中論 觀涅槃品第二十五
難的人問到了根上：
「若一切法空，無生無滅者， 何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃？」
他心裡的涅槃是做出來的——有實煩惱可斷，有實五陰可滅。
龍樹反手還他一句：「若諸法不空，則無生無滅」。有自性的東西不待緣、不可改，煩惱斷不動，五陰滅不掉。青目收成一句：「是故有無二門，則非至涅槃。」
一頌先立其相
「無得亦無至，不斷亦不常， 不生亦不滅，是說名涅槃。」
青目說「無至者，無處可至」；說不斷，理由是「五陰先來畢竟空故」——不是斷得徹底，是本來無物可斷。
四門逐盡
有法必帶老死，且從眾緣生皆是有為，故涅槃不名有。無又踩著有才說得出，「先有今無則名無」，涅槃卻「非有法變為無故」。有無相違，「如明暗不俱」，合不成一處。有無既不立，非有非無也就無所依而分別。
正答只是不受
「受諸因緣故，輪轉生死中； 不受諸因緣，是名為涅槃。」
不是滅掉五陰，是「無性五陰不復相續故，說名涅槃」。連得的人也不可得——青目問：「離如來，誰當得涅槃？」
極處
「涅槃與世間，無有少分別； 世間與涅槃，亦無少分別。」
五陰相續往來假名世間，而五陰之性畢竟空、無受寂滅；「以一切法不生不滅故」，兩頭無別。推到際上，也「無毫釐差別」。所觀之境不曾換過，換的是看見沒有。
收
「諸法不可得，滅一切戲論， 無人亦無處，佛亦無所說。」
所遮的是涅槃的定相。戲論滅不是空白——青目緊接著說「通達諸法實相得安隱道」，並歸之：「是名諸法實相，亦名如，法性，實際，涅槃。」
問方所修的斷惑滅陰，一件也沒有被取消；取消的只是『有一實物可斷、有一實處可到』的那個念頭。
The challenger asks at the root:
“If all dharmas are empty, neither arisen nor ceased, what is cut off and what extinguished that it may be called nirvāṇa?”
The nirvāṇa in his mind is something produced—real afflictions can be cut off and real aggregates extinguished.
Nāgārjuna returns the sentence: “If dharmas were not empty, there would be neither arising nor ceasing.” What possesses intrinsic nature does not depend on conditions and cannot change; afflictions could not be cut, the aggregates could not be extinguished. Qingmu gathers it: “Thus neither the gate of existence nor the gate of nonexistence leads to nirvāṇa.”
One Verse First Establishes Its Mark
“Nothing is attained and nowhere is reached; it is neither annihilation nor permanence, neither arising nor ceasing. What is spoken of in this way is called nirvāṇa.”
Qingmu says, “Nowhere is reached means that no place exists at which to arrive.” He calls it not annihilated because “the five aggregates have from the beginning been ultimately empty”—not because cutting is thorough, but because no thing was ever there to cut.
The Four Gates Are Exhausted in Turn
Whatever exists bears aging and death and, arising from conditions, is conditioned; therefore nirvāṇa is not existent. Nonexistence in turn can be spoken only by leaning on existence—“what existed before but does not exist now is called nonexistent”—yet nirvāṇa is “not an existent dharma turning into nonexistence.” Existence and nonexistence contradict one another, “as light and darkness do not coexist,” and cannot combine. Once neither existence nor nonexistence stands, their joint negation has no basis for discrimination.
The Direct Answer Is Simply Nonappropriation
“Because one appropriates causes and conditions, one revolves in birth and death; not appropriating causes and conditions is called nirvāṇa.”
The five aggregates are not destroyed; “because the five aggregates lacking intrinsic nature no longer continue, this is called nirvāṇa.” Even the one who attains cannot be found—Qingmu asks: “Apart from the Tathāgata, who would attain nirvāṇa?”
The Summit
“Nirvāṇa and the world have not the slightest difference; the world and nirvāṇa likewise have not the slightest difference.”
Because the five aggregates continue, come, and go, they are provisionally called the world; yet their nature is ultimately empty, unappropriated, and quiescent. “Because all dharmas neither arise nor cease,” the two ends do not differ. At the limit, there is “not a hair’s breadth of difference.” The object viewed never changed; what changed is whether it was seen.
Gathering In
“Dharmas are all unfindable and all conceptual proliferation ceases; there is neither person nor place, and the Buddha has spoken nothing.”
What is blocked is a determinate mark of nirvāṇa. The exhaustion of proliferation is not blankness—Qingmu immediately says one “comprehends the true marks of dharmas and attains the path of peace,” then gathers it as “the true marks of dharmas, also called suchness, Dharma-nature, the reality-limit, and nirvāṇa.”
Not one part of the questioner’s practice of cutting afflictions and extinguishing the aggregates is canceled. What is canceled is only the thought that “a real thing is there to be cut and a real place there to be reached.”
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷四〈觀涅槃品第二十五〉· 大正藏 T30n1564〔起 T30 0034c14〕。段/行首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
〔T30 0034c14〕問曰：
「若一切法空，無生無滅者，
何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃？」
若一切法空，則無生無滅。無生無滅者，何所斷何所滅，而名為涅槃？是故一切法不應空。以諸法不空故，斷諸煩惱滅五陰，名為涅槃。
答曰：
「若諸法不空，則無生無滅；
何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃？」
若一切世間不空，則無生無滅，何所斷何所滅而名為涅槃？是故有無二門，則非至涅槃。所名涅槃者：
「無得亦無至，不斷亦不常，
不生亦不滅，是說名涅槃。」
無得者，於行於果無所得。無至者，無處可至。不斷者，五陰先來畢竟空故，得道入無餘涅槃時亦無所斷。不常者，若有法可得分別者則名為常，涅槃寂滅無法可分別故，不名為常。生滅亦爾，如是相者名為涅槃。復次經說，涅槃非有、非無、非有無、非非有非非無，一切法不受，內寂滅名涅槃。何以故？
〔T30 0035a07〕「涅槃不名有，有則老死相；
終無有有法，離於老死相。」
眼見一切萬物皆生滅故，是老死相。涅槃若是有，則應有老死相。但是事不然，是故涅槃不名有。又不見離生滅老死別有定法而名涅槃。若涅槃是有，即應有生滅老死相；以離老死相故，名為涅槃。復次：
「若涅槃是有，涅槃即有為；
終無有一法，而是無為者。」
涅槃非是有。何以故？一切萬物從眾緣生，皆是有為。無有一法名為無為者，雖常法假名無為，以理推之，無常法尚無有，何況常法不可見不可得者。復次：
「若涅槃是有，云何名無受？
無有不從受，而名為有法。」
若謂涅槃是有法者，經則不應說無受是涅槃。何以故？無有有法不受而有，是故涅槃非有。
問曰：若有非涅槃者，無應是涅槃耶？
答曰：
「有尚非涅槃，何況於無耶！
涅槃無有有，何處當有無？」
若有非涅槃，無云何是涅槃？何以故？因有故有無；若無有，何有無？如經說，先有今無則名無。涅槃則不爾。何以故？非有法變為無故。是故無亦不作涅槃。復次：
「若無是涅槃，云何名不受？
未曾有不受，而名為無法。」
若謂無是涅槃，經則不應說不受名涅槃。何以故？無有不受而名無法，是故知涅槃非無。
問曰：若涅槃非有非無者，何等是涅槃？
答曰：
「受諸因緣故，輪轉生死中；
不受諸因緣，是名為涅槃。」
不如實知顛倒故，因五受陰往來生死。如實知顛倒故，則不復因五受陰往來生死。無性五陰不復相續故，說名涅槃。復次：
「如佛經中說，斷有斷非有；
是故知涅槃，非有亦非無。」
有名三有，非有名三有斷滅。佛說斷此二事故，當知涅槃非有亦非無。
問曰：若有若無非涅槃者，今有無共合是涅槃耶？
答曰：
「若謂於有無，合為涅槃者，
有無即解脫，是事則不然。」
若謂於有無合為涅槃者，即有無二事合為解脫。是事不然。何以故？有無二事相違故，云何一處有？復次：
「若謂於有無，合為涅槃者；
涅槃非無受，是二從受生。」
若謂有無合為涅槃者，經不應說涅槃名無受。何以故？有無二事從受生，相因而有。是故有無二事，不得合為涅槃。復次：
「有無共合成，云何名涅槃？
涅槃名無為，有無是有為。」
有無二事共合，不得名涅槃。涅槃名無為，有無是有為，是故有無非是涅槃。復次：
「有無二事共，云何是涅槃？
是二不同處，如明暗不俱。」
有無二事不得名涅槃。何以故？有無相違，一處不可得，如明暗不俱。是故有時無無、無時無有，云何有無共合而名為涅槃？
問曰：若有無共合非涅槃者，今非有非無應是涅槃。
答曰：
「若非有非無，名之為涅槃；
此非有非無，以何而分別？」
若涅槃非有非無者，此非有非無因何而分別？是故非有非無是涅槃者，是事不然。復次：
「分別非有無，如是名涅槃；
若有無成者，非有非無成。」
汝分別非有非無是涅槃者，是事不然。何以故？若有無成者，然後非有非無成。有相違名無、無相違名有，是有無第三句中已破。有無無故，云何有非有非無？是故涅槃非非有非非無。復次：
「如來滅度後，不言有與無，
亦不言有無，非有及非無。
如來現在時，不言有與無，
亦不言有無，非有及非無。」
若如來滅後、若現在，有如來亦不受，無如來亦不受，亦有如來亦無如來亦不受，非有如來非無如來亦不受。以不受故，不應分別涅槃有無等。離如來，誰當得涅槃？何時何處以何法說涅槃？是故一切時一切種、求涅槃相不可得。復次：
〔T30 0036a04〕「涅槃與世間，無有少分別；
世間與涅槃，亦無少分別。」
五陰相續往來因緣故，說名世間。五陰性畢竟空無受寂滅，此義先已說。以一切法不生不滅故，世間與涅槃無有分別，涅槃與世間亦無分別。復次：
「涅槃之實際，及與世間際，
如是二際者，無毫釐差別。」
究竟推求世間、涅槃、實際、無生際，以平等不可得故，無毫釐差別。復次：
「滅後有無等，有邊等常等，
諸見依涅槃，未來過去世。」
如來滅後有如來、無如來、亦有如來亦無如來、非有如來非無如來。世間有邊、世間無邊、世間亦有邊亦無邊、世間非有邊非無邊。世間常、世間無常、世間亦常亦無常、世間非有常非無常。此三種十二見。如來滅後有無等四見，依涅槃起。世間有邊無邊等四見，依未來世起。世間常無常等四見，依過去世起。如來滅後有無等不可得，涅槃亦如是。如世間前際後際、有邊無邊、有常無常等不可得，涅槃亦如是。是故說世間、涅槃等無有異。復次：
「一切法空故，何有邊無邊，
亦邊亦無邊，非有非無邊？
何者為一異，何有常無常，
亦常亦無常，非常非無常？
諸法不可得，滅一切戲論，
無人亦無處，佛亦無所說。」
一切法、一切時、一切種，從眾緣生故，畢竟空故無自性。如是法中，何者是有邊，誰為有邊？何者是無邊，亦有邊亦無邊，非有邊非無邊。誰為非有邊非無邊？何者是常，誰為是常？何者是無常，常無常非常非無常，誰為非常非無常？何者身即是神，何者身異於神？如是等六十二邪見，於畢竟空中皆不可得。諸有所得皆息、戲論皆滅。戲論滅故，通達諸法實相得安隱道。從〈因緣品〉來，分別推求諸法，有亦無、無亦無、有無亦無、非有非無亦無，是名諸法實相，亦名如，法性，實際，涅槃。是故如來無時無處為人說涅槃定相，是故說諸有所得皆息、戲論皆滅。
The canonical text stands in Chinese only. This edition renders the essence, the plain reading, the exposition and the apparatus into English — never the sūtra itself. Switch to 漢讀本 or 並行雙語 above to read it.
