中論 觀去來品第二
有人拿最平常的事來立論:走過的、沒走的、正在走的,三個時分都有作用看得見,所以有法。
龍樹沒有否認那條路,只把三個時分一格一格拆開。已去的去已經謝了,未去的去還沒有起;至於中間那一格,青目說:「去時名半去半未去,不離已去、未去故。」它是拿前後兩格合出來的名字,不是第三塊地。
器皿是果子做出來的
若說去時裡另有一個去,去時就成了先在的容器——「應去時中有去,如器中有果」。可是去時本來要靠去才叫得出來。硬這樣說,數目就多出一份:「若去時有去,則有二種去:」,跟著人也多一份,「一人有二去二去者」。
起步
「已去中無發,未去中無發, 去時中無發,何處當有發?」
走完了太遲,沒走時太早,而去時比起步更晚。青目一路拆到底:「發無故無去,無去故無去者」。
不動的那一個
去者不住,「去未息故」;不去者也不住,因為「因去法滅故有住,無去則無住」。住是從去的止息上得的名。青目把這一門推到穀芽與十二因緣:「相續故名行,斷故名止」。
只剩下相待
一也不是——「作者及作業,是事則為一」;異也不是——「不相因待,一法滅應一法在」。剩下的只有一句:「因去有去者,因去者有去」。
於是青目結道:「三法虛妄,空無所有,但有假名,如幻如化。」而他同時攔住另一頭:「不得言定有、不得言定無」。腳照樣走到門口;找不到的,是那個一定。
Someone establishes a thesis from the most ordinary fact: activity can be seen in all three phases—what has gone, what has not gone, and what is presently going—so dharmas must exist.
Nāgārjuna does not deny the road. He takes the three phases apart, one cell at a time. Going has subsided in what has gone and has not yet begun in what has not gone. As for the middle cell, Qingmu says: “The time of going names what is half gone and half not yet gone; it is not apart from the already gone and not yet gone.” It is a name assembled from the cells before and after, not a third patch of ground.
The Vessel Is Made by the Fruit
If another going exists inside the time of going, that time becomes a preexisting container—“going would be contained within the time of going as fruit is contained in a vessel.” Yet the time of going receives its name only through going. Insist on this, and the count increases: “If going exists at the time of going, there are two kinds of going,” and the person multiplies with it: “One person has two goings and two goers.”
The First Step
“There is no setting forth in what has gone, none in what has not gone, and none at the time of going. Where could setting forth occur?”
Once the walk is finished it is too late; before it begins it is too early; and the time of going comes later than the first step. Qingmu dismantles the sequence to its end: “Because there is no setting forth, there is no going; because there is no going, there is no goer.”
The Motionless One
The goer does not stand, “because going has not ceased.” The non-goer does not stand either, because “standing exists through the cessation of going; without going, there is no standing.” Standing is a name obtained from the cessation of going. Qingmu extends the gateway to grain and sprout and to the twelve links of dependent origination: “Succession is called continuation; interruption is called cessation.”
Only Mutual Dependence Remains
They are not identical—then “agent and action would be one.” They are not different—then “they would not depend on one another, and when one dharma ceased the other should remain.” What remains is a single statement: “The goer exists because of going, and going because of the goer.”
Qingmu therefore concludes: “The three dharmas are false, empty, and without possession of their own; they exist only as provisional designations, like an illusion or transformation.” At the same time he bars the opposite extreme: “They cannot be called determinately existent or determinately nonexistent.” The feet still walk to the doorway. What cannot be found is the “determinately.”
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷一〈觀去來品第二〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0003c06〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0003c06〕問曰:世間眼見三時有作:已去、未去、去時。以有作故,當知有諸法。
答曰:
「已去無有去,未去亦無去,
離已去未去,去時亦無去。」
已去無有去,已去故。若離去有去業,是事不然。未去亦無去,未有去法故。去時名半去半未去,不離已去、未去故。
問曰:
「動處則有去,此中有去時,
非已去未去,是故去時去。」
隨有作業處,是中應有去。眼見去時中有作業、已去中作業已滅、未去中未有作業,是故當知去時有去。
〔T30 0004a01〕答曰:
「云何於去時,而當有去法?
若離於去法,去時不可得。」
去時有去法,是事不然。何以故?離去法去時不可得。若離去法有去時者,應去時中有去,如器中有果。復次:
「若言去時去,是人則有咎;
離去有去時,去時獨去故。」
若謂已去未去中無去、去時實有去者,是人則有咎。若離去法有去時,則不相因待。何以故?若說去時有去,是則為二;而實不爾,是故不得言離去有去時。復次:
「若去時有去,則有二種去:
一謂為去時,二謂去時去。」
若謂去時有去,是則有過,所謂有二去:一者因去有去時;二者去時中有去。
問曰:若有二去,有何咎?
答曰:
「若有二去法,則有二去者;
以離於去者,去法不可得。」
若有二去法,則有二去者。何以故?因去法有去者故。一人有二去二去者,此則不然,是故去時亦無去。
問曰:離去者無去法,可爾。今三時中定有去者。
答曰:
「若離於去者,去法不可得;
以無去法故,何得有去者?」
若離於去者,則去法不可得。今云何於無去法中言三時定有去者?復次:
「去者則不去,不去者不去;
離去不去者,無第三去者。」
無有去者。何以故?若有去者,則有二種:若去者、若不去者。若離是二,無第三去者。
問曰:若去者去,有何咎?
答曰:
「若言去者去,云何有此義?
若離於去法,去者不可得。」
若謂定有去者用去法,是事不然。何以故?離去法,去者不可得故。若離去者定有去法,則去者能用去法;而實不爾。復次:
「若去者有去,則有二種去:
一謂去者去,二謂去法去。」
若言去者用去法,則有二過,於一去者中而有二去:一以去法成去者、二以去者成去法。去者成已然後用去法,是事不然。是故先三時中謂定有去者用去法,是事不然。復次:
「若謂去者去,是人則有咎,
離去有去者,說去者有去。」
若人說去者能用去法,是人則有咎,離去法有去者。何以故?說去者用去法,是為先有去者後有去法。是事不然,是故三時中無有去者。復次,若決定有去、有去者,應有初發。而於三時中求發不可得。何以故?
「已去中無發,未去中無發,
去時中無發,何處當有發?」
何以故三時中無發?
「未發無去時,亦無有已去,
是二應有發,未去何有發?
無去無未去,亦復無去時,
一切無有發,何故而分別?」
若人未發則無去時亦無已去;若有發當在二處:去時、已去中。二俱不然,未去時未有發故。未去中何有發?發無故無去,無去故無去者,何得有已去、未去、去時。
問曰:若無去、無去者,應有住、住者。答曰:
「去者則不住,不去者不住,
離去不去者,何有第三住?」
若有住、有住者,應去者住、若不去者住。若離此二,應有第三住。是事不然。去者不住,去未息故,與去相違名為住。不去者亦不住。何以故?因去法滅故有住,無去則無住。離去者不去者,更無第三住者。若有第三住者,即在去者、不去者中。以是故,不得言去者住。復次:
〔T30 0005a05〕「去者若當住,云何有此義?
若當離於去,去者不可得。」
汝謂去者住。是事不然。何以故。離去法,去者不可得。若去者在去相,云何當有住?去住相違故。復次:
「去未去無住,去時亦無住,
所有行止法,皆同於去義。」
若謂去者住,是人應在去時、已去、未去中住。三處皆無住,是故汝言去者有住,是則不然。如破去法、住法,行、止亦如是。行者,如從穀子相續至芽莖葉等。止者,穀子滅故芽莖葉滅。相續故名行,斷故名止。又如無明緣諸行乃至老死是名行,無明滅故諸行等滅是名止。
問曰:汝雖種種門破去去者、住住者,而眼見有去住。
答曰:肉眼所見不可信。若實有去去者,為以一法成?為以二法成?二俱有過。何以故?
「去法即去者,是事則不然;
去法異去者,是事亦不然。」
若去法、去者一,是則不然,異亦不然。
問曰:一、異有何過?
答曰:
「若謂於去法,即為是去者;
作者及作業,是事則為一。
若謂於去法,有異於去者;
離去者有去,離去有去者。」
如是二俱有過。何以故?若去法即是去者,是則錯亂,破於因緣。因去有去者,因去者有去。又去名為法,去者名為人,人常法無常。若一者,則二俱應常、二俱無常。一中有如是等過。若異者則相違。未有去法應有去者,未有去者應有去法,不相因待,一法滅應一法在。異中有如是等過。復次:
「去去者是二,若一異法成,
二門俱不成,云何當有成?」
若去者、去法有,若以一法成、若以異法成,二俱不可得;先已說無第三法成。若謂有成,應說因緣。無去無去者,今當更說。
「因去知去者,不能用是去;
先無有去法,故無去者去。」
隨以何去法知去者?是去者不能用是去法。何以故?是去法未有時無有去者,亦無去時、已去、未去。如先有人、有城邑,得有所起。去法、去者則不然,去者因去法成,去法因去者成故。復次:
「因去知去者,不能用異去,
於一去者中,不得二去故。」
隨以何去法知去者,是去者不能用異去法。何以故?一去者中二去法不可得故。復次:
「決定有去者,不能用三去;
不決定去者,亦不用三去。
去法定不定,去者不用三,
是故去去者,所去處皆無。」
決定者,名本實有,不因去法生。去法名身動。三種名未去、已去、去時。若決定有去者,離去法應有去者,不應有住,是故說決定有去者不能用三去。若去者不決定,不決定名本實無,以因去法得名去者,以無去法故不能用三去。因去法故有去者,若先無去法則無去者。云何言不決定去者用三去?如去者,去法亦如是。若先離去者決定有去法,則不因去者有去法,是故去者不能用三去法。若決定無去法,去者何所用?如是思惟觀察,去法、去者、所去處,是法皆相因待。因去法有去者,因去者有去法,因是二法則有可去處,不得言定有、不得言定無,是故決定知,三法虛妄,空無所有,但有假名,如幻如化。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋,姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷一〈觀去來品第二〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕=大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、問:三時有作,所以有諸法
〔T30 0003c06〕問的一方說:世間人用眼睛就看得見,三個時分都有作用在——已經去了的、還沒有去的、正在去的。既然有作用,就應當知道有種種法。
答的一方於是回答如下。
二、三時之中都沒有去
頌:已經去了的裡面沒有去,還沒有去的裡面也沒有去;離開已去與未去這兩分,正在去的那個時候也沒有去。
釋:已去裡面沒有去,因為它已經去過了。假使說離開了去,另外還有一個去的作業留在那裡,這件事不能成立。未去裡面也沒有去,因為那裡還不曾有去法。至於去時,這個名字說的是一半已經去了、一半還沒有去;它並不脫離已去與未去而另有一分。
三、問:正在動作的地方就有去
頌:正在動作的地方就有去,這裡面就有去時;它既不是已去,也不是未去,所以說去時有去。
釋:凡是有作業的地方,那裡就應當有去。眼睛看得見:去時之中有作業在,已去之中作業已經滅了,未去之中還不曾有作業。所以應當知道,去時裡有去。
四、去時離了去法就找不到
〔T30 0004a01〕答的一方回答。
頌:怎麼能在去時之中,另外安放一個去法?如果離開了去法,去時根本找不到。
釋:說去時裡有去法,這件事不能成立。什麼緣故?離開去法,去時就找不到。假使離開去法還另有一個去時,那麼去時之中就得另有一個去在裡面,像器皿裡裝著果子那樣。
再者:
五、去時若能獨自去,就不再與去相待
頌:若說去時有去,說這話的人就有過失;那是離開了去而另有一個去時,變成去時自己在去。
釋:假使主張已去與未去之中沒有去,而去時之中確實有去,這個人就有過失。如果離開去法另有一個去時,兩邊就不再互相依待。什麼緣故?如果說去時之中有去,那就成了兩個;而事實並非如此。所以不能說離開去另有去時。
再者:
六、去時有去就成了兩個去
頌:如果去時裡有去,就有兩種去:一個是被說成去時的那個,一個是去時之中的那個去。
釋:假使主張去時裡有去,這就有過失,也就是有兩個去:一個是因著去而有的去時,一個是去時之中所有的去。
問:就算有兩個去,有什麼過失?
七、兩個去就逼出兩個去者
答:
頌:如果有兩個去法,就有兩個去者;因為離開了去者,去法根本找不到。
釋:如果有兩個去法,就有兩個去者。什麼緣故?因為去者是因著去法才有的。一個人身上有兩個去、兩個去者,這不能成立。所以去時之中也沒有去。
問:離開去者就沒有去法,這一點可以承認;如今三時之中確實有去者。
八、沒有去法,哪裡來的去者
答:
頌:如果離開了去者,去法就找不到;既然沒有去法,又怎麼會有去者?
釋:如果離開去者,那麼去法就找不到。如今怎麼能在沒有去法的地方,說三時之中確實有去者?
再者:
九、去者、不去者之外沒有第三個
頌:去者並不去,不去者也不去;離開去者與不去者,沒有第三個去者。
釋:沒有去者。什麼緣故?若有去者,那就只有兩種:或是去者,或是不去者。離開這兩種,沒有第三個去者。
問:若說去者去,有什麼過失?
十、離了去法,去者找不到
答:
頌:若說去者去,這句話怎麼講得通?如果離開了去法,去者根本找不到。
釋:假使主張確實有一個去者在使用去法,這件事不能成立。什麼緣故?因為離開去法,去者就找不到。若是離開去者而確實有去法,那麼去者才能使用去法;而事實並非如此。
再者:
十一、去者用去法,又成兩個去
頌:如果去者有去,就有兩種去:一個是去者所去的去,一個是去法自身的去。
釋:假使說去者使用去法,就有兩重過失:在同一個去者身上有兩個去,一個是用來成立去者的去法,一個是由去者所成立的去法。去者先已經成立了,然後才使用去法,這件事不能成立。所以先前所說三時之中確實有去者在使用去法,這件事不能成立。
再者:
十二、先有去者後有去法,次第顛倒
頌:若說去者去,說這話的人就有過失;那是離開了去而另有去者,再說這個去者有去。
釋:若有人說去者能使用去法,這個人就有過失,因為那是離開去法而先有一個去者。什麼緣故?說去者使用去法,就是先有去者、後有去法。這件事不能成立。所以三時之中沒有去者。
再者,如果確實有去、有去者,就應當有一個最初的發動;然而在三時之中尋求這個發,都找不到。什麼緣故?
十三、三時之中都沒有初發
頌:已去之中沒有發,未去之中沒有發,去時之中也沒有發;那麼哪裡會有發?
為什麼說三時之中沒有發?
頌:還沒有發動的時候,既沒有去時,也沒有已去;如果說這兩處應當有發,那麼未去之中又哪裡會有發?既沒有去,也沒有未去,同樣也沒有去時;一切處都沒有發,還要分別什麼?
釋:若一個人還沒有發動,那就既沒有去時,也沒有已去。假使有發,應當落在兩個地方:去時之中、已去之中。這兩處都不能成立,因為未去的時候還不曾有發。未去之中哪裡會有發?發既然沒有,就沒有去;沒有去,就沒有去者;那麼已去、未去、去時,又怎麼會有?
