中論 觀四諦品第二十四
問的人不是外道，他手裡拿的是佛法本身：「破四顛倒，通達四諦，得四沙門果。」他怕空把這條路拆了，因此說：「如是說空者，是則破三寶。」又說「空法壞因果，亦壞於罪福」。
論主不辯護空，先指出誤認：
「汝今實不能，知空空因緣， 及知於空義，是故自生惱。」
把空認作無所有，才推得出那一長串過失。
二諦是入口，不是兩層樓
「諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法： 一以世俗諦，二第一義諦。」
青目分得清楚：世間顛倒所生的虛妄法「於世間是實」；賢聖見顛倒之性，知一切法空無生，「於聖人是第一義諦名為實」。一套法，兩重諦。
而世俗不可廢：「若不依俗諦，不得第一義；」因為「第一義皆因言說，言說是世俗」——廢了世俗，第一義連說出口的門都沒有。
論主也不諱言空的危險：「不能正觀空，鈍根則自害」——如不善捉毒蛇；傷人的不是空。
空亦復空，所以一切法得成
「我所說性空，空亦復空，無如是過。」空不是可以抱住的東西，著空之過便無處著落。
於是全品的樞紐：
「以有空義故，一切法得成； 若無空義者，一切則不成。」
能生能變正因無自性；若有定性，便一法不成。
而全論最為人持誦的一頌：
「眾因緣生法，我說即是無， 亦為是假名，亦是中道義。」
一法三說：屬眾緣故無自性、無自性故空；「但為引導眾生故，以假名說」；「是法無性故不得言有，亦無空故不得言無」，兩邊不落即是中道。
過失還施彼身
「此過今還在汝。」問方那條鏈，論主照樣還他一次：
「若一切不空，則無有生滅， 如是則無有，四聖諦之法。」
苦若定性則不無常，而「經說無常是苦義」；定性則不從集生、不應有滅、無有修道——「若法實者則是常，常則不可增益」。先前不見苦者今亦不能見，四行不成則四果無，八賢聖無則僧寶無，乃至「無法寶僧寶，云何有佛寶？」
佛與菩提亦然：定性則不相為因，「如鐵無金性，雖復種種鍛煉終不成金」。罪福亦然：果既從罪福生，「云何言不空？」
修行的憑據就在這個空字
「若無有空者，未得不應得， 亦無斷煩惱，亦無苦盡事。」
現見萬物生滅變易，已反證無定性。末後引經作結：
「是故經中說，若見因緣法， 則為能見佛，見苦集滅道。」
問方所怕的那條路，只在空義裡走得通。
破空者的下場，青目說盡：「若破空義則破因緣法，破因緣法則破三寶，若破三寶則為自破。」
The questioner is not an outsider. What he holds is the Buddhadharma itself: “Eliminate the four inversions, penetrate the four truths, attain the four fruits of a renunciant.” He fears emptiness will dismantle this path, and therefore says, “One who teaches emptiness in this way destroys the Three Jewels.” He also says, “Emptiness destroys cause and result and also demerit and merit.”
The treatise master does not defend emptiness. He first identifies the misrecognition:
“You do not in fact know emptiness or the reasons for emptiness, nor do you know the meaning of emptiness; therefore you distress yourself.”
Only by treating emptiness as sheer nonexistence can one derive that long chain of faults.
The Two Truths Are an Entrance, Not Two Stories of a Building
“The Buddhas rely on two truths when teaching the Dharma to beings: first, the conventional truth; second, the ultimate truth.”
Qingmu distinguishes them clearly. False dharmas born from the world’s inversion are “real to the world”; noble ones see the nature of inversion and know all dharmas to be empty and unarisen—“for noble ones, this is the ultimate truth and is called reality.” One set of dharmas, two truths.
Nor can convention be abolished: “Without relying on the conventional truth, the ultimate cannot be attained,” because “the ultimate is entirely disclosed through words, and words are conventional.” Abolish convention and the ultimate no longer has a door through which it can be spoken.
The master also makes no secret of emptiness’s danger: “Unable to contemplate emptiness correctly, the dull-witted harm themselves”—like one unskilled in catching a venomous snake. It is not emptiness that causes the harm.
Emptiness Itself Is Empty, and Therefore All Dharmas Can Be Established
“I teach the emptiness of nature, and emptiness itself is empty; there is no such fault.” Emptiness is not something one can embrace, so faults caused by grasping emptiness have nowhere to lodge.
Now comes the chapter’s pivot:
“Because emptiness has meaning, all dharmas can be established; without the meaning of emptiness, nothing could be established.”
Things can arise and change precisely because they lack intrinsic nature. If they possessed determinate natures, not one dharma could be established.
And then the most widely recited verse in the entire treatise:
“Dharmas born from many conditions, I say, are precisely absence; they are also provisional names, and this is the meaning of the Middle Way.”
One dharma, three descriptions: because it belongs to many conditions it has no intrinsic nature, and because it has no intrinsic nature it is empty; “it is only to guide beings that one speaks by means of provisional names”; and “because this dharma has no nature, one cannot say it exists; because even emptiness is absent, one cannot say it does not exist.” Falling into neither extreme is the Middle Way.
Returning the Fault to Its Owner
“This fault now returns to you.” The master returns the objector’s chain to him in the same form:
“If everything were nonempty, there would be neither arising nor cessation; consequently, the four noble truths would not exist.”
If suffering possessed determinate nature, it would not be impermanent, yet “scripture says that impermanence is the meaning of suffering.” Determinate nature means that suffering does not arise from origin, should not cease, and leaves no path to cultivate—“if a dharma were real, it would be permanent; what is permanent cannot be increased.” One who did not see suffering before could not see it now; if the four activities fail, the four fruits do not exist; without the eight noble persons there is no Jewel of the Saṅgha; and eventually, “without the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha, how could there be the Jewel of the Buddha?”
The same applies to Buddha and awakening. With determinate natures neither can cause the other, “just as iron lacks the nature of gold and never becomes gold despite every kind of refinement.” The same applies to demerit and merit: if a result arises from demerit and merit, “how could it be called nonempty?”
The Ground of Practice Lies in This Very Word Emptiness
“If emptiness did not exist, what had never been attained should not be attained; there would be no severing of afflictions and no exhaustion of suffering.”
The manifest arising, cessation, and transformation of all things already prove the absence of determinate nature. The chapter concludes by citing scripture:
“Therefore a scripture says: one who sees dharmas of causes and conditions is able to see the Buddha and sees suffering, origin, cessation, and the path.”
The path the objector fears losing can be traversed only within emptiness.
Qingmu completely states the outcome for one who refutes emptiness: “To refute emptiness is to refute dharmas of causes and conditions; to refute dharmas of causes and conditions is to refute the Three Jewels; and to refute the Three Jewels is to refute oneself.”
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷四〈觀四諦品第二十四〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0032b12〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0032b12〕問曰：破四顛倒，通達四諦，得四沙門果。
「若一切皆空，無生亦無滅，
如是則無有，四聖諦之法。
以無四諦故，見苦與斷集，
證滅及修道，如是事皆無。
以是事無故，則無四道果；
無有四果故，得向者亦無。
若無八賢聖，則無有僧寶；
以無四諦故，亦無有法寶；
以無法僧寶，亦無有佛寶。
如是說空者，是則破三寶。」
若一切世間皆空無所有者，即應無生無滅。以無生無滅故，則無四聖諦。何以故？從集諦生苦諦，集諦是因、苦諦是果。滅苦集諦名為滅諦，能至滅諦名為道諦。道諦是因、滅諦是果。如是四諦有因有果，若無生無滅則無四諦。四諦無故，則無見苦、斷集、證滅、修道。見苦斷集證滅修道無故，則無四沙門果。四沙門果無故，則無四向四得者。若無此八賢聖，則無僧寶。又四聖諦無故，法寶亦無。若無法寶、僧寶者，云何有佛？得法名為佛，無法何有佛？汝說諸法皆空，則壞三寶。復次：
「空法壞因果，亦壞於罪福，
亦復悉毀壞，一切世俗法。」
若受空法者，則破罪福及罪福果報，亦破世俗法。有如是等諸過故，諸法不應空。
答曰：
「汝今實不能，知空空因緣，
及知於空義，是故自生惱。」
汝不解云何是空相？以何因緣說空？亦不解空義。不能如實知故，生如是疑難。復次：
「諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法：
一以世俗諦，二第一義諦。
若人不能知，分別於二諦，
則於深佛法，不知真實義。」
世俗諦者，一切法性空，而世間顛倒，故生虛妄法，於世間是實。諸賢聖真知顛倒性，故知一切法皆空無生，於聖人是第一義諦名為實。諸佛依是二諦，而為眾生說法。若人不能如實分別二諦，則於甚深佛法不知實義。若謂一切法不生是第一義諦，不須第二俗諦者，是亦不然。何以故？
〔T30 0033a02〕「若不依俗諦，不得第一義；
不得第一義，則不得涅槃。」
第一義皆因言說，言說是世俗，是故若不依世俗，第一義則不可說。若不得第一義，云何得至涅槃？是故諸法雖無生，而有二諦。復次：
「不能正觀空，鈍根則自害，
如不善呪術，不善捉毒蛇。」
若人鈍根不善解空法，於空有失而生邪見。如為利捉毒蛇，不能善捉反為所害。又如呪術，欲有所作不能善成則還自害。鈍根觀空法亦如是。復次：
「世尊知是法，甚深微妙相，
非鈍根所及，是故不欲說。」
世尊以法甚深微妙，非鈍根所解，是故不欲說。復次：
「汝謂我著空，而為我生過；
汝今所說過，於空則無有。」
汝謂我著空故，為我生過。我所說性空，空亦復空，無如是過。復次：
「以有空義故，一切法得成；
若無空義者，一切則不成。」
以有空義故，一切世間、出世間法皆悉成就。若無空義，則皆不成就。復次：
「汝今自有過，而以迴向我，
如人乘馬者，自忘於所乘。」
汝於有法中有過不能自覺，而於空中見過，如人乘馬而忘其所乘。何以故？
「若汝見諸法，決定有性者，
即為見諸法，無因亦無緣。」
汝說諸法有定性。若爾者，則見諸法無因無緣。何以故？若法決定有性，則應不生不滅，如是法何用因緣？若諸法從因緣生，則無有性。是故諸法決定有性，則無因緣。若謂諸法決定住自性，是則不然。何以故？
「即為破因果，作作者作法，
亦復壞一切，萬物之生滅。」
諸法有定性，則無因果等諸事。如偈說：
「眾因緣生法，我說即是無，
亦為是假名，亦是中道義。
未曾有一法，不從因緣生，
是故一切法，無不是空者。」
眾因緣生法，我說即是空。何以故？眾緣具足和合而物生，是物屬眾因緣故無自性，無自性故空，空亦復空。但為引導眾生故，以假名說，離有無二邊，故名為中道。是法無性故不得言有，亦無空故不得言無。若法有性相，則不待眾緣而有，若不待眾緣則無法，是故無有不空法。汝上所說空法有過者，此過今還在汝。何以故？
「若一切不空，則無有生滅，
如是則無有，四聖諦之法。」
若一切法各各有性不空者，則無有生滅。無生滅故，則無四聖諦法。何以故？
「苦不從緣生，云何當有苦？
無常是苦義，定性無無常。」
苦不從緣生故則無苦。何以故？經說無常是苦義。若苦有定性，云何有無常？以不捨自性故。復次：
「若苦有定性，何故從集生？
是故無有集，以破空義故。」
若苦有定性者，則不應更生，先已有故。若爾者，則無集諦，以壞空義故。復次：
「苦若有定性，則不應有滅。
汝著定性故，即破於滅諦。」
苦若有定性者，則不應滅。何以故？性則無滅故。復次：
「苦若有定性，則無有修道；
若道可修習，即無有定性。」
法若定有，則無有修道。何以故？若法實者則是常，常則不可增益。若道可修，道則無有定性。復次：
「若無有苦諦，及無集滅諦，
所可滅苦道，竟為何所至？」
諸法若先定有性，則無苦集滅諦。今滅苦道，竟為至何滅苦處？復次：
「若苦定有性，先來所不見，
於今云何見？其性不異故。」
若先凡夫時不能見苦性，今亦不應見。何以故？不見性定故。復次：
「如見苦不然，斷集及證滅，
修道及四果，是亦皆不然。」
如苦諦性，先不見者後亦不應見。如是亦不應有斷集、證滅、修道。何以故？是集性先來不斷，今亦不應斷，性不可斷故。滅先來不證，今亦不應證，先來不證故。道先來不修，今亦不應修，先來不修故。是故四聖諦見斷證修四種行，皆不應有。四種行無故，四道果亦無。何以故？
〔T30 0034a04〕「是四道果性，先來不可得；
諸法性若定，今云何可得？」
諸法若有定性，四沙門果先來未得，今云何可得？若可得者，性則無定。復次：
「若無有四果，則無得向者，
以無八聖故，則無有僧寶。」
無四沙門果故，則無得果、向果者。無八賢聖故，則無有僧寶。而經說八賢聖，名為僧寶。復次：
「無四聖諦故，亦無有法寶，
無法寶僧寶，云何有佛寶？」
行四聖諦得涅槃法，若無四諦則無法寶，若無二寶云何當有佛寶？汝以如是因緣，說諸法定性，則壞三寶。
問曰：汝雖破諸法，究竟道阿耨多羅三藐三菩提應有，因是道故名為佛。
答曰：
「汝說則不因，菩提而有佛；
亦復不因佛，而有於菩提。」
汝說諸法有定性者，則不應因菩提有佛、因佛有菩提，是二性常定故。復次：
「雖復勤精進，修行菩提道，
若先非佛性，不應得成佛。」
以先無性故，如鐵無金性，雖復種種鍛煉終不成金。復次：
「若諸法不空，無作罪福者，
不空何所作？以其性定故。」
若諸法不空，終無有人作罪福者。何以故？罪福性先已定故，又無作作者故。復次：
「汝於罪福中，不生果報者，
是則離罪福，而有諸果報。」
汝於罪福因緣中皆無果報者，則應離罪福因緣而有果報。何以故？果報不待因出故。
問曰：離罪福可無善惡果報，但從罪福有善惡果報。
答曰：
「若謂從罪福，而生果報者，
果從罪福生，云何言不空？」
若離罪福無善惡果，云何言果不空？若爾，離作者則無罪福。汝先說諸法不空，是事不然。復次：
「汝破一切法，諸因緣空義，
則破於世俗，諸餘所有法。」
汝若破眾因緣法第一空義者，則破一切世俗法。何以故？
「若破於空義，即應無所作；
無作而有作，不作名作者。」
若破空義，則一切果皆無作無因，又不作而作，又一切作者不應有所作，又離作者應有業、有果報、有受者。但是事皆不然，是故不應破空。復次：
「若有決定性，世間種種相，
則不生不滅，常住而不壞。」
若諸法有定性，則世間種種相，天、人、畜生、萬物，皆應不生不滅常住不壞。何以故？有實性不可變異故。而現見萬物各有變異相生滅變易，是故不應有定性。復次：
「若無有空者，未得不應得，
亦無斷煩惱，亦無苦盡事。」
若無有空法者，則世間、出世間所有功德，未得者皆不應得，亦不應有斷煩惱者，亦無苦盡。何以故？以性定故。
「是故經中說，若見因緣法，
則為能見佛，見苦集滅道。」
若人見一切法從眾緣生，是人即能見佛法身，增益智慧，能見四聖諦苦集滅道，見四聖諦得四果滅諸苦惱，是故不應破空義。若破空義則破因緣法，破因緣法則破三寶，若破三寶則為自破。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷四〈觀四諦品第二十四〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、問難：一切皆空，四諦、四果與三寶都不成
〔T30 0032b12〕問的一方說：破除四種顛倒，就通達四聖諦；通達了四聖諦，就證得四種沙門果。
（問方的頌）如果一切法都是空的，那就沒有生，也沒有滅；既然這樣，四聖諦這一法就不存在了。
因為沒有四聖諦的緣故，見苦與斷集、證滅以及修道，這幾件事就全都沒有了。
因為這幾件事沒有的緣故，就沒有四種道果；沒有四種道果的緣故，向著果位而行的人，也一樣沒有。
如果沒有四向、四得這八種賢聖，就沒有僧寶；因為沒有四聖諦的緣故，也就沒有法寶；
因為沒有法寶、僧寶的緣故，也就沒有佛寶。像這樣講空的人，就是在破壞三寶。
（青目的釋）如果一切世間都是空、都無所有，那就應當沒有生、沒有滅。因為沒有生沒有滅的緣故，就沒有四聖諦。為什麼呢？從集諦生出苦諦，集諦是因、苦諦是果；能把苦與集滅盡的，叫作滅諦；能通到滅諦的，叫作道諦，道諦是因、滅諦是果。像這樣，四諦是有因有果的；如果沒有生沒有滅，就沒有四諦。四諦既然沒有，就沒有見苦、斷集、證滅、修道。見苦、斷集、證滅、修道既然沒有，就沒有四種沙門果。四種沙門果既然沒有，就沒有四向與四得的人。如果沒有這八種賢聖，就沒有僧寶。又因為四聖諦沒有的緣故，法寶也沒有。如果法寶、僧寶都沒有，怎麼會有佛呢？得到法才稱之為佛，沒有法，哪裡有佛？你說諸法都空，那就是壞了三寶。
接著再進一步說。
二、問難：空法還壞了因果、罪福與世俗
（問方的頌）空法壞了因與果，也壞了罪與福，而且把一切世俗之法，也全都毀壞了。
（青目的釋）如果接受空法，那就破了罪、福以及罪福的果報，也破了世俗之法。有這樣種種過失的緣故，所以諸法不應當是空的。
三、答：你不知道空、不知道說空的因緣、也不知道空義
答的一方於是回答如下。
（頌）你如今其實不能知道什麼是空、不能知道以什麼因緣說空，也不能知道空的義理，所以才自己生出苦惱來。
（青目的釋）你不了解什麼叫作空相，不了解以什麼因緣而說空，也不了解空的義理。因為不能如實地知道，所以才生起這樣的疑難。
接著再進一步說。
四、諸佛依二諦為眾生說法
（頌）諸佛是依著二諦，來為眾生說法的：一是世俗諦，二是第一義諦。
如果有人不能知道、不能分別這二諦，那麼對於甚深的佛法，就不會知道它真實的義理。
（青目的釋）所謂世俗諦，是說一切法的體性本空，然而世間顛倒，因此生起種種虛妄之法，這些法在世間看來是真實的。諸位賢聖真實地知道那顛倒的性質，因此知道一切法都空、都無所生；這在聖人份上就是第一義諦，稱之為真實。諸佛依著這二諦，來為眾生說法。如果有人不能如實地分別二諦，那麼對於甚深的佛法，就不知道它的實義。
如果有人說：一切法不生就是第一義諦，不需要第二重的世俗諦——這樣說也是不對的。為什麼呢？
五、不依世俗諦，就得不到第一義
〔T30 0033a02〕（頌）如果不依靠世俗諦，就得不到第一義；得不到第一義，就得不到涅槃。
（青目的釋）第一義都是憑藉言說而顯的，而言說本身就是世俗；所以如果不依靠世俗，第一義就沒有辦法說出來。如果得不到第一義，又怎麼能到達涅槃？所以說，諸法雖然無生，卻仍然有二諦。
接著再進一步說。
六、鈍根觀空，如同不會捉毒蛇
（頌）不能正確地觀空，鈍根的人反而傷了自己，就像不善於持咒術的人，像不善於捉毒蛇的人一樣。
（青目的釋）如果人是鈍根，不能善巧地了解空法，就會在空上面有所失誤而生起邪見。就像為了取利而去捉毒蛇，捉得不好，反倒被蛇所害。又像咒術，本想有所作為，卻不能善巧地成就，結果反而害了自己。鈍根的人觀察空法，也是這樣。
接著再進一步說。
七、世尊知道這法甚深，所以不想說
（頌）世尊知道這一法有甚深微妙的相貌，不是鈍根的人所能企及，所以不想說。
（青目的釋）世尊因為這法甚深微妙，不是鈍根的人所能理解，所以不想說。
接著再進一步說。
八、我所說的性空，空也是空
（頌）你說我執著於空，因而替我安上種種過失；但你如今所說的那些過失，在空這裡其實都沒有。
（青目的釋）你說我因為執著空的緣故，就替我安上過失。我所說的是體性本空，而且這個空本身也是空的，所以並沒有你說的那種過失。
接著再進一步說。
九、正因為有空義，一切法才得以成立
（頌）因為有空義的緣故，一切法才得以成立；如果沒有空義，那麼一切法反而都不能成立。
（青目的釋）因為有空義的緣故，一切世間法、出世間法都得以成就。如果沒有空義，那就全都不能成就。
接著再進一步說。
十、過失本在你自己，你卻迴向給我
（頌）你如今自己有過失，卻把它迴轉過來安在我身上，就像騎馬的人，自己忘了身下所騎的那匹馬。
（青目的釋）你在主張實有的說法裡本來就有過失，自己卻覺察不到，反而在空上面看見過失；這就像騎著馬的人，卻忘了自己所騎的是什麼。為什麼這樣說呢？
十一、主張定性，就等於主張無因無緣
（頌）如果你看見諸法是決定有其自性的，那就等於看見諸法沒有因、也沒有緣。
（青目的釋）你說諸法有決定的自性。若是這樣，那就是看見諸法無因無緣。為什麼呢？如果一個法決定地有自性，那它就應當不生不滅；這樣的法，還用得著因緣做什麼？如果諸法是從因緣生的，那就沒有自性。所以說，諸法若決定有性，就等於沒有因緣。
如果說諸法決定安住在自性上，這也是不對的。為什麼呢？
（頌）那就等於破壞了因與果、作、作者與所作之法，也破壞了一切萬物的生與滅。
（青目的釋）諸法若有決定的自性，就沒有因果等等這些事情了。就像頌裡所說的：
十二、眾因緣生法：是空、是假名、是中道
（頌）眾多因緣所生的法，我說它就是無；它也是假名，也就是中道的義理。
不曾有過任何一個法，是不從因緣而生的；所以說，一切法沒有一個不是空的。
（青目的釋）眾多因緣所生的法，我說它就是空。為什麼呢？眾緣具足和合，事物才生起；這個事物既然屬於眾多因緣，所以沒有自性；沒有自性，所以是空的；而這個空，本身也是空的。只是為了引導眾生的緣故，才用假名來說；因為離開了有、無這兩邊，所以叫作中道。這個法因為沒有自性，所以不能說它是有；又因為連空也無可執取，所以也不能說它是無。如果一個法有其自性、有其定相，那它就不必等待眾緣就能存在；如果不等待眾緣，那就根本沒有這個法。所以說，沒有哪一個法是不空的。