龍樹菩薩造、梵志青目釋，姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯《中論》卷四〈觀涅槃品第二十五〉·大正藏 T30n1564。段首〔T30 …〕＝大正藏頁·欄·行錨。
一、問難：一切法空，還斷得了什麼、滅得了什麼
〔T30 0034c14〕問的一方說：
假如一切法都是空的，都無生也無滅，那麼究竟斷的是什麼、所滅的是什麼，而可以稱作涅槃呢？
問方接著自己申說：假如一切法空，就沒有生也沒有滅；既然無生無滅，還有什麼可斷、有什麼可滅，而叫作涅槃？所以一切法不應當是空的。正因為諸法不空，才能斷除種種煩惱、滅去五陰，那才叫作涅槃。
二、反答：法若不空，一樣說不出涅槃
答的一方說：
假如諸法並不空，那麼也一樣無生無滅；究竟斷的是什麼、所滅的是什麼，而可以稱作涅槃呢？
意思是：假如一切世間並不空，那麼就沒有生也沒有滅；既然如此，還有什麼可斷、有什麼可滅而叫作涅槃？所以有與無這兩道門，都不是通到涅槃的路。那麼，所稱作涅槃的，究竟是什麼呢——
三、正說涅槃之相
無所得，也無所至；不是斷滅，也不是常住；不是生，也不是滅：這樣說的，才名為涅槃。
所謂無得，是說在因行上、在果位上，都沒有一件可以到手的東西。所謂無至，是說沒有一個地方可以去到。所謂不斷，是因為五陰從本以來就畢竟是空的，所以得道而入無餘涅槃的時候，也沒有什麼東西被斷掉。所謂不常，是說：如果有一個法可以被取來分別，那才叫作常；涅槃是寂滅的，沒有一個法可以拿來分別，所以也不稱為常。生與滅也是同樣的道理。具有這樣之相的，就名為涅槃。
其次，經中說：涅槃不是有、不是無、不是亦有亦無、也不是非有非非無；對一切法都不領受執取，內裡寂滅，這才名為涅槃。何以見得呢——
四、涅槃不是有
〔T30 0035a07〕涅槃不能叫作有，因為凡是有法，就帶著老死之相；終究沒有一個有法，能夠離開老死之相。
眼睛所見的一切萬物都在生滅，這就是老死之相。涅槃如果是有，就應當也有老死之相；但事實並非如此，所以涅槃不能叫作有。而且，也看不到在生滅老死之外，另有一個固定的法叫作涅槃。涅槃如果是有，那就應當有生滅老死之相；正因為離了老死之相，才名為涅槃。其次——
涅槃如果是有，涅槃就成了有為法；而終究沒有一個法，是既為實有而又是無為的。
涅槃不是有。為什麼呢？一切萬物都從眾多因緣而生，全都屬於有為。沒有哪一個法可以叫作無為；雖然把所謂常法假名為無為，但依理推求，連無常之法尚且沒有一個真實可得，何況那個看不見、拿不到的常法呢。其次——
涅槃如果是有，怎麼又稱它作無受？從來沒有一個不依領受而成立的東西，可以叫作有法。
假如說涅槃是有法，經中就不應當說無受是涅槃。為什麼呢？沒有任何一個有法是不經領受而能成為有的。所以涅槃不是有。
五、涅槃也不是無
問的一方說：假如有不是涅槃，那麼無應該就是涅槃了吧？
答的一方說：
有尚且不是涅槃，何況是無呢！涅槃之中連有都沒有，哪裡還會有無？
假如有不是涅槃，無又怎麼會是涅槃？為什麼呢？因為有了有，才對著說無；如果連有都沒有，哪裡來的無？就像經中所說：先前是有、如今沒有了，這才叫作無。涅槃卻不是這樣。為什麼呢？因為並沒有一個有法變成了無。所以無也作不成涅槃。其次——
涅槃如果是無，怎麼又稱它作不受？從來不曾有一個不依領受而成立的東西，可以叫作無法。
假如說無是涅槃，經中就不應當說不受名為涅槃。為什麼呢？沒有任何一個不經領受而能叫作無法的。所以可知涅槃不是無。
六、那麼涅槃究竟是什麼
問的一方說：假如涅槃既不是有、也不是無，那麼什麼才是涅槃？
答的一方說：
因為領受了種種因緣，所以在生死之中輪轉；不再領受種種因緣，這就名為涅槃。
由於不能如實了知顛倒，所以依著五受陰而往來生死。一旦如實了知了顛倒，就不再依五受陰而往來生死。無自性的五陰不再相續下去，所以說名為涅槃。其次——
正如佛在經中所說：既斷有，也斷非有；由此可知，涅槃既不是有，也不是無。
有，指的是三有；非有，指的是三有的斷滅。佛說這兩件事都要斷除，所以應當知道：涅槃既不是有，也不是無。
七、有無合起來也不是涅槃
問的一方說：假如有不是涅槃、無也不是涅槃，那麼如今把有與無合起來，就是涅槃了吧？
答的一方說：
假如說把有與無合起來就成為涅槃，那就等於說有與無本身即是解脫；這件事並不成立。
假如說把有與無合起來成為涅槃，那就是把有、無兩件事合起來當作解脫。這不成立。為什麼呢？有與無兩件事互相違背，怎麼能在同一處並存？其次——
假如說把有與無合起來就成為涅槃，那麼涅槃就不能說是無受了，因為有與無這兩件事都是從領受而生的。
假如說有無合起來是涅槃，經中就不應當說涅槃名為無受。為什麼呢？有與無兩件事都從領受而生，彼此相待而有。所以有、無兩件事，不能合起來成為涅槃。其次——
有與無共同和合而成，怎麼能叫作涅槃？涅槃名為無為，而有與無都是有為。
有、無兩件事共同和合，不能叫作涅槃。涅槃名為無為，有與無是有為，所以有無並不是涅槃。其次——
有與無兩件事共在一處，怎麼會是涅槃？這兩者不能同處，就像光明與黑暗不會並存。
有、無兩件事不能叫作涅槃。為什麼呢？有與無互相違背，在同一處是不可得的，就像明與暗不並存。所以有的時候就沒有無，無的時候就沒有有；怎麼能說有無共合而名為涅槃呢？
八、非有非無也不是涅槃
問的一方說：假如有無共合不是涅槃，那麼如今非有非無應該就是涅槃。
答的一方說：
假如把非有非無稱作涅槃，那麼這個非有非無，又是憑什麼分別出來的？
假如涅槃是非有非無，那麼這個非有非無依憑什麼而被分別？所以說非有非無是涅槃，這件事並不成立。其次——
你分別出一個非有非無，就這樣叫作涅槃；可是要先有有與無得以成立，非有非無才成立得起來。
你分別非有非無是涅槃，這件事並不成立。為什麼呢？必須有與無先成立，然後非有非無才成立。與有相違的叫作無，與無相違的叫作有——而這一對有無，在前面第三句中已經破過了。既然有與無都不成立，哪裡還有一個非有非無？所以涅槃也不是非非有非非無。其次——
九、如來現在與滅後，四句都不領受
如來滅度以後，不說是有、也不說是無，不說亦有亦無，也不說非有非無。如來現在之時，不說是有、也不說是無，不說亦有亦無，也不說非有非無。
無論如來滅後或者現在：說有如來，也不領受；說無如來，也不領受；說亦有如來亦無如來，也不領受；說非有如來非無如來，也不領受。正因為都不領受，所以不應當把涅槃分別成有、無等等。何況離開了如來，還有誰去得涅槃？在什麼時、什麼處、用什麼法去說涅槃？所以說：在一切時、以一切方式去尋求涅槃之相，都是不可得的。其次——
十、涅槃與世間，沒有一絲一毫的分別
〔T30 0036a04〕涅槃與世間，沒有絲毫的分別；世間與涅槃，也沒有絲毫的分別。
由於五陰相續往來的因緣，所以假名為世間。而五陰之性畢竟是空的，無所領受而寂滅——這個道理前面已經說過了。因為一切法不生不滅的緣故，所以世間與涅槃沒有分別，涅槃與世間也沒有分別。其次——
涅槃的實際，以及世間的邊際，這兩個際，沒有毫釐的差別。
究竟地推求世間、涅槃、實際、無生際，因為平等而不可得的緣故，所以沒有毫釐的差別。其次——
十一、諸見各有所依，而所依皆不可得
如來滅後有、無等等，世間有邊等等、常等等——這些見解，分別依著涅槃、依著未來世、依著過去世而生起。
也就是：如來滅後有如來、無如來、亦有如來亦無如來、非有如來非無如來；世間有邊、世間無邊、世間亦有邊亦無邊、世間非有邊非無邊；世間常、世間無常、世間亦常亦無常、世間非有常非無常——這是三組共十二種見。如來滅後有無等四見，是依著涅槃而起的；世間有邊無邊等四見，是依著未來世而起的；世間常無常等四見，是依著過去世而起的。如來滅後的有無等等既不可得，涅槃也是如此。正如世間的前際後際、有邊無邊、有常無常等等都不可得，涅槃也是如此。所以說：世間與涅槃平等而沒有差異。其次——
十二、戲論滅盡，無人亦無處
因為一切法空的緣故，哪裡有什麼有邊、無邊、亦邊亦無邊、非有邊非無邊？什麼是一、什麼是異？哪裡有常、無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常？諸法都不可得，一切戲論都止息了：沒有一個人，也沒有一個處所，佛也不曾說過什麼。
一切法、一切時、一切方式，都從眾多因緣而生，畢竟空而沒有自性。在這樣的法之中：什麼是有邊？誰是有邊？什麼是無邊、是亦有邊亦無邊、是非有邊非無邊？誰是非有邊非無邊？什麼是常？誰是常？什麼是無常、是常無常、是非常非無常？誰是非常非無常？什麼是身即是神？什麼是身異於神？像這樣的六十二種邪見，在畢竟空之中全都不可得。一切有所得的心都止息了，一切戲論都滅盡了。戲論滅盡的緣故，便通達諸法實相，得到安隱之道。
從〈觀因緣品〉一路下來，分別推求諸法：說有，不成立；說無，也不成立；說亦有亦無，也不成立；說非有非無，也不成立——這就叫作諸法實相，也名為如，名為法性，名為實際，名為涅槃。所以說，如來不曾在任何時、任何處，為人說出一個固定的涅槃之相；因此才說：一切有所得的心都止息了，一切戲論都滅盡了。
Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Four, “Examination of Nirvāṇa, Chapter Twenty-Five,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.
I. Challenge: If All Dharmas Are Empty, What Can Be Cut Off or Extinguished?
〔T30 0034c14〕The questioner says:
If all dharmas are empty, neither arisen nor ceased, then what is cut off and what is extinguished that it may be called nirvāṇa?
The questioner elaborates: If all dharmas are empty, there is neither arising nor ceasing. With neither arising nor ceasing, what can be cut off or extinguished and called nirvāṇa? Therefore all dharmas should not be empty. Precisely because dharmas are not empty, the many afflictions can be cut off and the five aggregates extinguished; that is called nirvāṇa.
II. Counteranswer: If Dharmas Are Not Empty, Nirvāṇa Is Equally Inexpressible
The respondent says:
If dharmas were not empty, there would likewise be neither arising nor ceasing. What would be cut off and what extinguished that it might be called nirvāṇa?
That is, if the whole world were not empty, there would be neither arising nor ceasing. What then could be cut off or extinguished and called nirvāṇa? Thus neither the gate of existence nor the gate of nonexistence leads to nirvāṇa. What, then, is called nirvāṇa?
III. The Marks of Nirvāṇa Positively Stated
Nothing is attained and nowhere is reached; it is neither annihilation nor permanence, neither arising nor ceasing. What is spoken of in this way is called nirvāṇa.
“Nothing is attained” means that no object can be acquired either in causal practice or in fruition. “Nowhere is reached” means that no place exists at which to arrive. “Not annihilated” means that because the five aggregates have from the beginning been ultimately empty, when one attains the path and enters nirvāṇa without remainder, nothing is cut off. “Not permanent” means that only if a dharma could be apprehended and discriminated could it be called permanent; nirvāṇa is quiescent extinction, with no dharma to discriminate, and so is not called permanent. The same applies to arising and ceasing. What possesses such marks is called nirvāṇa.
Furthermore, the scripture says that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither both existent and nonexistent nor neither existent nor nonexistent. It receives and grasps no dharma; inwardly quiescent, it is called nirvāṇa. How is this known?
IV. Nirvāṇa Is Not Existent
〔T30 0035a07〕Nirvāṇa cannot be called existent, because whatever exists bears the marks of aging and death. No existent dharma ever exists apart from the marks of aging and death.
Everything seen by the eye arises and ceases; these are the marks of aging and death. If nirvāṇa were existent, it too should bear the marks of aging and death. But this is not so, and therefore nirvāṇa cannot be called existent. Nor can one see some fixed dharma apart from arising, ceasing, aging, and death and call it nirvāṇa. If nirvāṇa were existent, it should bear the marks of arising, ceasing, aging, and death; precisely because it is free from aging and death, it is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore:
If nirvāṇa were existent, it would be conditioned; yet no dharma that truly exists is also unconditioned.
Nirvāṇa is not existent. Why? All things arise from many causes and conditions and are conditioned. No dharma can be called unconditioned. Although so-called permanent dharmas are provisionally named unconditioned, when examined by reason, not even a real impermanent dharma can be found; how much less some permanent dharma that can neither be seen nor attained. Furthermore:
If nirvāṇa were existent, why would it be called nonappropriation? No existent dharma is ever established without appropriation.
If nirvāṇa were an existent dharma, the scripture should not say that nonappropriation is nirvāṇa. Why? No existent dharma comes to exist without appropriation. Therefore nirvāṇa is not existent.
V. Nirvāṇa Is Not Nonexistent Either
The questioner says: If existence is not nirvāṇa, then should nonexistence be nirvāṇa?
The respondent says:
Existence is not nirvāṇa; how much less nonexistence! Nirvāṇa contains no existence—where could nonexistence be?
If existence is not nirvāṇa, how could nonexistence be nirvāṇa? Why? Nonexistence is spoken of only in relation to existence; without existence, whence nonexistence? As the scripture says, what existed before but does not exist now is called nonexistent. Nirvāṇa is not like this. Why? No existent dharma turns into nonexistence. Therefore nonexistence too cannot be nirvāṇa. Furthermore:
If nirvāṇa were nonexistent, why would it be called nonappropriation? No nonexistent dharma is ever named without appropriation.
If nonexistence were nirvāṇa, the scripture should not call nonappropriation nirvāṇa. Why? Nothing is ever called a nonexistent dharma without appropriation. Thus one knows that nirvāṇa is not nonexistent.
VI. What, Then, Is Nirvāṇa?
The questioner says: If nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent, what is nirvāṇa?
The respondent says:
Because one appropriates causes and conditions, one revolves in birth and death. Not appropriating causes and conditions is called nirvāṇa.
Because one does not know inversion as it truly is, one comes and goes through birth and death dependent on the five appropriated aggregates. Once one knows inversion as it truly is, one no longer comes and goes through birth and death dependent on them. Because the five aggregates lacking intrinsic nature no longer continue, this is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore:
Just as the Buddha said in the scripture: both existence and nonexistence are cut off. Thus one knows that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent.
Existence means the three modes of existence; nonexistence means the annihilation of those three. The Buddha says that both are to be cut off. Therefore one should know that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent.
VII. Existence and Nonexistence Together Are Not Nirvāṇa
The questioner says: If neither existence nor nonexistence is nirvāṇa, then are existence and nonexistence conjoined together nirvāṇa?
The respondent says:
If conjoined existence and nonexistence constituted nirvāṇa, existence and nonexistence themselves would be liberation. This cannot be established.
If conjoined existence and nonexistence constituted nirvāṇa, the two matters of existence and nonexistence would together be taken as liberation. This cannot be established. Why? Existence and nonexistence contradict one another; how could they coexist in one place? Furthermore:
If conjoined existence and nonexistence constituted nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa could not be nonappropriation, because both existence and nonexistence arise from appropriation.
If conjoined existence and nonexistence were nirvāṇa, the scripture should not call nirvāṇa nonappropriation. Why? Both existence and nonexistence arise from appropriation and exist dependent upon one another. Therefore they cannot be conjoined to make nirvāṇa. Furthermore:
How could what is jointly constituted by existence and nonexistence be called nirvāṇa? Nirvāṇa is called unconditioned, while existence and nonexistence are conditioned.
The conjunction of existence and nonexistence cannot be called nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is called unconditioned and existence and nonexistence are conditioned; thus they are not nirvāṇa. Furthermore:
How could existence and nonexistence together in one place be nirvāṇa? The two cannot share a place, just as light and darkness do not coexist.
Existence and nonexistence cannot be called nirvāṇa. Why? They contradict one another and cannot be found in one place, just as light and darkness do not coexist. When existence is present, nonexistence is absent; when nonexistence is present, existence is absent. How could one say they conjoin and are called nirvāṇa?
VIII. Neither Existence nor Nonexistence Is Not Nirvāṇa
The questioner says: If conjoined existence and nonexistence are not nirvāṇa, then should neither existence nor nonexistence be nirvāṇa?
The respondent says:
If neither existence nor nonexistence were called nirvāṇa, on what basis would this “neither existent nor nonexistent” be discriminated?
If nirvāṇa were neither existent nor nonexistent, on what basis would this be discriminated? Thus the claim that neither existence nor nonexistence is nirvāṇa cannot be established. Furthermore:
You discriminate neither existence nor nonexistence and call that nirvāṇa. Yet it can be established only if existence and nonexistence are first established.