十四、問住:那就該有住與住者
問:如果沒有去、沒有去者,那就應當有住、有住者。答:
頌:去者並不住,不去者也不住;離開去者與不去者,哪裡會有第三種住?
釋:如果有住、有住者,那麼應當是去者在住,或是不去者在住。若離開這兩者,就得有第三種住;這件事不能成立。去者不住,因為他的去還沒有停息;與去相違的才叫作住。不去者也不住。什麼緣故?是因為去法止息了才說有住;沒有去,就沒有住。離開去者與不去者,再沒有第三個住者。若有第三個住者,那也仍舊落在去者、不去者之中。因為這個緣故,不能說去者在住。
再者:
十五、去者若住,去與住自相違
〔T30 0005a05〕頌:去者假如當真在住,這句話怎麼講得通?如果離開了去,去者根本找不到。
釋:你說去者在住,這件事不能成立。什麼緣故?離開去法,去者就找不到。假如去者正處在去的相狀裡,怎麼會同時有住?因為去與住兩相違背。
再者:
十六、行與止同例
頌:已去、未去之中沒有住,去時之中也沒有住;一切行與止的法,都和去的道理一樣。
釋:假使說去者在住,這個人就得在去時、已去、未去之中住;三處都沒有住,所以你說去者有住,這不能成立。像破去法、破住法那樣,行與止也是這樣。所謂行,好比從穀子相續而至於芽、莖、葉等;所謂止,是穀子滅了,所以芽、莖、葉也滅。相續叫作行,斷絕叫作止。又好比以無明為緣而有諸行,乃至老死,這叫作行;無明滅了,所以諸行等也滅,這叫作止。
十七、肉眼所見不足以證成
問:你雖然用種種門破了去與去者、住與住者,可是眼睛明明看見有去有住。
答:肉眼所見的不可信。假使確實有去、有去者,那是以一法成立呢,還是以二法成立呢?兩邊都有過失。什麼緣故?
頌:去法就是去者,這件事不能成立;去法異於去者,這件事同樣不能成立。
釋:若說去法與去者是一,這不能成立;說是異,也不能成立。
問:說一、說異各有什麼過失?
十八、一與異兩門的過失
答:
頌:假使在去法上,就說它便是去者,那麼作者與作業就成了一個。假使在去法上,說另有一個異於它的去者,那就成了離開去者另有去、離開去另有去者。
釋:這樣說來,兩邊都有過失。什麼緣故?若去法就是去者,那就錯亂了,破壞了因緣——本來是因著去才有去者,因著去者才有去。再說,去叫作法,去者叫作人;人是常,法是無常。若說兩者是一,那麼兩者都應當是常,或都應當是無常。說一,就有這一類過失。若說是異,那就自相違背了:還沒有去法就該先有去者,還沒有去者就該先有去法,兩者不再互相依待;一法滅了,另一法還應當存在。說異,就有這一類過失。
再者:
十九、一異兩門都不成,還能怎麼成
頌:去與去者這兩者,若說是以一法成立、或以異法成立,這兩門都不成立,那還能怎麼成立?
釋:如果去者與去法是有的,那麼或是以一法成立,或是以異法成立;兩邊都得不到。前面已經說過,沒有第三種法可以成立它們。如果還要主張它成立,就該說出所憑的因緣。既然沒有去、沒有去者,如今再往下說。
二十、成就去者的那個去,去者不能再用
頌:因著去而知道有去者,這個去者不能使用這一個去;因為先前不曾有去法,所以沒有去者去。
釋:不論拿哪一個去法來認出去者,這個去者都不能使用這個去法。什麼緣故?這個去法還沒有的時候,並沒有去者,也沒有去時、已去、未去。譬如先有人、先有城邑,才會有出發這回事;去法與去者卻不是這樣,因為去者是因著去法才成立的,去法也是因著去者才成立的。
再者:
二十一、換用另一個去也不行
頌:因著去而知道有去者,這個去者也不能使用另一個去;因為在同一個去者之中,得不到兩個去。
釋:不論拿哪一個去法來認出去者,這個去者都不能使用另一個去法。什麼緣故?因為一個去者之中,得不到兩個去法。
再者:
二十二、決定與不決定都用不了三時之去
頌:確實有自體的去者,不能使用三時之去;不是確實有自體的去者,也不能使用三時之去。去法無論說有自體或說沒有自體,去者都用不了這三時之去;所以去、去者以及所去的地方,全都沒有。
釋:所謂決定,是說它本來就實有,不因去法而生。去法,是身體動作之名。所謂三種,是說未去、已去、去時。假使確實有一個自體的去者,那麼離開去法也應當有去者,而且不該有住;所以說確實有自體的去者不能使用三時之去。假使去者不是決定的——所謂不決定,是說它本來實無,是因著去法才得到去者這個名字——既然沒有去法,就不能使用三時之去。因著去法才有去者,若先前沒有去法,就沒有去者;那還怎麼能說不決定的去者能使用三時之去?去者是這樣,去法也是這樣。假使先離開去者而確實有去法,那就不必因著去者才有去法了;所以去者不能使用三種去法。假使確實沒有去法,去者又能拿什麼來用?
像這樣思惟觀察:去法、去者、所去的地方,這三法都是互相依待的。因著去法才有去者,因著去者才有去法,因著這兩法才有可去之處。不能說它們一定是有,也不能說它們一定是無;所以決定可以知道,這三法虛妄,空無所有,只是有一個假名,如幻如化。
Composed by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, commented upon by the brahmin Qingmu, and translated by Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin: Treatise on the Middle, scroll one, “Examination of Going and Coming,” Taishō canon T30n1564. Markers at the beginnings of passages, 〔T30 …〕, give Taishō page, column, and line anchors.
I. Question: There Is Activity in the Three Times, So Dharmas Exist
〔T30 0003c06〕The questioner says: People in the world can see with their own eyes that activity occurs in all three temporal phases—what has already gone, what has not yet gone, and what is presently going. Since activity occurs, one should know that various dharmas exist.
The respondent answers as follows.
II. There Is No Going in Any of the Three Times
Verse: There is no going in what has already gone, nor any going in what has not yet gone. Apart from these two phases, the time presently going contains no going either.
Commentary: There is no going in what has already gone, because it has gone already. The claim that an act of going remains there separately from the going cannot stand. What has not yet gone likewise contains no going, because the dharma of going has not yet occurred there. As for “the time of going,” that name denotes what is partly already gone and partly not yet gone; it does not exist as a separate phase apart from the already gone and the not yet gone.
III. Question: Going Exists Wherever the Activity Is Present
Verse: Going occurs wherever activity is occurring; within this is the time of going. Since it is neither already gone nor not yet gone, going exists at the time of going.
Commentary: Wherever an activity occurs, going should occur there. The eye can see that activity is present at the time of going, that activity has ceased in what has already gone, and that no activity has yet occurred in what has not yet gone. One should therefore know that going exists at the time of going.
IV. The Time of Going Cannot Be Found Apart from the Dharma of Going
〔T30 0004a01〕The respondent answers.
Verse: How can another dharma of going be placed within the time of going? Apart from the dharma of going, the time of going cannot be found at all.
Commentary: The claim that a dharma of going exists at the time of going cannot stand. Why? Apart from the dharma of going, the time of going cannot be found. If another time of going existed apart from the dharma of going, another going would have to be contained within that time, as fruit is contained in a vessel.
Furthermore:
V. If the Time of Going Could Go by Itself, It Would No Longer Depend on Going
Verse: Whoever says that going exists at the time of going incurs a fault: a time of going would exist apart from going, and the time of going itself would be going.
Commentary: Whoever maintains that going is absent in what has already gone and what has not yet gone, but truly exists at the time of going, incurs a fault. If a time of going existed apart from the dharma of going, the two would no longer depend on one another. Why? To say that going exists at the time of going yields two goings, which is not the case. Therefore one cannot say that a time of going exists apart from going.
Furthermore:
VI. Going at the Time of Going Produces Two Goings
Verse: If going exists at the time of going, there are two goings: one by which something is called the time of going, and another going contained within that time.
Commentary: To maintain that going exists at the time of going incurs the fault of two goings: one is the going on account of which there is a time of going; the other is the going present within that time.
Question: Even if there are two goings, what fault follows?
VII. Two Goings Force Out Two Goers
Answer:
Verse: If there are two dharmas of going, there are two goers, because apart from a goer the dharma of going cannot be found.
Commentary: If there are two dharmas of going, there must be two goers. Why? Because a goer exists on account of the dharma of going. Two goings and two goers in a single person cannot stand. Therefore there is no going at the time of going.
Question: We can accept that no dharma of going exists apart from a goer, but goers certainly exist in the three times.
VIII. With No Dharma of Going, Where Could a Goer Come From?
Answer:
Verse: If the dharma of going cannot be found apart from a goer, how could there be a goer when no dharma of going exists?
Commentary: Apart from a goer, the dharma of going cannot be found. How, then, can one say that goers certainly exist in the three times where no dharma of going exists?
Furthermore:
IX. There Is No Third Kind Apart from the Goer and the Non-goer
Verse: The goer does not go, nor does the non-goer go. Apart from the goer and the non-goer, there is no third goer.
Commentary: There is no goer. Why? If a goer existed, there would be only two possibilities: a goer or a non-goer. Apart from these two, there is no third goer.
Question: What fault lies in saying that the goer goes?
X. Apart from the Dharma of Going, the Goer Cannot Be Found
Answer:
Verse: How can the statement “the goer goes” make sense? Apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found at all.
Commentary: The claim that a real goer employs the dharma of going cannot stand. Why? Because apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found. Only if a dharma of going truly existed apart from the goer could the goer employ it, but that is not the case.
Furthermore:
XI. If the Goer Uses the Dharma of Going, There Are Again Two Goings
Verse: If the goer possesses going, there are two goings: the going through which one is called a goer, and the going belonging to the dharma of going itself.
Commentary: To say that the goer employs the dharma of going entails a double fault: one goer would contain two goings, the dharma of going that establishes the goer and the dharma of going established by the goer. It cannot be the case that the goer is established first and only afterward employs the dharma of going. Thus, the earlier claim that a real goer employs going in the three times cannot stand.
Furthermore:
XII. A Goer Existing Before the Dharma of Going Reverses Their Sequence
Verse: Whoever says that the goer goes incurs a fault: a goer would exist apart from going, and then this goer would be said to possess going.
Commentary: Whoever says that the goer can employ the dharma of going incurs a fault, because a goer would exist before and apart from that dharma. Why? To say that a goer employs the dharma of going means that the goer exists first and the dharma of going later. This cannot stand. Therefore there is no goer in the three times.
Moreover, if going and a goer truly existed, there should be an initial setting in motion. Yet when this beginning is sought within the three times, it cannot be found. Why?
XIII. There Is No Initial Setting Forth in Any of the Three Times
Verse: There is no setting forth in what has already gone, none in what has not yet gone, and none at the time of going. Where, then, could setting forth occur?
Why is there no setting forth in any of the three times?
Verse: Before setting forth, there is neither the time of going nor what has already gone. If setting forth should occur in those two, where could it occur within what has not yet gone? There is neither going nor what has not yet gone, and likewise no time of going. If there is no setting forth anywhere, what remains to distinguish?
Commentary: Before a person sets forth, there is neither a time of going nor something already gone. If setting forth existed, it would have to occur in one of two places: at the time of going or in what has already gone. Neither can stand, because no setting forth has yet occurred in what has not yet gone. Where could setting forth occur in the not yet gone? Without setting forth, there is no going; without going, there is no goer. How, then, could there be what has already gone, what has not yet gone, or the time of going?
XIV. Question about Standing Still: Then Standing and a Stander Should Exist
Question: If there is neither going nor a goer, standing and a stander should exist. Answer:
Verse: The goer does not stand still, nor does the non-goer stand still. Apart from goer and non-goer, where could a third kind of standing occur?
Commentary: If standing and a stander existed, either the goer or the non-goer would have to stand. Apart from these two, a third kind of standing would be required, which cannot stand. The goer does not stand, because their going has not ceased, while “standing” names what opposes going. The non-goer does not stand either. Why? Standing is spoken of because the dharma of going has ceased; without going, there is no standing. Apart from goer and non-goer there is no third stander. If a third existed, it would still fall within goer or non-goer. For this reason, one cannot say that the goer stands.
Furthermore:
XV. If the Goer Stands, Going and Standing Contradict One Another
〔T30 0005a05〕Verse: How can the statement “the goer stands still” make sense? Apart from going, the goer cannot be found at all.
Commentary: Your statement that the goer stands cannot stand. Why? Apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found. If the goer is presently within the mark of going, how could standing exist at the same time? The marks of going and standing contradict one another.
Furthermore:
XVI. The Same Reasoning Applies to Continuation and Cessation
Verse: There is no standing in what has already gone or what has not yet gone, nor any standing at the time of going. Every dharma of continuation and cessation follows the same reasoning as going.
Commentary: If someone says the goer stands, that person must stand at the time of going, in what has already gone, or in what has not yet gone. Standing exists in none of the three, so the claim that the goer stands cannot be established. As the dharmas of going and standing are refuted, so too are continuation and cessation. “Continuation” is like the succession from grain to sprout, stalk, leaf, and so forth. “Cessation” is the ceasing of the grain, through which the sprout, stalk, and leaf also cease. Succession is called continuation; interruption is called cessation. It is also like ignorance conditioning volitional formations, and so on through aging-and-death: this is called continuation. When ignorance ceases and formations and the rest cease, this is called cessation.
XVII. What the Physical Eye Sees Is Insufficient as Proof
Question: You have refuted going and goer, standing and stander, through many gateways, yet the eye plainly sees going and standing.
Answer: What the physical eye sees is not trustworthy. If going and a goer truly existed, would they be established as one dharma or as two? Both sides entail faults. Why?
Verse: That the dharma of going is the goer cannot stand; that the dharma of going differs from the goer likewise cannot stand.
Commentary: To say that the dharma of going and the goer are identical cannot stand; to say they are different also cannot stand.
Question: What faults follow respectively from identity and difference?
XVIII. The Faults in the Two Gateways of Identity and Difference
Answer:
Verse: If the dharma of going were itself the goer, agent and action would be one. If a goer different from going existed within the dharma of going, going would exist apart from the goer and the goer apart from going.
Commentary: Both sides entail faults. Why? If the dharma of going were the goer, confusion would follow and causes and conditions would be destroyed: originally, the goer exists because of going and going exists because of the goer. Moreover, going is called a dharma and the goer a person; the person is permanent and the dharma impermanent. If they were one, both should be permanent or both impermanent. Identity entails faults of this kind. If they were different, the claim would contradict itself: a goer should exist before there is a dharma of going, and a dharma of going before there is a goer. They would no longer depend on one another, and when one ceased, the other should remain. Difference entails faults of this kind.
Furthermore:
XIX. If Neither Identity nor Difference Can Establish Them, How Else Could They Be Established?
Verse: If going and the goer cannot be established either as one dharma or as different dharmas, how can they be established at all?
