0002b04〕: 「世間眼見萬物不出。若有出，應見芽從穀出，如蛇從穴出；而實不爾，是故不出。」 tr. “The worldly eye sees that all things do not go forth. If there were going forth, one should see a sprout emerge from the grain as a snake emerges from its hole; but this is not so, and therefore there is no going forth.”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0002b06–0002b07〕: 「諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共不無因，是故知無生。」 tr. “Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from another; neither from both nor without a cause—thus one knows non-arising.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002b08–0002b11〕: 「不自生者，萬物無有從自體生，必待眾因。復次若從自體生，則一法有二體：一謂生、二謂生者。若離餘因從自體生者，則無因無緣。又生更有生，生則無窮。」 tr. “‘Not arising from itself’ means that no thing arises from its own body; it must depend on many causes. If it arose from its own body, one dharma would have two bodies, arising and that which arises. If it arose from itself apart from other causes, it would be without causes or conditions. Arising would itself have further arising, without end.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002b11–0002b13〕: 「自無故，他亦無。何以故？有自故有他。若不從自生，亦不從他生，共生則有二過：自生、他生故。」 tr. “Because there is no self, there is also no other. Why? An other exists because of a self. If arising is neither from self nor from other, arising from both entails both faults: self-arising and arising from another.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002b13–0002b17〕: 「若無因而有萬物者，是則為常。是事不然。無因則無果，若無因有果者，布施持戒等應墮地獄、十惡五逆應當生天，以無因故。」 tr. “If all things existed without a cause, they would be permanent, which is not so. Without a cause there is no effect. If an effect existed without a cause, giving, keeping precepts, and the like should lead to hell, while the ten evil acts and five heinous offenses should lead to heaven, because there would be no cause.”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0002b18–0002b19〕: 「如諸法自性，不在於緣中，以無自性故，他性亦復無。」 tr. “The intrinsic nature of dharmas is not present in conditions. Because intrinsic nature is absent, other-nature is likewise absent.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002b20–0002b27〕: 「諸法自性不在眾緣中，但眾緣和合故得名字。自性即是自體，眾緣中無自性。自性無故不自生，自性無故他性亦無。何以故？因自性有他性，他性於他亦是自性。若破自性即破他性，是故不應從他性生。若破自性、他性，即破共義。無因則有大過，有因尚可破，何況無因！於四句中生不可得，是故不生。」 tr. “The intrinsic nature of dharmas is not present among the many conditions; a name is obtained only because those conditions come together. Intrinsic nature is a thing’s own body, yet the conditions contain none. Because it is absent, there is neither self-arising nor other-nature. Why? Other-nature exists in relation to intrinsic nature, but relative to the other itself, it too is intrinsic nature. Refuting intrinsic nature refutes other-nature, and therefore things should not be said to arise from it. Refuting both also refutes arising from both. Arising without a cause entails a great fault—if arising with a cause can be refuted, how much more arising without one! Arising cannot be found in the four alternatives; therefore there is non-arising.”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse establishing the Abhidharma four conditions〔0002b29–0002c01〕: 「因緣次第緣，緣緣增上緣，四緣生諸法，更無第五緣。」 tr. “The causal condition, immediately preceding condition, object condition, and dominant condition: the four conditions produce all dharmas; there is no fifth condition.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary establishing the Abhidharma four conditions〔0002c02–0002c05〕: 「一切所有緣，皆攝在四緣，以是四緣萬物得生。因緣名一切有為法；次第緣除過去現在阿羅漢最後心心數法，餘過去現在心心數法；緣緣、增上緣一切法。」 tr. “Every condition is included within the four conditions, and through them all things arise. Causal condition names all conditioned dharmas. Immediately preceding condition names all past and present mental events and mental factors apart from an arhat’s final ones. Object condition and dominant condition include all dharmas.”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0002c06–0002c07〕: 「果為從緣生，為從非緣生？是緣為有果，是緣為無果？」 tr. “Does the effect arise from conditions or from non-conditions? Do these conditions possess an effect, or do they lack one?”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002c08–0002c10〕: 「若謂有果，是果為從緣生、為從非緣生？若謂有緣，是緣為有果、為無果？二俱不然。何以故？」 tr. “If an effect exists, does it arise from conditions or non-conditions? If conditions exist, do they possess an effect or lack one? Neither is so. Why?”