中論 觀三相品第七

Someone establishes all things through arising, abiding, and ceasing: the flower opens, remains in bloom, and withers. The three stages lie before us, so dharmas must exist.

The answer is only four words: “The three marks have no fixed determination.” It then asks in return—you say the three marks can mark the conditioned, but what are the marks themselves? If conditioned, they require another set of three marks, while arising, abiding, and ceasing contradict one another and cannot crowd into a single dharma. If unconditioned, they do not even possess marks of their own; something markless cannot mark anything else.

Add One Layer and Another Must Be Added

Add three more marks above the three, and the additions never end; add none, and the three marks themselves do not count as conditioned.

The questioner devises another plan: primary arising produces secondary arising, and secondary arising produces primary arising; with each pair supporting the other, the regress can close. The respondent asks only once: “Secondary arising does not yet exist—how can it produce primary arising?” Two things that have not yet stood cannot hold each other up.

A Lamp Cannot Illuminate the Darkness on Its Own Body

The questioner offers a lamp: it illuminates objects and also itself.

The respondent does not debate self and other. It asks what “illuminating” means—“Only dispelling darkness is called illumination; where there is no darkness, there is no illumination.” There is no darkness in the lamp’s body or in the place filled by its light, so nothing there is dispelled. A lamp half-arisen and half-not-yet-arisen is still less capable of dispelling darkness. If it could dispel darkness without reaching it, a single lamp here should dispel all the darkness in the world.

The analogy can also be run backward: if a lamp truly illuminates itself and another because it opposes darkness, darkness, which likewise opposes the lamp, should “darken itself and darken another.” Darkness cannot conceal itself and another; the lamp’s self-illumination and illumination of another collapse with it—“Therefore, the lamp analogy fails.”

Arising is the same: what has arisen need not arise again; what has not arisen is no dharma; the time of arising was already answered through the gate of going and coming. As for abiding, aging and death constantly follow every dharma. As for ceasing, milk does not cease while it is milk, and a second head cannot be cut off. Once the three marks fall, the conditioned cannot stand; the unconditioned was only a name obtained by contrast with the three marks, and when the contrast is removed, it too is removed.

Retreat to Conditions or to the Future: Arising Is Still Unfindable

The questioner finally changes the account: do not grasp what has arisen, what has not arisen, or the time of arising; simply say that arising exists because many conditions conjoin. The respondent draws the sentence tighter:

“If a dharma arises from many conditions, its nature is quiescent cessation; therefore, arising and the time of arising are both quiescent cessation.”

What arises through many conditions lacks intrinsic nature. Quiescent cessation means “neither this nor that, without marks; the path of speech is cut off and all proliferations cease.” It is not that conditions fail to produce dharmas; at the very place where conditioned arising occurs, it is already quiescent cessation.

Retreat to the three times and the result is the same. If this not-yet-arisen future dharma already exists, “This dharma already existed—what further use is arising?” If arising itself has another arising that produces it, “If one claims a further arising, arising upon arising is endless.” If no additional arising is posited and arising produces itself, then “all dharmas should likewise be able to produce themselves, but in fact they do not.”

Seeing Is Simply Seeing

What, then, can still be said? Out of compassion for beings, the noble ones continue to speak with the words to which their listeners cling. The words are the same; the mind using them is different.

Like an illusion, a dream, or a gandharva city—the sentence Qingmu adds under the illusion analogy is where the chapter reaches the heart: “One should not form thoughts of sorrow or joy within it, but simply regard it as something seen by the eye.”

There is no need to deny what stands before the eye, and no need to rise and fall with it. The moment sorrow or joy stirs, one has admitted that the event carries real weight.

The final sentence gathers everything: “Ordinary people discriminate it as existent; the wise investigate it and cannot find it.” The object seen has not changed; the eye that sees has.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Two, “Examination of the Three Marks, Chapter Seven,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Since the Three Marks Exist, All Things Exist

〔T30 0009a07〕The questioner says: The sūtra teaches that conditioned dharmas have three marks: arising, abiding, and ceasing. All things arise through the dharma of arising, abide through the dharma of abiding, and cease through the dharma of ceasing. Because these three marks exist, the many dharmas truly exist.

The respondent says: This is not so. Why? Because the three marks have no fixed determination. One must ask whether the three marks are conditioned dharmas that can mark conditioned dharmas, or unconditioned dharmas that can mark conditioned dharmas. Neither can stand. Why?

II. If Arising Is Conditioned, It Must Have Another Three Marks

The verse says: If arising is conditioned, it too should possess the three marks; if arising is unconditioned, on what grounds is it called a mark of the conditioned?

Qingmu explains: If arising is conditioned, it should itself possess the three marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing. That cannot stand. Why? Because the operations of the three contradict one another. “Contradictory” means that the mark of arising should attend a dharma that is arising, the mark of abiding one that is abiding, and the mark of ceasing one that is ceasing. While a dharma is arising, the contradictory marks of abiding and ceasing should not be present simultaneously. The three cannot coexist in one time, just as light and darkness cannot coexist. Therefore, arising should not be a conditioned dharma; the marks of abiding and ceasing should be examined in the same way.

The questioner says: If arising is not conditioned, what fault is there in taking it as unconditioned?

