中論 觀如來品第二十二
問方只說一句常話：如來是「一切世中尊」，是法王，是一切智人，故「是則應有」。讚歎無錯，錯在「應有」。答方就地一驗：「若有應取；若無何所取？」
五路都走不通
「非陰不離陰，此彼不相在； 如來不有陰，何處有如來？」
是陰，則隨陰生滅，且「受者受法則一」；離陰，則落常，且「眼等諸根不能見知」。「如器中有果、水中有魚」「如床上有人、器中有乳」「如人有子」——凡說在中、說擁有，甲乙必成兩個，便回常過。「如是五種求不可得」。
退到和合，退到他性
說「五陰和合有如來」，已自認待緣，「則無有自性」。再退說因他性有，兩句便截：「他性亦無自性」；「無相待因故，他性不可得」——自既無，他也安不上名。
青目譬喻平白：「如因五指有拳，是拳無有自體。」握則有用，散則無體。「我有種種名，或名眾生、人、天、如來等」——在五陰外安一如來自體，與凡夫安我，手勢一樣。
空不是拿來立的
兩頭都空，人還想以空捏一個空如來，故問「則定有空耶？」答：「空則不可說，非空不可說，共不共叵說，但以假名說。」理由只一句：「但破相違故以假名說。」空是解結之藥，非結論。
「寂滅相中無，常無常等四」，邊無邊亦然。實相「畢竟清淨不可取」，「空尚不受，何況有四種見」；「四種見皆因受生」，又「以自見為貴、他見為賤」——爭的是我見比你見高。
兩頭都不站
「邪見深厚者，則說無如來；如來寂滅相，分別有亦非。」
說無如來，是「破世間樂」那一種粗邪見，「乃失世間樂，何況涅槃」。說有如來也不是——是在寂滅相上加分別；「貪著於我，分別有無」，故「分別有無故不得涅槃」。滅後有無連思惟也不許：「如來從本已來畢竟空，何況滅後！」問已預設滅前有實在的他。
「如來過戲論，而人生戲論」，「戲論破慧眼，是皆不見佛。」戲論者，「憶念取相分別此彼」。不見，非佛不在，是眼自蓋，故「不能見如來法身」。青目收得準：「初中後思惟，如來定性不可得」——不可得的只是定性。
落處
「如來所有性，即是世間性；如來無有性，世間亦無性。」
追問到底，答只九字：「如來無有性，同世間無性。」
同的不是染淨，是存在的方式：兩邊都待緣、都無自體，沒有一道自性的牆把如來隔在世間外。
一路破下來手裡越來越空，末後這句是回頭的路：佛不在別處。
The questioner says only something familiar: the Tathāgata is “honored throughout all worlds,” the Dharma King and the omniscient person; therefore, “he should exist.” There is no fault in the praise. The fault lies in “should exist.” The respondent tests it on the spot: “If he exists, he should be apprehensible; if he does not exist, what is there to apprehend?”
None of the Five Routes Works
“Not the aggregates, not apart from the aggregates; neither resides within the other. The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates—where is there a Tathāgata?”
If he is the aggregates, he arises and ceases with them, and “experiencer and experienced dharma become one.” If apart from them, he becomes permanent, and “the faculties such as the eye cannot see or know him.” “Like fruit in a vessel or fish in water,” “like a person on a bed or milk in a vessel,” “like a person having a son”—whether one says inside or possessed, A and B become two and return to the fault of permanence. “Sought in these five ways, he cannot be found.”
Retreat to Combination, Then to Other-Nature
To say “the Tathāgata exists when the five aggregates combine” already admits dependence on conditions, and therefore “there is no intrinsic nature.” Retreat again and say he exists through other-nature, and two sentences cut the route off: “Other-nature itself has no intrinsic nature”; “without an opposed ground of mutual dependence, other-nature cannot be found.” Once self is absent, the name “other” has nowhere to land.
Qingmu’s analogy is plain: “Just as a fist exists through five fingers, this fist has no substance of its own.” Clenched, it functions; opened, it has no body. “The self has many names: being, person, deva, Tathāgata, and so forth.” To place a Tathāgata-substance outside the five aggregates uses the same gesture by which an ordinary person installs a self.
Emptiness Is Not Established as Something
When both ends are empty, one still tries to mold an empty Tathāgata out of emptiness, asking: “Then does emptiness definitely exist?” The answer: “Empty cannot be spoken; nonempty cannot be spoken; both and neither cannot be spoken; they are spoken only as provisional names.” The reason is one sentence: “They are provisionally named only to dismantle contradiction.” Emptiness is medicine that unties a knot, not a conclusion.
“Within the mark of quiescence there is no tetralemma of permanent and impermanent,” and the same holds for bounded and unbounded. The true character is “ultimately pure and cannot be appropriated”; “even emptiness is not accepted, how much less the four views.” “The four views all arise through appropriation” and “honor one’s own view while disparaging another’s.” What is at stake is whose view stands higher.
Neither Side Stands
“Those whose wrong views are deeply rooted say that there is no Tathāgata; yet within the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence, to discriminate and say that he exists is likewise wrong.”
To say there is no Tathāgata is the coarse wrong view that “destroys worldly well-being”; it “loses even worldly well-being, how much more nirvāṇa.” Yet saying there is a Tathāgata is also wrong when it adds discrimination to the mark of quiescence. One “craves and clings to a self and discriminates existence and nonexistence,” and therefore “does not attain nirvāṇa because of discriminating existence and nonexistence.” Even the question of existence after cessation is disallowed: “The Tathāgata has always been ultimately empty—how much more after cessation!” The question has already assumed a real one before cessation.
“The Tathāgata has passed beyond conceptual proliferation, yet people generate it”; “conceptual proliferation destroys the eye of wisdom, and such people do not see the Buddha.” Conceptual proliferation means “recollection, apprehending marks, and discriminating this and that.” Not seeing does not mean that the Buddha is absent; the eye has covered itself, and therefore “cannot see the Tathāgata’s Dharma-body.” Qingmu concludes precisely: “Contemplated from beginning through middle to end, the Tathāgata’s determinate nature cannot be found.” What cannot be found is determinate nature alone.
Where It Lands
“Whatever nature the Tathāgata has is the nature of the world; the Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature, and the world likewise has no intrinsic nature.”
Pressed to the end, the answer is only nine Chinese characters: “The Tathāgata has no nature, just as the world has no nature.”
What they share is not purity and defilement, but the mode of existence: both depend on conditions and lack a substance of their own. No wall of intrinsic nature separates the Tathāgata outside the world.
The farther the refutation proceeds, the emptier the hand becomes. The final sentence is the road back: the Buddha is not elsewhere.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷四〈觀如來品第二十二〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0029c07〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0029c07〕問曰：一切世中尊，唯有如來正遍知號為法王，一切智人是則應有。
答曰：今諦思惟，若有應取；若無何所取？何以故？如來，
「非陰不離陰，此彼不相在；
如來不有陰，何處有如來？」
若如來實有者，為五陰是如來？為離五陰有如來？為如來中有五陰？為五陰中有如來？為如來有五陰。是事皆不然。五陰非是如來。何以故？生滅相故。五陰生滅相，若如來是五陰，如來即是生滅相。若生滅相者，如來即有無常斷滅等過。又受者受法則一，受者是如來、受法是五陰。是事不然，是故如來非是五陰。離五陰亦無如來，若離五陰有如來者，不應有生滅相。若爾者，如來有常等過。又眼等諸根不能見知，但是事不然，是故離五陰亦無如來。如來中亦無五陰。何以故？若如來中有五陰，如器中有果、水中有魚者，則為有異。若異者，即有如上常等過，是故如來中無五陰。又五陰中無如來。何以故？若五陰中有如來，如床上有人、器中有乳者，如是則有別異，如上說過，是故五陰中無如來。如來亦不有五陰。何以故？若如來有五陰，如人有子，如是則有別異。若爾者，有如上過。是事不然，是故如來不有五陰。如是五種求不可得，何等是如來？
〔T30 0030a03〕問曰：如是義求如來不可得，而五陰和合有如來。
答曰：
「陰合有如來，則無有自性；
若無有自性，云何因他有？」
若如來五陰和合故有，即無自性。何以故？因五陰和合有故。
問曰：如來不以自性有，但因他性有。
答曰：若無自性，云何因他性有？何以故？他性亦無自性。又無相待因故，他性不可得，不可得故不名為他。復次：
「法若因他生，是即為非我；
若法非我者，云何是如來？」
若法因眾緣生，即無有我。如因五指有拳，是拳無有自體。如是因五陰名我，是我即無自體。我有種種名，或名眾生、人、天、如來等。若如來因五陰有，即無自性，無自性故無我。若無我，云何說名如來？是故偈中說「法若因他生，是即為非我；若法非我者，云何是如來？」復次：
「若無有自性，云何有他性？
離自性他性，何名為如來？」
若無自性，他性亦不應有。因自性故名他性，此無故彼亦無，是故自性、他性二俱無。若離自性、他性，誰為如來？復次：
「若不因五陰，先有如來者，
以今受陰故，則說為如來。
今實不受陰，更無如來法，
若以不受無，今當云何受？
若其未有受，所受不名受，
無有無受法，而名為如來。
若於一異中，如來不可得，
五種求亦無，云何受中有？
又所受五陰，不從自性有，
若無自性者，云何有他性？」
若未受五陰先有如來者，是如來今應受五陰已作如來，而實未受五陰時先無如來，今云何當受？又不受五陰者，五陰不名為受，無有無受而名為如來。又如來一異中求不可得，五陰中五種求亦不可得。若爾者，云何於五陰中說有如來？又所受五陰，不從自性有。若謂從他性有。若不從自性有。云何從他性有？何以故？以無自性故，又他性亦無。復次：
「以如是義故，受空受者空，
云何當以空，而說空如來？」
以是義思惟，受及受者皆空。若受空者，云何以空受而說空如來？
問曰：汝謂受空、受者空，則定有空耶？
答曰？
不然。何以故？
「空則不可說，非空不可說，
共不共叵說，但以假名說。」
諸法空則不應說，諸法不空亦不應說，諸法空不空亦不應說，非空非不空亦不應說。何以故？但破相違故以假名說。如是正觀思惟，諸法實相中不應以諸難為難。何以故？
「寂滅相中無，常無常等四；
寂滅相中無，邊無邊等四。」
諸法實相如是微妙寂滅，但因過去世起四種邪見：世間有常、世間無常、世間常無常、世間非常非無常；寂滅中盡無。何以故？諸法實相畢竟清淨不可取，空尚不受，何況有四種見。四種見皆因受生，諸法實相無所因受。四種見皆以自見為貴、他見為賤，諸法實相無有此彼。是故說寂滅中無四種見。如因過去世有四種見，因未來世有四種見亦如是。世間有邊、世間無邊、世間有邊無邊、世間非有邊非無邊。
問曰：若如是破如來者，則無如來耶？
答曰：
「邪見深厚者，則說無如來；
如來寂滅相，分別有亦非。」
邪見有二種：一者破世間樂；二者破涅槃道。破世間樂者是麁邪見，言無罪無福，無如來等賢聖。起是邪見，捨善為惡，則破世間樂。破涅槃道者，貪著於我，分別有無，起善滅惡。起善故得世間樂，分別有無故不得涅槃。是故若言無如來者，是深厚邪見，乃失世間樂，何況涅槃！若言有如來，亦是邪見。何以故？如來寂滅相，而種種分別故。是故寂滅相中，分別有如來亦為非。
「如是性空中，思惟亦不可，
如來滅度後，分別於有無。」
諸法實相性空故，不應於如來滅後思惟若有、若無、若有無。如來從本已來畢竟空，何況滅後！
「如來過戲論，而人生戲論，
〔T30 0031a01〕戲論破慧眼，是皆不見佛。」
戲論名憶念取相分別此彼。言佛滅不滅等，是人為戲論，覆慧眼故，不能見如來法身。此〈如來品〉中，初中後思惟，如來定性不可得。是故偈說：
「如來所有性，即是世間性；
如來無有性，世間亦無性。」
此品中思惟推求，如來性即是一切世間性。
問曰：何等是如來性？
答曰：如來無有性，同世間無性。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷四〈觀如來品第二十二〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、問：尊號能不能證成有一個如來
〔T30 0029c07〕問的一方說：一切世間之中最尊貴的，唯有如來——他是正遍知，號為法王，是一切智人；這樣的一位，就應當是有的。
答的一方說：如今且如實思惟：若說是有，那就應當可以取得；若說是無，又有什麼可取的呢？為什麼這樣說？就如來而言——
二、頌：五種尋求
如來不是五陰，也不離開五陰；如來與五陰，此不在彼之中，彼也不在此之中。
如來並不擁有五陰。那麼，何處還有一個如來？
三、釋：五門逐一勘驗
若如來確實是有的，那就要問：是五陰就是如來？是離開五陰另有如來？是如來之中有五陰？是五陰之中有如來？還是如來擁有五陰？這幾件事都不能成立。
第一，五陰不是如來。為什麼？因為五陰是生滅之相。五陰既是生滅相，如來若就是五陰，如來也就是生滅相；若是生滅相，如來便有無常、斷滅等種種過失。再者，這樣一來，能受的與所受之法就成了同一件事——能受的是如來，所受之法是五陰。這是不對的。所以如來不是五陰。
第二，離開五陰也沒有如來。若離開五陰另有一個如來，他就不應當有生滅之相；若是如此，如來便有常住等過失。而且，眼等諸根也無從見他、知他——但這件事並不是這樣。所以離開五陰也沒有如來。
第三，如來之中也沒有五陰。為什麼？如來之中若有五陰，就像器皿之中有果子、水中有魚一樣，那麼二者便成了異物；既是異物，就有上面所說的常住等過失。所以如來之中沒有五陰。
第四，五陰之中也沒有如來。為什麼？五陰之中若有如來，就像床上有人、器皿之中有乳一樣，這樣二者便有分別差異，仍有上面所說的過失。所以五陰之中沒有如來。
第五，如來也不擁有五陰。為什麼？如來若擁有五陰，就像人有兒子一樣，這樣二者便有分別差異；若是如此，就有上面所說的過失。這是不對的。所以如來不擁有五陰。
像這樣以五種方式尋求都尋不著，那麼，什麼才是如來呢？
四、問：五陰和合便有如來
〔T30 0030a03〕問的一方說：照這樣的義理去求，如來固然求不可得；但五陰和合起來，就有如來。
答的一方於是說如下的偈頌。
五、頌與釋：和合而有便無自性
五陰和合而有如來，那就沒有自性；既然沒有自性，又怎能因著他者而有？
若如來是因五陰和合的緣故才有的，那就沒有自性。為什麼？因為他是因五陰和合才有的。
問的一方說：如來不是憑自性而有，只是因他性而有。
答的一方說：若沒有自性，怎能因他性而有？為什麼？因為他性本身也沒有自性。再者，沒有相待的因，他性便不可得；不可得的緣故，也就不能叫作他。此外還有：
法若是因他緣而生的，那就不是我；法若不是我，又怎麼會是如來？
若法是因眾緣而生的，就沒有我。就像因五根手指而有拳，這拳並沒有自體。同樣，因五陰而名為我，這個我也就沒有自體。我有種種名稱，或叫作眾生，或叫作人，或叫作天，或叫作如來等等。如來若是因五陰而有的，就沒有自性；沒有自性的緣故，就沒有我。既然沒有我，又憑什麼說他名為如來？所以偈中說：法若因他而生，那就不是我；法若不是我，又怎麼會是如來？此外還有：
六、頌與釋：自性他性二俱無
若沒有自性，哪裡會有他性？離開了自性與他性，還有什麼可名為如來？
若沒有自性，他性也不應當有。正因為有自性，才相對地說他性；此處既然沒有，彼處也就沒有。所以自性、他性二者俱無。若離開自性與他性，誰是如來呢？此外還有：
七、頌：受陰的前與後
若不因五陰，而是先已有一個如來，那才可以說：因為如今受了五陰的緣故，所以說他為如來。
如今實在不曾有一個未受陰而先在的如來，此外也更沒有別的如來之法；若因為那個不受陰者是沒有的，如今又要由誰來受？
若那個能受者還不曾有，所受的也就不能叫作所受；沒有一個不受之法，而可名為如來。
若在一與異之中，如來都不可得；以五種方式尋求也沒有，那麼怎會在受之中有？
再者，所受的五陰，也不是從自性而有的；既然沒有自性，哪裡會有他性？
八、釋：逐句解上來諸頌
若未受五陰之前先有如來，那麼這個如來如今應當是受了五陰之後才作如來的；然而事實上未受五陰之時並沒有一個先在的如來，如今又是誰來受呢？再者，不受五陰的話，五陰就不叫作所受；沒有一個不受而可名為如來的。再者，如來在一與異之中尋求不可得，在五陰之中以五種方式尋求也不可得；若是如此，怎能說五陰之中有如來？再者，所受的五陰，不是從自性而有。若說是從他性而有——既然不是從自性而有，又怎能從他性而有？為什麼？因為沒有自性的緣故；而且他性也是沒有的。此外還有：
九、頌與釋：受空、受者空
依上來這樣的義理，所受是空的，能受者也是空的；那麼怎能拿一個空的所受，去說一個空的如來？
依這樣的義理思惟，所受與能受者都是空的。所受既然是空的，怎能以空的所受而說有一個空的如來？
十、問答：那麼是不是決定有一個空
問的一方說：你說所受空、能受者空，那麼是不是決定有一個空？
答的一方說：
不是這樣。為什麼？
說空，便不可說；說非空，也不可說；說亦空亦非空、說非空非非空，都說不得——只是以假名而說。
諸法是空，就不應當說；諸法不空，也不應當說；諸法亦空亦不空，也不應當說；諸法非空非不空，也不應當說。為什麼？只是為了破除相違，才用假名來說。像這樣正觀思惟，於諸法實相之中，不應當拿種種責難當作責難。為什麼？
十一、頌與釋：寂滅相中沒有八種見
寂滅之相中，沒有常、無常等四句。
寂滅之相中，沒有有邊、無邊等四句。
諸法實相是這樣的微妙寂滅。只是眾生因著過去世而起四種邪見：世間是常、世間無常、世間亦常亦無常、世間非常非無常——這些在寂滅之中一概沒有。為什麼？諸法實相畢竟清淨、不可取著，連空尚且不受，何況那四種見！四種見都是因受取而生的，而諸法實相並無所因、無所受。四種見都是以自己所見為貴、以他人所見為賤，而諸法實相並沒有這邊那邊。所以說寂滅之中沒有這四種見。正如因過去世而有四種見，因未來世而有四種見也是一樣：世間有邊、世間無邊、世間亦有邊亦無邊、世間非有邊非無邊。
十二、問答：這樣破如來，豈不是就沒有如來
問的一方說：若像這樣破如來，那麼是不是就沒有如來了？
答的一方說：
邪見深厚的人，才會說沒有如來；而如來是寂滅之相，在其中分別說有，也是不對的。
邪見有兩種：一種是破壞世間的安樂，一種是破壞通往涅槃的道。破壞世間安樂的，是粗重的邪見——說沒有罪、沒有福，沒有如來等賢聖。起了這種邪見，便捨棄善行而去作惡，於是破壞了世間的安樂。破壞涅槃道的，是貪著於我，分別有無；他也起善滅惡，因起善的緣故得世間安樂，但因分別有無的緣故不得涅槃。所以若說沒有如來，這是深厚的邪見，連世間安樂尚且失去，何況涅槃！而若說有如來，也同樣是邪見。為什麼？因為如來是寂滅之相，卻對他作種種分別的緣故。所以說：寂滅相中，分別說有如來，也是不對的。
十三、頌與釋：滅度之後不可思惟有無
在這樣的性空之中，連思惟也不可以——思惟如來滅度之後，分別他是有還是無。
諸法實相是性空的緣故，不應當在如來滅後思惟他是有、是無、還是亦有亦無。如來從本以來畢竟是空，何況滅度之後！
十四、頌與釋：戲論覆蓋慧眼
〔T30 0031a01〕如來超過一切戲論，而人卻生起戲論；戲論破壞慧眼，這些人都見不到佛。
所謂戲論，就是憶念、取相、分別這個與那個。說佛滅、佛不滅等等，這樣的人就是在戲論；因為覆蓋了慧眼的緣故，不能見如來法身。在這〈如來品〉之中，從初、到中、到後這樣思惟下來，如來的決定之性了不可得。所以偈中說：
十五、頌與釋：如來所有性即是世間性
如來所有的性，就是世間的性；如來沒有自性，世間也同樣沒有自性。
這一品之中如此思惟推求：如來之性就是一切世間之性。
問的一方說：什麼是如來性呢？
答的一方說：如來沒有自性，正同於世間沒有自性。
Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Later Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, fascicle four, “Examination of the Tathāgata, Chapter Twenty-Two,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-initial〔T30 …〕marks a Taishō page-column-line anchor.
1. Question: Can Titles of Honor Prove That a Tathāgata Exists?
