中論 觀因果品第二十

Textual Collation

The base text is T30n1564〔0026b02–0027c10〕in the Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka. The chapter contains ten questions, sixteen verse groups, and twenty-four verses. Each verse in the three multiverse groups is listed separately, producing fifty-one items in all.

Comparative Readings

The Bhāviveka-line T30n1566 preserves alternative interpretations concerning distinctions among causes and conditions, simultaneous producer and produced, and the gate of one and different. The extant Chinese Sthiramati-line T30n1567 ends at Chapter Thirteen, so this chapter is marked absent without conjectural supplementation.

The questioner takes the visible arising of a fruit when many causes and conditions conjoin to establish that the fruit exists from conjunction. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0026b02–0026b03〕 reads: 「問曰：眾因緣和合現有果生故，當知是果從眾緣和合有。」 tr. “Question: Because a fruit is visibly seen to arise when many causes and conditions conjoin, one should know that this fruit exists from the conjunction of many conditions.”

Nāgārjuna says that if the fruit already exists within the conjunction of many conditions, it need not be produced again by conjunction. His verse in T30n1564〔0026b04–0026b05〕 reads: 「若眾緣和合，而有果生者；和合中已有，何須和合生？」 tr. “If a fruit arises when many conditions conjoin, it already exists within conjunction; why would conjunction need to produce it?”

Qingmu says that if the fruit already had a determinate body within conjunction, it should not arise again from conjunction. His commentary in T30n1564〔0026b06–0026b08〕 reads: 「若謂眾因緣和合有果生，是果則和合中已有。而從和合生者，是事不然。何以故？果若先有定體，則不應從和合生。」 tr. “If one says that a fruit arises when many causes and conditions conjoin, then this fruit already exists within conjunction. To say that what already exists is nevertheless produced from conjunction cannot be established. Why? If the fruit already had a determinate body, it should not arise from conjunction.”

The questioner asserts that although the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions, it can still arise from those conditions. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0026b08–0026b09〕 reads: 「問曰：眾緣和合中雖無果，而果從眾緣生者，有何咎？」 tr. “Question: Although the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions, it arises from those conditions. What fault is there?”

Nāgārjuna says that if the fruit is absent within conjunction, one cannot say that the fruit arises from the conjunction of many conditions. His verse in T30n1564〔0026b11–0026b12〕 reads: 「若眾緣和合，是中無果者，云何從眾緣，和合而果生？」 tr. “If the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions, how can one say that it arises from the conjunction of many conditions?”

Qingmu says that what is absent within conjunction cannot arise from conjunction, and that if a thing lacks intrinsic nature, it ultimately does not arise. His commentary in T30n1564〔0026b13–0026b15〕 reads: 「若從眾緣和合則果生者，是和合中無果，而從和合生。是事不然。何以故？若物無自性，是物終不生。復次：」 tr. “To say that a fruit arises from the conjunction of many conditions means that although the fruit is absent within conjunction, it nevertheless arises from conjunction. This cannot be established. Why? If a thing lacks intrinsic nature, that thing ultimately does not arise. Further:”

Nāgārjuna says that if the fruit is present within conjunction, it should be obtainable within conjunction, yet it cannot in fact be found. His verse in T30n1564〔0026b16–0026b17〕 reads: 「若眾緣和合，是中有果者；和合中應有，而實不可得。」 tr. “If a fruit is present within the conjunction of many conditions, it should be obtainable within conjunction, yet in fact it cannot be found.”

Qingmu says that if the fruit already existed within conjunction, a fruit that is form should be visible to the eye and one that is not form should be knowable to the mind. Since it cannot be found, its prior presence is unestablished. His commentary in T30n1564〔0026b18–0026b20〕 reads: 「若從眾緣和合中有果者，若色應可眼見、若非色應可意知，而實和合中果不可得。是故和合中有果，是事不然。復次：」 tr. “If a fruit exists within the conjunction of many conditions, then if it is form, it should be visible to the eye; if it is not form, it should be knowable to the mind. Yet in fact the fruit cannot be found within conjunction. Therefore, the claim that the fruit is present within conjunction cannot be established. Further:”

Nāgārjuna says that if the fruit is determinately absent within conjunction, causes and conditions become the same as noncauses and nonconditions. His verse in T30n1564〔0026b21–0026b22〕 reads: 「若眾緣和合，是中無果者；是則眾因緣，與非因緣同。」 tr. “If the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions, then those causes and conditions would be the same as noncauses and nonconditions.”