Commentary: If the goer and the dharma of going existed, they would be established either as one dharma or as different dharmas. Neither can be obtained. As already explained, there is no third dharma through which they could be established. Anyone who still maintains that they are established should state the causes and conditions on which that establishment depends. Since there is neither going nor a goer, the inquiry now continues.
XX. The Goer Cannot Reuse the Going That Established the Goer
Verse: The goer known through going cannot employ this same going, because before the dharma of going existed, no goer went.
Commentary: No matter which dharma of going is used to identify a goer, that goer cannot employ the same dharma. Why? Before that dharma existed, there was neither goer nor time of going, already gone, or not yet gone. A person and a city, for example, exist before an act of departure can occur. The dharma of going and the goer are not like this, because the goer is established through going and going is established through the goer.
Furthermore:
XXI. Employing Another Going Does Not Work Either
Verse: The goer known through going cannot employ another going either, because two goings cannot be found within one goer.
Commentary: No matter which dharma of going is used to identify a goer, that goer cannot employ another dharma of going. Why? Because two dharmas of going cannot be found within one goer.
Furthermore:
XXII. Neither the Fixed nor the Unfixed Can Employ Going in the Three Times
Verse: A goer with a fixed body of its own cannot employ going in the three times; a goer without a fixed body of its own cannot employ it either. Whether the dharma of going is said to possess or lack a body of its own, the goer cannot employ this threefold going. Therefore going, the goer, and the place gone to are all absent.
Commentary: “Fixed” means that something truly exists from the beginning and does not arise through the dharma of going. “Dharma of going” names the body’s activity. “Threefold” means what has not yet gone, what has already gone, and the time of going. If a goer with a real body of its own existed, the goer should exist apart from the dharma of going and should never stand still. Therefore a goer with a fixed body cannot employ the threefold going. If the goer is not fixed—meaning that it did not truly exist beforehand and obtains the name goer only through the dharma of going—then without that dharma it cannot employ going in the three times. A goer exists through the dharma of going; without a prior dharma of going there is no goer. How, then, can an unfixed goer employ going in the three times? What holds for the goer holds for the dharma of going as well. If a real dharma of going existed before and apart from the goer, it would not need the goer in order to exist. Thus the goer cannot employ the three kinds of going. If no dharma of going truly exists, what could the goer employ?
Contemplate and examine in this way: the dharma of going, the goer, and the destination are three dharmas that depend on one another. The goer exists because of going, going exists because of the goer, and the place that can be gone to exists because of both. They cannot be called determinately existent or determinately nonexistent. One can therefore know with certainty that these three dharmas are false, empty, and without possession of their own; they exist only as provisional designations, like an illusion or transformation.
這一品開頭來問的人,並沒有講什麼玄理,他講的是最平常的事。「世間眼見三時有作」——世上的人睜開眼就看得見,三個時分都有作用在:走過的那一段、還沒走的那一段、正在走的這一步。既然作用是看得見的,有作用,就該有法。
這是一個很難反駁的立法。人可以懷疑一個看不見的靈魂,很難懷疑自己剛剛走過的那條路。
而龍樹並沒有去否認那條路。他接下來所做的,只是把三時這三個字,一格一格拆開來看。
走過的、沒走的、正在走的
頌一開口就把三格排出來:
「已去無有去,未去亦無去, 離已去未去,去時亦無去。」
青目的釋只有短短幾句,卻把三格都封住了。已去裡面為什麼沒有去?「已去故」——它已經去過了,去的作用在那裡已經謝了。若說那裡還留著一個去,那就是「若離去有去業」,把去業從去裡拆出來另放一份,這件事不能成立。未去裡面為什麼沒有去?「未有去法故」——那裡的去還不曾發生。
於是人心自然往中間躲:那就說去落在正在去的那一刻上。
而這一躲,正是這一品最要看清的地方。青目說:「去時名半去半未去,不離已去、未去故。」去時這個名字,本身是拿已去與未去合出來的——一半已經去了,一半還沒有去。它不是第三塊獨立的地。躲進去時,等於躲回剛剛已經看過的那兩格。
在去時裡再放一個去,數目就多出一份
問方於是把立場說得更硬:「動處則有去」——正在動作的地方就有去;已去中作業已滅,未去中作業未有,所以去只能在去時。
龍樹的回答先問一句最素樸的話:「云何於去時,而當有去法?」
要害在於去時是怎麼來的。去時不是先擺在那裡等去進來的一段時間,它是靠著現行的去法才叫得出這個名字。既然它是靠去才有的,就不能反過來當去的容器。青目用了一個很好懂的比方:若離去法還有一個去時,那就成了「應去時中有去,如器中有果」——器皿先在,果子後放進去;可是這裡的器皿,本身是果子做出來的。
而且,一旦說離去而有去時,兩頭就「則不相因待」了:去時自己能去,去者也不必再管它。
若硬要這樣說,數目就對不上。「若去時有去,則有二種去:」一個是用來成立去時的那個去,一個是被放進去時裡的那個去。同一件事被算了兩遍。去法一多,人也跟著多:「一人有二去二去者」。一個人走路,走出兩個走、兩個走的人來——沒有人會承認自己是這樣走的。
那麼把去者先立起來呢
問方換一條路:既然去法離不開去者,那就先承認三時之中確實有一個去者。
這條路上龍樹連下數頌,一頌堵一處。
第一處是離開去法去找去者。可是去者這個名字,本來就是從去上得來的;沒有去法的地方,說不出誰是去者。
第二處是把去者與去法都立起來,讓去者去使用去法。這樣一算,同一個去者身上又有兩個去——一個把他造成去者,一個給他使用。
第三處是次第上的顛倒。青目說得很直:「說去者用去法,是為先有去者後有去法。」先有一個現成的去者,然後他才開始去。可是不去的人並不叫去者,他要等去了才成其為去者。
還有一頌,是把人的兩端一起封死的:「去者則不去,不去者不去」,而且「無第三去者」。去者已經在去裡,他的去不是另外一件待作的事;不去者根本沒有去。除此之外,找不出一個既不算去者、也不算不去者的第三種人來擔任這件事。
第一步落在哪一刻
青目在這裡替讀者往前追了一步:「若決定有去、有去者,應有初發。」若真有一個自性的去,總該有一個起步的剎那可以指出來。
頌就在三時之中找這一剎那:
「已去中無發,未去中無發, 去時中無發,何處當有發?」
已去裡找不到,因為那時已經走完了;未去裡找不到,因為那時還沒有走;去時裡也找不到,因為去時本身要等去法有了才立得起來,它比起步還晚。
第二頌從反面再照一次:「未發無去時,亦無有已去」。還沒有起步的時候,去時與已去這兩塊地根本還不存在,怎麼能把起步安放在還不存在的地方?於是頌收成一句反問:「一切無有發,何故而分別?」
青目一路拆到底:「發無故無去,無去故無去者」,去者既沒有,已去、未去、去時這三個名字也就跟著落空。
人平常談一件事的開始,總以為時間先在那裡,然後事情在某一點上發生。這一段所看見的恰好相反:那一點,是事情自己劃出來的。
停下來的那個,也一樣
問方換了個方向:既然去不成立,那總該有住吧——不動的那個總是實的。
頌的答覆與破去同一個形式:「去者則不住,不去者不住」,離開這兩者也沒有第三種住。青目把兩邊的理由都說清楚了:去者不住,「去未息故,與去相違名為住」——他還在去,而住正是與去相反的那件事;不去者也不住,因為「因去法滅故有住,無去則無住」——住這個名字,是從去的止息上得來的,沒有去可止,也就沒有住可說。
住,並不是動走了以後剩下來的那一樣東西。它跟去一樣,是一個要靠對方才叫得出的名字。
青目接著把這一門推廣開去:「所有行止法,皆同於去義。」而且他舉的例子並不玄:穀子相續而生芽、莖、葉,這叫行;穀子滅了,芽莖葉也滅,這叫止——「相續故名行,斷故名止」。他還舉了更切身的一組:「又如無明緣諸行乃至老死是名行」,無明滅了諸行等也滅,這叫止。
一顆種子與一條生死,用的是同一把尺。
那就相信眼睛吧
問方最後亮出的,還是最初那張牌:種種門都破過了,可是眼睛明明看見有人在走、有人停下。
青目的回答只有六個字:「肉眼所見不可信。」
這句話容易讀重。他並不是說你沒看見身體在動;他問的是另一件事:你所看見的那個動,能不能證明有一個自性的去與去者?所以他緊接著給出兩條路要對方選:「為以一法成?為以二法成?」是一,還是異。
說一,就是去法即是去者。那麼「作者及作業,是事則為一」——走路這件事和走路的人併成同一件。青目說這是「是則錯亂,破於因緣」,因為本來是「因去有去者,因去者有去」,併成一件,就沒有兩頭可以相因了。他還從另一面看:「人常法無常」,去者是人,去是法;若二者是一,那就得兩個都常,或兩個都無常。
說異,麻煩更明顯。異就是各自成立、互不相干:「未有去法應有去者,未有去者應有去法」——走路的人可以先在那裡而完全沒有走,走也可以自己走著而沒有人在走。既然「不相因待」,那就「一法滅應一法在」,一個沒了,另一個照舊。
一也不是,異也不是;而這兩門之外,沒有第三種成立的方式。
兩頭都靠對方,所以兩頭都不是自己有的
再往下的兩頌,是把相待這件事直接說白。
「因去知去者,不能用是去; 先無有去法,故無去者去。」
認出他是去者的那個去,他不能再拿來用;因為那個去還沒有的時候,根本還沒有他這個去者。青目在此處給了一個很細的對照:「如先有人、有城邑,得有所起。」人和城可以先在那裡,然後才有出發這回事;但去者不是那樣的東西——「去者因去法成,去法因去者成故」。人是先有的,去者不是。
換一個去也不行:同一個去者身上,容不下第二個去。
末後一段,青目把兩種立場都給了名字。「決定者,名本實有,不因去法生。」決定的去者,是不靠去法就已經在的;而「不決定名本實無,以因去法得名去者」,不決定的去者,本身沒有,只是因去法而得名。前者若成立,離了去法他仍然是去者,那他就不該有停下來的一刻;後者本來就沒有自己的分,更談不上支配三時之去。順帶連去法自己也一併看過:「去法名身動」,它是身體動作之名,也不能離去者先成。
於是青目下了整品的結:「是法皆相因待」——去法、去者、所去處,三個都是互相依待的名字。而後緊跟一句要緊的話:「不得言定有、不得言定無」。
最後才落到那一句:「三法虛妄,空無所有,但有假名,如幻如化。」
假名不是空話。人照樣起身、照樣走到門口、照樣停下;只是這一整件事裡,找不到一個不靠別的而自己在那裡的去,也找不到一個不靠去而自己在那裡的去者。如幻如化說的正是這個:幻師變出來的人會走路,你看得見他走,卻不能在他身上找出一個走的人來。
讀這一品的人可以帶走什麼
一是留意『正在』這兩個字。人遇到過去與未來都靠不住的時候,總會退到當下這一刻,以為那裡總還有一點實的。這一品指出:那一刻本身,也是拿前後合出來的名字。
二是看清名字是從哪裡來的。去者從去來,住從去的止息來,所去處從二者來。日常裡的許多身分也是這樣得名的——作事的人、說話的人、走這條路的人。名字若先於事情立起來,多半就已經站不住了。
三是不必因為破而不走。青目自己說「不得言定有、不得言定無」。所破的是那個一定,不是那雙腳。
承衍:吉藏之鏡
以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論,只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。
吉藏《中觀論疏》先為本品立科:廣分七門,依所破而列——先以三時門破去法,次以三時門破去者,次破初發,次破住與住者,再以一異門、因緣門、定不定門破去與去者;處中則收為四門,依能破而名,作三時門破、一異門破、因緣門破、有無門破。這是疏家的科判,不是龍樹頌與青目長釋自署的篇章標目。
他又把本品一組名相收在動足之緣上安立:人靜坐時只是人,一動足才叫去者,此動稱為去法,將步之前叫未去,足所經處叫已去,取其現動叫去時,取其初動叫發,當步之動叫是去,餘步比照此動叫異去,足所履處叫去處;如此諸名都是眾緣和合而虛受,仔細觀察無一可得。在二去之過上,他從二去推到二時、二身、二色陰乃至二人。在破住一門,他說破住有兩重意思,一是先破動、次破靜,令人於行住坐臥四儀宛然處不落動靜;二是就住門再破去,住既破則求去之心亦息。在定不定門,他把兩端接到常斷與實假上判:定有即常,定無即斷;不因法而有的人是常人、實人,因法而有的人是無常人、假人。疏末他以幻行防止把破自性讀成斷無,說幻去宛然,不是定無;幻去非去,也不是定有。
這面鏡把本品接進了三論一系判釋的架構;其分科、名相安立與諸重責難是吉藏所增,不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判,各還其位。
The person who opens this chapter with a question offers no abstruse doctrine. He invokes the most ordinary fact: “The worldly eye sees activity in the three times.” Anyone who opens their eyes can see activity in all three phases—the stretch already walked, the stretch not yet walked, and this step being walked now. If the activity is visible, then where there is activity, there must be a dharma.
This is a difficult position to refute. One may doubt an invisible soul; it is much harder to doubt the road one has just walked.
Nāgārjuna does not deny that road. What he does next is simply take the three phases apart, one cell at a time.
Already Gone, Not Yet Gone, and Presently Going
The opening verse lays out the three cells:
“There is no going in what has already gone, nor in what has not yet gone; apart from the already gone and not yet gone, there is no going at the time of going.”
Qingmu’s explanation takes only a few sentences, but it closes all three. Why is there no going in what has already gone? “Because it has already gone.” The activity of going has subsided there. To say that another going remains would mean that “an act of going exists apart from going”—separating the act and setting another copy down beside it. That cannot stand. Why is there no going in what has not yet gone? “Because no dharma of going has yet occurred.” Going has not happened there.
The mind naturally retreats into the middle: then let going reside in the instant presently going.
That retreat is exactly what this chapter asks us to see. Qingmu says, “The time of going names what is half gone and half not yet gone; it is not apart from the already gone and not yet gone.” The name “time of going” is assembled from what has gone and what has not: half already gone, half not yet gone. It is not a third independent patch of ground. To hide in the time of going is to hide again in the two cells just examined.
Put Another Going Inside the Time of Going, and the Count Increases by One
The questioner hardens the position: “Going occurs wherever there is motion.” Going is present where activity is occurring. Activity has ceased in what has gone and has not yet begun in what has not gone, so going can only be present at the time of going.
Nāgārjuna begins his answer with the plainest question: “How could a dharma of going be present at the time of going?”
The key is how the time of going comes to be. It is not a span of time waiting there first for going to enter it. It obtains its name through the presently operating dharma of going. Since it exists through going, it cannot then become a container for going. Qingmu gives an accessible comparison: if a time of going existed apart from the dharma of going, “going would have to be contained within the time of going as fruit is contained in a vessel.” The vessel exists first and fruit is placed into it later—but here, the fruit itself makes the vessel.