〔T30 0029c07〕The questioner says: In all the world, only the Tathāgata is most honored. He is the Perfectly and Completely Awakened One, called the Dharma King and the omniscient person. Such a one should therefore exist.
The respondent says: Now consider the matter in accordance with reality. If he exists, he should be apprehensible; if he does not exist, what is there to apprehend? Why is this said? Concerning the Tathāgata—
2. Verse: The Fivefold Search
The Tathāgata is not the five aggregates and is not apart from the five aggregates; the Tathāgata and the aggregates do not reside within each other.
Nor does the Tathāgata possess the five aggregates. Where, then, is there a Tathāgata?
3. Commentary: Examining Each of the Five Routes
If the Tathāgata truly existed, one would have to ask: Are the five aggregates themselves the Tathāgata? Is there another Tathāgata apart from the five aggregates? Are the five aggregates within the Tathāgata? Is the Tathāgata within the five aggregates? Or does the Tathāgata possess the five aggregates? None of these can be established.
First, the five aggregates are not the Tathāgata. Why? Because the five aggregates bear the mark of arising and ceasing. Since the aggregates arise and cease, if the Tathāgata were the aggregates, the Tathāgata too would bear the mark of arising and ceasing. If he bore that mark, the Tathāgata would incur the various faults of impermanence, annihilation, and so forth. Further, experiencer and experienced dharma would then become one: the experiencer is the Tathāgata, while the experienced dharma is the five aggregates. This is wrong. Therefore, the Tathāgata is not the five aggregates.
Second, there is no Tathāgata apart from the five aggregates. If another Tathāgata existed apart from the five aggregates, he should not bear the mark of arising and ceasing. If so, the Tathāgata would incur faults such as permanent abiding. Moreover, the faculties such as the eye would have no means to see or know him—but this is not in fact so. Therefore, there is no Tathāgata apart from the five aggregates.
Third, the five aggregates are not within the Tathāgata. Why? If the five aggregates were within the Tathāgata, like fruit within a vessel or fish in water, the two would be different things. Being different, they would incur the faults of permanent abiding explained above. Therefore, the five aggregates are not within the Tathāgata.
Fourth, the Tathāgata is not within the five aggregates. Why? If the Tathāgata were within the five aggregates, like a person on a bed or milk within a vessel, the two would be distinctly different and would still incur the faults explained above. Therefore, the Tathāgata is not within the five aggregates.
Fifth, the Tathāgata does not possess the five aggregates. Why? If the Tathāgata possessed the five aggregates, like a person having a son, the two would be distinctly different. If so, they would incur the faults explained above. This is wrong. Therefore, the Tathāgata does not possess the five aggregates.
Sought in these five ways and not found, what then is the Tathāgata?
4. Question: The Tathāgata Exists When the Five Aggregates Combine
〔T30 0030a03〕The questioner says: Sought according to this reasoning, the Tathāgata indeed cannot be found; yet when the five aggregates combine, there is a Tathāgata.
The respondent then speaks the following verse.
5. Verse and Commentary: What Exists through Combination Has No Intrinsic Nature
If the Tathāgata exists through the combination of the five aggregates, then he has no intrinsic nature. Since he has no intrinsic nature, how could he exist by virtue of other-nature?
If the Tathāgata exists because the five aggregates combine, he has no intrinsic nature. Why? Because he exists by virtue of the combination of the five aggregates.
The questioner says: The Tathāgata does not exist through intrinsic nature, but exists only by virtue of other-nature.
The respondent says: Without intrinsic nature, how could he exist by virtue of other-nature? Why? Because other-nature itself has no intrinsic nature. Further, without an opposed ground of mutual dependence, other-nature cannot be found; since it cannot be found, it cannot be called “other.” Further:
If a dharma arises through other conditions, it is not a self. If a dharma is not a self, how could it be the Tathāgata?
If a dharma arises through many conditions, there is no self. Just as a fist exists through five fingers yet has no substance of its own, so the self is named by virtue of the five aggregates and has no substance of its own. The self has many names: being, person, deva, Tathāgata, and so forth. If the Tathāgata exists through the five aggregates, he has no intrinsic nature. Since he has no intrinsic nature, there is no self. Without a self, on what basis can he be named Tathāgata? Thus the verse says: if a dharma arises through another, it is not a self; if the dharma is not a self, how could it be the Tathāgata? Further:
6. Verse and Commentary: Neither Intrinsic Nature nor Other-Nature Exists
Without intrinsic nature, where could other-nature exist? Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, what could be named Tathāgata?
If there is no intrinsic nature, other-nature likewise should not exist. Other-nature is named only in relation to intrinsic nature. Since this does not exist here, that likewise does not exist there. Therefore, intrinsic nature and other-nature are both nonexistent. Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, who is the Tathāgata? Further:
7. Verses: Before and After Appropriating the Aggregates
Only if a Tathāgata already existed before and without depending on the five aggregates could one say that because he now appropriates the five aggregates, he is called the Tathāgata.
In reality, no Tathāgata first exists without appropriating the aggregates, nor is there some other dharma of the Tathāgata. Since one who does not appropriate the aggregates is nonexistent, who now could appropriate them?
If an appropriator has not yet existed, what is appropriated cannot be called appropriated. There is no dharma that does not appropriate the aggregates yet can be named Tathāgata.
If the Tathāgata cannot be found within identity or difference and is absent in the fivefold search, how could he exist within appropriation?
Further, the appropriated five aggregates do not exist through intrinsic nature. Since there is no intrinsic nature, where could other-nature exist?
8. Commentary: Explaining the Preceding Verses Line by Line
If a Tathāgata existed before appropriating the five aggregates, this Tathāgata should now become a Tathāgata after appropriating them. Yet in reality, no Tathāgata first exists before appropriating the five aggregates; who now could appropriate them? Further, if the five aggregates are not appropriated, they are not called what is appropriated; there is no one who can be named Tathāgata without appropriating the five aggregates. Further, the Tathāgata cannot be found when sought through identity and difference, nor can he be found in the fivefold search within the five aggregates. If so, how can one say that the Tathāgata exists within the five aggregates? Further, the appropriated five aggregates do not exist through intrinsic nature. If one says they exist through other-nature—since they do not exist through intrinsic nature, how could they exist through other-nature? Why? Because intrinsic nature does not exist, and other-nature likewise does not exist. Further:
9. Verse and Commentary: Appropriation Is Empty and the Appropriator Is Empty
According to the preceding reasoning, appropriation is empty and the appropriator is also empty. How could an empty appropriation be used to speak of an empty Tathāgata?
Examined according to this reasoning, appropriation and appropriator are both empty. Since appropriation is empty, how could an empty appropriation be used to speak of an empty Tathāgata?
10. Question and Answer: Then Is There Definitely an Emptiness?
The questioner says: You say that appropriation is empty and the appropriator is empty. Does that mean emptiness definitely exists?
The respondent says:
It is not so. Why?
To speak of empty is impossible; to speak of nonempty is impossible. To speak of both empty and nonempty, or neither empty nor nonempty, is likewise impossible—they are spoken only as provisional names.
One should not say that dharmas are empty, nor that dharmas are nonempty; one should not say that dharmas are both empty and nonempty, nor that they are neither empty nor nonempty. Why? These are spoken as provisional names only to dismantle contradiction. In such correct contemplation of the true character of dharmas, the various challenges should not be taken as challenges. Why?
11. Verse and Commentary: The Eight Views Do Not Exist within the Mark of Quiescence
Within the mark of quiescence, there is no tetralemma of permanent, impermanent, and the rest.
Within the mark of quiescence, there is no tetralemma of bounded, unbounded, and the rest.
The true character of dharmas is subtle and quiescent in this way. Beings form four wrong views regarding the past: the world is permanent; the world is impermanent; the world is both permanent and impermanent; the world is neither permanent nor impermanent. None of these exists within quiescence. Why? The true character of dharmas is ultimately pure and cannot be appropriated. Even emptiness is not accepted—how much less the four views! The four views all arise through appropriation, while the true character of dharmas has nothing through which it appropriates. The four views all honor one’s own view and disparage another’s, while the true character of dharmas has neither this side nor that. Therefore, it is said that the four views do not exist within quiescence. Just as four views concerning the past exist, there are likewise four views concerning the future: the world is bounded; the world is unbounded; the world is both bounded and unbounded; the world is neither bounded nor unbounded.
12. Question and Answer: If the Tathāgata Is Refuted in This Way, Does That Mean There Is No Tathāgata?
The questioner says: If the Tathāgata is refuted in this way, does that mean there is no Tathāgata?
The respondent says:
Only those whose wrong views are deeply rooted say that there is no Tathāgata; yet within the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence, to discriminate and say that he exists is likewise wrong.
There are two kinds of wrong view: one destroys worldly well-being, while the other destroys the path to nirvāṇa. The kind that destroys worldly well-being is a coarse wrong view: saying there is no demerit, no merit, and no Tathāgata or other noble one. On forming such a wrong view, one abandons wholesome conduct and does evil, thereby destroying worldly well-being. The kind that destroys the path to nirvāṇa craves and clings to a self and discriminates between existence and nonexistence. Such a person also cultivates good and ends evil, gaining worldly well-being because of cultivating good, yet failing to attain nirvāṇa because of discriminating between existence and nonexistence. Therefore, saying that there is no Tathāgata is a deeply rooted wrong view: one loses even worldly well-being, how much more nirvāṇa! Yet to say that the Tathāgata exists is likewise a wrong view. Why? Because one makes various discriminations about the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence. Therefore, within the mark of quiescence, to discriminate and say that the Tathāgata exists is likewise wrong.