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0002c11–0002c12〕: 「因是法生果，是法名為緣；若是果未生，何不名非緣？」 tr. “Because this dharma produces an effect, it is called a condition. Before the effect has arisen, why is it not called a non-condition?”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002c13–0002c16〕: 「諸緣無決定。何以故？若果未生，是時不名為緣；但眼見從緣生果，故名之為緣。緣成由於果，以果後、緣先故。若未有果，何得名為緣？」 tr. “Conditions have no fixed status. Why? Before an effect arises, something is not called a condition. It is called one only because the eye sees an effect arise from it. A condition is established through the effect, since effect is later and condition earlier. Without an effect, how could the name condition be obtained?”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002c16–0002c18〕: 「為緣？如瓶以水土和合故有瓶生，見瓶故知水土等是瓶緣。若瓶未生時，何以不名水土等為非緣？是故果不從緣生。」 tr. “A condition? A jar arises through the conjunction of water and clay; seeing the jar, one knows that water, clay, and the like are its conditions. Before the jar arises, why not call them non-conditions? Therefore an effect does not arise from conditions.”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0002c20–0002c21〕: 「果先於緣中，有無俱不可。先無為誰緣，先有何用緣。」 tr. “Whether an effect already exists or does not exist in conditions, neither is possible. If absent before, for whom are they conditions? If present before, what need is there for conditions?”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0002c22–0002c24〕: 「緣中先非有果、非無果。若先有果，不名為緣，果先有故。若先無果，亦不名為緣，不生餘物故。」 tr. “The effect neither exists nor does not exist beforehand in conditions. If it already existed, they would not be called conditions, since the effect was already there. If it did not exist, they likewise would not be called conditions, since they would not produce another thing.”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0003a02–0003a03〕: 「若果非有生，亦復非無生，亦非有無生，何得言有緣？」 tr. “If an effect is produced neither as existent, nonexistent, nor both existent and nonexistent, how can there be a causal condition?”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0003a04–0003a09〕: 「若緣能生果，應有三種：若有、若無、若有無。如先偈中說，緣中若先有果，不應言生，以先有故。若先無果，不應言生，以先無故，亦應與非緣同故。有無亦不生者，有無名為半有半無，二俱有過。又有與無相違，無與有相違，何得一法有二相？」 tr. “If conditions produce an effect, it should be existent, nonexistent, or both. If already existent in conditions, it should not be called produced, since it already exists. If absent, it likewise should not be called produced, since it was absent, and conditions would be the same as non-conditions. Production as both also fails: this means half existent and half nonexistent, entailing both faults. Moreover, existence and nonexistence contradict one another. How can one dharma have both marks?”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0003a12–0003a13〕: 「果若未生時，則不應有滅，滅法何能緣？故無次第緣。」 tr. “Before an effect arises, there should be no ceasing. How can a ceased dharma condition anything? Therefore there is no immediately preceding condition.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0003a14–0003a18〕: 「諸心心數法於三世中次第生。現在心心數法滅，與未來心作次第緣。未來法未生，與誰作次第緣？若未來法已有，即是生，何用次第緣？現在心心數法無有住時，若不住，何能為次第緣，若有住，則非有為法。」 tr. “Mental events and factors arise sequentially in the three times. Present ones cease and serve as the immediately preceding condition for a future mind. But before the future dharma arises, for whom do they serve as such a condition? If it already exists, it has arisen; what need has it of that condition? Present mental events and factors never abide. If they do not abide, how can they condition succession? If they abide, they are not conditioned dharmas.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0003a20–0003a24〕: 「若言滅法猶有則是常，若常則無罪福等。若謂滅時能與作次第緣，滅時半滅半未滅，更無第三法名為滅時。又佛說：一切有為法念念滅，無一念時住。」 tr. “If a ceased dharma still exists, it is permanent; if permanent, there is no demerit or merit. If at the time of ceasing it serves as the immediately preceding condition, it is then half ceased and half not ceased, and there is no third dharma called the time of ceasing. Moreover, the Buddha taught that all conditioned dharmas cease moment by moment and never abide for even one moment.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0003a24–0003a29〕: 「云何言現在法有欲滅未欲滅？汝謂一念中無是欲滅未欲滅，則破自法。汝阿毘曇說：有滅法、有不滅法；有欲滅法、有不欲滅法。