Moreover, once a time of going is said to exist apart from going, the two “no longer depend on one another.” The time of going can go by itself; the goer need have nothing further to do with it.
Insist on this, and the count fails. “If going exists at the time of going, there are two kinds of going”: one establishes the time of going, and the other is placed inside that time. The same event has been counted twice. As soon as the dharmas of going multiply, people multiply with them: “One person has two goings and two goers.” No one would accept that walking produces two walks and two people walking.
What If the Goer Is Established First?
The questioner tries another route: if the dharma of going cannot be separated from a goer, concede first that a real goer exists in the three times.
Nāgārjuna answers with several verses in succession, each closing one opening.
The first looks for a goer apart from the dharma of going. Yet the name “goer” comes from going in the first place. Where no dharma of going exists, no one can be called a goer.
The second establishes goer and going together, letting the goer employ the dharma of going. Once again, the same goer has two goings—one makes him a goer, the other is there for him to employ.
The third exposes a reversed sequence. Qingmu says directly: “To say the goer uses the dharma of going is to place the goer first and the dharma of going later.” A ready-made goer exists first and only then begins to go. But a person who is not going is not called a goer; they must go before they become one.
Another verse closes both human poles at once: “The goer does not go; the non-goer does not go,” and “there is no third goer.” The goer is already established through going; their going is not a separate task still to be performed. The non-goer has no going at all. Apart from these, no third kind of person—neither goer nor non-goer—can be found to carry out the act.
In Which Moment Does the First Step Fall?
Qingmu now pursues the inquiry one step further for the reader: “If going and a goer determinately exist, there should be an initial setting forth.” If going possessed intrinsic nature, there ought to be a first instant that can be pointed out.
The verse seeks this instant in the three times:
“There is no setting forth in what has gone, none in what has not gone, and none at the time of going. Where could setting forth occur?”
It cannot be found in what has already gone, for the walk is complete there. It cannot be found in what has not yet gone, for there is no walking there. Nor can it be found at the time of going, because that time must wait for the dharma of going before it can be established; it comes later than the first step.
A second verse illuminates the point from the other side: “Before setting forth, there is no time of going and nothing already gone.” Before the first step, the two fields called “time of going” and “already gone” do not yet exist. How can the first step be placed in a field that does not exist? The verse ends with the question: “If there is no setting forth anywhere, why make these distinctions?”
Qingmu dismantles the series to its end: “Because there is no setting forth, there is no going; because there is no going, there is no goer.” Once the goer is gone, the three names already gone, not yet gone, and time of going become empty as well.
When we speak of an event’s beginning, we ordinarily assume that time is already there and the event occurs at one of its points. This passage sees the reverse: the event itself draws the point.
The One Who Stops Is the Same
The questioner changes direction. If going cannot be established, then surely standing still can—the motionless thing, at least, must be real.
The verse answers in the same form used to refute going: “The goer does not stand, nor does the non-goer stand,” and apart from them there is no third standing. Qingmu explains both sides. The goer does not stand “because going has not ceased; what opposes going is called standing.” They are still going, while standing is precisely its opposite. The non-goer does not stand either, because “standing exists because the dharma of going ceases; without going, there is no standing.” The name standing comes from the cessation of going. If no going ceases, there is no standing to name.
Standing is not the thing left behind once motion has departed. Like going, it is a name that can be spoken only through its counterpart.
Qingmu then extends this gateway: “Every dharma of continuation and cessation follows the same reasoning as going.” His examples are not obscure. A grain continues into sprout, stalk, and leaf: this is continuation. The grain ceases, and therefore sprout, stalk, and leaf also cease: this is cessation—“succession is called continuation; interruption is called cessation.” He gives a still more intimate sequence: “Ignorance conditions formations, and so on through aging-and-death: this is called continuation.” When ignorance ceases and formations and the rest cease, that is cessation.
One seed and one cycle of birth and death are measured with the same rule.
Then Trust the Eye
The questioner’s final card is the first one again. Every gateway has been refuted, yet the eye plainly sees people walking and stopping.
Qingmu answers in six characters: “What the physical eye sees is not trustworthy.”
It is easy to make this sentence too heavy. He is not saying that you failed to see a body moving. He asks something else: can the movement you see prove a going and a goer with intrinsic nature? He immediately presents two routes from which the opponent must choose: “Are they established through one dharma or through two?” Identity or difference.
Identity means that the dharma of going is the goer. Then “agent and action would be one”: walking and the person walking collapse into the same thing. Qingmu says this “causes confusion and destroys causes and conditions,” because originally “the goer exists because of going and going because of the goer.” Merge them and there are no longer two ends that can condition one another. He also looks from another side: “The person is permanent, the dharma impermanent.” The goer is a person, going a dharma. If both are one, both must be permanent or both impermanent.
Difference causes a more obvious difficulty. Difference means each is established independently: “Before the dharma of going exists, the goer should exist; before the goer exists, the dharma of going should exist.” A person who walks could be present with no walking at all, and walking could walk by itself with no one walking. Since they “do not depend on one another,” “when one dharma ceases, the other should remain.” One disappears and the other continues unchanged.
They are neither identical nor different, and outside these two gateways there is no third way to establish them.
Each End Depends on the Other; Neither Exists from Its Own Side
The next two verses state mutual dependence directly.
“The goer known through going cannot employ this same going; before the dharma of going existed, no goer went.”
The goer cannot then employ the going through which they were recognized as a goer, because before that going there was no such goer. Qingmu gives a subtle contrast: “When a person and a city exist first, setting forth can occur.” Person and city can already be there, and only then can departure take place. A goer is not something like that: “The goer is established through the dharma of going, and the dharma of going through the goer.” A person exists first. A goer does not.
Substituting another going also fails. One goer has no room for a second going.
In the final passage Qingmu names both positions. “Fixed means truly existent from the beginning, not produced through the dharma of going.” A fixed goer is already present without depending on going. “Unfixed means not truly existent from the beginning, but obtaining the name goer through the dharma of going.” An unfixed goer has no share of its own and is merely named through going. If the former stood, he would remain a goer apart from going and could never stop. The latter has no independent part to begin with and therefore cannot command going in the three times. The dharma of going is examined along with him: “Dharma of going names the body’s motion.” It too cannot be established before and apart from a goer.
Qingmu then gives the chapter’s conclusion: “These dharmas all depend on one another.” Going, goer, and destination are all mutually dependent names. Immediately follows the crucial statement: “They cannot be called determinately existent or determinately nonexistent.”
Only then does he arrive at the final sentence: “The three dharmas are false, empty, and without possession of their own; they exist only as provisional designations, like an illusion or transformation.”
A provisional designation is not empty talk. A person still rises, walks to the doorway, and stops. Yet within the whole event no going can be found that stands there without depending on anything else, and no goer can be found who stands there without depending on going. “Like an illusion or transformation” means precisely this: the person conjured by an illusionist walks, and you see him walk, yet no one who walks can be extracted from him.
What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?
First, notice the word “presently.” When past and future both prove unreliable, the mind retreats to the present instant, imagining that something real must remain there. This chapter shows that the instant itself is a name assembled from before and after.
Second, see where a name comes from. The goer comes from going, standing from the cessation of going, and the destination from both. Many everyday identities arise in the same way—the person who acts, the person who speaks, the person who walks this road. When a name is established before the event, it usually has already lost its footing.
Third, do not stop walking because walking has been refuted. Qingmu himself says, “They cannot be called determinately existent or determinately nonexistent.” What is refuted is the “determinately,” not your two feet.
Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror
The preceding is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows lets the Sui–Tang Three Treatises tradition illuminate it from the side. The mirror is not the treatise; it offers another way to read the same verses.
Jizang’s Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle first classifies the chapter. In a broad division it has seven gateways named after what they refute: a three-time gateway refuting going; a three-time gateway refuting the goer; then refutations of initial setting forth, standing and stander, going and goer through identity and difference, through causes and conditions, and through fixed and unfixed. In an intermediate division he condenses these into four gateways named after the means of refutation: the three times, identity and difference, causes and conditions, and existence and nonexistence. These are a commentator’s divisions, not chapter headings supplied by Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s prose.
He also establishes the chapter’s terms through the condition of moving a foot. A person seated still is simply a person; once the foot moves, the person is called a goer and that motion a dharma of going. Before the step is “not yet gone”; the place crossed by the foot is “already gone”; its present motion is the “time of going”; its initial motion is “setting forth”; the motion of the current step is “this going”; other steps compared with it are “other going”; and the place on which the foot falls is “destination.” All these names are falsely received through the conjunction of many conditions; examined closely, not one can be found. From the fault of two goings he infers two times, two bodies, two form aggregates, and ultimately two persons. In refuting standing he gives two purposes: first refute motion and then stillness, so that amid the evident four postures of walking, standing, sitting, and lying down one falls into neither; then, through standing, refute going again, so that once standing is refuted the mind that seeks going also rests. In the fixed–unfixed gateway he connects the two extremes to permanence and annihilation, real and provisional: fixed existence is permanence and fixed nonexistence annihilation; a person existing independently of dharmas is permanent and real, while a person existing through dharmas is impermanent and provisional. The commentary ends with illusory going to prevent refutation of intrinsic nature from being read as annihilating absence: illusory going is plainly present and therefore not fixed nonexistence; illusory going is not real going and therefore not fixed existence.
This mirror connects the chapter to the Three Treatises tradition’s interpretive structure. Its divisions, terminology, and layers of challenge are Jizang’s additions, not the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s long commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