13. Verse and Commentary: After Cessation, One Cannot Conceive Existence or Nonexistence
Within such emptiness of nature, even conception is impossible—the conception that discriminates whether the Tathāgata exists or does not exist after cessation.
Because the true character of dharmas is empty of nature, one should not conceive the Tathāgata after cessation as existent, nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent. The Tathāgata has always been ultimately empty—how much more after cessation!
14. Verse and Commentary: Conceptual Proliferation Covers the Eye of Wisdom
〔T30 0031a01〕The Tathāgata has passed beyond all conceptual proliferation, yet people generate conceptual proliferation. Conceptual proliferation destroys the eye of wisdom, and such people do not see the Buddha.
Conceptual proliferation means recollection, apprehending marks, and discrimination between this and that. Those who say that the Buddha has ceased, has not ceased, and so forth engage in conceptual proliferation; because it covers the eye of wisdom, they cannot see the Tathāgata’s Dharma-body. In this “Examination of the Tathāgata,” contemplating from beginning through middle to end, the determinate nature of the Tathāgata cannot be found. Therefore, the verse says:
15. Verse and Commentary: The Tathāgata’s Nature Is the Nature of the World
Whatever nature the Tathāgata has is the nature of the world. The Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature; the world likewise has no intrinsic nature.
The examination and inquiry in this chapter reveal that the nature of the Tathāgata is the nature of the entire world.
The questioner says: What is the nature of the Tathāgata?
The respondent says: The Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature, just as the world has no intrinsic nature.
《中論》一路破去、破來、破生、破滅，讀者大抵還撐得住——那些都是法。到了這一品，所破的是佛。
而且問的人並不是來挑釁的。他開口只說了一句最尋常不過的話：「一切世中尊，唯有如來正遍知號為法王，一切智人是則應有。」世間最尊的就是如來；他是正遍知，是法王，是一切智人。這樣一位，總該是有的吧？
這一問裡藏著一個轉折，要看清楚。前半截是讚歎，後半截是推論。讚歎沒有問題，問題出在那個「應有」——他以為尊號既然成立，那個承載尊號的東西也就跟著成立了。
答方沒有駁他的讚歎，只把那個「有」字接過來，就地一驗：「今諦思惟，若有應取；若無何所取？」——你說有，那就指給我看，怎麼取；你若說無，又有什麼可取的。
整品從這裡開始。
一、五種尋求：不是它、不離它、不在裡面、不在外面、不歸它所有
龍樹的頌只有四句：
「非陰不離陰，此彼不相在； 如來不有陰，何處有如來？」
這四句是一張網。要在五陰之外安一個如來，不外五條路：或者如來就是五陰，或者離開五陰別有如來，或者如來裡面有五陰，或者五陰裡面有如來，或者如來擁有五陰。青目把五條路一條一條走給你看。
第一條走不通，理由是「生滅相故」。五陰是剎那生滅的東西；如來若就是五陰，如來也就成了剎那生滅的東西，於是「如來即有無常斷滅等過」。青目還補了一刀：這樣一來「受者受法則一」——那個受五陰的和所受的五陰，變成同一件事了。能承受的與被承受的合成一個，這句話本身就不成話。
第二條也走不通。離開五陰另立一個如來，那他就不該有生滅相；不生不滅，便落到常住那一邊，「如來有常等過」。而且青目提醒：那樣一個離陰的如來，「眼等諸根不能見知」——眼睛看不見他，耳朵聽不見他，六根都碰不著他。可是佛在世時，人分明見過他。
第三、第四條，青目用了兩對譬喻。如來中有五陰，那便像「如器中有果、水中有魚」；五陰中有如來，那便像「如床上有人、器中有乳」。這幾個譬喻都指向同一件事：凡說甲在乙中，甲乙必是兩樣東西。果不是瓶，魚不是水，人不是床。既然是兩樣，如來就與五陰無干，又落回第二條的常住之過。
第五條，「如人有子」。說如來擁有五陰，就像人有兒子——父子是兩人。一旦分成兩個，前面的過失原封不動地跟過來。
於是青目收句：「如是五種求不可得，何等是如來？」
讀到這裡，人心裡多半會發緊。要留意的是：這五求所勘驗的，從來不是佛有沒有出世、有沒有說法、有沒有度眾生。所勘驗的只有一件事——能不能在五陰之外，指認出一個獨立自立、不待任何因緣而自己在那裡的『如來自體』。找不到那個東西，並不等於沒有佛。
二、那就說「五陰和合有如來」吧
問的人退了一步，這一退很老實：「五陰和合有如來。」單看哪一陰都不是如來，但五陰湊在一起，如來就在那裡。
這一步幾乎就對了。可是龍樹接著點出它自己說出口的話裡有什麼：
「陰合有如來，則無有自性； 若無有自性，云何因他有？」
你說「和合」，就等於承認了『待緣』；承認了待緣，就等於承認了沒有自性。青目說得極省：「若如來五陰和合故有，即無自性。何以故？因五陰和合有故。」
問的人於是再退一步：那就說如來不憑自性而有，只是「因他性有」吧。
答方回他兩句話。第一句：「他性亦無自性」——你所倚靠的那個「他」，它自己也是和合來的，也沒有自體，一個站不住的東西撐不起另一個。第二句更狠：「無相待因故，他性不可得」——「他」這個名字，本來是相對於「自」才安得上的。自既然沒有，「他」也就無從說起，「不可得故不名為他」。
這裡要慢一點讀。人常以為破了自性還可以退守他性，好像自性是正門，他性是後門。龍樹告訴你：那不是兩扇門，是一扇門的兩邊。
三、因緣所生的，就不是「我」
接著是本品最要緊的一組推論：
「法若因他生，是即為非我； 若法非我者，云何是如來？」
青目替這一句配了一個譬喻——「如因五指有拳，是拳無有自體。」
這個譬喻值得停一停。手指握起來就叫拳，張開來就沒有拳。你不能說拳是假的，拳打得到人；你也不能說拳是一個東西，因為拳不在五指之外，五指散開它就不在了。它有作用，卻沒有自體。
「如是因五陰名我，是我即無自體。」我也是這樣。五陰湊合處，就有一個叫作「我」的用；離開五陰，找不到那個承受者。
而青目下面一句，是整品的樞紐：「我有種種名，或名眾生、人、天、如來等。」
眾生、人、天、如來，這些名字掛在同一個地方。凡夫執一個「我」，是在五陰上安一個主人；學佛的人若在五陰之外安一個『如來自體』，安法完全相同，只是把名字換得莊嚴了些。所以龍樹說：「若無我，云何說名如來？」——連我都無自體，如來自體從哪裡來？
再往下一頌把自他二性作最後收束：「若無有自性，云何有他性？離自性他性，何名為如來？」
四、受陰之前，有沒有一個先在的如來
問的人心裡還有一個影子沒散：也許有一位如來，本來就在，後來才受了這副五陰之身，於是我們叫他如來。
龍樹用一組頌把這個影子照散。若要這樣說，先得有一個『受五陰之前的如來』；可是「今實不受陰，更無如來法」——那個先在者，尋不著；除他之外，也沒有第二個叫作如來的法。既然那個能受者根本不在，如今是誰在受？青目說得直白：「而實未受五陰時先無如來，今云何當受？」
還有一層：「若其未有受，所受不名受」——「所受」這個名，是相對於『能受者』才有的。能受者不成立，五陰也就不叫「所受」，只是五陰而已。「無有無受法，而名為如來」——沒有一個既不受五陰、又能叫作如來的東西。
到這裡，一異也求過了，五求也求過了，前後也求過了；連所受的五陰自己，龍樹也不放過：「又所受五陰，不從自性有」。能受、所受兩頭都空。
五、受空、受者空——那「空」能不能拿來說如來
於是頌說：
「以如是義故，受空受者空， 云何當以空，而說空如來？」
這句話容易讀漏。它不是說『空的受加空的受者等於空的如來』，它是在攔一個更細的執：兩頭都空了，你還想拿這個「空」當材料，捏出一個『空的如來』來安放。
問的人果然就這樣問了：「則定有空耶？」——照你這麼說，是不是決定有一個「空」？
這一問問得極好，它把最後一層執逼到了明處。答方的回答是四句一起否掉：
「空則不可說，非空不可說， 共不共叵說，但以假名說。」
青目逐句展開：諸法空，不應說；諸法不空，不應說；亦空亦不空，不應說；非空非不空，也不應說。那麼「空」這個字為什麼還在說？青目給的理由只有一句：「但破相違故以假名說。」
空是用來破的，不是用來立的。有人執實有，就對他說空；空的職分是解那個結，結解了，藥也就撤了。若把空本身當成一個結論拿在手裡，那就是拿藥當飯吃。
所以青目接著說：「如是正觀思惟，諸法實相中不應以諸難為難。」到了實相，那些互相為難的問法本身就用不上了。
六、寂滅相中，八種見都進不來
兩句頌，句式一模一樣：
「寂滅相中無，常無常等四； 寂滅相中無，邊無邊等四。」
過去世上起四種見：世間常、世間無常、世間亦常亦無常、世間非常非無常；未來世上依樣起四種：有邊、無邊、亦有邊亦無邊、非有邊非無邊。合起來八種。
青目說明它們為什麼進不來，給了三個理由，一個比一個深。
其一，實相「畢竟清淨不可取」——沒有一個地方可以下手去抓。青目加了一句：「空尚不受，何況有四種見。」連「空」都不安立，何況這八種。
其二，「四種見皆因受生」——這些見不是憑空長出來的，是「受」長出來的。你先取了一樣東西，才會對它起常或無常的判斷。而實相「無所因受」，沒有那個被取的東西，見也就沒有生處。
其三，也最刺人：「四種見皆以自見為貴、他見為賤」凡有見，必有高下；有高下，必有此彼。而「諸法實相無有此彼」。這一句把整場爭論的底子掀了出來——爭常爭斷，爭到底並不是在爭理，是在爭我的見比你的見高。實相中沒有這個座位。
七、說『沒有如來』，是最深的邪見
問的人到這裡終於問出那句最怕的話：「若如是破如來者，則無如來耶？」
龍樹的回答，兩邊都不許站：
「邪見深厚者，則說無如來； 如來寂滅相，分別有亦非。」
先看前半。青目把邪見分兩種：「破世間樂」與「破涅槃道」。
破世間樂的那一種，是粗的：說沒有罪、沒有福，沒有如來等賢聖。這種見一起，人就「捨善為惡」，連世間的安樂都保不住。青目給的斷語很重：「若言無如來者，是深厚邪見，乃失世間樂，何況涅槃！」
所以要說清楚：整品五求不得、自他俱破，指向的從來不是『沒有佛』。斷言沒有佛，不但沒有走到這一品的深處，反而摔在最淺處。
再看後半。破涅槃道的那一種，是細的：「貪著於我，分別有無」。這種人也修善也止惡，所以得世間樂；可是「分別有無故不得涅槃」——他心裡始終擱著一個要判定為有或為無的對象，那個判定的動作本身，就把涅槃隔在外面。
青目於是說了本品最需要細讀的一句：「若言有如來，亦是邪見。」為什麼？「如來寂滅相，而種種分別故。」
不是「有如來」這三個字錯了。是在寂滅相上加分別，錯了。寂滅之相不是一個對象；你一旦把它擺在對面判定『他在』，你所判定的那個已經不是它。
一頭是斷，一頭是常；深厚邪見在這一頭，細微分別在那一頭。這一品要人站的，是兩頭都不站。
八、滅度以後，是有還是沒有
順著這裡，龍樹把話說到最遠處：
「如是性空中，思惟亦不可， 如來滅度後，分別於有無。」
如來滅後究竟還在不在——這是佛世以來最纏人的一問。答方沒有選其中一邊，他說：連「思惟」這件事都不可以。
青目的理由極簡，也極徹底：「如來從本已來畢竟空，何況滅後！」
問題本身預設了：滅之前有一個實在的他，所以滅之後才要追問他去了哪裡。若從本以來就不曾有一個自性的他，那『滅後有沒有』這一問就懸在半空，沒有著落處。
於是接到本品最有力的一頌：
「如來過戲論，而人生戲論」——如來早已越過戲論，人卻偏偏生起戲論；「戲論破慧眼，是皆不見佛。」
青目給了戲論一個定義：「憶念取相分別此彼。」
拆開來是四件事：憶念——心攀到已經過去的影子上；取相——在影子上抓一個相；分別——把相判成這樣或那樣；此彼——於是有了我這邊和他那邊。「言佛滅不滅等，是人為戲論」，這樣的追問，正是四件事一齊發動。
而果報是：「覆慧眼故，不能見如來法身。」
要看清楚這句的因果向。不是佛藏起來了，是慧眼被自己蓋住了。日頭沒有走，是眼睛蒙了。所以龍樹說「是皆不見佛」——不見，不是佛不在。
青目最後把整品收起來：「此〈如來品〉中，初中後思惟，如來定性不可得。」注意他用的是「定性」二字。不可得的是那個決定不變的自體，不是佛。
九、如來所有性，即是世間性
末後一頌，是整部《中論》裡最靜的兩句之一：
「如來所有性，即是世間性； 如來無有性，世間亦無性。」
青目只補了一句：「此品中思惟推求，如來性即是一切世間性。」
問的人還不甘心，追問到底：「何等是如來性？」
青目的回答只有九個字：「如來無有性，同世間無性。」
這一問一答，是本品的落處，也值得慢慢領。人一路讀來，最容易生的期待是：破了五陰中的如來，末後總該指出一個真正的如來性來。可是這裡什麼也沒有指。他只說：如來沒有自性，世間也沒有自性——就在這個『沒有』上，兩邊是同一件事。
同在哪裡？不是說佛與凡夫一樣，也不是說染淨無別。同的是存在的方式：世間法無一不是待緣而有，如來也不例外；世間法中找不到一個不待緣的自體，如來身上也找不到。既然兩邊都無自性，就沒有一道自性的牆把如來隔在世間之外。
這句話為什麼要放在最後？因為前面八段都在破，讀者手裡越來越空，很容易生出一個念頭：那佛豈不是離我極遠？這一頌正好回過來——如來之性即是世間之性，你此刻所處的這個世間，並不是另一塊地。
而這也正是後來〈觀涅槃品〉所要說的那件事的先聲。此處先立住一句：如來與世間，同在無自性上。
十、讀這一品的人可以帶走什麼
一是不要把佛安在五陰之外。五求所勘的是那個『安』的動作。安得越莊嚴，越像一個我。
二是空是解結的，不是拿來供起來的。「但破相違故以假名說」——藥不當飯。
三是不要在寂滅相上判有無。說無如來，是深厚邪見；分別有如來，也不是。要放下的不是佛，是那個判定的手勢。
四是戲論不是說錯話，是憶念取相分別此彼。慧眼被蓋住的時候，人往往自覺很用功。
五是如來性即世間性。這不是把佛拉下來，是把『佛在別處』這個念頭放下。
承衍：吉藏之鏡
以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論，只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。
吉藏《中觀論疏》以三門總結上來所求：不一不異、不自不他、不前不後；並說上來所求的三種人法——一者外道、二者小乘、三者大乘——皆不可得。對於受空受者空一段，他讀作呵責執有之語：怎能拿空當受、拿空當如來。
論到四句不可說而經中仍說有佛，吉藏的解釋是：那是無名相中假名相說，並援《涅槃經》生生等六句不可說、第七句有因緣故亦得說為例，說明破四種相違故假名說佛；空既是為違有而假立，若又執有此空，便重墮諸難。
至於末頌，吉藏列三重讀法：一者問方品初舉出世以證有世間，論主今反舉世間以例出世；二者針對聽者以為佛出四句之表、居百非之外，故明如來之性即是世間之性；三者針對前偈「如來過戲論」而起的世出世異見，明此四句本來不四即是如來。末後他說如來與世間同絕四句，故二性無別性。
這面鏡把本品接進了三論一系破邪顯正的判釋架構；其判釋是吉藏所增，不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判，各還其位。
As the Treatise on the Middle refutes going, coming, arising, and ceasing, readers can usually keep their footing—those are dharmas. In this chapter, what is refuted is the Buddha.