你在前面所說的『空法有過失』，這個過失如今反倒回到你自己身上。為什麼呢？
十三、反過來說：如果一切不空，四諦才真的沒有
（頌）如果一切法都不空，那就沒有生滅；既然這樣，四聖諦這一法也就不存在了。
（青目的釋）如果一切法各各有其自性而不空，那就沒有生滅。因為沒有生滅的緣故，就沒有四聖諦之法。為什麼呢？
（頌）苦如果不從因緣生，怎麼會有苦？無常正是苦的義理，而決定有性的東西沒有無常。
（青目的釋）苦不從因緣生，所以就沒有苦。為什麼呢？經上說無常就是苦的義理。如果苦有決定的自性，怎麼會有無常？因為它不捨棄自己的體性。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）如果苦有決定的自性，為什麼還要從集生起呢？所以就沒有集諦了，這是因為破了空義的緣故。
（青目的釋）如果苦有決定的自性，那就不應當再生起，因為它先前已經有了。若是這樣，就沒有集諦，因為壞了空義的緣故。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）苦如果有決定的自性，就不應當有滅；你執著於定性的緣故，就破壞了滅諦。
（青目的釋）苦如果有決定的自性，那就不應當滅。為什麼呢？因為所謂性，是不會滅的。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）苦如果有決定的自性，就沒有可修的道；如果道是可以修習的，那就沒有決定的自性。
（青目的釋）法如果決定是有，那就沒有修道這回事。為什麼呢？如果法是實有的，那就是常；既是常，就不可能再增益。如果道可以修習，那麼道就沒有決定的自性。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）如果沒有苦諦，也沒有集諦、滅諦，那麼那條能滅苦的道，究竟要通到哪裡去？
（青目的釋）諸法如果先前就決定有性，就沒有苦諦、集諦、滅諦。如今這條滅苦之道，究竟要到哪一個滅苦之處去呢？
接著再進一步說。
（頌）苦如果決定有性，那麼從前不曾見到的，如今又怎麼能見到？因為它的性並沒有變異。
（青目的釋）如果先前作凡夫的時候不能見到苦性，如今也不應當見到。為什麼呢？因為那不見苦的體性已經固定了。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）就像見苦不能成立一樣，斷集與證滅、修道以及四果，也一樣都不能成立。
（青目的釋）就像苦諦之性，先前不曾見的人，後來也不應當見。同樣的，也不應當有斷集、證滅、修道。為什麼呢？集的性從來不曾斷，如今也不應當斷，因為性是不可斷的。滅從來不曾證，如今也不應當證，因為從來不曾證。道從來不曾修，如今也不應當修，因為從來不曾修。所以四聖諦上見、斷、證、修這四種行，都不應當有。四種行既然沒有，四種道果也就沒有。為什麼呢？
十四、四果、八賢聖與三寶，在定性中一併落空
〔T30 0034a04〕（頌）這四種道果的性，從來就不可得；諸法之性如果是決定的，如今又怎麼可能得到？
（青目的釋）諸法如果有決定的自性，那麼四種沙門果從來未曾得到，如今又怎麼能得到？如果能得到，那體性就不是決定的了。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）如果沒有四果，就沒有得果與向果的人；因為沒有八種賢聖的緣故，就沒有僧寶。
（青目的釋）因為沒有四種沙門果的緣故，就沒有得果的人、向果的人。因為沒有八種賢聖的緣故，就沒有僧寶。而經上正是說八種賢聖，名為僧寶。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）因為沒有四聖諦的緣故，也就沒有法寶；沒有法寶、僧寶，又怎麼會有佛寶？
（青目的釋）修行四聖諦而得涅槃之法，如果沒有四諦，就沒有法寶；如果沒有法、僧二寶，怎麼會有佛寶？你以這樣的因緣，主張諸法有決定的自性，那就是壞了三寶。
十五、佛與菩提：先前無性，鍛煉也不成金
問的一方說：你雖然破了諸法，但究竟之道——阿耨多羅三藐三菩提——總該是有的；正因為有這條道的緣故，才稱之為佛。
答的一方回答如下。
（頌）照你的說法，就不會因為菩提而有佛，也不會因為佛而有菩提。
（青目的釋）你說諸法有決定的自性，那就不應當因菩提而有佛、因佛而有菩提，因為這兩者的性都是常定不變的。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）縱然勤加精進，修行菩提之道，如果先前並非佛性，也不應當能成佛。
（青目的釋）因為先前沒有那個性的緣故；就像鐵裡沒有金的性，縱然經過種種鍛煉，終究不會變成金。
接著再進一步說。
十六、罪福與果報
（頌）如果諸法不空，就沒有造作罪與福的人；既然不空，還能作什麼呢？因為它的性是決定的緣故。
（青目的釋）如果諸法不空，終究不會有人造作罪與福。為什麼呢？因為罪福之性先前已經決定了，而且也沒有能作的作用與作者。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）你主張在罪福之中不生果報，那就等於離開罪與福，另外有種種果報。
（青目的釋）你主張在罪福的因緣之中都沒有果報，那就應當離開罪福的因緣而有果報。為什麼呢？因為果報並不等待因就出現了。
問的一方說：離開罪福，可以沒有善惡果報；但善惡果報就是從罪福而有的。
答的一方回答如下。
（頌）如果說果報是從罪福而生的，那麼果既然從罪福生，怎麼還能說它不空？
（青目的釋）如果離開罪福就沒有善惡之果，那怎麼還能說果是不空的？若是這樣，離開作者也就沒有罪福。你先前說諸法不空，這件事並不成立。
接著再進一步說。
十七、破了空義，反而破了世俗
（頌）你破一切法、破眾因緣的空義，那就是破了世俗，以及其餘所有的法。
（青目的釋）你如果破了眾因緣法的第一空義，那就破了一切世俗之法。為什麼呢？
（頌）如果破了空義，就應當無所作為；卻又成了沒有作而有所作、不作卻名為作者。
（青目的釋）如果破了空義，那麼一切果都成了無作、無因，又成了不作而作，又一切作者都不應當有所作為，又成了離開作者而另有業、有果報、有受者。但這些事都是不對的，所以不應當破空。
接著再進一步說。
十八、若有定性，世間便常住不壞
（頌）如果有決定的自性，那麼世間種種相貌，就應當不生不滅、常住而不會壞。
（青目的釋）如果諸法有決定的自性，那麼世間種種相貌——天、人、畜生以及萬物——都應當不生不滅、常住不壞。為什麼呢？因為有實在的自性，是不可能變異的。然而現前所見的萬物，各各都有變異之相、有生滅變易，所以不應當說它們有決定的自性。
接著再進一步說。
（頌）如果沒有空，那麼未曾得到的就不應當得到，也沒有斷煩惱這回事，也沒有苦盡這回事。
（青目的釋）如果沒有空法，那麼世間、出世間所有的功德，未曾得到的都不應當得到，也不應當有斷煩惱的人，也沒有苦的窮盡。為什麼呢？因為體性已經決定了。
十九、見因緣法，就是見佛
（頌）所以經中說：如果見到因緣之法，就是能夠見佛，就是見到苦、集、滅、道。
（青目的釋）如果有人見到一切法都是從眾緣而生，這個人就能見到佛的法身、增長智慧，就能見到四聖諦——苦、集、滅、道；見了四聖諦，便得四果，滅除種種苦惱。所以不應當破壞空義。如果破了空義，就破了因緣之法；破了因緣之法，就破了三寶；如果破了三寶，那就是自己破了自己。
Nāgārjuna composed the root verses, the Brahmin Qingmu commented, and the Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva translated the Treatise on the Middle, fascicle four, “Examination of the Four Truths,” in the Later Qin · Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph openings marked 〔T30 …〕 give page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.
1. Objection: If Everything Is Empty, the Four Truths, Four Fruits, and Three Jewels Cannot Be Established
〔T30 0032b12〕The objector says: by eliminating the four inversions, one penetrates the four noble truths; by penetrating the four noble truths, one realizes the four fruits of a renunciant.
(Objector’s verse) If all dharmas are empty, then there is neither arising nor cessation. Consequently, the four noble truths do not exist.
Because the four noble truths do not exist, seeing suffering, severing its origin, realizing cessation, and cultivating the path are all absent.
Because these are absent, the four fruits of the path do not exist. And because the four fruits do not exist, those progressing toward the fruits likewise do not exist.
If the four progressing and the four attained—these eight noble persons—do not exist, the Jewel of the Saṅgha does not exist. And because the four noble truths do not exist, the Jewel of the Dharma does not exist either.
Because the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha do not exist, the Jewel of the Buddha also does not exist. One who teaches emptiness in this way is therefore destroying the Three Jewels.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If every world is empty and wholly nonexistent, there should be neither arising nor cessation. Because there is neither arising nor cessation, there are no four noble truths. Why? The truth of suffering arises from the truth of origin: origin is the cause and suffering the result. That which brings suffering and origin entirely to cessation is called the truth of cessation. That which leads to cessation is called the truth of the path: the path is the cause and cessation the result. Thus the four truths involve causes and results. If there is neither arising nor cessation, the four truths do not exist. If the four truths do not exist, there is no seeing suffering, severing origin, realizing cessation, or cultivating the path. If these four activities do not exist, the four fruits of a renunciant do not exist. If the four fruits do not exist, there are no persons progressing toward or attaining them. If these eight noble persons do not exist, the Jewel of the Saṅgha does not exist. Moreover, because the four noble truths do not exist, the Jewel of the Dharma does not exist. If the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha do not exist, how could there be a Buddha? One is called a Buddha upon attaining the Dharma. Without the Dharma, where could there be a Buddha? You say that all dharmas are empty; this destroys the Three Jewels.
The objection is then pressed further.
2. Objection: Emptiness Also Destroys Cause and Result, Demerit and Merit, and Convention
(Objector’s verse) Emptiness destroys cause and result, and it also destroys demerit and merit; moreover, it destroys every conventional dharma.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If one accepts emptiness, one destroys demerit and merit and their karmic results, and one also destroys conventional dharmas. Because it entails all these faults, dharmas should not be empty.
3. Reply: You Do Not Know Emptiness, Why Emptiness Is Taught, or What Emptiness Means
The respondent now answers as follows.
(Verse) You do not in fact know what emptiness is, the reasons for which emptiness is taught, or the meaning of emptiness. Therefore you create distress for yourself.
(Qingmu’s commentary) You do not understand what the characteristic of emptiness is, the reasons for which emptiness is taught, or the meaning of emptiness. Because you do not know them as they really are, you raise this objection.
The answer is then developed further.
4. The Buddhas Teach Beings by Relying on the Two Truths
(Verse) The Buddhas rely on two truths when teaching the Dharma to beings: first, the conventional truth; second, the ultimate truth.
If someone cannot know and distinguish these two truths, that person cannot know the true meaning of the profound Buddhadharma.
(Qingmu’s commentary) The conventional truth means that the nature of all dharmas is originally empty, yet because the world is inverted, various false dharmas arise and appear real to the world. Noble ones know the nature of that inversion as it really is, and therefore know that all dharmas are empty and unarisen. For noble ones, this is the ultimate truth and is called reality. The Buddhas rely on these two truths when teaching the Dharma to beings. If someone cannot distinguish the two truths as they really are, that person does not know the real meaning of the profound Buddhadharma.
Suppose someone says that the nonarising of all dharmas is the ultimate truth, and that no second level of conventional truth is needed. This too is incorrect. Why?
5. Without Relying on the Conventional Truth, the Ultimate Cannot Be Attained
〔T30 0033a02〕(Verse) Without relying on the conventional truth, the ultimate cannot be attained. Without attaining the ultimate, nirvāṇa cannot be attained.
(Qingmu’s commentary) The ultimate is disclosed through words, and words themselves are conventional. Therefore, without relying on convention, there is no way to articulate the ultimate. If the ultimate cannot be attained, how could nirvāṇa be reached? Thus, although dharmas are unarisen, there are still two truths.
The answer is then developed further.
6. For the Dull-Witted, Contemplating Emptiness Is Like Mishandling a Venomous Snake
(Verse) When emptiness is contemplated incorrectly, the dull-witted harm themselves, like one unskilled in incantations or one unskilled in catching a venomous snake.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If a person is dull-witted and cannot skillfully understand the teaching of emptiness, that person goes astray regarding emptiness and gives rise to wrong views. It is like catching a venomous snake for profit: if one grasps it badly, the snake instead causes harm. It is also like an incantation intended to accomplish something: if one cannot execute it skillfully, it instead harms oneself. The dull-witted person’s contemplation of emptiness is just like this.
The answer is then developed further.
7. The World-Honored One Knew This Dharma Was Profound and Therefore Did Not Wish to Teach It
(Verse) The World-Honored One knew that this Dharma has profound and subtle characteristics beyond the reach of the dull-witted, and therefore did not wish to teach it.
(Qingmu’s commentary) Because this Dharma is profound and subtle and cannot be understood by the dull-witted, the World-Honored One did not wish to teach it.
The answer is then developed further.
8. The Emptiness of Nature That I Teach Is Itself Empty
(Verse) You say that I cling to emptiness and therefore assign me various faults. Yet none of the faults you now allege is present in emptiness.
(Qingmu’s commentary) You say that because I cling to emptiness, you may assign me these faults. I teach that nature is originally empty, and this emptiness is itself empty. Therefore none of the faults you allege applies.
The answer is then developed further.
9. Precisely Because Emptiness Has Meaning, All Dharmas Can Be Established
(Verse) Because emptiness has meaning, all dharmas can be established. If emptiness had no meaning, no dharma could be established.
(Qingmu’s commentary) Because emptiness has meaning, all worldly and world-transcending dharmas can be accomplished. Without the meaning of emptiness, none could be accomplished.
The answer is then developed further.
10. The Fault Is Yours, Yet You Turn It Back upon Me
(Verse) You now possess a fault yourself, yet turn it around and place it upon me, like a rider who forgets the very horse beneath him.
(Qingmu’s commentary) Your thesis of real existence already contains a fault, but you fail to notice it and instead perceive a fault in emptiness. This is like a rider forgetting what he is riding. Why is this so?
11. To Assert Fixed Nature Is to Assert the Absence of Causes and Conditions
(Verse) If you see dharmas as possessing determinate intrinsic natures, you thereby see dharmas as having neither causes nor conditions.
(Qingmu’s commentary) You say that dharmas possess determinate intrinsic natures. If so, you see dharmas as having neither causes nor conditions. Why? If a dharma determinately possessed an intrinsic nature, it should neither arise nor cease. What use would such a dharma have for causes and conditions? If dharmas arise from causes and conditions, they have no intrinsic nature. Thus, if dharmas determinately possess natures, they have no causes and conditions.