Qingmu uses milk as a cause of curds and water as not a cause of curds: if both contain the same absence of curds, one cannot say that curds come only from milk, and cause and noncause become confused. His commentary in T30n1564〔0026b23–0026b26〕 reads: 「若眾緣和合中無果者，則眾因緣即同非因緣。如乳是酪因緣，若乳中無酪，水中亦無酪。若乳中無酪，則與水同，不應言但從乳出。是故眾緣和合中無果者，是事不然。」 tr. “If the fruit is absent within the conjunction of many conditions, those causes and conditions are equivalent to noncauses and nonconditions. For example, milk is a cause and condition for curds. If curds are absent within milk, they are likewise absent within water. If curds are absent within milk, milk is the same as water, and one should not say that curds come only from milk. Therefore, the claim that the fruit is absent within conjunction cannot be established.”

The questioner says that the cause ceases after serving as cause for the fruit, thereby claiming that cause and fruit can be established while avoiding prior existence and prior absence. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0026b27–0026b28〕 reads: 「問曰：因為果作因已滅，而有因果。無如是咎。」 tr. “Question: The cause ceases after serving as cause for the fruit, and thus there are cause and fruit. The preceding fault does not arise.”

Nāgārjuna says that if the cause ceases after serving as cause for the fruit, the same cause has two bodies, a giving cause and a ceasing cause. His verse in T30n1564〔0026b29–0026c01〕 reads: 「若因與果因，作因已而滅，是因有二體，一與一則滅。」 tr. “If a cause serves as cause for the fruit and ceases after serving as cause, that cause has two bodies: one gives, and one ceases.”

Qingmu says that one cause cannot have the two bodies of giving cause and ceasing cause, so cessation after serving as cause cannot rescue cause and fruit. His commentary in T30n1564〔0026c02–0026c04〕 reads: 「若因與果作因已而滅者，是因則有二體：一謂與因；二謂滅因。是事不然，一法有二體故。是故因與果作因已而滅，是事不然。」 tr. “If the cause ceases after serving as cause for the fruit, that cause has two bodies: one is called the cause that gives; the second is the cause that ceases. This cannot be so, because one dharma would have two bodies. Therefore, the claim that the cause ceases after serving as cause for the fruit cannot be established.”

The questioner asserts that the cause can cease without first serving as cause for the fruit, while a fruit still arises. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0026c04–0026c06〕 reads: 「問曰：若謂因不與果作因已而滅，亦有果生，有何咎。」 tr. “Question: What fault is there if the cause ceases without serving as cause for the fruit, yet a fruit still arises?”

Nāgārjuna says that if the cause ceases before serving as cause for the fruit, the fruit that arises afterward becomes causeless. His verse in T30n1564〔0026c07–0026c08〕 reads: 「若因不與果，作因已而滅，因滅而果生，是果則無因。」 tr. “If the cause has already ceased without serving as cause for the fruit, and the fruit arises after the cause ceases, this fruit is causeless.”

Qingmu says that a fruit arising after its cause has ceased is causeless, whereas all fruits visibly seen arise from causes. His commentary in T30n1564〔0026c09–0026c12〕 reads: 「若是因不與果作因已而滅者，則因滅已而果生，是果則無因。是事不然。何以故？現見一切果，無有無因生者。是故汝說因不與果作因已而滅亦有果生者，是事不然。」 tr. “If this cause ceases without serving as cause for the fruit, the fruit arises only after the cause has ceased and is therefore a causeless fruit. This cannot be established. Why? Among all fruits visibly seen, none arises without a cause. Therefore, your claim that the cause can cease without serving as cause for the fruit and a fruit can still arise cannot be established.”

The questioner asserts that a fruit arises at the same time as the conjunction of many conditions. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0026c13〕 reads: 「問曰：眾緣合時而有果生者，有何咎？」 tr. “Question: What fault is there if a fruit arises at the time when many conditions conjoin?”

Nāgārjuna says that if the fruit arises at the same time as the conjunction of many conditions, producer and what is to be produced both exist simultaneously. His verse in T30n1564〔0026c14–0026c15〕 reads: 「若眾緣合時，而有果生者，生者及可生，則為一時俱。」 tr. “If a fruit arises at the time when many conditions conjoin, producer and what is to be produced would both exist simultaneously.”