欲滅法者，現在法將欲滅。未欲滅法者，除現在將欲滅法，餘現在法及過去未來無為法，是名不欲滅法。是故無次第緣。」 tr. “How can present dharmas be divided into those intending and not intending to cease? If you say no such distinction exists within one moment, you refute your own doctrine. Your Abhidharma speaks of dharmas that cease and do not cease, that intend and do not intend to cease. Those intending are present dharmas about to cease. Those not intending are all other present dharmas, together with past, future, and unconditioned dharmas. Therefore there is no immediately preceding condition.”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0003b02–0003b03〕: 「如諸佛所說，真實微妙法，於此無緣法，云何有緣緣？」 tr. “In the true and subtle Dharma taught by the buddhas, how could there be an object condition regarding dharmas that have no object?”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0003b04–0003b08〕: 「佛說大乘諸法，若有色無色、有形無形、有漏無漏、有為無為等諸法相入於法性，一切皆空無相無緣。譬如眾流入海同為一味。實法可信，隨宜所說不可為實，是故無緣緣。」 tr. “The Buddha teaches Mahāyāna dharmas: material or immaterial, formed or formless, contaminated or uncontaminated, conditioned or unconditioned. When their marks enter dharma-nature, all are empty, signless, and objectless, like many rivers entering the sea and becoming one flavor. The true Dharma is trustworthy; teachings adapted to capacities cannot be taken as ultimately true. Therefore there is no object condition.”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0003b09–0003b10〕: 「諸法無自性，故無有有相；說有是事故，是事有不然。」 tr. “Dharmas have no intrinsic nature, and therefore no mark of existence. The claim that because this exists, that exists cannot stand.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0003b11–0003b15〕: 「經說十二因緣，是事有故是事有。此則不然。何以故？諸法從眾緣生故自無定性，自無定性故無有有相。有相無故，何得言是事有故是事有？是故無增上緣，佛隨凡夫分別有無故說。」 tr. “The sūtra teaches the twelve links: because this exists, that exists. This does not stand here. Why? Because dharmas arise from many conditions, they have no fixed nature; therefore no mark of existence is present. Without that mark, how can one say because this exists, that exists? Thus there is no dominant condition; the Buddha spoke in accommodation to ordinary distinctions of existence and nonexistence.”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0003b16–0003b17〕: 「略廣因緣中，求果不可得；因緣中若無，云何從緣出？」 tr. “Sought among causes and conditions collectively or separately, an effect cannot be found. If none is present there, how could it emerge from conditions?”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0003b18–0003b20〕: 「略者，於和合因緣中無果。廣者，於一一緣中亦無果。若略廣因緣中無果，云何言果從因緣出？」 tr. “‘Collectively’ means no effect in the conjunction of causes and conditions; ‘separately’ means none in each individual condition. If neither contains an effect, how can one say it emerges from causes and conditions?”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0003b21–0003b22〕: 「若謂緣無果，而從緣中出；是果何不從，非緣中而出？」 tr. “If an effect absent from conditions could emerge from conditions, why would it not emerge from non-conditions?”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0003b23–0003b24〕: 「若因緣中求果不可得，何故不從非緣出？如泥中無瓶，何故不從乳中出？」 tr. “If no effect can be found in causes and conditions, why does it not emerge from non-conditions? A jar is not present in clay; why does it not emerge from milk?”
- T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0003b25–0003b28〕: 「若果從緣生，是緣無自性，從無自性生，何得從緣生？果不從緣生，不從非緣生，以果無有故，緣非緣亦無。」 tr. “If an effect arises from conditions, those conditions lack intrinsic nature. How can something produced from what lacks intrinsic nature be said to arise from conditions? An effect arises neither from conditions nor non-conditions. Because no effect exists, neither conditions nor non-conditions exist.”
- T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0003b29–0003c04〕: 「果從眾緣生，是緣無自性。若無自性則無法，無法何能生？是故果不從緣生。不從非緣生者，破緣故說非緣。實無非緣法，是故不從非緣生。若不從二生，是則無果。無果故，緣非緣亦無。」 tr. “An effect arises from many conditions, so those conditions lack intrinsic nature. Without intrinsic nature there is no dharma; how can no dharma produce anything? Therefore an effect does not arise from conditions. ‘Not from non-conditions’ is said only because conditions have been refuted; no actual dharma called a non-condition exists. If the effect arises from neither, there is no effect. Without an effect, neither conditions nor non-conditions exist.”