Your discrimination of neither existence nor nonexistence as nirvāṇa cannot be established. Why? Existence and nonexistence must first be established before their joint negation can be established. What contradicts existence is called nonexistence, and what contradicts nonexistence is called existence; yet this pair was refuted in the third proposition above. Since neither existence nor nonexistence is established, whence neither existence nor nonexistence? Thus nirvāṇa is not the negation of both existence and nonexistence either. Furthermore:
IX. Whether the Tathāgata Is Present or Has Passed Away, None of the Four Propositions Is Appropriated
After the Tathāgata passes away, one does not say that he exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist. While the Tathāgata is present, one does not say that he exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist.
Whether after the Tathāgata’s passing or while he is present, the assertion that the Tathāgata exists is not appropriated; that he does not exist is not appropriated; that he both exists and does not exist is not appropriated; and that he neither exists nor does not exist is not appropriated. Since none is appropriated, nirvāṇa should not be discriminated as existence, nonexistence, and so on. Moreover, apart from the Tathāgata, who would attain nirvāṇa? At what time, in what place, and through what dharma could nirvāṇa be spoken? Thus the mark of nirvāṇa cannot be found when sought at any time or in any way. Furthermore:
X. Nirvāṇa and the World Have Not the Slightest Difference
〔T30 0036a04〕Nirvāṇa and the world have not the slightest difference; the world and nirvāṇa likewise have not the slightest difference.
Because the five aggregates continue, come, and go through causes and conditions, they are provisionally named the world. Yet the intrinsic nature of the five aggregates is ultimately empty, unappropriated, and quiescently extinct; this meaning has already been explained. Because all dharmas neither arise nor cease, the world and nirvāṇa do not differ, and nirvāṇa and the world do not differ. Furthermore:
The reality-limit of nirvāṇa and the boundary of the world—between these two limits there is not a hair’s breadth of difference.
When the world, nirvāṇa, the reality-limit, and the limit of nonarising are ultimately sought, they are equal and unfindable; therefore there is not a hair’s breadth of difference. Furthermore:
XI. Views Each Depend on Something, Yet Their Supports Are Unfindable
Views of the Tathāgata’s existence and nonexistence after passing, views of whether the world has a limit, and views of permanence depend respectively upon nirvāṇa, the future, and the past.
That is: the Tathāgata exists after passing, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist; the world has a limit, has no limit, both has and has no limit, or neither has nor lacks a limit; the world is permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent. These are three groups totaling twelve views. The four views about existence after the Tathāgata’s passing arise dependent on nirvāṇa; the four views about the world’s limit arise dependent on the future; the four views about its permanence arise dependent on the past. Just as the Tathāgata’s existence and nonexistence after passing are unfindable, so is nirvāṇa. Just as the world’s earlier and later limits, finitude and infinitude, permanence and impermanence are unfindable, so is nirvāṇa. Therefore the world and nirvāṇa are equal and undifferentiated. Furthermore:
XII. Conceptual Proliferation Is Exhausted: Neither Person nor Place Remains
Because all dharmas are empty, what could possess a limit or no limit, both a limit and no limit, or neither a limit nor no limit? What is one and what is different? Where are permanence, impermanence, both permanence and impermanence, or neither permanence nor impermanence? Dharmas are all unfindable and all conceptual proliferation ceases: there is neither person nor place, and the Buddha has spoken nothing.
All dharmas, at all times and in all ways, arise from many causes and conditions and are ultimately empty and without intrinsic nature. Among such dharmas, what has a limit, and who has a limit? What is limitless, both limited and limitless, or neither limited nor limitless? Who is neither limited nor limitless? What is permanent, and who is permanent? What is impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent? Who is neither permanent nor impermanent? What means that the body is identical with the self? What means that the body differs from the self? All sixty-two wrong views of this kind are unfindable within ultimate emptiness. Every acquisitive mind ceases and all conceptual proliferation is exhausted. Because proliferation is exhausted, one comprehends the true marks of dharmas and attains the path of peace and security.
From the “Examination of Conditions” onward, dharmas have been discriminated and sought: existence is unestablished, nonexistence is unestablished, both existence and nonexistence are unestablished, and neither existence nor nonexistence is unestablished. This is called the true marks of dharmas; it is also called suchness, Dharma-nature, the reality-limit, and nirvāṇa. Therefore the Tathāgata has never, at any time or place, taught anyone a fixed mark of nirvāṇa. Thus it is said: every acquisitive mind ceases and all conceptual proliferation is exhausted.
《中論》一路破到這裡，去來、生滅、五陰、六情、作者、如來，沒有一樣站得住。讀到第二十五品，難的人終於問到了最痛的一處。他問的不是理路，是他自己的歸宿。
品首這一問，是以頌的形式出的：
「若一切法空，無生無滅者，
何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃？」
青目替他把話說完：既然無生無滅，那就沒有可斷的煩惱、沒有可滅的五陰；所以「是故一切法不應空。」他的結論是：正因為諸法不空，才有東西可以斷、可以滅——「斷諸煩惱滅五陰，名為涅槃。」
要看清這一問底下的那個假設。問方心裡的涅槃，是一件做出來的事：有一堆實在的煩惱擺在那裡，我一樣一樣斷掉；有一副實在的五陰壓在身上，我把它滅掉；斷盡滅盡之後所剩下的那個乾淨狀態，就是涅槃。這個想法極其自然，凡有志於出離的人幾乎都是這樣起心的。也正因為自然，它才需要在論的末尾被單獨處理一次。
反手一問：說法不空的人，更說不出涅槃
龍樹沒有替空辯護。他把問方的句子原樣接過來，只換了一個字：
「若諸法不空，則無生無滅；
何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃？」
同樣的難，反手還了回去。理路在哪裡？法若不空，就是各有自性；有自性的東西，是不待緣、不可改的。煩惱若有自性，它就永遠是煩惱，你斷不動它；五陰若有自性，它就永遠是五陰，你滅不掉它。真正取消『可斷可滅』的，不是空，恰恰是不空。
青目把這一輪收成一句：「是故有無二門，則非至涅槃。」
這一句是全品的門檻。他說的不是『有錯而無對』，也不是『無錯而有對』，而是這兩道門都不通。底下二十來頌，就是把這兩道門連同它們的組合，一道一道地走給你看。
那麼涅槃是什麼：龍樹先給出一個相
在拆四門之前，龍樹先正面說了一頌：
「無得亦無至，不斷亦不常，
不生亦不滅，是說名涅槃。」
青目逐字解。「無得者，於行於果無所得。」——修的因行裡沒有一件到手的東西，證的果位裡也沒有。「無至者，無處可至。」——涅槃不是一個地方，沒有一條路把你送過去。
「不斷」何解？青目給的理由要留心：「五陰先來畢竟空故」，所以「得道入無餘涅槃時亦無所斷」。他沒有說『斷得太徹底所以叫不斷』，而是說：五陰本來就是空的，從來沒有一個實物在那裡，得道之時自然也沒有一個實物被拿走。這一句正面回答了問方——不是空取消了斷，是空說明了斷的真相。
「不常」何解？「涅槃寂滅無法可分別故，不名為常。」常這個名，要有一個可以被指認、被分別的東西才安得上去。涅槃裡沒有這樣一個東西，所以連「常」也安不上。
青目接著引經，把後面全部的論式先立成一個總綱：「涅槃非有、非無、非有無、非非有非非無，一切法不受，內寂滅名涅槃。」
四門在此列齊。此下逐門推。
第一門：涅槃不是有
「涅槃不名有，有則老死相；
終無有有法，離於老死相。」
青目的釋是從眼前起的：「眼見一切萬物皆生滅故，是老死相。」凡是我們指得出來、算得上「有」的東西，沒有一樣不在生滅裡。生滅就是老死之相。涅槃若也是這樣的一個有，它就得跟著老死；而人求涅槃，求的正是離老死——求來一個帶著老死的東西，這件事自己就消掉了自己。
第二重理由更緊：
「若涅槃是有，涅槃即有為；
終無有一法，而是無為者。」
青目說：「一切萬物從眾緣生，皆是有為。」凡是「有」的，都是緣起的；凡是緣起的，都是有為的。所以「有」與「無為」兩個字掛不到一起。他還順手擋了一步退路：有人說常法可以假名為無為——青目答，連無常之法尚且推求不得，何況那個看不見拿不到的常法。
第三重理由從經上來：
「若涅槃是有，云何名無受？
無有不從受，而名為有法。」
經裡說涅槃是無受。而凡稱得上「有」的，都是在領受、執取的關係裡才立得起來的；離了受，一個東西連「有」這個名都得不到。既然經說無受，那涅槃就不在「有」這一格裡。
第二門：涅槃也不是無
問方立刻退到第二格：既然有不是涅槃，無總該是了吧。
「有尚非涅槃，何況於無耶！
涅槃無有有，何處當有無？」
青目點出關竅：「因有故有無；若無有，何有無？」無不是一個獨立的東西，它是踩著有說出來的。什麼叫無？青目引經作了定義：「先有今無則名無。」先前有一個，如今沒有了，這才叫無。
而涅槃並不是這樣得來的——「非有法變為無故。」涅槃不是某個實有的東西壞掉、消失掉之後剩下的那個窟窿。第一門既然已經說明沒有一個「有」的涅槃，那麼連讓它變沒的那個前項都不存在，「無」也就無從說起。
同樣，經說不受：
「若無是涅槃，云何名不受？
未曾有不受，而名為無法。」
有法要待受才立，無法一樣要待受才立。兩頭都繫在受上，所以兩頭都不是那個「內寂滅」。
兩門之間，龍樹正面答了一次
推到這裡，問的人已經沒有東西可抓了：不是有、不是無，那你到底在說什麼？他直接問了出來。龍樹的答，是全品最平實的一頌：
「受諸因緣故，輪轉生死中；
不受諸因緣，是名為涅槃。」
注意這一頌沒有換題目。它說的不是另有一個涅槃在別處，而是就著同一個人、同一副五陰說：領受因緣，這叫生死；不領受因緣，這就叫涅槃。青目釋得更細：由於不能如實知顛倒，才依五受陰往來生死；如實知了，就不再依五受陰往來。他末後那一句最要緊——「無性五陰不復相續故，說名涅槃。」
不是五陰被消滅了，是無自性的五陰不再相續下去。這裡沒有任何東西被清除，只有一種黏著停了。
龍樹再引經作證：
「如佛經中說，斷有斷非有；
是故知涅槃，非有亦非無。」
青目解：「有名三有，非有名三有斷滅。」佛所斷的是兩樣：一是三界之有，二是把三有滅掉的那個斷滅見。連「斷滅」也在所斷之列。所以涅槃兩邊都不落。
第三門與第四門：合起來、都不是，同樣不成
問方再退：那麼把有與無合起來呢？
龍樹連下四頌。第一，若有無合成即是涅槃，便等於說有與無這兩件事本身就是解脫；而青目指出：「有無二事相違故，云何一處有？」第二，有與無都是從受而生、相因而立的，合起來仍舊從受生，經卻說涅槃無受。第三，「涅槃名無為，有無是有為。」兩個有為湊在一起，湊不出一個無為。第四，龍樹用了一個現成的譬喻：「是二不同處，如明暗不俱。」明來暗去，暗來明去，從來不曾在一處。
問方最後退到第四格：非有非無總可以了吧。
「若非有非無，名之為涅槃；
此非有非無，以何而分別？」
這一問極利。「非有非無」是一個分別出來的名，可是它憑什麼分別？青目答得直：與有相違才叫無，與無相違才叫有；有與無這一對，「是有無第三句中已破」。前面的柱子都拆了，架在上面的第四句自然也就落了地。
四門走盡。有、無、亦有亦無、非有非無——這正是青目一開頭所引之經的四句。經先說了結論，龍樹逐句補了理路。
如來現在與滅後，四句都不領受
四門既盡，龍樹把同一件事移到如來身上再說一遍：
「如來滅度後，不言有與無，
亦不言有無，非有及非無。
如來現在時，不言有與無，
亦不言有無，非有及非無。」
青目的釋收得極重：「以不受故，不應分別涅槃有無等。」接著他問了一句幾乎沒有回頭路的話——「離如來，誰當得涅槃？」
這一句要慢讀。求涅槃的人，心裡總還留著一個『將要得涅槃的我』。而〈觀如來品〉已經推過：連如來都不在五陰中、不離五陰得。得者既不可得，那個「得」自然也就落空。所以青目說：「是故一切時一切種、求涅槃相不可得。」
一切時、一切種——不是『現在還找不到』，是任何時候用任何方式去找一個涅槃之相，都找不到。
極峰：涅槃與世間，無有少分別
〔T30 0036a04〕全論的高處，落在這兩句上：
「涅槃與世間，無有少分別；
世間與涅槃，亦無少分別。」
龍樹說了兩遍，一遍從涅槃這頭說，一遍從世間那頭說。兩頭都說，是不讓人把它讀成一邊倒。
青目的釋只有三步，卻步步有據。第一步：「五陰相續往來因緣故，說名世間。」世間不是一個地方，是五陰相續往來這件事的假名。第二步：「五陰性畢竟空無受寂滅」，而這一義前面諸品已經說過了。第三步：「以一切法不生不滅故」，所以兩邊沒有分別。
所以這裡並沒有把兩個東西拉平，而是說：所謂世間，除了那一串相續的五陰之外沒有別的；而那一串五陰的性，本來就是畢竟空、無受、寂滅的。人在世間裡，看見的是相續；如實看，看見的就是寂滅。所觀之境不曾換過一個，換的只是看見沒有。
龍樹再把它推到「際」上：
「涅槃之實際，及與世間際，
如是二際者，無毫釐差別。」
青目的理由是「以平等不可得故」——不是量過之後發現剛好一樣，是究竟推求下去，世間、涅槃、實際、無生際四個名所指的那個「際」，本來就無可得，也就無從差出毫釐。
此二頌是本論所至之極處。此處只依龍樹頌與青目釋所說者傳之，不作進一步判定。
諸見有所依，所依既空，見亦不立
「滅後有無等，有邊等常等，
諸見依涅槃，未來過去世。」
青目在此列了三組：如來滅後有無等四見、世間有邊無邊等四見、世間常無常等四見——「此三種十二見。」而且他標明了各自所依：滅後四見依涅槃起，邊無邊四見依未來世起，常無常四見依過去世起。
這一段的用處在於：見不是憑空生的，每一種見都靠一個被當作實有的所依站著。所依既然推求不可得，架在上面的見自然也立不住。青目由此得出：世間、涅槃平等而無有異。
收處：戲論滅盡，佛亦無所說
末後三頌一氣收下：
「一切法空故，何有邊無邊，
亦邊亦無邊，非有非無邊？
何者為一異，何有常無常，
亦常亦無常，非常非無常？
諸法不可得，滅一切戲論，
無人亦無處，佛亦無所說。」
青目的釋裡有一個反覆出現的句法：「何者是有邊，誰為有邊？」——先問那個法，再問那個人。六十二種邪見，全都要靠一個『什麼』加一個『誰』才立得起來；畢竟空中兩樣都不可得，所以「如是等六十二邪見，於畢竟空中皆不可得。」
於是「諸有所得皆息、戲論皆滅」。而戲論滅了不是一無所有——青目緊接著說：「通達諸法實相得安隱道。」戲論滅是這條道的入口，不是終點的空白。
最後他回望全論：「從〈因緣品〉來，分別推求諸法」，有也不成、無也不成、亦有亦無也不成、非有非無也不成——「是名諸法實相，亦名如，法性，實際，涅槃。」
到這一句，涅槃這個名才算安置停當。它不是一個被證到的東西，它是諸法實相的又一個名字；如、法性、實際，說的都是同一件事。
所以本品末句說得那樣決絕：「無人亦無處，佛亦無所說。」青目解為「是故如來無時無處為人說涅槃定相」——所遮的是「定相」二字。佛說過涅槃，也教人趣向涅槃；佛不曾說過的，是一個固定不變、可以拿在手裡的涅槃之相。
問方一開頭要的，正是那樣一個相。全品走到這裡，他手裡的東西空了；而他所修的斷惑滅陰，一件也沒有被取消——取消的只是『有一個實物可斷、有一個實處可到』的那個念頭。
承衍：吉藏之鏡
以上是本品自身之義。此下另以隋唐三論一路的眼旁照——鏡非論，只是換一種讀法看同一組頌。
吉藏《中觀論疏》讀本品四句，先問一句：你說的非有非無，是拿來作藥用的，還是道理上真有這麼一個非有非無？若是藥，病盡藥也就消了；若道理上真有，那我一樣可以道理上真有有無。他又說，涅槃本是絕四句的，四句只是表涅槃之門，不可把門當作涅槃本身。
他又特別看重『涅槃與世間無有少分別』一頌，說世間人法與出世間人法同樣絕於四句；若聽了前面而以為出世間絕四句、世間仍在四句之內，那還是世出世的二見，二見即是生死。他順此說到於道未曾二、於緣未曾一。至於末頌，他以一切法、一切時為所觀之法，以一切種為觀門，說到緣盡於觀、觀盡於緣，而緣觀俱寂。
這面鏡把本品接進了三論一系破邪顯正的判釋架構；其判釋是吉藏所增，不是龍樹頌與青目長釋的原話。並錄不判，各還其位。
The Treatise on the Middle has refuted all the way to this point: going and coming, arising and ceasing, the five aggregates, the six faculties, the agent, and the Tathāgata—nothing can stand. At Chapter Twenty-Five, the challenger finally asks at the most painful place. He is not asking about reasoning but about his own destination.