The claim that dharmas determinately abide in their intrinsic natures is also incorrect. Why?
(Verse) You thereby destroy cause and result, action, agent, and what is acted upon, and you also destroy the arising and cessation of all things.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas possess determinate intrinsic natures, there can be no cause and result or the other matters just named. As the verse says:
12. Dharmas Born from Many Conditions: Empty, Provisional Names, and the Middle Way
(Verse) Dharmas born from many conditions, I say, are precisely absence; they are also provisional names, and this is the meaning of the Middle Way.
Never has there been a single dharma that did not arise from conditions; therefore no dharma is not empty.
(Qingmu’s commentary) Dharmas born from many conditions, I say, are precisely empty. Why? A thing arises only when many conditions are complete and conjoin. Because this thing belongs to many causes and conditions, it has no intrinsic nature; because it has no intrinsic nature, it is empty. And this emptiness is itself empty. It is only to guide beings that one speaks by means of provisional names. Because this is free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence, it is called the Middle Way. Because this dharma has no intrinsic nature, one cannot say that it exists; and because even emptiness cannot be grasped, one cannot say that it does not exist. If a dharma possessed an intrinsic nature and determinate characteristic, it would not need to await conditions in order to exist. If it did not await conditions, there would be no such dharma at all. Therefore no dharma is not empty.
The fault you earlier alleged—that the teaching of emptiness is defective—now returns instead to you. Why?
13. Conversely, If Everything Were Nonempty, the Four Truths Would Truly Not Exist
(Verse) If all dharmas were nonempty, there would be neither arising nor cessation. Consequently, the four noble truths would not exist.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If every dharma possessed its own intrinsic nature and were nonempty, there would be neither arising nor cessation. Because there would be neither arising nor cessation, the four noble truths would not exist. Why?
(Verse) If suffering did not arise from causes and conditions, how could suffering exist? Impermanence is precisely the meaning of suffering, yet what determinately possesses a nature is not impermanent.
(Qingmu’s commentary) Because suffering would not arise from causes and conditions, suffering would not exist. Why? A scripture says that impermanence is the meaning of suffering. If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, how could it be impermanent? It would never relinquish its own nature.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, why would it still arise from origin? Thus there would be no truth of origin, because the meaning of emptiness had been destroyed.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, it should not arise again, for it would already have existed. If so, there would be no truth of origin, because the meaning of emptiness had been destroyed.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, it should not cease. By clinging to determinate nature, you destroy the truth of cessation.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, it should not cease. Why? What is called a nature does not cease.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) If suffering possessed a determinate intrinsic nature, there would be no path to cultivate. If the path can be cultivated, it has no determinate intrinsic nature.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If a dharma determinately existed, there would be no cultivation of the path. Why? If a dharma truly existed, it would be permanent. Being permanent, it could not be increased. If the path can be cultivated, then the path has no determinate intrinsic nature.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) If there were no truth of suffering and no truths of origin and cessation, where could the path that brings suffering to cessation possibly lead?
(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas already determinately possessed natures, there would be no truths of suffering, origin, and cessation. To what place where suffering is extinguished could this path that extinguishes suffering possibly lead?
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) If suffering determinately possessed a nature, how could what was not seen before come to be seen now? Its nature would not have changed.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If, while one was previously an ordinary person, one could not see the nature of suffering, one should not see it now either. Why? The nature of not seeing suffering would already be fixed.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) Just as seeing suffering cannot be established, severing origin, realizing cessation, cultivating the path, and the four fruits likewise cannot be established.
(Qingmu’s commentary) Just as one who did not previously see the nature of the truth of suffering should not see it later, so too there should be no severing origin, realizing cessation, or cultivating the path. Why? The nature of origin was never severed, so it should not be severed now, for a nature cannot be severed. Cessation was never realized, so it should not be realized now, precisely because it was never realized. The path was never cultivated, so it should not be cultivated now, precisely because it was never cultivated. Therefore the four activities of seeing, severing, realizing, and cultivating with respect to the four noble truths should not exist. If the four activities do not exist, the four fruits of the path do not exist either. Why?
14. The Four Fruits, Eight Noble Persons, and Three Jewels All Collapse under Fixed Nature
〔T30 0034a04〕(Verse) The natures of these four fruits of the path have always been unattainable. If the natures of dharmas were determinate, how could they now be attained?
(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas possessed determinate intrinsic natures, the four fruits of a renunciant, never having been attained before, could not be attained now. If they could be attained, their natures would not be determinate.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) If the four fruits do not exist, there are no persons attaining or progressing toward the fruits. Because the eight noble persons do not exist, the Jewel of the Saṅgha does not exist.
(Qingmu’s commentary) Because the four fruits of a renunciant do not exist, there are no persons attaining or progressing toward the fruits. Because the eight noble persons do not exist, the Jewel of the Saṅgha does not exist. The scriptures indeed call these eight noble persons the Jewel of the Saṅgha.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) Because the four noble truths do not exist, the Jewel of the Dharma does not exist. Without the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha, how could there be the Jewel of the Buddha?
(Qingmu’s commentary) The Dharma of nirvāṇa is attained by cultivating the four noble truths. If there are no four truths, there is no Jewel of the Dharma. If the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha do not exist, how could there be the Jewel of the Buddha? By asserting that dharmas possess determinate intrinsic natures on these grounds, you destroy the Three Jewels.
15. Buddha and Awakening: If the Nature Was Absent Before, Refining Iron Cannot Produce Gold
The objector says: although you refute dharmas, the ultimate path—unsurpassed complete awakening—must at least exist. Precisely because this path exists, one is called a Buddha.
The respondent answers as follows.
(Verse) According to your thesis, there could be no Buddha by reason of awakening, nor could there be awakening by reason of a Buddha.
(Qingmu’s commentary) You say that dharmas possess determinate intrinsic natures. If so, there should be neither a Buddha by reason of awakening nor awakening by reason of a Buddha, because the natures of both would be permanently fixed and unchanging.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) Even if one strives diligently and cultivates the path to awakening, if one did not previously possess the nature of a Buddha, one still could not become a Buddha.
(Qingmu’s commentary) This is because that nature was previously absent. Just as iron lacks the nature of gold and therefore never becomes gold despite all manner of refinement, so too here.
The answer is then developed further.
16. Demerit and Merit and Their Results
(Verse) If dharmas were nonempty, there would be no one who performs demerit or merit. Since they are nonempty, what could be done? Their natures would be determinate.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas were nonempty, ultimately no one could perform demerit or merit. Why? The natures of demerit and merit would already be determined, and there would be neither the function of doing nor an agent who does.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) You maintain that karmic results do not arise within demerit and merit. This would mean that various karmic results exist apart from demerit and merit.
(Qingmu’s commentary) You maintain that no karmic results exist within the causes and conditions of demerit and merit. Karmic results should then exist apart from those causes and conditions. Why? A result would appear without awaiting its cause.
The objector says: apart from demerit and merit, there need be no wholesome or unwholesome karmic results. Wholesome and unwholesome karmic results arise precisely from demerit and merit.
The respondent answers as follows.
(Verse) If karmic results arise from demerit and merit, then since results arise from demerit and merit, how could they be called nonempty?
(Qingmu’s commentary) If wholesome and unwholesome results do not exist apart from demerit and merit, how could results be called nonempty? Likewise, without an agent there can be no demerit or merit. Your earlier claim that dharmas are nonempty therefore cannot be established.
The answer is then developed further.
17. By Refuting Emptiness, You Instead Refute Convention
(Verse) If you refute all dharmas and the meaning of emptiness in what arises through many causes and conditions, you thereby refute convention and every other dharma.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If you refute the primary meaning of emptiness in dharmas of many causes and conditions, you refute every conventional dharma. Why?
(Verse) If you refute the meaning of emptiness, nothing could be done. Yet there would then be doing without any act, and one who does nothing would be called an agent.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If you refute the meaning of emptiness, every result becomes unmade and causeless; there is doing without doing; no agent should perform anything; and karma, karmic results, and recipients would exist apart from an agent. But all these are incorrect. Therefore emptiness should not be refuted.
The answer is then developed further.
18. If There Were Fixed Nature, the World Would Abide Permanently and Never Perish
(Verse) If determinate intrinsic nature existed, the various features of the world would neither arise nor cease, but would abide permanently and never perish.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If dharmas possessed determinate intrinsic natures, the world’s various forms—gods, humans, animals, and all things—should neither arise nor cease, but abide permanently and never perish. Why? A real intrinsic nature cannot change. Yet all things presently seen each display transformation, arising, cessation, and alteration. Therefore they should not be said to possess determinate intrinsic natures.
The answer is then developed further.
(Verse) If there were no emptiness, what had never been attained should not be attained; there would be no severing of afflictions and no exhaustion of suffering.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If the teaching of emptiness did not exist, no worldly or world-transcending quality that had not previously been attained could ever be attained. Nor could anyone sever afflictions, and suffering could never be exhausted. Why? Natures would already be determined.
19. To See Dharmas of Causes and Conditions Is to See the Buddha
(Verse) Therefore a scripture says: one who sees dharmas of causes and conditions is able to see the Buddha and sees suffering, origin, cessation, and the path.
(Qingmu’s commentary) If someone sees that all dharmas arise from many conditions, that person can see the Buddha’s Dharma body, develop wisdom, and see the four noble truths—suffering, origin, cessation, and the path. Seeing the four noble truths, one attains the four fruits and eliminates every kind of suffering and distress. Therefore the meaning of emptiness should not be destroyed. To destroy the meaning of emptiness is to destroy dharmas of causes and conditions; to destroy dharmas of causes and conditions is to destroy the Three Jewels; and to destroy the Three Jewels is to destroy oneself.
《中論》讀到這一品，論主接到了最重的一擊。
前面那些問難，多半是拿一個東西上來——去來、生滅、作者、業、時、如來——等著被拆。這一品不同：問方手裡拿的不是可疑之物，是佛法本身——四諦、四向四果、八賢聖、法寶僧寶佛寶。他說：照你這樣講空，這些全都沒有了。
他開口第一句先擺出修證次第：「破四顛倒，通達四諦，得四沙門果。」這是他自己走的路，環環相扣；正因為扣得緊，抽掉最底下那一環，整座樓就塌。他要抽的那一環，就是生滅。
一、問方的推法：從無生滅一路推到沒有佛
問方的頌一口氣推了六重：
「若一切皆空，無生亦無滅， 如是則無有，四聖諦之法。」
第一步：一切皆空便無生滅，無生滅便無四諦。青目替他補足理由：四諦有因有果——集是因、苦是果，道是因、滅是果；因果就是生滅，沒有生滅，四諦這個結構自己就散了。
以下五步順推：四諦沒有則見斷證修四行沒有，四行沒有則四沙門果沒有，四果沒有則得果向果的人沒有，這八種人沒有則僧寶沒有；四諦沒有，法寶也沒有。最後一刀：
「如是說空者，是則破三寶。」
青目把這一刀複述得更白：「汝說諸法皆空，則壞三寶。」
問方還加一段：空不但壞出世間，也壞世間：
「空法壞因果，亦壞於罪福， 亦復悉毀壞，一切世俗法。」
指控至此完整：講空的人，上壞三寶，下壞罪福。這是全書最重、也最值得同情的一問——問的人不是不信佛，是太信了，怕空把他所信的一切拆掉。
二、答的第一句：不是空有過，是你不知空
論主的回答，第一句不辯護空，先指出誤解：
「汝今實不能，知空空因緣， 及知於空義，是故自生惱。」
「自生惱」三字下得極準：過失不在空，在你自己起的煩惱。青目把不能知拆成三分：「汝不解云何是空相？以何因緣說空？亦不解空義。」——不知空是什麼樣子，不知佛以什麼因緣說空，不知空的義理。三重都不知，才推得出那一長串過失。
要留意這個回答的體例：論主不說『你的推理錯在第三步』，他說你連前提裡那個「空」字都認錯了。把空認作『無所有』，再拿無所有代入四諦，當然處處落空。所以底下整品，就是把那個「空」字重新交代一遍。
三、諸佛依二諦說法
交代的第一步，是二諦：
「諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法： 一以世俗諦，二第一義諦。 若人不能知，分別於二諦， 則於深佛法，不知真實義。」
青目的釋把兩諦各安其位。世俗諦一邊：「一切法性空，而世間顛倒，故生虛妄法，於世間是實。」——法性本空，但世間顛倒，於是有種種虛妄之法，這些法在世間份上是實的。第一義諦一邊：「諸賢聖真知顛倒性，故知一切法皆空無生，於聖人是第一義諦名為實。」
兩處都用一個「實」字，份位卻不同：一個是「於世間是實」，一個是「於聖人是第一義諦名為實」。同一堆法，站在顛倒裡看是實有的世間，如實見顛倒之性便是空無生。不是兩套法，是一套法上的兩重諦。
問方的病在只認一諦：他把四諦、四果、三寶都放在有自性、能自己站住的那一層上，一聽說空，就以為那層被抽掉、東西全掉下來。論主要說的是：它們本來就不站在那一層。
那麼反過來：只要第一義、不要世俗諦，行不行？青目替論主先擋住這一問，引出下一頌。
四、不依俗諦，第一義說不出口
〔T30 0033a02〕
「若不依俗諦，不得第一義； 不得第一義，則不得涅槃。」
理由在青目那一句：「第一義皆因言說，言說是世俗」。
第一義本身離言，但凡能開口說的第一義都憑言說而顯，而言說落在世俗這一邊。廢掉世俗，第一義連被說出來的門都沒有；沒有門就進不去，涅槃也就無從得。
於是世俗諦不是第一義的對手，是它的入口。空不但不破世俗，還必須靠世俗才說得出來——問方擔心空毀掉世俗，實情正相反。
五、毒蛇與呪術：空是拿得住才有用的東西
論主接著承認一件事：空確實是危險的。
「不能正觀空，鈍根則自害， 如不善呪術，不善捉毒蛇。」
青目說得直白：「如為利捉毒蛇，不能善捉反為所害。」為取利捉蛇而捉法不對，被咬的是自己；持呪不善成，也是反過來害己。
這一喻不是罵人，是誠實。把空認作無所有就毀了罪福因果，那正是問方所怕的事；而那件事真的會發生——發生在不善觀空的人身上。所以下一頌接著說：
「世尊知是法，甚深微妙相， 非鈍根所及，是故不欲說。」
不欲說不是吝法，是知道這法太深，說了會被接錯。論主等於承認問方的顧慮有真實依據——只是那顧慮該指向錯解空的人，不該指向空。
六、空亦復空
那麼論主所說的空，究竟是什麼？
「汝謂我著空，而為我生過； 汝今所說過，於空則無有。」
青目給出全品最關鍵的一句注腳：「我所說性空，空亦復空，無如是過。」
問方安過失的方式，是把空當成一個叫作「空」的實體，論主抱著它不放，於是抱出一身毛病。論主說：我所說的是性空，而這個空本身也空；空既不是可以抱住的東西，那些著空之過便無處著落。
一旦空自己也空，『空會不會毀掉一切』這個問題就換了面貌：空不是一把砍掉萬法的刀，空是說萬法本來就不是自己站住的。
七、樞紐：以有空義故，一切法得成
於是全品的樞紐句出現了：
「以有空義故，一切法得成； 若無空義者，一切則不成。」
青目的釋一字不多：「以有空義故，一切世間、出世間法皆悉成就。」
這是整部《中論》的轉身處。前面二十三品都在破，讀者容易以為結論是『什麼都不成立』；這一頌把方向掉轉：正因為空，一切法才成立；若不空，反倒一法不成。
要看清『成立』二字。一件事能成立，就得能生、能變、能從無到有；而能生能變，正因為它沒有固定不變的自性。若有自性，它就一直是它那個樣子——不生不滅、不增不減，也就什麼都不成了。所以空不是成立的對頭，空是成立的條件。緊接著論主把這道理用到問方身上：
「汝今自有過，而以迴向我， 如人乘馬者，自忘於所乘。」
過失明明在你自己主張的定性裡，你卻迴轉過來安給空。青目點破：問方「於有法中有過不能自覺，而於空中見過」。
八、定性即是無因緣
為什麼說過在定性？頌接下去：
「若汝見諸法，決定有性者， 即為見諸法，無因亦無緣。」
青目給出推法：「若法決定有性，則應不生不滅，如是法何用因緣？」決定有自性的東西已經是它了，不必被生也不會被滅，因緣對它毫無用處；反過來，凡從因緣生的就沒有自性。二者不能兼得。
於是：
「即為破因果，作作者作法， 亦復壞一切，萬物之生滅。」
問方指控空壞因果，論主指出：真正壞因果的是定性。自此攻守易位。
九、眾因緣生法：是空、是假名、是中道
轉身處，論主說了全論最為人持誦的一頌：
「眾因緣生法，我說即是無， 亦為是假名，亦是中道義。 未曾有一法，不從因緣生， 是故一切法，無不是空者。」
青目起手先把頌裡的「無」字接成「空」字：「眾因緣生法，我說即是空。」以下逐重：
第一重，何以是空。「是物屬眾因緣故無自性，無自性故空，空亦復空。」——三層下來：屬眾緣故無自性，無自性故空，而這個空也空。青目沒有停在「空」上，他多推一步，把空自己也交出去；這一步若少了，空就成了最後一個實有的東西，問方的指控便真的成立。
第二重，何以是假名。「但為引導眾生故，以假名說」。既然無自性，本不可名；之所以還立名字、還說話，是為了引導眾生。假名不是欺誑，是為引導而施設。
第三重，何以是中道。「離有無二邊，故名為中道」。青目再說得更細：「是法無性故不得言有，亦無空故不得言無。」——因為沒有自性，不能說它有；因為連空也無可執取，也不能說它無。兩邊都說不上去，才叫中道。
這三重是同一件事的三個面，不是三個階段：緣生之法，說它無自性叫空，說它有施設叫假名，說它兩邊不落叫中道。不是空之外另有假名，也不是空與假名之外另有一個中。
青目把話收回論爭：「此過今還在汝。」——底下十幾頌，就是把問方那條推理鏈一環一環照樣還給他。
十、還施彼身：若一切不空，四諦才真的沒有
「若一切不空，則無有生滅， 如是則無有，四聖諦之法。」
這與問方開場那一頌正是對句：問方說「若一切皆空」則無四諦，論主說「若一切不空」則無四諦——同一結論，前提相反。以下逐諦查驗。
苦諦：「苦不從緣生，云何當有苦？ 無常是苦義，定性無無常。」
苦若有定性便不待緣，不待緣則無苦。青目再提經據：「經說無常是苦義」——苦之為苦正在無常；定性之物不捨自性，便無無常，也就沒有苦。
集諦：「若苦有定性，何故從集生？」苦既先已定有，就不必再從集生；集諦於是失去作用。
滅諦：「苦若有定性，則不應有滅。」性是不滅的，苦若是性，就滅不掉。
道諦：「苦若有定性，則無有修道； 若道可修習，即無有定性。」
青目的理由乾淨：「若法實者則是常，常則不可增益。」修道就是增益，而常法無可增益。要嘛道可修而無定性，要嘛道有定性而不可修——問方只能取一頭。
四諦逐一查過，論主再合起來問一句：「所可滅苦道，竟為何所至？」若苦集滅都不成，這條滅苦之道究竟通到哪裡去？
再查修證的轉變：
「若苦定有性，先來所不見， 於今云何見？其性不異故。」
凡夫先前不見苦，如今見苦，這中間有一個轉變；若性不變異，先前不見的，如今憑什麼見得到？
一句既立，四種行一齊隨之：
「如見苦不然，斷集及證滅， 修道及四果，是亦皆不然。」
青目逐項補齊：集性不可斷，滅先來不證，道先來不修——四行都不成。四行不成，四果亦無：「是四道果性，先來不可得；」
於是問方那條鏈原樣重演：無四果則無得果向果者，無八賢聖則無僧寶——青目在此特意記下經據：「而經說八賢聖，名為僧寶。」再往上：
「無四聖諦故，亦無有法寶， 無法寶僧寶，云何有佛寶？」
問方拿三寶來難空，論主把三寶還回去難他的定性。問方所怕的那件事，正是他自己的主張所導致的。
十一、佛與菩提：鐵無金性
問方退了一步：諸法可破，但究竟道阿耨多羅三藐三菩提總該有吧？因這條道而名為佛。論主答：