- T08n0227, Smaller Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra〔0578c24–0578c25〕: 「菩薩坐道場時，如是觀十二因緣，離於二邊，是為菩薩不共之法。」 tr. “When a bodhisattva sits at the place of awakening and contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination in this way, he is free from the two extremes. This is a dharma unique to a bodhisattva.”
- T30n1565, Treatise Conforming to the Middle〔0040a24–0040a28〕: 「一切法自體性空。若其彼法自體空者，彼法無體；若無體者，是名般若波羅蜜；若是般若波羅蜜者，彼無少法可取可捨、若生若滅、若斷若常、若一義若異義、若來若去。此是真實般若波羅蜜。」 tr. “The body and nature of every dharma are empty. If a dharma’s own body is empty, that dharma has no body; this is called the perfection of wisdom. If it is the perfection of wisdom, no slightest dharma can be grasped or relinquished, arising or ceasing, annihilated or permanent, identical or different, coming or going. This is the true perfection of wisdom.”
- T30n1565, Treatise Conforming to the Middle〔0041a01–0041a04〕: 「言戲論者，所謂取著有得有物二，及不實取諸相等，是戲弄法，故名戲論。彼今略說。所謂取體、若取非體、取體非體、或取非體非非體等，此偈於彼一切皆斷。」 tr. “‘Conceptual proliferation’ means grasping at attainment and at an existent object, together with unreal apprehension of marks and the like. These are frivolous dharmas and therefore called proliferation. In brief: grasping a body, no body, both body and no body, or neither no body nor not-no-body—this verse cuts all of them off.”
- T30n1566, Prajñā Lamp Commentary〔0051c26–0051c28〕: 「緣起者，種種因緣和合得起，故名緣起。語自性執，永不行故，名戲論息。一切災障無故，或時自性空，故名善滅。」 tr. “‘Dependent origination’ means originating through the conjunction of many causes and conditions. Because discursive clinging to intrinsic nature no longer operates, conceptual proliferation is said to cease. Because every affliction and obstruction is absent—or because intrinsic nature is empty—it is called skillful cessation.”
- T30n1566, Prajñā Lamp Commentary〔0055a25–0055a28〕: 「是故佛說，第一義中，因及眾緣不能生眼。如是應知，佛為憐愍世間住於亂慧無因惡因諸諍論者，於世諦中，說有因緣、次第緣、緣緣、增上緣。」 tr. “The Buddha therefore said that within the ultimate meaning, cause and the many conditions cannot produce the eye. One should understand that, out of compassion for worldly disputants dwelling in confused wisdom, no cause, and evil causes, the Buddha spoke within conventional truth of a causal condition, immediately preceding condition, object condition, and dominant condition.”
- T30n1567, Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation〔0136a27–0136b01〕: 「若取著言詮，即為戲論。如其言詮，於如是性執有性者，彼皆息滅，此即名為滅諸戲論、離諸嬈惱性。分別自性空已乃名寂靜。」 tr. “To grasp verbal formulation is conceptual proliferation. When those who cling through such formulations to the existence of a nature have brought all such clinging to rest, this is called ending all conceptual proliferation and leaving the nature of disturbance behind. Only after discerning intrinsic nature as empty is there tranquility.”
