中論 觀有無品第十五

The questioner begins: “Dharmas each possess intrinsic nature because each has a distinctive efficacy. A jar possesses the intrinsic nature of a jar, and cloth the intrinsic nature of cloth. This intrinsic nature appears when many conditions conjoin.”

One sentence conceals two claims: intrinsic nature already exists, and intrinsic nature emerges only when many conditions gather.

What Emerges from Conditions Is Fabricated by Them

“That intrinsic nature exists among many conditions cannot be established; if intrinsic nature emerges from many conditions, it is called a fabricated dharma.” Qingmu shuts the gate: “If it emerged from many conditions, it would be a fabricated dharma and would possess no determinate intrinsic nature.”

The questioner hoped that “emerges” would preserve the prior existence of intrinsic nature. Once the word is spoken, intrinsic nature has entered the hands of conditions.

Intrinsic Nature Means Precisely What Does Not Depend on Another

“The name ‘intrinsic nature’ means what is unfabricated and does not depend upon another dharma for establishment.” Two positions are not contending here; one position contends with itself.

Qingmu’s two analogies each govern one end: “Gold mixed with copper is not genuine gold” governs independence from conditions; “unlike long and short or this and that, which exist through mutual dependence because they lack determinate intrinsic nature” governs independence from another. Names such as long and short require the opposite term precisely because they lack determinate intrinsic nature of their own.

Retreat to Other-Nature, and One Turns in Place

“If a dharma lacks intrinsic nature, how could other-nature exist?” Qingmu says, “Other-nature for its own part is itself intrinsic nature,” and closes decisively: “Other-nature is itself intrinsic nature.”

Ask the same question next door, and that house is rented too. “Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, how could another dharma exist?” A third thing has nowhere to stand.

Refute Existence, and the Nonexistence Left Behind

“If existence cannot be established, how could nonexistence be established? Only because an existent dharma exists is its destruction called nonexistence.”

Nonexistence is not an independent thing but a name left after existence is destroyed. Once existence is unestablished, that name has nothing on which to depend.

A Downward-Sliding Slope

“When intrinsic nature is refuted, the person sees other-nature; when other-nature is refuted, the person sees existence; when existence is refuted, the person sees nonexistence; when nonexistence is refuted, the person is bewildered.”

In the argument, the four gates are four propositions; in a person, they are four changes of grip. Thus the quality Qingmu singles out is not cleverness but “slight attachment”—such a person “knows that extinguishing all views is peaceful and secure, so no longer gives rise to these four kinds of conceptual proliferation.”

This Is Not a New Teaching

“The Buddha can extinguish existence and nonexistence, just as when he transformed Kātyāyana; as stated in the scripture, he is free from both existence and nonexistence.” Qingmu identifies the source: “In the Śāṇḍa Kātyāyana Sūtra, the Buddha taught him the meaning of right view, free from existence and nonexistence.”

If the Buddha saw even a trace of determinate existence remaining among dharmas, he would not refute existence. Yet once existence is refuted, people take it as nonexistence; therefore he “teaches that neither exists.”

What Is Before Our Eyes Speaks for Itself

“If a dharma truly possessed intrinsic nature, it should not later change,” yet “because we now directly see that dharmas possess marks of change, we should know that they have no determinate marks.”

This sentence does not come from reasoning but from the eyes. Jars break; people age.

The Landing Point Is Demerit and Merit

“Determinate existence means attachment to permanence; determinate nonexistence means attachment to annihilation. Therefore the wise should not cling to existence or nonexistence.” Permanence is when “the dharma arrives in the present and passes into the past without abandoning its original mark”; annihilation “means the absence of a cause for continuity.”

Qingmu’s final sentence returns the matter to human life: “If one holds views of annihilation or permanence, demerit, merit, and other such matters are absent and worldly affairs are destroyed. Therefore these views should be abandoned.” Permanence leaves a person unable to change; annihilation leaves a person without responsibility. Views of existence and nonexistence are abandoned so that demerit, merit, and practice can still stand.

Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, author; the Brahmin Qingmu, commentator; Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva of the Yao Qin, translator. Treatise on the Middle, Scroll Three, “Examination of Existence and Nonexistence, Chapter Fifteen,” Taishō T30n1564. Paragraph-openers 〔T30 …〕 are page-column-line anchors in the Taishō canon.

I. Question: Each Dharma Has Its Own Intrinsic Nature

〔T30 0019c20〕The questioner says: Dharmas each possess their own intrinsic nature because each has a distinctive efficacy. A jar, for example, possesses the intrinsic nature of a jar, and cloth the intrinsic nature of cloth. This intrinsic nature appears when the many conditions conjoin.

The respondent answers as follows.

II. Verse and Explanation: What Emerges from Many Conditions Is a Fabricated Dharma

That intrinsic nature exists among many conditions cannot be established. If intrinsic nature emerges from many conditions, it is called a fabricated dharma.

If dharmas truly possessed intrinsic nature, it should not emerge from many conditions. Why? If it emerged from many conditions, it would be a fabricated dharma and would possess no determinate intrinsic nature.

III. Question and Answer: What Fault Is There If Intrinsic Nature Is Fabricated?

The questioner says: What fault is there if the intrinsic nature of dharmas is fabricated from many conditions?

The respondent says:

If intrinsic nature were something fabricated, how could the meaning of intrinsic nature still hold? The very name “intrinsic nature” means what is unfabricated and does not depend upon another dharma for establishment.

Just as gold mixed with copper is not genuine gold, so if intrinsic nature truly existed, it would not require many conditions; if it emerged from many conditions, one should know that no genuine intrinsic nature exists. Furthermore, if intrinsic nature were determinate, it should not await something else before appearing. It is unlike long and short or this and that, which exist only through mutual dependence precisely because they lack determinate intrinsic nature.

IV. Question and Answer: If There Is No Intrinsic Nature, Does Other-Nature Exist?

The questioner says: If dharmas lack intrinsic nature, they should possess other-nature.

〔T30 0020a04〕The respondent says:

If a dharma lacks intrinsic nature, how could other-nature exist? Intrinsic nature, when spoken of in relation to another nature, is itself called other-nature.

Because the intrinsic nature of dharmas would be fabricated by many conditions and established through mutual dependence, it does not exist. Other-nature, for its own part, is itself intrinsic nature; it too arises from many conditions and exists through mutual dependence, and therefore it too is absent. Since it is absent, how can one say that dharmas arise from other-nature? Other-nature is itself intrinsic nature.

V. Question and Answer: Is There a Dharma Apart from Intrinsic Nature and Other-Nature?

The questioner says: What fault is there if dharmas exist apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature?

The respondent says:

Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, how could another dharma exist? Only if intrinsic nature and other-nature existed could dharmas be established.

Your claim that dharmas exist apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature cannot be established. Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, there is no dharma. Why? Only where intrinsic nature and other-nature exist can a dharma be established. For example, a jar’s essence is its intrinsic nature, while the thing upon which it depends is other-nature.

VI. Question and Answer: Since Existence Is Refuted, Does Nonexistence Exist?

The questioner says: If existence is refuted through intrinsic nature and other-nature, then nonexistence should now exist.

The respondent says:

If existence cannot be established, how could nonexistence be established? Only because an existent dharma exists is its destruction called nonexistence.

If you have already accepted that existence cannot be established, you should also accept that nonexistence is absent. Why? It is the destruction of an existent dharma that is called nonexistence; this nonexistence exists only because existence was destroyed.

VII. Verse and Explanation: Those Who See Existence and Nonexistence Do Not See the True Meaning of the Buddha-Dharma

Furthermore:

If someone sees existence and nonexistence and sees intrinsic nature and other-nature, that person does not see the true meaning of the Buddha-Dharma.

If someone deeply grasps dharmas, that person will insist upon finding a view of existence. When intrinsic nature is refuted, the person sees other-nature; when other-nature is refuted, the person sees existence; when existence is refuted, the person sees nonexistence; when nonexistence is refuted, the person is bewildered. But those with sharp faculties and slight attachment know that extinguishing all views is peaceful and secure, so they no longer give rise to these four kinds of conceptual proliferation. Such people see the true meaning of the Buddha-Dharma. Therefore the preceding verse was spoken.