Qingmu uses the impossibility of father and son being born simultaneously to show that if producer and what is to be produced exist at the same time, cause and fruit are unestablished. His commentary in T30n1564〔0026c16–0026c19〕 reads: 「若眾緣合時有果生者，則生者可生即一時俱。但是事不爾。何以故？如父子不得一時生。是故汝說眾緣合時有果生者，是事不然。」 tr. “If a fruit arises at the time when many conditions conjoin, producer and what is to be produced would both exist simultaneously. But this is not so. Why? A father and son cannot be born at the same time. Therefore, your claim that a fruit arises at the time when many conditions conjoin cannot be established.”

The questioner asserts that the fruit arises first and the many conditions conjoin afterward. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0026c19〕 reads: 「問曰：若先有果生，而後眾緣合，有何咎？」 tr. “Question: What fault is there if the fruit arises first and the many conditions conjoin afterward?”

Nāgārjuna says that if the fruit arises before the conjunction of many conditions, it is apart from causes and conditions and becomes a causeless fruit. His verse in T30n1564〔0026c21–0026c22〕 reads: 「若先有果生，而後眾緣合，此即離因緣，名為無因果。」 tr. “If the fruit arises first and the many conditions conjoin afterward, it is apart from causes and conditions and is called a causeless fruit.”

Qingmu says that the fruit cannot arise before the many conditions conjoin, because a fruit apart from causes and conditions is causeless. His commentary in T30n1564〔0026c23–0026c25〕 reads: 「若眾緣未合而先有果生者，是事不然，果離因緣故則名無因果。是故汝說眾緣未合時先有果生者，是事則不然。」 tr. “If a fruit arises before the many conditions have conjoined, this cannot be established. Because the fruit is apart from causes and conditions, it is called a causeless fruit. Therefore, your claim that the fruit arises before the many conditions conjoin cannot be established.”

The questioner asserts that the cause transforms into the fruit when it ceases. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0026c25–0026c26〕 reads: 「問曰：因滅變為果者，有何咎？」 tr. “Question: What fault is there if the cause ceases and transforms into the fruit?”

Nāgārjuna says that if the cause transforms into the fruit, the body of the cause reaches the position of the fruit, making the previously arisen cause arise again. His verse in T30n1564〔0026c27–0026c28〕 reads: 「若因變為果，因即至於果，是則前生因，生已而復生。」 tr. “If the cause transforms into the fruit, the cause itself reaches the fruit; then the previously arisen cause arises once more after having arisen.”

Qingmu says that if the previously arisen cause ceases and transforms into the fruit, it should arise again; if the cause is identical with the fruit, it is not called transformation, and if it has transformed, it cannot still be called identical with the cause. His commentary in T30n1564〔0026c29–0027a04〕 reads: 「因有二種：一者前生；二者共生。若因滅變為果，是前生因應還更生。但是事不然。何以故？已生物不應更生。若謂是因即變為果，是亦不然。何以故？若即是不名為變，若變不名即是。」 tr. “There are two kinds of cause: one arises before, and the second arises together. If the cause ceases and transforms into the fruit, the cause that arose before should turn back and arise once more. But this is not so. Why? What has already arisen should not arise again. Nor is it correct to say that this very cause transforms into the fruit. Why? If it remains identical, it is not called transformation; if it has transformed, it cannot be called identical.”

The questioner uses a lump of clay transforming into a jar as an example, saying that the cause is not wholly extinguished but only loses the name cause while the body of the cause transforms into the fruit. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0027a04–0027a06〕 reads: 「問曰：因不盡滅但名字滅，而因體變為果，如泥團變為瓶，失泥團名而瓶名生。」 tr. “Question: The cause is not wholly extinguished; only its name ceases, while the body of the cause transforms into the fruit—as when a lump of clay becomes a jar, losing the name lump of clay while the name jar arises.”

Qingmu says that a lump of clay ceasing first and a jar arising afterward is not the body of a cause transforming into a fruit; clay can also produce many vessels. If lump of clay is only a name, there is nothing to transform, while milk transforming into curds can be called transformation. His commentary in T30n1564〔0027a06–0027a10〕 reads: 「答曰：泥團先滅而有瓶生，不名為變。又泥團體不獨生，瓶瓫甕等皆從泥中出。若泥團但有名，不應變為瓶，變名如乳變為酪。是故汝說因名雖滅而變為果，是事不然。」 tr. “Answer: A lump of clay first ceases and then a jar arises; this is not called transformation. Moreover, the body of the lump of clay does not produce only one thing: jars, basins, urns, and the rest all come from clay. If lump of clay is only a name, it should not transform into a jar. What is called transformation is like milk transforming into curds. Therefore, your claim that although the cause’s name ceases, it transforms into the fruit cannot be established.”