The respondent says: If arising is unconditioned, how can it mark a conditioned dharma? Why? Because an unconditioned dharma has no intrinsic nature. The name unconditioned is applied only once conditioned dharmas have ceased. Thus, not arising and not ceasing are called the mark of the unconditioned, but it has no distinct mark of its own. Since it is no dharma, it cannot mark a dharma, just as a rabbit’s horn or turtle’s hair cannot mark a dharma. Thus, arising is not unconditioned; abiding and ceasing are the same.

III. Neither Gathered nor Dispersed Can Stand

Further, the verse says: Whether gathered together or dispersed separately, the three marks cannot mark anything; how could three marks occupy one place at one time?

Qingmu explains: Do arising, abiding, and ceasing each separately mark conditioned dharmas, or do the three mark them only after conjoining? Neither can stand. Why? If each marks separately, then in the same locus some marks will be present and others absent: at the time of arising, abiding and ceasing are absent; at the time of abiding, arising and ceasing are absent; at the time of ceasing, arising and abiding are absent. If the three mark by conjoining, how could mutually contradictory dharmas all be present at one time?

If one says that another three marks exist above these three, that also cannot stand. Why? The verse says: If arising, abiding, and ceasing possess further conditioned marks, the regress is endless; if they possess no further marks, they are not conditioned.

Qingmu explains: If further conditioned marks exist above arising, abiding, and ceasing, then arising itself must again have an arising, an abiding, and a ceasing. Another layer of marks should exist above that layer, and in this way there would be no end. If there are no further marks, then these three cannot be called conditioned dharmas and cannot mark conditioned dharmas.

IV. Seven Dharmas Arise Together: Primary Arising and Secondary Arising Produce Each Other

The questioner says: You claim that the three marks produce an infinite regress. That is not so. Although arising, abiding, and ceasing are conditioned dharmas, the regress is not endless. Why? The verse says: What secondary arising produces is precisely primary arising; what primary arising produces is, in turn, that secondary arising.

Qingmu explains: When one dharma arises, seven dharmas arise together, including its own body: first, the dharma itself; second, arising; third, abiding; fourth, ceasing; fifth, secondary arising; sixth, secondary abiding; and seventh, secondary ceasing. Among these seven, primary arising, excluding itself, can produce the other six dharmas. Secondary arising produces primary arising, while primary arising produces secondary arising. Therefore, although the three marks are conditioned, no infinite regress follows.

The respondent says: The verse says: If this secondary arising is said to produce primary arising, secondary arising itself is produced by primary arising—how can it produce primary arising?

Qingmu explains: If secondary arising can produce primary arising, then secondary arising should not be said to be produced by primary arising. Why? Since secondary arising is produced by primary arising, how can it in turn produce primary arising?

Further, the verse says: If this primary arising is said to produce secondary arising, primary arising itself is produced by that secondary arising—how can it produce secondary arising?

Qingmu explains: If primary arising can produce secondary arising, then primary arising should not be said to be produced by secondary arising. Why? Since primary arising is produced by secondary arising, how can it in turn produce secondary arising? According to that account, the dharma of secondary arising should produce primary arising; yet secondary arising cannot produce primary arising. Secondary arising does not yet possess its own body—how can it produce primary arising? Therefore, primary arising cannot produce secondary arising either.

The questioner says: At the very time secondary arising is arising, neither before nor after, it can produce primary arising.

The respondent says: This is not so. Why? The verse says: If secondary arising, while arising, can produce primary arising, secondary arising does not yet exist—how can it produce primary arising?

Qingmu explains: If secondary arising could produce primary arising while it is arising, the claim might be made; but in fact it does not yet exist, so secondary arising cannot produce primary arising while arising.

Further, the verse says: If primary arising, while arising, can produce secondary arising, primary arising does not yet exist—how can it produce secondary arising?

Qingmu explains: If primary arising could produce secondary arising while it is arising, the claim might be made; but in fact it does not yet exist, so primary arising cannot produce secondary arising while arising.

V. The Lamp Analogy: Illuminating Itself and Another

The questioner says: The verse says: Just as a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate another, the dharma of arising is likewise: it produces itself and another.

Qingmu explains: A lamp entering a dark room illuminates all the objects and can also illuminate itself. Arising is the same: it can produce another dharma and also produce itself.

The respondent says: This is not so. Why? The verse says: There is no darkness in the lamp itself, nor darkness where the light abides; only dispelling darkness is called illumination; where there is no darkness, there is no illumination.

Qingmu explains: The lamp’s body itself has no darkness, and the place reached by its light likewise has no darkness, because light and darkness oppose one another. Dispelling darkness is called illumination; where there is no darkness, there is no illumination. How, then, can one say that a lamp illuminates itself and another?

The questioner says: The lamp does not illuminate before it has arisen or after it has arisen, but can illuminate itself and another precisely while arising.

The respondent says: The verse says: How can a lamp, at the time it is arising, dispel darkness? When the lamp first arises, it cannot yet reach darkness.

Qingmu explains: A lamp at the time of arising is called half-arisen and half-not-yet-arisen. The lamp’s body is not yet established—how can it dispel darkness? Moreover, the lamp does not reach darkness, just as a person must catch a thief before it is called defeating the thief. To say that the lamp can dispel darkness without reaching it also cannot stand. Why? The verse says: If a lamp can dispel darkness before reaching it, 〔T30 0010a01〕then a lamp burning here should dispel darkness everywhere.