The opening question takes the form of a verse:
“If all dharmas are empty, neither arisen nor ceased, what is cut off and what extinguished that it may be called nirvāṇa?”
Qingmu completes the thought for him. If there is neither arising nor ceasing, there are no afflictions to cut off and no five aggregates to extinguish; therefore, “all dharmas should not be empty.” His conclusion is that precisely because dharmas are not empty, things can be cut off and extinguished—“the many afflictions are cut off and the five aggregates extinguished; this is called nirvāṇa.”
See the assumption beneath the question. In the questioner’s mind, nirvāṇa is something produced: a heap of real afflictions lies there, and I cut them off one by one; real aggregates weigh upon me, and I extinguish them; the clean state left when cutting and extinction are complete is nirvāṇa. The thought is entirely natural. Almost everyone aspiring to release begins in this way. Precisely because it is natural, it must be treated separately near the treatise’s end.
The Question Returned: Those Who Say Dharmas Are Not Empty Can Explain Nirvāṇa Still Less
Nāgārjuna does not defend emptiness. He takes the questioner’s sentence exactly as given and changes a single word:
“If dharmas were not empty, there would be neither arising nor ceasing. What would be cut off and what extinguished that it might be called nirvāṇa?”
The same challenge is returned. What is the reasoning? If a dharma is not empty, it possesses intrinsic nature; what possesses intrinsic nature does not depend on conditions and cannot change. If affliction possessed intrinsic nature, it would forever be affliction and could not be cut; if the five aggregates possessed intrinsic nature, they would forever be the five aggregates and could not be extinguished. What truly cancels the “cuttable and extinguishable” is not emptiness but precisely nonemptiness.
Qingmu gathers this exchange into one sentence: “Thus neither the gate of existence nor the gate of nonexistence leads to nirvāṇa.”
This sentence is the threshold of the entire chapter. It does not say “existence is wrong and nonexistence right,” nor “nonexistence is wrong and existence right.” Neither gate opens. The next twenty-odd verses walk through both gates and their combinations one by one.
What, Then, Is Nirvāṇa? Nāgārjuna First Gives a Mark
Before dismantling the four gates, Nāgārjuna gives a positive verse:
“Nothing is attained and nowhere is reached; it is neither annihilation nor permanence, neither arising nor ceasing. What is spoken of in this way is called nirvāṇa.”
Qingmu explains word by word. “Nothing is attained means that nothing is acquired in either practice or fruition.” No object is acquired within causal practice or resultant realization. “Nowhere is reached means that no place exists at which to arrive.” Nirvāṇa is not a location, and no road delivers you there.
What does “not annihilated” mean? Qingmu’s reason must be noticed: “because the five aggregates have from the beginning been ultimately empty,” therefore “when one attains the path and enters nirvāṇa without remainder, nothing is cut off.” He does not say, “It is called nonannihilation because the cutting is so complete.” He says that the aggregates were empty from the start; no real object was ever there, so no real object is taken away upon attaining the path. This directly answers the questioner. Emptiness does not cancel cutting; it explains the truth of cutting.
What does “not permanent” mean? “Because nirvāṇa is quiescent extinction and no dharma can be discriminated, it is not called permanent.” The name permanent can attach only where something can be identified and discriminated. Nothing like that exists in nirvāṇa, so even “permanent” cannot be placed upon it.
Qingmu next cites scripture, establishing the general outline for all the reasoning that follows: “Nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither both existent and nonexistent nor neither existent nor nonexistent. It appropriates no dharma; inwardly quiescent, it is called nirvāṇa.”
The four gates are complete. Each is now examined.
First Gate: Nirvāṇa Is Not Existent
“Nirvāṇa cannot be called existent, because existence bears the marks of aging and death; no existent dharma ever exists apart from the marks of aging and death.”
Qingmu’s explanation begins before our eyes: “Everything seen by the eye arises and ceases; these are the marks of aging and death.” Nothing we can point to and count as “existent” stands outside arising and ceasing. Arising and ceasing are aging and death. If nirvāṇa were another such existent thing, it would follow aging and death; yet what one seeks in nirvāṇa is precisely freedom from aging and death. To seek an object bearing aging and death cancels itself.
The second reason is tighter:
“If nirvāṇa were existent, nirvāṇa would be conditioned; yet no single dharma that exists is unconditioned.”
Qingmu says: “All things arise from many conditions and are conditioned.” Whatever exists is dependently arisen, and whatever is dependently arisen is conditioned. Thus “existent” and “unconditioned” cannot attach to one another. He also blocks a retreat: someone may say that a permanent dharma is provisionally called unconditioned. Qingmu answers that not even an impermanent dharma can be found when sought, much less that permanent dharma that can neither be seen nor attained.
The third reason comes from scripture:
“If nirvāṇa were existent, why would it be called nonappropriation? No existent dharma is ever named without appropriation.”
The scripture calls nirvāṇa nonappropriation. Whatever earns the name “existent” is established only within a relation of receiving and grasping; apart from appropriation, a thing cannot even obtain the name existent. Since the scripture says nonappropriation, nirvāṇa does not occupy the cell of existence.
Second Gate: Nirvāṇa Is Not Nonexistent Either
The questioner immediately retreats to the second cell: if existence is not nirvāṇa, surely nonexistence must be.
“Existence is not nirvāṇa; how much less nonexistence! Nirvāṇa contains no existence—where could nonexistence be?”
Qingmu gives the key: “Nonexistence exists dependent on existence; without existence, whence nonexistence?” Nonexistence is not an independent thing; it is spoken by leaning on existence. What is nonexistence? Qingmu cites scripture to define it: “What existed before but does not exist now is called nonexistent.” Something existed before and is absent now—that is nonexistence.
Nirvāṇa does not come about that way—“it is not an existent dharma turning into nonexistence.” Nirvāṇa is not the hole left after some real thing is destroyed and disappears. The first gate has already shown there is no existent nirvāṇa; without the prior term that could become absent, nonexistence has nowhere to begin.
The scripture likewise speaks of nonappropriation:
“If nonexistence were nirvāṇa, why would it be called nonappropriation? No nonexistent dharma is ever named without appropriation.”
An existent dharma depends on appropriation for establishment; a nonexistent dharma does too. Both ends are tied to appropriation, so neither is that “inward quiescence.”
Between the Two Gates, Nāgārjuna Gives a Direct Answer
At this point the questioner has nothing left to grasp. It is neither existent nor nonexistent—what are you talking about? He asks directly. Nāgārjuna answers with the most straightforward verse in the chapter:
“Because one appropriates causes and conditions, one revolves in birth and death; not appropriating causes and conditions is called nirvāṇa.”
Notice that this verse does not change the subject. It does not posit another nirvāṇa somewhere else but speaks of the same person and the same aggregates. Appropriating causes and conditions is called birth and death; not appropriating them is called nirvāṇa. Qingmu explains in greater detail: failing to know inversion as it truly is, one comes and goes through birth and death dependent on the five appropriated aggregates; when one knows it truly, one no longer comes and goes through them. His final sentence matters most: “Because the five aggregates lacking intrinsic nature no longer continue, this is called nirvāṇa.”
The five aggregates are not destroyed; the five aggregates lacking intrinsic nature no longer continue. No thing is cleared away here. Only a mode of adhesion stops.
Nāgārjuna again cites scripture as evidence:
“Just as the Buddha said in the scripture: both existence and nonexistence are cut off. Thus one knows that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent.”
Qingmu explains: “Existence means the three modes of existence; nonexistence means the annihilation of those three.” The Buddha cuts off two things: the existence of the three realms and the annihilationist view that destroys them. Even “annihilation” is among what must be cut off. Thus nirvāṇa falls on neither side.
Third and Fourth Gates: Combining the Two or Negating Both Fails Likewise
The questioner retreats again: what if existence and nonexistence are conjoined?
Nāgārjuna gives four verses in succession. First, if their conjunction were nirvāṇa, existence and nonexistence themselves would be liberation; yet Qingmu points out, “The two matters contradict one another; how could they exist in one place?” Second, both arise from appropriation and stand through mutual dependence; conjoined, they remain products of appropriation, while scripture calls nirvāṇa nonappropriation. Third, “Nirvāṇa is called unconditioned, while existence and nonexistence are conditioned.” Two conditioned things cannot be assembled into an unconditioned one. Fourth, Nāgārjuna uses a ready analogy: “The two cannot share a place, just as light and darkness do not coexist.” When light comes, darkness goes; when darkness comes, light goes. They never occupy one place.
The questioner finally retreats to the fourth cell: surely neither existence nor nonexistence will work.
“If neither existence nor nonexistence were called nirvāṇa, on what basis would this ‘neither existent nor nonexistent’ be discriminated?”
The question is sharp. “Neither existence nor nonexistence” is a discriminated name, but on what basis is it discriminated? Qingmu answers directly: what contradicts existence is called nonexistence, and what contradicts nonexistence is called existence; yet that pair “was refuted in the third proposition.” Once the lower pillars are dismantled, the fourth proposition resting upon them naturally falls.
The four gates are exhausted: existence, nonexistence, both, and neither. These are precisely the four propositions in the scripture Qingmu cited at the beginning. Scripture gave the conclusion first; Nāgārjuna supplies the reasoning proposition by proposition.
Whether the Tathāgata Is Present or Has Passed, None of the Four Propositions Is Appropriated
With the four gates exhausted, Nāgārjuna moves the same matter onto the Tathāgata:
“After the Tathāgata passes away, one does not say that he exists or does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist. While the Tathāgata is present, one does not say that he exists or does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist.”
Qingmu’s explanation lands heavily: “Since none is appropriated, nirvāṇa should not be discriminated as existence, nonexistence, and so on.” He then asks a question with almost no road back: “Apart from the Tathāgata, who would attain nirvāṇa?”
Read slowly. One who seeks nirvāṇa always retains an “I who will attain nirvāṇa.” Yet the “Examination of the Tathāgata” has already shown that even the Tathāgata is neither within the aggregates nor found apart from them. If the attainer is unfindable, attainment naturally falls empty. Thus Qingmu says: “The mark of nirvāṇa cannot be found when sought at any time or in any way.”
At any time, in any way—not merely “it cannot yet be found now.” No mark of nirvāṇa can be found at any time through any method.
The Summit: Nirvāṇa and the World Have Not the Slightest Difference
〔T30 0036a04〕The height of the whole treatise rests in these two clauses:
“Nirvāṇa and the world have not the slightest difference; the world and nirvāṇa likewise have not the slightest difference.”
Nāgārjuna says it twice, once from nirvāṇa and once from the world. Both directions are stated so that no one reads it as one-sided.
Qingmu’s explanation has only three steps, each grounded in the text. First: “Because the five aggregates continue, come, and go through causes and conditions, they are named the world.” The world is not a place but a provisional name for the continuing movement of the five aggregates. Second: “The intrinsic nature of the five aggregates is ultimately empty, unappropriated, and quiescent,” a meaning already explained in preceding chapters. Third: “Because all dharmas neither arise nor cease,” the two sides do not differ.
Thus two objects are not being leveled. The so-called world is nothing apart from that sequence of aggregates; the intrinsic nature of that sequence is originally ultimately empty, unappropriated, and quiescent. Within the world, one sees continuity; seen as it truly is, one sees quiescence. The object viewed was never exchanged for another. What changes is whether it is seen.
Nāgārjuna carries the point to the “limit”:
“The reality-limit of nirvāṇa and the boundary of the world— between these two limits there is not a hair’s breadth of difference.”
Qingmu’s reason is “because they are equal and unfindable.” It is not that measurement reveals exact equality; when ultimately sought, the “limit” indicated by the four names world, nirvāṇa, reality-limit, and nonarising-limit was unfindable from the start, so not a hair’s breadth of difference can arise.
These two verses are the furthest point reached in this treatise. Here they are transmitted solely according to Nāgārjuna’s verses and Qingmu’s explanation, without further adjudication.
Views Depend on Something; When Their Supports Are Empty, Views Cannot Stand
“Views of existence and nonexistence after passing, views of whether the world has a limit, and views of permanence depend respectively upon nirvāṇa, the future, and the past.”
Qingmu lists three groups: the four views about the Tathāgata after passing, the four about the world’s limit, and the four about the world’s permanence—“three groups totaling twelve views.” He also names their supports: the first four depend on nirvāṇa, the next four on the future, and the last four on the past.