The questioner asserts that although the cause has ceased, it can still produce the fruit. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0027a10–0027a11〕 reads: 「問曰：因雖滅失而能生果，是故有果。無如是咎。」 tr. “Question: Although the cause has ceased, it can produce the fruit. Therefore, the fruit exists, and the preceding fault does not arise.”

Nāgārjuna asks how a cause that has ceased can produce a fruit and, if the cause remains within the fruit, how it can produce the fruit separately. His verse in T30n1564〔0027a12–0027a13〕 reads: 「云何因滅失，而能生於果？又若因在果，云何因生果？」 tr. “How can a cause that has ceased still produce a fruit? And if the cause remains within the fruit, how can the cause produce the fruit?”

Qingmu says that a cause that has ceased has no way to produce the fruit, while a cause that has not ceased and conjoins with the fruit likewise cannot produce the fruit again. His commentary in T30n1564〔0027a14–0027a15〕 reads: 「若因滅失已，云何能生果？若因不滅而與果合，何能更生果？」 tr. “If the cause has already ceased, how can it produce the fruit? If the cause does not cease but conjoins with the fruit, how can it produce the fruit again?”

The questioner asserts that the cause pervasively possesses its fruit and that the fruit nevertheless arises. Qingmu’s commentary presenting the questioner’s thesis in T30n1564〔0027a15–0027a16〕 reads: 「問曰：是因遍有果而果生。」 tr. “Question: This cause pervasively possesses the fruit, and the fruit arises.”

Nāgārjuna says that if the cause pervasively possesses the fruit, no further fruit remains to be produced; whether the cause sees or does not see the fruit, neither produces it. His verse in T30n1564〔0027a17–0027a18〕 reads: 「若因遍有果，更生何等果？因見不見果，是二俱不生。」 tr. “If the cause already pervasively possesses the fruit, what further fruit would it produce? Whether the cause sees the fruit or does not see it, neither can produce the fruit.”

Qingmu says that if the cause does not see the fruit, the fruit does not follow the cause and no fruit yet exists to be produced; if the cause already sees the fruit, the fruit already exists and should not be produced again. His commentary in T30n1564〔0027a19–0027a22〕 reads: 「是因若不見果，尚不應生果，何況見！若因自不見果，則不應生果。何以故？若不見果，果則不隨因。又未有果，云何生果？若因先見果，不應復生，果已有故。復次：」 tr. “If this cause does not see the fruit, it still should not produce the fruit—how much less if it sees it! If the cause itself does not see the fruit, it should not produce the fruit. Why? If it does not see the fruit, the fruit does not follow the cause. Moreover, since the fruit does not yet exist, how could it produce the fruit? If the cause has already seen the fruit, it should not produce it again, because the fruit already exists. Further:”

Nāgārjuna says that a past cause ultimately does not conjoin with a past, future, or present fruit. His verse in T30n1564〔0027a23–0027a24〕 reads: 「若言過去因，而於過去果，未來現在果，是則終不合。」 tr. “A past cause, with respect to a past fruit and to future and present fruits, ultimately does not conjoin.”

Nāgārjuna says that a future cause ultimately does not conjoin with a future, present, or past fruit. His verse in T30n1564〔0027a25–0027a26〕 reads: 「若言未來因，而於未來果，現在過去果，是則終不合。」 tr. “A future cause, with respect to a future fruit and to present and past fruits, ultimately does not conjoin.”

Nāgārjuna says that a present cause ultimately does not conjoin with a present, future, or past fruit. His verse in T30n1564〔0027a27–0027a28〕 reads: 「若言現在因，而於現在果，未來過去果，是則終不合。」 tr. “A present cause, with respect to a present fruit and to future and past fruits, ultimately does not conjoin.”

Qingmu repeats that past, future, and present fruits do not conjoin with causes in any of the three times. His commentary in T30n1564〔0027a29–0027b03〕 reads: 「過去果不與過去、未來、現在因合。未來果不與未來、現在、過去因合。現在果不與現在、未來、過去因合。如是三種果，終不與過去、未來、現在因合。復次：」 tr. “A past fruit does not conjoin with a past, future, or present cause; a future fruit does not conjoin with a future, present, or past cause; a present fruit does not conjoin with a present, future, or past cause. Thus, these three kinds of fruit ultimately do not conjoin with causes in the past, future, or present. Further:”

Nāgārjuna asks how the cause can produce the fruit when cause and fruit are not conjoined and how it could separately produce the fruit when they are already conjoined. His verse in T30n1564〔0027b04–0027b05〕 reads: 「若不和合者，因何能生果？若有和合者，因何能生果？」 tr. “If cause and fruit are not conjoined, how can the cause produce the fruit? If cause and fruit are conjoined, how can the cause produce the fruit?”