底本單元為 T30n1564〈觀去來品第二〉〔T30 0003c06–0005c15〕。正文保存大正底本文字;宋、元、明三藏本原校只在本節陳列,不以異讀倒改原典。原校共見下列二十五處異文:
| 位置 | 大正底本 | 原校異讀 |
|---|---|---|
| 0003c05 | 中論 | 中觀【宋】【元】 |
| 0003c05 | 觀去來品 | 論破去來品【宋】【元】;破去來品【明】 |
| 0003c05 | 二十五偈 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0004a04 | 法 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0004b02 | 若 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0004b02 | 去者 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0004b20 | 然 | 爾【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0004b20 | 是故三時中無有去者 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0004b22 | 中 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0004b26 | 以 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0004c10 | 事 | 皆【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005a03 | 者 | 去【宋】 |
| 0005a14 | 法 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005a15 | 穀 | 豰【元】 |
| 0005a25 | 過 | 咎【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005b03 | 為 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005b03 | 常 | 常故【宋】【元】;常去【明】 |
| 0005b04 | 俱 | 俱應【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005b10 | 若(第一處) | 應【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005b10 | 若(第二處) | 應【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005b16 | 去 | 去去【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005b18 | 起 | 趣【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005b29 | 本 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005c01 | 種 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
| 0005c02 | 者 | 無【宋】【元】【明】 |
品題「觀去來/破去來」與「二十五偈」有無,關涉目錄標示與傳本計數;正文中的省文、增字與同音異形,則多不改變本品論證骨架。此處一律唯錄不判;如需定奪,須另立校勘案,不能把某一本的讀法無標記地寫回讀者原典。
二、異釋對勘
本節按論證關節逐處拉取 T1566、T1567;同義處用來確認共同傳承,另有開展處則明標為異釋,不把清辨本、安慧本的長行倒稱青目釋。
(一)三時求去
T30n1564青目釋〔0003c06–0003c07〕:「世間眼見三時有作:已去、未去、去時。以有作故,當知有諸法。」此問以現見作用推定諸法實有,建立本品所答的立場。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0003c08–0003c09〕:「已去無有去,未去亦無去,離已去未去,去時亦無去。」已去之作用已謝,未去之作用未起。T30n1564青目釋〔0003c11–0003c12〕:「去時名半去半未去,不離已去、未去故。」去時也不離前兩分另有自體,這是本品第一門。
T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0060b07〕:「離已去未去,去時亦不受。」其長行隨即追問去時究竟是已去、未去,還是半去半未去;三分都不能立出獨立去時。T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0139c15〕:「離已去未去,去時亦無去。」三本在「無有去/不受」等譯語上不同,論證所向相應。
(二)去時、二去與二去者
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004a02–0004a03〕:「云何於去時,而當有去法?若離於去法,去時不可得。」T30n1564青目釋〔0004a04–0004a06〕:「去時有去法,是事不然。何以故?離去法去時不可得。若離去法有去時者,應去時中有去,如器中有果。」去時不能像先成之器般容受另一個去。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004a13–0004a14〕:「若去時有去,則有二種去:一謂為去時,二謂去時去。」去法先被用來成立「去時」,再於去時中另立去法,同一作用便被重計。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004a18–0004a19〕:「若有二去法,則有二去者;以離於去者,去法不可得。」兩個去法又逼出兩個去者。
T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0060c21–0060c26〕:「「若去時中去,復及此行去,則墮二去過,此義則不然。」釋曰:此謂於世諦中義不然故。復次偈曰:「若有二去法,則有二去者。」釋曰:何因緣故作如此遮?若有二法,則有二者。」T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0140a11–0140a12〕:「若去時有去,則有二種去:一謂有去時,二謂去時去。」兩部異釋都保存由二去推至二去者的壓力。
(三)去者與去法相待
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004a24–0004a25〕:「若離於去者,去法不可得;以無去法故,何得有去者?」去法不能離去者自立,去者也不能在無去法處先成。接下來「去者、不去者、第三去者」與「去者去」諸頌,都是反覆檢查這一相待。
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004a28–0004a29〕:「去者則不去,不去者不去;離去不去者,無第三去者。」去者之名已依去法,不去者正以無去相得名,兩類之外沒有一個不落有去、無去的第三主體。
其後「去者去」另經三重檢驗。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004b04–0004b05〕:「若言去者去,云何有此義?若離於去法,去者不可得。」先破離去而有去者。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004b09–0004b10〕:「若去者有去,則有二種去:一謂去者去,二謂去法去。」T30n1564青目釋〔0004b11–0004b13〕:「若言去者用去法,則有二過,於一去者中而有二去:一以去法成去者、二以去者成去法。去者成已然後用去法,是事不然。」再破以一去成者、另一去由者使用。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004b16–0004b17〕:「若謂去者去,是人則有咎,離去有去者,說去者有去。」T30n1564青目釋〔0004b18–0004b21〕:「若人說去者能用去法,是人則有咎,離去法有去者。何以故?說去者用去法,是為先有去者後有去法。是事不然,是故三時中無有去者。」末破先立去者、後加去法的次序顛倒。
T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0061a16–0061a23〕:「「離去者無去。」釋曰:汝言去者為去依止,以此依止有故,為去因者,是義不然。何以故?若未說因時,去則不成。此之過失,汝不得離。如偈曰:「離去者有去,是義則不然。」釋曰:若離去者,去則不成。如此句義,先已分別。是故偈曰:「若其無彼去,何處有去者?」」此處明說兩端都不能脫離對方成立。
(四)初發
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004b24–0004b25〕:「已去中無發,未去中無發,去時中無發,何處當有發?」若初發在已去,已經太遲;若在未去,去法尚未生;若在去時,則去時本身已依去法而立。
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004b27–0004c01〕:「未發無去時,亦無有已去,是二應有發,未去何有發?無去無未去,亦復無去時,一切無有發,何故而分別?」T30n1564青目釋〔0004c02–0004c05〕:「若人未發則無去時亦無已去;若有發當在二處:去時、已去中。二俱不然,未去時未有發故。未去中何有發?發無故無去,無去故無去者,何得有已去、未去、去時。」此處反向顯示:未發時連去時與已去都未成立,不能借已成時間安置初發。
T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0062b01–0062b07〕:「「已去中無發,未去亦無發,去時中無發,何處當有發?」釋曰:已去中無發者,謂去作用於彼已謝故。未去亦無發者,謂未行無去,去則不然。去時中無發者,謂已去未去等皆無去義,云何可說去時有去?如是三種俱無初發,是故偈言,何處當有發。」T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0140c19〕:「離已去未去,去時中無發。」兩釋同樣不在三時中另安一個自性開端。
(五)住、行與止
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0004c07–0004c08〕:「去者則不住,不去者不住,離去不去者,何有第三住?」T30n1564青目釋〔0004c09–0005a04〕:「若有住、有住者,應去者住、若不去者住。若離此二,應有第三住。是事不然。去者不住,去未息故,與去相違名為住。不去者亦不住。何以故?因去法滅故有住,無去則無住。離去者不去者,更無第三住者。若有第三住者,即在去者、不去者中。以是故,不得言去者住。」去者、不去者、第三住者三分皆不能留下自性住者。
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0005a10–0005a11〕:「去未去無住,去時亦無住,所有行止法,皆同於去義。」青目把這一門展至穀種相續及十二因緣:相續故名行,斷故名止;不是在去之外另立一個自性住。
T30n1564青目釋〔0005a14–0005a18〕:「如破去法、住法,行、止亦如是。行者,如從穀子相續至芽莖葉等。止者,穀子滅故芽莖葉滅。相續故名行,斷故名止。又如無明緣諸行乃至老死是名行,無明滅故諸行等滅是名止。」此處把行止義用明確擴到外在穀芽與內在十二因緣。
T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0062c16–0062c25〕:「「去者則不住。」釋曰:此謂第一義中立去者住,驗不可得。何以故?以去者動作故,譬如調達正行未息。若謂未去者住,是亦不然。如偈曰:「未去者不住。」釋曰:彼未去者以無去故,於世諦中彼去息故,名之為住。此義不成,以去無體故。復次惡見所持、邪執自在作如是說,欲得異住。如偈曰:「異去未去者,誰為第三住?」」T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0141b10〕:「所有行止法,皆同去義說。」三本都不讓住者成為動作停止後剩下的常體。
(六)去法與去者非一非異
T30n1564青目釋〔0005a18–0005a19〕:「問曰:汝雖種種門破去去者、住住者,而眼見有去住。」外人以肉眼現見去住作難,要求論主在前述諸破之後說明現見如何安立。
T30n1564青目釋〔0005a19–0005a21〕:「答曰:肉眼所見不可信。若實有去去者,為以一法成?為以二法成?二俱有過。何以故?」此答不是否定肉眼所見的身動,而是否定現見本身足以證成自性實有;若仍主張實有,所立不出一法成與二法成,下一頌遂逐一檢驗一、異。
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0005a22–0005a23〕:「去法即去者,是事則不然;去法異去者,是事亦不然。」若是一,作者與作業混為一體;若是異,離行者應有行走,離行走也應有行者。
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0005a26–0005a29〕:「若謂於去法,即為是去者;作者及作業,是事則為一。若謂於去法,有異於去者;離去者有去,離去有去者。」T30n1564青目釋〔0005b01–0005b07〕:「若去法即是去者,是則錯亂,破於因緣。因去有去者,因去者有去。又去名為法,去者名為人,人常法無常。若一者,則二俱應常、二俱無常。一中有如是等過。若異者則相違。未有去法應有去者,未有去者應有去法,不相因待,一法滅應一法在。異中有如是等過。」這是作者作業、人法性質、先有與存亡諸過的底本根據。
T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0063c04–0063c13〕:「如是第一義中,去及去者此二不一。何以故?以作者作業故,如能斫、所斫。此二顯現,亦不得異。何以故?以去、去者更互俱空故,譬如餘物。或有難言:若去及去者更互俱空,空無異相,體不可得。汝引能斫、所斫為譬喻者,此義不成。論者言:汝不善說,唯遮一故。彼二相差別,世間悉解。如是能斫、所斫更互俱空,此義成立。如能覺、所覺二更互空。於世諦中二相異故,引為譬喻,非喻不成。」這一異釋特別說明:自性的一、異俱不可得,不妨礙世間分辨作者與作業。
T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0142a08–0142a17〕:「「去法異去者,是事亦不然。」釋曰:若離去法,而彼去者即不決定。若離去法不決定時,無復別異去者可去。此所分別,若有去者去法二種可得,即去者去法有二可成。所以有去法,故即有去者;有去者故,即有去法。如因果二不相離性,此說義成。若因果同生,即無性可得,如種生芽。是故有去法故即有去者,有去者故即有去法。若一性所成、若異性所成,然去者去法二俱無有,勝義諦中此說成就。」其中因果與種芽之喻是安慧本的開展,不回填為羅什本原句。
(七)同去、異去
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0005b13–0005b14〕:「因去知去者,不能用是去;先無有去法,故無去者去。」使某人成為去者的同一去法,不能再被一個已成的去者使用,否則先後倒置。T30n1564龍樹頌〔0005b20–0005b21〕:「因去知去者,不能用異去,於一去者中,不得二去故。」改用另一去法,又回到一人二去的過失。
T30n1564青目釋〔0005b15–0005b19〕:「隨以何去法知去者?是去者不能用是去法。何以故?是去法未有時無有去者,亦無去時、已去、未去。如先有人、有城邑,得有所起。去法、去者則不然,去者因去法成,去法因去者成故。」人與城邑可在行程前被指出,不等於「去者」這個依作用得名的身分也能先於去法實有。
T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0064c21〕:「先無有去法,故無去者去。」T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0142a22〕:「因去知去者,不能用是去。」兩本於譯句開合不同,均保存「以去成去者,再令去者用去」不能成立的次第難題。
(八)定、不定與有實、無實
T30n1564龍樹頌〔0005b25–0005b28〕:「決定有去者,不能用三去;不決定去者,亦不用三去。去法定不定,去者不用三,是故去去者,所去處皆無。」青目釋「決定」為本實有而不因去法生,「不決定」為本實無而因去法得名;兩門都不能把相待名立成自性。
T30n1564青目釋〔0005b29–0005c10〕:「決定者,名本實有,不因去法生。去法名身動。三種名未去、已去、去時。若決定有去者,離去法應有去者,不應有住,是故說決定有去者不能用三去。若去者不決定,不決定名本實無,以因去法得名去者,以無去法故不能用三去。因去法故有去者,若先無去法則無去者。云何言不決定去者用三去?如去者,去法亦如是。若先離去者決定有去法,則不因去者有去法,是故去者不能用三去法。若決定無去法,去者何所用?」此為定、不定兩義及其不能用三去的底本長行。
清辨本不用羅什本「定/不定」的同一譯語,而作有實、無有實、亦有實無實。T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0065b14–0065b22〕:「「有實無有實,亦有實無實,如是三去者,各不用三去。」釋曰:有實去者,謂與去和合故,名為有去。此義云何?若有實去者,不用三去。謂有實去不去、無實去不去、亦俱去不去,以作動故,譬如餘物。若無實去者,亦無三去,以去空故,譬如住者。彼俱去去者,同前驗破。如破去者,去法亦然。立義出因,引譬方便,應如此知。由依道理、阿含二種觀察,於一切時三去不成故。」
安慧本則作實有、不實有、亦有亦不有。T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0142b06–0142b15〕:「「若實有去法,去者不用三;不實有去法,去者不用三。」此中云何?復次頌言:「去法有不有,去者不用三。」釋曰:若或實有、若不實有,此中去者去法不用三去。若實有者,即去者去法和合。若不實有者,即去者離去法。若亦有亦不有者,二俱無性。或可實有者,去者有故。不實有者,去者不有故。亦有亦不有者,二無去法故。是故去者不用三去,所以不作是義。」三本可以對讀,卻不可把彼此譯語默認為逐字相同。
(九)因緣施設與結歸
T30n1564青目釋〔0005c10–0005c14〕:「如是思惟觀察,去法、去者、所去處,是法皆相因待。因去法有去者,因去者有去法,因是二法則有可去處,不得言定有、不得言定無,是故決定知,三法虛妄,空無所有,但有假名,如幻如化。」品末不是補立一個離作用的實體,也不是說日常全無行走,而是把三名安置在相因待中。
T30n1564青目釋〔0005c12–0005c13〕:「不得言定有、不得言定無」是本品明示的防誤邊界:破定性不等於落入決定無,保留依待也不等於復立決定有。
T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0064c23–0064c26〕:「雖無去者,而世諦中意欲為因,次生功用,風界自在,處邊無間,諸行聚起,時節差別,剎那剎那前後相異。此等起故,名為去者。」T30n1567《大乘中觀釋論》〔0141b20–0141b22〕:「此中應知,風界動轉即有去者,身等動發往方處相此乃名去,非去者去法二性別異。」風界與身動是兩部異釋對世俗施設的特定說明,不冒稱青目釋。
T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0065b24–0065b28〕:「「是故去無性,去者亦復然,去時及諸法,一切無所有。」釋曰:如先立驗破去去者,諸餘作法亦應例遮。此品中明去無自性者,欲令信解無來無去別緣起義,是故得成。」清辨本在結處明言「無性」與「別緣起義」相應,這是其明文承義。
三、諸家異釋(吉藏專疏)
吉藏先總判本品的章法。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0054c03–0054c10〕:「品廣分為七,處中為四,略說二周。所言七者,初以三時門破去法、二以三時門破去者、三以三時門破初發、四以三時門破住住者、五以一異門破去去者、六以因緣門破去去者、七以定不定門破去去者。次明處中開四門者,從能破門為名者,第一三時門破、二者一異門破、三者因緣門破、四者有無門破。」七門按所破展開,四門按能破收攝;這是疏家的科判,不是龍樹頌自署的篇章標目。
對本品諸名,吉藏從動足之緣逐一安立。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0055c02–0055c09〕:「如人靜坐直是人耳,正動一足便名去者,因此之動稱為去法亦名去業。將步之前名為未去,足動所經名為已去,取其現動名為去時。取其初動目之為發,當步之動名之為是去,餘步形此名為異去,足之所履稱為去處。然即眾緣和合虛受其名,諦觀察之無一可得。而著相者謂有決定,是故論主就而求之也。」此段將全品名相明確收為眾緣和合而受名。
在二去之過上,吉藏把論證推至身心。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0056b04–0056b09〕:「「一謂為去時」者,此是以一去法為時體也。「二謂去時去」者,復有一法假時而去。問:此有何過耶?答:既有二法即有二時,若有一時應有一法,豈一時之中而有兩去法耶?又去法名身動,既有兩動便有二身二色陰也。色陰既二,四心豈一耶?」T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0056b12–0056b16〕:「二去法是二色陰,既有二色陰即成於二人,若唯有一人亦但有一法,故復進退屈也。又若言法二而人一,亦應人二法一也。下半釋並者,以離法無人,故法二即人二也。」由二去而二時、二身、二人,是吉藏對青目「二去者」過失的展開。
在初發一門,吉藏分發為因、去為果,復破以時為所依。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0058a10–0058a16〕:「若未發有時,可從時中發;未發竟無時,從何處發耶?問:未發何故無時耶?答:發是動發之法,因法故有時;未發則無法,無法云何有時耶?問:若爾,今因發故有時,可得從時中發耶?答:若因發有時,即時無自體,時無自體即發無所賴,云何得從時中發耶?」若時因發而立,便不能反作發的自性容器。
在破住處,吉藏不讓靜成為動之外的實體。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0058b11–0058b16〕:「「問曰無去無去者應有住住者」,第二以三時門破住。破住二意:一先破動、今破靜,令悟四儀宛然而未曾動靜;二破住為成破去。上就去門破去,今就住門破去。既其見住則去心必生,今破其住則無靜對動,則去心都息。」此處所息的是對動靜兩端的執著,不是否認四儀所現。
在一異門,吉藏先以作者、作業顯去者、去法不可為一,再列異的五種相離。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0060a04–0060a11〕:「汝既得異,應得相離。相離有五:一者東西離,去若在東者應居西。二者有無離,未有去法應先有去人,未有去人應先有去法。三存亡離,去人死去法應存,去法亡去人應在。四去住離,去法自去而人自住,去人自去而去法應住。五不相成異,人法既異則不相成,如牛二角。」五離把「異」的後果逐項展開,不只停在一句結論。
在定、不定門,吉藏連到常斷與實假。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0061a23–0061a28〕:「若定有即常,常無有去;定無則斷,斷令誰去耶?又決定則不因法有人,人本實有;不決定即是因法有人,人本實無。此二即總該一切。不因法有人,人是常人;因法有人,人是無常人。又不因法有人,人是實人;因法有人,人是假人。破此二,即一切皆盡。」這一判釋揭示:把去者定為離法本有,落常實;把去者定為本無而全無所依,落斷無;因法施設的人不可再凝為第三個自體。
疏末以幻行防止把破自性誤成斷無。T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0061c12–0061c13〕:「幻去宛然,豈是定無?幻去非去,豈是定有?」此鏡與青目「不得言定有、不得言定無」「但有假名,如幻如化」相照;吉藏的開展必須留在承衍層,不蔽原頌與青目釋。
四、名相
| 名相 | 本品義界 |
|---|---|
| 已去 | 去作用已謝,不能再安置一個正在去。 |
| 未去 | 去作用未起,不能說其中已有去。 |
| 去時 | 依現行去法而得名,不是先成的時間容器;若其中再立去,即成二去。 |
| 去者 | 因去法而受此名;離去法沒有一個已完成的去者可再支配去法。 |
| 去法 | 身動之作用名;不能離去者自有,也不能與去者成自性的一或異。 |
| 發 | 初動之名;三時中皆找不到一個自性發端。 |
| 住 | 因去法止息而說;不能成為去者、不去者之外的第三常體。 |
| 是去/異去 | 使人得名去者的同一去法,與另立的第二去法;兩門各生先後或二去之過。 |
| 定/不定 | 青目釋定為本實有,不定為本實無而因法得名;兩邊都不能支配三時之去。 |
| 所去處 | 因去法與去者而施設,與二者同為相因待之名。 |
| 假名如幻 | 依緣可說而無決定自性;不是一概否定行走、方向與處所。 |
五、科判
原典實測三十七個長行區塊、二十二個頌組、五十頌行;頌組與頌行都不直接等於頌數。依底本文義可分九個論證關節:
- 三時求去〔T30 0003c06–0004a01〕;
- 去時另立去而成二去、二去者〔0004a01–0004a22〕;
- 去者與去法相待,去者、不去者、第三者俱不可立〔0004a22–0004b20〕;
- 三時求初發〔0004b20–0004c02〕;
- 住者及一切行止同例〔0004c02–0005a19〕;
- 去法與去者非一非異〔0005a19–0005b10〕;
- 去者不能用是去、異去〔0005b10–0005b24〕;
- 去法、去者定不定俱不成〔0005b24–0005c09〕;
- 去、去者、所去處相因待,假名如幻〔0005c09–0005c15〕。
吉藏七門把第二、第三等關節收在三時破去法、三時破去者等門內,又以三時、一異、因緣、有無四種能破門再作中分。兩種科判各有用途;本檔以讀者逐段可追為主,不改稱吉藏原科。
六、關中舊學·譯史
本品傳本身分仍依卷首署記:龍樹頌、青目釋、鳩摩羅什譯。頌與長行必須分層讀;「如器中有果」「如先有人、有城邑」、穀芽相續及十二因緣等例,均在青目長行,不冒稱龍樹頌。T1566、T1567各自保存另一套頌釋開合;本次只作同位拉取,不以其長行補寫羅什本。
僧叡序所記青目釋曾經譯場「裁而裨之」,提示今本長行具有傳譯編整史;然而本品內無逐句標記可以再分辨哪一句出於青目、哪一句出於譯場裁補,故本檔一律按傳本層稱「青目釋」,不作無證細分。
七、唯識軸互讀(空有)
本品的同位證據已由 T1566、T1567充分提供。尤其兩部異釋所說「世諦中二相異」「風界動轉即有去者」或「身等動發往方處相此乃名去」,只作其本身對依緣施設的說明;本檔不另牽後世空有判攝,也不把某一異釋提升為三本共同原句。
八、系內餘論互讀
本品先用作者與作業說明去者與去法不可為一,後續〈觀作作者品〉會把作者、作業、所用作法與果報展成專品;此處只標示論內前後呼應,不以後品取代本品證據。青目在行止段以穀種至芽莖葉、無明緣行乃至老死說相續與斷,則回扣〈觀因緣品〉的相待觀門:行止可依緣施設,不能因此再立常一主體。
九、校本定位
| 類別 | 本次所據 |
|---|---|
| 底本真相源 | T30n1564〔0003c05–0005c15〕 |
| 讀者原典範圍 | T30n1564〔0003c06–0005c15〕 |
| 清辨異釋 | T30n1566〔0059c06–0065c09〕 |
| 安慧異釋 | T30n1567〔0139b25–0142b27〕 |
| 吉藏逐文疏 | T42n1824〔0053a05–0061c21〕 |
本次對勘覆蓋三時、二去、去者、初發、住、一異、是去異去、定不定與因緣假名九個關節;所有引文均由原始經藏標記檔重取。無現代學者、無現代梵本、無未標示的跨本改寫;異釋與吉藏開展只在各自層位成立。
Textual Collation
The base-text unit is “Examination of Going and Coming, Chapter Two” in T30n1564〔T30 0003c06–0005c15〕. The main text preserves the wording of the Taishō base. Variants from the original collation of the Song, Yuan, and Ming canons are displayed only in this section and never retrojected into the source text. The original collation records the following twenty-five variants:
| Location | Taishō base text | Variant in the original collation |
|---|---|---|
| 0003c05 | 中論 · “Treatise on the Middle” | 中觀 · “Middle Contemplation”【Song】【Yuan】 |