The passage shows that views do not arise from nowhere; each stands on a support treated as truly existent. Once that support proves unfindable, the view erected upon it naturally cannot stand. Qingmu therefore concludes that the world and nirvāṇa are equal and undifferentiated.
The Conclusion: Proliferation Is Exhausted, and the Buddha Has Spoken Nothing
The final three verses gather everything at once:
“Because all dharmas are empty, what could possess a limit or no limit, both a limit and no limit, or neither a limit nor no limit? What is one and what is different? Where are permanence and impermanence, both permanence and impermanence, or neither permanence nor impermanence? Dharmas are all unfindable and all conceptual proliferation ceases; there is neither person nor place, and the Buddha has spoken nothing.”
In Qingmu’s explanation one syntax appears repeatedly: “What has a limit, and who has a limit?” He first asks about the dharma and then the person. All sixty-two wrong views require both a “what” and a “who” to stand. Neither can be found in ultimate emptiness; therefore “all sixty-two wrong views of this kind are unfindable within ultimate emptiness.”
Thus “every acquisition ceases and all conceptual proliferation is exhausted.” Yet the exhaustion of proliferation is not nothingness—Qingmu immediately says one “comprehends the true marks of dharmas and attains the path of peace and security.” The exhaustion of proliferation is the entrance to this path, not the blankness at its end.
Finally he looks back over the whole treatise: “From the ‘Examination of Conditions’ onward, dharmas have been discriminated and sought.” Existence is unestablished, nonexistence unestablished, both unestablished, and neither unestablished—“This is called the true marks of dharmas; it is also called suchness, Dharma-nature, the reality-limit, and nirvāṇa.”
Only here is the name nirvāṇa settled. It is not a thing realized and obtained, but another name for the true marks of dharmas. Suchness, Dharma-nature, and the reality-limit all speak of the same matter.
Thus the chapter’s final line is so decisive: “There is neither person nor place, and the Buddha has spoken nothing.” Qingmu explains it as “the Tathāgata has never, at any time or place, taught anyone a fixed mark of nirvāṇa.” What is blocked is “fixed mark.” The Buddha has spoken nirvāṇa and taught people to move toward it. What the Buddha has never taught is a fixed, unchanging mark of nirvāṇa that can be held in the hand.
That is precisely the kind of mark the questioner sought at the beginning. At the chapter’s end, his hand is empty; yet not one part of his practice of cutting afflictions and extinguishing the aggregates has been canceled. Only the thought that “there is a real thing to cut and a real place to reach” has been canceled.
Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror
The meaning above belongs to the chapter itself. What follows is a side illumination from the Sui–Tang Sanlun lineage—a mirror is not the treatise, but another way of reading the same verses.
Reading the chapter’s four propositions, Jizang’s Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle first asks: is neither existence nor nonexistence used as medicine, or does such a thing truly exist in principle? If it is medicine, the medicine disappears when the illness is exhausted. If it truly exists, one could equally assert that existence and nonexistence truly exist. He also says that nirvāṇa transcends the four propositions; the propositions are only gates indicating nirvāṇa and must not be taken as nirvāṇa itself.
He gives particular weight to the verse “Nirvāṇa and the world have not the slightest difference,” saying that worldly and supramundane persons and dharmas equally transcend the four propositions. If one hears the earlier argument and thinks only the supramundane transcends them while the worldly remains within them, this is still the dual view of world and transcendence; a dual view is birth and death. He then says that in the Way they were never two and in relation to conditions they were never one. For the final verse, he treats all dharmas and all times as objects contemplated and all ways as gates of contemplation, reaching conditions exhausted within contemplation, contemplation exhausted within conditions, and both conditions and contemplation quiescent.
This mirror joins the chapter to the Sanlun lineage’s architecture of refuting the wrong and revealing the right. Its classifications are Jizang’s additions, not the words of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s prose. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.
考據Apparatus
一、校勘
本品底本為《大正新脩大藏經》T30n1564〔0034c14–0036b16〕；正文依底本次第，分明保存問方、龍樹頌與青目釋。清辨系 T30n1566 有同題異釋；安慧系現存漢譯止於第十三品，本品據實標闕。
二、異釋對勘
清辨系 T30n1566 保存無自體不違世諦、涅槃證得亦無自體與一切相寂滅的同品異釋；安慧系本品闕傳。
形式載體為龍樹頌的問方立說，以一切法空、無生無滅反難沒有可斷可滅之法，便不應有涅槃 T30n1564龍樹頌（問方立說）〔0034c15–0034c16〕：「若一切法空，無生無滅者，何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃？」
形式載體為青目釋長行的問方立說，主張若一切法空便無可斷可滅，並以諸法不空保存斷煩惱、滅五陰與涅槃 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0034c17–0034c20〕：「若一切法空，則無生無滅。無生無滅者，何所斷何所滅，而名為涅槃？是故一切法不應空。以諸法不空故，斷諸煩惱滅五陰，名為涅槃。」
答頌指出諸法若不空、各有固定自性，反而同樣無生無滅，也沒有可斷可滅而稱涅槃 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034c21–0034c22〕：「若諸法不空，則無生無滅；何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃？」
青目說世間若不空便無生無滅，所以有與無兩門都不能直達涅槃 T30n1564青目釋〔0034c23–0034c25〕：「若一切世間不空，則無生無滅，何所斷何所滅而名為涅槃？是故有無二門，則非至涅槃。所名涅槃者：」
涅槃無所得也無所至，不是斷滅也不是常住，不生也不滅 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0034c26–0034c27〕：「無得亦無至，不斷亦不常，不生亦不滅，是說名涅槃。」
青目逐項說無得、無至、不斷、不常與不生不滅，並引經以不受、內寂滅說涅槃離四句 T30n1564青目釋〔0034c28–0035a06〕：「無得者，於行於果無所得。無至者，無處可至。不斷者，五陰先來畢竟空故，得道入無餘涅槃時亦無所斷。不常者，若有法可得分別者則名為常，涅槃寂滅無法可分別故，不名為常。生滅亦爾，如是相者名為涅槃。復次經說，涅槃非有、非無、非有無、非非有非非無，一切法不受，內寂滅名涅槃。何以故？」
涅槃不能名為有，因為有法即帶老死相，沒有一個有法能離老死 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035a07–0035a08〕：「涅槃不名有，有則老死相；終無有有法，離於老死相。」
青目以萬物現見生滅及找不到離生滅老死的定法，說明涅槃不名有 T30n1564青目釋〔0035a09–0035a13〕：「眼見一切萬物皆生滅故，是老死相。涅槃若是有，則應有老死相。但是事不然，是故涅槃不名有。又不見離生滅老死別有定法而名涅槃。若涅槃是有，即應有生滅老死相；以離老死相故，名為涅槃。復次：」
涅槃若是有法便屬有為，因為沒有一個實有之法能同時是無為 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035a14–0035a15〕：「若涅槃是有，涅槃即有為；終無有一法，而是無為者。」
青目說萬物從眾緣生皆屬有為，無為與常法也只是假名，理推並無可得常體 T30n1564青目釋〔0035a16–0035a19〕：「涅槃非是有。何以故？一切萬物從眾緣生，皆是有為。無有一法名為無為者，雖常法假名無為，以理推之，無常法尚無有，何況常法不可見不可得者。復次：」
涅槃若是有法便不能名為無受，因為沒有不從受取而成立的有法 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035a20–0035a21〕：「若涅槃是有，云何名無受？無有不從受，而名為有法。」
青目以經說無受是涅槃，斷定沒有一個不受而自成的有法，所以涅槃非有 T30n1564青目釋〔0035a22–0035a24〕：「若謂涅槃是有法者，經則不應說無受是涅槃。何以故？無有有法不受而有，是故涅槃非有。」
形式載體為青目釋長行的問方立說，由有不是涅槃退問無是否就是涅槃 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0035a24–0035a25〕：「問曰：若有非涅槃者，無應是涅槃耶？」
有尚且不是涅槃，無更不能成立，因為沒有有法便無從相待說無 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035a26–0035a27〕：「有尚非涅槃，何況於無耶！涅槃無有有，何處當有無？」
青目說無只在先有今無時得名，涅槃不是有法轉成無，所以無也不能作涅槃 T30n1564青目釋〔0035a28–0035b02〕：「若有非涅槃，無云何是涅槃？何以故？因有故有無；若無有，何有無？如經說，先有今無則名無。涅槃則不爾。何以故？非有法變為無故。是故無亦不作涅槃。復次：」
涅槃若是無法也不能名為不受，因為無法之名同樣依受取關係而立 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035b03–0035b04〕：「若無是涅槃，云何名不受？未曾有不受，而名為無法。」
青目以沒有不受而名無法，收束涅槃非無 T30n1564青目釋〔0035b05–0035b07〕：「若謂無是涅槃，經則不應說不受名涅槃。何以故？無有不受而名無法，是故知涅槃非無。」
形式載體為青目釋長行的問方立說，承認涅槃非有非無後追問究竟何者是涅槃 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0035b07–0035b08〕：「問曰：若涅槃非有非無者，何等是涅槃？」
受取諸因緣便輪轉生死，不受取諸因緣便假名涅槃 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035b09–0035b10〕：「受諸因緣故，輪轉生死中；不受諸因緣，是名為涅槃。」
青目說不如實知顛倒便因五受陰往來生死，如實知時無性五陰不再相續，所以名涅槃 T30n1564青目釋〔0035b11–0035b13〕：「不如實知顛倒故，因五受陰往來生死。如實知顛倒故，則不復因五受陰往來生死。無性五陰不復相續故，說名涅槃。復次：」
佛經說斷有與斷非有兩事，所以涅槃既非有也非無 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035b14–0035b15〕：「如佛經中說，斷有斷非有；是故知涅槃，非有亦非無。」
青目解有為三有、非有為三有斷滅，佛說兩者都須斷，所以涅槃非有非無 T30n1564青目釋〔0035b16–0035b17〕：「有名三有，非有名三有斷滅。佛說斷此二事故，當知涅槃非有亦非無。」
形式載體為青目釋長行的問方立說，由有與無各非涅槃改問兩者合起來是否是涅槃 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0035b17–0035b18〕：「問曰：若有若無非涅槃者，今有無共合是涅槃耶？」
若把有與無合成涅槃，便等於把有無二事本身當作解脫，這不能成立 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035b19–0035b20〕：「若謂於有無，合為涅槃者，有無即解脫，是事則不然。」
青目說有無相違而不能在一處共同成為解脫 T30n1564青目釋〔0035b21–0035b23〕：「若謂於有無合為涅槃者，即有無二事合為解脫。是事不然。何以故？有無二事相違故，云何一處有？復次：」
有無若合為涅槃，涅槃便不能名無受，因為有與無兩事都從受取而生 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035b24–0035b25〕：「若謂於有無，合為涅槃者；涅槃非無受，是二從受生。」
青目說有無相因而有、都從受生，所以不得合成無受涅槃 T30n1564青目釋〔0035b26–0035b28〕：「若謂有無合為涅槃者，經不應說涅槃名無受。何以故？有無二事從受生，相因而有。是故有無二事，不得合為涅槃。復次：」
有無共合屬有為，不能成為稱作無為的涅槃 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035b29–0035c01〕：「有無共合成，云何名涅槃？涅槃名無為，有無是有為。」
青目說有無共合既是有為，便不名涅槃 T30n1564青目釋〔0035c02–0035c03〕：「有無二事共合，不得名涅槃。涅槃名無為，有無是有為，是故有無非是涅槃。復次：」
有與無如明暗不能同處，所以兩者不能共合成涅槃 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035c04–0035c05〕：「有無二事共，云何是涅槃？是二不同處，如明暗不俱。」
青目說有時無無、無時無有，如明暗不俱，故有無不能共合名涅槃 T30n1564青目釋〔0035c06–0035c08〕：「有無二事不得名涅槃。何以故？有無相違，一處不可得，如明暗不俱。是故有時無無、無時無有，云何有無共合而名為涅槃？」
形式載體為青目釋長行的問方立說，由有無共合失敗退立非有非無應是涅槃 T30n1564青目釋（問方立說）〔0035c08–0035c10〕：「問曰：若有無共合非涅槃者，今非有非無應是涅槃。」
若以非有非無名涅槃，必須說明它憑什麼被分別成立 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035c11–0035c12〕：「若非有非無，名之為涅槃；此非有非無，以何而分別？」
青目說找不到非有非無的分別根據，所以第四句也不能作涅槃 T30n1564青目釋〔0035c13–0035c15〕：「若涅槃非有非無者，此非有非無因何而分別？是故非有非無是涅槃者，是事不然。復次：」
只有有與無先成立，非有非無才可依相違分別，前兩句不成，第四句也不成 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035c16–0035c17〕：「分別非有無，如是名涅槃；若有無成者，非有非無成。」
青目說無依有、有依無而立，前三句既破便沒有非有非無可得，所以涅槃也非第四句 T30n1564青目釋〔0035c18–0035c22〕：「汝分別非有非無是涅槃者，是事不然。何以故？若有無成者，然後非有非無成。有相違名無、無相違名有，是有無第三句中已破。有無無故，云何有非有非無？是故涅槃非非有非非無。復次：」
如來滅後與現在都不以有、無、亦有亦無、非有非無四句宣說 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0035c23–0035c26〕：「如來滅度後，不言有與無，亦不言有無，非有及非無。如來現在時，不言有與無，亦不言有無，非有及非無。」
青目說如來現在與滅後四句皆不受，便無人、無時、無處、無法可為涅槃作固定分別 T30n1564青目釋〔0035c27–0036a03〕：「若如來滅後、若現在，有如來亦不受，無如來亦不受，亦有如來亦無如來亦不受，非有如來非無如來亦不受。以不受故，不應分別涅槃有無等。離如來，誰當得涅槃？何時何處以何法說涅槃？是故一切時一切種、求涅槃相不可得。復次：」
涅槃與世間彼此沒有絲毫自性差別 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0036a04–0036a05〕：「涅槃與世間，無有少分別；世間與涅槃，亦無少分別。」
青目以五陰相續往來假名世間，以五陰性空、無受寂滅說涅槃，故兩者不離同一無性五陰 T30n1564青目釋〔0036a06–0036a09〕：「五陰相續往來因緣故，說名世間。五陰性畢竟空無受寂滅，此義先已說。以一切法不生不滅故，世間與涅槃無有分別，涅槃與世間亦無分別。復次：」
涅槃的實際與世間的邊際沒有毫釐差別 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0036a10–0036a11〕：「涅槃之實際，及與世間際，如是二際者，無毫釐差別。」
青目說究竟推求世間、涅槃、實際與無生際都平等不可得 T30n1564青目釋〔0036a12–0036a13〕：「究竟推求世間、涅槃、實際、無生際，以平等不可得故，無毫釐差別。復次：」
如來滅後有無等四見、有邊等四見與常等四見，分別依涅槃、未來與過去而起 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0036a14–0036a15〕：「滅後有無等，有邊等常等，諸見依涅槃，未來過去世。」