Qingmu says that if cause and fruit are not conjoined, there is no fruit to produce; if they are conjoined, the fruit already exists within the cause and likewise cannot be produced again. His commentary in T30n1564〔0027b06–0027b09〕 reads: 「若因果不和合則無果，若無果云何因能生果？若謂因果和合時因能生果者，是亦不然。何以故？若果在因中，則因中已有果，云何而復生？復次：」 tr. “If cause and fruit are not conjoined, there is no fruit; if there is no fruit, how can the cause produce it? If one says that the cause produces the fruit when cause and fruit conjoin, this too is incorrect. Why? If the fruit is within the cause, the fruit already exists within the cause; how could it arise again? Further:”

Nāgārjuna asks how an empty cause with no fruit can produce a fruit, and how a nonempty cause that already possesses the fruit can produce it. His verse in T30n1564〔0027b10–0027b11〕 reads: 「若因空無果，因何能生果？若因不空果，因何能生果？」 tr. “If the cause is empty and has no fruit, how can the cause produce the fruit? If the cause is not empty and already has the fruit, how can the cause produce the fruit?”

Qingmu says that a cause with no fruit is like a person who has not conceived and cannot bear a child, while if the cause already has the fruit, what already exists should not be produced again. His commentary in T30n1564〔0027b12–0027b14〕 reads: 「若因無果者，以無果故因空，云何因生果？如人不懷姙，云何能生子？若因先有果，已有果故不應復生。復次，今當說果。」 tr. “If the cause has no fruit, then because it has no fruit the cause is empty. How could the cause produce the fruit? It is like a person who has not conceived: how could that person bear a child? If the cause already has the fruit, because the fruit already exists it should not be produced again. Further, it is now time to speak of the fruit.”

Nāgārjuna says that if the fruit is not empty, it neither arises nor ceases. His verse in T30n1564〔0027b15–0027b16〕 reads: 「果不空不生，果不空不滅，以果不空故，不生亦不滅。」 tr. “If the fruit is not empty, it does not arise; if the fruit is not empty, it does not cease. Because the fruit is not empty, it neither arises nor ceases.”

Nāgārjuna says that if the fruit is empty, it likewise neither arises nor ceases. His verse in T30n1564〔0027b17–0027b18〕 reads: 「果空故不生，果空故不滅，以果是空故，不生亦不滅。」 tr. “Because the fruit is empty, it does not arise; because the fruit is empty, it does not cease. Because the fruit is empty, it neither arises nor ceases.”

Qingmu says that if the nonempty fruit already exists within the cause, it need not arise again, and without arising there is no ceasing; if an empty fruit means having nothing whatsoever, nothing remains that could arise or cease. His commentary in T30n1564〔0027b19–0027b24〕 reads: 「果若不空，不應生、不應滅。何以故？果若因中先決定有，更不須復生，生無故無滅，是故果不空故不生不滅。若謂果空故有生滅，是亦不然。何以故？果若空，空名無所有，云何當有生滅？是故說果空故不生不滅。復次，今以一異破因果。」 tr. “If the fruit is not empty, it should neither arise nor cease. Why? If the fruit already exists determinately within the cause, it need not arise again; because arising is absent, ceasing is absent. Therefore, because the fruit is not empty, it does not arise or cease. If one says that because the fruit is empty it can arise and cease, this too is incorrect. Why? If the fruit is empty, emptiness means having nothing whatsoever; how could arising or ceasing occur? Therefore, because the fruit is empty, it does not arise or cease. Further, cause and fruit will now be refuted through one and different.”

Nāgārjuna says that whether cause and fruit are one or different, neither branch is established. His verse in T30n1564〔0027b25–0027b26〕 reads: 「因果是一者，是事終不然；因果若異者，是事亦不然。」 tr. “To say that cause and fruit are one ultimately cannot be established; to say that cause and fruit are different likewise cannot be established.”

Nāgārjuna says that if cause and fruit are one, producer and produced become one; if they are different, cause becomes the same as noncause. His verse in T30n1564〔0027b27–0027b28〕 reads: 「若因果是一，生及所生一；若因果是異，因則同非因。」 tr. “If cause and fruit are one, producer and what is produced become one; if cause and fruit are different, the cause becomes the same as a noncause.”