- T30n1567, Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation〔0137b18–0137b21〕: 「若如是見，此非道理，彼遍計性故。是故前說無第五緣，亦非斷滅。世間所有諸執無因惡因諍論亂意之者，為攝化彼故，如其分位於世俗諦開示宣說諸因緣等，此即非勝義諦。」 tr. “A view of this kind is unreasonable, for it is imagined nature. Thus, the preceding statement that there is no fifth condition is not annihilation. In order to embrace and guide worldly people whose minds are confused by clinging, no cause, evil cause, and dispute, causes and conditions were revealed and taught at their proper level within conventional truth; this is not ultimate truth.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0005c01–0005c03〕: 「觀此正因緣不生不滅乃至不來不去，故此因緣即是中道。因於中道發生正觀，觀辨於心論宣於口，故知觀於因緣釋中觀論。」 tr. “Contemplate these true causes and conditions as neither arising nor ceasing, through neither coming nor going; therefore these causes and conditions are precisely the Middle Way. Correct contemplation arises through the Middle Way: contemplation discerns it in the mind and treatise declares it through the mouth. Thus, contemplating causes and conditions explains the Treatise on the Middle Contemplation.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0005c06–0005c09〕: 「觀正因緣既不生不滅，即破邪因緣是斷常生滅。是故偈云「能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論。」能說是因緣，謂顯正也；善滅諸戲論，謂破邪也。」 tr. “Contemplating true causes and conditions as neither arising nor ceasing refutes false causes and conditions as annihilation, permanence, arising, or ceasing. Thus the verse says, ‘Able to teach these causes and conditions, he skillfully ends all conceptual proliferation.’ Teaching these causes and conditions reveals the correct; skillfully ending proliferation refutes the false.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0005c24–0005c25〕: 「因緣有三：一從下破四緣受名，以四緣攝生義盡」 tr. “Causes and conditions have three meanings. First, the name is taken from the refutation of the four conditions below, for the four conditions exhaust the meanings of production.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0005c28–0005c29〕: 「以生死涅槃、凡聖解惑皆是假名相待，無有自性，稱為因緣義」 tr. “Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, ordinary and noble, understanding and delusion, are all relative provisional designations without intrinsic nature; this is called the meaning of causes and conditions.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0006a03–0006a04〕: 「以萬法皆是因緣、無有自性，以無自性是故不生」 tr. “Because the myriad dharmas are all causes and conditions, they have no intrinsic nature; because they have no intrinsic nature, they do not arise.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0006a06〕: 「三者此品觀十二因緣，故云觀因緣品。」 tr. “Third, this chapter contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination; therefore it is called ‘Examination of Conditions.’”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0007a03–0007a08〕: 「因緣凡有三義：一者因緣是空義。以因緣所生法即是寂滅性，故知因緣即是空義。二者因緣是假義。既無自性故不得言有，空亦復空故不得言空，為化眾生故以假名說，故因緣是假義。三者因緣是中道義。即此因緣離於二邊，故名為中道。」 tr. “Causes and conditions have three meanings. First, they mean emptiness: dharmas produced by causes and conditions are the nature of quiescent cessation, so causes and conditions mean emptiness. Second, they mean the provisional: lacking intrinsic nature, they cannot be called existent; emptiness too is empty, so they cannot be called empty. They are taught by provisional designation to guide beings. Third, they mean the Middle Way: these very causes and conditions are free of the two extremes, and therefore called the Middle Way.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0046a23–0046b01〕: 「今申假名四緣生義，良由諸法從四緣生，故是無生法。若定實即不假緣，既其假緣即無性，無性故無生。又他若聞四緣即言有生、若聞無生即無四緣，今須反之，若聞四緣即知無生，亦聞真諦即須知有生。問：諸法既空，云何諸法從四緣生？答：如水中月雖空，要從月從水生。雖從此二生，而實無生。一切法亦爾也。」 tr. “We now clarify the provisional meaning of arising from the four conditions. Precisely because dharmas arise from four conditions, they are non-arising dharmas. If fixed and real, they would not depend on conditions; because they provisionally depend on conditions, they have no nature, and therefore do not arise. Others hear four conditions and say there is arising, or hear non-arising and deny four conditions. Reverse this: hearing four conditions, know non-arising; hearing ultimate truth, also know conventional arising. Question: Since dharmas are empty, how do they arise from four conditions? Answer: Although the moon in water is empty, it must appear from moon and water. Though appearing through both, it does not truly arise. All dharmas are likewise.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0052c08–0052c10〕: 「緣由果有，緣無自性；果由緣有，果無自性。又緣復賴緣，緣無性也。又果生緣壞，緣則改變，故無性也。」 tr. “Conditions exist through the effect and therefore lack intrinsic nature; the effect exists through conditions and therefore lacks intrinsic nature. Conditions also depend on conditions and so have no nature. When the effect arises, conditions break down and change, and therefore have no nature.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0052c11–0052c12〕: 「乃明都無能生所生性，云何乃於無生法中計有生」 tr. “This reveals that neither producer nor produced has a nature. How, then, can arising be imagined within non-arising dharmas?”
- T30n1568, Nāgārjuna’s treatise〔0159c28–0159c29〕: 「眾緣所生法有二種：一者內，二者外。眾緣亦有二種：一者內，二者外。」 tr. “Dharmas produced by many conditions are of two kinds, internal and external. The many conditions are likewise of two kinds, internal and external.”
- T30n1568, Nāgārjuna’s treatise〔0160a08–0160a09〕: 「如是內外諸法皆從眾緣生，從眾緣生故，即非是無性耶！」 tr. “All internal and external dharmas thus arise from many conditions. Because they arise from many conditions, are they not thereby without intrinsic nature?”