Qingmu explains: If a lamp possessed the power to dispel darkness without reaching it, then lighting a lamp in this one place should dispel the darkness in every place, because it equally fails to reach them all.

Further, the lamp should not illuminate itself or another. Why? The verse says: If a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate another, darkness should likewise darken itself and also darken another.

Qingmu explains: If the lamp can illuminate itself and another because it opposes darkness, then darkness, which opposes the lamp, should likewise be able to obscure itself and obscure another. If darkness opposes the lamp yet cannot obscure itself or another, then the lamp, though opposed to darkness, likewise should not illuminate itself or another. Thus, the lamp analogy is incorrect. The many reasons refuting arising have not yet been exhausted, so the discussion continues.

VI. Arising Sought in What Has Arisen, What Has Not Arisen, and the Time of Arising

The verse says: If this arising has not yet arisen, how can it produce itself? If it produces itself after arising, once it has arisen, what use is further arising?

Qingmu explains: When arising produces itself, does it arise after already arising, or before it has arisen? If it arises before arising, it is a non-dharma; how can a non-dharma produce itself? If one says it arises after arising, it is already established and has no need to arise again, just as an act already performed should not be performed again. Neither what has arisen nor what has not arisen arises; therefore, there is no arising. Your earlier claim that arising, like a lamp, can produce itself and another cannot stand. Abiding and ceasing are the same.

Further, the verse says: Arising does not arise within what has arisen, nor within what has not arisen; it does not arise at the time of arising either—this was already answered in “Examination of Going and Coming.”

Qingmu explains: “Arising” means that arising exists through the conjunction of many conditions. Within what has arisen, there is no activity of arising, so there is no arising; within what has not arisen, there is no activity of arising, so there is no arising there either. The time of arising likewise cannot stand: apart from the dharma of arising, the time of arising cannot be found; apart from the time of arising, the dharma of arising cannot be found. Where, then, could arising at the time of arising occur? This was already answered in “Examination of Going and Coming.”

A dharma that has arisen cannot arise again. Why? If it arose again after arising, then by successive repetition there would be no end, just as a deed already done would be done again. Moreover, if what has arisen arises again, through which dharma of arising does it arise? This mark of arising has not itself arisen. Yet by saying that what has arisen then arises, you contradict your own claim. Why? The mark of arising has not arisen, yet you call it arisen. If what has not arisen can be called arisen, a dharma could arise after arising or before arising. Your earlier claim that it arises after arising then becomes indeterminate. Moreover, just as what has burned should not burn again and what has gone should not go again, for these and other such reasons what has arisen should not arise again.

A dharma that has not arisen likewise does not arise. Why? If a dharma has not arisen, it should not conjoin with the conditions of arising; if it does not conjoin with those conditions, there is no dharma that can arise. If a dharma arose without conjoining with the conditions of arising, an unperformed dharma should perform, a dharma that has not gone should go, an undefiled dharma should become defiled, one without anger should become angry, and one without delusion should become deluded. The dharmas of the world would all be destroyed, so what has not arisen does not arise. Moreover, if a not-yet-arisen dharma could arise, then all not-yet-arisen things in the world should arise: all ordinary people in whom bodhi has not arisen should now give rise to bodhi; arhats who abide in the indestructible dharma and have no afflictions should now produce afflictions; rabbits and the rest, which have no horns, should now produce horns. None of these things occurs. Therefore, a dharma that has not arisen does not arise.

VII. Can It Arise Once the Conditions Are Complete?

The questioner says: A not-yet-arisen dharma does not arise because conditions, action, agent, time, place, and so forth are not yet present. If conditions, action, agent, time, place, and the rest conjoin, the not-yet-arisen dharma arises. Therefore, the claim that no not-yet-arisen dharma ever arises is incorrect.

The respondent says: If a dharma arises when conditions, time, place, and the rest conjoin, then what already existed does not arise, what originally did not exist does not arise, and what both existed and did not exist does not arise. These three cases have already been refuted. Therefore, what has arisen does not arise; what has not arisen does not arise; and the time of arising does not arise. Why? The part already arisen does not arise, and the part not yet arisen does not arise, as previously answered. Moreover, if a time of arising existed apart from arising, one could say that arising occurs at the time of arising. But no time of arising exists apart from arising, so the time of arising does not arise. Further, saying that arising occurs at the time of arising incurs the fault of two arisings: one because it is called the time of arising on account of arising, and one because another arising is placed within the time of arising. Neither can stand. There are not two dharmas—how could there be two arisings? Thus, the time of arising does not arise. Moreover, before the dharma of arising has begun to operate, there is no time of arising; without a time of arising, upon what can arising depend? Thus, arising cannot be said to occur at the time of arising. Sought in this way, there is no arising in what has arisen, what has not arisen, or the time of arising. Since there is no arising, arising is unestablished; since arising is unestablished, abiding and ceasing are unestablished; since arising, abiding, and ceasing are unestablished, conditioned dharmas are unestablished. Thus the verse says that the matter was already answered with what has gone, what has not gone, and the time of going.

The questioner says: I do not insist that what has arisen arises, what has not arisen arises, or arising occurs at the time of arising. I only say that arising exists because many conditions conjoin.

The respondent says: Although you speak this way, the claim still cannot stand. Why? The verse says: If arising at the time of arising has already failed, how could arising be obtained when many conditions conjoin at that time?