Nāgārjuna says that whether the fruit determinately has or determinately lacks intrinsic nature, the cause has nothing to produce. His verse in T30n1564〔0027b29–0027c01〕 reads: 「若果定有性，因為何所生？若果定無性，因為何所生？」 tr. “If the fruit determinately has intrinsic nature, what would the cause produce? If the fruit determinately lacks intrinsic nature, what again would the cause produce?”

Nāgārjuna says that if a cause does not produce a fruit, it lacks the mark of being a cause; without such a mark, no one can possess the fruit. His verse in T30n1564〔0027c02–0027c03〕 reads: 「因不生果者，則無有因相，若無有因相，誰能有是果？」 tr. “If the cause does not produce the fruit, it has no mark of being a cause; if it has no mark of being a cause, who could possess this fruit?”

Nāgārjuna says that if conjunction arises from many causes and conditions, it still cannot produce itself and therefore cannot produce a fruit. His verse in T30n1564〔0027c04–0027c05〕 reads: 「若從眾因緣，而有和合生，和合自不生，云何能生果？」 tr. “If conjunction arises from many causes and conditions, conjunction itself does not arise; how could it produce the fruit?”

Nāgārjuna says that the fruit arises neither from conjoined nor unconjoined conditions; if there is no fruit, no dharma of conjunction can be established. His verse in T30n1564〔0027c06–0027c07〕 reads: 「是故果不從，緣合不合生；若無有果者，何處有合法？」 tr. “Therefore, the fruit arises neither from conjoined nor unconjoined conditions; if there is no fruit, where could a dharma of conjunction exist?”

Qingmu says that the dharma of the conjunction of many conditions cannot produce itself; since it lacks its own body, it cannot produce a fruit. The fruit arises neither from conjunction nor nonconjunction, and without a fruit there is no place for conjunction. His commentary in T30n1564〔0027c08–0027c10〕 reads: 「是眾緣和合法，不能生自體。自體無故，云何能生果？是故果不從緣合生，亦不從不合生。若無有果者，何處有合法？」 tr. “This dharma of the conjunction of many conditions cannot produce its own body. Since its own body is absent, how could it produce the fruit? Therefore, the fruit arises neither from the conjunction of conditions nor from nonconjunction. If there is no fruit, where could a dharma of conjunction exist?”

The Bhāviveka line lists three functions of a cause’s mark and five functions of a condition’s mark, then records two challenges from a Sūtra follower and two replies from the treatise author, finally distinguishing visible wheat sprouts within conventional truth from their nonestablishment in the ultimate meaning. The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0111c19–0112a05〕, reads: 「釋曰：此言無果者，謂果空故。因之與果云何差別？因相者，謂自果生、無間生、自分生等差別，是為因相。緣相者，謂通生種種果，能長養他，令他相續，乃至遠處通生諸果，非自分生能廣饒益。如是等名為因緣差別相。與非因緣同者，謂非因緣不生於果。何以故？果空故。以是故因緣與非因緣同。復次今為執因中無果者出驗，第一義中種子等諸因緣不能生果。何以故？果空故，譬如非因緣。復次修多羅人言：緣能生果。何以故？有決定緣能生果故。若果空者，義不相應。論者言：第一義中無如是驗，還同上非因緣過。欲令他信解者，汝驗無力。修多羅人復言：見麥種子能生麥芽，以是故彼出因者無有義理。論者言：世諦之中實見麥種能生麥芽，非第一義。若於第一義中麥生芽者，是義不然。」 tr. “Explanation: ‘no fruit’ means that the fruit is empty. How do cause and fruit differ? The mark of a cause means such distinctions as producing its own fruit, producing immediately, and producing its own kind; these are marks of a cause. The mark of a condition means broadly producing many kinds of fruit, being able to nourish another, causing another’s continuity, and even broadly producing fruits at a distance rather than producing its own kind, thereby widely benefiting. These and the like are called the distinctive marks of causes and conditions. ‘The same as noncauses and nonconditions’ means that noncauses and nonconditions do not produce fruit. Why? Because the fruit is empty. Therefore, causes and conditions are the same as noncauses and nonconditions. Further, an inference is now advanced against one who clings to the absence of a fruit within a cause: within the ultimate meaning, causes and conditions such as seeds cannot produce a fruit. Why? Because the fruit is empty, like noncauses and nonconditions. Further, the Sūtra follower says: conditions can produce a fruit. Why? Because determinate conditions capable of producing a fruit exist. If the fruit were empty, the meaning would not accord. The treatise author says: within the ultimate meaning no such inference exists; it returns to the preceding fault of noncauses and nonconditions. If you wish another to trust and understand, your inference has no force. The Sūtra follower again says: wheat seed is seen to produce a wheat sprout. Therefore, the reason you advance has no logic. The treatise author says: within conventional truth, wheat seed is truly seen to produce a wheat sprout; not so in the ultimate meaning. If within the ultimate meaning wheat produced a sprout, that could not be established.”