「汝說則不因，菩提而有佛； 亦復不因佛，而有於菩提。」
二者各有定性便各自常定，誰也不因誰——問方想保住的那個「因是道故名為佛」，正被他自己的定性拆散。
再進一步：
「雖復勤精進，修行菩提道， 若先非佛性，不應得成佛。」
青目取論中之喻：「如鐵無金性，雖復種種鍛煉終不成金。」先前決定不是佛，任你精進到底也成不了佛——定性論最終取消的，是修行本身的意義。
十二、罪福與果報：不空反而無人能作
問方最初指控空壞罪福，論主逐項還他：
「若諸法不空，無作罪福者， 不空何所作？以其性定故。」
罪福之性若先已定，就沒有人在造罪造福——造作意味著改變，而定性不可改。青目再補一句：「又無作作者故」。
再問果報：
「汝於罪福中，不生果報者， 是則離罪福，而有諸果報。」
若罪福因緣中不生果報，果報就成了離因而有，青目說得清楚：「果報不待因出故」。
問方再退：離罪福可以沒有善惡果報，但果報就是從罪福來的。論主一句收：
「若謂從罪福，而生果報者， 果從罪福生，云何言不空？」
既承認果從罪福生，它就是緣生的；緣生的東西怎麼還說不空？問方每一次退守都退進緣起裡，而一退進緣起，空義就自己成立了。
十三、破空即破世俗
論主再把問方那句「亦復悉毀壞，一切世俗法」原樣奉還：
「汝破一切法，諸因緣空義， 則破於世俗，諸餘所有法。」
「若破於空義，即應無所作； 無作而有作，不作名作者。」
青目把破空之後的荒謬列了一串：果無作無因、不作而作、作者無所作、離作者而有業有果報有受者。世俗之能運轉，全靠諸法可生可變；破了空義，這一切就都亂了。
再看世間本身：
「若有決定性，世間種種相， 則不生不滅，常住而不壞。」
青目訴諸現前所見：天、人、畜生、萬物若有實性就該常住不壞，「而現見萬物各有變異相生滅變易，是故不應有定性。」——眼前的無常，就是定性論的反證。
出世間也一樣：
「若無有空者，未得不應得， 亦無斷煩惱，亦無苦盡事。」
沒有空，未得的永遠得不到，煩惱斷不了，苦也盡不了。修行之所以可能，正因為法不是定的——你之所以還能改變，是因為你本來就不是一個固定的東西。
十四、收結：見因緣法，即是見佛
全品最後，論主引經作結：
「是故經中說，若見因緣法， 則為能見佛，見苦集滅道。」
青目說：見一切法從眾緣生者，「是人即能見佛法身，增益智慧」，能見四聖諦，見四聖諦而得四果、滅諸苦惱。
一品回到起點。問方開場那條路——破四顛倒、通達四諦、得四沙門果——他怕被空毀了；論主末後說：見因緣法即見四諦、即見佛。同一條路，不但沒有被空毀掉，反而只有在空義裡才走得通。
末句是全品的落錘：「若破空義則破因緣法，破因緣法則破三寶，若破三寶則為自破。」
破空的人破的是因緣法，因緣法既破，三寶隨之而破。他本想護三寶，結果所護的都在他手裡碎了。「自破」二字，答完了開場那一難。
讀這一品的人可以帶走什麼
一是認清自己心裡那個「空」字。若它是無所有，問方每一句指控都對；若它是「空亦復空」的那個空，一句也安不上。
二是知道二諦不是兩層樓：世俗是第一義得以被說出來的口。
三是把樞紐句記牢：「以有空義故，一切法得成」——破的是自性，不是法。未得能得、煩惱能斷、苦能盡，全靠這個空字撐著。
承衍：吉藏之鏡
以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論，只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。
吉藏《中觀論疏》釋本品時，先指出問方之病在封執取空相，正因執取空相，所以不知空義。他解「以有空義故，一切法得成」一偈，說上半顯論主無過、下半顯外人有失；所以由空一切得成，是因為前偈既說空亦復空便是非空非有，非空非有故空有俱成。他又從二諦立說：由第一義空故有世諦，二諦成則一切成；若無空義，第一義不成，世諦亦不成。
至於「眾因緣生法」一偈，吉藏以三是之說讀之：因緣生法是畢竟空——有自性則不從因緣，既從因緣生即是無自性，所以是空；亦為是假名——因緣既本不有、今亦不空，非空非有而無以名之，故假名說有、亦假名說空；亦是中道義——無自性故非有，既非有亦復非空，非有非空故名中道。
這面鏡把本品接進了三論一系破邪顯正的判釋架構；其判釋是吉藏所增，不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判，各還其位。
When the Treatise on the Middle reaches this chapter, its master receives the gravest blow yet.
Most earlier objections brought forward one thing—coming and going, arising and cessation, agent, karma, time, the Tathāgata—and waited for it to be dismantled. This chapter is different. What the objector holds is not something suspect but the Buddhadharma itself: the four truths, four progressions and four fruits, eight noble persons, and Jewels of Dharma, Saṅgha, and Buddha. He says: if emptiness means what you teach, all of these disappear.
His opening sentence first lays out the sequence of cultivation and realization: “Eliminate the four inversions, penetrate the four truths, attain the four fruits of a renunciant.” This is the path he himself follows, each link fastened to the next. Precisely because the links are tight, removing the lowest one brings the entire building down. The link he means to remove is arising and cessation.
1. The Objector’s Inference: From No Arising and Cessation All the Way to No Buddha
The objector’s verse drives through six steps in a single breath:
“If everything is empty, there is neither arising nor cessation; consequently, the four noble truths do not exist.”
First: if everything is empty, there is no arising or cessation; without arising and cessation, there are no four truths. Qingmu supplies the reason: the four truths have cause and result—origin is the cause and suffering the result; the path is the cause and cessation the result. Cause and result are arising and cessation. Without arising and cessation, the structure of the four truths itself disintegrates.
The next five steps follow in order. Without the four truths, the four activities of seeing, severing, realizing, and cultivating do not exist. Without those activities, the four fruits of a renunciant do not exist. Without the four fruits, no one attains or progresses toward them. Without these eight kinds of person, there is no Jewel of the Saṅgha; and without the four truths, there is no Jewel of the Dharma. Then comes the final stroke:
“One who teaches emptiness in this way destroys the Three Jewels.”
Qingmu restates the stroke even more plainly: “You say that dharmas are all empty; this destroys the Three Jewels.”
The objector adds another point: emptiness destroys not only the world-transcending but also the world:
“Emptiness destroys cause and result and also demerit and merit; moreover, it utterly destroys every conventional dharma.”
The indictment is now complete. One who teaches emptiness destroys the Three Jewels above and demerit and merit below. This is the weightiest and also the most sympathetic question in the entire treatise. The questioner does not lack faith in the Buddha. He believes so strongly that he fears emptiness will dismantle everything in which he believes.
2. The Reply’s First Sentence: Emptiness Is Not at Fault; You Do Not Know Emptiness
The treatise master’s first sentence does not defend emptiness. It identifies the misunderstanding:
“You do not in fact know emptiness or the reasons for emptiness, nor do you know the meaning of emptiness; therefore you distress yourself.”
“Distress yourself” is exact. The fault lies not in emptiness but in the distress you generate. Qingmu divides the failure to know into three: “You do not understand what the characteristic of emptiness is, the reasons for which emptiness is taught, or the meaning of emptiness.” You do not know what emptiness is like, why the Buddha teaches it, or what it means. Only by failing on all three counts can one derive that long chain of faults.
Notice the form of the answer. The treatise master does not say, “Your reasoning goes wrong at the third step.” He says: you have misidentified the very word “emptiness” in your premise. Treat emptiness as sheer nonexistence, substitute that nonexistence into the four truths, and of course everything comes up empty. The entire rest of the chapter therefore explains that word “emptiness” anew.
3. The Buddhas Teach by Relying on the Two Truths
The first step in that explanation is the two truths:
“The Buddhas rely on two truths when teaching the Dharma to beings: first, the conventional truth; second, the ultimate truth. If someone cannot know and distinguish these two truths, that person does not know the true meaning of the profound Buddhadharma.”
Qingmu’s commentary gives each truth its place. On the side of conventional truth: “The nature of all dharmas is empty, yet because the world is inverted, false dharmas arise and appear real to the world.” The nature of dharmas is originally empty, but because the world is inverted, various false dharmas arise, and at the level of the world they are real. On the side of ultimate truth: “Noble ones truly know the nature of inversion and therefore know all dharmas to be empty and unarisen; for noble ones, this is the ultimate truth and is called reality.”
Both passages use the same word “real,” but at different levels: one says “real to the world,” the other “for noble ones, this is the ultimate truth and is called reality.” The same dharmas, seen from within inversion, are a world of real existence; when the nature of inversion is seen as it really is, they are empty and unarisen. These are not two sets of dharmas but two truths concerning one set of dharmas.
The objector’s illness is recognizing only one truth. He places the four truths, four fruits, and Three Jewels on a level where they possess intrinsic natures and stand on their own. The moment he hears “empty,” he assumes that level has been removed and everything has fallen. The treatise master’s point is that they never stood on that level in the first place.
But could one reverse course and retain only the ultimate, discarding the conventional truth? Qingmu blocks this question in advance and introduces the next verse.
4. Without Relying on the Conventional, the Ultimate Cannot Be Spoken
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“Without relying on the conventional truth, the ultimate cannot be attained; without attaining the ultimate, nirvāṇa cannot be attained.”
The reason appears in Qingmu’s sentence: “The ultimate is entirely disclosed through words, and words are conventional.”
The ultimate itself is beyond words, but whenever it can be spoken, it is disclosed through words, and words fall on the side of convention. Abolish convention and the ultimate has no door through which it can even be expressed. With no door, there is no way in, and nirvāṇa cannot be attained.
Thus the conventional truth is not the ultimate’s rival; it is the entrance to the ultimate. Far from destroying convention, emptiness must rely on convention even to be spoken. The objector fears that emptiness will destroy convention, but the actual situation is the reverse.
5. Venomous Snake and Incantation: Emptiness Is Useful Only When One Can Hold It
The treatise master next acknowledges something: emptiness really is dangerous.
“Unable to contemplate emptiness correctly, the dull-witted harm themselves, like one unskilled in incantations or unskilled in catching a venomous snake.”
Qingmu says it bluntly: “It is like catching a venomous snake for profit: failing to grasp it well, one is instead harmed.” If one catches a snake for gain but uses the wrong grip, one is bitten; if one cannot execute an incantation properly, it also turns back and causes harm.
This simile is not an insult. Treating emptiness as sheer nonexistence really does destroy demerit and merit and cause and result, exactly as the objector fears. And that really does happen—to the person who does not contemplate emptiness skillfully. Thus the next verse continues:
“The World-Honored One knew this Dharma to have profound and subtle characteristics beyond the reach of the dull-witted, and therefore did not wish to teach it.”
He did not withhold the Dharma out of stinginess. He knew it was too deep and would be received wrongly. The treatise master in effect concedes that the objector’s concern has a real basis—but the concern applies to people who misconstrue emptiness, not to emptiness itself.
6. Emptiness Itself Is Empty
What, then, is the emptiness taught by the treatise master?
“You say that I cling to emptiness and therefore assign me faults; yet the faults you now allege do not exist in emptiness.”
Qingmu supplies the chapter’s most crucial gloss: “I teach the emptiness of nature, and emptiness itself is empty; there is no such fault.”
The objector assigns faults by treating emptiness as an entity called “emptiness” that the treatise master embraces and refuses to release, thereby acquiring every ailment that comes with it. The master replies: I teach the emptiness of nature, and this emptiness is itself empty. Since emptiness is not a thing one can hold, faults caused by grasping emptiness have nowhere to lodge.
Once emptiness itself is empty, the question “Will emptiness destroy everything?” changes its shape. Emptiness is not a blade that cuts down the myriad dharmas. Emptiness says that the myriad dharmas never stood by themselves.
7. The Pivot: Because Emptiness Has Meaning, All Dharmas Can Be Established
Now the pivot of the entire chapter appears:
“Because emptiness has meaning, all dharmas can be established; without the meaning of emptiness, nothing could be established.”
Qingmu’s explanation adds not one unnecessary word: “Because emptiness has meaning, all worldly and world-transcending dharmas are accomplished.”
This is where the whole Treatise on the Middle turns. The preceding twenty-three chapters have all been refuting, so a reader can easily assume that the conclusion is “nothing can be established.” This verse reverses the direction: precisely because of emptiness, all dharmas can be established; if they were not empty, not one could be established.
We must see clearly what “established” means. For something to be established, it must be able to arise, change, and pass from absence into presence. It can arise and change precisely because it lacks a fixed and unchanging intrinsic nature. If it possessed such a nature, it would forever remain exactly as it is—neither arising nor ceasing, neither increasing nor diminishing—and nothing could ever be established. Emptiness is therefore not establishment’s opponent; it is establishment’s condition. The master immediately applies this reasoning to the objector:
“You now possess a fault yourself, yet turn it back upon me, like a rider who forgets what he is riding.”
The fault lies plainly in the determinate nature you assert, yet you turn it around and attach it to emptiness. Qingmu exposes the point: the objector “possesses a fault within existent dharmas but cannot notice it himself, and instead sees a fault in emptiness.”
8. Determinate Nature Means No Causes or Conditions
Why does the fault lie in determinate nature? The verse continues:
“If you see dharmas as determinately possessing natures, you thereby see dharmas as having neither causes nor conditions.”
Qingmu gives the inference: “If a dharma determinately possessed a nature, it should neither arise nor cease. What use would such a dharma have for causes and conditions?” A thing with a determinate intrinsic nature already is what it is. It need not be produced and cannot be extinguished; causes and conditions have no use for it. Conversely, whatever arises through causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature. One cannot have both.
Therefore:
“You thereby destroy cause and result, action, agent, and what is acted upon, and also destroy the arising and cessation of all things.”
The objector accuses emptiness of destroying cause and result. The treatise master shows that determinate nature is what truly destroys them. From this point, attack and defense exchange places.
9. Dharmas Born from Many Conditions: Empty, Provisional Names, and the Middle Way
At the turn, the master speaks the most widely recited verse in the entire treatise:
“Dharmas born from many conditions, I say, are precisely absence; they are also provisional names, and this is the meaning of the Middle Way. Never has there been a single dharma that did not arise from conditions; therefore no dharma is not empty.”
Qingmu begins by receiving the verse’s word “absence” as “empty”: “Dharmas born from many conditions, I say, are precisely empty.” He then unfolds it layer by layer:
First, why is it empty? “Because the thing belongs to many causes and conditions, it has no intrinsic nature; because it has no intrinsic nature, it is empty; emptiness too is empty.” Three layers descend: because it belongs to many conditions it has no intrinsic nature; because it has no intrinsic nature it is empty; and this emptiness itself is empty. Qingmu does not stop at “empty.” He takes one more step and relinquishes emptiness itself. Without this step, emptiness would become the last truly existent thing, and the objector’s accusation would actually stand.
Second, why is it a provisional name? “It is only to guide beings that one speaks by means of provisional names.” Since it has no intrinsic nature, it cannot finally be named. Names are still established and words still spoken in order to guide beings. A provisional name is not a deception; it is an establishment made for guidance.
Third, why is it the Middle Way? “Because this is free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence, it is called the Middle Way.” Qingmu speaks more precisely: “Because this dharma has no nature, one cannot say it exists; and because even emptiness is absent, one cannot say it does not exist.” Because it lacks intrinsic nature, it cannot be called existent; because even emptiness cannot be grasped, it cannot be called nonexistent. When neither extreme can be asserted, this is called the Middle Way.
These three layers are three faces of the same event, not three stages. To call a dependently arisen dharma devoid of intrinsic nature is emptiness; to speak of its conditioned establishment is provisional naming; to say it falls into neither extreme is the Middle Way. There is no provisional name apart from emptiness, nor some separate middle beyond emptiness and provisional naming.
Qingmu returns the point to the dispute: “This fault now returns to you.” The next dozen or more verses return the objector’s chain of inference to him link by link.
10. Returning the Charge: If Everything Were Nonempty, the Four Truths Would Truly Not Exist
“If everything were nonempty, there would be neither arising nor cessation; consequently, the four noble truths would not exist.”
This precisely answers the objector’s opening verse. The objector says, “If everything is empty,” there are no four truths. The master says, “If everything were nonempty,” there would be no four truths—the same conclusion from the opposite premise. He then tests each truth in turn.
The truth of suffering: “If suffering did not arise from conditions, how could suffering exist? Impermanence is the meaning of suffering, yet determinate nature is not impermanent.”
If suffering possessed determinate nature, it would not await conditions; if it did not await conditions, there would be no suffering. Qingmu again adduces scripture: “Scripture says that impermanence is the meaning of suffering.” Suffering is suffering precisely in its impermanence. A thing of determinate nature never relinquishes itself, and so lacks impermanence and therefore suffering.