Qingmu explains: Arising at the time of arising has already been refuted through many reasons. On what grounds do you now say again that arising exists because many conditions conjoin? Whether the conditions are complete or incomplete, the claim is refuted in the same way as arising.

Further, the verse says: If a dharma arises from many conditions, its nature is quiescent cessation; therefore, arising and the time of arising are both quiescent cessation.

Qingmu explains: A dharma arising from many conditions lacks intrinsic nature and is therefore quiescent cessation. “Quiescent cessation” means neither this nor that, without marks; the path of speech is cut off and all proliferations cease. “Many conditions” means, for example, that cloth exists because of threads and a mat because of rushes. If threads had a fixed mark of their own, they should not come from hemp; if cloth had a fixed mark, it should not come from threads. Yet cloth actually comes from threads, and threads from hemp. Therefore, neither threads nor cloth possess fixed nature. Fire and fuel likewise form through the conjunction of causes and conditions and lack intrinsic nature: when fuel is absent, fire is absent; when fire is absent, fuel is absent. All dharmas are the same. Thus, a dharma arising from many conditions lacks intrinsic nature; because it lacks intrinsic nature, it is empty, like a mirage without reality. Therefore, the verse says that arising and the time of arising are both quiescent cessation, and one should not say that arising occurs at the time of arising. Although you try through many causes and conditions to establish the mark of arising, all are proliferations, not marks of quiescent cessation.

VIII. Is There a Dharma in the Future Waiting to Arise?

The questioner says: The three times are determinately different. A future dharma can arise, and when causes and conditions arrive, it arises. Why say there is no arising?

The respondent says: The verse says: If a not-yet-arisen dharma exists and is said to arise, since this dharma already existed, what further use is arising?

Qingmu explains: If a not-yet-arisen dharma exists within the future and later arises, then the dharma already existed. Why should it arise again? A dharma already existent should not arise again.

The questioner says: Although it exists in the future, it does not bear the same mark as the present. Because it acquires the mark of the present, it is said to arise.

〔T30 0011a01〕The respondent says: The mark of the present does not exist within the future. If it does not exist, how can one say that a future dharma will arise? If it exists, the dharma is not called future but should be called present; what is present should not arise again. Neither side contains arising, so it does not arise.

Moreover, you say that arising occurs at the time of arising and that it can also produce another. This will now be examined further. The verse says: If one says arising occurs at the time of arising and can produce something, where is there another arising capable of producing this arising?

Qingmu explains: If arising can produce another while it is arising, then who can produce this arising?

The verse says: If one claims a further arising, arising upon arising is endless; if arising exists apart from the arising that produces it, all dharmas should produce themselves.

Qingmu explains: If another arising exists above arising, arising is endless. If no further arising exists above this arising and it produces itself, then all dharmas should likewise be able to produce themselves, but in fact they do not.

Further, the verse says: An existent dharma should not arise, nor should a nonexistent dharma; what both exists and does not exist likewise does not arise—this principle was already explained.

Qingmu explains: When arising is spoken of, does arising occur in an existent dharma, a nonexistent dharma, or a dharma both existent and nonexistent? None can stand, as already explained. Apart from these three possibilities there is no further arising. Therefore, there is no arising.

IX. A Dharma Bearing the Mark of Ceasing Cannot Arise, and No Nonceasing Dharma Exists

Further, the verse says: While dharmas are ceasing, they should not arise; that a dharma should not cease ultimately never occurs.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma bears the mark of ceasing, it should not arise. Why? Because the two marks contradict one another. By one mark, ceasing, it is known that the dharma is ceasing; by the other, arising, it is known that the dharma is arising. Two contradictory marks cannot occupy one time. Therefore, a dharma bearing the mark of ceasing should not arise.

The questioner says: If a dharma bearing the mark of ceasing should not arise, then a dharma bearing a mark of nonceasing should arise.

The respondent says: Every conditioned dharma ceases moment after moment, so there is no nonceasing dharma. Apart from the conditioned, there is no fixed unconditioned dharma; “unconditioned dharma” is merely a name. Thus, a dharma that does not cease ultimately never occurs.

X. Abiding Cannot Be Found Either

The questioner says: Even if a dharma has no arising, surely it abides.

The respondent says: The verse says: A nonabiding dharma does not abide, nor does a dharma already abiding; it does not abide at the time of abiding either—without arising, how can there be abiding?

Qingmu explains: A nonabiding dharma does not abide because it lacks the mark of abiding. A dharma already abiding likewise does not abide. Why? Because it already possesses abiding. Abiding is spoken of in contrast to going. If the dharma of abiding already exists, it should not abide again. Nor does it abide at the time of abiding, because apart from abiding and nonabiding there is no distinct time of abiding. Thus, it does not abide. When abiding is sought everywhere in this way and cannot be found, that is no arising. Since there is no arising, how can there be abiding?

Further, the verse says: While dharmas are ceasing, they should not abide; that a dharma should not cease ultimately never occurs.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma bears the mark of ceasing, it does not bear the mark of abiding. Why? Because one dharma would contain two contradictory marks: first ceasing and second abiding. The marks of abiding and ceasing cannot occupy one time and place. Thus, a dharma bearing the mark of ceasing cannot be said to abide.

The questioner says: If a dharma does not cease, surely it abides.

The respondent says: There is no nonceasing dharma. Why? The verse says: All dharmas whatsoever bear the marks of aging and death; one never sees any dharma abide apart from aging and death.