VIII. Verse and Explanation: The Buddha Extinguishes Existence and Nonexistence, as When He Transformed Kātyāyana

Furthermore:

The Buddha can extinguish existence and nonexistence, just as when he transformed Kātyāyana; as stated in the scripture, he is free from both existence and nonexistence.

In the Śāṇḍa Kātyāyana Sūtra, the Buddha taught him the meaning of right view, free from existence and nonexistence. If there were the slightest determinate existence among dharmas, the Buddha should not have refuted existence. As for nonexistence, once existence is refuted, people take that refutation to mean nonexistence. Because the Buddha thoroughly comprehends the marks of dharmas, he teaches that neither exists. Therefore you should abandon views of existence and nonexistence.

IX. Verse and Explanation: What Truly Possessed Intrinsic Nature Should Not Later Change

Furthermore:

If a dharma truly possessed intrinsic nature, it should not later change. That intrinsic nature might bear a mark of change can never be established.

If dharmas determinately possessed intrinsic nature, they should never change. Why? If determinate intrinsic nature existed, there should be no mark of change, as in the preceding analogy of genuine gold. Because we now directly see that dharmas possess marks of change, we should know that they have no determinate marks.

Furthermore:

If a dharma truly possessed intrinsic nature, how could it change? If a dharma truly lacked all intrinsic nature, again how could it change?

If a dharma determinately possessed intrinsic nature, how could it change? If it had no intrinsic nature, it would have no essence of its own, so how could it change?

X. Verse and Explanation: Determinate Existence Falls into Eternalism; Determinate Nonexistence Falls into Annihilationism

Furthermore:

Determinate existence means attachment to permanence; determinate nonexistence means attachment to annihilation. Therefore the wise should not cling to existence or nonexistence.

If a dharma determinately possessed a mark of existence, it could never possess a mark of nonexistence; that would be permanence. Why? Consider the account of a person in the three times: a dharma’s mark exists in the future; the dharma then arrives in the present and passes into the past without abandoning its original mark. This is permanence. To say that the fruit already exists within the cause is likewise permanence. If one asserts determinate nonexistence, that nonexistence must mean that something existed before but does not exist now; this is annihilation. Annihilation means the absence of a cause for continuity. Through these two views one departs from the Buddha-Dharma.

XI. Question and Answer: Why Does Existence Produce the View of Permanence and Nonexistence Produce the View of Annihilation?

The questioner says: Why does existence produce the view of permanence and nonexistence the view of annihilation?

The respondent says:

If a dharma has determinate intrinsic nature and is not nonexistent, that is permanence. If it existed before but does not exist now, that is annihilation.

If a dharma’s intrinsic nature were determinately existent, it would bear the mark of existence, not the mark of nonexistence, and should never become nonexistent. If it became nonexistent, it would not be existent and would instead become a nonexistent dharma—the fault of this has already been explained. One would thus fall into the view of permanence. If a dharma existed before and, after destruction, became nonexistent, this is called annihilation. Why? Because existence should not become nonexistence. This follows from your claim that existence and nonexistence each possess a determinate mark. If one holds views of annihilation or permanence, demerit, merit, and other such matters are absent and worldly affairs are destroyed. Therefore these views should be abandoned.

The dispute in this chapter circles one word from beginning to end: intrinsic nature.

The questioner opens by saying: “Dharmas each possess intrinsic nature because each has a distinctive efficacy. A jar possesses the intrinsic nature of a jar, and cloth the intrinsic nature of cloth. This intrinsic nature appears when many conditions conjoin.” The claim sounds entirely reasonable. A jar can hold water and cloth can cover the body; each has its own efficacy. Since their efficacies differ, some distinct thing underneath must support each one—a jar is a jar because it possesses jar-nature. This intrinsic nature cannot ordinarily be seen; it “appears” only when clay, wheel, cord, water, potter, and all the other conditions gather.