- T30n1568, Nāgārjuna’s treatise〔0160b02–0160b03〕: 「故眾緣皆空。緣空故，從緣生法亦空，是故當知一切有為法皆空。」 tr. “Thus the many conditions are all empty. Because conditions are empty, dharmas produced from conditions are also empty. Therefore know that all conditioned dharmas are empty.”
- T25n1509, Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom〔0296b14–0296b15〕: 「「因緣」者，相應因、共生因、自種因、遍因、報因——是五因名為因緣。復次，一切有為法，亦名因緣。」 tr. “‘Causal condition’ means associated cause, co-arisen cause, same-kind cause, pervasive cause, and retributive cause. These five causes are called causal conditions. Furthermore, all conditioned dharmas are also called causal conditions.”
- T25n1509, Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom〔0296c07–0296c10〕: 「般若波羅蜜於一切法無所捨、無所破，畢竟清淨，無諸戲論。如佛說有四緣，但以少智之人著於四緣而生邪論；為破著故，說言諸法實空，無所破。」 tr. “Regarding all dharmas, the perfection of wisdom has nothing to relinquish and nothing to refute. It is ultimately pure and free of conceptual proliferation. The Buddha taught four conditions, but people of little wisdom cling to them and produce false discourse. To refute that clinging, dharmas are said to be truly empty; nothing is refuted.”
- T25n1509, Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom〔0297a28–0297b02〕: 「菩薩觀知諸法從四緣生，而不取四緣中定相。四緣和合生，如水中月，雖為虛誑無所有，要從水月因緣生，不從餘緣有；諸法亦如是，各自從因緣生，亦無定實。」 tr. “The bodhisattva contemplates and knows that dharmas arise from the four conditions, yet does not grasp a fixed mark in them. Their conjunction produces as the moon in water appears: although deceptive and without possession of its own, it must appear through the conditions of water and moon, not from other conditions. Dharmas are likewise, each arising from its causes and conditions without fixed reality.”
- T32n1631, Vigrahavyāvartanī〔0015b03–0015b09〕: 「若一切法皆是因緣，則是因緣、因緣和合，離諸因緣是則更無一切自體，如是一切諸法皆空。如芽非是種子中有，非地、非水、非火、非風、非虛空等因緣中有，非是一一因緣中有，非諸因緣和合中有，非離因緣、因緣和合餘處別有。若此等中一切皆無，如是得言芽無自體。」 tr. “If all dharmas are causes and conditions, then apart from those causes, conditions, and their conjunction, no body of anything exists; all dharmas are empty. A sprout is not in the seed, earth, water, fire, wind, space, or other conditions; not in each condition; not in their conjunction; and not somewhere else apart from causes, conditions, and their conjunction. Since it is absent from all these, the sprout can be said to have no body of its own.”
- T32n1631, Vigrahavyāvartanī〔0015a16–0015a17〕: 「若彼有自體，不須因緣生，若須因緣者，如是得言空。」 tr. “If it had a body of its own, it would not need to arise from causes and conditions. If it needs causes and conditions, it may in this way be called empty.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0050b05–0050b08〕: 「無始來常有此心，即有能緣、所緣。《淨名經》云「心有攀緣，即是病本。」何所攀緣？謂之三界。云何斷攀緣？謂無所得。今求緣緣不可得，即是斷眾生病本，令得解脫也。」 tr. “From beginningless time this mind has constantly been present, and therefore there are apprehender and apprehended. The Vimalakīrti Sūtra says, ‘When mind cognitively engages, this is the root of illness.’ What does it engage? The three realms. How is engagement ended? Through non-attainment. Seeking the object condition now and finding it unattainable ends the root of beings’ illness and enables liberation.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0050b08–0050b21〕: 「解緣緣有五。一云：心是能緣、境是所緣，心境合說故名緣緣。二解云：心是能緣，復緣前境，故心名緣緣。第三解云：前境是緣、能生心緣，緣能生緣，故名緣緣，從境受名。四解云：緣緣者，是心緣之緣，即是果也；萬法為心緣作緣，從果受名，故云緣緣。根本集阿毘曇師作此釋。何以知然？《大品》云「因、次第、緣、增上」，而次第及增上既是果，則知緣緣亦是果，故從果受名。即此論云「無相無緣」。無緣是無能緣，無相明無所緣，故知以心為能緣，萬法為能緣之心作緣，故云緣緣。五解云：通別兩舉。所言緣者，是生心之緣，謂別緣也。此緣復是四緣中之一緣，是通緣也。故通別兩舉，名為緣緣也。」 tr. “There are five explanations of the object condition. First, mind apprehends and object is apprehended; mind and object are named together. Second, the apprehending mind again apprehends the prior object, so mind is called object condition. Third, the prior object is a condition that produces an apprehending mind; a condition produces an apprehender, and the name follows the object. Fourth, the object condition is the condition for mind’s apprehension—that is, its effect. The myriad dharmas condition the apprehending mind, and the name follows the effect. Abhidharma masters of the Mūlasaṃgīti explain it this way. The Large Prajñā says ‘cause, succession, object, dominance.’ Since succession and dominance are effects, object condition too is an effect and takes its name from the effect. This treatise says ‘signless and objectless’: objectless means no apprehender; signless means no apprehended. Mind is therefore the apprehender and the myriad dharmas condition it. Fifth, the general and specific are both named: the condition that produces mind is the specific condition, and it is also one among the four conditions generally. Naming both general and specific yields ‘object condition.’”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0050c03–0050c10〕: 「又破因緣故無境、破次第緣是破心，既無心境，云何有緣緣？今縱妄情言有，故破之易折也。又前後二門相成。上明既不得前滅後生，云何得緣境耶？即以前門成後；今明既不得緣境，云何得生滅耶？即以後門成前。又各逐義便，彼既立心前滅後生，宜一一就三世中責之；今立能緣所緣，故引實相畢竟空蕩之。」 tr. “Refuting the causal condition leaves no object; refuting the immediately preceding condition refutes mind. With neither mind nor object, how can there be an object condition? It is only conceded provisionally to deluded feeling so that it may easily be refuted. The two gateways support one another. If prior ceasing and later arising cannot be obtained, how can an object be apprehended? The former supports the latter. If apprehending an object cannot be obtained, how can arising and ceasing be obtained? The latter supports the former. Each follows what is apt: they establish mind as ceasing earlier and arising later, so it is challenged across the three times; they now establish apprehender and apprehended, so the ultimately empty true mark is invoked to sweep them clear.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0051a13–0051a14〕: 「求此色不可得，故無緣緣，而不無緣緣義，今只明緣緣即是無緣緣。」 tr. “This form cannot be found when sought, and therefore there is no fixed object condition; yet the meaning of the object condition is not absent. The point is simply that the object condition is precisely the absence of a fixed object condition.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0051a16–0051a20〕: 「若聞色自安置世諦、聞空置第一義，此是空者自空、不空者自不空耳，則是斷常二見。今只是有者不有，豈得無有？只明空者不空，豈得無空？故知空有不二，但破偏執定有定無，故言非有非無耳。」 tr. “If form is assigned exclusively to conventional truth and emptiness to ultimate meaning, then the empty is empty by itself and the nonempty nonempty by itself—the two views of annihilation and permanence. Here what exists does not fixedly exist, but how could existence be absent? What is empty is not fixed emptiness, but how could emptiness be absent? Emptiness and existence are nondual; only partial clinging to fixed existence or nonexistence is refuted. Thus it is neither existent nor nonexistent.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0051b10–0051b11〕: 「無相無所緣，無緣無能緣也。」 tr. “‘Signless’ means no apprehended object; ‘objectless’ means no apprehending mind.”
- T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0051b16–0051b20〕: 「無緣緣是真實說，有緣緣是隨宜說，所以用無以破有。問：何故就此偈明權實耶？答：此偈有二意，一者引正破邪、二者舉實顯權。偈既云真實微妙法，則知有方便隨宜法也。」 tr. “The absence of a fixed object condition is the true teaching; an object condition is an adaptive teaching. Absence is therefore used to refute existence. Question: Why clarify expedient and true through this verse? Answer: The verse has two intentions: it invokes the correct to refute the false, and presents the true to reveal the expedient. Since the verse says ‘true and subtle Dharma,’ one knows there is also an expedient teaching adapted to capacities.”
This chapter records twenty-one variants from the original Taishō collation and actually cites nine Chinese-translated sūtra, treatise, and commentary works, including the base text. Every locus was freshly retrieved from the original marked canon files. There are no modern scholars, no modern Sanskrit editions, and no adjudication among alternative commentaries.