The Bhāviveka line says that if cause and fruit are simultaneous, producer and produced are lost. The father-and-son analogy refutes only intrinsic simultaneity; within conventional truth, a lamp and its light may arise together without being cause and fruit relative to one another. The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0112a26–0112b03〕, reads: 「釋曰：此謂有同時過，而不欲令能生所生二法如父子二同時而起，有如上過。復次云何別時起？謂所生及能生因果為二。今次作驗，非果與因和合同時俱起。何以故？所生及能生二故，譬如父子二。如先所說有器炷油等和合有力故，世諦中燈共光同時起，非燈與光相望為因果，是故汝說不善。」 tr. “Explanation: this means that there is the fault of simultaneity. One does not wish producer and produced to arise simultaneously as two dharmas, like father and son, for then the preceding fault occurs. Further, how could they arise at different times? It means that what is produced and what produces, cause and fruit, are two. The next inference is made: fruit and cause do not conjoin and arise together simultaneously. Why? Because produced and producer are two, like father and son. As previously stated, because the conjunction of a vessel, wick, oil, and the rest has force, within conventional truth lamp and light arise simultaneously; lamp and light are not cause and fruit relative to one another. Therefore, your statement is unsound.”

The Bhāviveka line says that if cause and fruit are one, producer and produced are lost; if different, cause becomes the same as noncause. What is intended is only that the two dharmas, cause and fruit, are continuous and not different. The Prajñā Lamp Commentary, T30n1566〔0113c16–0113c22〕, reads: 「釋曰：此謂汝不欲得能生所生二如父與子，云何為一？亦如火與薪，云何得一？此之二喻，世間共見。以是故我今說驗，因之與果不得為一。何以故？能生所生有異故，譬如父子二。此謂計一者過。復次執異者云何？謂因與果異故，譬如一切非因法。而汝不欲因同非因，汝意欲得因果二法相續不異。」 tr. “Explanation: this means that you do not wish producer and produced, like father and son, to be one. How could they be one? Likewise fire and fuel—how could they be one? These two analogies are commonly seen in the world. Therefore, I now state the inference: cause and fruit cannot be one. Why? Because producer and produced are distinct, like father and son. This is the fault of positing one. Further, what of one who clings to difference? It means that cause and fruit are different, like every noncausal dharma. Yet you do not wish the cause to be the same as a noncause. You intend that the two dharmas, cause and fruit, be continuous and not different.”

Divergent Readings of the Masters (Jizang’s Specialized Commentary)

Jizang says that refuting intrinsically real cause and fruit posited inside and outside is precisely what discloses cause and fruit through causes and conditions: cause and fruit are vividly present and constantly quiescent. His Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, T42n1824〔0132a25–0132b01〕, reads: 「此品為破因果、為申因果耶？答：品品之中皆有申破二義，求內外大小性實因果皆悉無從，故名破因果。以計性實之人即破因果義，故論主須破之。二者性實因果既除，始得辨因緣因果。既稱因緣，則因果宛然而常寂滅，故因中發觀則戲論斯忘也。」 tr. “Does this chapter refute cause and fruit, or expound cause and fruit? Answer: every chapter has both the meaning of exposition and of refutation. When intrinsically real cause and fruit are sought inside and outside and in Greater and Lesser Vehicles, they are entirely without source; therefore, this is called refuting cause and fruit. Because a person who posits intrinsic reality thereby refutes the meaning of cause and fruit, the treatise author must refute that person. Second, only once intrinsically real cause and fruit have been removed can cause and fruit through causes and conditions be discerned. Precisely because they are called causes and conditions, cause and fruit are vividly present and constantly quiescent. Thus, when contemplation arises within causes, conceptual proliferation is forgotten.”