One sentence conceals two things: intrinsic nature already exists, and intrinsic nature emerges only when many conditions gather.

The questioner sees no conflict between them. Perhaps he imagines intrinsic nature as something buried in the ground and conditions as the spade that digs it out; the thing was always there, and the spade merely makes it visible.

What Nāgārjuna does throughout the chapter is bring both the spade and that buried thing into the light.

What Emerges from Conditions Is Fabricated by Them

The answering verse has only two clauses: “That intrinsic nature exists among many conditions cannot be established. If intrinsic nature emerges from many conditions, it is called a fabricated dharma.”

Qingmu closes the matter: “If it emerged from many conditions, it would be a fabricated dharma and would possess no determinate intrinsic nature.”

Everything that exists only by relying on conditions is fabricated by those conditions; what is fabricated has no determinate intrinsic nature. The “appearance” imagined by the questioner is not appearance but production. Only when clay, wheel, cord, water, and potter gather is there a jar; if one is absent, the jar does not come about. Since it is assembled, what is assembled must obey the conditions assembling it.

Whatever must wait for conditions must change with conditions; whatever changes with conditions is not the unchanging thing.

Thus the questioner’s own words—“this intrinsic nature appears when many conditions conjoin”—complete the argument against themselves. He hoped that “appears” would preserve the priority of intrinsic nature, but as soon as the word is spoken, intrinsic nature enters the hands of conditions.

“Intrinsic Nature” Means Precisely What Does Not Depend on Another

The questioner retreats one step: “What fault is there if the intrinsic nature of dharmas is fabricated from many conditions?” Even if intrinsic nature is fabricated by conditions, so what?

The answering verse is severe: “If intrinsic nature were something fabricated, how could the meaning of intrinsic nature still hold?” It adds a definition: “The name ‘intrinsic nature’ means what is unfabricated and does not depend upon another dharma for establishment.”

This sentence is the pivot of the whole chapter. Nāgārjuna does not set up a new theory to oppose the questioner; he merely lays out the meaning of the word that the questioner himself employs: in the mouths of both sides, intrinsic nature means that which is unfabricated and does not depend on another dharma for establishment. If it is fabricated, it is no longer what this word indicates. Two positions are not contending; one position contends with itself.

Qingmu supplies two analogies, each governing a different point.

The first is gold: “Gold mixed with copper is not genuine gold.” Once gold is mixed with something else, it is no longer pure gold. This analogy governs “not dependent on conditions”: genuine intrinsic nature admits no admixture from outside—“if intrinsic nature truly existed, it would not require many conditions”; conversely, “if it emerged from many conditions, one should know that no genuine intrinsic nature exists.”

The second is long and short, this and that: “If intrinsic nature were determinate, it should not await something else before appearing. It is unlike long and short or this and that, which exist through mutual dependence because they lack determinate intrinsic nature.” This analogy governs “not dependent on another.” Is a bamboo pole long or short? Without another beside it, the question cannot be answered. Names such as long and short require the opposite term precisely because they lack determinate intrinsic nature of their own. Qingmu’s point is that if intrinsic nature were determinate, it should not fall into the situation of long and short, which depend on the opposite term.

Read together, the two analogies block both ends of “unfabricated and not dependent on another dharma”: independent of conditions and independent of another.

Retreat to Other-Nature, and One Turns in Place

The questioner changes direction: “If dharmas lack intrinsic nature, they should possess other-nature.” If nothing is available on this side, surely one can still depend on something else.

The answering verse says: “If a dharma lacks intrinsic nature, how could other-nature exist? Intrinsic nature, when spoken of in relation to another nature, is itself called other-nature.”

This requires slow reading. “Other” is spoken from this side; stand on the other side and that “other” is its own “self.” The name changes, but the situation does not. Qingmu speaks more plainly: “Other-nature for its own part is itself intrinsic nature,” and that thing likewise “arises from many conditions and exists through mutual dependence,” so it too is absent. The final sentence is decisive: “Other-nature is itself intrinsic nature.”