The truth of origin: “If suffering possessed determinate nature, why would it arise from origin?” If suffering already determinately existed, it would not need to arise from origin. The truth of origin would lose its function.
The truth of cessation: “If suffering possessed determinate nature, it should not cease.” A nature does not cease. If suffering were a nature, it could not be extinguished.
The truth of the path: “If suffering possessed determinate nature, there would be no cultivation of the path; if the path can be cultivated, it has no determinate nature.”
Qingmu’s reason is clean: “If a dharma were real, it would be permanent; what is permanent cannot be increased.” Cultivating the path is an increase, and a permanent dharma cannot increase. Either the path can be cultivated and lacks determinate nature, or it possesses determinate nature and cannot be cultivated. The objector can choose only one.
Having tested each of the four truths, the master gathers them and asks: “Where could the path that extinguishes suffering possibly lead?” If suffering, origin, and cessation cannot be established, where exactly could this path for extinguishing suffering go?
Now test the transformation involved in cultivation and realization:
“If suffering determinately possessed a nature, how could what was not seen before be seen now? Its nature would not have changed.”
An ordinary person did not see suffering before and sees suffering now; a transformation has occurred between the two. If nature does not change, how could what was not seen before now become visible?
Once this sentence stands, the four activities follow together:
“Just as seeing suffering cannot be established, severing origin, realizing cessation, cultivating the path, and the four fruits likewise cannot be established.”
Qingmu completes each item: origin’s nature cannot be severed, cessation was never realized before, and the path was never cultivated before—the four activities all fail. If the four activities fail, so do the four fruits: “The natures of these four fruits of the path have always been unattainable.”
The objector’s chain now repeats in its original form. Without the four fruits, there are no persons attaining or progressing toward them; without the eight noble persons, there is no Jewel of the Saṅgha. Qingmu pointedly records the scriptural basis here: “Yet scripture calls the eight noble persons the Jewel of the Saṅgha.” Then the chain moves upward:
“Because the four noble truths do not exist, the Jewel of the Dharma does not exist; without the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha, how could there be the Jewel of the Buddha?”
The objector challenged emptiness with the Three Jewels; the master returns the Three Jewels as a challenge to determinate nature. The very outcome the objector fears is produced by his own position.
11. Buddha and Awakening: Iron Lacks the Nature of Gold
The objector retreats one step. Dharmas may be refuted, but surely the ultimate path—unsurpassed complete awakening—must exist? It is because of this path that one is called a Buddha. The master replies:
“According to your thesis, there could be no Buddha by reason of awakening, nor could there be awakening by reason of a Buddha.”
If each possesses determinate nature, each is permanently fixed in itself and neither arises because of the other. The objector’s intended safeguard—“one is called a Buddha because of this path”—is dismantled by his own determinate nature.
The master goes further:
“Even if one strives diligently and cultivates the path to awakening, if one did not previously possess Buddha nature, one could not become a Buddha.”
Qingmu draws the treatise’s simile: “Just as iron lacks the nature of gold and never becomes gold despite every kind of refinement.” If one was determinately not a Buddha before, no amount of striving could ever make one a Buddha. The final thing canceled by the theory of determinate nature is the very meaning of practice.
12. Demerit and Merit and Their Results: Nonemptiness Leaves No One Able to Act
The objector began by accusing emptiness of destroying demerit and merit. The master returns each item:
“If dharmas were nonempty, there would be no one who performs demerit or merit; since they are nonempty, what could be done? Their natures would be determinate.”
If the natures of demerit and merit were already determined, no one could be producing either one. Producing means changing, and determinate nature cannot change. Qingmu adds: “There would be neither doing nor an agent.”
Then comes the question of karmic results:
“You maintain that karmic results do not arise within demerit and merit; this would mean that various karmic results exist apart from demerit and merit.”
If karmic results do not arise among the causes and conditions of demerit and merit, results exist apart from causes. Qingmu is explicit: “A karmic result would appear without awaiting its cause.”
The objector retreats again: apart from demerit and merit there need be no wholesome or unwholesome results, but such results do arise from demerit and merit. The master closes with one sentence:
“If karmic results arise from demerit and merit, then since results arise from demerit and merit, how could they be called nonempty?”
Once it is conceded that a result arises from demerit and merit, it is dependently arisen. How can something dependently arisen still be called nonempty? Every retreat takes the objector further into dependent arising, and with each step into dependent arising, emptiness establishes itself.
13. To Refute Emptiness Is to Refute Convention
The master now returns verbatim the objector’s charge that emptiness “utterly destroys every conventional dharma”:
“If you refute all dharmas and the meaning of emptiness in conditioned arising, you thereby refute convention and every other dharma.”
“If you refute the meaning of emptiness, nothing could be done; yet there would be doing without any act, and one who does nothing would be called an agent.”
Qingmu lists the absurdities that follow from refuting emptiness: results are unmade and causeless; there is doing without doing; agents do nothing; and karma, karmic results, and recipients exist apart from agents. Convention can function only because dharmas can arise and change. Refute emptiness, and all of this becomes disordered.
Consider the world itself:
“If determinate nature existed, the various features of the world would neither arise nor cease, but abide permanently and never perish.”
Qingmu appeals to what is presently seen. If gods, humans, animals, and all things possessed real natures, they should abide permanently and never perish. “Yet all things presently seen each display transformation, arising, cessation, and alteration. Therefore they should not possess determinate natures.” The impermanence before one’s eyes is the counterproof to determinate nature.
The world-transcending is no different:
“If emptiness did not exist, what had never been attained should not be attained; there would be no severing of afflictions and no exhaustion of suffering.”
Without emptiness, what has not been attained can never be attained, afflictions cannot be severed, and suffering cannot be exhausted. Practice is possible precisely because dharmas are not fixed. You can still change because you were never a fixed thing in the first place.
14. Conclusion: To See Dharmas of Causes and Conditions Is to See the Buddha
At the chapter’s end, the master concludes by citing scripture:
“Therefore a scripture says: one who sees dharmas of causes and conditions is able to see the Buddha and sees suffering, origin, cessation, and the path.”
Qingmu says that one who sees all dharmas arise from many conditions “can see the Buddha’s Dharma body and develop wisdom,” can see the four noble truths, and through seeing them attains the four fruits and extinguishes every distress.
The chapter returns to its starting point. The path named by the objector at the opening—eliminate the four inversions, penetrate the four truths, attain the four fruits of a renunciant—was what he feared emptiness would destroy. The master ends by saying that to see dharmas of causes and conditions is to see the four truths and see the Buddha. The same path has not been destroyed by emptiness; it can be traversed only within emptiness.
The final sentence strikes the chapter’s gavel: “To refute emptiness is to refute dharmas of causes and conditions; to refute dharmas of causes and conditions is to refute the Three Jewels; and to refute the Three Jewels is to refute oneself.”
The one who refutes emptiness refutes dharmas of causes and conditions; once those are refuted, the Three Jewels are refuted with them. Intending to protect the Three Jewels, he shatters what he protects in his own hands. The words “refute oneself” answer the opening challenge.
What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?
First, recognize the word “emptiness” in your own mind. If it means sheer nonexistence, every charge the objector makes is correct. If it is the emptiness in which “emptiness itself is empty,” not one charge can attach.
Second, know that the two truths are not two stories of a building. Convention is the mouth through which the ultimate can be spoken.
Third, hold fast to the pivotal sentence: “Because emptiness has meaning, all dharmas can be established.” What is refuted is intrinsic nature, not dharmas. What was not attained can be attained, afflictions can be severed, and suffering can be exhausted—all because this word “emptiness” bears their weight.
Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror
Everything above belongs to this chapter’s own meaning. What follows looks alongside it through the eye of the Sui–Tang Three Treatises tradition. A mirror is not the treatise; it is simply another way of reading the same verses.
In commenting on this chapter in the Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, Jizang first locates the objector’s illness in rigidly grasping the characteristic of emptiness: precisely because he grasps emptiness’s characteristic, he does not know emptiness’s meaning. Explaining the verse “Because emptiness has meaning, all dharmas can be established,” Jizang says the upper half shows the treatise master free of fault and the lower half shows the outsider at fault. Everything can be established because of emptiness because the previous verse says emptiness itself is empty, which is neither empty nor existent; being neither empty nor existent, both emptiness and existence can be established. He also frames the point through the two truths: because of ultimate emptiness there is conventional truth; when the two truths are established, everything is established. Without emptiness, neither the ultimate nor the conventional truth is established.
As for the verse “Dharmas born from many conditions,” Jizang reads it through the three “are”s. A dependently arisen dharma is ultimately empty: if it possessed intrinsic nature, it would not arise through conditions; since it does arise through conditions, it lacks intrinsic nature and is therefore empty. It is also a provisional name: causes and conditions were never existent and now are not empty either; being neither empty nor existent, they cannot finally be named, so both existence and emptiness are spoken of provisionally. It is also the meaning of the Middle Way: lacking intrinsic nature, it is not existent; being not existent, neither is it empty. Neither existent nor empty is called the Middle Way.
This mirror joins the chapter to the Three Treatises tradition’s hermeneutical architecture of refuting error and disclosing the correct. That interpretation is Jizang’s addition, not the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verse or Qingmu’s extended commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
本品底本為《大正新脩大藏經》T30n1564〔0032b12–0034c12〕；正文依羅什本保存問方、龍樹頌與青目釋的聲部。清辨本 T30n1566〔0124b01〕題為〈觀聖諦品第二十四〉；安慧本 T30n1567〔0156b28〕的〈觀生死品〉是第十一品，現存漢譯止於第十三品，本品闕傳，不得移作本品題名。
二、異釋對勘
清辨系 T30n1566 保存二諦、緣起自體無起與見因緣即見佛的同品異釋；安慧系 T30n1567 現存漢譯止於第十三品，本品闕傳。兩者只作異釋對讀，不混入羅什本正文。
品初問方以破四顛倒、通達四諦與得四沙門果，建立隨後反難空義的修證前提 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0032b12〕：「問曰：破四顛倒，通達四諦，得四沙門果。」
問頌主張一切皆空、無生無滅會取消四諦、見斷證修、四向四果、八賢聖與三寶 T30n1564龍樹頌（問方立說）〔0032b13–0032b22〕：「若一切皆空，無生亦無滅，如是則無有，四聖諦之法。以無四諦故，見苦與斷集，證滅及修道，如是事皆無。以是事無故，則無四道果；無有四果故，得向者亦無。若無八賢聖，則無有僧寶；以無四諦故，亦無有法寶；以無法僧寶，亦無有佛寶。如是說空者，是則破三寶。」
青目轉述問方以集因苦果、道因滅果說明四諦，再由見斷證修、向果八聖推至法僧佛三寶皆無 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0032b23–0032c05〕：「若一切世間皆空無所有者，即應無生無滅。以無生無滅故，則無四聖諦。何以故？從集諦生苦諦，集諦是因、苦諦是果。滅苦集諦名為滅諦，能至滅諦名為道諦。道諦是因、滅諦是果。如是四諦有因有果，若無生無滅則無四諦。四諦無故，則無見苦、斷集、證滅、修道。見苦斷集證滅修道無故，則無四沙門果。四沙門果無故，則無四向四得者。若無此八賢聖，則無僧寶。又四聖諦無故，法寶亦無。若無法寶、僧寶者，云何有佛？得法名為佛，無法何有佛？汝說諸法皆空，則壞三寶。復次：」
問頌又主張空法破壞因果、罪福及一切世俗法 T30n1564龍樹頌（問方立說）〔0032c06–0032c07〕：「空法壞因果，亦壞於罪福，亦復悉毀壞，一切世俗法。」
青目轉述問方說受持空法便破罪福、果報與世俗，所以諸法不應空 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0032c08–0032c09〕：「若受空法者，則破罪福及罪福果報，亦破世俗法。有如是等諸過故，諸法不應空。」
龍樹指出問方不知空、說空的因緣及空義，所以由誤解自生疑難 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0032c11–0032c12〕：「汝今實不能，知空空因緣，及知於空義，是故自生惱。」
青目把三項展開為不知空相、不知何因緣說空、不知空義，故不能如實而生疑難 T30n1564青目釋〔0032c13–0032c15〕：「汝不解云何是空相？以何因緣說空？亦不解空義。不能如實知故，生如是疑難。復次：」
諸佛依世俗諦與第一義諦二諦說法，不分辨二諦便不知甚深佛法真實義 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0032c16–0032c19〕：「諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法：一以世俗諦，二第一義諦。若人不能知，分別於二諦，則於深佛法，不知真實義。」
青目說世間因顛倒而以虛妄法為實，賢聖知其性空無生為第一義實，諸佛依此二諦說法 T30n1564青目釋〔0032c20–0033a01〕：「世俗諦者，一切法性空，而世間顛倒，故生虛妄法，於世間是實。諸賢聖真知顛倒性，故知一切法皆空無生，於聖人是第一義諦名為實。諸佛依是二諦，而為眾生說法。若人不能如實分別二諦，則於甚深佛法不知實義。若謂一切法不生是第一義諦，不須第二俗諦者，是亦不然。何以故？」
若不依世俗諦便不得第一義，不得第一義便不得涅槃 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033a02–0033a03〕：「若不依俗諦，不得第一義；不得第一義，則不得涅槃。」
青目說第一義須因世俗言說而可說，不得第一義便不能至涅槃，所以無生法仍有二諦 T30n1564青目釋〔0033a04–0033a07〕：「第一義皆因言說，言說是世俗，是故若不依世俗，第一義則不可說。若不得第一義，云何得至涅槃？是故諸法雖無生，而有二諦。復次：」
不正觀空的鈍根人會自害，如不善持咒與不善捉毒蛇 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033a08–0033a09〕：「不能正觀空，鈍根則自害，如不善呪術，不善捉毒蛇。」
青目說鈍根因不善解空而起邪見，如捉蛇、持咒不得法反受其害 T30n1564青目釋〔0033a10–0033a13〕：「若人鈍根不善解空法，於空有失而生邪見。如為利捉毒蛇，不能善捉反為所害。又如呪術，欲有所作不能善成則還自害。鈍根觀空法亦如是。復次：」
世尊知空法甚深微妙、非鈍根所及，所以起初不欲宣說 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033a14–0033a15〕：「世尊知是法，甚深微妙相，非鈍根所及，是故不欲說。」