青目逐列滅後有無、世間邊無邊與常無常三組十二見，並說所依不可得時諸見與涅槃皆不可得 T30n1564青目釋〔0036a16–0036a26〕：「如來滅後有如來、無如來、亦有如來亦無如來、非有如來非無如來。世間有邊、世間無邊、世間亦有邊亦無邊、世間非有邊非無邊。世間常、世間無常、世間亦常亦無常、世間非有常非無常。此三種十二見。如來滅後有無等四見，依涅槃起。世間有邊無邊等四見，依未來世起。世間常無常等四見，依過去世起。如來滅後有無等不可得，涅槃亦如是。如世間前際後際、有邊無邊、有常無常等不可得，涅槃亦如是。是故說世間、涅槃等無有異。復次：」
一切法空故，邊無邊、一異、常無常等皆不可得，所得與戲論止息時也無固定人、處與佛說定法 T30n1564龍樹頌〔0036a27–0036b03〕：「一切法空故，何有邊無邊，亦邊亦無邊，非有非無邊？何者為一異，何有常無常，亦常亦無常，非常非無常？諸法不可得，滅一切戲論，無人亦無處，佛亦無所說。」
青目以一切法從緣生故無自性，說六十二見、諸有所得與戲論皆不可得，通達實相便得安隱道 T30n1564青目釋〔0036b04–0036b16〕：「一切法、一切時、一切種，從眾緣生故，畢竟空故無自性。如是法中，何者是有邊，誰為有邊？何者是無邊，亦有邊亦無邊，非有邊非無邊。誰為非有邊非無邊？何者是常，誰為是常？何者是無常，常無常非常非無常，誰為非常非無常？何者身即是神，何者身異於神？如是等六十二邪見，於畢竟空中皆不可得。諸有所得皆息、戲論皆滅。戲論滅故，通達諸法實相得安隱道。從〈因緣品〉來，分別推求諸法，有亦無、無亦無、有無亦無、非有非無亦無，是名諸法實相，亦名如，法性，實際，涅槃。是故如來無時無處為人說涅槃定相，是故說諸有所得皆息、戲論皆滅。」
《般若燈論釋》說諸法無自體如幻而不違世諦，諸行無起即是涅槃，證得亦無自體。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0128a23–0128a27〕：「諸法無自體者，如幻燈滅，是亦不違世諦智境界故。無自體者，從無始因緣展轉而起，如幻如焰。諸行無起，即是涅槃。證得涅槃亦復如是，無有自體。我亦不立無體體故，非立義過。」
《般若燈論釋》說以斷滅因證成涅槃不立，真實法與施設法兩種執法俱不然。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》〔0128b18–0128b22〕：「釋曰：此謂如是涅槃，我所欲得。如汝所說，斷故滅故為出因等，斷諸煩惱得涅槃者，此等因義今皆不成，顛倒心故作如是說，義皆不然。復次諸執有涅槃者，或說涅槃是真實法，或說涅槃是施設法。二俱不然。以是義故，」
《般若燈論釋》所引《梵天王所問經》中，梵王白佛以一切相寂滅說涅槃，並說正見者不作一法有生滅，也不欲證獲一法。 T30n1566《般若燈論釋》所引《梵天王所問經》（梵王白佛）〔0131b01–0131b07〕：「一切相皆寂滅是為涅槃。一切所作皆已謝是為涅槃。世尊！愚癡眾生於佛法中雖得出家，而墮外道見中求涅槃體，如於麻中求油、指手言得，何異乳中求覓生酥？若於一切法畢竟寂滅中求涅槃者，乃至邪慢外道中聲聞非佛法中聲聞，若是正見成就行者，不作一法有起有滅，亦不欲得證獲一法，」
三、諸家異釋（吉藏專疏）
吉藏說非有非無若只作藥用則病盡藥消，四句只是表涅槃之門，不能把門當涅槃。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0158a24–0158a29〕：「今總問汝：為以非有無作藥用、為道理有此非有無耶？若作藥用，病盡則藥消。若道理有非有無，我亦道理有有無；若言求有無不可得者，我亦求非有無不可得也。又所以有四句者，涅槃絕四句，四句是表涅槃之門耳，云何用門為涅槃耶？」
吉藏說世間與出世間都須離四句，若仍見世出世為二便還是生死。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0158c03–0158c07〕：「又有此文來者，或聞上出世間人法絕於四句，言世間人法在於四句。若爾，還是世出世二見，若是二見即成生死。是故今明非但出世人法絕於四句，世間人法亦絕四句，能如此悟即是涅槃耶。就文為二：」
吉藏以世與出世同絕四句說無二，又明於道未曾二、於緣未曾一。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0158c10–0158c22〕：「所以世間與涅槃不二者，從〈因緣品〉至〈成壞品〉求世間四句不可得，從〈如來品〉至〈涅槃品〉求出世間法四句不得。世與出世既同絕四句，所以世與出世無有二也。既識無二，即須知二。悟二無二名為方便般若，了無二二稱般若方便。《法華》明諸佛知見有四智：了生死涅槃二而無二謂如來智、悟不二而二名佛智，此二智任運現前謂自然無功用智，此三不從師得名無師智。此之四智則是諸佛知見，為欲開示悟入此四知見故出現於世也。問：就誰論二不二？答：於道未曾二，於緣未曾一。於道未曾二，生死常涅槃；於緣未曾一，涅槃常生死也。」
吉藏以一切法與一切時為所觀之法，以一切種為觀門，說緣盡於觀、觀盡於緣而緣觀俱寂。 T42n1824《中觀論疏》〔0159c13–0159c19〕：「「一切法」者，謂生死涅槃也。「一切時」者，三世時也。此二列所觀之法。「一切種」者，明觀門也，以觀門無量故云一切種。如《智度論》釋一切種知一切法。論云「智慧門名為種」。「從眾緣生畢竟空」者，初兩句空即是緣盡於觀，一切種空謂觀盡於緣，故非緣非觀、緣觀俱寂。」
四、名相
無得與無至是否定可占有的果物與可遷入的處所；無受是不再執取五受陰，不是先有今無；四句為有、無、亦有亦無、非有非無；三組十二見是滅後有無、世間邊無邊、世間常無常各四句。
五、科判
根本文除六個只標問答起訖而別無實義的短句外，共有四十六個實質聲部：空不空與六遮六項、非有六項、非無五項、不受與雙遣五項、有無共合九項、非有非無五項、如來四句二項、世間兩際四項、諸見收束四項。
六、關中舊學·譯史
本品署龍樹造、青目釋、鳩摩羅什譯；清辨系有同題異釋，安慧系現存漢譯止於第十三品，本品據實標闕。
七、唯識軸互讀（空有）
根本文說世間與涅槃無有少分別：五陰相續往來因緣故說名世間，五陰性畢竟空、無受寂滅。
八、系內餘論互讀
本品末釋以從眾緣生、畢竟空故無自性，收束六十二邪見、諸有所得與戲論皆不可得，通達諸法實相而得安隱道。
九、校本定位
| 用途 | 書證與範圍 |
|---|---|
| 根本論頌與青目釋 | T30n1564〔0034c14–0036b16〕 |
| 清辨系異釋 | T30n1566〔0128a09–0131b11〕 |
| 安慧系異釋 | T30n1567 漢譯止於第十三品，本品無傳 |
| 吉藏逐文疏 | T42n1824 同品 |
Textual Collation
The base text for this chapter is the Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka, T30n1564〔0034c14–0036b16〕. Following the base text’s sequence, the main text distinctly preserves the questioner, Nāgārjuna’s verses, and Qingmu’s commentary. The Bhāviveka-lineage T30n1566 preserves an alternative exegesis under the same title; the extant Chinese translation of the Sthiramati lineage ends at Chapter Thirteen, so this chapter is truthfully marked absent.
Comparative Readings
The Bhāviveka-lineage T30n1566 preserves corresponding interpretations that absence of essence does not contradict conventional truth, that the attainment of nirvāṇa likewise lacks essence, and that all marks are quiescent. This chapter is absent from the Sthiramati-lineage transmission.
Formally carried by a Nāgārjuna verse presenting the questioner’s position, the challenge argues that if all dharmas are empty, neither arisen nor ceased, then nothing can be cut off or extinguished and nirvāṇa should not exist. Nāgārjuna’s verse presenting the questioner’s position in T30n1564〔0034c15–0034c16〕 reads: 「若一切法空，無生無滅者，何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃？」 tr. “If all dharmas are empty, neither arisen nor ceased, what is cut off and what extinguished that it may be called nirvāṇa?”
Formally carried by Qingmu’s prose commentary presenting the questioner’s position, the argument says that if all dharmas are empty, nothing can be cut off or extinguished, and preserves the cutting off of afflictions, extinction of the five aggregates, and nirvāṇa by asserting that dharmas are not empty. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s position in T30n1564〔0034c17–0034c20〕 reads: 「若一切法空，則無生無滅。無生無滅者，何所斷何所滅，而名為涅槃？是故一切法不應空。以諸法不空故，斷諸煩惱滅五陰，名為涅槃。」 tr. “If all dharmas are empty, there is neither arising nor ceasing. With neither arising nor ceasing, what can be cut off or extinguished and called nirvāṇa? Therefore all dharmas should not be empty. Because dharmas are not empty, the many afflictions are cut off and the five aggregates extinguished; this is called nirvāṇa.”
The answering verse points out that if dharmas are not empty but each possess fixed intrinsic nature, there is likewise neither arising nor ceasing and nothing that can be cut off or extinguished and called nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0034c21–0034c22〕 reads: 「若諸法不空，則無生無滅；何斷何所滅，而稱為涅槃？」 tr. “If dharmas were not empty, there would be neither arising nor ceasing. What would be cut off and what extinguished that it might be called nirvāṇa?”
Qingmu says that if the world were not empty, there would be neither arising nor ceasing; thus neither the gate of existence nor that of nonexistence directly reaches nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0034c23–0034c25〕 reads: 「若一切世間不空，則無生無滅，何所斷何所滅而名為涅槃？是故有無二門，則非至涅槃。所名涅槃者：」 tr. “If the whole world were not empty, there would be neither arising nor ceasing. What then could be cut off or extinguished and called nirvāṇa? Thus neither the gate of existence nor the gate of nonexistence leads to nirvāṇa. What is called nirvāṇa is:”
In nirvāṇa nothing is attained and nowhere reached; it is neither annihilation nor permanence, neither arising nor ceasing. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0034c26–0034c27〕 reads: 「無得亦無至，不斷亦不常，不生亦不滅，是說名涅槃。」 tr. “Nothing is attained and nowhere is reached; it is neither annihilation nor permanence, neither arising nor ceasing. What is spoken of in this way is called nirvāṇa.”
Qingmu explains in turn nonattainment, nonarrival, nonannihilation, nonpermanence, nonarising, and noncessation, then cites scripture to define nirvāṇa as free from the four propositions, nonappropriating, and inwardly quiescent. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0034c28–0035a06〕 reads: 「無得者，於行於果無所得。無至者，無處可至。不斷者，五陰先來畢竟空故，得道入無餘涅槃時亦無所斷。不常者，若有法可得分別者則名為常，涅槃寂滅無法可分別故，不名為常。生滅亦爾，如是相者名為涅槃。復次經說，涅槃非有、非無、非有無、非非有非非無，一切法不受，內寂滅名涅槃。何以故？」 tr. “‘Nothing is attained’ means that nothing is acquired in either practice or fruition. ‘Nowhere is reached’ means that no place exists at which to arrive. ‘Not annihilated’ means that because the five aggregates have from the beginning been ultimately empty, when one attains the path and enters nirvāṇa without remainder, nothing is cut off. ‘Not permanent’ means that if some dharma could be acquired and discriminated, it would be called permanent; because nirvāṇa is quiescent extinction and no dharma can be discriminated, it is not called permanent. The same applies to arising and ceasing. What has such marks is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore, the scripture says that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither both existent and nonexistent nor neither existent nor nonexistent. It appropriates no dharma; inwardly quiescent, it is called nirvāṇa. Why?”
Nirvāṇa cannot be called existent, because an existent dharma bears the marks of aging and death, and no existent dharma is apart from them. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035a07–0035a08〕 reads: 「涅槃不名有，有則老死相；終無有有法，離於老死相。」 tr. “Nirvāṇa cannot be called existent, because existence bears the marks of aging and death. No existent dharma ever exists apart from the marks of aging and death.”
From the evident arising and ceasing of all things and the failure to find a fixed dharma apart from arising, ceasing, aging, and death, Qingmu explains why nirvāṇa is not called existent. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035a09–0035a13〕 reads: 「眼見一切萬物皆生滅故，是老死相。涅槃若是有，則應有老死相。但是事不然，是故涅槃不名有。又不見離生滅老死別有定法而名涅槃。若涅槃是有，即應有生滅老死相；以離老死相故，名為涅槃。復次：」 tr. “Everything seen by the eye arises and ceases; these are the marks of aging and death. If nirvāṇa were existent, it should bear the marks of aging and death. But this is not so, and therefore nirvāṇa is not called existent. Nor can one see some fixed dharma apart from arising, ceasing, aging, and death and call it nirvāṇa. If nirvāṇa were existent, it should bear the marks of arising, ceasing, aging, and death; precisely because it is free from aging and death, it is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore:”
If nirvāṇa were an existent dharma, it would be conditioned, for no dharma truly existent can simultaneously be unconditioned. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035a14–0035a15〕 reads: 「若涅槃是有，涅槃即有為；終無有一法，而是無為者。」 tr. “If nirvāṇa were existent, nirvāṇa would be conditioned; yet no single dharma that exists is unconditioned.”
Qingmu says that everything arising from many conditions is conditioned; “unconditioned” and “permanent dharma” are only provisional names, and no permanent essence can be found through reason. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035a16–0035a19〕 reads: 「涅槃非是有。何以故？一切萬物從眾緣生，皆是有為。無有一法名為無為者，雖常法假名無為，以理推之，無常法尚無有，何況常法不可見不可得者。復次：」 tr. “Nirvāṇa is not existent. Why? All things arise from many conditions and are conditioned. No dharma can be called unconditioned. Although so-called permanent dharmas are provisionally named unconditioned, when examined by reason, not even an impermanent dharma truly exists; how much less a permanent dharma that can neither be seen nor attained. Furthermore:”
If nirvāṇa were existent, it could not be called nonappropriation, because no existent dharma is established without appropriation. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035a20–0035a21〕 reads: 「若涅槃是有，云何名無受？無有不從受，而名為有法。」 tr. “If nirvāṇa were existent, why would it be called nonappropriation? No existent dharma is ever named without appropriation.”