In other words, the questioner thinks he has found a new foothold but has merely moved the same question next door. That house too is rented.

Apart from Self and Other, Can a Third Thing Be Established?

Before saying, “If existence is refuted through intrinsic nature and other-nature,” the questioner first asks: what fault is there if dharmas exist apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature?

The answering verse says: “Apart from intrinsic nature and other-nature, how could another dharma exist? Only if intrinsic nature and other-nature existed could dharmas be established.”

The latter half requires attention. Nāgārjuna is not endorsing intrinsic nature and other-nature; he is pointing out that the “establishment of a dharma” sought by the opponent has only these two available routes. Qingmu gives an example of the opponent’s classification: “A jar’s essence is intrinsic nature, while the thing upon which it depends is other-nature.” The jar’s own essence counts as self; what it depends upon counts as other. The ways one can imagine a “dharma” being established do not exceed these two gates. When neither gate succeeds, no third thing has a place to stand; placing one there from nowhere merely starts again under a new name.

Refute Existence, and the “Nonexistence” Left in the Hand

The questioner now makes a move many people make: “If existence is refuted through intrinsic nature and other-nature, then nonexistence should now exist.” You have dismantled existence; what remains must be nonexistence.

The answering verse says: “If existence cannot be established, how could nonexistence be established? Only because an existent dharma exists is its destruction called nonexistence.” Qingmu repeats: “It is the destruction of an existent dharma that is called nonexistence; this nonexistence exists only because existence was destroyed.”

This move is crucial. Nonexistence is not an independent thing; it is the name left after existence is destroyed. When a jar breaks, we say, “The jar is gone.” The “gone” in this sentence rests entirely on the former jar. If that jar was never established through determinate intrinsic nature in the first place, “the jar is gone” likewise has no determinate footing.

Thus whoever accepts that existence is unestablished must accept that nonexistence is also unestablished. People often imagine that refuting existence automatically lands them on the side of nonexistence, like a balance where one side rises when the other sinks. But here, the beam itself rests on existence. When existence is gone, the beam is gone too.

A Downward-Sliding Slope

Nāgārjuna next turns from argument toward the person: “If someone sees existence and nonexistence and sees intrinsic nature and other-nature, that person does not see the true meaning of the Buddha-Dharma.”

Qingmu’s long explanation is the passage closest to the human heart in this chapter. He first names the root illness: “If someone deeply grasps dharmas, that person will insist upon finding a view of existence.” Deeply attached people must grasp something. He then describes the slide: “When intrinsic nature is refuted, the person sees other-nature; when other-nature is refuted, the person sees existence; when existence is refuted, the person sees nonexistence; when nonexistence is refuted, the person is bewildered.”

Intrinsic nature, other-nature, existence, nonexistence—these are exactly the four gates examined in sequence above. Qingmu arranges them into a slope: dismantle one gate and the hand instantly reaches for the next; when all four have been dismantled, the person is stunned.

The earlier reasoning looks horizontally across four gates; this passage looks vertically at one person. The same four things are four propositions in the argument and four changes of grip in a person. The act of grasping has not changed; only its object changes. Thus after all four gates are refuted, that person has not been resolved; he has merely run out of things to grasp. This is what “bewildered” means.

Where, then, is the way out? Qingmu says: “Those with sharp faculties and slight attachment know that extinguishing all views is peaceful and secure, so they no longer give rise to these four kinds of conceptual proliferation.”

Notice that the quality he selects is not cleverness but “slight attachment.” A person whose attachment is light does not rush to replace whatever has been dismantled. Through the dismantling itself, he tastes the security of opening the hand, and the four kinds of conceptual proliferation no longer arise. This sentence pulls the chapter from debate back into practice: the four gates are not four questions but four movements of the hand. When the hand does not reach, the questions naturally disappear.

This Is Not Nāgārjuna’s New Teaching

After so much refutation, a reader can hardly avoid asking: is forbidding a stand on either existence or nonexistence not too severe?