| 0003c05 | 觀去來品 · “Examination of Going and Coming” | 論破去來品 · “Treatise Chapter Refuting Going and Coming”【Song】【Yuan】; 破去來品 · “Refutation of Going and Coming”【Ming】 |
| 0003c05 | 二十五偈 · “twenty-five verses” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0004a04 | 法 · “dharma” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0004b02 | 若 · “if” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0004b02 | 去者 · “goer” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0004b20 | 然 · “so” | 爾 · “thus”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0004b20 | 是故三時中無有去者 · “therefore no goer exists in the three times” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0004b22 | 中 · “within” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0004b26 | 以 · “because” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0004c10 | 事 · “matter” | 皆 · “all”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005a03 | 者 · nominal marker | 去 · “going”【Song】 |
| 0005a14 | 法 · “dharma” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005a15 | 穀 · “grain” | 豰 · variant graph【Yuan】 |
| 0005a25 | 過 · “fault” | 咎 · “fault”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005b03 | 為 · “be” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005b03 | 常 · “permanent” | 常故 · “because permanent”【Song】【Yuan】; 常去 · “permanent going”【Ming】 |
| 0005b04 | 俱 · “both” | 俱應 · “both should”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005b10 | 若 · “if” (first occurrence) | 應 · “should”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005b10 | 若 · “if” (second occurrence) | 應 · “should”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005b16 | 去 · “going” | 去去 · “going going”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005b18 | 起 · “setting forth” | 趣 · “proceeding toward”【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005b29 | 本 · “originally” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005c01 | 種 · “kinds” | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
| 0005c02 | 者 · nominal marker | omitted【Song】【Yuan】【Ming】 |
The chapter-title readings 「觀去來/破去來」 tr. “examination of going and coming / refutation of going and coming” and the presence or absence of 「二十五偈」 tr. “twenty-five verses” affect catalog labeling and transmitted verse counts. Omissions, additions, homophones, and graphic variants within the main text generally do not alter the chapter’s argumentative skeleton. All are recorded without adjudication. Any decision among them would require a separate collation case; a reading from one edition cannot be silently written back into the reader source.
Comparative Readings
This section draws T1566 and T1567 at corresponding argumentative joints. Shared meanings confirm common transmission; additional developments are explicitly marked as alternative commentary and never passed off as Qingmu’s prose.
A. Seeking Going in the Three Times
Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0003c06–0003c07〕 reads: 「世間眼見三時有作:已去、未去、去時。以有作故,當知有諸法。」 tr. “The worldly eye sees activity in the three times: already gone, not yet gone, and the time of going. Since activity exists, one should know that dharmas exist.” The question infers the real existence of dharmas from visibly present activity and establishes the position answered by the chapter. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0003c08–0003c09〕 reads: 「已去無有去,未去亦無去,離已去未去,去時亦無去。」 tr. “There is no going in what has already gone, nor in what has not yet gone; apart from the already gone and not yet gone, there is no going at the time of going.” Activity has subsided in what has gone and has not arisen in what has not gone. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0003c11–0003c12〕 says: 「去時名半去半未去,不離已去、未去故。」 tr. “The time of going names what is half gone and half not yet gone, because it is not apart from the already gone and not yet gone.” The time of going therefore has no separate body apart from the first two phases. This is the chapter’s first gateway.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0060b07〕, reads: 「離已去未去,去時亦不受。」 tr. “Apart from the already gone and not yet gone, the time of going cannot be accepted either.” Its prose immediately asks whether the time of going is already gone, not yet gone, or half gone and half not yet gone; none of the three divisions can establish an independent time of going. The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0139c15〕, reads: 「離已去未去,去時亦無去。」 tr. “Apart from the already gone and not yet gone, there is no going at the time of going.” The three versions differ in such vocabulary as 「無有去/不受」 tr. “there is no going / cannot be accepted,” while pointing in corresponding argumentative directions.
B. The Time of Going, Two Goings, and Two Goers
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004a02–0004a03〕 reads: 「云何於去時,而當有去法?若離於去法,去時不可得。」 tr. “How could a dharma of going exist at the time of going? Apart from the dharma of going, the time of going cannot be found.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0004a04–0004a06〕 reads: 「去時有去法,是事不然。何以故?離去法去時不可得。若離去法有去時者,應去時中有去,如器中有果。」 tr. “That a dharma of going exists at the time of going is not so. Why? Apart from going, the time of going cannot be found. If a time of going existed apart from the dharma of going, going would be contained within the time of going as fruit is contained in a vessel.” The time of going cannot receive another going as though it were a vessel established beforehand. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004a13–0004a14〕 reads: 「若去時有去,則有二種去:一謂為去時,二謂去時去。」 tr. “If going exists at the time of going, there are two kinds of going: one that constitutes the time of going, and one that goes at the time of going.” The dharma of going first establishes the 「去時」 tr. “time of going” and is then established again within it, counting the same activity twice. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004a18–0004a19〕 reads: 「若有二去法,則有二去者;以離於去者,去法不可得。」 tr. “If there are two dharmas of going, there are two goers, because the dharma of going cannot be found apart from a goer.” Two goings force out two goers.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0060c21–0060c26〕, reads: 「「若去時中去,復及此行去,則墮二去過,此義則不然。」釋曰:此謂於世諦中義不然故。復次偈曰:「若有二去法,則有二去者。」釋曰:何因緣故作如此遮?若有二法,則有二者。」 tr. “‘If going occurs within the time of going and this movement also goes, the fault of two goings follows; this is not so.’ Commentary: This means that it is not so within conventional truth. The next verse says: ‘If there are two dharmas of going, there are two goers.’ Why make this denial? If there are two dharmas, there are two agents.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0140a11–0140a12〕, reads: 「若去時有去,則有二種去:一謂有去時,二謂去時去。」 tr. “If going exists at the time of going, there are two kinds: one that establishes the time of going and one that goes at the time of going.” Both alternative commentaries preserve the pressure that moves from two goings to two goers.
C. Mutual Dependence of Goer and Dharma of Going
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004a24–0004a25〕 reads: 「若離於去者,去法不可得;以無去法故,何得有去者?」 tr. “Apart from a goer, the dharma of going cannot be found; since no dharma of going exists, how can there be a goer?” Going cannot stand apart from the goer, nor can the goer be established first where no going exists. The verses that follow on 「去者、不去者、第三去者」 tr. “goer, non-goer, and a third goer” and 「去者去」 tr. “the goer goes” repeatedly examine this mutual dependence.
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004a28–0004a29〕 reads: 「去者則不去,不去者不去;離去不去者,無第三去者。」 tr. “The goer does not go, nor does the non-goer go; apart from the goer and non-goer, there is no third goer.” The name goer already depends on the dharma of going, while non-goer is named precisely by the absence of going. Outside these two there is no third subject that falls under neither going nor its absence.
The assertion 「去者去」 tr. “the goer goes” then undergoes three examinations. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004b04–0004b05〕 reads: 「若言去者去,云何有此義?若離於去法,去者不可得。」 tr. “If one says the goer goes, how can this make sense? Apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found.” It first refutes a goer existing apart from going. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004b09–0004b10〕 reads: 「若去者有去,則有二種去:一謂去者去,二謂去法去。」 tr. “If the goer possesses going, there are two kinds of going: the going of the goer and the going of the dharma of going.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0004b11–0004b13〕 reads: 「若言去者用去法,則有二過,於一去者中而有二去:一以去法成去者、二以去者成去法。去者成已然後用去法,是事不然。」 tr. “If the goer uses the dharma of going, two faults follow: one goer has two goings, one by which going establishes the goer and one by which the goer establishes going. That the goer is established and only then uses the dharma of going is not so.” This next refutes using one going to establish the agent and another for the agent to employ. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004b16–0004b17〕 reads: 「若謂去者去,是人則有咎,離去有去者,說去者有去。」 tr. “Whoever maintains that the goer goes incurs a fault: a goer exists apart from going and is then said to possess going.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0004b18–0004b21〕 reads: 「若人說去者能用去法,是人則有咎,離去法有去者。何以故?說去者用去法,是為先有去者後有去法。是事不然,是故三時中無有去者。」 tr. “Whoever says that the goer can use the dharma of going incurs a fault: a goer exists apart from going. Why? To say the goer uses going places the goer first and the dharma of going later. This is not so; therefore no goer exists in the three times.” This finally refutes the reversed sequence in which the goer is established first and going added later.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0061a16–0061a23〕, reads: 「「離去者無去。」釋曰:汝言去者為去依止,以此依止有故,為去因者,是義不然。何以故?若未說因時,去則不成。此之過失,汝不得離。如偈曰:「離去者有去,是義則不然。」釋曰:若離去者,去則不成。如此句義,先已分別。是故偈曰:「若其無彼去,何處有去者?」」 tr. “‘Apart from a goer there is no going.’ Commentary: You say that the goer is the support of going and that the existence of this support is the cause of going. This is not so. Why? Before that cause is stated, going is not established; you cannot escape this fault. The verse says, ‘That going exists apart from a goer is not so.’ Apart from a goer, going is not established, as already explained. Therefore the verse says, ‘If that going is absent, where can a goer exist?’” This explicitly says that neither end can be established apart from the other.
D. Initial Setting Forth
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004b24–0004b25〕 reads: 「已去中無發,未去中無發,去時中無發,何處當有發?」 tr. “There is no setting forth in what has already gone, none in what has not yet gone, and none at the time of going. Where could setting forth occur?” In what has gone it is too late; in what has not gone the dharma of going has not arisen; at the time of going, that very time already depends on the dharma of going.
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004b27–0004c01〕 reads: 「未發無去時,亦無有已去,是二應有發,未去何有發?無去無未去,亦復無去時,一切無有發,何故而分別?」 tr. “Before setting forth there is no time of going and nothing already gone. If setting forth should occur in these two, how could it occur in what has not gone? There is neither going nor not yet gone, and likewise no time of going. If setting forth exists nowhere, why make distinctions?” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0004c02–0004c05〕 reads: 「若人未發則無去時亦無已去;若有發當在二處:去時、已去中。二俱不然,未去時未有發故。未去中何有發?發無故無去,無去故無去者,何得有已去、未去、去時。」 tr. “Before a person sets forth there is neither a time of going nor something already gone. If setting forth existed, it would occur in one of those two, but neither is possible because it has not occurred in what has not yet gone. Where could it occur there? With no setting forth there is no going; with no going there is no goer. How could there be already gone, not yet gone, or time of going?” This shows from the reverse direction that before setting forth, even the time of going and what has gone are unestablished. One cannot borrow an already constituted time in which to place an initial setting forth.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0062b01–0062b07〕, reads: 「「已去中無發,未去亦無發,去時中無發,何處當有發?」釋曰:已去中無發者,謂去作用於彼已謝故。未去亦無發者,謂未行無去,去則不然。去時中無發者,謂已去未去等皆無去義,云何可說去時有去?如是三種俱無初發,是故偈言,何處當有發。」 tr. “‘There is no setting forth in what has gone, none in what has not gone, and none at the time of going. Where could setting forth occur?’ In what has gone it is absent because the activity of going has subsided. In what has not gone it is absent because without movement there is no going. At the time of going it is absent because neither the already gone nor not yet gone contains going; how can one say going exists at the time of going? None of the three contains an initial setting forth; therefore the verse asks where it could occur.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0140c19〕, reads: 「離已去未去,去時中無發。」 tr. “Apart from what has already gone and what has not yet gone, there is no setting forth at the time of going.” Both alternative commentaries likewise refrain from installing a self-existent beginning in the three times.