Nor does the questioner come to provoke. He opens with the most ordinary statement imaginable: “In all the world, only the Tathāgata is most honored. He is the Perfectly and Completely Awakened One, called the Dharma King and the omniscient person. Such a one should therefore exist.” The Tathāgata is most honored in the world; he is perfectly awakened, the Dharma King, and omniscient. Surely such a one exists?
The turn concealed in this question must be seen clearly. Its first half is praise; its second half is inference. The praise is faultless. The problem lies in “should exist”: the questioner thinks that once the titles of honor are established, a thing bearing them is established as well.
The respondent does not reject the praise. He takes up only the word “exist” and tests it on the spot: “Now contemplate in accordance with reality. If he exists, he should be apprehensible; if he does not exist, what is there to apprehend?” If you say he exists, point out how he can be taken. If you say he does not exist, what is there to take?
The whole chapter begins here.
1. The Fivefold Search: Not It, Not Apart from It, Not Inside, Not Outside, Not Possessing It
Nāgārjuna’s verse has only four lines:
“Not the aggregates, not apart from the aggregates; neither resides within the other. The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates—where is there a Tathāgata?”
These four lines form a net. To install a Tathāgata outside the five aggregates leaves only five routes: the Tathāgata is the five aggregates; another Tathāgata exists apart from them; the aggregates are within the Tathāgata; the Tathāgata is within the aggregates; or the Tathāgata possesses the aggregates. Qingmu walks each route for the reader.
The first does not work, “because they bear the mark of arising and ceasing.” The five aggregates arise and cease moment by moment. If the Tathāgata were the aggregates, the Tathāgata would also arise and cease moment by moment, and “would incur the faults of impermanence, annihilation, and the rest.” Qingmu adds another cut: “Experiencer and experienced dharma would be one.” The one appropriating the five aggregates and the aggregates appropriated would become the same thing. To merge what bears and what is borne into one is already incoherent.
The second route likewise fails. To establish a Tathāgata apart from the five aggregates would remove the mark of arising and ceasing from him. Unarisen and unceasing, he falls to the side of permanent abiding and “incurs faults such as permanence.” Qingmu also reminds us that such a Tathāgata apart from the aggregates “could not be seen or known by the faculties such as the eye.” Eyes could not see him, ears could not hear him, and none of the six faculties could meet him. Yet when the Buddha lived, people plainly saw him.
For the third and fourth routes, Qingmu uses two pairs of analogies. Five aggregates within the Tathāgata would be “like fruit in a vessel or fish in water”; the Tathāgata within the aggregates would be “like a person on a bed or milk in a vessel.” All these analogies point to the same thing: whenever A is said to be in B, A and B must be two things. Fruit is not the vessel, fish not water, person not bed. Once the two are separate, the Tathāgata has nothing to do with the aggregates and returns to the second route’s fault of permanence.
The fifth route is “like a person having a son.” To say the Tathāgata possesses the aggregates is like a person having a son—father and son are two persons. Once divided into two, all the preceding faults return unchanged.
Qingmu therefore concludes: “Sought in these five ways and not found, what is the Tathāgata?”
At this point, the reader’s heart will likely tighten. Notice what the fivefold search examines. It never asks whether the Buddha appeared in the world, taught Dharma, or liberated beings. It examines only this: can an independent, self-standing “Tathāgata-substance” that waits on no causes or conditions be identified outside the five aggregates? Not finding that thing does not mean there is no Buddha.
2. Then Let Us Say That “the Tathāgata Exists When the Five Aggregates Combine”
The questioner retreats one step, and honestly: “When the five aggregates combine, there is a Tathāgata.” No single aggregate viewed alone is the Tathāgata, but when the five come together, the Tathāgata is there.
This is almost correct. Yet Nāgārjuna points out what the claim itself has already said:
“If the Tathāgata exists through the combination of the aggregates, he has no intrinsic nature; without intrinsic nature, how could he exist by virtue of another?”
To say “combination” is to admit dependence on conditions; to admit dependence on conditions is to admit the absence of intrinsic nature. Qingmu is extremely concise: “If the Tathāgata exists because the five aggregates combine, he has no intrinsic nature. Why? Because he exists by virtue of the combination of the five aggregates.”
The questioner retreats again: then let us say that the Tathāgata does not exist through intrinsic nature but “exists by virtue of other-nature.”
The respondent gives two sentences. First: “Other-nature itself has no intrinsic nature.” The “other” on which you rely is itself produced by combination and has no substance of its own. Something unable to stand cannot support another. The second sentence cuts still deeper: “Because there is no ground of mutual dependence, other-nature cannot be found.” The name “other” can be established only in relation to “self.” Once self is absent, there is no basis for speaking of other: “Since it cannot be found, it is not called other.”
Read this slowly. People often think that once intrinsic nature is refuted, other-nature remains as a refuge—as though intrinsic nature were the front door and other-nature the back. Nāgārjuna says they are not two doors, but two sides of one door.
3. What Arises through Conditions Is Not a “Self”
Next comes the chapter’s most important inference:
“If a dharma arises through another, it is not a self; if a dharma is not a self, how could it be the Tathāgata?”
Qingmu gives it an analogy: “Just as a fist exists through five fingers, this fist has no substance of its own.”
Pause over the analogy. Close the fingers and it is called a fist; open them and no fist remains. One cannot call the fist false—it can strike someone. Nor can one call it a thing, because it exists nowhere outside the five fingers and disappears when they open. It functions but lacks substance of its own.
“So the self is named by virtue of the five aggregates and has no substance of its own.” The self is likewise so. Where the five aggregates come together, something functions under the name “I”; apart from the five aggregates, no one who bears them can be found.
Qingmu’s next sentence is the hinge of the whole chapter: “The self has many names: being, person, deva, Tathāgata, and so forth.”
Being, person, deva, and Tathāgata: all these names are hung in the same place. When an ordinary person clings to an “I,” he installs a master upon the five aggregates. If a Buddhist installs a “Tathāgata-substance” outside the five aggregates, the gesture is identical; only the name has become more magnificent. Thus Nāgārjuna says: “Without a self, how can he be named Tathāgata?” If even the self has no substance of its own, where would Tathāgata-substance come from?
The next verse finally gathers intrinsic and other-nature together: “Without intrinsic nature, how could there be other-nature? Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, what can be named Tathāgata?”
4. Before Appropriating the Aggregates, Was There an Antecedent Tathāgata?
One shadow remains in the questioner’s mind: perhaps a Tathāgata was originally there, then later appropriated this body of five aggregates, whereupon we called him Tathāgata.
Nāgārjuna dispels the shadow through a group of verses. To say this, one must first have a “Tathāgata before appropriating the five aggregates.” Yet “in reality there is no one who does not appropriate the aggregates, nor is there another dharma of the Tathāgata.” The antecedent one cannot be found; beyond him, no second dharma called Tathāgata exists. Since the appropriator was never there, who appropriates now? Qingmu says directly: “In reality, no Tathāgata first exists before appropriating the five aggregates. Who now could appropriate them?”
There is another layer: “If appropriation has not yet existed, what is appropriated is not called appropriation.” The name “what is appropriated” exists only in relation to an appropriator. If the appropriator is not established, the five aggregates are not “appropriated”; they are simply the five aggregates. “There is no dharma without appropriation that is named Tathāgata.” There is nothing that can avoid appropriating the aggregates yet still be called Tathāgata.
By now identity and difference have been sought, the five searches performed, and before and after examined. Nor does Nāgārjuna spare the appropriated five aggregates themselves: “The appropriated five aggregates do not exist through intrinsic nature.” Both appropriator and appropriated are empty.
5. Appropriation Is Empty and Appropriator Is Empty—Can “Emptiness” Then Be Used to Speak of the Tathāgata?
Thus the verse says:
“According to this reasoning, appropriation is empty and the appropriator is empty. How could emptiness be used to speak of an empty Tathāgata?”
This sentence is easy to miss. It does not say, “empty appropriation plus empty appropriator equals empty Tathāgata.” It blocks a subtler attachment: once both ends are empty, you still wish to use “emptiness” as material and mold an “empty Tathāgata” in which to settle.
The questioner indeed asks exactly that: “Does emptiness then definitely exist?” According to your explanation, is there not definitely an emptiness?
It is an excellent question, because it forces the final layer of attachment into the open. The respondent denies all four propositions together:
“Empty cannot be spoken; nonempty cannot be spoken. Both and neither cannot be spoken; they are spoken only through provisional names.”
Qingmu unfolds each line: one should not say dharmas are empty; one should not say they are nonempty; one should not say they are both empty and nonempty; nor neither empty nor nonempty. Why, then, is the word “empty” still spoken? Qingmu gives one reason only: “It is spoken as a provisional name only to dismantle contradiction.”
Emptiness is used to refute, not to establish. When someone clings to real existence, emptiness is spoken to that person. Its work is to untie the knot; once the knot is untied, the medicine is removed. To hold emptiness itself as a conclusion is to eat the medicine as food.
Qingmu therefore continues: “In such correct contemplation, within the true character of dharmas, the various challenges should not be taken as challenges.” At the level of true character, mutually contentious questions no longer apply.
6. None of the Eight Views Enters the Mark of Quiescence
Two verses have exactly the same form:
“Within the mark of quiescence there is no tetralemma of permanent and impermanent; within the mark of quiescence there is no tetralemma of bounded and unbounded.”
Four views arise regarding the past: the world is permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent. The same pattern generates four regarding the future: bounded, unbounded, both bounded and unbounded, or neither. Together they make eight.
Qingmu offers three reasons why they cannot enter, each deeper than the last.
First, the true character is “ultimately pure and cannot be appropriated.” There is nowhere to reach and grasp. Qingmu adds: “Even emptiness is not accepted, how much less the four views.” Even emptiness is not established, much less these eight.
Second, “the four views all arise through appropriation.” These views do not grow from nowhere; appropriation grows them. Only after taking something up does one judge it permanent or impermanent. Yet the true character “has nothing through which it appropriates.” Without an appropriated thing, views have no birthplace.
Third, and most piercing: “The four views all honor one’s own view and disparage another’s.” Wherever there is a view, there is hierarchy; wherever hierarchy appears, there are this and that. Yet “the true character of dharmas has neither this nor that.” This sentence exposes the foundation beneath the whole dispute. Arguing permanence and annihilation ultimately does not contend over principle, but over my view being higher than yours. No such seat exists within true character.
7. To Say “There Is No Tathāgata” Is the Deepest Wrong View
At last the questioner asks what he fears most: “If the Tathāgata is refuted in this way, does that mean there is no Tathāgata?”
Nāgārjuna’s answer lets neither side stand:
“Those whose wrong views are deeply rooted say there is no Tathāgata; yet within the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence, to discriminate and say he exists is likewise wrong.”
Consider the first half. Qingmu divides wrong views into two: those that “destroy worldly well-being” and those that “destroy the path to nirvāṇa.”
The kind that destroys worldly well-being is coarse: saying there is no demerit, no merit, and no Tathāgata or other noble one. Once this view arises, one “abandons good and does evil,” losing even the well-being of the world. Qingmu’s verdict is severe: “Saying there is no Tathāgata is a deeply rooted wrong view: one loses even worldly well-being, how much more nirvāṇa!”
This must be stated clearly: throughout the chapter, neither failure of the fivefold search nor refutation of self and other ever points toward “there is no Buddha.” To assert no Buddha is not to reach the chapter’s depth, but to fall at its shallowest edge.
Now consider the second half. The view that destroys the path to nirvāṇa is subtle: “craving and clinging to a self and discriminating existence and nonexistence.” Such people cultivate good and end evil, so they attain worldly well-being. But they “do not attain nirvāṇa because of discriminating existence and nonexistence.” Their minds retain an object that must be judged existent or nonexistent, and the gesture of judgment itself keeps nirvāṇa outside.
Qingmu therefore speaks the sentence that requires the chapter’s closest reading: “To say the Tathāgata exists is likewise a wrong view.” Why? “Because one makes various discriminations about the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence.”
The words “there is a Tathāgata” are not themselves wrong. What is wrong is adding discrimination to the mark of quiescence. Quiescence is not an object. Once placed opposite and judged “he is there,” what has been judged is already not it.
One side is annihilation, the other permanence. Deeply rooted wrong view stands at one end, subtle discrimination at the other. This chapter asks us to stand at neither.
8. After Cessation, Does He Exist or Not?
Following this line, Nāgārjuna takes the claim to its farthest point:
“Within such emptiness of nature, conception is likewise impossible: after the Tathāgata’s cessation, discriminating existence and nonexistence.”
Does the Tathāgata remain after cessation? This has been one of the most entangling questions since the Buddha’s lifetime. The respondent does not choose either side. He says that even the act of conceiving is impossible.
Qingmu’s reason is utterly concise and thorough: “The Tathāgata has always been ultimately empty—how much more after cessation!”
The question already assumes that a real one exists before cessation, and so asks where he goes afterward. If no intrinsically existent one has ever existed, the question “Does he exist after cessation?” hangs in the air with nowhere to land.
This leads to the chapter’s most forceful verse:
“The Tathāgata has passed beyond conceptual proliferation, yet people generate conceptual proliferation.” The Tathāgata has long passed beyond it, yet people insist on producing it; “conceptual proliferation destroys the eye of wisdom, and such people do not see the Buddha.”
Qingmu defines conceptual proliferation: “Recollection, apprehending marks, and discrimination between this and that.”
Unfolded, these are four movements. Recollection: the mind reaches toward an image already past. Apprehending marks: it grasps a mark on that image. Discrimination: it judges the mark this way or that. This and that: there now appears my side and the other side. “Those who say that the Buddha has ceased, has not ceased, and so forth engage in conceptual proliferation”—the question activates all four movements at once.
Its result is: “Because it covers the eye of wisdom, they cannot see the Tathāgata’s Dharma-body.”
See the direction of causality. The Buddha did not hide; the eye of wisdom covered itself. The sun did not leave; the eye became veiled. Thus Nāgārjuna says “such people do not see the Buddha.” Not seeing does not mean the Buddha is absent.
Qingmu finally gathers the chapter: “In this ‘Examination of the Tathāgata,’ contemplating from beginning through middle to end, the Tathāgata’s determinate nature cannot be found.” Notice the words “determinate nature.” What cannot be found is an unchanging substance, not the Buddha.