Because the scripture calls nonappropriation nirvāṇa, Qingmu concludes that no existent dharma is self-established without appropriation and nirvāṇa is not existent. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035a22–0035a24〕 reads: 「若謂涅槃是有法者，經則不應說無受是涅槃。何以故？無有有法不受而有，是故涅槃非有。」 tr. “If nirvāṇa were an existent dharma, the scripture should not say that nonappropriation is nirvāṇa. Why? No existent dharma exists without appropriation. Therefore nirvāṇa is not existent.”
Formally carried by Qingmu’s prose presenting the questioner’s position, the question retreats from existence not being nirvāṇa to ask whether nonexistence is nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s position in T30n1564〔0035a24–0035a25〕 reads: 「問曰：若有非涅槃者，無應是涅槃耶？」 tr. “Question: If existence is not nirvāṇa, then should nonexistence be nirvāṇa?”
Even existence is not nirvāṇa, how much less nonexistence; without an existent dharma, nonexistence cannot be relationally stated. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035a26–0035a27〕 reads: 「有尚非涅槃，何況於無耶！涅槃無有有，何處當有無？」 tr. “Existence is not nirvāṇa; how much less nonexistence! Nirvāṇa contains no existence—where could nonexistence be?”
Qingmu says that nonexistence is named only when something existed before and does not exist now. Nirvāṇa is not an existent dharma turning into nonexistence, so nonexistence cannot be nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035a28–0035b02〕 reads: 「若有非涅槃，無云何是涅槃？何以故？因有故有無；若無有，何有無？如經說，先有今無則名無。涅槃則不爾。何以故？非有法變為無故。是故無亦不作涅槃。復次：」 tr. “If existence is not nirvāṇa, how could nonexistence be nirvāṇa? Why? Nonexistence exists dependent on existence; without existence, whence nonexistence? As the scripture says, what existed before but does not exist now is called nonexistent. Nirvāṇa is not like this. Why? It is not an existent dharma turning into nonexistence. Therefore nonexistence too cannot be nirvāṇa. Furthermore:”
If nirvāṇa were a nonexistent dharma, it likewise could not be called nonappropriation, because the name “nonexistent dharma” is also established within appropriation. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035b03–0035b04〕 reads: 「若無是涅槃，云何名不受？未曾有不受，而名為無法。」 tr. “If nonexistence were nirvāṇa, why would it be called nonappropriation? No nonexistent dharma is ever named without appropriation.”
Qingmu concludes from the fact that no unappropriated thing is called a nonexistent dharma that nirvāṇa is not nonexistent. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035b05–0035b07〕 reads: 「若謂無是涅槃，經則不應說不受名涅槃。何以故？無有不受而名無法，是故知涅槃非無。」 tr. “If nonexistence were nirvāṇa, the scripture should not call nonappropriation nirvāṇa. Why? Nothing is called a nonexistent dharma without appropriation. Thus one knows that nirvāṇa is not nonexistent.”
Formally carried by Qingmu’s prose presenting the questioner’s position, the question accepts that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent and asks what nirvāṇa ultimately is. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s position in T30n1564〔0035b07–0035b08〕 reads: 「問曰：若涅槃非有非無者，何等是涅槃？」 tr. “Question: If nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent, what is nirvāṇa?”
Appropriating causes and conditions means revolving in birth and death; not appropriating causes and conditions is provisionally named nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035b09–0035b10〕 reads: 「受諸因緣故，輪轉生死中；不受諸因緣，是名為涅槃。」 tr. “Because one appropriates causes and conditions, one revolves in birth and death. Not appropriating causes and conditions is called nirvāṇa.”
Qingmu says that failing to know inversion as it truly is leads one through birth and death dependent on the five appropriated aggregates; when one knows it truly, the five aggregates lacking intrinsic nature no longer continue, and this is called nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035b11–0035b13〕 reads: 「不如實知顛倒故，因五受陰往來生死。如實知顛倒故，則不復因五受陰往來生死。無性五陰不復相續故，說名涅槃。復次：」 tr. “Because one does not know inversion as it truly is, one comes and goes through birth and death dependent on the five appropriated aggregates. When one knows inversion as it truly is, one no longer comes and goes through birth and death dependent on them. Because the five aggregates lacking intrinsic nature no longer continue, this is called nirvāṇa. Furthermore:”
The Buddhist scripture says that both existence and nonexistence are to be cut off, so nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035b14–0035b15〕 reads: 「如佛經中說，斷有斷非有；是故知涅槃，非有亦非無。」 tr. “Just as the Buddha said in the scripture: both existence and nonexistence are cut off. Thus one knows that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent.”
Qingmu explains existence as the three modes of existence and nonexistence as their annihilation; because the Buddha says both must be cut off, nirvāṇa is neither. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035b16–0035b17〕 reads: 「有名三有，非有名三有斷滅。佛說斷此二事故，當知涅槃非有亦非無。」 tr. “Existence means the three modes of existence; nonexistence means the annihilation of those three. The Buddha says that both are to be cut off. Therefore one should know that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor nonexistent.”
Formally carried by Qingmu’s prose presenting the questioner’s position, the question moves from neither existence nor nonexistence being nirvāṇa to ask whether the two conjoined are nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s position in T30n1564〔0035b17–0035b18〕 reads: 「問曰：若有若無非涅槃者，今有無共合是涅槃耶？」 tr. “Question: If neither existence nor nonexistence is nirvāṇa, then are existence and nonexistence conjoined together nirvāṇa?”
To conjoin existence and nonexistence as nirvāṇa would make those two matters themselves liberation, which cannot be established. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035b19–0035b20〕 reads: 「若謂於有無，合為涅槃者，有無即解脫，是事則不然。」 tr. “If conjoined existence and nonexistence constituted nirvāṇa, existence and nonexistence themselves would be liberation. This cannot be established.”
Qingmu says that existence and nonexistence contradict one another and cannot jointly constitute liberation in one place. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035b21–0035b23〕 reads: 「若謂於有無合為涅槃者，即有無二事合為解脫。是事不然。何以故？有無二事相違故，云何一處有？復次：」 tr. “If conjoined existence and nonexistence constituted nirvāṇa, the two matters of existence and nonexistence would together be liberation. This cannot be established. Why? The two matters contradict one another; how could they exist in one place? Furthermore:”
If existence and nonexistence conjoined as nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa could not be nonappropriation, because both arise from appropriation. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035b24–0035b25〕 reads: 「若謂於有無，合為涅槃者；涅槃非無受，是二從受生。」 tr. “If conjoined existence and nonexistence constituted nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa would not be nonappropriation, for both arise from appropriation.”
Qingmu says that existence and nonexistence arise from appropriation and exist dependent on each other, so they cannot combine into unappropriated nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035b26–0035b28〕 reads: 「若謂有無合為涅槃者，經不應說涅槃名無受。何以故？有無二事從受生，相因而有。是故有無二事，不得合為涅槃。復次：」 tr. “If conjoined existence and nonexistence were nirvāṇa, the scripture should not call nirvāṇa nonappropriation. Why? Both matters arise from appropriation and exist dependent on one another. Therefore they cannot combine into nirvāṇa. Furthermore:”
Conjoined existence and nonexistence are conditioned and cannot become nirvāṇa, which is called unconditioned. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035b29–0035c01〕 reads: 「有無共合成，云何名涅槃？涅槃名無為，有無是有為。」 tr. “How could what is jointly constituted by existence and nonexistence be called nirvāṇa? Nirvāṇa is called unconditioned, while existence and nonexistence are conditioned.”
Qingmu says that because conjoined existence and nonexistence are conditioned, they cannot be called nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035c02–0035c03〕 reads: 「有無二事共合，不得名涅槃。涅槃名無為，有無是有為，是故有無非是涅槃。復次：」 tr. “Conjoined existence and nonexistence cannot be called nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is called unconditioned, while existence and nonexistence are conditioned; therefore they are not nirvāṇa. Furthermore:”
Existence and nonexistence cannot share one place, just as light and darkness cannot coexist; therefore they cannot jointly constitute nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035c04–0035c05〕 reads: 「有無二事共，云何是涅槃？是二不同處，如明暗不俱。」 tr. “How could existence and nonexistence together be nirvāṇa? The two cannot share a place, just as light and darkness do not coexist.”
Qingmu says that existence and nonexistence contradict one another: when one is present the other is absent, as light and darkness do not coexist, so they cannot jointly be nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035c06–0035c08〕 reads: 「有無二事不得名涅槃。何以故？有無相違，一處不可得，如明暗不俱。是故有時無無、無時無有，云何有無共合而名為涅槃？」 tr. “Existence and nonexistence cannot be called nirvāṇa. Why? They contradict one another and cannot be found in one place, just as light and darkness do not coexist. When existence is present, nonexistence is absent; when nonexistence is present, existence is absent. How could one say they conjoin and are called nirvāṇa?”
Formally carried by Qingmu’s prose presenting the questioner’s position, the question retreats from the failure of conjoined existence and nonexistence to assert that neither existence nor nonexistence is nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s position in T30n1564〔0035c08–0035c10〕 reads: 「問曰：若有無共合非涅槃者，今非有非無應是涅槃。」 tr. “Question: If conjoined existence and nonexistence are not nirvāṇa, then should neither existence nor nonexistence be nirvāṇa?”
If neither existence nor nonexistence were named nirvāṇa, the basis for discriminating this fourth proposition would have to be explained. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035c11–0035c12〕 reads: 「若非有非無，名之為涅槃；此非有非無，以何而分別？」 tr. “If neither existence nor nonexistence were called nirvāṇa, on what basis would this ‘neither existent nor nonexistent’ be discriminated?”
Qingmu says that no basis for discriminating neither existence nor nonexistence can be found; therefore the fourth proposition cannot be nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035c13–0035c15〕 reads: 「若涅槃非有非無者，此非有非無因何而分別？是故非有非無是涅槃者，是事不然。復次：」 tr. “If nirvāṇa were neither existent nor nonexistent, on what basis would this be discriminated? Thus the claim that neither existence nor nonexistence is nirvāṇa cannot be established. Furthermore:”
Only if existence and nonexistence are first established can their joint negation be discriminated through opposition; since the earlier propositions fail, the fourth fails too. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035c16–0035c17〕 reads: 「分別非有無，如是名涅槃；若有無成者，非有非無成。」 tr. “You discriminate neither existence nor nonexistence and call that nirvāṇa. Only if existence and nonexistence are established can neither existence nor nonexistence be established.”
Qingmu says that nonexistence is established through opposition to existence and existence through opposition to nonexistence. Since the first three propositions have been refuted, neither existence nor nonexistence remains, so nirvāṇa is not the fourth proposition. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035c18–0035c22〕 reads: 「汝分別非有非無是涅槃者，是事不然。何以故？若有無成者，然後非有非無成。有相違名無、無相違名有，是有無第三句中已破。有無無故，云何有非有非無？是故涅槃非非有非非無。復次：」 tr. “Your discrimination of neither existence nor nonexistence as nirvāṇa cannot be established. Why? Existence and nonexistence must first be established before their joint negation can be established. What contradicts existence is called nonexistence, and what contradicts nonexistence is called existence; yet this pair was refuted in the third proposition. Since neither existence nor nonexistence exists, whence neither existence nor nonexistence? Thus nirvāṇa is not the negation of both existence and nonexistence either. Furthermore:”
Whether after the Tathāgata’s passing or while he is present, none of the four propositions—existence, nonexistence, both, or neither—is taught. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0035c23–0035c26〕 reads: 「如來滅度後，不言有與無，亦不言有無，非有及非無。如來現在時，不言有與無，亦不言有無，非有及非無。」 tr. “After the Tathāgata passes away, one does not say that he exists or does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist. While the Tathāgata is present, one does not say that he exists or does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist.”
Qingmu says that none of the four propositions about the Tathāgata, present or after passing, is appropriated; thus no person, time, place, or dharma can provide a fixed discrimination of nirvāṇa. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0035c27–0036a03〕 reads: 「若如來滅後、若現在，有如來亦不受，無如來亦不受，亦有如來亦無如來亦不受，非有如來非無如來亦不受。以不受故，不應分別涅槃有無等。離如來，誰當得涅槃？何時何處以何法說涅槃？是故一切時一切種、求涅槃相不可得。復次：」 tr. “Whether after the Tathāgata’s passing or while he is present, the assertion that the Tathāgata exists is not appropriated; that he does not exist is not appropriated; that he both exists and does not exist is not appropriated; and that he neither exists nor does not exist is not appropriated. Since none is appropriated, nirvāṇa should not be discriminated as existence, nonexistence, and so on. Apart from the Tathāgata, who would attain nirvāṇa? At what time, in what place, and through what dharma could nirvāṇa be spoken? Thus the mark of nirvāṇa cannot be found when sought at any time or in any way. Furthermore:”
Nirvāṇa and the world have not the slightest difference through intrinsic nature. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0036a04–0036a05〕 reads: 「涅槃與世間，無有少分別；世間與涅槃，亦無少分別。」 tr. “Nirvāṇa and the world have not the slightest difference; the world and nirvāṇa likewise have not the slightest difference.”
Qingmu provisionally names the continuing, coming, and going of the five aggregates “the world,” and calls the intrinsic nature of the five aggregates empty, unappropriated, and quiescent; hence the two do not depart from the same five aggregates lacking intrinsic nature. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0036a06–0036a09〕 reads: 「五陰相續往來因緣故，說名世間。五陰性畢竟空無受寂滅，此義先已說。以一切法不生不滅故，世間與涅槃無有分別，涅槃與世間亦無分別。復次：」 tr. “Because the five aggregates continue, come, and go through causes and conditions, they are named the world. The intrinsic nature of the five aggregates is ultimately empty, unappropriated, and quiescent; this meaning has already been explained. Because all dharmas neither arise nor cease, the world and nirvāṇa do not differ, and nirvāṇa and the world do not differ. Furthermore:”
The reality-limit of nirvāṇa and the boundary of the world have not a hair’s breadth of difference. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0036a10–0036a11〕 reads: 「涅槃之實際，及與世間際，如是二際者，無毫釐差別。」 tr. “The reality-limit of nirvāṇa and the boundary of the world—between these two limits there is not a hair’s breadth of difference.”
Qingmu says that when the world, nirvāṇa, the reality-limit, and the limit of nonarising are ultimately sought, all are equal and unfindable. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0036a12–0036a13〕 reads: 「究竟推求世間、涅槃、實際、無生際，以平等不可得故，無毫釐差別。復次：」 tr. “When the world, nirvāṇa, the reality-limit, and the limit of nonarising are ultimately sought, they are equal and unfindable; therefore there is not a hair’s breadth of difference. Furthermore:”
The four views about the Tathāgata after passing, four views about the world’s limit, and four views about permanence arise dependent respectively upon nirvāṇa, the future, and the past. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0036a14–0036a15〕 reads: 「滅後有無等，有邊等常等，諸見依涅槃，未來過去世。」 tr. “Views of existence and nonexistence after passing, views of whether the world has a limit, and views of permanence depend respectively upon nirvāṇa, the future, and the past.”