E. Standing, Continuation, and Cessation
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0004c07–0004c08〕 reads: 「去者則不住,不去者不住,離去不去者,何有第三住?」 tr. “The goer does not stand, nor does the non-goer stand; apart from the goer and non-goer, how could there be a third standing?” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0004c09–0005a04〕 reads: 「若有住、有住者,應去者住、若不去者住。若離此二,應有第三住。是事不然。去者不住,去未息故,與去相違名為住。不去者亦不住。何以故?因去法滅故有住,無去則無住。離去者不去者,更無第三住者。若有第三住者,即在去者、不去者中。以是故,不得言去者住。」 tr. “If standing and a stander existed, either the goer or non-goer would stand. Apart from both, a third standing would be required, which is not so. The goer does not stand because going has not ceased; what opposes going is called standing. The non-goer does not stand either, because standing exists through the cessation of going; without going, there is no standing. Apart from the goer and non-goer there is no third stander. If there were, it would still fall within one of the two. Therefore one cannot say the goer stands.” Goer, non-goer, and third stander all fail to leave behind a stander with intrinsic nature.
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0005a10–0005a11〕 reads: 「去未去無住,去時亦無住,所有行止法,皆同於去義。」 tr. “There is no standing in what has gone or not gone, nor at the time of going; every dharma of continuation and cessation follows the reasoning of going.” Qingmu extends this gateway to the succession of grain and sprout and to the twelve links of dependent origination: succession is called continuation and interruption cessation; no self-existent standing is established apart from going.
Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0005a14–0005a18〕 reads: 「如破去法、住法,行、止亦如是。行者,如從穀子相續至芽莖葉等。止者,穀子滅故芽莖葉滅。相續故名行,斷故名止。又如無明緣諸行乃至老死是名行,無明滅故諸行等滅是名止。」 tr. “As the dharmas of going and standing are refuted, continuation and cessation are likewise. Continuation is the succession from grain to sprout, stalk, leaf, and so forth. Cessation is the ceasing of the grain, through which sprout, stalk, and leaf cease. Succession is called continuation; interruption is called cessation. Ignorance conditioning formations and so on through aging-and-death is called continuation; when ignorance ceases and formations and the rest cease, this is called cessation.” The meanings of continuation and cessation are explicitly extended here to the external sequence of grain and sprout and the internal twelve links.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0062c16–0062c25〕, reads: 「「去者則不住。」釋曰:此謂第一義中立去者住,驗不可得。何以故?以去者動作故,譬如調達正行未息。若謂未去者住,是亦不然。如偈曰:「未去者不住。」釋曰:彼未去者以無去故,於世諦中彼去息故,名之為住。此義不成,以去無體故。復次惡見所持、邪執自在作如是說,欲得異住。如偈曰:「異去未去者,誰為第三住?」」 tr. “‘The goer does not stand.’ Establishing a goer who stands within ultimate meaning cannot be verified. Why? Because the goer is moving, like Devadatta whose walking has not ceased. Nor does the not-yet-goer stand. The verse says, ‘The not-yet-goer does not stand.’ In conventional truth that person is called standing because their going has ceased, but this cannot be established because going has no body. Those held by bad views and freely constructing false attachments seek a different standing. The verse asks, ‘Apart from the goer and not-yet-goer, who could be a third stander?’” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0141b10〕, reads: 「所有行止法,皆同去義說。」 tr. “Every dharma of continuation and cessation is explained according to the meaning of going.” None of the three versions lets the stander become a permanent body left behind after motion ceases.
F. Dharma of Going and Goer Are Neither Identical nor Different
Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0005a18–0005a19〕 reads: 「問曰:汝雖種種門破去去者、住住者,而眼見有去住。」 tr. “Question: Although you refute going and goer, standing and stander, through many gateways, the eye sees going and standing.” The outsider invokes the physical eye’s visible perception and asks how it is to be established after the preceding refutations.
Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0005a19–0005a21〕 reads: 「答曰:肉眼所見不可信。若實有去去者,為以一法成?為以二法成?二俱有過。何以故?」 tr. “Answer: What the physical eye sees is not trustworthy. If going and a goer truly existed, would they be established through one dharma or through two? Both entail faults. Why?” This does not deny the bodily movement seen by the eye; it denies that visible perception alone proves intrinsic existence. Anyone still asserting real existence must establish it through either one dharma or two, and the next verse examines identity and difference in turn.
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0005a22–0005a23〕 reads: 「去法即去者,是事則不然;去法異去者,是事亦不然。」 tr. “That the dharma of going is the goer is not so; that it differs from the goer is likewise not so.” If identical, agent and action collapse into one body; if different, walking should exist apart from a walker and a walker apart from walking.
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0005a26–0005a29〕 reads: 「若謂於去法,即為是去者;作者及作業,是事則為一。若謂於去法,有異於去者;離去者有去,離去有去者。」 tr. “If the dharma of going itself were the goer, agent and action would be one. If a goer different from going existed, going would exist apart from the goer and the goer apart from going.” Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0005b01–0005b07〕 reads: 「若去法即是去者,是則錯亂,破於因緣。因去有去者,因去者有去。又去名為法,去者名為人,人常法無常。若一者,則二俱應常、二俱無常。一中有如是等過。若異者則相違。未有去法應有去者,未有去者應有去法,不相因待,一法滅應一法在。異中有如是等過。」 tr. “If going were the goer, confusion would follow and causes and conditions be destroyed. The goer exists because of going, and going because of the goer. Going is called a dharma, the goer a person; the person is permanent and the dharma impermanent. If one, both should be permanent or both impermanent. Identity entails such faults. If different, contradiction follows: the goer should exist before going and going before the goer. They would not depend on one another, and when one ceased, the other should remain. Difference entails such faults.” This is the base-text ground for the faults involving agent and action, the natures of person and dharma, priority, and persistence.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0063c04–0063c13〕, reads: 「如是第一義中,去及去者此二不一。何以故?以作者作業故,如能斫、所斫。此二顯現,亦不得異。何以故?以去、去者更互俱空故,譬如餘物。或有難言:若去及去者更互俱空,空無異相,體不可得。汝引能斫、所斫為譬喻者,此義不成。論者言:汝不善說,唯遮一故。彼二相差別,世間悉解。如是能斫、所斫更互俱空,此義成立。如能覺、所覺二更互空。於世諦中二相異故,引為譬喻,非喻不成。」 tr. “Within ultimate meaning, going and goer are not one, because they are agent and action, like cutter and what is cut. Though both appear, they are not different either, because going and goer are mutually empty, as are other things. An objection says: if going and goer are mutually empty, without distinct marks or obtainable bodies, your analogy of cutter and cut fails. The treatise responds: you speak poorly, for only identity is denied. The world understands their two distinct marks. Cutter and cut are mutually empty, as knower and known are mutually empty. Their marks differ in conventional truth, so the analogy stands.” This alternative commentary specifically clarifies that the intrinsic identity and difference of the two cannot be found without preventing the conventional distinction between agent and action.
The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0142a08–0142a17〕, reads: 「「去法異去者,是事亦不然。」釋曰:若離去法,而彼去者即不決定。若離去法不決定時,無復別異去者可去。此所分別,若有去者去法二種可得,即去者去法有二可成。所以有去法,故即有去者;有去者故,即有去法。如因果二不相離性,此說義成。若因果同生,即無性可得,如種生芽。是故有去法故即有去者,有去者故即有去法。若一性所成、若異性所成,然去者去法二俱無有,勝義諦中此說成就。」 tr. “‘That the dharma of going differs from the goer is likewise not so.’ Apart from going, the goer is indeterminate; when indeterminate apart from going, no separate goer remains to go. If goer and going were two obtainable kinds, each could be established. Because there is going there is a goer, and because there is a goer there is going, like cause and effect inseparable in nature. If cause and effect arise together, no nature can be found, like seed producing sprout. Thus, because going exists there is a goer, and because a goer exists there is going. Whether established as one nature or different natures, neither goer nor going exists; this statement is established in ultimate truth.” Its images of cause and effect and seed and sprout are developments in Sthiramati’s version, not interpolations into Kumārajīva’s text.
G. Same Going and Different Going
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0005b13–0005b14〕 reads: 「因去知去者,不能用是去;先無有去法,故無去者去。」 tr. “The goer known through going cannot use this same going; before the dharma of going existed, no goer went.” The same going that makes someone a goer cannot then be used by an already established goer without reversing the sequence. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0005b20–0005b21〕 reads: 「因去知去者,不能用異去,於一去者中,不得二去故。」 tr. “The goer known through going cannot use a different going, because two goings cannot be found within one goer.” Substituting another going returns to the fault of two goings in one person.
Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0005b15–0005b19〕 reads: 「隨以何去法知去者?是去者不能用是去法。何以故?是去法未有時無有去者,亦無去時、已去、未去。如先有人、有城邑,得有所起。去法、去者則不然,去者因去法成,去法因去者成故。」 tr. “Whichever dharma of going identifies the goer, that goer cannot use the same dharma. Why? Before it existed, there was no goer and no time of going, already gone, or not yet gone. When a person and a city exist beforehand, setting forth can occur. Going and goer are not so: the goer is established through going, and going through the goer.” A person and a city can be pointed out before a journey; this does not mean that the role 「去者」 tr. “goer,” named through an activity, exists before the dharma of going.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0064c21〕, reads: 「先無有去法,故無去者去。」 tr. “Before the dharma of going existed, no goer went.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0142a22〕, reads: 「因去知去者,不能用是去。」 tr. “The goer known through going cannot use this same going.” Although their phrasing unfolds differently, both versions preserve the sequential difficulty 「以去成去者,再令去者用去」 tr. “establishing a goer through going and then making that goer employ going.”
H. Fixed, Unfixed, Real, and Unreal
Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0005b25–0005b28〕 reads: 「決定有去者,不能用三去;不決定去者,亦不用三去。去法定不定,去者不用三,是故去去者,所去處皆無。」 tr. “A fixed goer cannot use the three goings; an unfixed goer cannot use them either. Whether going is fixed or unfixed, the goer uses none of the three. Therefore going, goer, and destination are all absent.” Qingmu explains 「決定」 tr. “fixed” as truly existent from the beginning and not produced through going, and 「不決定」 tr. “unfixed” as not truly existent from the beginning but named through going. Neither gateway can turn a mutually dependent name into intrinsic nature.
Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0005b29–0005c10〕 reads: 「決定者,名本實有,不因去法生。去法名身動。三種名未去、已去、去時。若決定有去者,離去法應有去者,不應有住,是故說決定有去者不能用三去。若去者不決定,不決定名本實無,以因去法得名去者,以無去法故不能用三去。因去法故有去者,若先無去法則無去者。云何言不決定去者用三去?如去者,去法亦如是。若先離去者決定有去法,則不因去者有去法,是故去者不能用三去法。若決定無去法,去者何所用?」 tr. “‘Fixed’ means truly existent from the beginning and not produced through going. The dharma of going names bodily movement. The three are not yet gone, already gone, and time of going. If a fixed goer existed, the goer should exist apart from going and should never stand; therefore a fixed goer cannot use the three goings. If the goer is unfixed—meaning originally unreal and named through going—without going it cannot use the three. The goer exists through going; if going did not exist first, there is no goer. How could an unfixed goer use the three? As with goer, so with going. If going existed fixedly apart from the goer, it would not exist through the goer, so the goer cannot use the three. If going is fixedly absent, what can the goer use?” This is the base prose for the meanings of fixed and unfixed and their inability to employ the three goings.
Bhāviveka’s version does not use Kumārajīva’s exact vocabulary 「定/不定」 tr. “fixed / unfixed,” but speaks of real, unreal, and both real and unreal. The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0065b14–0065b22〕, reads: 「「有實無有實,亦有實無實,如是三去者,各不用三去。」釋曰:有實去者,謂與去和合故,名為有去。此義云何?若有實去者,不用三去。謂有實去不去、無實去不去、亦俱去不去,以作動故,譬如餘物。若無實去者,亦無三去,以去空故,譬如住者。彼俱去去者,同前驗破。如破去者,去法亦然。立義出因,引譬方便,應如此知。由依道理、阿含二種觀察,於一切時三去不成故。」 tr. “‘Real, unreal, and both real and unreal: these three kinds of goer each use none of the three goings.’ A real goer is so named through conjunction with going. A real goer does not use the three: real going does not go, unreal going does not go, and both together do not go, because they are activities, like other things. An unreal goer likewise has no three goings, because going is empty, like a stander. One both real and unreal is refuted as before. As the goer is refuted, so is going. Establish the thesis, give the reason, and use analogies accordingly. Through investigation by reasoning and āgama, the three goings fail at all times.”
Sthiramati’s version speaks instead of real existence, unreal existence, and both existence and nonexistence. The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0142b06–0142b15〕, reads: 「「若實有去法,去者不用三;不實有去法,去者不用三。」此中云何?復次頌言:「去法有不有,去者不用三。」釋曰:若或實有、若不實有,此中去者去法不用三去。若實有者,即去者去法和合。若不實有者,即去者離去法。若亦有亦不有者,二俱無性。或可實有者,去者有故。不實有者,去者不有故。亦有亦不有者,二無去法故。是故去者不用三去,所以不作是義。」 tr. “‘If the dharma of going truly exists, the goer does not use the three; if it does not truly exist, the goer does not use the three.’ What does this mean? Another verse says, ‘Whether going exists or not, the goer does not use the three.’ Whether truly existent or not, goer and going do not use the three goings. If truly existent, goer and going are conjoined. If not truly existent, the goer is apart from going. If both existent and nonexistent, neither has a nature. Alternatively, real means the goer exists; unreal means it does not; both means neither has a dharma of going. Therefore the goer does not use the three, and the claim is not made.” The three versions may be read together, but their vocabulary cannot be presumed to be word-for-word identical.
I. Dependent Establishment and the Conclusion
Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0005c10–0005c14〕 reads: 「如是思惟觀察,去法、去者、所去處,是法皆相因待。因去法有去者,因去者有去法,因是二法則有可去處,不得言定有、不得言定無,是故決定知,三法虛妄,空無所有,但有假名,如幻如化。」 tr. “Contemplated and examined in this way, going, goer, and destination all depend on one another. The goer exists because of going; going because of the goer; and the destination because of both. They cannot be called determinately existent or determinately nonexistent. Therefore one knows with certainty that the three dharmas are false, empty, and without possession of their own; they exist only as provisional designations, like an illusion or transformation.” The chapter does not conclude by installing a substance apart from activity, nor by claiming that ordinary walking is wholly absent. It places all three names within mutual dependence.
Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0005c12–0005c13〕 states: 「不得言定有、不得言定無」 tr. “They cannot be called determinately existent or determinately nonexistent.” This is the chapter’s explicit guardrail: refuting fixed nature does not fall into fixed nonexistence, while preserving dependent establishment does not reinstate fixed existence.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0064c23–0064c26〕, reads: 「雖無去者,而世諦中意欲為因,次生功用,風界自在,處邊無間,諸行聚起,時節差別,剎那剎那前後相異。此等起故,名為去者。」 tr. “Although no goer exists, within conventional truth intention and desire serve as causes; exertion then arises, the wind element operates freely, aggregates of activity arise without interval at the edge of a place, times differ, and preceding and following moments differ. Because these arise, one is called a goer.” The Mahāyāna Commentary on the Middle Contemplation, T30n1567〔0141b20–0141b22〕, reads: 「此中應知,風界動轉即有去者,身等動發往方處相此乃名去,非去者去法二性別異。」 tr. “Know here that when the wind element moves, there is a goer; the bodily movement toward a direction and place is called going. Goer and going are not two separate natures.” The wind element and bodily movement are the alternative commentaries’ specific explanations of conventional establishment; they are not attributed to Qingmu.