Qingmu explains: When all dharmas arise, impermanence constantly follows. Impermanence has two forms, called aging and death. Thus, aging and death are constantly present in every dharma, and there is no time of abiding.

Further, the verse says: Abiding does not abide through its own mark, nor through a different mark; just as arising does not produce itself, nor arise through a different mark.

Qingmu explains: If the dharma of abiding exists, does it abide through its own mark or through another? Neither can stand. If it abides through its own mark, it is permanent. Every conditioned dharma arises from many conditions; if abiding abides by itself, it is not called conditioned. If abiding abides through its own mark, then a dharma too should abide through its own mark—but just as the eye cannot see itself, abiding is the same. If it abides through a different mark, then abiding itself must have another abiding, producing an infinite regress. Moreover, one sees a different dharma produce a different mark, and the different mark cannot exist without depending on that different dharma; yet the different mark itself is not fixed. Therefore, that abiding should occur through a different mark cannot stand.

XI. Ceasing Cannot Be Found Either

The questioner says: If there is no abiding, surely there is ceasing.

The respondent says: No. Why? The verse says: A dharma already ceased does not cease again, nor does one not yet ceased; it does not cease at the time of ceasing either—without arising, where could there be ceasing?

Qingmu explains: A dharma already ceased does not cease again because it ceased before. What has not ceased likewise does not cease, because it is apart from the mark of ceasing. Nor does it cease at the time of ceasing, because apart from these two there is no distinct time of ceasing. Sought in this way, the dharma of ceasing is no arising; since there is no arising, where can there be ceasing?

Further, the verse says: If a dharma abides, it should not cease; if a dharma does not abide, it likewise should not cease.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma determinately abides, there is no ceasing. Why? Because the mark of abiding is present. If a dharma that abides were ceasing, it would have two marks, abiding and ceasing. Thus, ceasing cannot be said to exist within abiding, just as arising and death cannot occur at one time. If a dharma does not abide, it likewise does not cease. Why? Because it is apart from the mark of abiding. Apart from the mark of abiding there is no dharma; how can no dharma cease?

Further, the verse says: This dharma does not cease at the time that belongs to it; this dharma does not cease at a different time either.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma bears a mark of ceasing, does it cease through its own mark or through a different mark? Neither can stand. Milk, for example, does not cease while it is milk: as long as milk exists, the mark of milk remains determinately present. Nor does it cease at a time when it is not milk: if it is not milk, one cannot say that milk ceases.

Further, the verse says: Just as the mark of arising cannot be found in any dharma, because there is no mark of arising, there is no mark of ceasing either.

Qingmu explains: As sought before, the mark of arising in all dharmas cannot be found; at that time there is no mark of ceasing. Arising has been refuted, and therefore there is no arising; without arising, how can there be ceasing? If your mind is still unwilling to stop, the many reasons refuting ceasing will now be given.

The verse says: If a dharma exists, it has no ceasing; one dharma should not possess the marks of both existence and nonexistence.

Qingmu explains: While dharmas exist, the mark of ceasing cannot be found when sought. Why? How could one dharma possess both the mark of existence and the mark of nonexistence? Light and shadow do not occupy the same place.

Further, the verse says: If a dharma does not exist, it likewise has no ceasing; 〔T30 0012a01〕like a second head: because it does not exist, it cannot be cut off.

Qingmu explains: If a dharma does not exist, it has no mark of ceasing, just as a second head or a third hand cannot be cut off because it does not exist.

Further, the verse says: A dharma does not cease through its own mark, nor through another mark; just as it does not arise through its own mark, nor through another mark.

Qingmu explains: As stated when the mark of arising was examined, arising does not produce itself and does not arise from another. Arising through one’s own body cannot stand, because all things arise from many conditions, just as a fingertip cannot touch itself. Arising from another also cannot stand. Why? Because that arising does not yet exist, it cannot be said to arise from another. Since arising is absent, it has no body of its own; since its own body is absent, another is absent as well. Thus, arising from another cannot stand. Ceasing is the same: it neither ceases through its own mark nor through another mark.

XII. If the Conditioned Cannot Stand, Where Does the Unconditioned Come From?

Further, the verse says: Because arising, abiding, and ceasing cannot stand, there is no conditioned; since there are no conditioned dharmas, how can there be the unconditioned?

Qingmu explains: You previously said that the existence of the marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing establishes the conditioned, and the existence of the conditioned establishes the unconditioned. Now, when examined in accord with reason, the three marks cannot be found. How could there be the conditioned? As previously stated, there is no markless dharma. Since conditioned dharmas do not exist, how can the unconditioned exist? The mark of the unconditioned means not arising, not abiding, and not ceasing. Because the marks of the conditioned cease, it is called the mark of the unconditioned. The unconditioned has no separate mark of its own; it is through these three marks that the mark of the unconditioned exists. Fire, for example, has heat as its mark, earth hardness, and water cold; the unconditioned is not so.

XIII. Like an Illusion, a Dream, and a Gandharva City

The questioner says: If arising, abiding, and ceasing ultimately do not exist, how can the treatise still speak their names?

The respondent says: The verse says: Like an illusion, like a dream, like a gandharva city— the marks of the arising, abiding, and ceasing that are spoken are likewise.