青目重申世尊因法甚深、鈍根難解而不欲說 T30n1564青目釋〔0033a16–0033a17〕：「世尊以法甚深微妙，非鈍根所解，是故不欲說。復次：」
龍樹說問方把著空的過失加給他，但這些過失不在其所說之空 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033a18–0033a19〕：「汝謂我著空，而為我生過；汝今所說過，於空則無有。」
青目說所說的是性空，空本身也空，所以沒有問方所歸的著空過 T30n1564青目釋〔0033a20–0033a21〕：「汝謂我著空故，為我生過。我所說性空，空亦復空，無如是過。復次：」
正因有空義，一切法得以成立；若無空義，一切法反而不成 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033a22–0033a23〕：「以有空義故，一切法得成；若無空義者，一切則不成。」
青目明說空義使世間、出世間法成就，無空義則兩者皆不成 T30n1564青目釋〔0033a24–0033a25〕：「以有空義故，一切世間、出世間法皆悉成就。若無空義，則皆不成就。復次：」
問方自身在定有法中已有過失，卻把過失轉向空，如乘馬者忘記所乘 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033a26–0033a27〕：「汝今自有過，而以迴向我，如人乘馬者，自忘於所乘。」
青目說問方不能自覺有法中的過，反在空中見過，如騎馬忘馬 T30n1564青目釋〔0033a28–0033a29〕：「汝於有法中有過不能自覺，而於空中見過，如人乘馬而忘其所乘。何以故？」
若見諸法決定有性，就等於見諸法無因無緣 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033b01–0033b02〕：「若汝見諸法，決定有性者，即為見諸法，無因亦無緣。」
青目說決定有性之法應不生不滅而不須因緣；若從因緣生便沒有自性 T30n1564青目釋〔0033b03–0033b07〕：「汝說諸法有定性。若爾者，則見諸法無因無緣。何以故？若法決定有性，則應不生不滅，如是法何用因緣？若諸法從因緣生，則無有性。是故諸法決定有性，則無因緣。若謂諸法決定住自性，是則不然。何以故？」
定性論會破壞因果、作者、作業及一切萬物生滅 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033b08–0033b09〕：「即為破因果，作作者作法，亦復壞一切，萬物之生滅。」
青目總結諸法若有定性，因果等事便都不成立 T30n1564青目釋〔0033b10〕：「諸法有定性，則無因果等諸事。如偈說：」
眾因緣所生法，頌文說即是「無」，也是假名與中道；沒有一法不從因緣生，所以一切法無不是空 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033b11–0033b14〕：「眾因緣生法，我說即是無，亦為是假名，亦是中道義。未曾有一法，不從因緣生，是故一切法，無不是空者。」
青目說緣具和合而生者屬眾緣故無自性，空也空；只為引導假名說，離有無二邊名中道 T30n1564青目釋〔0033b15–0033b22〕：「眾因緣生法，我說即是空。何以故？眾緣具足和合而物生，是物屬眾因緣故無自性，無自性故空，空亦復空。但為引導眾生故，以假名說，離有無二邊，故名為中道。是法無性故不得言有，亦無空故不得言無。若法有性相，則不待眾緣而有，若不待眾緣則無法，是故無有不空法。汝上所說空法有過者，此過今還在汝。何以故？」
若一切法不空，各有自性，便無生滅，也沒有四聖諦 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033b23–0033b24〕：「若一切不空，則無有生滅，如是則無有，四聖諦之法。」
青目說各法有性不空便無生滅，無生滅故四諦不成 T30n1564青目釋〔0033b25–0033b26〕：「若一切法各各有性不空者，則無有生滅。無生滅故，則無四聖諦法。何以故？」
苦若不從緣生便無苦；經說無常是苦義，而定性苦不能無常 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033b27–0033b28〕：「苦不從緣生，云何當有苦？無常是苦義，定性無無常。」
青目說苦不從緣便無苦，苦若定性不捨自性，也不能具有無常義 T30n1564青目釋〔0033b29–0033c02〕：「苦不從緣生故則無苦。何以故？經說無常是苦義。若苦有定性，云何有無常？以不捨自性故。復次：」
苦若已有定性便不須再從集生，所以破空義反而使集諦不成 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033c03–0033c04〕：「若苦有定性，何故從集生？是故無有集，以破空義故。」
青目說苦性若先已決定有便不應再生，由此集諦失去作用 T30n1564青目釋〔0033c05–0033c06〕：「若苦有定性者，則不應更生，先已有故。若爾者，則無集諦，以壞空義故。復次：」
苦若有定性便不應滅，執著定性正破壞滅諦 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033c07–0033c08〕：「苦若有定性，則不應有滅。汝著定性故，即破於滅諦。」
青目說苦有定性就沒有滅，因為所謂性不能被滅 T30n1564青目釋〔0033c09–0033c10〕：「苦若有定性者，則不應滅。何以故？性則無滅故。復次：」
苦若有定性便無可修之道；若道能修習，便證明道無定性 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033c11–0033c12〕：「苦若有定性，則無有修道；若道可修習，即無有定性。」
青目說定有之法是常，常法不可增益；道若可修便沒有定性 T30n1564青目釋〔0033c13–0033c15〕：「法若定有，則無有修道。何以故？若法實者則是常，常則不可增益。若道可修，道則無有定性。復次：」
若沒有苦、集、滅三諦，能滅苦的道究竟也無所至 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033c16–0033c17〕：「若無有苦諦，及無集滅諦，所可滅苦道，竟為何所至？」
青目追問定性論既使苦集滅不成，滅苦之道還能到哪一個滅苦處 T30n1564青目釋〔0033c18–0033c19〕：「諸法若先定有性，則無苦集滅諦。今滅苦道，竟為至何滅苦處？復次：」
苦性若固定，凡夫先前不見苦，今日也不應轉為見苦 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033c20–0033c21〕：「若苦定有性，先來所不見，於今云何見？其性不異故。」
青目說凡夫先前若不能見苦且不見性已定，後來也不應能見 T30n1564青目釋〔0033c22–0033c23〕：「若先凡夫時不能見苦性，今亦不應見。何以故？不見性定故。復次：」
見苦若因定性不成，斷集、證滅、修道及四果也都不成 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0033c24–0033c25〕：「如見苦不然，斷集及證滅，修道及四果，是亦皆不然。」
青目逐項說先未見後不能見、先未斷後不能斷、先未證後不能證、先未修後不能修，故四行與四果皆無 T30n1564青目釋〔0033c26–0034a03〕：「如苦諦性，先不見者後亦不應見。如是亦不應有斷集、證滅、修道。何以故？是集性先來不斷，今亦不應斷，性不可斷故。滅先來不證，今亦不應證，先來不證故。道先來不修，今亦不應修，先來不修故。是故四聖諦見斷證修四種行，皆不應有。四種行無故，四道果亦無。何以故？」
四道果若有固定性而先前不可得，今日也不可能轉為可得 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034a04–0034a05〕：「是四道果性，先來不可得；諸法性若定，今云何可得？」
青目說四沙門果若定性，先未得者今不應得；今若可得，性便不定 T30n1564青目釋〔0034a06–0034a07〕：「諸法若有定性，四沙門果先來未得，今云何可得？若可得者，性則無定。復次：」
沒有四果便沒有得果者與向果者，沒有八賢聖便沒有僧寶 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034a08–0034a09〕：「若無有四果，則無得向者，以無八聖故，則無有僧寶。」
青目說四果若無，得果與向果者皆無，八賢聖無故僧寶也無；但經明說八賢聖名僧寶 T30n1564青目釋〔0034a10–0034a12〕：「無四沙門果故，則無得果、向果者。無八賢聖故，則無有僧寶。而經說八賢聖，名為僧寶。復次：」
沒有四聖諦便沒有法寶，沒有法寶與僧寶便沒有佛寶 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034a13–0034a14〕：「無四聖諦故，亦無有法寶，無法寶僧寶，云何有佛寶？」
青目說行四諦得涅槃法，四諦無則法寶無，法僧二寶無則佛寶無；定性論由此自壞三寶 T30n1564青目釋〔0034a15–0034a17〕：「行四聖諦得涅槃法，若無四諦則無法寶，若無二寶云何當有佛寶？汝以如是因緣，說諸法定性，則壞三寶。」
問方退守阿耨多羅三藐三菩提，主張究竟道應有，因得此道而名佛 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0034a17–0034a19〕：「問曰：汝雖破諸法，究竟道阿耨多羅三藐三菩提應有，因是道故名為佛。」
若佛與菩提各有定性，便不因菩提有佛，也不因佛而有菩提 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034a20–0034a21〕：「汝說則不因，菩提而有佛；亦復不因佛，而有於菩提。」
青目說定性論令佛與菩提兩性常定，所以兩者不應互相為因 T30n1564青目釋〔0034a22–0034a23〕：「汝說諸法有定性者，則不應因菩提有佛、因佛有菩提，是二性常定故。復次：」
若一人先前沒有佛性，在定性論下即使勤修菩提道也不應成佛 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034a24–0034a25〕：「雖復勤精進，修行菩提道，若先非佛性，不應得成佛。」
青目以鐵沒有金性，雖經鍛鍊終不成金，說明固定先性會取消成佛 T30n1564青目釋〔0034a26–0034a27〕：「以先無性故，如鐵無金性，雖復種種鍛煉終不成金。復次：」
若諸法不空、罪福自性先定，便沒有作者能造罪福，也無從另作 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034a28–0034a29〕：「若諸法不空，無作罪福者，不空何所作？以其性定故。」
青目說罪福性先已決定且沒有作作者，所以不空論下終無人造罪福 T30n1564青目釋〔0034b01–0034b02〕：「若諸法不空，終無有人作罪福者。何以故？罪福性先已定故，又無作作者故。復次：」
若罪福因緣中不生果報，便成離開罪福另有果報 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034b03–0034b04〕：「汝於罪福中，不生果報者，是則離罪福，而有諸果報。」
青目說若罪福因緣中沒有果報，果便不待因而出，成為離因之果 T30n1564青目釋〔0034b05–0034b07〕：「汝於罪福因緣中皆無果報者，則應離罪福因緣而有果報。何以故？果報不待因出故。」
問方承認離罪福沒有善惡果，但堅持善惡果報只從罪福而有 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0034b07–0034b08〕：「問曰：離罪福可無善惡果報，但從罪福有善惡果報。」
果報若從罪福生，正因它從因緣生，便不能再說不空 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034b09–0034b10〕：「若謂從罪福，而生果報者，果從罪福生，云何言不空？」
青目說離罪福沒有善惡果，果便是空；離作者也沒有罪福，所以先說諸法不空不成立 T30n1564青目釋〔0034b11–0034b13〕：「若離罪福無善惡果，云何言果不空？若爾，離作者則無罪福。汝先說諸法不空，是事不然。復次：」
破壞眾因緣法的空義，才會破壞世俗及其餘一切法 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034b14–0034b15〕：「汝破一切法，諸因緣空義，則破於世俗，諸餘所有法。」
青目重申若破眾因緣法的第一空義，便破一切世俗法 T30n1564青目釋〔0034b16–0034b17〕：「汝若破眾因緣法第一空義者，則破一切世俗法。何以故？」
若破空義，便無所作，反成無作而有作、不作而名作者 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034b18–0034b19〕：「若破於空義，即應無所作；無作而有作，不作名作者。」
青目說破空會造成果無作無因、不作而作、作者無所作，以及離作者另有業果受者等過 T30n1564青目釋〔0034b20–0034b23〕：「若破空義，則一切果皆無作無因，又不作而作，又一切作者不應有所作，又離作者應有業、有果報、有受者。但是事皆不然，是故不應破空。復次：」
若世間種種相有決定性，便應不生不滅、常住不壞 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034b24–0034b25〕：「若有決定性，世間種種相，則不生不滅，常住而不壞。」
青目以天、人、畜生與萬物現見生滅變易，反證它們沒有不可變的實性 T30n1564青目釋〔0034b26–0034b29〕：「若諸法有定性，則世間種種相，天、人、畜生、萬物，皆應不生不滅常住不壞。何以故？有實性不可變異故。而現見萬物各有變異相生滅變易，是故不應有定性。復次：」
若沒有空，未得者不能後得，也沒有斷煩惱與苦盡 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034c01–0034c02〕：「若無有空者，未得不應得，亦無斷煩惱，亦無苦盡事。」
青目說無空則世出世功德未得者不得，煩惱不能斷，苦也不能盡，因為性已決定 T30n1564青目釋〔0034c03–0034c05〕：「若無有空法者，則世間、出世間所有功德，未得者皆不應得，亦不應有斷煩惱者，亦無苦盡。何以故？以性定故。」
經中說見因緣法就是能見佛，也能見苦集滅道 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034c06–0034c07〕：「是故經中說，若見因緣法，則為能見佛，見苦集滅道。」
青目說見一切法從眾緣生便見佛法身、增益智慧、見四諦、得四果、滅苦惱；破空反而自破三寶 T30n1564青目釋〔0034c08–0034c12〕：「若人見一切法從眾緣生，是人即能見佛法身，增益智慧，能見四聖諦苦集滅道，見四聖諦得四果滅諸苦惱，是故不應破空義。若破空義則破因緣法，破因緣法則破三寶，若破三寶則為自破。」
《般若燈論釋》分世俗顛倒所實與聖者所見性空，並說不依二諦不得涅槃。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0125b08–0125b16〕：「釋曰：世俗諦者，一切諸法無生性空。而眾生顛倒故妄生執著，於世間為實。諸賢聖了達世間顛倒性故，知一切法皆空無自性，於聖人是第一義諦，亦名為實。佛為眾生依二諦說。云何為第一義諦？謂普過一切言語道故。一切小乘所分別者，令離一切分別因故。復次若無世諦，不能證得第一義諦，以是故，煩惱及生等滅者是涅槃相。若不依第一義諦，涅槃之道終不可得。」
《般若燈論釋》說緣起法第一義中自體無起，依世諦故有起，所謂空即自體空。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0126b01–0126b03〕：「所有從緣起者，第一義中自體無起，依世諦故有眼等起。我說此起空者，謂自體空故。」
《般若燈論釋》說見因緣法即能見佛、見聖諦、得聖果並滅煩惱。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0127c28–0127c29〕：「若見因緣法，是人能見佛，亦見聖諦，能得聖果，滅諸煩惱。」
三、諸家異釋（吉藏專疏）
吉藏說封執取空相正是不知空義。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0150a26–0150a27〕：「汝封執取空相，故不知空義。」
吉藏說空亦復空故非空非有，由第一義空而世諦與一切法得成。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0151c10–0151c15〕：「二偈上半明由空故一切法成，顯論主無過；下半明無空義一切不成，顯外人有失。問：云何由空一切成耶？答：前偈空亦復空，則是非空非有；今明非空非有，空有得成，故云一切成。又由第一義空故有世諦，故二諦成，則一切成；若無空則第一義不成，則世諦亦不成，」
吉藏以緣生無自性為空、依緣施設為假名、非有非空為中道。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0152b13–0152b22〕：「緣生法是於三是：一因緣生法是畢竟空。所以然者，若有自性則不從因緣，既從因緣生即是無自性，所以是空。亦為是假名者，示第二是，明因緣生法亦是假名。所以秤假者，前明因緣生法我說是空，然因緣既本不有，今亦不空，非空非有，不知何以目之，故假名說有亦假名說空。亦是中道義者，示第三是，明因緣生法亦是中道。因緣生法無有自性故空，所以非有；既其非有亦復非空，非有非空故名中道。」
四、名相
二諦是世俗諦與第一義諦；見斷證修是見苦、斷集、證滅、修道；四向四果合為八賢聖；空指緣生法無自性，假名指依緣施設，中道指不住自性有與斷無。
五、科判
本品依次展開總難、空義與二諦、空故一切成、四諦反證、修證三寶、佛與菩提、罪福果報，以及世間變異與見因緣即見佛。
六、關中舊學·譯史
本品署龍樹造、青目釋、鳩摩羅什譯；清辨本 T30n1566〔0124b01〕題為〈觀聖諦品第二十四〉。安慧本 T30n1567〔0156b28〕的〈觀生死品〉是第十一品，現存漢譯止於第十三品，本品闕傳。
七、唯識軸互讀（空有）
本品以由不見至見、未斷至斷、未證至證、未修至修、未得至得，反證諸法自性不決定；不以後世種性或心識模型補入根本文。
八、系內餘論互讀
本品在自身問答中已由緣起無自性說到二諦、涅槃、罪福果報與斷惑；本目不另以其他品的義理回寫本品。
九、校本定位
| 用途 | 書證與範圍 |
|---|---|
| 根本論頌與青目釋 | T30n1564〔0032b12–0034c12〕 |
| 清辨系異釋 | T30n1566〔0124b01–0128a01〕 |
| 安慧系異釋 | T30n1567 漢譯止於第十三品，本品無傳 |
| 吉藏逐文疏 | T42n1824 同品 |
Textual Collation
The base text for this chapter is the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō T30n1564〔0032b12–0034c12〕. Following Kumārajīva’s recension, the main text preserves the distinct voices of the objector, Nāgārjuna’s verses, and Qingmu’s commentary. Bhāviveka’s recension T30n1566〔0124b01〕titles it “Examination of the Noble Truths, Chapter Twenty-Four.” Sthiramati’s recension T30n1567〔0156b28〕has “Examination of Saṃsāra” as chapter eleven; its extant Chinese translation ends with chapter thirteen, so it does not transmit the present chapter and cannot supply its title.
Comparative Readings
Bhāviveka’s line T30n1566 preserves alternative explanations in the same chapter concerning the two truths, the intrinsic nonarising of dependently originated dharmas, and seeing the Buddha by seeing causes and conditions. The extant Chinese translation of Sthiramati’s line T30n1567 ends with chapter thirteen and does not transmit this chapter. Both are used only for comparative reading and are not blended into the main text of Kumārajīva’s recension.
At the chapter’s opening, the objector establishes the premise for the ensuing challenge to emptiness: eliminating the four inversions, penetrating the four truths, and attaining the four fruits of a renunciant. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary (the objector’s thesis)〔0032b12〕: 「問曰：破四顛倒，通達四諦，得四沙門果。」 tr. “The objector says: by eliminating the four inversions, one penetrates the four truths and attains the four fruits of a renunciant.”
The objector’s verse maintains that if everything is empty, the absence of arising and cessation would cancel the four truths; seeing, severing, realizing, and cultivating; the four progressions and four fruits; the eight noble persons; and the Three Jewels. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse (the objector’s thesis)〔0032b13–0032b22〕: 「若一切皆空，無生亦無滅，如是則無有，四聖諦之法。以無四諦故，見苦與斷集，證滅及修道，如是事皆無。以是事無故，則無四道果；無有四果故，得向者亦無。若無八賢聖，則無有僧寶；以無四諦故，亦無有法寶；以無法僧寶，亦無有佛寶。如是說空者，是則破三寶。」 tr. “If everything is empty, there is neither arising nor cessation; consequently, the four noble truths do not exist. Because the four truths do not exist, seeing suffering, severing origin, realizing cessation, and cultivating the path are all absent. Because these are absent, the four fruits of the path do not exist; because the four fruits do not exist, those attaining and progressing toward them do not exist. Without the eight noble persons, there is no Jewel of the Saṅgha; without the four truths, there is no Jewel of the Dharma; without the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha, there is no Jewel of the Buddha. Thus one who teaches emptiness destroys the Three Jewels.”
Qingmu restates the objector’s account of origin as cause and suffering as result, and of the path as cause and cessation as result, then proceeds through seeing, severing, realizing, and cultivating and the eight persons progressing toward and attaining the fruits to the disappearance of the Jewels of Dharma, Saṅgha, and Buddha. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary (the objector’s thesis)〔0032b23–0032c05〕: 「若一切世間皆空無所有者，即應無生無滅。以無生無滅故，則無四聖諦。何以故？從集諦生苦諦，集諦是因、苦諦是果。滅苦集諦名為滅諦，能至滅諦名為道諦。道諦是因、滅諦是果。如是四諦有因有果，若無生無滅則無四諦。四諦無故，則無見苦、斷集、證滅、修道。見苦斷集證滅修道無故，則無四沙門果。四沙門果無故，則無四向四得者。若無此八賢聖，則無僧寶。又四聖諦無故，法寶亦無。若無法寶、僧寶者，云何有佛？得法名為佛，無法何有佛？汝說諸法皆空，則壞三寶。復次：」 tr. “If every world is empty and wholly nonexistent, there should be neither arising nor cessation. Because there is neither arising nor cessation, there are no four noble truths. Why? The truth of suffering arises from the truth of origin: origin is the cause and suffering the result. The cessation of suffering and origin is called the truth of cessation; what reaches cessation is called the truth of the path. The path is the cause and cessation the result. Thus the four truths have causes and results. If there is neither arising nor cessation, there are no four truths. Without the four truths, there is no seeing suffering, severing origin, realizing cessation, or cultivating the path. Without these, there are no four fruits of a renunciant and no persons in the four progressions or four attainments. Without these eight noble persons, there is no Jewel of the Saṅgha. Since there are no four noble truths, there is no Jewel of the Dharma. Without the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha, how could there be a Buddha? One is called a Buddha by attaining the Dharma; without Dharma, where could a Buddha be? By saying all dharmas are empty, you destroy the Three Jewels. Further:”
The objector’s verse further claims that emptiness destroys cause and result, demerit and merit, and every conventional dharma. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse (the objector’s thesis)〔0032c06–0032c07〕: 「空法壞因果，亦壞於罪福，亦復悉毀壞，一切世俗法。」 tr. “Emptiness destroys cause and result and also demerit and merit; moreover, it utterly destroys every conventional dharma.”
Qingmu restates the objector’s claim that accepting emptiness destroys demerit and merit, their karmic results, and convention, and therefore that dharmas should not be empty. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary (the objector’s thesis)〔0032c08–0032c09〕: 「若受空法者，則破罪福及罪福果報，亦破世俗法。有如是等諸過故，諸法不應空。」 tr. “If one accepts emptiness, one destroys demerit and merit and their karmic results, and also destroys conventional dharmas. Because there are such faults, dharmas should not be empty.”
Nāgārjuna points out that the objector does not know emptiness, the reasons for teaching emptiness, or emptiness’s meaning, and therefore generates the objection through misunderstanding. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0032c11–0032c12〕: 「汝今實不能，知空空因緣，及知於空義，是故自生惱。」 tr. “You do not in fact know emptiness, the reasons for emptiness, or the meaning of emptiness; therefore you create distress for yourself.”