Nāgārjuna’s next verse answers precisely that doubt: “The Buddha can extinguish existence and nonexistence, just as when he transformed Kātyāyana; as stated in the scripture, he is free from both existence and nonexistence.”

Qingmu identifies the source: “In the Śāṇḍa Kātyāyana Sūtra, the Buddha taught him the meaning of right view, free from existence and nonexistence.”

This citation carries weight because freedom from existence and nonexistence is not a new rule established by this treatise; it is the meaning of right view as the Buddha already taught it. In moving from the first verse to this point, the chapter has not stepped beyond the Buddha’s teaching. Nāgārjuna has only retraced, in the manner of a treatise, what the Buddha taught Kātyāyana.

Qingmu then resolves a real doubt for the reader. He says: “If there were the slightest determinate existence among dharmas, the Buddha should not have refuted existence.” If the Buddha saw even a trace of determinate existence remaining, he would not refute it. Yet people have a habit: “As for nonexistence, once existence is refuted, people take the refutation to mean nonexistence.” Refute existence and they assume nonexistence is being established. This is precisely the third step down the preceding slope. Thus Qingmu says: “Because the Buddha thoroughly comprehends the marks of dharmas, he teaches that neither exists.” Neither exists in order to cut off every path by which people might land at either extreme. The final sentence is a direct admonition: “Therefore you should abandon views of existence and nonexistence.”

What Is Before Our Eyes Speaks for Itself

The preceding passages reason through the matter. Here Nāgārjuna points to what stands before the eyes.

The verse says: “If a dharma truly possessed intrinsic nature, it should not later change,” and again, “That intrinsic nature might bear a mark of change can never be established.” Qingmu’s explanation is spare: “If determinate intrinsic nature existed, there should be no mark of change, as in the preceding analogy of genuine gold.” He returns to the analogy: if genuine gold really is genuine gold, it cannot be gold today and something else tomorrow.

Then comes the statement of direct perception: “Because we now directly see that dharmas possess marks of change, we should know that they have no determinate marks.”

This sentence comes not from reasoning but from the eyes. One need not understand a formal argument; one need only look. Jars break, cloth decays, people age. Change is something directly seen before us. The fact of change itself bears witness to “no determinate mark.”

Perhaps the questioner still wishes to defend the side of nonexistence. Nāgārjuna therefore adds another verse, questioning both ends at once: “If a dharma truly possessed intrinsic nature, how could it change? If a dharma truly lacked all intrinsic nature, again how could it change?” Qingmu follows both questions: what determinately possesses intrinsic nature cannot move, while that which “has no intrinsic nature and therefore no essence of its own” has nothing to change. Change can be placed within neither determinate existence nor determinate nonexistence—yet it is happening before our eyes.

Determinate Existence Falls into Permanence; Determinate Nonexistence into Annihilation

In the final section, Nāgārjuna states the practical destination of the two views: “Determinate existence means attachment to permanence; determinate nonexistence means attachment to annihilation. Therefore the wise should not cling to existence or nonexistence.”

Qingmu gives examples of each.

For permanence, he cites two accounts. First, the three times: “A dharma’s mark exists in the future; the dharma then arrives in the present and passes into the past without abandoning its original mark. This is permanence.” The dharma travels through the three times and changes location while losing nothing of its original mark; it is therefore permanent. Second, the fruit preexists within the cause: “To say that the fruit already exists within the cause is likewise permanence.” The fruit lies ready in the cause and merely awaits the moment to appear; that too is permanence.

On the side of annihilation, to assert determinate nonexistence means that something “must have existed before but not exist now.” It existed before and is now gone; this is annihilation. Qingmu defines it: “Annihilation means the absence of a cause for continuity.” Annihilation means that the cause of continuity is gone, so the earlier and later segments cannot connect.

Qingmu gathers the outcome of the two views in one sentence: “Through these two views one departs from the Buddha-Dharma.”

The questioner asks a good question here: “Why does existence produce the view of permanence and nonexistence the view of annihilation?”