Qingmu explains: The marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing have no fixed determination; ordinary people, through craving and attachment, call them fixed. The noble ones, moved by compassion and wishing to stop their inversion, teach them using the very names to which they cling—although the words are the same, the minds are different. Statements of the marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing should therefore not be taken as objections. For what is made by illusion, one should not demand its source. One should not form thoughts of sorrow or joy within it, but simply regard it as something seen by the eye. What is seen in a dream should not be sought as real. A gandharva city appears at sunrise but has no body; it is merely provisionally given a name and soon disappears. Arising, abiding, and ceasing are the same: ordinary people discriminate them as existent, while the wise investigate them and cannot find them.

The person at the opening of this chapter says something to which everyone would nod.

He says: the sūtra plainly teaches that conditioned dharmas have three marks—arising, abiding, and ceasing. All things “arise through the dharma of arising, abide through the dharma of abiding, and cease through the dharma of ceasing”; therefore, the many dharmas truly exist. He has not imagined an entity from nothing. He holds the facts before his eyes: the flower opens, remains in bloom, and withers. Everyone can see the three stages. From them he infers backward: since the three operations of arising, abiding, and ceasing perform their work upon all things, those things exist.

The respondent does not deny that flowers bloom and wither. He replies with only one sentence: “The three marks have no fixed determination.”

He then asks a question from which the chapter’s more than thirty verses all grow: you say the three marks can mark conditioned dharmas—then to what class do the three marks themselves belong?

The First Cut: Is What Marks Conditioned or Unconditioned?

There are only two options.

If arising is a conditioned dharma, then by the questioner’s own rule every conditioned dharma must have three marks; arising itself must therefore possess arising, abiding, and ceasing. Qingmu does not begin here with infinite regress. He first addresses something closer: the three cannot crowd into the same place. “Contradiction means that the mark of arising should attend the dharma that is arising, the mark of abiding the dharma that is abiding, and the mark of ceasing the dharma that is ceasing.” While one dharma is arising, how could the contradictory marks of abiding and ceasing be present at the same time? His analogy is exceedingly spare: “As light and darkness do not coexist.”

If arising is called unconditioned, the path is even less open. “Because the unconditioned has no nature.” The name unconditioned is itself only “given because the conditioned has ceased”; it is attached after the conditioned comes to rest. Apart from not arising and not ceasing, “it has no further mark of its own.” How could something without a mark of its own mark something else? Qingmu uses two ready-made absences: “A rabbit’s horn and a turtle’s hair cannot mark a dharma.”

What is brought to prove another must first stand itself. After this first cut, the three marks have already lost the ground beneath them. Every rescue that follows attempts to restore this ground.

Neither Gathered nor Dispersed

The question retreats a step: do the three marks each mark separately, or do they gather and mark together?

If they mark separately, then “at the time of arising there is no abiding or ceasing; at the time of abiding no arising or ceasing; at the time of ceasing no arising or abiding.” At the same locus, marks are sometimes present and sometimes absent, so the three are not universal marks of the conditioned. What if they gather and mark together? “How could mutually contradictory dharmas all be present at one time?” Three operations that conflict with one another cannot crowd simultaneously into one dharma.

Someone then adds another layer for them: above the three marks, supply another set of three marks. The respondent merely follows this road to its end: “This becomes endless; without further marks, they are not conditioned.” Add one layer, and another must be added forever. Add none, and the original marks are not conditioned dharmas and are unqualified to mark the conditioned.

Set another brick beneath something that cannot stand, and the brick itself needs support.

Seven Dharmas Arising Together: Two Things Not Yet Standing Support Each Other

The questioner now offers an intricate mechanism. When one dharma arises, seven dharmas arise together, including its own body: the dharma, arising, abiding, ceasing, secondary arising, secondary abiding, and secondary ceasing. Primary arising, “apart from itself, can produce the other six dharmas,” while secondary arising in turn produces primary arising. In this way, each pair attends to the other and the chain closes at the second layer without becoming infinite.

This move is genuinely elegant. The respondent does not take a detour, but asks one question: where does secondary arising come from? From primary arising. If so—“Secondary arising comes from primary arising; how can it produce primary arising?”

Turn the question around toward primary arising. Primary arising comes from secondary arising: “Primary arising comes from that; how can it produce secondary arising?” Qingmu states the crux plainly: “Secondary arising does not yet possess its own body—how can it produce primary arising?”

The questioner finally relocates the action to the present instant: regardless of before or after, in the very moment secondary arising is arising, it can produce primary arising. The answer remains the same: “Secondary arising does not yet exist—how can it produce primary arising?”

Two people can support one another only if at least one is already standing. If both are still falling, mutual support is not support; it is falling together. This passage lays bare the chapter’s structure: the questioner believes he has found a closed circle, but has merely multiplied “not yet” by two.

The Lamp Analogy: A Lamp Cannot Illuminate Darkness on Its Own Body

The questioner changes to an image familiar to everyone: “A lamp entering a dark room illuminates all objects and can also illuminate itself.” A lamp illuminates another and itself; arising produces another and itself.

The respondent’s reply is the chapter’s finest move. He does not begin with the logic of “self” and “other,” but with the word “illuminate”:

“There is no darkness within the lamp, nor darkness where it abides; only dispelling darkness is called illumination; where there is no darkness, there is no illumination.”

What is illumination? Dispelling darkness is called illumination. Then look: is there darkness in the body of the lamp? No. Is there darkness where the light is present? No. Since neither place contains darkness to begin with, the lamp dispels nothing there—where there is no darkness to dispel, the word “illumination” has no application. The lamp only appears to illuminate itself because we have secretly treated “brightness” as “illumination.”