Qingmu expands this into three failures: not knowing the characteristic of emptiness, not knowing the reasons for which emptiness is taught, and not knowing emptiness’s meaning. Thus, not knowing things as they really are, the objector raises this challenge. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0032c13–0032c15〕: 「汝不解云何是空相？以何因緣說空？亦不解空義。不能如實知故，生如是疑難。復次：」 tr. “You do not understand what the characteristic of emptiness is, the reasons for which emptiness is taught, or the meaning of emptiness. Because you cannot know them as they really are, you raise this objection. Further:”
The Buddhas teach by relying on the conventional and ultimate truths; one who does not distinguish the two cannot know the true meaning of the profound Buddhadharma. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0032c16–0032c19〕: 「諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法：一以世俗諦，二第一義諦。若人不能知，分別於二諦，則於深佛法，不知真實義。」 tr. “The Buddhas rely on two truths when teaching the Dharma to beings: first, the conventional truth; second, the ultimate truth. If someone cannot know and distinguish these two truths, that person does not know the true meaning of the profound Buddhadharma.”
Qingmu says that because the world is inverted, it takes false dharmas to be real, whereas noble ones know their nature to be empty and unarisen as the reality of the ultimate. The Buddhas teach by relying on these two truths. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0032c20–0033a01〕: 「世俗諦者，一切法性空，而世間顛倒，故生虛妄法，於世間是實。諸賢聖真知顛倒性，故知一切法皆空無生，於聖人是第一義諦名為實。諸佛依是二諦，而為眾生說法。若人不能如實分別二諦，則於甚深佛法不知實義。若謂一切法不生是第一義諦，不須第二俗諦者，是亦不然。何以故？」 tr. “As for the conventional truth: the nature of all dharmas is empty, yet because the world is inverted, false dharmas arise and appear real to the world. Noble ones truly know the nature of inversion and therefore know all dharmas to be empty and unarisen; for noble ones, this is the ultimate truth and is called reality. The Buddhas rely on these two truths to teach beings. If someone cannot distinguish the two truths as they really are, that person does not know the real meaning of the profound Buddhadharma. If one says that the nonarising of all dharmas is the ultimate truth and that a second, conventional truth is unnecessary, this too is not so. Why?”
Without relying on the conventional truth, the ultimate cannot be attained; without attaining the ultimate, nirvāṇa cannot be attained. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033a02–0033a03〕: 「若不依俗諦，不得第一義；不得第一義，則不得涅槃。」 tr. “Without relying on the conventional truth, the ultimate cannot be attained; without attaining the ultimate, nirvāṇa cannot be attained.”
Qingmu says the ultimate can be articulated only through conventional speech. Without attaining the ultimate one cannot reach nirvāṇa; thus, although dharmas are unarisen, there are still two truths. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033a04–0033a07〕: 「第一義皆因言說，言說是世俗，是故若不依世俗，第一義則不可說。若不得第一義，云何得至涅槃？是故諸法雖無生，而有二諦。復次：」 tr. “The ultimate is entirely disclosed through words, and words are conventional. Therefore, without relying on convention, the ultimate cannot be spoken. If the ultimate is not attained, how could nirvāṇa be reached? Thus, although dharmas are unarisen, there are still two truths. Further:”
The dull-witted person who fails to contemplate emptiness correctly harms himself, like one unskilled in incantations or in catching a venomous snake. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033a08–0033a09〕: 「不能正觀空，鈍根則自害，如不善呪術，不善捉毒蛇。」 tr. “Unable to contemplate emptiness correctly, the dull-witted harm themselves, like one unskilled in incantations or unskilled in catching a venomous snake.”
Qingmu says that the dull-witted give rise to wrong views by failing to understand emptiness skillfully, like people harmed by a snake they grasp badly or by an incantation they execute badly. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033a10–0033a13〕: 「若人鈍根不善解空法，於空有失而生邪見。如為利捉毒蛇，不能善捉反為所害。又如呪術，欲有所作不能善成則還自害。鈍根觀空法亦如是。復次：」 tr. “If people are dull-witted and do not understand emptiness skillfully, they go astray regarding emptiness and give rise to wrong views. It is like catching a venomous snake for profit: failing to grasp it well, they are instead harmed. It is also like an incantation intended to accomplish something: if they cannot execute it skillfully, it instead harms them. The dull-witted person’s contemplation of emptiness is just like this. Further:”
The World-Honored One knew emptiness to be profound and subtle, beyond the reach of the dull-witted, and therefore at first did not wish to teach it. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033a14–0033a15〕: 「世尊知是法，甚深微妙相，非鈍根所及，是故不欲說。」 tr. “The World-Honored One knew this Dharma to have profound and subtle characteristics beyond the reach of the dull-witted, and therefore did not wish to teach it.”
Qingmu reiterates that because the Dharma is profound and difficult for the dull-witted to understand, the World-Honored One did not wish to teach it. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033a16–0033a17〕: 「世尊以法甚深微妙，非鈍根所解，是故不欲說。復次：」 tr. “Because the Dharma is profound and subtle and cannot be understood by the dull-witted, the World-Honored One did not wish to teach it. Further:”
Nāgārjuna says that the objector attributes to him the fault of clinging to emptiness, but those faults are absent from the emptiness he teaches. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033a18–0033a19〕: 「汝謂我著空，而為我生過；汝今所說過，於空則無有。」 tr. “You say that I cling to emptiness and therefore assign me faults; yet the faults you now allege do not exist in emptiness.”
Qingmu says that what is taught is the emptiness of nature and that emptiness itself is empty; hence the alleged fault of clinging to emptiness does not apply. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033a20–0033a21〕: 「汝謂我著空故，為我生過。我所說性空，空亦復空，無如是過。復次：」 tr. “You say that because I cling to emptiness, you may assign me a fault. I teach the emptiness of nature, and emptiness is itself empty; there is no such fault. Further:”
Precisely because emptiness has meaning, all dharmas can be established; without emptiness’s meaning, no dharma could be established. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033a22–0033a23〕: 「以有空義故，一切法得成；若無空義者，一切則不成。」 tr. “Because emptiness has meaning, all dharmas can be established; without the meaning of emptiness, nothing could be established.”
Qingmu explicitly says that emptiness’s meaning enables worldly and world-transcending dharmas to be accomplished, while without emptiness neither can be accomplished. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033a24–0033a25〕: 「以有空義故，一切世間、出世間法皆悉成就。若無空義，則皆不成就。復次：」 tr. “Because emptiness has meaning, all worldly and world-transcending dharmas are accomplished. Without the meaning of emptiness, none is accomplished. Further:”
The objector already possesses the fault within a thesis of determinate existence, but turns it toward emptiness, like a rider forgetting the horse he rides. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033a26–0033a27〕: 「汝今自有過，而以迴向我，如人乘馬者，自忘於所乘。」 tr. “You now possess a fault yourself, yet turn it back upon me, like a rider who forgets what he is riding.”
Qingmu says the objector fails to notice the fault in the thesis of existent dharmas and instead sees a fault in emptiness, like a rider forgetting the horse. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033a28–0033a29〕: 「汝於有法中有過不能自覺，而於空中見過，如人乘馬而忘其所乘。何以故？」 tr. “You possess a fault within existent dharmas but cannot notice it yourself, and instead see a fault in emptiness, like a rider forgetting what he rides. Why?”
To see dharmas as determinately possessing natures is to see them as having neither causes nor conditions. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033b01–0033b02〕: 「若汝見諸法，決定有性者，即為見諸法，無因亦無緣。」 tr. “If you see dharmas as determinately possessing natures, you thereby see dharmas as having neither causes nor conditions.”
Qingmu says that a dharma with determinate nature should neither arise nor cease and would not require causes and conditions; if it arises from causes and conditions, it has no intrinsic nature. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033b03–0033b07〕: 「汝說諸法有定性。若爾者，則見諸法無因無緣。何以故？若法決定有性，則應不生不滅，如是法何用因緣？若諸法從因緣生，則無有性。是故諸法決定有性，則無因緣。若謂諸法決定住自性，是則不然。何以故？」 tr. “You say that dharmas possess determinate natures. If so, you see dharmas as having neither causes nor conditions. Why? If a dharma determinately possessed a nature, it should neither arise nor cease. What use would such a dharma have for causes and conditions? If dharmas arise from causes and conditions, they have no intrinsic natures. Thus, if dharmas determinately possess natures, they have no causes or conditions. If one says that dharmas determinately abide in their intrinsic natures, this too is not so. Why?”
The theory of determinate nature destroys cause and result, agent, action, and the arising and cessation of all things. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033b08–0033b09〕: 「即為破因果，作作者作法，亦復壞一切，萬物之生滅。」 tr. “You thereby destroy cause and result, action, agent, and what is acted upon, and also destroy the arising and cessation of all things.”
Qingmu concludes that if dharmas possessed determinate natures, cause and result and all such matters could not be established. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033b10〕: 「諸法有定性，則無因果等諸事。如偈說：」 tr. “If dharmas possessed determinate natures, there would be no cause and result or other such matters. As the verse says:”
The verse says that dharmas born from many causes and conditions are precisely 「無」 tr. “absence”; they are also provisional names and the Middle Way. No dharma fails to arise from causes and conditions, so no dharma is not empty. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033b11–0033b14〕: 「眾因緣生法，我說即是無，亦為是假名，亦是中道義。未曾有一法，不從因緣生，是故一切法，無不是空者。」 tr. “Dharmas born from many conditions, I say, are precisely absence; they are also provisional names, and this is the meaning of the Middle Way. Never has there been a single dharma that did not arise from conditions; therefore no dharma is not empty.”
Qingmu says that what arises through the conjunction of conditions has no intrinsic nature because it belongs to those conditions, and hence is empty; emptiness too is empty. Provisional names are used only for guidance, and freedom from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence is called the Middle Way. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033b15–0033b22〕: 「眾因緣生法，我說即是空。何以故？眾緣具足和合而物生，是物屬眾因緣故無自性，無自性故空，空亦復空。但為引導眾生故，以假名說，離有無二邊，故名為中道。是法無性故不得言有，亦無空故不得言無。若法有性相，則不待眾緣而有，若不待眾緣則無法，是故無有不空法。汝上所說空法有過者，此過今還在汝。何以故？」 tr. “Dharmas born from many conditions, I say, are precisely empty. Why? A thing arises when many conditions are complete and conjoin. Because the thing belongs to those many causes and conditions, it has no intrinsic nature; because it has no intrinsic nature, it is empty. Emptiness too is empty. It is only to guide beings that one speaks by means of provisional names. Because this is free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence, it is called the Middle Way. Because this dharma has no nature, one cannot say it exists; and because even emptiness is absent, one cannot say it does not exist. If a dharma possessed a nature and characteristic, it would exist without awaiting conditions. Yet without awaiting conditions, there would be no dharma. Therefore there is no nonempty dharma. The fault you earlier alleged in emptiness now returns to you. Why?”
If every dharma were nonempty and possessed an intrinsic nature, there would be neither arising nor cessation and no four noble truths. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033b23–0033b24〕: 「若一切不空，則無有生滅，如是則無有，四聖諦之法。」 tr. “If everything were nonempty, there would be neither arising nor cessation; consequently, the four noble truths would not exist.”
Qingmu says that if each dharma possessed a nature and were nonempty, there would be neither arising nor cessation, and therefore the four truths could not be established. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033b25–0033b26〕: 「若一切法各各有性不空者，則無有生滅。無生滅故，則無四聖諦法。何以故？」 tr. “If every dharma individually possessed a nature and were nonempty, there would be neither arising nor cessation. Because there would be neither arising nor cessation, the four noble truths would not exist. Why?”
If suffering did not arise from conditions, suffering would not exist. Scripture says impermanence is the meaning of suffering, whereas suffering with determinate nature could not be impermanent. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033b27–0033b28〕: 「苦不從緣生，云何當有苦？無常是苦義，定性無無常。」 tr. “If suffering did not arise from conditions, how could suffering exist? Impermanence is the meaning of suffering, yet what possesses determinate nature is not impermanent.”
Qingmu says that suffering not born from conditions would not exist; if suffering possessed determinate nature and never relinquished itself, it could not possess the meaning of impermanence. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033b29–0033c02〕: 「苦不從緣生故則無苦。何以故？經說無常是苦義。若苦有定性，云何有無常？以不捨自性故。復次：」 tr. “Because suffering would not arise from conditions, there would be no suffering. Why? Scripture says that impermanence is the meaning of suffering. If suffering possessed determinate nature, how could it be impermanent? It would not relinquish its intrinsic nature. Further:”
If suffering already possessed determinate nature, it would not need to arise again from origin; thus refuting emptiness instead makes the truth of origin impossible. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033c03–0033c04〕: 「若苦有定性，何故從集生？是故無有集，以破空義故。」 tr. “If suffering possessed determinate nature, why would it arise from origin? Therefore origin does not exist, because the meaning of emptiness has been destroyed.”
Qingmu says that if suffering’s nature already determinately existed, it should not arise again; origin consequently loses its function. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033c05–0033c06〕: 「若苦有定性者，則不應更生，先已有故。若爾者，則無集諦，以壞空義故。復次：」 tr. “If suffering possessed determinate nature, it should not arise again, because it would already exist. If so, there would be no truth of origin, because the meaning of emptiness had been destroyed. Further:”
If suffering possessed determinate nature, it should not cease; clinging to determinate nature is precisely what destroys the truth of cessation. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033c07–0033c08〕: 「苦若有定性，則不應有滅。汝著定性故，即破於滅諦。」 tr. “If suffering possessed determinate nature, it should not cease. Because you cling to determinate nature, you destroy the truth of cessation.”
Qingmu says that if suffering possessed determinate nature, there could be no cessation, because what is called a nature cannot cease. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033c09–0033c10〕: 「苦若有定性者，則不應滅。何以故？性則無滅故。復次：」 tr. “If suffering possessed determinate nature, it should not cease. Why? A nature cannot cease. Further:”
If suffering possessed determinate nature, there would be no path to cultivate; if the path can be cultivated, this proves that it has no determinate nature. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033c11–0033c12〕: 「苦若有定性，則無有修道；若道可修習，即無有定性。」 tr. “If suffering possessed determinate nature, there would be no cultivation of the path. If the path can be cultivated, it has no determinate nature.”
Qingmu says that a determinately existent dharma is permanent and a permanent dharma cannot be increased; if the path can be cultivated, it has no determinate nature. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033c13–0033c15〕: 「法若定有，則無有修道。何以故？若法實者則是常，常則不可增益。若道可修，道則無有定性。復次：」 tr. “If a dharma determinately existed, there would be no cultivation of the path. Why? If a dharma were real, it would be permanent; what is permanent cannot be increased. If the path can be cultivated, the path has no determinate nature. Further:”
If the truths of suffering, origin, and cessation did not exist, the path that extinguishes suffering would have nowhere to lead. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033c16–0033c17〕: 「若無有苦諦，及無集滅諦，所可滅苦道，竟為何所至？」 tr. “If there were no truth of suffering and no truths of origin and cessation, where could the path that extinguishes suffering possibly lead?”
Qingmu asks where the path that extinguishes suffering could lead if the theory of determinate nature has already made suffering, origin, and cessation impossible. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033c18–0033c19〕: 「諸法若先定有性，則無苦集滅諦。今滅苦道，竟為至何滅苦處？復次：」 tr. “If dharmas already determinately possessed natures, there would be no truths of suffering, origin, and cessation. To what place where suffering is extinguished could the path that extinguishes suffering possibly lead? Further:”
If the nature of suffering were fixed, an ordinary person who did not see suffering before should not later come to see it. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033c20–0033c21〕: 「若苦定有性，先來所不見，於今云何見？其性不異故。」 tr. “If suffering determinately possessed a nature, how could what was not seen before be seen now? Its nature would not have changed.”
Qingmu says that if an ordinary person previously could not see suffering and the nature of nonseeing were fixed, that person should not be able to see it later. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033c22–0033c23〕: 「若先凡夫時不能見苦性，今亦不應見。何以故？不見性定故。復次：」 tr. “If, while one was previously an ordinary person, one could not see the nature of suffering, one should not see it now either. Why? The nature of nonseeing would be fixed. Further:”
If seeing suffering is made impossible by determinate nature, severing origin, realizing cessation, cultivating the path, and the four fruits are likewise impossible. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0033c24–0033c25〕: 「如見苦不然，斷集及證滅，修道及四果，是亦皆不然。」 tr. “Just as seeing suffering cannot be established, severing origin, realizing cessation, cultivating the path, and the four fruits likewise cannot be established.”
Qingmu treats each point in turn: what was not seen before cannot later be seen, what was not severed cannot later be severed, what was not realized cannot later be realized, and what was not cultivated cannot later be cultivated. Thus the four activities and four fruits are all absent. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0033c26–0034a03〕: 「如苦諦性，先不見者後亦不應見。如是亦不應有斷集、證滅、修道。何以故？是集性先來不斷，今亦不應斷，性不可斷故。滅先來不證，今亦不應證，先來不證故。道先來不修，今亦不應修，先來不修故。是故四聖諦見斷證修四種行，皆不應有。四種行無故，四道果亦無。何以故？」 tr. “Just as one who did not previously see the nature of the truth of suffering should not see it later, so too there should be no severing origin, realizing cessation, or cultivating the path. Why? The nature of origin was never severed, so it should not be severed now, for a nature cannot be severed. Cessation was never realized, so it should not be realized now, because it was never realized. The path was never cultivated, so it should not be cultivated now, because it was never cultivated. Thus the four activities of seeing, severing, realizing, and cultivating with respect to the four noble truths should not exist. Without the four activities, the four fruits of the path do not exist either. Why?”
If the four fruits of the path had fixed natures and were previously unattainable, they could not become attainable now. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034a04–0034a05〕: 「是四道果性，先來不可得；諸法性若定，今云何可得？」 tr. “The natures of these four fruits of the path have always been unattainable. If the natures of dharmas were determinate, how could they now be attained?”
Qingmu says that if the four fruits of a renunciant possessed determinate natures, what was not attained before should not be attained now; if attainable now, their natures are not determinate. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034a06–0034a07〕: 「諸法若有定性，四沙門果先來未得，今云何可得？若可得者，性則無定。復次：」 tr. “If dharmas possessed determinate natures, how could the four fruits of a renunciant, not attained before, be attained now? If they can be attained, their natures are not determinate. Further:”
Without the four fruits there are no persons attaining or progressing toward them; without the eight noble persons, there is no Jewel of the Saṅgha. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034a08–0034a09〕: 「若無有四果，則無得向者，以無八聖故，則無有僧寶。」 tr. “If the four fruits do not exist, there are no persons attaining or progressing toward the fruits. Because the eight noble persons do not exist, the Jewel of the Saṅgha does not exist.”