9. Whatever Nature the Tathāgata Has Is the Nature of the World
The final verse contains two of the quietest lines in the entire Treatise on the Middle:
“Whatever nature the Tathāgata has is the nature of the world; the Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature, and the world likewise has no intrinsic nature.”
Qingmu adds one sentence: “The contemplation and inquiry in this chapter reveal that the nature of the Tathāgata is the nature of the entire world.”
Still unsatisfied, the questioner presses to the end: “What is the nature of the Tathāgata?”
Qingmu’s answer has only nine Chinese characters: “The Tathāgata has no nature, just as the world has no nature.”
This exchange is where the chapter lands, and it deserves slow reception. After reading the whole way, one most easily expects that once the Tathāgata within the five aggregates has been refuted, a true Tathāgata-nature will finally be pointed out. Yet nothing is pointed out. Qingmu only says: the Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature, and neither does the world. Precisely in this “absence,” the two are the same.
How are they the same? It does not mean that Buddha and ordinary beings are alike, nor that purity and defilement do not differ. What is shared is the mode of existence: no worldly dharma exists apart from conditions, and the Tathāgata is no exception. No substance independent of conditions can be found among worldly dharmas, nor in the Tathāgata. Since both lack intrinsic nature, no wall of intrinsic nature separates the Tathāgata outside the world.
Why place this sentence last? Because the preceding eight sections all refute, leaving the reader’s hand emptier and emptier, and easily producing the thought that the Buddha must therefore be very far away. The verse turns back at exactly this point: the Tathāgata’s nature is the nature of the world. This very world in which you now stand is not another ground.
This is also a first sounding of what the later “Examination of Nirvāṇa” will say. For now, one sentence is established: the Tathāgata and the world meet in the absence of intrinsic nature.
10. What Can a Reader Carry Away from This Chapter?
First, do not install the Buddha outside the five aggregates. The fivefold search examines the gesture of installation. The more magnificent the installation, the more it resembles a self.
Second, emptiness unties knots; it is not placed upon an altar. “It is spoken as a provisional name only to dismantle contradiction”—medicine is not food.
Third, do not judge existence or nonexistence upon the mark of quiescence. To say there is no Tathāgata is a deeply rooted wrong view; to discriminate that the Tathāgata exists is likewise wrong. What is to be released is not the Buddha, but the gesture of judgment.
Fourth, conceptual proliferation is not merely saying the wrong thing; it is recollection, apprehending marks, and discriminating this and that. When the eye of wisdom is covered, one often feels most diligent.
Fifth, the Tathāgata’s nature is the nature of the world. This does not pull the Buddha down; it releases the thought that the Buddha is elsewhere.
Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror
The foregoing is the meaning of the chapter itself. What follows uses the eye of the Sui-Tang Three Treatise lineage as a sidewise illumination—a mirror is not the treatise, but another way of reading the same verses.
In his Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, Jizang gathers the preceding search into three approaches: neither identical nor different, neither self nor other, neither before nor after. He also says that all three kinds of person and dharma sought above—non-Buddhist, Lesser Vehicle, and Great Vehicle—cannot be found. He reads the passage on empty appropriation and empty appropriator as a rebuke of clinging to existence: how can emptiness be taken as appropriation and emptiness as the Tathāgata?
On the four propositions being ineffable while the sūtras still say there is a Buddha, Jizang explains that provisional names and marks are spoken within what lacks name and mark. He cites the six ineffable statements beginning with arising-arising in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, and the seventh statement that can be spoken because it has causes and conditions, to show that the Buddha is provisionally named in order to break the four contradictions. Since emptiness is provisionally established only to oppose existence, to cling to that emptiness is to fall again into every difficulty.
For the final verse, Jizang offers three readings. First, the questioner at the chapter’s opening raises the supramundane to prove the mundane, while the treatise master now raises the mundane to illustrate the supramundane. Second, against the hearer who supposes that the Buddha stands beyond the four propositions and outside the hundred negations, he explains that the Tathāgata’s nature is the nature of the world. Third, against the view dividing mundane and supramundane generated by the preceding words “the Tathāgata has passed beyond conceptual proliferation,” he explains that the fact these four propositions have never been four is itself the Tathāgata. Finally, he says that Tathāgata and world equally transcend the four propositions, so their two natures have no distinct nature.
This mirror connects the chapter to the Three Treatise lineage’s interpretive structure of refuting error and disclosing correctness. Its judgments are Jizang’s additions, not the original words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s extended commentary. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
本品底本為《大正新脩大藏經》T30n1564〔0029c07–0031a10〕；正文依底本聲部保存問者、龍樹頌與青目釋。清辨本 T30n1566〔0117a06〕題為觀如來品第二十二；安慧本 T30n1567〔0156b28〕的觀生死品是第十一品，現存漢譯止於第十三品，不得移作本品題名。
二、異釋對勘
安慧 T1567 本品闕傳。清辨系 T30n1566 保存五求、空四句、如來滅後四項與見緣起即見如來等同品異釋。安慧系現存漢譯止於第十三品，不作推補。
問方以如來是世尊、法王與一切智人，主張如來應有自性。 T30n1564青目釋〔0029c07–0029c08〕：「問曰：一切世中尊，唯有如來正遍知號為法王，一切智人是則應有。」
青目代答方說應諦實思惟如來，若有便應可取，若無則無所取。 T30n1564青目釋〔0029c08–0029c09〕：「答曰：今諦思惟，若有應取；若無何所取？何以故？如來，」
龍樹以非即五陰、非離五陰、彼此不相在、非如來所有五陰的五求檢驗如來。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0029c10–0029c11〕：「非陰不離陰，此彼不相在；如來不有陰，何處有如來？」
青目說如來若即五陰便隨五陰生滅，並使受者與所受成一。 T30n1564青目釋〔0029c14–0029c19〕：「五陰非是如來。何以故？生滅相故。五陰生滅相，若如來是五陰，如來即是生滅相。若生滅相者，如來即有無常斷滅等過。又受者受法則一，受者是如來、受法是五陰。是事不然，是故如來非是五陰。」
青目說離五陰若另有如來便成常住，且眼等諸根也無從見知。 T30n1564青目釋〔0029c19–0029c22〕：「離五陰亦無如來，若離五陰有如來者，不應有生滅相。若爾者，如來有常等過。又眼等諸根不能見知，但是事不然，是故離五陰亦無如來。」
青目說如來中若有五陰便如器中有果、水中有魚，兩者成異而重落常過。 T30n1564青目釋〔0029c22–0029c25〕：「如來中亦無五陰。何以故？若如來中有五陰，如器中有果、水中有魚者，則為有異。若異者，即有如上常等過，是故如來中無五陰。」
青目說五陰中若有如來便如床上有人、器中有乳，仍使兩者別異。 T30n1564青目釋〔0029c25–0029c28〕：「又五陰中無如來。何以故？若五陰中有如來，如床上有人、器中有乳者，如是則有別異，如上說過，是故五陰中無如來。」
青目說如來若擁有五陰便如人有子，使如來與五陰別異，五求皆不可得。 T30n1564青目釋〔0029c28–0030a03〕：「如來亦不有五陰。何以故？若如來有五陰，如人有子，如是則有別異。若爾者，有如上過。是事不然，是故如來不有五陰。如是五種求不可得，何等是如來？」
問方承認五求不得，改說五陰和合便有如來。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030a03–0030a04〕：「問曰：如是義求如來不可得，而五陰和合有如來。」
龍樹說若如來由五陰和合而有便無自性，無自性也不能另由他性自立。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030a05–0030a06〕：「陰合有如來，則無有自性；若無有自性，云何因他有？」
青目說如來正因依五陰和合而有，所以沒有自性。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030a07–0030a08〕：「若如來五陰和合故有，即無自性。何以故？因五陰和合有故。」
問方主張如來雖非自性有，仍可因他性而有。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030a08–0030a09〕：「問曰：如來不以自性有，但因他性有。」
青目說他性也無自性，且沒有相待的自便無可得之他。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030a09–0030a12〕：「答曰：若無自性，云何因他性有？何以故？他性亦無自性。又無相待因故，他性不可得，不可得故不名為他。復次：」
龍樹說法若因他緣生便非自我，既非我便不能作自性如來。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030a13–0030a14〕：「法若因他生，是即為非我；若法非我者，云何是如來？」
青目以五指成拳譬喻五陰假名為我，說眾生、人、天、如來等名皆無自體。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030a15–0030a19〕：「若法因眾緣生，即無有我。如因五指有拳，是拳無有自體。如是因五陰名我，是我即無自體。我有種種名，或名眾生、人、天、如來等。若如來因五陰有，即無自性，無自性故無我。若無我，云何說名如來？」
龍樹說無自性便無他性，離自他二性也沒有可名自性如來者。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030a22–0030a23〕：「若無有自性，云何有他性？離自性他性，何名為如來？」
青目說因自性才有他性，自既無則他也無，離二性無誰是如來。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030a24–0030a26〕：「若無自性，他性亦不應有。因自性故名他性，此無故彼亦無，是故自性、他性二俱無。若離自性、他性，誰為如來？復次：」
龍樹假設未受五陰前先有如來，才可能說後來受陰而名如來。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030a27–0030a28〕：「若不因五陰，先有如來者，以今受陰故，則說為如來。」
龍樹說未受五陰時實無如來，便沒有一個先在者能於今受陰。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030a29–0030b01〕：「今實不受陰，更無如來法，若以不受無，今當云何受？」
龍樹說能受尚未成立時，所受也不能先名為受，無受法不能成如來。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030b02–0030b03〕：「若其未有受，所受不名受，無有無受法，而名為如來。」
龍樹說如來在一異與五求中皆不可得，不能又在受陰關係中實有。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030b04–0030b05〕：「若於一異中，如來不可得，五種求亦無，云何受中有？」
龍樹說所受五陰也不從自性有，無自性便不能另由他性有。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030b06–0030b07〕：「又所受五陰，不從自性有，若無自性者，云何有他性？」
青目說未受陰前若先有如來才可受陰，但未受時無如來便無誰能受。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030b08–0030b10〕：「若未受五陰先有如來者，是如來今應受五陰已作如來，而實未受五陰時先無如來，今云何當受？」
青目說沒有受者時五陰不名所受，也沒有不受五陰而名如來者。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030b10–0030b11〕：「又不受五陰者，五陰不名為受，無有無受而名為如來。」
青目說一異與五求皆不得，便不能說如來實在五陰受取中。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030b11–0030b13〕：「又如來一異中求不可得，五陰中五種求亦不可得。若爾者，云何於五陰中說有如來？」
青目說所受五陰若無自性，他性也無，不能由他性救五陰實有。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030b13–0030b16〕：「又所受五陰，不從自性有。若謂從他性有。若不從自性有。云何從他性有？何以故？以無自性故，又他性亦無。」
青目由前後、一異、五求與自他諸門，收束如來與五陰都不能自性成立。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030b08–0030b16〕：「若未受五陰先有如來者，是如來今應受五陰已作如來，而實未受五陰時先無如來，今云何當受？又不受五陰者，五陰不名為受，無有無受而名為如來。又如來一異中求不可得，五陰中五種求亦不可得。若爾者，云何於五陰中說有如來？又所受五陰，不從自性有。若謂從他性有。若不從自性有。云何從他性有？何以故？以無自性故，又他性亦無。」
龍樹說受與受者皆空，不能再以空的受法安立一個空如來。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030b17–0030b18〕：「以如是義故，受空受者空，云何當以空，而說空如來？」
青目解釋受與受者皆空，反問怎能以空受另說空如來。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030b19–0030b20〕：「以是義思惟，受及受者皆空。若受空者，云何以空受而說空如來？」
問方追問受與受者皆空是否表示空本身決定實有。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030b20–0030b21〕：「問曰：汝謂受空、受者空，則定有空耶？」
青目以答辭標明轉入答方，接著明斥此問並追問理由。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030b21〕：「不然。何以故？」
龍樹說空、不空、亦空亦不空、非空非不空四句都不可執取，只能依假名說。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030b22–0030b23〕：「空則不可說，非空不可說，共不共叵說，但以假名說。」
青目說空等四句只為破相違而假名施設，正觀實相時不應把任一句變成難題。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030b24–0030b28〕：「諸法空則不應說，諸法不空亦不應說，諸法空不空亦不應說，非空非不空亦不應說。何以故？但破相違故以假名說。如是正觀思惟，諸法實相中不應以諸難為難。何以故？」
龍樹說寂滅實相中沒有世間常、無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常四句。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030b29〕：「寂滅相中無，常無常等四」
龍樹說寂滅實相中也沒有世間有邊、無邊、亦有邊亦無邊、非有邊非無邊四句。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030c01〕：「寂滅相中無，邊無邊等四。」
青目說常無常與邊無邊八見都因取受而起，實相清淨不可取且無此彼高下。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030c02–0030c11〕：「諸法實相如是微妙寂滅，但因過去世起四種邪見：世間有常、世間無常、世間常無常、世間非常非無常；寂滅中盡無。何以故？諸法實相畢竟清淨不可取，空尚不受，何況有四種見。四種見皆因受生，諸法實相無所因受。四種見皆以自見為貴、他見為賤，諸法實相無有此彼。是故說寂滅中無四種見。如因過去世有四種見，因未來世有四種見亦如是。世間有邊、世間無邊、世間有邊無邊、世間非有邊非無邊。」
問方擔心破除如來的四句自性便等於斷言沒有如來。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030c11–0030c12〕：「問曰：若如是破如來者，則無如來耶？」
龍樹說深厚邪見者才斷言無如來，而在如來寂滅相中分別定有也不對。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030c13–0030c14〕：「邪見深厚者，則說無如來；如來寂滅相，分別有亦非。」
青目分破世間樂與破涅槃道兩種邪見，說無罪福無賢聖使善行失壞，執有無也障涅槃。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030c15–0030c23〕：「邪見有二種：一者破世間樂；二者破涅槃道。破世間樂者是麁邪見，言無罪無福，無如來等賢聖。起是邪見，捨善為惡，則破世間樂。破涅槃道者，貪著於我，分別有無，起善滅惡。起善故得世間樂，分別有無故不得涅槃。是故若言無如來者，是深厚邪見，乃失世間樂，何況涅槃！若言有如來，亦是邪見。何以故？如來寂滅相，而種種分別故。是故寂滅相中，分別有如來亦為非。」
龍樹說性空中不可思惟如來滅度後的有無分別。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030c24–0030c25〕：「如是性空中，思惟亦不可，如來滅度後，分別於有無。」
青目說諸法實相性空，不能於如來滅後分別有、無或有無，如來本來畢竟空。 T30n1564青目釋〔0030c26–0030c28〕：「諸法實相性空故，不應於如來滅後思惟若有、若無、若有無。如來從本已來畢竟空，何況滅後！」
龍樹說如來超越戲論，眾生若生起戲論便覆慧眼而不見佛。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0030c29–0031a01〕：「如來過戲論，而人生戲論，戲論破慧眼，是皆不見佛。」
青目解釋戲論是憶念取相分別此彼，執佛滅不滅會覆慧眼而不見法身。 T30n1564青目釋〔0031a02–0031a05〕：「戲論名憶念取相分別此彼。言佛滅不滅等，是人為戲論，覆慧眼故，不能見如來法身。此〈如來品〉中，初中後思惟，如來定性不可得。是故偈說：」
龍樹說如來之性即世間之性，如來無自性，世間也無自性。 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0031a06–0031a07〕：「如來所有性，即是世間性；如來無有性，世間亦無性。」
青目說本品推求所得，是如來性即一切世間性。 T30n1564青目釋〔0031a08〕：「此品中思惟推求，如來性即是一切世間性。」