Qingmu enumerates the three groups of twelve views—existence after passing, the world’s limit, and permanence—and says that when their supports are unfindable, both the views and nirvāṇa are unfindable. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0036a16–0036a26〕 reads: 「如來滅後有如來、無如來、亦有如來亦無如來、非有如來非無如來。世間有邊、世間無邊、世間亦有邊亦無邊、世間非有邊非無邊。世間常、世間無常、世間亦常亦無常、世間非有常非無常。此三種十二見。如來滅後有無等四見，依涅槃起。世間有邊無邊等四見，依未來世起。世間常無常等四見，依過去世起。如來滅後有無等不可得，涅槃亦如是。如世間前際後際、有邊無邊、有常無常等不可得，涅槃亦如是。是故說世間、涅槃等無有異。復次：」 tr. “The Tathāgata exists after passing, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist. The world has a limit, has no limit, both has and has no limit, or neither has nor lacks a limit. The world is permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent. These are three groups totaling twelve views. The four views about the Tathāgata after passing arise dependent on nirvāṇa; the four views about the world’s limit arise dependent on the future; the four views about permanence arise dependent on the past. Just as the Tathāgata’s existence and nonexistence after passing are unfindable, so is nirvāṇa. Just as the world’s earlier and later limits, finitude and infinitude, permanence and impermanence are unfindable, so is nirvāṇa. Therefore the world and nirvāṇa do not differ. Furthermore:”
Because all dharmas are empty, limit and no limit, identity and difference, permanence and impermanence are unfindable; when acquisition and proliferation cease, there is no fixed person, place, or determinate teaching by the Buddha. Nāgārjuna’s verse in T30n1564〔0036a27–0036b03〕 reads: 「一切法空故，何有邊無邊，亦邊亦無邊，非有非無邊？何者為一異，何有常無常，亦常亦無常，非常非無常？諸法不可得，滅一切戲論，無人亦無處，佛亦無所說。」 tr. “Because all dharmas are empty, what could possess a limit or no limit, both a limit and no limit, or neither a limit nor no limit? What is one and what is different? Where are permanence, impermanence, both permanence and impermanence, or neither permanence nor impermanence? Dharmas are all unfindable and all conceptual proliferation ceases: there is neither person nor place, and the Buddha has spoken nothing.”
Because all dharmas arise from conditions and lack intrinsic nature, Qingmu says that the sixty-two views, every acquisition, and all proliferation are unfindable; comprehending the true marks brings the path of peace. Qingmu’s commentary in T30n1564〔0036b04–0036b16〕 reads: 「一切法、一切時、一切種，從眾緣生故，畢竟空故無自性。如是法中，何者是有邊，誰為有邊？何者是無邊，亦有邊亦無邊，非有邊非無邊。誰為非有邊非無邊？何者是常，誰為是常？何者是無常，常無常非常非無常，誰為非常非無常？何者身即是神，何者身異於神？如是等六十二邪見，於畢竟空中皆不可得。諸有所得皆息、戲論皆滅。戲論滅故，通達諸法實相得安隱道。從〈因緣品〉來，分別推求諸法，有亦無、無亦無、有無亦無、非有非無亦無，是名諸法實相，亦名如，法性，實際，涅槃。是故如來無時無處為人說涅槃定相，是故說諸有所得皆息、戲論皆滅。」 tr. “All dharmas, at all times and in all ways, arise from many conditions and are ultimately empty and without intrinsic nature. Among such dharmas, what has a limit, and who has a limit? What is limitless, both limited and limitless, or neither limited nor limitless? Who is neither limited nor limitless? What is permanent, and who is permanent? What is impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent? Who is neither permanent nor impermanent? What means that the body is identical with the self? What means that the body differs from the self? All sixty-two wrong views of this kind are unfindable within ultimate emptiness. Every acquisition ceases and all conceptual proliferation is exhausted. Because proliferation is exhausted, one comprehends the true marks of dharmas and attains the path of peace and security. From the ‘Examination of Conditions’ onward, dharmas have been discriminated and sought: existence is absent, nonexistence is absent, both existence and nonexistence are absent, and neither existence nor nonexistence is absent. This is called the true marks of dharmas; it is also called suchness, Dharma-nature, the reality-limit, and nirvāṇa. Therefore the Tathāgata has never, at any time or place, taught anyone a fixed mark of nirvāṇa. Thus it is said: every acquisition ceases and all conceptual proliferation is exhausted.”
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary says that dharmas lack essence like illusions without contradicting conventional truth; the nonarising of formations is nirvāṇa, and attainment itself has no essence. T30n1566 Prajñā Lamp Commentary〔0128a23–0128a27〕 reads: 「諸法無自體者，如幻燈滅，是亦不違世諦智境界故。無自體者，從無始因緣展轉而起，如幻如焰。諸行無起，即是涅槃。證得涅槃亦復如是，無有自體。我亦不立無體體故，非立義過。」 tr. “Dharmas lack essence, like an illusory lamp being extinguished; this does not contradict the cognitive domain of conventional truth. What lacks essence arises in succession through beginningless causes and conditions, like illusion and flame. The nonarising of formations is itself nirvāṇa. Attaining nirvāṇa is likewise so and has no essence. Nor do I establish an essence of essencelessness, so there is no fault in the thesis.”
The Prajñā Lamp Commentary says that nirvāṇa cannot be established through reasons of cutting off and extinguishing; both grasping nirvāṇa as a real dharma and as a designated dharma fail. T30n1566 Prajñā Lamp Commentary〔0128b18–0128b22〕 reads: 「釋曰：此謂如是涅槃，我所欲得。如汝所說，斷故滅故為出因等，斷諸煩惱得涅槃者，此等因義今皆不成，顛倒心故作如是說，義皆不然。復次諸執有涅槃者，或說涅槃是真實法，或說涅槃是施設法。二俱不然。以是義故，」 tr. “Explanation: This means, ‘Such a nirvāṇa is what I wish to attain.’ As you say, cutting off and extinguishing are reasons for release, and one attains nirvāṇa by cutting off afflictions; but the meanings of all such reasons are now unestablished. Such claims are made by an inverted mind and are untenable. Furthermore, among those who grasp nirvāṇa as existent, some call it a real dharma and others a designated dharma. Neither is so. For this reason:”
In the Brahmā King’s Questions Sūtra cited by the Prajñā Lamp Commentary, the Brahmā king tells the Buddha that the quiescence of all marks is nirvāṇa and that one of right view neither produces arising or ceasing in a single dharma nor wishes to realize or obtain one. T30n1566 Prajñā Lamp Commentary, citing the Brahmā King’s Questions Sūtra, where the Brahmā king addresses the Buddha,〔0131b01–0131b07〕 reads: 「一切相皆寂滅是為涅槃。一切所作皆已謝是為涅槃。世尊！愚癡眾生於佛法中雖得出家，而墮外道見中求涅槃體，如於麻中求油、指手言得，何異乳中求覓生酥？若於一切法畢竟寂滅中求涅槃者，乃至邪慢外道中聲聞非佛法中聲聞，若是正見成就行者，不作一法有起有滅，亦不欲得證獲一法，」 tr. “The quiescent extinction of all marks is nirvāṇa. The passing away of all fabrications is nirvāṇa. World-Honored One, although foolish beings leave home within the Buddha-Dharma, they fall into non-Buddhist views and seek an essence of nirvāṇa, like seeking oil in sesame and pointing a hand to say it has been attained. How is that different from seeking fresh butter in milk? One who seeks nirvāṇa within the ultimate quiescence of all dharmas is a śrāvaka among wrongly proud non-Buddhists, not a śrāvaka within the Buddha-Dharma. One accomplished in right view does not make a single dharma arise or cease and does not wish to realize or obtain a single dharma.”
Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)
Jizang says that if “neither existence nor nonexistence” is used only as medicine, the medicine disappears when the illness is exhausted. The four propositions are merely gates indicating nirvāṇa and cannot be mistaken for nirvāṇa itself. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0158a24–0158a29〕 reads: 「今總問汝：為以非有無作藥用、為道理有此非有無耶？若作藥用，病盡則藥消。若道理有非有無，我亦道理有有無；若言求有無不可得者，我亦求非有無不可得也。又所以有四句者，涅槃絕四句，四句是表涅槃之門耳，云何用門為涅槃耶？」 tr. “I now ask you generally: do you use neither existence nor nonexistence as medicine, or does this neither existence nor nonexistence truly exist in principle? If it is medicine, the medicine disappears when the illness is exhausted. If neither existence nor nonexistence truly exists in principle, then existence and nonexistence also truly exist in principle. If you say that existence and nonexistence cannot be found when sought, I too say that neither existence nor nonexistence cannot be found when sought. Moreover, the four propositions exist because nirvāṇa transcends them; they are only gates indicating nirvāṇa. How could one take the gate as nirvāṇa?”
Jizang says that both worldly and supramundane dharmas must be free from the four propositions; if world and transcendence are still seen as two, this remains birth and death. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0158c03–0158c07〕 reads: 「又有此文來者，或聞上出世間人法絕於四句，言世間人法在於四句。若爾，還是世出世二見，若是二見即成生死。是故今明非但出世人法絕於四句，世間人法亦絕四句，能如此悟即是涅槃耶。就文為二：」 tr. “This passage also appears because some hear above that supramundane persons and dharmas transcend the four propositions and say that worldly persons and dharmas remain within them. If so, this is still a dualistic view of world and transcendence, and that dualistic view becomes birth and death. Thus the present passage clarifies that not only supramundane persons and dharmas but worldly persons and dharmas also transcend the four propositions. To awaken in this way is nirvāṇa. The text divides into two parts:”
Jizang explains nonduality by saying that world and transcendence equally transcend the four propositions, then clarifies that in the Way they were never two and in relation to conditions they were never one. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0158c10–0158c22〕 reads: 「所以世間與涅槃不二者，從〈因緣品〉至〈成壞品〉求世間四句不可得，從〈如來品〉至〈涅槃品〉求出世間法四句不得。世與出世既同絕四句，所以世與出世無有二也。既識無二，即須知二。悟二無二名為方便般若，了無二二稱般若方便。《法華》明諸佛知見有四智：了生死涅槃二而無二謂如來智、悟不二而二名佛智，此二智任運現前謂自然無功用智，此三不從師得名無師智。此之四智則是諸佛知見，為欲開示悟入此四知見故出現於世也。問：就誰論二不二？答：於道未曾二，於緣未曾一。於道未曾二，生死常涅槃；於緣未曾一，涅槃常生死也。」 tr. “World and nirvāṇa are nondual because from the ‘Examination of Conditions’ through the ‘Examination of Arising and Destruction,’ the four propositions concerning the world cannot be found, and from the ‘Examination of the Tathāgata’ through the ‘Examination of Nirvāṇa,’ the four propositions concerning supramundane dharmas cannot be found. Since world and transcendence equally transcend the four propositions, they are not two. Once nonduality is known, duality must also be known. Awakening to two as nondual is expedient prajñā; understanding the nondual as dual is prajñā as expedient. The Lotus Sūtra explains four wisdoms within the insight of the buddhas: understanding birth and death and nirvāṇa as two yet nondual is Tathāgata-wisdom; awakening to nonduality yet duality is Buddha-wisdom; the spontaneous presence of these two wisdoms is natural, effortless wisdom; and because these three are not received from a teacher, there is teacherless wisdom. These four wisdoms are the insight of the buddhas, and they appear in the world to open, disclose, awaken to, and enter this fourfold insight. Question: For whom are duality and nonduality discussed? Answer: In the Way they were never two; in relation to conditions they were never one. In the Way they were never two, so birth and death are always nirvāṇa; in relation to conditions they were never one, so nirvāṇa is always birth and death.”
Taking all dharmas and all times as objects contemplated and all ways as gates of contemplation, Jizang says that conditions are exhausted within contemplation, contemplation within conditions, and both become quiescent. T42n1824 Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle〔0159c13–0159c19〕 reads: 「「一切法」者，謂生死涅槃也。「一切時」者，三世時也。此二列所觀之法。「一切種」者，明觀門也，以觀門無量故云一切種。如《智度論》釋一切種知一切法。論云「智慧門名為種」。「從眾緣生畢竟空」者，初兩句空即是緣盡於觀，一切種空謂觀盡於緣，故非緣非觀、緣觀俱寂。」 tr. “‘All dharmas’ means birth and death and nirvāṇa. ‘All times’ means the three times. These two enumerate the dharmas contemplated. ‘All ways’ clarifies the gates of contemplation; because those gates are immeasurable, the text says all ways. As the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom explains knowing all dharmas in all ways, ‘a gate of wisdom is called a way.’ ‘Arising from many conditions and ultimately empty’ means that in the first two clauses, emptiness is conditions exhausted within contemplation, while the emptiness of all ways means contemplation exhausted within conditions. Thus there are neither conditions nor contemplation; conditions and contemplation are both quiescent.”
Terminology
Nonattainment and nonarrival negate an appropriable fruit and a place into which one can migrate. Nonappropriation means no longer grasping the five appropriated aggregates, not prior existence becoming present nonexistence. The four propositions are existence, nonexistence, both existence and nonexistence, and neither existence nor nonexistence. The three groups of twelve views are the four propositions concerning existence after passing, the world’s limit, and the world’s permanence.
Doctrinal Outline
Apart from six short markers that only indicate the boundaries of questions and answers without independent doctrinal content, the root text contains forty-six substantive voice units: six on emptiness, nonemptiness, and the six negations; six on not existent; five on not nonexistent; five on nonappropriation and the double relinquishment; nine on conjoined existence and nonexistence; five on neither existence nor nonexistence; two on the Tathāgata and four propositions; four on the two limits of the world; and four concluding the views.
Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History
This chapter is attributed to Nāgārjuna as author, Qingmu as commentator, and Kumārajīva as translator. The Bhāviveka lineage preserves an alternative exegesis under the same title; the extant Chinese translation of the Sthiramati lineage ends at Chapter Thirteen, so this chapter is truthfully marked absent.
Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)
The root text says that world and nirvāṇa have not the slightest difference: the continuing, coming, and going of the five aggregates through conditions is called the world, while the intrinsic nature of the five aggregates is ultimately empty, unappropriated, and quiescent.
Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage
The chapter’s closing commentary uses arising from many conditions, ultimate emptiness, and absence of intrinsic nature to conclude that the sixty-two wrong views, every acquisition, and all conceptual proliferation are unfindable; comprehending the true marks of dharmas brings the path of peace.
Position of the Editions
| Use | Textual witness and range |
|---|---|
| Nāgārjuna’s root verses and Qingmu’s commentary | T30n1564〔0034c14–0036b16〕 |
| Bhāviveka-lineage alternative reading | T30n1566〔0128a09–0131b11〕 |
| Sthiramati-lineage alternative reading | The Chinese translation of T30n1567 ends at Chapter Thirteen; this chapter is not transmitted |
| Jizang’s line-by-line commentary | T42n1824, corresponding chapter |