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0065b24–0065b28〕, reads: 「「是故去無性,去者亦復然,去時及諸法,一切無所有。」釋曰:如先立驗破去去者,諸餘作法亦應例遮。此品中明去無自性者,欲令信解無來無去別緣起義,是故得成。」 tr. “‘Therefore going has no nature, and so does the goer; the time of going and all dharmas have no possession of their own.’ As going and goer were refuted through the preceding demonstration, all other activities should be denied by analogy. This chapter clarifies that going has no intrinsic nature so that one may trust and understand the distinct meaning of dependent origination as neither coming nor going; therefore the argument is established.” Bhāviveka’s conclusion explicitly connects 「無性」 tr. “absence of intrinsic nature” with 「別緣起義」 tr. “the distinct meaning of dependent origination.” This is its express inheritance of the meaning.
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang first gives a comprehensive judgment on the chapter’s architecture. His Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, T42n1824〔0054c03–0054c10〕, reads: 「品廣分為七,處中為四,略說二周。所言七者,初以三時門破去法、二以三時門破去者、三以三時門破初發、四以三時門破住住者、五以一異門破去去者、六以因緣門破去去者、七以定不定門破去去者。次明處中開四門者,從能破門為名者,第一三時門破、二者一異門破、三者因緣門破、四者有無門破。」 tr. “Broadly the chapter has seven divisions, intermediately four, and briefly two rounds. The seven are: first, refuting going through the gateway of the three times; second, refuting the goer through that gateway; third, refuting initial setting forth through it; fourth, refuting standing and stander through it; fifth, refuting going and goer through identity and difference; sixth, through causes and conditions; seventh, through fixed and unfixed. The intermediate four are named after the means of refutation: the three times, identity and difference, causes and conditions, and existence and nonexistence.” The seven unfold according to what is refuted, while the four gather them according to the refuting method. These are a commentator’s divisions, not chapter headings authored by Nāgārjuna’s verses.
Jizang establishes the chapter’s terms one by one from the condition of moving a foot. His Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, T42n1824〔0055c02–0055c09〕, reads: 「如人靜坐直是人耳,正動一足便名去者,因此之動稱為去法亦名去業。將步之前名為未去,足動所經名為已去,取其現動名為去時。取其初動目之為發,當步之動名之為是去,餘步形此名為異去,足之所履稱為去處。然即眾緣和合虛受其名,諦觀察之無一可得。而著相者謂有決定,是故論主就而求之也。」 tr. “A person sitting still is simply a person; when one foot moves, the person is called a goer, and that motion is called the dharma or act of going. Before the step is not yet gone; the place crossed by the moving foot is already gone; present motion is the time of going. Initial motion is setting forth; the current step’s motion is this going; other steps compared with it are different going; and where the foot treads is destination. These names are falsely received through the conjunction of many conditions; examined truly, not one can be found. Those attached to marks deem them fixed, so the treatise author searches them.” This passage expressly gathers all the chapter’s terminology as names received through the conjunction of conditions.
Regarding the fault of two goings, Jizang carries the argument into body and mind. His commentary, T42n1824〔0056b04–0056b09〕, reads: 「「一謂為去時」者,此是以一去法為時體也。「二謂去時去」者,復有一法假時而去。問:此有何過耶?答:既有二法即有二時,若有一時應有一法,豈一時之中而有兩去法耶?又去法名身動,既有兩動便有二身二色陰也。色陰既二,四心豈一耶?」 tr. “‘One constitutes the time of going’ means one dharma of going forms the body of that time. ‘The second goes at the time of going’ means another dharma goes by relying on that time. What fault follows? Two dharmas mean two times. If one time has one dharma, how can one time contain two goings? Going names bodily motion; two motions mean two bodies and two form aggregates. With two form aggregates, how could the four mental aggregates be one?” His commentary, T42n1824〔0056b12–0056b16〕, continues: 「二去法是二色陰,既有二色陰即成於二人,若唯有一人亦但有一法,故復進退屈也。又若言法二而人一,亦應人二法一也。下半釋並者,以離法無人,故法二即人二也。」 tr. “Two goings are two form aggregates, and two form aggregates make two persons. If there is only one person, there is only one dharma. If two dharmas and one person were allowed, one might equally have two persons and one dharma. The latter half explains their conjunction: apart from a dharma there is no person, so two dharmas are two persons.” The inference from two goings to two times, bodies, and persons is Jizang’s unfolding of Qingmu’s fault of 「二去者」 tr. “two goers.”
In the gateway of initial setting forth, Jizang divides setting forth as cause and going as effect, then refutes time as a support. His commentary, T42n1824〔0058a10–0058a16〕, reads: 「若未發有時,可從時中發;未發竟無時,從何處發耶?問:未發何故無時耶?答:發是動發之法,因法故有時;未發則無法,無法云何有時耶?問:若爾,今因發故有時,可得從時中發耶?答:若因發有時,即時無自體,時無自體即發無所賴,云何得從時中發耶?」 tr. “If time existed before setting forth, setting forth could arise within it. Before setting forth there is no time at all; from where could it arise? Why is there no time before setting forth? Setting forth is a dharma of moving forth, and time exists through the dharma. Before setting forth there is no dharma; without a dharma, how can time exist? If time now exists through setting forth, can setting forth arise within it? If time exists through setting forth, time has no body of its own; then setting forth has no support. How could it arise from time?” If time is established through setting forth, it cannot in turn become a self-existent container for setting forth.
When refuting standing, Jizang does not allow stillness to become a substance apart from motion. His commentary, T42n1824〔0058b11–0058b16〕, reads: 「「問曰無去無去者應有住住者」,第二以三時門破住。破住二意:一先破動、今破靜,令悟四儀宛然而未曾動靜;二破住為成破去。上就去門破去,今就住門破去。既其見住則去心必生,今破其住則無靜對動,則去心都息。」 tr. “‘Question: If there is no going or goer, there should be standing and a stander.’ Second comes refuting standing through the three times. This has two purposes. First motion was refuted, now stillness, so one awakens amid the evident four postures without ever falling into motion or stillness. Second, refuting standing completes the refutation of going. Going was refuted through going; now it is refuted through standing. Seeing standing necessarily produces a mind of going. Refute standing, leave no stillness opposed to motion, and the mind of going wholly rests.” What rests is clinging to the poles of motion and stillness, not the manifest four bodily postures.
In the identity–difference gateway, Jizang first uses agent and action to show that goer and going cannot be one, then lists five separations entailed by difference. His commentary, T42n1824〔0060a04–0060a11〕, reads: 「汝既得異,應得相離。相離有五:一者東西離,去若在東者應居西。二者有無離,未有去法應先有去人,未有去人應先有去法。三存亡離,去人死去法應存,去法亡去人應在。四去住離,去法自去而人自住,去人自去而去法應住。五不相成異,人法既異則不相成,如牛二角。」 tr. “If difference is obtained, separation should be obtained. There are five separations. First, east–west: if going is in the east, the goer should reside in the west. Second, existence–nonexistence: before going there should be a goer; before a goer, going. Third, persistence–perishing: when the goer dies, going should persist; when going perishes, the goer should remain. Fourth, going–standing: going should go by itself while the person stands, or the person go while going stands. Fifth, failure to establish one another: if person and dharma differ, they do not establish each other, like a cow’s two horns.” These five separations unfold the consequences of 「異」 tr. “difference” rather than stopping with one conclusion.
In the fixed–unfixed gateway, Jizang connects the poles with permanence and annihilation, and reality and provisionality. His commentary, T42n1824〔0061a23–0061a28〕, reads: 「若定有即常,常無有去;定無則斷,斷令誰去耶?又決定則不因法有人,人本實有;不決定即是因法有人,人本實無。此二即總該一切。不因法有人,人是常人;因法有人,人是無常人。又不因法有人,人是實人;因法有人,人是假人。破此二,即一切皆盡。」 tr. “Fixed existence is permanence, and what is permanent has no going. Fixed nonexistence is annihilation; who could go once annihilated? The fixed means a person exists independently of a dharma and is originally real. The unfixed means a person exists through a dharma and was originally unreal. These two encompass all. A person independent of dharmas is permanent; one dependent on dharmas impermanent. A person independent of dharmas is real; one dependent on dharmas provisional. Refute both and all is exhausted.” This reveals that fixing a goer as inherently present apart from dharmas falls into permanent reality, while fixing the goer as originally absent with nothing dependent falls into annihilating absence; the person provisionally established through dharmas cannot be congealed into a third intrinsic body.
The commentary ends with illusory walking to prevent refutation of intrinsic nature from being mistaken for annihilating absence. Jizang’s commentary, T42n1824〔0061c12–0061c13〕, reads: 「幻去宛然,豈是定無?幻去非去,豈是定有?」 tr. “Illusory going is plainly present—how could it be fixed nonexistence? Illusory going is not real going—how could it be fixed existence?” This mirror corresponds to Qingmu’s 「不得言定有、不得言定無」 tr. “cannot be called determinately existent or determinately nonexistent” and 「但有假名,如幻如化」 tr. “exist only as provisional designations, like an illusion or transformation.” Jizang’s development must remain in the carried-forward layer and not eclipse the root verse or Qingmu’s commentary.
Terminology
| Term | Doctrinal scope in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Already gone | The activity of going has subsided; another present going cannot be placed there. |
| Not yet gone | The activity of going has not arisen; going cannot be said already to exist there. |
| Time of going | Named through the presently operating dharma of going, not a temporal vessel established beforehand. To place going within it again produces two goings. |
| Goer | Receives this name through going. Apart from the dharma of going there is no completed goer that can then command going. |
| Dharma of going | A name for bodily motion. It neither exists independently of the goer nor stands in intrinsic identity or difference with the goer. |
| Setting forth | A name for initial motion; no self-existent beginning can be found in any of the three times. |
| Standing | Spoken through the cessation of going; it cannot become a third permanent body apart from goer and non-goer. |
| This going / different going | The same going that gives a person the name goer, and a separately established second going; each route entails either reversed sequence or two goings. |
| Fixed / unfixed | Qingmu explains fixed as truly existent from the beginning, and unfixed as originally unreal but named through a dharma. Neither can command going in the three times. |
| Destination | Established through going and goer, and like both is a mutually dependent name. |
| Provisional designation like an illusion | Speakable in dependence on conditions but without fixed intrinsic nature; not a blanket denial of walking, direction, or place. |
Doctrinal Outline
Direct measurement of the source gives thirty-seven long-prose blocks, twenty-two verse groups, and fifty verse lines. Neither verse groups nor verse lines directly equal a verse count. According to the meaning of the base text, the chapter divides into nine argumentative joints:
- Seeking going in the three times〔T30 0003c06–0004a01〕;
- Establishing another going at the time of going, thereby producing two goings and two goers〔0004a01–0004a22〕;
- Mutual dependence of goer and going; goer, non-goer, and third goer all fail〔0004a22–0004b20〕;
- Seeking initial setting forth in the three times〔0004b20–0004c02〕;
- The same reasoning applies to stander and to all continuation and cessation〔0004c02–0005a19〕;
- Going and goer are neither identical nor different〔0005a19–0005b10〕;
- The goer can use neither this going nor a different going〔0005b10–0005b24〕;
- Neither fixed nor unfixed going and goer can stand〔0005b24–0005c09〕;
- Going, goer, and destination mutually depend; provisional designation is like an illusion〔0005c09–0005c15〕.
Jizang’s seven gateways gather the second, third, and other joints within the three-time refutations of going and goer; he then makes an intermediate division through four refuting gateways: the three times, identity and difference, causes and conditions, and existence and nonexistence. Both classifications serve a purpose. This apparatus prioritizes a sequence that readers can follow passage by passage and does not rename Jizang’s original divisions.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
The transmitted identity of this chapter remains that stated at the head of the scroll: verses by Nāgārjuna, commentary by Qingmu, translation by Kumārajīva. Verse and prose must be read in distinct layers. The examples 「如器中有果」 tr. “as fruit is contained in a vessel,” 「如先有人、有城邑」 tr. “as when a person and city exist first,” the succession of grain and sprout, and the twelve links of dependent origination all occur in Qingmu’s prose and are not passed off as Nāgārjuna’s verse. T1566 and T1567 each preserve a different arrangement of verse and commentary; they are drawn only at parallel loci and their prose is not used to supplement Kumārajīva’s recension.
Seng Rui’s preface records that Qingmu’s commentary was 「裁而裨之」 tr. “edited and supplemented” in the translation workshop, indicating a history of translation and editorial arrangement in the received prose. The chapter itself, however, has no sentence-level markers that could distinguish words by Qingmu from workshop interventions. This apparatus therefore calls the transmitted layer 「青目釋」 tr. “Qingmu’s commentary” throughout and makes no unsupported finer division.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
Parallel evidence for this chapter is already supplied fully by T1566 and T1567. Their respective statements 「世諦中二相異」 tr. “the two marks differ in conventional truth,” 「風界動轉即有去者」 tr. “when the wind element moves there is a goer,” and 「身等動發往方處相此乃名去」 tr. “bodily movement toward a direction and place is called going” stand only as their own explanations of dependent establishment. This apparatus does not import later classifications of emptiness and existence or elevate a reading from one commentary into wording supposedly shared by all three.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
This chapter first uses agent and action to show that goer and going cannot be identical. The later “Examination of Action and Agent” unfolds agent, action, the means employed in acting, and karmic result into a chapter of their own. This is only a marker of internal correspondence, not a substitution of later evidence for this chapter. In the section on continuation and cessation, Qingmu uses grain continuing through sprout, stalk, and leaf, and ignorance conditioning formations through aging-and-death, to explain succession and interruption. This returns to the gateway of mutual dependence in “Examination of Conditions”: continuation and cessation can be established through conditions, but no permanent unitary subject may be added on that account.
Position of the Editions
| Category | Sources used here |
|---|---|
| Base-text ground truth | T30n1564〔0003c05–0005c15〕 |
| Reader source range | T30n1564〔0003c06–0005c15〕 |
| Bhāviveka’s alternative commentary | T30n1566〔0059c06–0065c09〕 |
| Sthiramati’s alternative commentary | T30n1567〔0139b25–0142b27〕 |
| Jizang’s line-by-line commentary | T42n1824〔0053a05–0061c21〕 |
This collation covers nine joints: the three times, two goings, goer, initial setting forth, standing, identity and difference, same and different going, fixed and unfixed, and dependent provisional designation. Every quotation was freshly retrieved from the original marked canon files. There are no modern scholars, no modern Sanskrit editions, and no unmarked rewriting across recensions. Alternative commentaries and Jizang’s developments stand only in their respective layers.