Jizang says that if cause and fruit both exist or are both absent simultaneously, producer and produced are lost; to obtain simultaneity is to lose producer and produced, while to obtain producer and produced is to lose simultaneity. His commentary in T42n1824〔0133b19–0133b23〕 reads: 「上半牒、下半破。破意云：夫相生之道以能生為有，故能生他；所生為無，故從他生。若立一時，有則俱有、無則俱無。俱無則唯是所生，失於能生；俱有則唯是能生，失於所生。故若一時則失能所，得能所則失一時。」 tr. “The first half states the position and the latter half refutes it. The refutation means: in the way of mutual production, the producer exists and can therefore produce another; what is produced is absent and is therefore produced by another. If simultaneity is established, either both exist or both are absent. If both are absent, there is only what is to be produced and the producer is lost; if both exist, there is only the producer and what is to be produced is lost. Therefore, to obtain simultaneity is to lose producer and produced; to obtain producer and produced is to lose simultaneity.”

Jizang individually lists four faults under the gate of one and four challenges under the gate of different, saying that one confuses cause and fruit or agent and action, while difference reverses cause and noncause. His commentary in T42n1824〔0135c02–0135c09〕 reads: 「第三一異門破。初偈雙牒雙非、第二偈雙牒雙難。一有四過：一者但是因則無果，無果亦無因；二但是果無因，無因亦無果；三既是一物，不可說因果；四因果既一，則作者作業亦一，陶師與瓶一也。異亦四難：一者因與果異，亦與非因異，則俱成非因；二者因非因俱成因；三因成非因，非因成因；四有因有非因，則有異有不異。」 tr. “Third is refutation through the gate of one and different. The first verse states both positions and denies both; the second states both positions and challenges both. One has four faults: first, if there is only the cause, there is no fruit, and without fruit there is no cause; second, if there is only the fruit, there is no cause, and without cause there is no fruit; third, since they are one thing, cause and fruit cannot be spoken; fourth, since cause and fruit are one, agent and action are likewise one—the potter is one with the jar. Difference likewise has four challenges: first, if cause and fruit are different and the cause is also different from noncause, both become noncauses; second, cause and noncause both become causes; third, cause becomes noncause and noncause becomes cause; fourth, if there are cause and noncause, there are both difference and nondifference.”

Terminology

Conjunction is examined in the final verse: if conjunction arises from many causes and conditions, conjunction itself still cannot produce itself.

The gate in which the fruit exists within the cause is examined through 「和合中已有，何須和合生」 tr. “it already exists within conjunction; why would conjunction need to produce it?”

The gate in which the fruit is absent within the cause is examined through 「云何從眾緣和合而果生」 tr. “how could the fruit arise from the conjunction of many conditions?”

The cause ceasing after serving as cause for the fruit is a gate first established by the questioner.

The cause ceasing without serving as cause for the fruit is another gate to which the questioner retreats.

Causes that arise before and causes that arise together are the two kinds of cause Qingmu expressly lists in the passage on a cause transforming into a fruit.

Pervasive possession in this passage is the questioner’s thesis that the cause already pervasively possesses its fruit.

Seeing the fruit and not seeing the fruit are the two branches listed in the next verse and both judged unable to produce.

The pairings of the three times first list a past cause against past, future, and present fruits.

The pairings of the three times next list a future cause against future, present, and past fruits.

The pairings of the three times finally list a present cause against present, future, and past fruits.

The gate of one and different first uses one verse to state and deny both positions, then the next verse explains the faults of the two branches separately.

Doctrinal Outline

Following the original divisions of question, verse, and commentary, the chapter’s forty-three items divide into eight sections in the sequence 10/6/6/5/6/4/4/2. The three multiverse groups respectively contain three, two, and six verses. Listing each verse separately produces fifty-one items, with the eight sections in the sequence 10/6/6/5/6/6/5/7.

Old Guanzhong Learning · Translation History

The chapter is attributed to Nāgārjuna as author, Qingmu as commentator, and Kumārajīva as translator. The Bhāviveka line preserves an alternative interpretation of the same chapter for comparison. The extant Chinese Sthiramati line ends at Chapter Thirteen, so this chapter is truthfully marked absent.

Cross-Reading with the Yogācāra Axis (Emptiness and Existence)

Fruit present within the cause, fruit absent within the cause, the cause ceasing after serving as cause, simultaneity, transformation into fruit, and one and different are all titled in the sequence listed by this chapter. This layer does not redefine them through later sectarian terminology.

Cross-Reading with Other Treatises of the Same Lineage

This chapter follows “Examination of Time” and precedes “Examination of Arising and Decay.” Only their adjacency in the fascicle is recorded here; no doctrine is poured down from one chapter into another.

Position of the Editions