The questioner retreats once more: the lamp does not illuminate before it arises or after it has arisen, but while it is arising. The respondent says: “A lamp at the time of arising is called half-arisen and half-not-yet-arisen.” The lamp’s own body is not yet established; with what could it dispel darkness? Moreover, it never reaches darkness—“Only when a person catches a thief is it called defeating the thief.” To catch a thief, one must reach the person; shouting from another street does not defeat the thief.

If a lamp could dispel darkness without reaching it, then lighting one lamp here “would dispel all darkness.” It is equally unable to reach darkness everywhere in the world.

The final blow returns symmetry to the opponent: if a lamp illuminates itself and another because it opposes darkness, darkness also opposes the lamp and should therefore “darken itself and darken another.” In fact, no mass of darkness makes itself dark. Since that side fails, the other fails as well. “Therefore, the lamp analogy fails.”

Arising Sought in Three Places Cannot Be Found in Any

Once the analogy has been removed, the respondent examines arising itself. Does arising arise within what has arisen, or within what has not yet arisen?

What has not arisen is no dharma; with what could a non-dharma produce itself? What has arisen is already established: “Once it has arisen, what use is further arising?”—“What has already been done should not be done again.” The question is simple but closes both ends. Together with the gate of the time of arising, already answered in “Examination of Going and Coming,” there is no arising in any of the three places.

For the claim that what has not arisen can arise, Qingmu gives three piercing examples. If a not-yet-arisen dharma could arise, then “all ordinary people in whom bodhi has not arisen should now give rise to bodhi”; “arhats who abide in the indestructible dharma and have no afflictions should now produce afflictions”; and “rabbits and the rest, which have no horns, should now produce horns.” If “not yet present” were enough to produce “present,” practice and the severing of afflictions would become accidents, and horns should grow upon rabbits. If a not-yet-arisen dharma could produce itself, causes and conditions would have no meaning.

The questioner therefore places all the weight upon conditions: when condition, act, agent, time, and place are all complete, the not-yet-arisen dharma arises. The respondent points out that this still must fall into one of three possibilities—prior existence, prior nonexistence, or both—and all three have already been refuted. Moreover, saying arising occurs at the time of arising incurs two arisings: one because “time of arising” receives its name from arising, and another placed inside the time of arising. “There are not two dharmas; how could there be two arisings?”

Conditions Are Not a Refuge; Conditions Are Precisely the Reason for Emptiness

The questioner finally changes his words: I specify none of the three gates; I say only that arising exists because many conditions conjoin.

The respondent does not refute conjunction yet again. He turns the conclusion of conjunction around and places it before the questioner:

“If a dharma arises from many conditions, its nature is quiescent cessation; therefore, arising and the time of arising are both quiescent cessation.”

This is the chapter’s pivot. You bring in many conditions to rescue arising, but to arise from many conditions is precisely to lack intrinsic nature. Qingmu explains quiescent cessation with great clarity: “Quiescent cessation means neither this nor that, without marks; the path of speech is cut off and all proliferations cease.” He then uses woven things: “Cloth exists because of threads, and a mat because of rushes.” If threads had a fixed mark of their own, they should not come from hemp; if cloth had a fixed mark, it should not come from threads. Yet one layer actually depends on another, so none has a fixed nature. Fire and fuel are the same: when one end is absent, the other is absent with it. “Because they lack intrinsic nature, they are empty, like a mirage without reality.”

At this point one thing must be seen clearly: the respondent has never removed the arising and ceasing before one’s eyes, only the determinate body added to them. The flower truly blooms; what cannot be found is a thing called “arising” standing there to execute the blooming.

Abiding: Aging and Death Follow Every Dharma

Once arising has been refuted, the questioner turns to abiding: even if a dharma does not arise, surely it abides.

The respondent does not begin with inference but observation: “All dharmas whatsoever bear the marks of aging and death; one never sees any dharma abide apart from aging and death.” Qingmu adds that impermanence follows from the instant of arising, and “impermanence has two forms, called aging and death.” What we call abiding is only an interval in which change proceeds too slowly for us to see.

Next, abiding is examined through self and other. If abiding abides through its own mark, it becomes permanent and therefore is not a conditioned dharma arising through many conditions. Moreover, self-action upon self has already failed—“The eye cannot see itself; abiding is the same.” If abiding occurs through another mark, that other must rely on yet another, producing an infinite regress.

The eye sees everything but itself. This is the same point running from the lamp analogy through the chapter: what acts cannot act upon itself.

Ceasing: Milk Does Not Cease While It Is Milk; a Second Head Cannot Be Cut Off

Ceasing is likewise sought in three places: what has ceased does not cease again, what has not ceased is apart from the mark of ceasing, and apart from these two there is no distinct time of ceasing.

Two analogies deserve to be remembered. The first is milk: “Milk does not cease while it is milk.” While it remains milk, the mark of milk stands there intact and is not ceasing; once it is not milk, one cannot say that milk is ceasing. No exact instant of decay can be indicated. The second is a second head: if the dharma does not exist, no ceasing can be spoken of—“Like a second head: because it does not exist, it cannot be cut off.” What never existed cannot be severed.