問方追問如來與世間共同的如來性究竟是什麼。 T30n1564青目釋〔0031a09〕：「問曰：何等是如來性？」
青目答如來無有自性，正同世間無有自性。 T30n1564青目釋〔0031a09–0031a10〕：「答曰：如來無有性，同世間無性。」
《般若燈論釋》先說因陰而假設名如來，再以「以假設故，譬如旋火輪」說假設相不證輪體，以「無實故，譬如瓶」說所指法無實，並以火上下遍轉而無輪體解前一喻，收在第一義無自體。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0117b09–0117b10〕：「修多羅人復言：因陰故假設名如來，我等所說無過。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0117b14–0117b16〕：「此謂有自體者，得如是過。應作是知，如來無自體。此中說驗，於第一義中如來無自體，以假設故，譬如旋火輪；無實故，譬如瓶。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0117b28–0117b29〕：「論者言：火於空中上下遍轉而無輪體」
《般若燈論釋》先否定離於聞慧而得第一義空，再把空、不空、無二與空無相無作夢幻等語分配到隨順所化、世諦施設、洗濯分別、破邪見癡眼膜、防說空增長邪見、破我執、遮異人立驗、息二見與得第一義等功能，第一義則以如幻如焰、自體無生而二俱不說。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0120a13–0120a23〕：「若有人言，離於聞慧而能於一切境界得第一義空者，則不說一切法空，無如是人故。為欲隨順所化眾生福智聚故說空等語，但以世諦施設故說。為欲洗濯不善分別垢故，為破邪見癡眼膜故，說一切境界不空。何以故？若為說空增長邪見。又為破執我等膜故，說一切境界空。第一義中如幻如焰，自體無生故，二俱不說。為遮異人立驗故，為息於境界起二見過故，為得第一義故，說言無二。如是為洗濯不善分別垢故，說空無相無作夢幻等語，是故說空滅一切見。」
《般若燈論釋》在如來滅後分別中另列如來有、如來無、亦有亦無、非有非無四項，第四項只屬清辨系所傳，不倒寫成羅什本青目三項。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0120b22–0120b23〕：「釋曰：此謂如來滅後，如來有耶？如來無耶？亦有亦無耶？非有非無耶？是義不然。」
《般若燈論釋》列有無、常無常、色身、言教身、法身、能相所相因果、能覺所覺、空無相無作無願、如幻如夢等皆是分別；生盲不見日輪譬喻戲論覆眼，其「復次如經偈言」所引偈以見緣起名見法、見如來，明稱「又如《金剛般若經》中偈言」後所引之偈則斥以色見與音聲求為邪道。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0120b27–0120c01〕：「釋曰：此謂境界無體、慧無分別。以是故，汝先出因，譬喻有過。何以故？有無、常無常、色身、言教身、法身，能相所相因果、能覺所覺、空無相無作無願、如幻如夢等，悉是分別。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0120c05–0120c08〕：「譬如生盲者不見日輪，不見如來亦復如是。何故不見？戲論分別覆慧眼故，是名不見。云何為見？能見法性如來，是名為見。」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0120c08–0120c09〕：「復次如經偈言「能見緣起者，是名為見法。若能見法者，即為見如來。」」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0120c11–0120c12〕：「又如《金剛般若經》中偈言：」 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0120c13–0120c14〕：「若以色見我，以音聲求我，是人行邪道，不能見如來。」
三、諸家異釋（吉藏專疏）
吉藏以不一不異、不自不他、不前不後三門總結求人法皆不可得，又列一外道、二小乘、三大乘三種人法，並呵斥把空受與空如來實體化。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0142c15–0142c17〕：「結上三門，謂不一不異、不自不他、不前不後，三義求人法不得。又上求三種人法：一外道、二小乘、三大乘，皆不可得。」 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0142c17–0142c18〕：「下半呵有。汝云何以空為受、以空為如來？」
吉藏說四句不可說而一句可說，並舉生生等六句、第七句與十法因緣說明可說；破四種相違才假名說佛，空只用來破有，若執此空便重墮諸難。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0143a10–0143a16〕：「上明四句不可說，今為釋疑。經中所以說有佛者，蓋是無名相中假名相說，如《涅槃》無名強名相說涅槃是佛異名耳。又此中四句不可說，一句可說，如《涅槃經》生生等六句不可說，第七句有因緣故亦互得說。以十法為生作因，是故可說也。」 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0143a19–0143a20〕：「空違於有故，得假空破有，豈有此空？若有此空，即墮諸難。此釋為正意也。」 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0143a23–0143a25〕：「今破此四種相違，故假名說佛耳。又釋：執佛是四句，則與佛相違；今破此四句，故假名說佛。」
吉藏三義先舉世間以例出世，再破佛出四句之表、居百非之外，第三破世出世異見，最後收在如來與世間同絕四句、二性無別性。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0144a22–0144a27〕：「一者外人品初舉出世證有世間，論主今舉世間以例出世，求世間有無四句既不可得，出世如來亦復例然。二者外人聞上破有無四句並皆非佛，便謂佛出四句之表、居百非之外，是故今明如來之性即是世間之性，非但佛出四句、超於百非，世間亦爾。」 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0144a28–0144b03〕：「三者從第四章呵責生，前偈既云如來過戲論，外人便謂戲論自是世間，如來便為出世，則起世出世異見。是故今明如來之性即世間性，非但如來超於四句，即此四句本來不四即是如來。」 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0144b04–0144b06〕：「下半釋上半，明如來與世間同絕四句，故二性無別性，無別性者體也。」
四、名相
五求是即陰、離陰、如來中有陰、陰中有如來、如來有陰；受與受者指所取五陰與被主張能取五陰的如來。空四句由青目明說只為破相違而假名說；常無常四見及依其類推的未來邊無邊四見，則由青目說為因受而生。
五、科判
根本文依聲部與複合頌義立四十七項根本義：品初三項、五求五項、和合自他九項、受陰前後十二項、空答、四句與八見七項、有無及滅後五項、戲論與世間同無性六項。
六、關中舊學·譯史
本品署龍樹造、青目釋、鳩摩羅什譯；清辨系有同品可作異釋見證，安慧系現存漢譯止於第十三品，本品據實標闕。
七、唯識軸互讀（空有）
安慧系本品無傳，本目據實標闕，不作推補。
八、系內餘論互讀
本品未採入具精確頁錨的系內餘論證據，本目從闕。
九、校本定位
| 用途 | 書證與範圍 |
|---|---|
| 根本論頌與青目釋 | T30n1564〔0029c07–0031a10〕 |
| 清辨系異釋 | T30n1566〔0117a06–0121b15〕 |
| 安慧系異釋 | T30n1567 漢譯止於第十三品，本品無傳 |
| 吉藏逐文疏 | T42n1824 同品 |
Textual Collation
The base text for this chapter is the Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka, T30n1564〔0029c07–0031a10〕. Following the base text’s voices, the body preserves the questioner, Nāgārjuna’s verses, and Qingmu’s commentary. The Bhāviveka text T30n1566〔0117a06〕 titles this “Examination of the Tathāgata, Chapter Twenty-Two.” The Sthiramati text T30n1567〔0156b28〕 has “Examination of Saṃsāra” as Chapter Eleven, and its extant Chinese translation ends with Chapter Thirteen; that title must not be moved to the present chapter.
Comparative Readings
The corresponding chapter is absent from the transmitted Sthiramati text. The Bhāviveka-line T30n1566 preserves coordinate alternative interpretations of the fivefold search, the tetralemma of emptiness, four propositions concerning the Tathāgata after cessation, and seeing dependent arising as seeing the Tathāgata. The extant Chinese translation of the Sthiramati line ends with Chapter Thirteen and is not conjecturally supplemented.
The questioner argues from the Tathāgata’s status as World-Honored One, Dharma King, and omniscient person that the Tathāgata should possess intrinsic nature. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0029c07–0029c08〕 reads: 「問曰：一切世中尊，唯有如來正遍知號為法王，一切智人是則應有。」 tr. “Question: In all the world, only the Tathāgata is most honored. He is the Perfectly and Completely Awakened One, called the Dharma King and the omniscient person. Such a one should therefore exist.”
Speaking for the respondent, Qingmu says that the Tathāgata should be contemplated in accordance with reality: if existent, he should be apprehensible; if nonexistent, there is nothing to apprehend. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0029c08–0029c09〕 reads: 「答曰：今諦思惟，若有應取；若無何所取？何以故？如來，」 tr. “Answer: Now contemplate in accordance with reality. If he exists, he should be apprehensible; if he does not exist, what is there to apprehend? Why? The Tathāgata—”
Nāgārjuna examines the Tathāgata through the fivefold search: not identical with the aggregates, not apart from the aggregates, neither contained in the other, and not possessing the aggregates. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0029c10–0029c11〕 reads: 「非陰不離陰，此彼不相在；如來不有陰，何處有如來？」 tr. “Not the aggregates, not apart from the aggregates; neither resides within the other. The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates—where is there a Tathāgata?”
Qingmu says that if the Tathāgata were the five aggregates, he would arise and cease with them, and experiencer and experienced would become one. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0029c14–0029c19〕 reads: 「五陰非是如來。何以故？生滅相故。五陰生滅相，若如來是五陰，如來即是生滅相。若生滅相者，如來即有無常斷滅等過。又受者受法則一，受者是如來、受法是五陰。是事不然，是故如來非是五陰。」 tr. “The five aggregates are not the Tathāgata. Why? Because they bear the mark of arising and ceasing. Since the five aggregates arise and cease, if the Tathāgata were the five aggregates, the Tathāgata would bear the mark of arising and ceasing. If he bore that mark, he would incur the faults of impermanence, annihilation, and the rest. Further, experiencer and experienced dharma would be one: the experiencer is the Tathāgata, while the experienced dharma is the five aggregates. This is not so. Therefore, the Tathāgata is not the five aggregates.”
Qingmu says that if a separate Tathāgata existed apart from the five aggregates, he would become permanently abiding and the faculties such as the eye would have no means to see or know him. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0029c19–0029c22〕 reads: 「離五陰亦無如來，若離五陰有如來者，不應有生滅相。若爾者，如來有常等過。又眼等諸根不能見知，但是事不然，是故離五陰亦無如來。」 tr. “There is likewise no Tathāgata apart from the five aggregates. If the Tathāgata existed apart from the five aggregates, he should not bear the mark of arising and ceasing. If so, he would incur faults such as permanence. Further, the faculties such as the eye could not see or know him. But this is not so. Therefore, there is no Tathāgata apart from the five aggregates.”
Qingmu says that if the five aggregates were within the Tathāgata, like fruit in a vessel or fish in water, the two would be different and the fault of permanence would return. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0029c22–0029c25〕 reads: 「如來中亦無五陰。何以故？若如來中有五陰，如器中有果、水中有魚者，則為有異。若異者，即有如上常等過，是故如來中無五陰。」 tr. “Nor are the five aggregates within the Tathāgata. Why? If the five aggregates were within the Tathāgata, like fruit in a vessel or fish in water, there would be difference. If they were different, faults such as permanence explained above would follow. Therefore, the five aggregates are not within the Tathāgata.”
Qingmu says that if the Tathāgata were within the five aggregates, like a person on a bed or milk in a vessel, the two would likewise be distinct. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0029c25–0029c28〕 reads: 「又五陰中無如來。何以故？若五陰中有如來，如床上有人、器中有乳者，如是則有別異，如上說過，是故五陰中無如來。」 tr. “Further, the Tathāgata is not within the five aggregates. Why? If the Tathāgata were within the five aggregates, like a person on a bed or milk in a vessel, there would be distinction and difference, with the faults explained above. Therefore, the Tathāgata is not within the five aggregates.”
Qingmu says that if the Tathāgata possessed the five aggregates like a person having a son, the Tathāgata and the aggregates would be different; none of the five searches finds him. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0029c28–0030a03〕 reads: 「如來亦不有五陰。何以故？若如來有五陰，如人有子，如是則有別異。若爾者，有如上過。是事不然，是故如來不有五陰。如是五種求不可得，何等是如來？」 tr. “Nor does the Tathāgata possess the five aggregates. Why? If the Tathāgata possessed the five aggregates, like a person having a son, there would be distinction and difference. If so, the faults explained above would follow. This is not so. Therefore, the Tathāgata does not possess the five aggregates. Sought in these five ways and not found, what is the Tathāgata?”
The questioner concedes that the fivefold search does not find the Tathāgata, then says that the Tathāgata exists when the five aggregates combine. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030a03–0030a04〕 reads: 「問曰：如是義求如來不可得，而五陰和合有如來。」 tr. “Question: Sought according to this reasoning, the Tathāgata cannot be found, yet when the five aggregates combine, there is a Tathāgata.”
Nāgārjuna says that if the Tathāgata exists through the combination of the five aggregates, he has no intrinsic nature; without intrinsic nature, he cannot independently exist through other-nature either. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030a05–0030a06〕 reads: 「陰合有如來，則無有自性；若無有自性，云何因他有？」 tr. “If the Tathāgata exists through the combination of the aggregates, he has no intrinsic nature. Without intrinsic nature, how could he exist by virtue of another?”
Qingmu says that the Tathāgata lacks intrinsic nature precisely because he exists in dependence on the combination of the five aggregates. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030a07–0030a08〕 reads: 「若如來五陰和合故有，即無自性。何以故？因五陰和合有故。」 tr. “If the Tathāgata exists because the five aggregates combine, he has no intrinsic nature. Why? Because he exists by virtue of the combination of the five aggregates.”
The questioner claims that though the Tathāgata does not exist through intrinsic nature, he can still exist through other-nature. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030a08–0030a09〕 reads: 「問曰：如來不以自性有，但因他性有。」 tr. “Question: The Tathāgata does not exist through intrinsic nature, but exists only by virtue of other-nature.”
Qingmu says that other-nature itself has no intrinsic nature and that without an opposed self serving as its ground of mutual dependence, no other can be found. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030a09–0030a12〕 reads: 「答曰：若無自性，云何因他性有？何以故？他性亦無自性。又無相待因故，他性不可得，不可得故不名為他。復次：」 tr. “Answer: Without intrinsic nature, how could he exist by virtue of other-nature? Why? Other-nature itself has no intrinsic nature. Further, because there is no ground of mutual dependence, other-nature cannot be found; since it cannot be found, it is not called other. Further:”
Nāgārjuna says that a dharma arising through other conditions is not a self; since it is not a self, it cannot be an intrinsically existent Tathāgata. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030a13–0030a14〕 reads: 「法若因他生，是即為非我；若法非我者，云何是如來？」 tr. “If a dharma arises through another, it is not a self. If a dharma is not a self, how could it be the Tathāgata?”