Qingmu says that if there are no four fruits, there are no persons attaining or progressing toward them, and without the eight noble persons there is no Jewel of the Saṅgha—although scripture explicitly calls the eight noble persons the Jewel of the Saṅgha. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034a10–0034a12〕: 「無四沙門果故，則無得果、向果者。無八賢聖故，則無有僧寶。而經說八賢聖，名為僧寶。復次：」 tr. “Because the four fruits of a renunciant do not exist, there are no persons attaining or progressing toward the fruits. Because the eight noble persons do not exist, there is no Jewel of the Saṅgha. Yet scripture calls the eight noble persons the Jewel of the Saṅgha. Further:”
Without the four noble truths, there is no Jewel of the Dharma; without the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha, there is no Jewel of the Buddha. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034a13–0034a14〕: 「無四聖諦故，亦無有法寶，無法寶僧寶，云何有佛寶？」 tr. “Because the four noble truths do not exist, the Jewel of the Dharma does not exist. Without the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha, how could there be the Jewel of the Buddha?”
Qingmu says that one attains nirvāṇa by practicing the four noble truths: without the four truths there is no Jewel of the Dharma, and without the Jewels of Dharma and Saṅgha there is no Jewel of the Buddha. Thus the theory of determinate nature destroys the Three Jewels. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034a15–0034a17〕: 「行四聖諦得涅槃法，若無四諦則無法寶，若無二寶云何當有佛寶？汝以如是因緣，說諸法定性，則壞三寶。」 tr. “By practicing the four noble truths, one attains the Dharma of nirvāṇa. Without the four truths there is no Jewel of the Dharma; without the other two Jewels, how could there be the Jewel of the Buddha? By asserting on such grounds that dharmas possess determinate natures, you destroy the Three Jewels.”
The objector retreats to unsurpassed complete awakening, maintaining that the ultimate path must exist and that one is called a Buddha by attaining it. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary (the objector’s thesis)〔0034a17–0034a19〕: 「問曰：汝雖破諸法，究竟道阿耨多羅三藐三菩提應有，因是道故名為佛。」 tr. “The objector says: although you refute dharmas, the ultimate path—unsurpassed complete awakening—must exist. Because of this path, one is called a Buddha.”
If Buddha and awakening each possessed determinate natures, there would be no Buddha by reason of awakening and no awakening by reason of a Buddha. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034a20–0034a21〕: 「汝說則不因，菩提而有佛；亦復不因佛，而有於菩提。」 tr. “According to your thesis, there could be no Buddha by reason of awakening, nor could there be awakening by reason of a Buddha.”
Qingmu says the theory of determinate nature makes the natures of Buddha and awakening permanently fixed, so neither should be a cause of the other. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034a22–0034a23〕: 「汝說諸法有定性者，則不應因菩提有佛、因佛有菩提，是二性常定故。復次：」 tr. “You say that dharmas possess determinate natures. There should then be neither a Buddha by reason of awakening nor awakening by reason of a Buddha, because the natures of both would be permanently fixed. Further:”
If a person did not previously possess Buddha nature, under the theory of determinate nature that person should not become a Buddha even through diligent cultivation of the path to awakening. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034a24–0034a25〕: 「雖復勤精進，修行菩提道，若先非佛性，不應得成佛。」 tr. “Even if one strives diligently and cultivates the path to awakening, if one did not previously possess Buddha nature, one should not be able to become a Buddha.”
Qingmu compares iron, which lacks the nature of gold and therefore never becomes gold despite refinement, to show how a fixed prior nature would cancel the possibility of becoming a Buddha. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034a26–0034a27〕: 「以先無性故，如鐵無金性，雖復種種鍛煉終不成金。復次：」 tr. “Because the nature was absent before, just as iron lacks the nature of gold and never becomes gold despite every kind of refinement. Further:”
If dharmas were nonempty and the natures of demerit and merit already fixed, no agent could perform demerit or merit and nothing else could be done. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034a28–0034a29〕: 「若諸法不空，無作罪福者，不空何所作？以其性定故。」 tr. “If dharmas were nonempty, there would be no one who performs demerit or merit. Since they are nonempty, what could be done? Their natures would be determinate.”
Qingmu says that because the natures of demerit and merit would already be determined and there would be neither doing nor agent, under the thesis of nonemptiness ultimately no one could perform demerit or merit. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034b01–0034b02〕: 「若諸法不空，終無有人作罪福者。何以故？罪福性先已定故，又無作作者故。復次：」 tr. “If dharmas were nonempty, ultimately no one could perform demerit or merit. Why? The natures of demerit and merit would already be determined, and there would be neither doing nor agent. Further:”
If karmic results do not arise within the causes and conditions of demerit and merit, results must exist separately from demerit and merit. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034b03–0034b04〕: 「汝於罪福中，不生果報者，是則離罪福，而有諸果報。」 tr. “You maintain that karmic results do not arise within demerit and merit. This would mean that various karmic results exist apart from demerit and merit.”
Qingmu says that if no karmic result exists within the conditions of demerit and merit, a result must appear without awaiting a cause and thus be a result apart from its cause. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034b05–0034b07〕: 「汝於罪福因緣中皆無果報者，則應離罪福因緣而有果報。何以故？果報不待因出故。」 tr. “If no karmic result exists within the causes and conditions of demerit and merit, karmic results should exist apart from those causes and conditions. Why? A karmic result would appear without awaiting its cause.”
The objector concedes that no wholesome or unwholesome result exists apart from demerit and merit, but insists that such results arise only from demerit and merit. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary (the objector’s thesis)〔0034b07–0034b08〕: 「問曰：離罪福可無善惡果報，但從罪福有善惡果報。」 tr. “The objector says: apart from demerit and merit, there may be no wholesome or unwholesome karmic results; wholesome and unwholesome karmic results arise only from demerit and merit.”
If karmic results arise from demerit and merit, precisely because they arise from causes and conditions they can no longer be called nonempty. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034b09–0034b10〕: 「若謂從罪福，而生果報者，果從罪福生，云何言不空？」 tr. “If karmic results arise from demerit and merit, then since results arise from demerit and merit, how could they be called nonempty?”
Qingmu says that if no wholesome or unwholesome result exists apart from demerit and merit, the result is empty. Likewise, without an agent there is no demerit or merit, so the prior assertion that dharmas are nonempty cannot stand. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034b11–0034b13〕: 「若離罪福無善惡果，云何言果不空？若爾，離作者則無罪福。汝先說諸法不空，是事不然。復次：」 tr. “If no wholesome or unwholesome result exists apart from demerit and merit, how could the result be called nonempty? Likewise, without an agent there would be no demerit or merit. Your earlier claim that dharmas are nonempty is not so. Further:”
Destroying the meaning of emptiness in dharmas of many causes and conditions is what destroys convention and all other dharmas. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034b14–0034b15〕: 「汝破一切法，諸因緣空義，則破於世俗，諸餘所有法。」 tr. “If you refute all dharmas and the meaning of emptiness in what arises through many causes and conditions, you thereby refute convention and every other dharma.”
Qingmu reiterates that refuting the primary meaning of emptiness in dharmas of many causes and conditions refutes every conventional dharma. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034b16–0034b17〕: 「汝若破眾因緣法第一空義者，則破一切世俗法。何以故？」 tr. “If you refute the primary meaning of emptiness in dharmas of many causes and conditions, you refute every conventional dharma. Why?”
If emptiness’s meaning is refuted, nothing can be done; paradoxically there would be action without doing, and one who does nothing would be called an agent. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034b18–0034b19〕: 「若破於空義，即應無所作；無作而有作，不作名作者。」 tr. “If you refute the meaning of emptiness, nothing could be done. Yet there would then be doing without any act, and one who does nothing would be called an agent.”
Qingmu says that refuting emptiness makes every result unmade and causeless, produces doing without doing and agents who do nothing, and posits karma, karmic results, and recipients apart from agents. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034b20–0034b23〕: 「若破空義，則一切果皆無作無因，又不作而作，又一切作者不應有所作，又離作者應有業、有果報、有受者。但是事皆不然，是故不應破空。復次：」 tr. “If one refutes the meaning of emptiness, every result becomes unmade and causeless; there is doing without doing; no agent should perform anything; and karma, karmic results, and recipients should exist apart from an agent. But all these are incorrect. Therefore emptiness should not be refuted. Further:”
If the various features of the world possessed determinate natures, they should neither arise nor cease, but abide permanently and never perish. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034b24–0034b25〕: 「若有決定性，世間種種相，則不生不滅，常住而不壞。」 tr. “If determinate nature existed, the various features of the world would neither arise nor cease, but would abide permanently and never perish.”
Qingmu uses the manifest arising, cessation, and transformation of gods, humans, animals, and all things to prove that they do not possess an unchanging real nature. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034b26–0034b29〕: 「若諸法有定性，則世間種種相，天、人、畜生、萬物，皆應不生不滅常住不壞。何以故？有實性不可變異故。而現見萬物各有變異相生滅變易，是故不應有定性。復次：」 tr. “If dharmas possessed determinate natures, the world’s various forms—gods, humans, animals, and all things—should neither arise nor cease, but abide permanently and never perish. Why? A real nature cannot change. Yet all things presently seen each display transformation, arising, cessation, and alteration. Therefore they should not possess determinate natures. Further:”
Without emptiness, what has not been attained could not later be attained, and there could be neither severance of afflictions nor exhaustion of suffering. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034c01–0034c02〕: 「若無有空者，未得不應得，亦無斷煩惱，亦無苦盡事。」 tr. “If emptiness did not exist, what had never been attained should not be attained; there would be no severing of afflictions and no exhaustion of suffering.”
Qingmu says that without emptiness, worldly and world-transcending qualities not yet attained could never be attained, afflictions could not be severed, and suffering could not be exhausted, because natures would already be determined. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034c03–0034c05〕: 「若無有空法者，則世間、出世間所有功德，未得者皆不應得，亦不應有斷煩惱者，亦無苦盡。何以故？以性定故。」 tr. “If the teaching of emptiness did not exist, no worldly or world-transcending quality not yet attained should ever be attained. Nor should there be anyone who severs afflictions, and suffering could not be exhausted. Why? Natures would be determined.”
A scripture says that to see dharmas of causes and conditions is to see the Buddha and to see suffering, origin, cessation, and the path. T30n1564, Nāgārjuna’s verse〔0034c06–0034c07〕: 「是故經中說，若見因緣法，則為能見佛，見苦集滅道。」 tr. “Therefore a scripture says: one who sees dharmas of causes and conditions is able to see the Buddha and sees suffering, origin, cessation, and the path.”
Qingmu says that seeing all dharmas arise from many conditions is seeing the Buddha’s Dharma body, increasing wisdom, seeing the four truths, attaining the four fruits, and extinguishing distress. Refuting emptiness instead destroys the Three Jewels and oneself. T30n1564, Qingmu’s commentary〔0034c08–0034c12〕: 「若人見一切法從眾緣生，是人即能見佛法身，增益智慧，能見四聖諦苦集滅道，見四聖諦得四果滅諸苦惱，是故不應破空義。若破空義則破因緣法，破因緣法則破三寶，若破三寶則為自破。」 tr. “If someone sees that all dharmas arise from many conditions, that person can see the Buddha’s Dharma body, develop wisdom, see the four noble truths—suffering, origin, cessation, and the path—attain the four fruits, and extinguish every distress. Therefore the meaning of emptiness should not be refuted. To refute emptiness is to refute dharmas of causes and conditions; to refute dharmas of causes and conditions is to refute the Three Jewels; and to refute the Three Jewels is to refute oneself.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary distinguishes what convention takes as real through inversion from the emptiness of nature seen by noble ones, and says that nirvāṇa cannot be attained without relying on the two truths. T30n1566, Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0125b08–0125b16〕: 「釋曰：世俗諦者，一切諸法無生性空。而眾生顛倒故妄生執著，於世間為實。諸賢聖了達世間顛倒性故，知一切法皆空無自性，於聖人是第一義諦，亦名為實。佛為眾生依二諦說。云何為第一義諦？謂普過一切言語道故。一切小乘所分別者，令離一切分別因故。復次若無世諦，不能證得第一義諦，以是故，煩惱及生等滅者是涅槃相。若不依第一義諦，涅槃之道終不可得。」 tr. “Explanation: as for the conventional truth, all dharmas are unarisen and empty of nature. Yet because beings are inverted, they falsely generate attachments and take dharmas as real in the world. Noble ones comprehend the inverted nature of the world and know all dharmas to be empty and without intrinsic nature; for noble ones, this is the ultimate truth and is also called real. The Buddha teaches beings by relying on the two truths. What is the ultimate truth? It universally surpasses every path of speech. It causes one to leave behind the causes of every discrimination made by followers of the Lesser Vehicle. Further, without the conventional truth, the ultimate truth cannot be realized. Accordingly, the cessation of afflictions, birth, and the like is the characteristic of nirvāṇa. Without relying on the ultimate truth, the path to nirvāṇa can never be attained.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary says that dependently originated dharmas intrinsically do not arise in the ultimate, while arising is posited in reliance on conventional truth; what is called empty is empty of intrinsic being. T30n1566, Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0126b01–0126b03〕: 「所有從緣起者，第一義中自體無起，依世諦故有眼等起。我說此起空者，謂自體空故。」 tr. “Whatever arises from conditions intrinsically does not arise in the ultimate. In reliance on conventional truth there is the arising of the eye and so forth. When I say this arising is empty, I mean that it is empty of intrinsic being.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary says that seeing dharmas of causes and conditions is seeing the Buddha and the noble truths, attaining the noble fruits, and extinguishing afflictions. T30n1566, Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0127c28–0127c29〕: 「若見因緣法，是人能見佛，亦見聖諦，能得聖果，滅諸煩惱。」 tr. “If someone sees dharmas of causes and conditions, that person can see the Buddha and the noble truths, attain the noble fruits, and extinguish every affliction.”
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang says that rigidly grasping the characteristic of emptiness is precisely what it means not to know emptiness. T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0150a26–0150a27〕: 「汝封執取空相，故不知空義。」 tr. “Because you rigidly grasp and appropriate the characteristic of emptiness, you do not know the meaning of emptiness.”
Jizang says that because emptiness itself is empty, there is neither emptiness nor existence; because of ultimate emptiness, conventional truth and all dharmas can be established. T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0151c10–0151c15〕: 「二偈上半明由空故一切法成，顯論主無過；下半明無空義一切不成，顯外人有失。問：云何由空一切成耶？答：前偈空亦復空，則是非空非有；今明非空非有，空有得成，故云一切成。又由第一義空故有世諦，故二諦成，則一切成；若無空則第一義不成，則世諦亦不成，」 tr. “The upper halves of the two verses clarify that because of emptiness all dharmas are established, showing that the treatise master has no fault; the lower halves clarify that without the meaning of emptiness nothing is established, showing that the outsider is at fault. Question: how does emptiness enable everything to be established? Answer: the preceding verse says emptiness itself is empty, which is neither empty nor existent. Here, because neither emptiness nor existence obtains, both emptiness and existence can be established; hence everything is established. Moreover, because of ultimate emptiness there is conventional truth. Thus the two truths are established, and so everything is established. Without emptiness, the ultimate would not be established, and conventional truth would not be established either.”
Jizang identifies absence of intrinsic nature in conditioned arising as emptiness, establishment in reliance on conditions as provisional naming, and neither existence nor emptiness as the Middle Way. T42n1824, Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0152b13–0152b22〕: 「緣生法是於三是：一因緣生法是畢竟空。所以然者，若有自性則不從因緣，既從因緣生即是無自性，所以是空。亦為是假名者，示第二是，明因緣生法亦是假名。所以秤假者，前明因緣生法我說是空，然因緣既本不有，今亦不空，非空非有，不知何以目之，故假名說有亦假名說空。亦是中道義者，示第三是，明因緣生法亦是中道。因緣生法無有自性故空，所以非有；既其非有亦復非空，非有非空故名中道。」 tr. “Dependently arisen dharmas have three ‘are’s. First, a dharma born from causes and conditions is ultimately empty. Why? If it possessed an intrinsic nature, it would not arise from causes and conditions. Since it arises from causes and conditions, it has no intrinsic nature and therefore is empty. ‘They are also provisional names’ displays the second ‘is’: dependently arisen dharmas are also provisional names. Why call them provisional? The preceding statement clarifies that I call dependently arisen dharmas empty. Yet causes and conditions were never existent and now are not empty either. Being neither empty nor existent, they cannot be named; therefore both existence and emptiness are spoken of as provisional names. ‘This is also the meaning of the Middle Way’ displays the third ‘is’: dependently arisen dharmas are also the Middle Way. Because dependently arisen dharmas have no intrinsic nature, they are empty and therefore not existent. Since they are not existent, neither are they empty. Being neither existent nor empty is called the Middle Way.”
Terminology
The two truths are the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. Seeing, severing, realizing, and cultivating mean seeing suffering, severing origin, realizing cessation, and cultivating the path. The four progressions and four fruits together are the eight noble persons. Emptiness means that dependently arisen dharmas lack intrinsic nature; provisional naming means establishment in reliance on conditions; and the Middle Way means abiding neither in intrinsic existence nor in annihilating nonexistence.
Doctrinal Outline
The chapter proceeds through the general objection; emptiness and the two truths; the establishment of everything because of emptiness; a counterproof through the four truths; realization and the Three Jewels; Buddha and awakening; demerit, merit, and karmic results; and finally worldly transformation and seeing the Buddha by seeing causes and conditions.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
The chapter is attributed to Nāgārjuna as author, Qingmu as commentator, and Kumārajīva as translator. Bhāviveka’s recension T30n1566〔0124b01〕titles it “Examination of the Noble Truths, Chapter Twenty-Four.” Sthiramati’s recension T30n1567〔0156b28〕has “Examination of Saṃsāra” as chapter eleven; the extant Chinese translation ends with chapter thirteen and does not transmit the present chapter.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
By tracing the movement from not seeing to seeing, not severing to severing, not realizing to realizing, not cultivating to cultivating, and not attaining to attaining, this chapter proves that the intrinsic natures of dharmas are not determinate. It does not supplement the root text with later models of lineage-potential or consciousness.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
Within its own dialogue, this chapter already moves from dependent arising and the absence of intrinsic nature to the two truths, nirvāṇa, demerit and merit and their results, and the severance of afflictions. This register does not rewrite the chapter through doctrines from other chapters.
Position of the Editions
| Use | Witness and Scope |
|---|---|
| Root Treatise Verses and Qingmu’s Commentary | T30n1564〔0032b12–0034c12〕 |
| Bhāviveka-Line Alternative Commentary | T30n1566〔0124b01–0128a01〕 |
| Sthiramati-Line Alternative Commentary | The Chinese translation of T30n1567 ends with chapter thirteen; this chapter is not transmitted |
| Jizang’s Running Commentary | T42n1824, corresponding chapter |