That ceasing occurs neither from self nor from other has the same reason as arising: “A fingertip cannot touch itself.” As for another, that other likewise lacks a body of its own—“Because its own body is absent, the other is absent too.”

Once the Conditioned Fails, the Unconditioned Has No Support

When the three marks fail, conditioned dharmas fail. What, then, of the unconditioned? Qingmu speaks honestly about where the name comes from: “Because the marks of the conditioned cease, it is called the mark of the unconditioned. The unconditioned has no distinct mark of its own; it is through these three marks that the mark of the unconditioned exists.” Fire has heat, earth hardness, and water cold, each as its own mark; “the unconditioned is not so.” It is a name established only against the three marks on the other side.

Something established purely through contrast is removed when the contrast is removed. Thus, at the end of the chapter’s refutation, no secure unconditioned remains for one to inhabit.

Illusion, Dream, and Gandharva City: What, Then, Can Be Said?

The questioner finally asks an honest question: if arising, abiding, and ceasing ultimately do not exist, why does the treatise keep using their names?

The respondent closes with three analogies: “Like an illusion, like a dream, like a gandharva city.”

Qingmu’s explanation should be read slowly. The marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing have no fixed determination; ordinary people, through craving and attachment, call them fixed. Yet “the noble ones, moved by compassion and wishing to stop their inversion, teach them using the very names to which they cling. Although the words are the same, the minds are different.” The teaching uses the listener’s words, not the speaker’s view. With the same word “arising,” an ordinary person indicates a real event, while a noble one uses it to stop an inversion. The word has not changed; the mind has. To take these names as an objection therefore aims at the wrong place.

Under the illusion analogy, Qingmu adds the chapter’s most immediately practical sentence:

“For what is made by illusion, one should not demand its source. One should not form thoughts of sorrow or joy within it, but simply regard it as something seen by the eye.”

The first half concerns principle: one need not demand the origin of something conjured by illusion, because it never possessed an origin to trace. The latter half reaches the mind—one should not give rise to thoughts of sorrow or joy within it; one should take it simply as something the eye has seen.

This sentence is where the chapter turns from doctrine to cultivation of mind. After more than thirty verses have pressed arising, abiding, and ceasing into nonattainment, the reader can easily stop at a clever conclusion: so nothing exists after all. But that is not Qingmu’s point. His point is: since what is seen is like illusion, seeing is simply seeing. Do not add a portion of joy to it, and do not add a portion of sorrow. Sorrow and joy are the two faces of attachment. Once either arises, one has tacitly conceded that the event bears enough real weight to make the mind rise and fall.

Dream is the same: “What is seen in a dream should not be sought as real.” A gandharva city is the same: it appears at sunrise but has no body, “merely provisionally given a name and soon gone.” None of the three analogies tells one to close one’s eyes and stop seeing; they tell one to see without pursuing.

The final sentence gathers the chapter: “Ordinary people discriminate it as existent; the wise investigate it and cannot find it.” The same event appears existent when viewed through discrimination and unfindable when investigated. The object has not changed; the mode of seeing has.

What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?

First, what is refuted is fixed determination, not appearance. At the end of the search the treatise indeed says “therefore, no arising,” and “because arising, abiding, and ceasing cannot stand, there is no conditioned.” But what is absent is arising and ceasing with intrinsic nature; what is removed is their “fixed determination”—the three marks “have no fixed determination,” while “ordinary people, through craving and attachment, call them fixed.” The flower still blooms; there is simply no thing called arising behind it performing the act.

Second, what acts cannot act upon itself. There is no darkness within a lamp, the eye cannot see itself, and a fingertip cannot touch itself. Any attempt to use one thing to guarantee its own account breaks at this sentence.

Third, two things holding each other up cannot both remain ungrounded. The difficulty of primary and secondary arising appears throughout daily life: reason is used to certify confidence and confidence to certify reason; result certifies method and method result. Look to see whether either end stood first.

Fourth, seeing is simply seeing. “One should not form thoughts of sorrow or joy within it, but simply regard it as something seen by the eye.” This is the sentence the chapter leaves in the heart. There is no need to deny an object when it arrives, and no need to rise and fall with it. Only when no sorrow or joy is added have the preceding thirty-odd verses truly been read into the mind.

Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror

The preceding is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows lets the Sui–Tang Three Treatises tradition illuminate it from the side. The mirror is not the treatise; it offers another way to read the same verses.

Jizang’s Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle places the chapter within the sequence of the whole treatise. From “Examination of Conditions” through “Examination of Defilement and the Defiled,” the treatise clarified that no dharma is marked; this chapter clarifies that there is nothing that marks. When both marking and marked are unfindable, the conditioned is empty; when the conditioned is empty, the unconditioned is empty with it. He also divides the chapter’s thirty-five verses in two: the first thirty-four refute the existence of three marks, and the final verse refutes their nonexistence. Together, the two sections disclose that the three marks can be determined neither as existent nor nonexistent, which he calls the Middle Way within conventional truth. As for the illusion and dream of the final verse, he reads them back across several earlier chapters: if the three marks are like illusion and dream, then the four conditions, going and coming, six faculties, five aggregates, and the rest likewise enter the ten analogies.

This mirror joins the chapter to the Three Treatises tradition’s interpretation of the treatise’s whole sequence and the Middle Way of the two truths. Its division, doctrinal labels, and retrospective application to previous chapters are Jizang’s additions, not the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s long commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.