Qingmu uses the five fingers forming a fist as an analogy for the five aggregates provisionally named self, saying that names such as being, person, deva, and Tathāgata all lack substance of their own. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030a15–0030a19〕 reads: 「若法因眾緣生，即無有我。如因五指有拳，是拳無有自體。如是因五陰名我，是我即無自體。我有種種名，或名眾生、人、天、如來等。若如來因五陰有，即無自性，無自性故無我。若無我，云何說名如來？」 tr. “If a dharma arises through many conditions, there is no self. Just as a fist exists through five fingers yet has no substance of its own, so the self is named by virtue of the five aggregates and has no substance of its own. The self has many names: being, person, deva, Tathāgata, and so forth. If the Tathāgata exists through the five aggregates, he has no intrinsic nature. Since he has no intrinsic nature, there is no self. Without a self, how can he be named Tathāgata?”
Nāgārjuna says that without intrinsic nature there is no other-nature, and apart from both there is no one who can be named an intrinsically existent Tathāgata. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030a22–0030a23〕 reads: 「若無有自性，云何有他性？離自性他性，何名為如來？」 tr. “Without intrinsic nature, how could there be other-nature? Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, what can be named Tathāgata?”
Qingmu says that other-nature is named only because of intrinsic nature; when self is absent, other is absent, and apart from the two there is no one who is the Tathāgata. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030a24–0030a26〕 reads: 「若無自性，他性亦不應有。因自性故名他性，此無故彼亦無，是故自性、他性二俱無。若離自性、他性，誰為如來？復次：」 tr. “Without intrinsic nature, other-nature likewise should not exist. Other-nature is named because of intrinsic nature. Since this does not exist, that likewise does not exist. Therefore, intrinsic nature and other-nature are both absent. Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, who is the Tathāgata? Further:”
Nāgārjuna hypothetically says that only if a Tathāgata existed before appropriating the five aggregates could one say he later appropriates them and is named Tathāgata. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030a27–0030a28〕 reads: 「若不因五陰，先有如來者，以今受陰故，則說為如來。」 tr. “If a Tathāgata existed first without depending on the five aggregates, then because he now appropriates the aggregates, he would be called Tathāgata.”
Nāgārjuna says that in reality there is no Tathāgata before appropriating the five aggregates; therefore, no antecedent one can now appropriate them. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030a29–0030b01〕 reads: 「今實不受陰，更無如來法，若以不受無，今當云何受？」 tr. “In reality, there is no one who does not appropriate the aggregates, nor is there another dharma of the Tathāgata. Since one who does not appropriate them is nonexistent, who now could appropriate them?”
Nāgārjuna says that before an appropriator is established, what is appropriated cannot first be named appropriation; a dharma without appropriation cannot become the Tathāgata. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030b02–0030b03〕 reads: 「若其未有受，所受不名受，無有無受法，而名為如來。」 tr. “If appropriation has not yet existed, what is appropriated is not called appropriation. There is no dharma without appropriation that is named Tathāgata.”
Nāgārjuna says that the Tathāgata is unfindable through identity and difference and through the fivefold search, so he cannot then be substantially existent within the relation of appropriating the aggregates. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030b04–0030b05〕 reads: 「若於一異中，如來不可得，五種求亦無，云何受中有？」 tr. “If the Tathāgata cannot be found within identity or difference, and the fivefold search likewise finds nothing, how could he exist within appropriation?”
Nāgārjuna says that the appropriated five aggregates likewise do not exist through intrinsic nature; without intrinsic nature, they cannot exist through other-nature. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030b06–0030b07〕 reads: 「又所受五陰，不從自性有，若無自性者，云何有他性？」 tr. “Further, the appropriated five aggregates do not exist through intrinsic nature. Without intrinsic nature, how could there be other-nature?”
Qingmu says that the Tathāgata could appropriate the aggregates only if he existed before appropriating them; since no Tathāgata exists then, there is no one who can appropriate them. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030b08–0030b10〕 reads: 「若未受五陰先有如來者，是如來今應受五陰已作如來，而實未受五陰時先無如來，今云何當受？」 tr. “If a Tathāgata existed before appropriating the five aggregates, this Tathāgata should now become a Tathāgata after appropriating them. Yet in reality, no Tathāgata first exists before appropriating the five aggregates. Who now could appropriate them?”
Qingmu says that without an appropriator, the five aggregates are not called what is appropriated, and there is no one called Tathāgata without appropriating the aggregates. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030b10–0030b11〕 reads: 「又不受五陰者，五陰不名為受，無有無受而名為如來。」 tr. “Further, without one who appropriates the five aggregates, the aggregates are not called appropriation. There is no one without appropriation who is named Tathāgata.”
Qingmu says that because neither identity and difference nor the fivefold search finds the Tathāgata, he cannot be said to exist substantially in the appropriation of the five aggregates. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030b11–0030b13〕 reads: 「又如來一異中求不可得，五陰中五種求亦不可得。若爾者，云何於五陰中說有如來？」 tr. “Further, sought through identity and difference, the Tathāgata cannot be found; nor can he be found through the fivefold search within the five aggregates. If so, how can one say that the Tathāgata exists within the five aggregates?”
Qingmu says that if the appropriated five aggregates have no intrinsic nature, other-nature likewise does not exist and cannot rescue their substantial existence. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030b13–0030b16〕 reads: 「又所受五陰，不從自性有。若謂從他性有。若不從自性有。云何從他性有？何以故？以無自性故，又他性亦無。」 tr. “Further, the appropriated five aggregates do not exist through intrinsic nature. If one says they exist through other-nature—if they do not exist through intrinsic nature, how could they exist through other-nature? Why? Because intrinsic nature does not exist, and other-nature likewise does not exist.”
Through before and after, identity and difference, the fivefold search, and intrinsic and other-nature, Qingmu concludes that neither the Tathāgata nor the five aggregates can be established through intrinsic nature. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030b08–0030b16〕 reads: 「若未受五陰先有如來者，是如來今應受五陰已作如來，而實未受五陰時先無如來，今云何當受？又不受五陰者，五陰不名為受，無有無受而名為如來。又如來一異中求不可得，五陰中五種求亦不可得。若爾者，云何於五陰中說有如來？又所受五陰，不從自性有。若謂從他性有。若不從自性有。云何從他性有？何以故？以無自性故，又他性亦無。」 tr. “If a Tathāgata existed before appropriating the five aggregates, this Tathāgata should now become a Tathāgata after appropriating them. Yet in reality, no Tathāgata first exists before appropriating them. Who now could appropriate them? Further, without one who appropriates the five aggregates, the aggregates are not called appropriation. There is no one without appropriation who is named Tathāgata. Further, sought through identity and difference, the Tathāgata cannot be found, nor can he be found through the fivefold search within the aggregates. If so, how can one say that a Tathāgata exists within the five aggregates? Further, the appropriated five aggregates do not exist through intrinsic nature. If one says they exist through other-nature—if they do not exist through intrinsic nature, how could they exist through other-nature? Why? Because intrinsic nature does not exist, and other-nature likewise does not exist.”
Nāgārjuna says that appropriation and appropriator are both empty; an empty appropriated dharma cannot then establish an empty Tathāgata. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030b17–0030b18〕 reads: 「以如是義故，受空受者空，云何當以空，而說空如來？」 tr. “According to this reasoning, appropriation is empty and the appropriator is empty. How could emptiness be used to speak of an empty Tathāgata?”
Qingmu explains that appropriation and appropriator are both empty and asks how empty appropriation can be used to speak separately of an empty Tathāgata. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030b19–0030b20〕 reads: 「以是義思惟，受及受者皆空。若受空者，云何以空受而說空如來？」 tr. “Contemplated according to this reasoning, appropriation and appropriator are both empty. If appropriation is empty, how can empty appropriation be used to speak of an empty Tathāgata?”
The questioner asks whether appropriation and appropriator being empty means that emptiness itself is definitely real. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030b20–0030b21〕 reads: 「問曰：汝謂受空、受者空，則定有空耶？」 tr. “Question: You say that appropriation is empty and appropriator is empty. Does emptiness then definitely exist?”
Qingmu’s answer marks the respondent’s turn, directly rejects the question, and asks why. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030b21〕 reads: 「不然。何以故？」 tr. “It is not so. Why?”
Nāgārjuna says that the four propositions—empty, nonempty, both empty and nonempty, and neither empty nor nonempty—cannot be appropriated and are spoken only through provisional names. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030b22–0030b23〕 reads: 「空則不可說，非空不可說，共不共叵說，但以假名說。」 tr. “Empty cannot be spoken; nonempty cannot be spoken. Both and neither cannot be spoken; they are spoken only through provisional names.”
Qingmu says that the four propositions involving emptiness are provisionally posited only to dismantle contradiction; when correctly contemplating the true character, none should be made into a challenge. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030b24–0030b28〕 reads: 「諸法空則不應說，諸法不空亦不應說，諸法空不空亦不應說，非空非不空亦不應說。何以故？但破相違故以假名說。如是正觀思惟，諸法實相中不應以諸難為難。何以故？」 tr. “One should not say that dharmas are empty, nor that dharmas are nonempty; one should not say that dharmas are both empty and nonempty, nor that they are neither empty nor nonempty. Why? They are spoken through provisional names only to dismantle contradiction. In such correct contemplation, within the true character of dharmas, the various challenges should not be taken as challenges. Why?”
Nāgārjuna says that the four propositions—world permanent, impermanent, both, and neither—do not exist within the quiescent true character. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030b29〕 reads: 「寂滅相中無，常無常等四」 tr. “Within the mark of quiescence there is no tetralemma of permanent, impermanent, and the rest.”
Nāgārjuna says that the four propositions—world bounded, unbounded, both, and neither—likewise do not exist within the quiescent true character. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030c01〕 reads: 「寂滅相中無，邊無邊等四。」 tr. “Within the mark of quiescence there is no tetralemma of bounded, unbounded, and the rest.”
Qingmu says that the eight views concerning permanence and impermanence and boundedness and unboundedness all arise through appropriation, while the true character is pure, inapprehensible, and without hierarchy between this and that. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030c02–0030c11〕 reads: 「諸法實相如是微妙寂滅，但因過去世起四種邪見：世間有常、世間無常、世間常無常、世間非常非無常；寂滅中盡無。何以故？諸法實相畢竟清淨不可取，空尚不受，何況有四種見。四種見皆因受生，諸法實相無所因受。四種見皆以自見為貴、他見為賤，諸法實相無有此彼。是故說寂滅中無四種見。如因過去世有四種見，因未來世有四種見亦如是。世間有邊、世間無邊、世間有邊無邊、世間非有邊非無邊。」 tr. “The true character of dharmas is subtle and quiescent in this way. Four wrong views arise only through the past: the world is permanent, the world is impermanent, the world is both permanent and impermanent, the world is neither permanent nor impermanent. None exists within quiescence. Why? The true character of dharmas is ultimately pure and cannot be appropriated. Even emptiness is not accepted, how much less the four views. The four views all arise through appropriation, while the true character of dharmas has nothing through which it appropriates. The four views all honor one’s own view and disparage another’s, while the true character of dharmas has neither this nor that. Therefore, it is said that the four views do not exist within quiescence. Just as four views arise regarding the past, four views likewise arise regarding the future: the world is bounded, the world is unbounded, the world is both bounded and unbounded, and the world is neither bounded nor unbounded.”
The questioner worries that removing the Tathāgata’s intrinsic nature through the four propositions is equivalent to asserting that there is no Tathāgata. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030c11–0030c12〕 reads: 「問曰：若如是破如來者，則無如來耶？」 tr. “Question: If the Tathāgata is refuted in this way, does that mean there is no Tathāgata?”
Nāgārjuna says that only those with deeply rooted wrong views assert that there is no Tathāgata, yet it is likewise wrong to discriminate determinate existence within the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030c13–0030c14〕 reads: 「邪見深厚者，則說無如來；如來寂滅相，分別有亦非。」 tr. “Those whose wrong views are deeply rooted say there is no Tathāgata; yet within the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence, to discriminate and say that he exists is likewise wrong.”
Qingmu distinguishes two kinds of wrong view: those that destroy worldly well-being and those that destroy the path to nirvāṇa. Denying demerit, merit, and noble ones destroys wholesome action, while clinging to existence and nonexistence obstructs nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030c15–0030c23〕 reads: 「邪見有二種：一者破世間樂；二者破涅槃道。破世間樂者是麁邪見，言無罪無福，無如來等賢聖。起是邪見，捨善為惡，則破世間樂。破涅槃道者，貪著於我，分別有無，起善滅惡。起善故得世間樂，分別有無故不得涅槃。是故若言無如來者，是深厚邪見，乃失世間樂，何況涅槃！若言有如來，亦是邪見。何以故？如來寂滅相，而種種分別故。是故寂滅相中，分別有如來亦為非。」 tr. “There are two kinds of wrong view: one destroys worldly well-being, and the other destroys the path to nirvāṇa. The kind that destroys worldly well-being is a coarse wrong view, saying there is no demerit, no merit, and no Tathāgata or other noble one. On forming such a view, one abandons good and does evil, thereby destroying worldly well-being. The kind that destroys the path to nirvāṇa craves and clings to a self, discriminates between existence and nonexistence, cultivates good, and ends evil. Because of cultivating good, one gains worldly well-being; because of discriminating existence and nonexistence, one does not attain nirvāṇa. Therefore, saying there is no Tathāgata is a deeply rooted wrong view: one loses even worldly well-being, how much more nirvāṇa! Yet saying the Tathāgata exists is likewise a wrong view. Why? Because one makes various discriminations about the Tathāgata’s mark of quiescence. Therefore, within the mark of quiescence, discriminating and saying that the Tathāgata exists is likewise wrong.”
Nāgārjuna says that within emptiness of nature, one cannot conceive distinctions of existence and nonexistence concerning the Tathāgata after cessation. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030c24–0030c25〕 reads: 「如是性空中，思惟亦不可，如來滅度後，分別於有無。」 tr. “Within such emptiness of nature, conception is likewise impossible: after the Tathāgata’s cessation, discriminating existence and nonexistence.”
Qingmu says that because the true character of dharmas is empty of nature, one cannot discriminate the Tathāgata after cessation as existent, nonexistent, or both; the Tathāgata has always been ultimately empty. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0030c26–0030c28〕 reads: 「諸法實相性空故，不應於如來滅後思惟若有、若無、若有無。如來從本已來畢竟空，何況滅後！」 tr. “Because the true character of dharmas is empty of nature, one should not conceive the Tathāgata after cessation as existent, nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent. The Tathāgata has always been ultimately empty—how much more after cessation!”
Nāgārjuna says that the Tathāgata has passed beyond conceptual proliferation, while beings who generate it cover their eye of wisdom and do not see the Buddha. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0030c29–0031a01〕 reads: 「如來過戲論，而人生戲論，戲論破慧眼，是皆不見佛。」 tr. “The Tathāgata has passed beyond conceptual proliferation, yet people generate conceptual proliferation. Conceptual proliferation destroys the eye of wisdom; such people do not see the Buddha.”