The answering verse says: “If a dharma has determinate intrinsic nature and is not nonexistent, that is permanence. If it existed before but does not exist now, that is annihilation.” Qingmu’s long explanation follows both roads to their ends. On the side of permanence: if intrinsic nature is determinately existent, it bears a mark of existence rather than nonexistence and “should never become nonexistent.” If one truly says it is nonexistent, it is no longer existent but becomes a nonexistent dharma—a fault already examined, “as previously explained.” Thus one can only preserve existence all the way through, falling into the view of permanence. On the side of annihilation, “if a dharma existed before and, after destruction, became nonexistent, this is called annihilation.” He also identifies the premise of this route: “This follows from your claim that existence and nonexistence each possess a determinate mark.” It is precisely because you first assign a determinate mark to existence and another to nonexistence that the interval between them breaks.

The Final Landing Is Demerit and Merit

Qingmu’s closing sentence brings the whole chapter from doctrine into ordinary human life: “If one holds views of annihilation or permanence, demerit, merit, and other such matters are absent and worldly affairs are destroyed. Therefore these views should be abandoned.”

This deserves to be read slowly. If all dharmas are permanent and never abandon their original marks, one who does evil is forever that way, doing good cannot change anything, and practice has no place to begin. If all dharmas are annihilated and the earlier and later do not continue, what one does now cannot connect with what one experiences later; demerit and merit again become empty.

Permanence leaves a person unable to change; annihilation leaves a person without responsibility. Both overthrow worldly affairs. Thus abandoning views of existence and nonexistence is not merely about tidiness in argument; it lets demerit, merit, and practice continue to stand.

The chapter’s movement is now complete. It begins with the harmless-looking common sense of jar-nature and cloth-nature, passes through intrinsic nature and fabricated dharmas, self and other, existence and nonexistence, permanence and annihilation, and finally returns to whether a person will open the hand. “Therefore the wise should not cling to existence or nonexistence” does not mean understanding a theory; it means no longer extending that hand.

What Readers Can Carry Away from This Chapter

First, one word cannot be used in two ways. Whenever someone says, “It already exists, but appears only when the conditions arrive,” first ask: does it appear, or is it fabricated?

Second, refuting one side does not mean landing on the other. If existence cannot be established, nonexistence cannot be established either. An empty hand is not the problem; reaching downward to grasp again is.

Third, change stands before the eyes. One need not wait to understand the formal argument before trusting that things have no determinate intrinsic nature. To see a jar break and a person age is already to see what this chapter teaches.

Fourth, views of existence and nonexistence are abandoned so that demerit and merit can stand. This chapter does not empty out the world. On the contrary, permanence and annihilation are the two views that empty out the world.

Carried Forward: Jizang’s Mirror

The meaning above belongs to the chapter itself. What follows is a side illumination from the Sui–Tang Sanlun lineage—a mirror is not the treatise, but another way of reading the same verses.

In his Commentary on the Treatise on the Middle, Jizang reads the two views of existence and nonexistence through the two truths. The Tathāgata always teaches based on the two truths, which are the conditionally empty and existent. The opponent hears “existent” and interprets it as existence through intrinsic nature; he hears “nonexistent” and interprets it as nonexistence through intrinsic nature. The two truths are therefore obstructed and the two wisdoms do not arise. Jizang also identifies the joint in the chapter’s opening passage: many conditions and intrinsic nature have contradictory meanings. If intrinsic nature exists, it does not rely on conditions; if it relies on conditions, it loses its own essence. To claim both that intrinsic nature exists and that it relies on conditions is self-contradictory. Concerning change in the later passage, he says that if arising is treated as prior nonexistence becoming present existence and cessation as previous existence returning to nonexistence, change is reified as nonexistence turning into existence and existence turning into nonexistence. When change is refuted, both existence and nonexistence are refuted with it.

This mirror joins the chapter to the Sanlun lineage’s architecture of refuting the wrong and revealing the right. Its classification is Jizang’s addition, not the wording of Nāgārjuna’s verses or Qingmu’s prose. The readings are recorded side by side without adjudication, each returned to its own place.