Qingmu explains conceptual proliferation as recollection, apprehending marks, and discrimination between this and that; clinging to the Buddha’s cessation or nonceasing covers the eye of wisdom and prevents seeing the Dharma-body. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031a02–0031a05〕 reads: 「戲論名憶念取相分別此彼。言佛滅不滅等，是人為戲論，覆慧眼故，不能見如來法身。此〈如來品〉中，初中後思惟，如來定性不可得。是故偈說：」 tr. “Conceptual proliferation means recollection, apprehending marks, and discrimination between this and that. Those who say that the Buddha has ceased, has not ceased, and so forth engage in conceptual proliferation; because it covers the eye of wisdom, they cannot see the Tathāgata’s Dharma-body. In this ‘Examination of the Tathāgata,’ contemplating from beginning through middle to end, the Tathāgata’s determinate nature cannot be found. Therefore, the verse says:”
Nāgārjuna says that the Tathāgata’s nature is the nature of the world; the Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature, and the world has none. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0031a06–0031a07〕 reads: 「如來所有性，即是世間性；如來無有性，世間亦無性。」 tr. “Whatever nature the Tathāgata has is the nature of the world. The Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature; the world likewise has no intrinsic nature.”
Qingmu says that the chapter’s examination and inquiry reveal the nature of the Tathāgata to be the nature of the entire world. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031a08〕 reads: 「此品中思惟推求，如來性即是一切世間性。」 tr. “The contemplation and inquiry in this chapter reveal that the nature of the Tathāgata is the nature of the entire world.”
The questioner asks what the nature shared by the Tathāgata and world ultimately is. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031a09〕 reads: 「問曰：何等是如來性？」 tr. “Question: What is the nature of the Tathāgata?”
Qingmu answers that the Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature, just as the world has no intrinsic nature. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0031a09–0031a10〕 reads: 「答曰：如來無有性，同世間無性。」 tr. “Answer: The Tathāgata has no intrinsic nature, just as the world has no intrinsic nature.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary first says that the name Tathāgata is provisionally posited through the aggregates, then uses 「以假設故，譬如旋火輪」 tr. “because it is provisionally posited, like a wheel of fire” to show that the posited appearance does not prove a wheel-substance, and 「無實故，譬如瓶」 tr. “because it is unreal, like a jar” to say the designated dharma is unreal. It explains the first analogy through fire turning everywhere up and down without any wheel-substance and concludes that there is no substance of its own in ultimate truth. T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0117b09–0117b10〕 reads: 「修多羅人復言：因陰故假設名如來，我等所說無過。」 tr. “The Sautrāntika again says: the name Tathāgata is provisionally posited because of the aggregates; what we say is faultless.” T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0117b14–0117b16〕 reads: 「此謂有自體者，得如是過。應作是知，如來無自體。此中說驗，於第一義中如來無自體，以假設故，譬如旋火輪；無實故，譬如瓶。」 tr. “This fault follows for one who says there is substance of its own. One should know that the Tathāgata has no substance of his own. The proof stated here is: in ultimate truth, the Tathāgata has no substance of his own because he is provisionally posited, like a wheel of fire, and because he is unreal, like a jar.” T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0117b28–0117b29〕 reads: 「論者言：火於空中上下遍轉而無輪體」 tr. “The dialectician says: fire turns everywhere up and down in space, yet there is no substance of a wheel.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary first denies that ultimate emptiness can be attained apart from wisdom born of hearing, then assigns statements of empty, nonempty, nondual, empty-signless-wishless, dreamlike, and illusory to distinct functions: according with those to be transformed, conventional positing, washing away unwholesome discrimination, breaking the cataract of wrong views, preventing teaching emptiness from increasing wrong views, breaking attachment to self, blocking others’ proofs, ending the two views, and attaining ultimate truth. In ultimate truth neither proposition is spoken, because things are like illusion and mirage and their substance is unborn. T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0120a13–0120a23〕 reads: 「若有人言，離於聞慧而能於一切境界得第一義空者，則不說一切法空，無如是人故。為欲隨順所化眾生福智聚故說空等語，但以世諦施設故說。為欲洗濯不善分別垢故，為破邪見癡眼膜故，說一切境界不空。何以故？若為說空增長邪見。又為破執我等膜故，說一切境界空。第一義中如幻如焰，自體無生故，二俱不說。為遮異人立驗故，為息於境界起二見過故，為得第一義故，說言無二。如是為洗濯不善分別垢故，說空無相無作夢幻等語，是故說空滅一切見。」 tr. “If someone says that ultimate emptiness regarding every object can be attained apart from wisdom born of hearing, then one does not say that all dharmas are empty, because there is no such person. In order to accord with the collections of merit and wisdom of beings to be transformed, words such as ‘empty’ are spoken, but only as conventional positing in conventional truth. In order to wash away the defilement of unwholesome discrimination and break the cataract of delusion and wrong view, all objects are said to be nonempty. Why? Because speaking emptiness can increase wrong views. Further, in order to break the cataract of attachment to self and the rest, all objects are said to be empty. In ultimate truth, because they are like illusion and mirage and their substance is unborn, neither is spoken. In order to block others’ establishment of proofs, end the fault of the two views arising regarding objects, and attain ultimate truth, nonduality is taught. Thus, to wash away the defilement of unwholesome discrimination, words such as empty, signless, wishless, dreamlike, and illusory are taught. Therefore, it is said that emptiness extinguishes all views.”
In discriminating the Tathāgata after cessation, the Prajñāpradīpa Commentary separately lists four propositions: the Tathāgata exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, and neither exists nor does not exist. The fourth belongs only to the transmitted Bhāviveka line and is not retrojected as a fourth item into Qingmu’s three in Kumārajīva’s text. T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0120b22–0120b23〕 reads: 「釋曰：此謂如來滅後，如來有耶？如來無耶？亦有亦無耶？非有非無耶？是義不然。」 tr. “The commentary says: this means that after the Tathāgata’s cessation, does the Tathāgata exist? Does the Tathāgata not exist? Does he both exist and not exist? Does he neither exist nor not exist? This is not so.”
The Prajñāpradīpa Commentary lists existence and nonexistence, permanence and impermanence, form-body, verbal-teaching body, Dharma-body, mark and what bears a mark, cause and fruit, knower and known, emptiness-signlessness-wishlessness, and illusion and dream as discriminations. The analogy of one blind from birth not seeing the sun illustrates conceptual proliferation covering the eye. The verse introduced by 「復次如經偈言」 tr. “Further, as a sūtra verse says” names seeing dependent arising as seeing Dharma and seeing the Tathāgata. The verse introduced explicitly by 「又如《金剛般若經》中偈言」 tr. “Again, as a verse in the Diamond Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says” rebukes seeing through form and seeking through sound as a wrong path. T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0120b27–0120c01〕 reads: 「釋曰：此謂境界無體、慧無分別。以是故，汝先出因，譬喻有過。何以故？有無、常無常、色身、言教身、法身，能相所相因果、能覺所覺、空無相無作無願、如幻如夢等，悉是分別。」 tr. “The commentary says: this means that objects lack substance and wisdom lacks discrimination. Therefore, the reason and analogy you previously offered are faulty. Why? Existence and nonexistence, permanence and impermanence, form-body, verbal-teaching body, Dharma-body, mark and what bears a mark, cause and fruit, knower and known, emptiness-signlessness-wishlessness, illusion and dream—all are discriminations.” T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0120c05–0120c08〕 reads: 「譬如生盲者不見日輪，不見如來亦復如是。何故不見？戲論分別覆慧眼故，是名不見。云何為見？能見法性如來，是名為見。」 tr. “Just as one blind from birth does not see the orb of the sun, one who does not see the Tathāgata is likewise so. Why is he not seen? Because conceptual proliferation and discrimination cover the eye of wisdom; this is called not seeing. What is seeing? To see the Dharma-nature Tathāgata is called seeing.” T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0120c08–0120c09〕 reads: 「復次如經偈言「能見緣起者，是名為見法。若能見法者，即為見如來。」」 tr. “Further, as a sūtra verse says: ‘One who can see dependent arising is said to see the Dharma. One who can see the Dharma thereby sees the Tathāgata.’” T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0120c11–0120c12〕 reads: 「又如《金剛般若經》中偈言：」 tr. “Again, as a verse in the Diamond Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says:” T30n1566 Prajñāpradīpa Commentary〔0120c13–0120c14〕 reads: 「若以色見我，以音聲求我，是人行邪道，不能見如來。」 tr. “If one sees me through form or seeks me through sound, that person travels a wrong path and cannot see the Tathāgata.”
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang summarizes the search for person and dharmas through three approaches—neither identical nor different, neither self nor other, neither before nor after. He also lists three kinds of person and dharma sought above: non-Buddhist, Lesser Vehicle, and Great Vehicle, none of which can be found; and he rebukes substantializing empty appropriation and an empty Tathāgata. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0142c15–0142c17〕 reads: 「結上三門，謂不一不異、不自不他、不前不後，三義求人法不得。又上求三種人法：一外道、二小乘、三大乘，皆不可得。」 tr. “The preceding three approaches are concluded: neither identical nor different, neither self nor other, neither before nor after. Through these three meanings, person and dharmas cannot be found. Further, the three kinds of person and dharma sought above—first non-Buddhist, second Lesser Vehicle, third Great Vehicle—cannot be found.” T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0142c17–0142c18〕 reads: 「下半呵有。汝云何以空為受、以空為如來？」 tr. “The second half rebukes existence: how can you take emptiness as appropriation and emptiness as the Tathāgata?”
Jizang says that though the four propositions are ineffable, one statement can be spoken. He cites the six ineffable statements beginning with arising-arising in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the seventh statement, and the ten dharmas as conditions to explain what may be spoken. The Buddha is provisionally named only to break four contradictions; emptiness is used only to refute existence, and clinging to that emptiness returns one to every difficulty. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0143a10–0143a16〕 reads: 「上明四句不可說，今為釋疑。經中所以說有佛者，蓋是無名相中假名相說，如《涅槃》無名強名相說涅槃是佛異名耳。又此中四句不可說，一句可說，如《涅槃經》生生等六句不可說，第七句有因緣故亦互得說。以十法為生作因，是故可說也。」 tr. “Above it was explained that the four propositions cannot be spoken; this now resolves a doubt. The sūtras speak of a Buddha because provisional names and marks are spoken within what lacks name and mark, just as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra forcefully assigns a name within the nameless and says nirvāṇa is another name for Buddha. Further, here the four propositions cannot be spoken, yet one statement can be spoken. As in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, six statements beginning with arising-arising cannot be spoken, but because the seventh has causes and conditions, it too may be spoken reciprocally. Because ten dharmas serve as causes for arising, it can be spoken.” T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0143a19–0143a20〕 reads: 「空違於有故，得假空破有，豈有此空？若有此空，即墮諸難。此釋為正意也。」 tr. “Because emptiness opposes existence, provisional emptiness may refute existence. How could this emptiness exist? If this emptiness existed, one would fall into all the difficulties. This explanation expresses the correct intent.” T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0143a23–0143a25〕 reads: 「今破此四種相違，故假名說佛耳。又釋：執佛是四句，則與佛相違；今破此四句，故假名說佛。」 tr. “The present text breaks these four contradictions; therefore, Buddha is spoken only as a provisional name. Another explanation: to grasp the Buddha through the four propositions contradicts the Buddha. Because the four propositions are now refuted, Buddha is provisionally named.”
Jizang presents three meanings of the closing verse. First, the questioner initially uses the supramundane to prove the mundane, while the treatise master now uses the mundane to illustrate the supramundane. Second, he refutes the idea that the Buddha stands beyond the four propositions and outside the hundred negations. Third, he refutes the view that world and what transcends the world are different, concluding that Tathāgata and world equally transcend the four propositions and that their two natures have no distinct nature. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0144a22–0144a27〕 reads: 「一者外人品初舉出世證有世間，論主今舉世間以例出世，求世間有無四句既不可得，出世如來亦復例然。二者外人聞上破有無四句並皆非佛，便謂佛出四句之表、居百非之外，是故今明如來之性即是世間之性，非但佛出四句、超於百非，世間亦爾。」 tr. “First, at the chapter’s opening the opponent raises the supramundane to prove the existence of the mundane; the treatise master now raises the mundane to illustrate the supramundane. Since the four propositions of existence and nonexistence cannot be found when seeking the world, the supramundane Tathāgata is likewise so. Second, hearing above that none of the four propositions of existence and nonexistence is the Buddha, the opponent supposes that the Buddha stands beyond the four propositions and dwells outside the hundred negations. Therefore, the present text explains that the Tathāgata’s nature is the nature of the world: it is not only the Buddha who stands beyond the four propositions and transcends the hundred negations; the world is likewise so.” T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0144a28–0144b03〕 reads: 「三者從第四章呵責生，前偈既云如來過戲論，外人便謂戲論自是世間，如來便為出世，則起世出世異見。是故今明如來之性即世間性，非但如來超於四句，即此四句本來不四即是如來。」 tr. “Third, this arises from the rebuke in the fourth section. Since the preceding verse says that the Tathāgata passes beyond conceptual proliferation, the opponent supposes that conceptual proliferation is itself the world and the Tathāgata is thereby supramundane, forming a view that the mundane and supramundane are different. Therefore, the present text explains that the Tathāgata’s nature is the nature of the world: not only does the Tathāgata transcend the four propositions; the fact that these four propositions have never been four is itself the Tathāgata.” T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0144b04–0144b06〕 reads: 「下半釋上半，明如來與世間同絕四句，故二性無別性，無別性者體也。」 tr. “The second half explains the first: the Tathāgata and the world equally transcend the four propositions. Therefore, the two natures have no distinct nature, and the absence of distinct nature is their substance.”
Terminology
The fivefold search asks whether the Tathāgata is the aggregates, apart from the aggregates, contains the aggregates, is contained in the aggregates, or possesses the aggregates. Appropriation and appropriator mean the appropriated five aggregates and the Tathāgata claimed to appropriate them. Qingmu states explicitly that the tetralemma of emptiness is spoken provisionally only to dismantle contradiction. The four views of permanence and impermanence and the corresponding four future views of boundedness and unboundedness are said by Qingmu to arise through appropriation.
Doctrinal Outline
Following voices and the meanings of compound verses, the root text presents forty-seven fundamental doctrinal items: three at the chapter opening; five in the fivefold search; nine on combination, intrinsic nature, and other-nature; twelve on before and after appropriating the aggregates; seven on the answer of emptiness, the four propositions, and the eight views; five on existence, nonexistence, and after cessation; and six on conceptual proliferation and the shared absence of intrinsic nature in world and Tathāgata.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
This chapter is attributed to Nāgārjuna as author, Qingmu as commentator, and Kumārajīva as translator. The Bhāviveka line preserves a corresponding chapter as evidence of alternative interpretations. The extant Chinese translation of the Sthiramati line ends with Chapter Thirteen; its absence here is reported as such.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
The corresponding Sthiramati-line chapter is not transmitted. This section records the absence and does not supply conjectural material.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
No evidence from another treatise of the same lineage with a precise page anchor was admitted into this chapter; this section remains absent.
Position of the Editions
| Use | Textual witness and range |
|---|---|
| Root verses and Qingmu commentary | T30n1564〔0029c07–0031a10〕 |
| Bhāviveka-line alternative interpretation | T30n1566〔0117a06–0121b15〕 |
| Sthiramati-line alternative interpretation | T30n1567 Chinese translation ends with Chapter Thirteen; this chapter is not transmitted |
| Jizang’s running commentary | T42n1824, corresponding chapter |